Smt. Mishri Devi And Anr. vs New Delhi Municipal Council And Anr.

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURTOF DELHIAT NEWDELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 07.08.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 27.10.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010655592019
+ W.P.(C) 2850/2019
SMT. MISHRI DEVI AND ANR. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Robin Ratnakar David,
Senior Advocate along with
Mr. Neiting Khongsai, Mr.
Ankit Siwach, Mr. TPS Makkar
and Mr. Vishal Thakur,
Advocates.
versus

NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL AND ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Yoginder Handoo, ASC
along with Mr. Ashwin Kataria,
Mr. Garvit Solanki, Mr. Aditya
Aggarwal and Mr. Gaurav
Vishwakarma, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

J U D G M E N T
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1. The present Petition has been preferred under Articles 226 and
1
227 of the Constitution of India , assailing the Order dated
2
14.01.2019 passed by the learned Principal District & Sessions
3
Judge, New Delhi District, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi ,

1
Constitution
2
Impugned Order
3
learned Appellate Court
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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whereby the Appeal preferred by the Petitioners under Section 9 of the
4
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971
against the Order dated 09.11.2017 passed by the learned Estate
5
Officer, New Delhi Municipal Council , came to be dismissed.
2. By way of the Impugned Order, the learned Appellate Court has
affirmed the Order dated 09.11.2017 passed by the learned Estate
Officer, whereby the Petitioners were held to be in unauthorised
occupation of the subject premises, being Shop No. 44, Gole Market,
New Delhi - 110001 and were directed to vacate the same in
accordance with the provisions of the PP Act.
3. The present Petition arises from proceedings initiated under the
PP Act consequent upon the cancellation of the rights under which the
Petitioners claimed occupation of the subject premises. Prior to the
initiation of the proceedings before the learned Estate Officer, a Show
6
Cause Notice dated 07.07.2017 was issued to the Petitioners by the
Deputy Director (Estate-I), NDMC, which was followed by
cancellation of the Petitioners' rights in respect of the subject premises
7
vide communication/order dated 25.07.2017 . Thereafter, statutory
proceedings under the PP Act were initiated before the learned Estate
Officer, including issuance of notice under Section 4 thereof,
culminating in the Order dated 09.11.2017 passed under Sections 5
and 7 of the PP Act, which was subsequently affirmed by the learned
Appellate Court vide the Impugned Order dated 14.01.2019.
4. At the outset, it is made clear that the controversy arising for
consideration in the present Petition concerns the legality of the

4
PP Act
5
NDMC
6
Show Cause Notice
7
Cancellation
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BHATIA
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proceedings culminating in the Impugned Order and, in particular, the
challenge raised by the Petitioners to the cancellation of the rights
under which they claimed occupation of the subject premises and the
consequential proceedings initiated under the PP Act.
5. For the sake of clarity, uniformity and consistency, the parties
in the present Petition shall hereinafter be referred to in accordance
with their ranks before this Court.
BRIEF FACTS:
6. Shorn of unnecessary details, the brief facts necessary for the
adjudication of the present Petition are as follows:
a) The subject premises form part of the premises belonging to the
respondent/NDMC and were originally governed by the applicable
policy and terms of allotment/licence. The Petitioners claim their
rights in respect thereof pursuant to the induction of Petitioner No.1
in the existing arrangement and the subsequent
transfer/regularisation of the rights concerning the subject premises
in their favour. According to the Petitioners, the induction and the
consequential transfer of rights were permissible under the
applicable Policy and were processed by the competent authorities
in accordance with the procedure prevailing at the relevant time.
b) The circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the aforesaid
rights by the Petitioners subsequently came under scrutiny. It is an
admitted position that Petitioner No.1 is the mother of Sh. R.K.
Gaur, who was serving as Director (Estate-I), NDMC during the
period relevant to the transactions concerning the subject premises.
According to the Respondents, Sh. R.K. Gaur was associated with
the processing of the matters through which the Petitioners came to
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BHATIA
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acquire rights in respect of the subject premises, despite the
relationship between him and Petitioner No.1.
c) The Respondents' case is that the aforesaid relationship was not
disclosed at the relevant stage and that the transactions concerning
the subject premises were processed in circumstances giving rise to
a conflict of interest. The matter was subsequently examined by the
competent authorities and the role of Sh. R.K. Gaur and other
officials in the processing of the transactions came under scrutiny.
The matter was also taken up with the Ministry of Home Affairs
and disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the concerned
officials.
d) In the aforesaid backdrop, the Deputy Director (Estate-I),
NDMC issued a Show Cause Notice dated 07.07.2017 to the
Petitioners concerning the rights claimed by them over the subject
premises. The Petitioners were called upon to explain their position
and show cause as to why appropriate action ought not to be taken.
The Petitioners submitted their response to the said Show Cause
Notice on 24.07.2017.
e) Thereafter, vide communication/order dated 25.07.2017, the
transfer/regularisation of the rights in favour of the Petitioners in
respect of the subject premises came to be cancelled. According to
the Petitioners, the cancellation was effected without due
consideration of their Reply dated 24.07.2017 and without
affording them a meaningful opportunity of hearing. The
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the action was taken
pursuant to the material which had emerged during the examination
of the transactions concerning the subject premises.
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BHATIA
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f) Consequent upon the Cancellation dated 25.07.2017, an
Application under Sections 5 and 7 of the PP Act was filed before
the learned Estate Officer, seeking eviction of the Petitioners from
the subject premises and other consequential reliefs. The learned
Estate Officer, in the proceedings so initiated, records that a notice
under Section 4 of the PP Act dated 04.08.2017 was issued to the
Petitioners.
g) The Petitioners entered appearance before the learned Estate
Officer and contested the proceedings. The record of the Estate
Officer reflects that the Petitioners filed their Reply and Written
Submissions and the matter was heard from time to time. Upon
completion of the proceedings, the learned Estate Officer, vide
Order dated 09.11.2017, held the Petitioners to be in unauthorised
occupation of the subject premises and passed consequential
directions under the PP Act.

h) Aggrieved by the aforesaid Order, the Petitioners preferred an
Appeal under Section 9 of the PP Act before the learned Appellate
Court. Before the learned Appellate Court, the Petitioners, inter
alia , questioned the circumstances leading to the cancellation of
their rights and contended that their induction and the subsequent
transfer/regularisation of rights in respect of the subject premises
were in accordance with the applicable policy and procedure.
i) The Respondents opposed the Appeal and contended that the
rights claimed by the Petitioners had been acquired in
circumstances which warranted scrutiny and had thereafter been
validly cancelled. It was further contended that upon cancellation of
the authority under which the Petitioners claimed occupation, their
continued possession of the subject premises could not be sustained
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BHATIA
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in the absence of any independent or subsisting authority in their
favour.
j) Vide the Impugned Order dated 14.01.2019, the learned
Appellate Court dismissed the Appeal preferred by the Petitioners
and affirmed the findings returned by the learned Estate Officer.
The learned Appellate Court examined the circumstances
surrounding the acquisition and subsequent cancellation of the
rights claimed by the Petitioners and concluded that the Petitioners
had failed to establish any subsisting authority entitling them to
continue in occupation of the subject premises.
k) Aggrieved by the aforesaid Order, the Petitioners have
approached this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution. The Petitioners challenge, inter alia , the
circumstances in which their rights were cancelled and the
consequential proceedings initiated under the PP Act. The
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the proceedings
before the learned Estate Officer were independently and validly
initiated after cancellation of the Petitioners' rights and that no case
for interference with the concurrent findings of the statutory
authorities is made out. The rival contentions, therefore, call for
consideration of the legality of the Impugned Order and the
proceedings culminating therein.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS:
7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners would
submit that the rights in respect of the subject premises had been
acquired pursuant to the applicable policy and procedure and upon
approval by the competent authority. It would be contended that Sh.
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BHATIA
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R.K. Gaur, the then Director (Estate-I), was not himself the competent
authority to grant the final approval and that the requisite decision was
ultimately taken by the competent authority/Chairman. The Petitioners
would, therefore, submit that the mere fact that Sh. R.K. Gaur was the
son of Petitioner No.1 could not, by itself, render the transaction
illegal or justify cancellation of the rights granted in their favour.
8. Learned counsel would further submit that there was no
conclusive finding of any illegality, misconduct or abuse of official
position against Sh. R.K. Gaur in respect of the subject premises and
that the departmental proceedings initiated against him had not
attained finality. It would be contended that the Petitioners could not
be deprived of their rights merely on the basis of allegations or the
pendency of such proceedings, particularly when no independent
breach of the terms governing the occupation, misrepresentation or
unlawful conduct had been established against the Petitioners. The
Petitioners would further contend that the action taken against them
was influenced by the alleged acts of Sh. R.K. Gaur and was not
founded upon any independent violation attributable to the Petitioners.
9. Learned counsel would submit that the Show Cause Notice
dated 07.07.2017 and the consequential Cancellation dated 25.07.2017
were also assailed on the ground of violation of the principles of
natural justice. It would be contended that the Petitioners had
submitted their Reply dated 24.07.2017, but the same was not duly
considered before the Cancellation was effected. The Petitioners
would further contend that the material and allegations subsequently
relied upon by the Respondents were either not properly put to them
or were not the subject matter of an effective opportunity to respond.
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BHATIA
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The learned Appellate Court, according to the Petitioners, failed to
appreciate the aforesaid aspects while affirming the Cancellation.
10. It would further be contended that the learned Estate Officer
and the learned Appellate Court failed to independently examine the
legality of the Cancellation before treating the Petitioners' continued
occupation as unauthorised. Learned counsel would submit that the
mere cancellation of the rights could not, by itself, conclude the issue
where the validity of such Cancellation was specifically under
challenge. The Petitioners would contend that the authorities failed to
properly consider the documentary material demonstrating the manner
in which the rights had been acquired and instead proceeded
substantially on the basis of the circumstances concerning Sh. R.K.
Gaur.
11. Learned counsel would also submit that the proceedings under
the PP Act were not sustainable in the manner in which they had been
undertaken and that the Respondents could not bypass the procedure
prescribed by law while seeking eviction of the Petitioners. It would
further be contended that the action taken against the Petitioners,
including the consequential steps for dispossession, was arbitrary and
that the learned Appellate Court had failed to appreciate the absence
of any conclusive material establishing that the Petitioners had
unlawfully acquired or continued to hold the subject premises.
12. In view of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the
Petitioners would pray that the Impugned Order dated 14.01.2019 and
the Order dated 09.11.2017 passed by the learned Estate Officer,
along with the consequential action taken against the Petitioners, be
set aside.
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS:

13. Per contra , learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondents would submit that the present Petition does not disclose
any illegality or perversity in the Impugned Order. It would be
contended that the learned Estate Officer and the learned Appellate
Court had examined the material on record and had rightly concluded
that, upon cancellation of the rights claimed by the Petitioners, they
had no subsisting authority to continue in occupation of the subject
premises.
14. Learned counsel would submit that the transaction concerning
the subject premises was not an ordinary transaction undertaken in the
regular course. It would be contended that Sh. R.K. Gaur, who was the
son of Petitioner No.1 and was serving as Director (Estate-I), NDMC
at the relevant time, was actively associated with the processing of the
transaction and had neither disclosed the relationship nor recused
himself. The Respondents would submit that the circumstances in
which the induction of the Petitioners and the subsequent
transfer/regularisation were processed consequently warranted
scrutiny, which also resulted in disciplinary proceedings against the
concerned officials.
15. Learned counsel would further submit that the Cancellation
dated 25.07.2017 was preceded by the Show Cause Notice dated
07.07.2017 and that the Petitioners had submitted their response
thereto. It would be contended that the action taken thereafter was
based upon the material available with the Respondents and could not
be characterised as an action founded merely upon the relationship
between Petitioner No.1 and Sh. R.K. Gaur. The Respondents would
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BHATIA
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further submit that the Petitioners were thereafter afforded due
opportunity to contest the proceedings before the learned Estate
Officer and had filed their reply and written submissions.
16. Learned counsel would submit that the proceedings under the
PP Act were distinct from the administrative process culminating in
the Cancellation. It would be contended that, once the rights under
which the Petitioners claimed occupation stood cancelled, the
Petitioners were required to demonstrate a subsisting authority to
remain in occupation of the public premises, which they had failed to
do. The learned Estate Officer was, therefore, justified in examining
their continued occupation under the PP Act and the learned Appellate
Court rightly affirmed the said determination.
17. Learned counsel would further submit that the allegations of
violation of the principles of natural justice, arbitrariness or coercive
action were without merit, since the action against the Petitioners was
undertaken through the procedure prescribed by law and the
Petitioners were afforded opportunity at the relevant stages. It would
be contended that the Petitioners, in substance, seek re-appreciation of
the factual material and the findings returned by the statutory
authorities, without demonstrating any jurisdictional error, perversity
or procedural infirmity warranting interference under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution.
18. In view of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the
Respondents would pray that the present Petition be dismissed.
ANALYSIS:
19. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the parties at length and perused the material placed on record.
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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20. Before adverting to the facts and circumstances of the present
case, it is necessary to briefly examine the scope of interference by
this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution. Insofar as the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution is concerned, the power of judicial review is primarily
directed towards examining the legality of the decision-making
process and does not entail an appellate re-appreciation of the merits
8
of the decision. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, while examining the scope and ambit of judicial
review in the context of tender matters, enunciated principles
governing the exercise of such jurisdiction, which are equally
applicable while exercising powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinunder:
“ 72. Lord Scarman in Nottinghamshire County
9
Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment proclaimed:
“ „Judicial review‟ is a great weapon in the hands of the judges;
but the judges must observe the constitutional limits set by our
parliamentary system upon the exercise of this beneficial
power.”
Commenting upon this Michael Supperstone and James Goudie in
their work Judicial Review (1992 Edn.) at p. 16 say:
“If anyone were prompted to dismiss this sage warning as a
mere obiter dictum from the most radical member of the higher
judiciary of recent times, and therefore to be treated as an
idiosyncratic aberration, it has received the endorsement of the
Law Lords generally. The words of Lord Scarman were echoed
by Lord Bridge of Harwich, speaking on behalf of the Board
when reversing an interventionist decision of the New Zealand
Court of Appeal in Butcher v. Petrocorp Exploration Ltd . 18-
3-1991.”
73. Observance of judicial restraint is currently the mood in
England. The judicial power of review is exercised to rein in any
unbridled executive functioning. The restraint has two
contemporary manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial
intervention; the other covers the scope of the court's ability to

8
(1994) 6 SCC 651
9
1986 AC 240, 251 : (1986) 1 All ER 199
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BHATIA
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quash an administrative decision on its merits. These restraints
bear the hallmarks of judicial control over administrative action.
74. Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of
the decision in support of which the application for judicial review
is made, but the decision-making process itself.
10
75. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans Lord
Brightman said:
“Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a
decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was
made.
*
Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the
decision-making process. Unless that restriction on the power
of the court is observed, the court will in my view, under the
guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of
usurping power.”
In the same case Lord Hailsham commented on the purpose of the
remedy by way of judicial review under RSC, Ord. 53 in the
following terms:
“This remedy, vastly increased in extent, and rendered, over a
long period in recent years, of infinitely more convenient access
than that provided by the old prerogative writs and actions for a
declaration, is intended to protect the individual against the
abuse of power by a wide range of authorities, judicial, quasi-
judicial, and, as would originally have been thought when I first
practised at the Bar, administrative. It is not intended to take
away from those authorities the powers and discretions properly
vested in them by law and to substitute the courts as the bodies
making the decisions. It is intended to see that the relevant
authorities use their powers in a proper manner (p. 1160).”
11
In R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex p Datafin plc , Sir
John Donaldson, M.R. commented:
“An application for judicial review is not an appeal.”
12
In Lonrho plc v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ,
Lord Keith said:
“Judicial review is a protection and not a weapon.”
It is thus different from an appeal. When hearing an appeal the
Court is concerned with the merits of the decision under appeal.
13
In Amin, Re , Lord Fraser observed that:
“Judicial review is concerned not with the merits of a decision
but with the manner in which the decision was made…. Judicial
review is entirely different from an ordinary appeal. It is made
effective by the court quashing the administrative decision
without substituting its own decision, and is to be contrasted

10
(1982) 3 All ER 141, 154
11
(1987) 1 All ER 564
12
(1989) 2 All ER 609
13
(1983) 2 All ER 864
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BHATIA
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with an appeal where the appellate tribunal substitutes its own
decision on the merits for that of the administrative officer.”
76. In R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex p in Guinness
14
plc , Lord Donaldson, M.R. referred to the judicial review
jurisdiction as being supervisory or „longstop‟ jurisdiction. Unless
that restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court will,
under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of
usurping power.
77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of
legality. Its concern should be:
1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers?
2. Committed an error of law,
3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice,
4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have
reached or,
5. abused its powers.
Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular
policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is
fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions
have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from
case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative
action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as
under:
( i ) Illegality : This means the decision-maker must understand
correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and
must give effect to it.
( ii ) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness.
( iii ) Procedural impropriety.
The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out
addition of further grounds in course of time. As a matter of fact,
15
in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex Brind ,
Lord Diplock refers specifically to one development, namely, the
possible recognition of the principle of proportionality. In all these
cases the test to be adopted is that the court should, “consider
whether something has gone wrong of a nature and degree which
requires its intervention”.
78. What is this charming principle of Wednesbury
16
unreasonableness? Is it a magical formula? In R. v. Askew , Lord
Mansfield considered the question whether mandamus should be
granted against the College of Physicians. He expressed the
relevant principles in two eloquent sentences. They gained greater
value two centuries later:
“It is true, that the judgment and discretion of determining upon
this skill, ability, learning and sufficiency to exercise and
practise this profession is trusted to the College of Physicians

14
(1990) 1 QB 146 : (1989) 1 All ER 509
15
(1991) 1 AC 696
16
(1768) 4 Burr 2186 : 98 ER 139
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BHATIA
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and this Court will not take it from them, nor interrupt them in
the due and proper exercise of it. But their conduct in the
exercise of this trust thus committed to them ought to be fair,
candid and unprejudiced; not arbitrary, capricious, or biased;
much less, warped by resentment, or personal dislike.”

83. A modern comprehensive statement about judicial review by
Lord Denning is very apposite; it is perhaps worthwhile noting that
he stresses the supervisory nature of the jurisdiction:
“Parliament often entrusts the decision of a matter to a specified
person or body, without providing for any appeal. It may be a
judicial decision, or a quasi-judicial decision, or an
administrative decision. Sometimes Parliament says its decision
is to be final. At other times it says nothing about it. In all these
cases the courts will not themselves take the place of the body
to whom Parliament has entrusted the decision. The courts will
not themselves embark on a rehearing of the matter.
17
See Healey v. Minister of Health . But nevertheless, the
courts will, if called upon, act in a supervisory capacity. They
will see that the decision-making body acts fairly. See H.K. (an
18
infant), Re , and R. v. Gaming Board for Great Britain, ex p
19
Benaim and Khaida . The courts will ensure that the body acts
in accordance with the law. If a question arises on the
interpretation of words, the courts will decide it by declaring
what is the correct interpretation. See Punton v. Ministry of
20
Pensions and National Insurance . And if the decision-
making body has gone wrong in its interpretation they can set
its order aside. See Ashbridge Investments Ltd. v. Minister of
21
Housing and Local Government . (I know of some
expressions to the contrary but they are not correct). If the
decision-making body is influenced by considerations which
ought not to influence it; or fails to take into account matters
which it ought to take into account, the court will interfere.
22
See Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food .
If the decision-making body comes to its decision on no
evidence or comes to an unreasonable finding — so
unreasonable that a reasonable person would not have come to
it — then again the courts will interfere. See Associated
23
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. If the
decision-making body goes outside its powers or misconstrues
the extent of its powers, then, too the courts can interfere.

17
(1955) 1 QB 221 : (1954) 3 All ER 449 : (1954) 3 WLR 815
18
(1967) 2 QB 617, 630 : (1967) 1 All ER 226 : (1967) 2 WLR 692
19
(1970) 2 QB 417 : (1970) 2 All ER 528 : (1970) 2 WLR 1009
20
(1963) 1 WLR 186 : (1963) 1 All ER 275
21
(1965) 1 WLR 1320 : (1965) 3 All ER 371
22
1968 AC 997 : (1968) 1 All ER 694
23
(1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680
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BHATIA
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24
See Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission .
And, of course, if the body acts in bad faith or for an ulterior
object, which is not authorised by law, its decision will be set
25
aside. See Sydney Municipal Council v. Campbell . In
exercising these powers, the courts will take into account any
reasons which the body may give for its decisions. If it gives no
reasons — in a case when it may reasonably be expected to do
so, the courts may infer that it has no good reason for reaching
26
its conclusion, and act accordingly. See Padfield case (as AC
pp. 1007, 1061).”

21. In Sarvepalli Ramaiah (D) through LRs. v. District Collector,
27
Chittoor District & Ors. , it was held that judicial review is
concerned with examining the manner in which a decision has been
made and not with the correctness of the decision on merits. The
Court exercising such jurisdiction does not sit as an appellate
authority to substitute its own decision for that of the competent
authority. Thus, interference in exercise of such jurisdiction is
warranted only on recognised grounds, including illegality,
irrationality, perversity, want of authority or procedural impropriety.
The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced
hereinunder:
“ 41. In this case, the impugned decision, taken pursuant to orders
of Court, was based on some materials. It cannot be said to be
perverse, to warrant interference in exercise of the High Court's
extraordinary power of judicial review. A decision is vitiated by
irrationality if the decision is so outrageous, that it is in defiance of
all logic; when no person acting reasonably could possibly have
taken the decision, having regard to the materials on record. The
decision in this case is not irrational.
42. A decision may sometimes be set aside and quashed under
Article 226 on the ground of illegality. This is when there is an
apparent error of law on the face of the decision, which goes to the
root of the decision and/or in other words an apparent error, but for
which the decision would have been otherwise.

24
[(1969) 2 AC 147 : (1969) 1 All ER 208 : (1969) 2 WLR 163
25
1925 AC 338 : 1924 All ER Rep 930
26
1968 AC 997 : (1968) 1 All ER 694
27
(2019) 4 SCC 500
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BHATIA
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43. Judicial review under Article 226 is directed, not against the
decision, but the decision-making process. Of course, a patent
illegality and/or error apparent on the face of the decision, which
goes to the root of the decision, may vitiate the decision-making
process. In this case there is no such patent illegality or apparent
error. In exercise of power under Article 226, the Court does not sit
in appeal over the decision impugned, nor does it adjudicate hotly
disputed questions of fact.”


22. Equally, the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under Article
227 of the Constitution is supervisory in nature and is not intended to
be exercised as an appellate jurisdiction for re-appreciation or re-
evaluation of the material on record merely because another view may
be possible. In Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar
28
Patil , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained the limitations
governing the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction and held that
interference is warranted only where the order impugned suffers from
jurisdictional error, patent perversity or results in manifest failure of
justice. The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced
hereinunder:
“
( c ) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its
power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution,
interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can
it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders
of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an
alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that
would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by
the High Court.
( d ) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of
their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by
this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the
principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court
29
in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh (Supra)
have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches
and various other decisions of this Court.

28
(2010) 8 SCC 329
29
AIR 1954 SC 215
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BHATIA
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( e ) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (Supra), followed in
subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of
superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals
and courts subordinate to it, “within the bounds of their authority”.
( f ) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and
courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not
declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.
( g ) Apart from the situations pointed in ( e ) and ( f ), High Court can
interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has
been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts
subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest
failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been
flouted.
( h ) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot
interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because
another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts
subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction
has to be very sparingly exercised.
”

23. Having set out the scope of the jurisdiction exercised by this
Court, it would be apposite to delineate the grounds upon which the
present Petition has been instituted. The Petitioners principally
contend that the transfer/regularisation in their favour was processed
and approved in accordance with the applicable procedure and by the
competent authority; that the circumstances concerning the
involvement of Sh. R.K. Gaur could not, by themselves, furnish a
valid basis for disturbing the rights claimed by them, particularly in
the absence of any conclusive finding against the Petitioners; and that
the Cancellation dated 25.07.2017 was arbitrary and contrary to the
principles of natural justice, inter alia, on the ground that the Reply
dated 24.07.2017 was not duly considered.
24. The Petitioners further assail the Impugned Order on the ground
that the learned Appellate Court failed to properly appreciate the
material relating to the acquisition and subsequent cancellation of the
rights claimed by them. It is also contended that the findings returned
by the learned Estate Officer and affirmed by the learned Appellate
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BHATIA
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Court suffer from perversity and non-consideration of material on
record. Lastly, the Petitioners seek to assail the consequential
proceedings under the PP Act on the premise that the same could not
have been sustained once the underlying Cancellation itself was
challenged as being unlawful.
25. The aforesaid grounds fall for consideration in the context of
the findings returned by the learned Appellate Court while affirming
the Order dated 09.11.2017 passed by the learned Estate Officer. It
would, therefore, be appropriate to notice the relevant findings of the
learned Appellate Court in the Impugned Order:
“ 6.0 Facts are not in dispute. Admittedly, Sh. Ravinder Kumar and
Smt. Pushpa Devi were the licensees of the the said shop which
was lastly renewed vide license deed dated 12.02.2015 (effective
from 01.04.2011 to 31.03.2021). Vide undated letter, Sh. Ravinder
Kumar and Smt. Pushpa Devi, applied to NDMC seeking
permission for entering into partnership with the appellants Smt.
Mishri Devi and Smt. Manorama Sharma; said letter/application
was filed in the office of Director (Estate) Sh. R.K. Gaur/ son of
appellant no.1 on 02.03.2015. The said request was approved by
the competent authority and was conveyed to the licencees Sh.
Ravinder Kumar and Smt. Pushpa Devi vide letter dated
25.03.2015. The said licencees entered into a partnership with the
appellants herein on 26.03.2015. Vide their application dated
31.03.2015, they submitted the partnership deed along with other
documents for acceptance/confirmation. They also made a
statement before Dy.Director, Estate-1 on 31.03.2015 confirming
that they have no objection to addition of the names of the
appellants in the license and also confirmed the documents i.e.
Partnership Deed, indemnity bond and the affidavits, all dated
26.03.2015.
6.1 It is also not in dispute that subsequently, all the partners i.e.
the existing licensees Sh.Ravinder Kumar and Smt. Pushpa Devi as
well as the inducted partners i.e. the appellants Mishri Devi and
Manorama Sharma vide their undated letter addressed to the
Director Estate-I, apparently received in NDMC office on
27.04.2015 (as it bears initials/signatures of some official with date
27.04.2015) conveyed that it has been decided to dissolve the
partnership and the existing licensees wanted to hand over the
charge of the said shop to the appellants herein; and that they had
no objection to transfer/regularization of the said in favour of the
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BHATIA
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appellants, mentioning that they will never claim any right in the
said shop. In response to the same, Dy. Director (Estates) vide
letter dated 06.05.2015, sought confirmation from the existing
licensees/outgoing partners Sh. Ravinder Kumar and Smt. Pushpa
Devi about dissolution of partnership and their affidavit/NOC in
favour of appellants. In response thereto, existing licensees Sh.
Ravinder Kumar and Smt. Pushpa Devi appeared before Dy.
Director, Estate-1 Sh.Himanshu Ranjan and made a statement
confirming Dissolution Deed dated 27.04.2015 and affidavit dated
27.04.2015 and stated that they have no objection to
transfer/regularization of license of the said shop in joint names of
the appellants.
6.2 It is not in dispute that pursuant thereto the existing licensees
exited and that the appellants came into possession/occupation of
the said shop.
6.3 Admittedly, vide cancellation notice/order dated 25.07.2017,
the transfer of license in the appellants' name was cancelled on
account of the same having been obtained/managed by the
appellant no.1's son, the then Director (Estates-I) Sh. R.K. Gaur by
suppressing the material facts/his relationship with appellant no.1
and misusing his position. The said cancellation notice reads as
under:-
*
6.4 It is a settled position of law that once the license expires/ is
cancelled, the authority to occupy the public premises comes to an
end and the licencee becomes an unauthorized occupant. The onus
is upon the occupant to show his authority to occupy the public
premises after cancellation/expiry of licence ( UOI vs S.M.
Agarwal & Ors., 1995(II) AD(Delhi) 293 (Division Bench ). The
appellants however, have failed to demonstrate their authority to
occupy the said shop after cancellation of their occupation
rights/allotment. Therefore, I find no infirmity in the findings of
the Estate Officer that the appellants became unauthorized
occupants of the said shop after 25.07.2017.
7.0 The appellants have contended that the Estate Officer failed to
appreciate that the respondent wrongly cancelled the allotment of
the said shop without appreciating the facts and providing proper
opportunity of hearing to the appellants. It is pleaded that the
Estate Officer malafide passed the impugned order merely on the
ground that the then Director Estates-I Sh. R.K.Gaur was the son
of the appellant no.1, without recording any finding of breach of
any of the terms and conditions of the license agreement. It is also
contended that the Estate Officer failed to appreciate that the
necessary procedure for transfer of the said shop was duly
followed and necessary approval was duly obtained by the
appellants. The Estate Officer also failed to appreciate that the
matter of induction of the appellants as partners and dissolution of
partnership/occupation of the said shop by the appellants, was dealt
with at various levels and not only by one person Sh. R.K. Gaur,
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BHATIA
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Director Estates-I. Sh. R.K. Gaur only forwarded the matter for
approval of the competent authority, Chairman, NDMC; and that it
was approved by the Chairman, NDMC. It is also contended that
the Estate Officer conducted the eviction proceedings like
vigilance proceedings against Sh.R.K.Gaur, the then Director
Estates-I/ son of appellant no.1 and proceeded to pass the
impugned order on the basis of surmises and conjunctures.
7.1 Admittedly, Sh.R.K.Gaur, son of the appellant no.1 was
Director Estates-I at the relevant time and dealt with the matter of
the licencees - Sh.Ravinder and Smit. Pushpa Devi's request for
entering into partnership with his mother/appellant no.1 and the
appellant no.2; and their induction as partners in the said
partnership and its dissolution later, whereby the aforesaid
licensees exited the partnership, thus putting his mother/appellant
no.1 & appellant no.2 in occupation/possession of the said shop.
7.2 The respondent's case is that on revelation of the misuse of
authority by Sh.R.K.Gaur, the then Director (Estate-I) in
connivance with/influencing officials working under him, in
orchestrating transfer/regularization of the said shop in his
mother/appellant, no.1's name by concealment of facts and by
playing fraud upon the organization, the license of the said shop
was rightly cancelled. Ld. Counsel for the respondent submitted
that the existing licensees Sh.Ravinder and Smt.Pushpa had
applied for renewal of the license which was pending with the
respondent since 12.10.2012. After joining as Director (Estates-I)
on 28.11.2014 Sh.R.K.Gaur with an intention to obtain possession/
allotment of the said shop through his mother, with respect to
which request for renewal was pending, got the license of the same
renewed in February 2015; and the License Deed dated 13:02.2015
for a period of ten years w.e.f. 01.04.2011 to 31.03.2021 came to
be executed in favour of the existing licensees Sh. Ravinder and
Smt. Pushpa Devi. It was argued that Sh.R.K.Gaur, the then
Director Estates-I misusing his position, first got renewed the
license of the existing licensees and thereafter, managed transfer of
the said shop in the name of his mother/appellant no.1 by first
making her/appellants enter into partnership with the existing
licensees and then dissolution of the said partnership, whereby the
existing licensees exited the partnership thus putting appellant
no.1/his mother and appellant no.2 in occupation/possession of the
same.
7.2.1 It is not in dispute that the license of the said shop in favour
of Sh.Ravinder and Smt.Pushpa, had expired on 31.03.2011. The
appellants themselves have stated that the license of the said shop
was regularized in the name of Sh. Ravinder and Smt. Pushpa Devi
for running the trade of cottage and handicraft and travel counter
w.e.f. 19.06.2010 to 31.03.2011. It has also come on record that
their application for renewal of the license was pending with the
respondent. The appellants themselves have stated in their appeal
that the license in their favour was renewed in March 2015 for a
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BHATIA
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period of ten years and placed of record copy of renewed License
Deed dated 13.02.2015.
7.2.2 It is the appellants' own case that the licensees' (Sh. Ravinder
and Smt. Pushpa Devi) application for permission for entering into
partnership was submitted on 02.03.2015 in the Office of Director
(Estate) Sh. R.K. Gaur, who is son of appellant no. 1 Smt. Mishri
Devi.
It is also not in dispute that the said request was put up and
recommended for approval by Director Estate Sh. R.K. Gaur, son
of appellant no.1, without disclosing his relationship with the
appellant no.1 Smt. Mishri Devi. On the basis of those
recommendations, same was approved by the competent authority.
It is further not in dispute that subsequent dissolution of the said
partnership and exiting of the existing licensees and the process for
regularization/transfer of the said shop in favour of his
mother/appellant no 1 & appellant no.2, was also processed by
him/his Division.
7.3 Ld. Counsel for the respondent further submitted that on the
above facts coming to light, vigilance enquiry was initiated against
Sh.R.K.Gaur, Director (Estates-I), Sh. Himanshu Ranjan, Dy.
Director and Sh. Kishore Prasad, Sr.Assistant. In support, Ld.
Counsel has placed on record, a copy of letter No.14033/05/2017-
UTS-II dated 30.05.2018 of Ministry of Home Affairs addressed to
The Principal Secretary(Vigilance), Directorate of Vigilance,
Government of NCT of Delhi, relevant portion of which reads as
under:-
*
7.3.1 During course of proceedings, Ld. Counsel for the respondent
also submitted that even charge sheet has been served on
Sh.R.K.Gaur, Director (Estates-I). Same has not been disputed.
7.4 In view of the above facts and circumstances, I find no force in
the appellants' contention that the regularization of the said shop in
the appellants' favour has been cancelled without any basis.
8.0 The appellants have further contended that no opportunity of
hearing was given before issuance of cancellation notice/order. It is
pleaded that the show cause notice was received by them on
17.07.2017 and accordingly, the reply was to be submitted within
15 days thereof i.e. on or before 01.08.2017. The appellants visited
NDMC office on 24.07.2017 to file the reply but the officials
refused to accept the reply and rather informed that the cancellation
notice dated 25.07.2017 has already been issued. Thus, their reply
was not even considered before cancellation of
allotment/regularization.
8.1 Ld. Counsel for the respondent on the other hand, submitted
that the appellants did not make any submission of late receipt of
the said notice in their reply. Even otherwise, the appellants reply
was duly responded to and the appellants did not raise any such

plea before the Estate Officer.
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BHATIA
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8.2 It is not in dispute that the show cause notice dated 07.07.2017
issued by the respondent called upon the appellants to show cause
as to why the license of the said shop in their favour be not
cancelled and specifically directed that the reply should reach
NDMC office within 15 days failing which necessary action as
deemed fit shall be taken. Admittedly, the appellants responded to
the said notice with reply dated 24.07.2017. Perusal of the reply
placed on record by the appellants as Annexure IX with this appeal
shows that they have nowhere mentioned that the notice was
received by them belatedly on 17.07.2017 as pleaded in the appeal.
Their reply simply mentions that:-
"I have received a Show Cause Notice from your department on
07/07/2017 vide reference no D-1223/S0-Estate-I/2017"
8.2.1 In view of the above, the appellants' plea of late receipt of
show cause notice on 17.07.2017 is evidently an after thought.
8.3 Further, it is noteworthy that vide their reply dated 24.07.2017,
the appellants have simply reiterated the facts as mentioned in their
appeal and have already been dealt with in preceding paras viz.,
they entered into partnership with the existing licensees, erstwhile
licencees exited(due to fund problem) and consequently they came
into occupation of the said shop, following due procedure.
Appellant no.1 Smt.Mishri Devi in her reply further stated that "It
is correct that the application for the partnership got processed by
the then Director (Estate-1) Sh.R. K. Gaur, who is also my son.
However, the application got processed only after the entire policy
and the procedure of the NDMC was followed up and after the
submission of the requisite documents. It is wrong to say that
Sh.R.K.Gaur the then director(Estate-I) had misused his power and
position or has been biased." In this respect, a reference is made to
the NDMC's response dated 03.08.2017 to the appellants' above
reply, which reads:
*
8.3.1 In the above reply, NDMC has categorically mentioned that
both the appellants' posted their reply on 28.07.2017 and has even
given the details of the post office from where the replies were
dispatched. Neither have the appellants' disputed dispatch of reply
on 28.07.2017. Nor have they placed on record any material to
show the timely dispatch of their replies dated 24.07.2017. It is
also noteworthy that the appellants' have pleaded that they reached
the NDMC office on 24.07.2017 to file their reply; same was not
received and they were informed about the cancellation
notice/order dated 25.07.2017. It has remained unexplained as to
how were they informed about the order which was passed
subsequently. Be that as it may. Even otherwise, from the aforesaid
letter of NDMC, it is seen that the NDMC has dealt with all the
contentions raised by appellants in their reply. In view of the same,
it is evident that the appellants' reply though belated was duly
considered.
8.4 In view of the above facts and circumstances, I do not find any
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BHATIA
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force in the appellants' contention that the license of the said shop
was cancelled without any basis and without providing them
opportunity of hearing.
9.0 Lastly, Ld.Counsel for the appellants argued that the appellant
no.1's son was transferred from the Estate Department on
30.04.2015. Whereas the regularization process continued even
thereafter and the approval of the same was granted in May 2015,
that is, much after he left the Department. This argument lacks
merit in view of admitted position that the entire process of
appellants' entering into partnership with the existing licencees;
dissolution of partnership and the appellants coming to be in
possession/occupation pursuant thereto, took place in
Sh.R.K.Gaur's tenure, except that the final approval may have
come later. More so, in view of the findings already recorded in
preceding paras.
9.1 In view of the findings recorded in preceding paras, I find no
infirmity in the impugned order. The appeal is therefore,
dismissed.
10.0 It may be clarified that any observation made herein above
shall have no reflection on merits of disciplinary proceedings
against Sh.R.K.Gaur, the then Director (Estate-I).
11.0 Record of the Estate Officer be returned along with copy of
this judgment.
11.1 Appeal file be consigned to record room. ”

26. The aforesaid findings indicate the manner in which the learned
Appellate Court considered the circumstances surrounding the
Petitioners' acquisition of the rights in respect of the subject premises,
the subsequent cancellation thereof, and the proceedings culminating
in the Order passed by the learned Estate Officer. The grounds urged
in the present Petition would, therefore, have to be examined against
the aforesaid findings and within the limited parameters of the
jurisdiction available to this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution.
27. The sequence of events assumes significance in adjudicating the
aforesaid challenge. The record reveals that, prior to the initiation of
proceedings before the learned Estate Officer, NDMC had undertaken
an examination of the circumstances in which the Petitioners had
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BHATIA
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acquired the rights claimed by them in respect of the subject premises.
It was in the course of the said process that the Show Cause Notice
dated 07.07.2017 was issued by the Deputy Director (Estate-I),
NDMC, calling upon the Petitioners to explain their position. The
Petitioners submitted their response thereto on 24.07.2017 and,
thereafter, the rights claimed by them in respect of the subject
premises came to be cancelled vide Communication/Order dated
25.07.2017.
28. The Petitioners have specifically challenged the Cancellation
dated 25.07.2017, contending that the rights in their favour had been
acquired in accordance with the prescribed procedure and that the
involvement of Sh. R.K. Gaur, who was the son of Petitioner No.1 and
was serving as Director (Estate-I), NDMC, could not, by itself, furnish
a basis for cancelling the rights so acquired. The Petitioners have
further contended that Sh. R.K. Gaur was not the competent authority
and that the requisite approvals had been accorded by the competent
authority. These contentions, therefore, require examination, since the
finding of unauthorised occupation under the PP Act is consequential
upon the cessation of the authority under which the Petitioners
claimed occupation of the subject premises.
29. The fact that the formal approval was ultimately accorded by
the competent authority does not, by itself, render irrelevant the
circumstances in which the transaction came to be processed. The
learned Appellate Court has considered the role of Sh. R.K. Gaur in
the processing of the transaction, including the fact that he was the son
of Petitioner No.1, as also the material relating to the subsequent
processing of the rights claimed by the Petitioners. The circumstance
of such relationship, however, was not the sole consideration; rather, it
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BHATIA
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formed part of the circumstances which led the Respondents to
scrutinise the manner in which the transaction had been processed.
30. It is also material that, prior to the Cancellation, the Petitioners
were issued the Show Cause Notice dated 07.07.2017 and were called
upon to explain the circumstances in which the rights in question had
been acquired. The Petitioners submitted their Reply dated
24.07.2017, which, as noticed by the learned Appellate Court, was
taken into consideration. The Cancellation dated 25.07.2017 was thus
not an action which followed merely from the existence of the
relationship between Petitioner No.1 and Sh. R.K. Gaur. The learned
Appellate Court, upon examining the material placed before it and the
grievance raised by the Petitioners with respect to the aforesaid
process, found no infirmity warranting interference with the
Cancellation.
31. The Petitioners have not demonstrated any jurisdictional error,
patent illegality or perversity in the aforesaid appreciation by the
learned Appellate Court. This Court is also not called upon, in the
present proceedings, to return any independent finding on the merits
of the disciplinary proceedings initiated against Sh. R.K. Gaur. The
question is whether the material considered by the learned Appellate
Court furnished a legally sustainable basis for upholding the
Cancellation. On the material placed before the Court, no ground has
been made out warranting interference with the aforesaid finding.
32. The consequence of the aforesaid finding has to be considered
separately from the administrative process which culminated in the
Cancellation. The proceedings under the PP Act were instituted
thereafter, when the Petitioners' authority to remain in occupation had
ceased to subsist. The question before the learned Estate Officer was
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BHATIA
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consequently whether, notwithstanding the Cancellation dated
25.07.2017, the Petitioners could demonstrate any independent or
subsisting authority entitling them to continue in occupation of the
subject premises. No such authority has been demonstrated.
33. This assumes significance in view of Section 2(g) of the PP
Act, which does not confine “unauthorised occupation” to occupation
which was unauthorised from its inception. The provision also covers
a case where occupation was initially lawful but the authority under
which the premises were occupied subsequently expires or is
determined and the occupant nevertheless continues in possession.
34. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. & Anr.
v. Punjab National Bank & Ors. , (1990) 4 SCC 406, while examining
the scope of the expression “unauthorised occupation” under the PP
Act, has recognised that continued occupation after the expiry or
determination of the authority under which the premises were
occupied would fall within its ambit. The relevant portion of the
aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinunder:
“ 30. The definition of the expression „unauthorised occupation‟
contained in Section 2( g ) of the Public Premises Act is in two
parts. In the first part the said expression has been defined to mean
the occupation by any person of the public premises without
authority for such occupation. It implies occupation by a person
who has entered into occupation of any public premises without
lawful authority as well as occupation which was permissive at the
inception but has ceased to be so. The second part of the definition
is inclusive in nature and it expressly covers continuance in
occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority
(whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under
which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has
been determined for any reason whatsoever. This part covers a case
where a person had entered into occupation legally under valid
authority but who continues in occupation after the authority under
which he was put in occupation has expired or has been
determined. The words “whether by way of grant or any other
mode of transfer” in this part of the definition are wide in
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BHATIA
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amplitude and would cover a lease because lease is a mode of
transfer under the Transfer of Property Act. The definition of
unauthorised occupation contained in Section 2( g ) of the Public
Premises Act would, therefore, cover a case where a person has
entered into occupation of the public premises legally as a tenant
under a lease but whose tenancy has expired or has been
determined in accordance with law.”

35. In the present case, the Petitioners' occupation may have
originated under rights which they claim were validly acquired;
however, upon the Cancellation dated 25.07.2017 being upheld, those
rights could no longer furnish authority for their continued
occupation. In the absence of any other subsisting authority in their
favour, the learned Estate Officer was justified in examining their
occupation within the statutory framework of the PP Act. The
subsequent proceedings, therefore, cannot be rendered unsustainable
merely by reiterating a challenge to the Cancellation which has
already been examined and found to warrant no interference.
36. In this context, the further contention that the Petitioners could
not have been subjected to adverse consequences in the absence of
any independent breach, misrepresentation or unlawful conduct
attributable to them also does not advance their case. The material
before the learned Appellate Court was not confined to the personal
conduct of the Petitioners, but concerned the circumstances in which
the rights claimed by them had been processed and conferred. The
mere absence of any separate finding of misconduct against the
Petitioners themselves could not, by itself, render the Cancellation
legally unsustainable or preserve a right which had ceased to subsist
upon the Cancellation dated 25.07.2017.
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BHATIA
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37. Once the Cancellation operated against the Petitioners, the
material question before the learned Estate Officer was whether any
independent and subsisting authority continued in their favour to
occupy the subject premises. In the absence of any such subsisting
authority being demonstrated, the subsequent proceedings under the
PP Act could not be rendered unsustainable merely on the ground that
the Petitioners were not themselves the subject of any separate
disciplinary or penal proceeding.
38. The Petitioners have also urged that the Cancellation dated
25.07.2017 was effected without due consideration of their Reply
dated 24.07.2017 and without affording them an effective opportunity
of hearing. This contention, however, was specifically examined by
the learned Appellate Court. The learned Appellate Court considered
the Petitioners' case regarding the receipt of the Show Cause Notice
dated 07.07.2017, examined the contents of their Reply dated
24.07.2017 and also took note of the subsequent response furnished
by NDMC thereto. Upon such consideration, the learned Appellate
Court concluded that the defence raised by the Petitioners had, in fact,
been considered.
39. The finding of the learned Appellate Court in this regard is not
founded merely upon the fact that a reply was submitted by the
Petitioners. The learned Appellate Court examined the contents of the
Reply dated 24.07.2017 and the material placed by NDMC in
response thereto, and found that the very matters sought to be urged
by the Petitioners had been dealt with in the course of the decision-
making process. The grievance of the Petitioners, therefore,
essentially pertains to the manner and adequacy of the consideration
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accorded to their defence, rather than to a complete denial of an
opportunity to place their case before the competent authority.
40. It is equally significant that the Petitioners thereafter
participated in the proceedings before the learned Estate Officer, filed
their reply and written submissions, and contested the proceedings on
merits. The Petitioners further availed the statutory remedy of appeal
under Section 9 of the PP Act, in which the circumstances
surrounding the acquisition of their rights, the subsequent
Cancellation and the basis of the action taken against them were again
examined. The statutory scheme thus afforded the Petitioners
successive opportunities to place their case before the competent fora.
41. In these circumstances, the mere fact that the Petitioners dispute
the conclusion ultimately reached by the competent authority cannot,
by itself, be elevated into a violation of the principles of natural
justice. The requirement of audi alteram partem is concerned with
affording a meaningful opportunity to meet the case against a party; it
does not confer a right to insist that the defence so advanced must
necessarily result in a conclusion favourable to the party concerned. In
the present case, the material on record does not disclose that the
Petitioners were prevented from responding to the Show Cause Notice
or that their defence was altogether excluded from consideration.
42. The principles of natural justice are not confined merely to
affording an opportunity of hearing, but also require that the decision-
making process be fair, impartial and informed by due consideration
of the defence raised. This necessarily encompasses the requirement
of a reasoned decision as well as the rule against bias, embodied in the
maxim nemo judex in causa sua . In the present case, the learned
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Appellate Court has specifically examined the Petitioners‟ grievance
regarding the alleged non-consideration of their Reply dated
24.07.2017 and has recorded reasons for rejecting the same.
43. Equally, the circumstances surrounding the involvement of Sh.
R.K. Gaur, including his relationship with Petitioner No.1, have been
examined in the context of his role in processing the transactions
concerning the subject premises. The material on record, therefore,
requires consideration not merely from the standpoint of whether the
formal approval was accorded by the competent authority, but also
with reference to the fairness and impartiality of the process preceding
such approval.
44. Even independently, on the touchstone of judicial precedents,
the participation of an official in a decision-making process
concerning a close relative may vitiate the fairness of such process. In
30
Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana , the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court emphasised the significance of a reasonable likelihood of bias
arising from a close relationship in the context of participation in a
decision-making process. Although the aforesaid decision did not
arise in the context of proceedings under the PP Act, the principle
enunciated therein is relevant to the present case, as the issue concerns
the fairness and impartiality of the decision-making process,
irrespective of the statutory framework governing such process. The
principle underlying the rule is that the fairness of a process may be
compromised where an official participates in matters concerning a
close relative, even where such participation does not, by itself,

30
(1985) 4 SCC 417
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establish actual bias or mala fides. The relevant portion of the
aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 16. We agree with the petitioners that it is one of the fundamental
principles of our jurisprudence that no man can be a judge in his
own cause and that if there is a reasonable likelihood of bias it is
“in accordance with natural justice and common sense that the
justice likely to be so biased should be incapacitated from sitting”.
The question is not whether the judge is actually biased or in fact
decides partially, but whether there is a real livelihood of bias.
What is objectionable in such a case is not that the decision is
actually tainted with bias but that the circumstances are such as to
create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of others that there is
a likelihood of bias affecting the decision. The basic principle
underlying this rule is that justice must not only be done but must
also appear to be done and this rule has received wide recognition
in several decisions of this Court. It is also important to note that
this rule is not confined to cases where judicial power stricto sensu
is exercised. It is appropriately extended to all cases where an
independent mind has to be applied to arrive at a fair and just
decision between the rival claims of parties. Justice is not the
function of the courts alone; it is also the duty of all those who are
expected to decide fairly between contending parties. The strict
standards applied to authorities exercising judicial power are being
increasingly applied to administrative bodies, for it is vital to the
maintenance of the rule of law in a Welfare State where the
jurisdiction of administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid pace
that the instrumentalities of the State should discharge their
functions in a fair and just manner. This was the basis on which the
applicability of this rule was extended to the decision-making
process of a selection committee constituted for selecting officers
to the Indian Forest Service in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India
[(1969) 2 SCC 262 : AIR 1970 SC 150 : (1970) 1 SCR 457] . What
happened in this case was that one Naqishbund, the acting Chief
Conservator of Forests, Jammu and Kashmir was a member of the
Selection Board which had been set up to select officers to the
Indian Forest Service from those serving in the Forest Department
of Jammu and Kashmir. Naqishbund who was a member of the
Selection Board was also one of the candidates for selection to the
Indian Forest Service. He did not sit on the Selection Board at the
time when his name was considered for selection but he did sit on
the Selection Board and participated in the deliberations when the
names of his rival officers were considered for selection and took
part in the deliberations of the Selection Board while preparing the
list of the selected candidates in order of preference. This Court
held that the presence of Naqishbund vitiated the selection on the
ground that there was reasonable likelihood of bias affecting the
process of selection. Hegde, J. speaking on behalf of the Court
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countered the argument that Naqishbund did not take part in the
deliberations of the Selection Board when his name was
considered, by saying : (SCC p. 270, para 15)
“But then the very fact that he was a member of the
Selection Board must have had its own impact on the
decision of the Selection Board. Further admittedly he
participated in the deliberations of the Selection Board
when the claims of his rivals ... was considered. He was
also party to the preparation of the list of selected
candidates in order of preference. At every stage of his
participation in the deliberations of the Selection Board
there was a conflict between his interest and duty.... The
real question is not whether he was biased. It is difficult
to prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore what we
have to see is whether there is reasonable ground for
believing that he was likely to have been biased.... There
must be a reasonable likelihood of bias. In deciding the
question of bias we have to take into consideration
human probabilities and ordinary course of human
conduct.”
This Court emphasised that it was not necessary to establish bias
but it was sufficient to invalidate the selection process if it could be
shown that there was reasonable likelihood of bias. The likelihood
of bias may arise on account of proprietary interest or on account
of personal reasons, such as, hostility to one party or personal
friendship or family relationship with the other. Where reasonable
likelihood of bias is alleged on the ground of relationship, the
question would always be as to how close is the degree of
relationship or in other words, is the nearness of relationship so
great as to give rise to reasonable apprehension of bias on the part
of the authority making the selection.
17. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh in D.K. Khanna case
[(1973) 1 SLR 80 (HP)] drawing inspiration from A.K. Kraipak
case [(1969) 2 SCC 262 : AIR 1970 SC 150 : (1970) 1 SCR 457]
held that where one of the members of the Committee constituted
for selecting members of the State Civil Service for promotion to
the Indian Administrative Service, was the son-in-law of a
candidate who was competing for inclusion in the list of selected
candidates, the entire selection process was vitiated by the presence
of such member, though he did not take any part in the
consideration of his father-in-law's candidature or in any manner
try to influence his colleagues in regard to his father-in-law. The
High Court observed that the degree of relationship in this case
was so close as to reasonably give an impression to the other
candidates that there was a real likelihood of the son-in-law
espousing the cause of his father-in-law as his own. So also in
Surinder Nath Goyal case [(1973) 1 SLR 690 (P&H)] , the High
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Court of Punjab and Haryana took the same view where it was
found that two of the candidates appearing for selection were
related to one of the members of the Selection Committee. The
same approach was adopted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
in M. Ariffudin case [(1973) 2 SLR 119 (AP)] where one of the
members of the Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission who
sat on the Commission and participated in the selection for the
posts of Professor and Lecturer in the Andhra Pradesh Technical
Education Service, was a partner with some of the candidates
appearing for the selection and it was held that the entire selection
process was vitiated, because there was clearly reasonable
likelihood of bias in favour of those candidates on the part of such
member of the Commission. We may point out that so far as this
last decision is concerned, it does not appear that the member of
the Commission who was a partner with some of the candidates,
withdrew when those candidates came to be interviewed and did
not participate in the consideration of their candidature.”
45. The aforesaid position finds further affirmation in the
subsequent decision of this Court in Commander & Ors. v.
31
Bhupendera Kardeam & Ors. , wherein, although the principal
controversy concerned the validity of a selection process, this Court
examined the participation of officials in a process involving their
family members and the consequent likelihood of bias arising from
such circumstances. The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is
reproduced hereinbelow:
“18. Given the background of the case and the allegations made
therein, more specifically the constitution of the selection
committee including the relatives of the candidates who have
applied for appointment would highlight the manner in which the
whole exercise was sought to be carried out. The exercise has not
been fair, transparent and open. To set right such a selection, if the
Tribunal has directed for a fresh consideration by a fresh selection
committee we do not see any infirmity in such directions. This
would also obviate any allegation of nepotism and bias. The
Supreme Court in its opinion reported as (1969) 2 SCC 262 A.K.
Kripak v. Union of India has held as under:
“The members of the selection board other than
Naqishbund, each one of them separately, have filed

31
2013 SCC OnLine Del 4514
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affidavits in this Court swearing that Naqishbund in no
manner influenced their decision in making the selections.
In a group deliberation each member of the group is
bound to influence the others, more so, if the member
concerned is a person with special knowledge. Ms bias is
likely to operate in a subtle manner. It is no wonder that
the other members of the selection board are unaware of
the extent to which his opinion influenced their
conclusions. We are unable to accept the contention that
in adjudging the suitability of the candidates the members
of the board did not have any mutual discussion. It is not
as if the records spoke of themselves. We are unable to
believe that the members of selection board functioned
like computers. At this stage it may also be noted that at
the time the selections were made, the members of the
selection board other than Naqishbund were not likely to
have known that Basu had appealed against his
supersession and that his appeal was pending before the
State Government. Therefore there was no occasion for
them to distrust the opinion expressed by Naqishbund.
Hence the board in making the selections must necessarily
have given weight to the opinion expressed by
Naqishbund.”
19. Further the Supreme Court in its opinion reported as (1985) 4
SCC 417 Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana (connected
matters) has held as under:
“We agree with the petitioners that it is one of the
fundamental principles of our jurisprudence that no man
can be a Judge in his own cause and that if there is a
reasonable likelihood of bias it is “in accordance with
natural justice and common sense that the justice likely to
be so biased should be incapacitated from sitting”. The
question is not whether the judge is actually biased or in
fact decides partially, but whether there is a real
likelihood of bias. What is objectionable in such a case is
not that the decision is actually tainted with bias but that
the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable
apprehension in the mind of others that there is a
likelihood of bias affecting the decision. The basic
principle underlying this rule is that justice must not only
be done but must also appear to be done and this rule has
received wide recognition in several decisions of this
Court. It is also important to note that this rule is not
confined to cases where judicial power stricto sensu is
exercised. It is appropriately extended to all cases where
an independent mind has to be applied to arrive at a fair
and just decision between the rival claims of parties.
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Justice is not the function of the courts alone; it is also the
duty of all those who are expected to decide fairly between
contending parties. The strict standards applied to
authorities exercising judicial power are being
increasingly applied to administrative bodies, for it is vital
to the maintenance of the rule of law in a welfare state
where the jurisdiction of administrative bodies in
increasing at a rapid pace that the instrumentalities of the
State should discharge their functions in a fair and just
manner. This was the basis on which the applicability of
this rule was extended to the decision-making process of a
selection committee constituted for selecting officers to the
Indian Forests Service in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India.
What happened in this case was that one Naquisbund, the
acting Chief Conservator of Forests, Jammu and Kashmir
was a member of the Selection Board which had been set
up to select officers to the Indian Forest Service from
those serving in the Forest Department of Jammu and
Kashmir. Naquisbund who was a member of the Selection
Board was also one of the candidates for selection to the
Indian Forest Service. He did not sit on the Selection
Board at the time when his name was considered for
selection but he did sit on the Selection Board and
participated in the deliberations when the names of his
rival officers were considered for selection and took part
in the deliberations of the Selection Board while
preparing the list of the selected candidates in order of
preference. This Court held that the presence of
Naquishbund vitiated the selection on the ground that
there was reasonable likelihood of bias affecting the
process of selection. Hegde, J. speaking on behalf of the
Court countered the argument that Naquisbund did not
take part in the deliberations of the Selection Board when
his name was considered, by saying : (SCC p. 270, para
15)
But then the very fact that he was a member of the
Selection Board must have its own impact on the decision
of the Selection Board. Further, admittedly, he
participated in the deliberations of the Selection Board
when the claims of his rivals … were considered. He was
also party to the preparation of the list of selected
candidates in order of preference. At every stage of his
participation in the deliberation of the selection board,
there was a conflict between his interest and duty …. The
real question is not whether he was biased. It is difficult to
prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore what we
have to see is whether there is reasonable ground for
believing that he was likely to have been biased ……….
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There must be a reasonable likelihood of bias. In deciding
the question of bias we have to take into consideration
human probabilities and ordinary course of human
conduct.
This Court emphasised that it was not necessary to
establishes as but it was sufficient to invalidate the
selection process if it could be shown that there was
reasonable likelihood of bias. The likelihood of bias may
arise on account of proprietory interest or on account of
personal reasons, such as, hostility to one party or
personal friendship or family relationship with the other.
Where reasonable likelihood of basis is alleged on the
ground of relationship, the question would always be as to
how close is the degree of relationship or in other words,
is the nearness of relationship so great as to give rise to
reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the
authority making the selection.”
46. Applying the aforesaid principle, Sh. R.K. Gaur, while serving
as Director (Estate-I), NDMC, participated in the processing of the
transactions through which the Petitioners acquired rights in respect of
the subject premises, despite Petitioner No. 1 being his mother. The
record further reflects that he recommended the request for approval
without disclosing the aforesaid relationship and that the subsequent
process concerning dissolution of the partnership and
transfer/regularisation of the premises was also handled by him or his
Division. In these circumstances, the fact that the final approval was
accorded by the competent authority does not, by itself, dispel the
concern arising from his participation in the preceding stages of the
decision-making process. The learned Estate Officer specifically
observed that Sh. R.K. Gaur ought to have recused himself from the
matter, while the learned Appellate Court examined his role and the
surrounding circumstances in upholding the Cancellation.
47. The decision-making process, viewed in its entirety, and in light
of the examination undertaken by the learned Appellate Court as well
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as the learned Estate Officer, does not disclose any procedural
unfairness or violation of the principles of natural justice warranting
interference by this Court.
48. This Court now turns to a further contention raised on behalf of
the Petitioners during the course of oral submissions, namely, that no
notice under Section 4 of the PP Act had been received by them and
that, consequently, the proceedings before the learned Estate Officer
could not be regarded as having been validly instituted in accordance
with the PP Act.
49. The specific contention that the notice under Section 4 of the PP
Act was not received by the Petitioners does not form part of the
pleaded challenge in the present Petition. Further, the Impugned Order
does not return any finding upon such objection. The objection is, in
any event, not a pure question of law, as its determination would
necessarily involve factual questions concerning the issuance, service
and receipt of the notice. This Court in the present Petition, is not
persuaded to undertake a fresh factual enquiry into the said objection
merely on the basis of an oral submission advanced during the course
of hearing, particularly having regard to the limited scope of scrutiny
available to this Court in the exercise of its writ or supervisory
jurisdiction.
50. Quite apart from the aforesaid aspect, the material forming part
of the record before this Court does not support the submission that
the proceedings before the learned Estate Officer were initiated
without a notice under Section 4 of the PP Act. The learned Estate
Officer, in the Order dated 09.11.2017, has specifically recorded that a
notice under Section 4 of the PP Act dated 04.08.2017 was issued to
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the Petitioners. The learned Estate Officer has also dealt with the issue
concerning the said notice in his findings. The said statutory notice
was thus subsequent to, and distinct from, the Show Cause Notice
dated 07.07.2017 and the Cancellation dated 25.07.2017. The relevant
portion of the findings recorded by the learned Estate Officer in the
Order dated 09.11.2017 is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 7. Findings of EO Court:
From the pleadings of both the parties, the following findings are
drawn:
(i) That Sh. R.K. Gaur the then Director(Estate-I) is the son of Smt.
Mishri Devi as admitted in her written reply.
(ii) That Sh. R.K. Gaur has processed the case for regularization of
this property in the name of Smt. Mishri Devi as Director(Estate)
and also transferred the property after approving the dissolution in
favour of Smt. Mishri Devi who happens to be his mother during
his tenure.
(iii) It is also established that his conduct and approvals on the file
had facilitated Smt. Mishri Devi who happens to be his mother to
get into the possession and gain occupancy rights of such premises
without disclosing the fact that he is son of Smt. Mishri Devi.
(iv) The pleadings also indicate that at various stages Sh. R.K.
Gaur, duly assisted by his staff, as pleaded in the application of the
applicant had misused his position by ensuring that Smt. Mishri
Devi is given benefit of obtaining a shop in a prime area of New
Delhi Municipal Council.
(v) In support of those findings, the applicant NDMC has also
submitted the documents of confirmation duly signed by the then
dealing assist. Sh. Kishore Prasad & Sh. Himanshu Ranjan, then
the Dy. Director(Estate-I) and also submitted documents
confirming approval and regularization in the name of Smt. Mishri
Devi & Smt. Manorama Sharma. The documentary evidence
attached to the pleading and shown in the argument indicate that
the Sh. R.K Gaur has actively participated in getting property
transferred to his mother during his tenure.
(vi) Apart from this, the application submitted by Smt. Mishri Devi
for dissolution of partnership base initials (27.4.2015) of the then
Director(Estate-I) Sh. R.K. Gaur who is son of Smt. Mishri Devi.
(vii) The Estate Officer has gone through the pleadings of the
applicant NDMC alongwith necessary documentary evidences. It
was admitted by the respondents in their reply that Sh. R.K. Gaur
who is also son of respondent no. 1. However, they pleaded that
notice under section 4 was not issued, but from the records it is
noticed that notice under section 4 was already issued vide notice
dated 04.8.2017. Hence there is compliance of statutory
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requirement besides following principles of natural justice in
according opportunity of hearing, both written, documentary and in
person. Smt. Mishri Devi, who had appeared in person also
confirmed that Sh. R.K. Gaur is her son. She also admitted that this
property was purchased for her grandsons and statement was given
to this effect. The applicant NDMC had stated that such kind of act
of getting the properties regularized in the name of their own
relatives and relations is violation of conduct rules under
CCS(Conduct) Rules, 1964.
(viii) The advocate of applicant quoted that CCS(Conduct) Rules
under Rule 3 prohibit misusing position as a Civil servant for
providing material benefits for himself, his family or friends.
Besides this, Ld. Counsel has also argued that it amounts to
offence under Prevention of Corruption Act and also liable for
criminal action.
(ix) Respondents pleaded that her son though Director had
followed the policy and according there is no infirmity in the
policy. However, the Applicant NDMC argued that the special
treatment was given by the concerned dealing asstt and Dy
Director in connivance with Director by suppressing vigilance case
and also by wrongly regularizing the case being the mother of
Director.
(x) This court feels that director should have recused himself from
the case rather than being actively associating with approvals and
ensuring giving of possession of the property to his mother and
relatives.
(xi) The documentary evidence showing the verification of persons
and documents by the Concerned Dealing Asstt, Deputy director
and duly approved by the Director indicate there is a malafide
intention in giving benefit to the respondents by wrongly
transferring the property and its possession to the family members
of the Director himself.”

51. The distinction between the aforesaid proceedings is material.
The Show Cause Notice dated 07.07.2017 was issued by the Deputy
Director (Estate-I), NDMC, in the course of the administrative process
concerning the rights claimed by the Petitioners. The Cancellation
dated 25.07.2017 followed thereafter. It was only subsequent thereto
that proceedings under Sections 5 and 7 of the PP Act came to be
instituted before the learned Estate Officer, in the course of which the
learned Estate Officer records issuance of the notice under Section 4
dated 04.08.2017. The departmental Show Cause Notice and the
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statutory notice under Section 4 of the PP Act thus operated at distinct
stages and served distinct purposes.
52. It is further material that the Petitioners entered appearance
before the learned Estate Officer and contested the proceedings. The
record reflects that they filed their Reply and participated in the
proceedings which ultimately culminated in the Order dated
09.11.2017. The proceedings were thus contested on merits before the
statutory authority and were thereafter subjected to appellate scrutiny
under Section 9 of the PP Act.
53. Assuming, arguendo , that the Petitioners seek to maintain that
the notice under Section 4 of the PP Act was not served upon them
notwithstanding the aforesaid recording in the Order dated 09.11.2017
of the learned Estate Officer, such a contention would necessarily
raise a disputed question of fact concerning the issuance and service
of the said notice. Significantly, there is no material placed on record
before this Court in support of the specific assertion of non-service.
The determination of such an issue would, therefore, require a proper
factual foundation and consideration of the relevant contemporaneous
material. The same cannot appropriately be undertaken in the present
proceedings merely on the basis of an oral assertion which does not
form part of the pleaded challenge.
54. The aforesaid approach is also consistent with the settled
principle that a Court cannot adjudicate a case upon a factual
foundation which falls outside the pleadings of the parties. In Rani
32
Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Chand Behari Kapoor , the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a decision cannot be based upon a

32
(1998) 7 SCC 469
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ground outside the pleadings and that it is the case pleaded by the
parties which has to be adjudicated. The relevant portion of the
aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 8. Coming to the first question, it transpires that the appellant-
Bank opened only two branches in the rural area in the year 1982.
For extending its banks, it had applied to the Reserve Bank of India
for 30 new licences for opening of new branches. Calculating the
number of officers which may be necessary to man these new
branches, advertisement had been issued on 18-7-1983 inviting
applications for 35 posts of Probationary Officers and 35 posts of
Field Supervisors. The appellant then applied to the Reserve Bank
for licences to open 27 more branches in the year 1983 and during
1984 and 1985, similar applications had been made for licences to
open 20 branches in 1984 and 17 branches in the year 1985. In
anticipation of the grant of licences by the Reserve Bank of India
and consequential opening of branches in different rural areas, the
appellant had taken the decision to increase the number of posts of
Probationary Officers as well as Field Supervisors. But as against
94 applications for licences for opening new branches, in fact only
46 branches had been opened and there could not be expansion of
business activity by opening new branches because of the revised
licensing policy of the Reserve Bank of India issued in October
1985. The appellant had categorically asserted before the High
Court that there exist no vacancies in the cadre of Field Supervisor
or Probationary Officer and in view of such assertion, it was for the
respondents who claim the right of being appointed to establish
that in fact vacancies exist. But we do not find any reliable
materials produced by the respondents from which a conclusion
could be arrived at that there exist vacancies in the Bank. The High
Court, however, entered into the arena of calculation basing upon
the principle that there should be appointment of one Field Officer
for 500 accounts as was decided by the Board in its resolution and
taking into account the 46 branches which the Bank had, the
number of vacancies in the post of Field Supervisors must be much
more than 55 and only 26 Field Supervisors had been appointed
pursuant to the advertisement dated 18-7-1983. This process of
conclusion in our considered opinion is wholly erroneous and is
not permissible for a court in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution. As has been stated earlier, the
process of selection to different posts in the Bank being made in
anticipation of opening of new branches and the requirement of
officers for new branches, but that does not mean that at the
material point of time, in fact any vacancy exists and at any rate,
no materials having been produced by the respondents, the Court
could not have come to the conclusion that vacancies exist. It is in
this connection, it would also be appropriate to notice that whether
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six of the Field Supervisors appointed resigned and thus
consequential vacancies were available. We have carefully
scrutinised the averments made in the writ petitions filed by the
respondents in the High Court as well as the rejoinder-affidavit
filed in the said Court and we do not find any assertion that has
been made in that regard. From the impugned judgment, however,
it appears that in the course of argument, a contention in that
regard had been advanced by the respondents and the Bank had
been called upon to give its reply but no positive reply having been
filed, the High Court jumped to the conclusion that in fact six
persons resigned and consequential vacancies were there. We,
however, are unable to sustain this line of reasoning of the High
Court. The writ petitioners not having made any averments
alleging resigning of six of the Field Supervisors after being
appointed, the Bank had no obligation to give any reply. In the
course of hearing, if a contention had been raised and supporting
material produced, then the Bank might have been obliged to file
the specific reply but no such material appears to have been
produced by the writ petitioners before the High Court and in such
context, absence of reply by the Bank does not ipso facto establish
the contention raised. It is too well settled that the petitioner who
approaches the court invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the
court under Article 226 must fully aver and establish his rights
flowing from the bundle of facts thereby requiring the respondent
to indicate its stand either by denial or by positive assertions. But
in the absence of any averments in the writ petition or even in the
rejoinder-affidavit, it is not permissible for a court to arrive at a
conclusion on a factual position merely on the basis of submissions
made in the course of hearing. The High Court, therefore, in our
view committed serious error in coming to the conclusion that
there existed vacancies in the post of Field Supervisor on the
materials produced before it. In fact the respondents herein who
were the petitioners in the High Court had not produced any
material in support of their stand that vacancies existed and yet
appointments have not been made. We are of the considered
opinion that the conclusion of the High Court that there existed
vacancies is unsustainable in law and is accordingly set aside.”
55. In view of the aforesaid, the oral submission regarding alleged
non-receipt of the notice under Section 4 of the PP Act does not
furnish a basis for this Court to hold that the proceedings before the
learned Estate Officer were initiated without compliance with Section
4 of the PP Act.
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W.P.(C) 2850/2019 Page 42 of 44
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

56. The grounds specifically pleaded in the present Petition, when
examined in the aforesaid context, do not disclose any jurisdictional
error, patent illegality, perversity or procedural infirmity in the
Impugned Order. The Petitioners have not demonstrated that the
Cancellation dated 25.07.2017 was vitiated in a manner which would
preserve or revive the authority under which they claimed occupation
of the subject premises.
57. Once the said authority ceased to subsist and no independent or
subsisting authority in favour of the Petitioners was demonstrated
thereafter, their continued occupation fell within the ambit of
“unauthorised occupation” under Section 2(g) of the PP Act. The
learned Estate Officer was, therefore, justified in examining the
Petitioners' occupation on that basis, and the learned Appellate Court
committed no error in affirming the said determination. The remaining
grievances essentially seek re-appreciation of the factual material
concerning the acquisition and subsequent cancellation of the rights
claimed by the Petitioners, the circumstances surrounding the
involvement of Sh. R.K. Gaur and the consideration accorded to the
Petitioners' defence.
CONCLUSION:
58. In view of the foregoing discussion, the grounds specifically
pleaded in the present Petition, therefore, do not disclose any
jurisdictional error, patent illegality, perversity or procedural infirmity
in the Impugned Order.
59. In the present case, the Petitioners essentially seek a re-
appreciation of the factual circumstances concerning the acquisition of
their rights, the material which resulted in cancellation thereof and the
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 2850/2019 Page 43 of 44
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

conclusions drawn by the learned Estate Officer and thereafter
affirmed by the learned Appellate Court, which is impermissible in the
absence of any manifest infirmity in the decision-making process.
60. Accordingly, this Court finds no infirmity in the approach
adopted by the learned Appellate Court in affirming the Order dated
09.11.2017 passed by the learned Estate Officer and finds no ground
to interfere with the Impugned Order dated 14.01.2019 in exercise of
jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
61. In view thereof, the present Petition is dismissed.
62. Accordingly, the present Petition, along with the pending
Application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of in the above terms.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
OCTOBER 27, 2026/ma


Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 2850/2019 Page 44 of 44
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14