Educomp Solutions Limited vs Mr. B.D. Park & Ors

Court
Delhi High Court

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment Reserved on: 15.10.2026
% Judgment Delivered on: 06.11.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010026992017
+ CS(COMM) 109/2017
EDUCOMP SOLUTIONS LIMITED .....Plaintiff
versus
MR. B.D. PARK & ORS .....Defendants

Advocates who appeared in this case

For the Plaintiff : Mr. Priya Darshan Kumar, Advocate.

For the Defendants : Mr. Saif Khan, Mr. Prajjwal
Kushwaha and Ms. Diya Vishwanath,
Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA

JUDGMENT
TEJAS KARIA, J
1. The present Suit has been instituted seeking a decree of permanent
injunction and damages, to restrain the Defendants from using the mark
“SMARTCLASS”, with any prefix or suffix, or any phonetically or visually
similar mark, on the grounds of alleged trademark infringement of the
Plaintiff’s registered trademark “EDUCOMP SMARTCLASS” /
(“ Plaintiff’s Marks ”) and passing off.


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FACTUAL MATRIX
2. The Plaintiff, Educomp Solutions Limited , was originally incorporated
in 1994 under the Companies Act, 1956, as Educomp Datamatics Private
Limited , with its registered office in Delhi, and was subsequently renamed
Educomp Solutions Limited . The Plaintiff commenced providing digital
classroom services under the Plaintiff’s Marks in 2003. The Plaintiff is
engaged in providing technology-enabled classroom solutions for schools,
including digital learning content and associated hardware and software. The
Plaintiff also develops educational content comprising digital modules,
animations, graphics, audio and video material for use in schools.
3. The Plaintiff holds various registrations in respect of trademarks
comprising the Plaintiff’s Marks. In addition, the Plaintiff holds several
registered and accepted trademark applications comprising the words and/or
device elements “SMART CLASS”, “SMARTCLASS” and/or “DIGITAL
CLASSROOM”, both independently and in conjunction with the Plaintiff’s
house mark ‘EDUCOMP’.

4. Defendant No. 1, Mr. B.D. Park, served as the Managing Director of
Defendant No. 2, Samsung India Electronics Pvt. Ltd , a company
incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, with its office at Gurgaon,
Haryana. Defendant No. 2 is engaged in the manufacture and trading of,
inter alia , telecommunication devices, including mobile phones, tablets and
other handheld devices. Defendant No. 1 resigned from his position as
Managing Director of Defendant No. 2 in December 2014.
5. The Plaintiff became aware of the Defendants’ use of the mark
“SAMSUNG SMARTCLASS” (“ Impugned Mark ”) in October 2016 and


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thereafter instituted the present Suit. By order dated 14.02.2017, this Court
granted an ex parte ad-interim injunction restraining the Defendants from
entering into any further agreements for the provision of services under the
Impugned Mark.
6. The injunction was subsequently vacated by order dated 21.02.2017.
This Court noted that the Plaintiff had misrepresented that the Defendants
had used the Impugned Mark for only the preceding three months, whereas
the record disclosed such use since 2013. The Court also took note of a
purchase order dated 24.06.2015 placed by the Defendants with the Plaintiff,
whose terms and conditions referred to the Impugned Mark.
7. Vide order dated 08.09.2017, the following Issues were framed:
i. Whether the defendants have infringed the plaintiff’s
registered trade mark “EDUCOMP SMARTCLASS”? OPP
ii. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the injunctions prayed
for?
iii. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for damages, if so, to what
extent? OPP
iv. Whether the suit is bad for impleadment of defendant No.1
who is neither a necessary nor a proper party? OPD
v. Relief
8. The Plaintiff’s evidence was closed vide order dated 19.09.2019,
following the grant of a final opportunity by order dated 11.07.2019.
Thereafter, in view of the insolvency proceedings concerning the Plaintiff
company, this Court, by order dated 26.02.2020, issued notice to the
Resolution Professional, Mr. Mahendra Kumar Khandelwal.


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9. In the absence of a report from the Resolution Professional, the Suit
was dismissed for non-prosecution by order dated 19.04.2023. The Plaintiff,
thereafter, filed I.A. No. 13035/2023 seeking restoration of the Suit. The
Suit was subsequently restored by order dated 18.03.2024.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF
10. The learned Counsel for Plaintiff made the following submissions:
10.1. The Plaintiff is the prior user of the Plaintiff’s Mark, having
used it continuously since 2003 and acquired substantial
goodwill and reputation through such use. The Defendants’ use
of the expression ‘SMARTCLASS’ in conjunction with the
house mark ‘SAMSUNG’ constitutes infringement of the
Plaintiff’s Mark.
10.2. The Defendants adopted the Impugned Mark with mala fide
intent to take unfair advantage of the goodwill and reputation
associated with the Plaintiff’s Marks. It is contended that the
Impugned Mark is deceptively similar to the Plaintiff’s Marks
and is used in relation to identical or similar digital classroom
services. The Plaintiff also submits that the Impugned Mark is
deceptively similar to the device mark forming part of the
Plaintiff’s Marks and is used as part of the name of the
Defendants’ business concern. According to the Plaintiff, such
use infringes upon Plaintiff’s Marks and damages its reputation
in the market, resulting in pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss. A
comparison of the competing trademarks is set out below:


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10.3. The expressions “SMARTCLASS” and “DIGITAL
CLASSROOM” have acquired distinctiveness and an
association with the Plaintiff by virtue of its continuous use,
advertising and investment. The Plaintiff holds several
registrations and applications for registration comprising the
expressions “SMARTCLASS” and “DIGITAL CLASSROOM”,
both independently and in conjunction with its house mark
‘EDUCOMP’. The Plaintiff submits that the registration of these
marks by the Trade Marks Registry on multiple occasions
supports its contention that the expressions are not merely
generic or descriptive, as alleged by Defendant No. 2. It is
further submitted that a trademark which has acquired
distinctiveness and public association through continuous use,
advertising and investment is entitled to protection against
unauthorised use and infringement.
10.4. Defendant No. 2’s contention that “SMARTCLASS” is generic,
descriptive and publici juris is contradicted by its own
applications for registration of the Impugned Mark in Classes 9,


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16, 41 and 42 during the pendency of the Suit. The Plaintiff
submits that such conduct indicates that Defendant No. 2 does
not itself consider the Impugned Mark to be generic and that the
Defendants’ contrary contention is an attempt to mislead the
Court.
10.5. The Plaintiff placed reliance upon Amritdhara Pharmacy v.
Satya Deo Gupta , 1962 SCC OnLine SC 13; Kaira District
Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. v. Bio Logic and
Psychotropics India Private Limited , Neutral Citation-
2024:DHC:7078 and Mankind Pharma Limited v. Novakind
Bio Sciences Private Limited , Neutral Citation-
2023:DHC:5653, to submit that deceptively similar marks used
in respect of identical goods or services are likely to cause
confusion or association in the mind of a consumer of average
intelligence and imperfect recollection, and that such likelihood
of association between the competing marks constitutes
infringement under Section 29(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act,
1999 (“ Trade Marks Act ”).
10.6. Reliance was further placed upon Moonshine Technology
Private Limited v. Tictok Skill Games Private Limited & Ors .,
Neutral Citation- 2022:DHC:353 to submit that, where identical
marks are used in respect of identical services, confusion is
presumed under Section 29(3) of the Trade Marks Act.
10.7. Defendant No. 1’s cessation as a Director or member of the
management of Defendant No. 2 in December 2014 does not


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absolve him of liability for acts committed or liabilities incurred
during his tenure. It is further submitted that the Defendants
commenced use of the Impugned Mark in 2013, when
Defendant No. 1 was part of Defendant No. 2’s management,
and that Defendant No. 1 cannot evade responsibility for the
alleged infringement of the Plaintiff’s trademark and passing off
during that period on the ground of resignation. In the
alternative, the Plaintiff submits that the alleged misjoinder or
non-joinder of a party is not, by itself, fatal to the Suit and that
any such defect may be cured by the Court.
10.8. In view of the above submissions, the Plaintiff contends that the
Defendants’ adoption and use of the Impugned Mark amounts to
infringement of the Plaintiff’s Marks and passing off, and seeks
a decree of permanent injunction and damages against the
Defendants.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT NO. 2

11. The learned Counsel for Defendant No. 2 made the following
submissions:
11.1. The Suit suffers from improper arraignment of parties, as
Defendant No. 1 had ceased to be associated with Defendant
No. 2 in December 2014. The Plaintiff deliberately impleaded
Defendant No. 2 as a contesting party while relying on outdated
information regarding its constitution obtained from a third-
party website, instead of the information available on Defendant
No. 2’s own website. Reliance is placed on Micolube India Ltd.


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v. Maggon Auto Centre, 2008 SCC OnLine Del 160, to submit
that deliberate misjoinder of parties and suppression of material
facts disentitle the Plaintiff to equitable relief.
11.2. The Plaintiff has failed to lead evidence to establish that the
Plaintiff’s Marks has acquired distinctiveness or that the
Defendant No. 2’s use of Impugned Mark amounts to
infringement of Plaintiff’s Marks. The Plaintiff has also failed to
establish exclusive goodwill in the expression
“SMARTCLASS” to sustain a case of passing off against
Defendant No.2 for using ‘SMARTCLASS’ along with its house
mark ‘SAMSUNG’.
11.3. The Plaintiff failed to lead evidence despite being granted
several opportunities, including a final opportunity vide order
dated 11.07.2019, resulting in the closure of Plaintiff’s evidence
vide order dated 19.09.2019. The said order has not been
challenged and has attained finality. It is further submitted that,
in the absence of evidence to discharge the Plaintiff’s burden of
proof in respect of the issues framed vide order dated
08.09.2017, the Suit is liable to be dismissed under Order XVII
Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“ CPC ”). Reliance
is placed on Jagannath Chauhan v. S.C. Nanda, 2003 SCC
OnLine Del 408, and Vijay Kumar Bhandari & Ors. v. Meenu
Chabra & Anr. , Neutral Citation- 2010:DHC:3848.
11.4. Defendant No. 2 has been using the Impugned Mark as part of
its Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives in the


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education sector since 19.07.2013, much before the Plaintiff’s
claims to have become aware of such use in October 2016. The
Plaintiff was aware of Defendant No. 2’s use of the Impugned
Mark at least since 24.06.2015, as evidenced by the purchase
orders dated 24.06.2015 and 05.11.2015, which expressly
referred to the “Samsung Smart Class logo”. Despite such
knowledge, the Plaintiff did not object to the use until the
institution of the Suit. The Suit is therefore affected by delay
and acquiescence.
11.5. The expression ‘SMARTCLASS’ is generic and descriptive of
technology-enabled classroom services and is widely used by
educational institutions, technology providers, technology
journals and the public at large. Various third parties, both in
India and across the world, are accordingly using the expression
‘SMARTCLASS’ in a descriptive / generic manner as the name
/ description of such a classroom. Defendant No. 2 uses the
Impugned Mark in conjunction with its house mark
‘SAMSUNG’, which is the distinctive element. Such use does
not cause confusion with the Plaintiff’s Marks or amount to
passing off or unfair competition, as the prominent use of the
“SAMSUNG” mark negates any likelihood of deception or
misrepresentation.
11.6. Defendant No. 2’s application for registration of the Impugned
Mark, filed on 11.05.2017 after the institution of the Suit, was
intended to protect its rights and does not detract from its


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contention that the expression “SMARTCLASS” is descriptive
and generic.
11.7. The Plaintiff itself has used the expression “SMART CLASS”
descriptively and interchangeably, while using it as a trademark
in conjunction with its house mark ‘EDUCOMP’. This
demonstrates that the expression “SMARTCLASS”, by itself, is
not distinctive.
11.8. Reliance is placed on Frankfinn Aviation Services Pvt. Ltd. v.
Tata Sia Airlines Ltd ., Neutral Citation- 2022:DHC:004489, to
submit that a claim of passing off requires the Plaintiff to
establish goodwill and reputation as well as misrepresentation
by the Defendant through an attempt to benefit from such
goodwill. The prominent use of the well-known “SAMSUNG”
trademark alongside the expression “SMARTCLASS” negates
any intention to deceive, misrepresent or confuse the public.
11.9. The judgments relied upon by the Plaintiff, namely Amritdhara
Pharmacy (supra), Mankind Pharma Limited (supra), Kaira
District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. (supra) and
Moonshine Technology Private Limited (supra), are
distinguishable from the facts of the Suit, which concerns two-
letter marks and involves the use of the expression
“SMARTCLASS”, which is descriptive and commonly used in
relation to technology-enabled classrooms, in conjunction with
the respective parties’ house marks.



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11.10. In view of the aforesaid submissions, Defendant No. 2 prays that
the Suit be dismissed with costs.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
12. The principal controversy in the present Suit is whether the
Defendants’ use of the expression “SMARTCLASS” in conjunction with
Defendant No. 2’s house mark “SAMSUNG” infringes the Plaintiff’s Marks
and constitutes passing off.
Issue No. 1: Whether the defendants have infringed the Plaintiff’s
registered trade mark “EDUCOMP SMARTCLASS”?
13. On behalf of the Plaintiff, it was submitted that use of the Plaintiff’s
Marks commenced in 2003 and that continuous use, advertising and
investment in its digital classroom services had generated substantial
goodwill and reputation in the expression “SMARTCLASS”. It was further
contended that the Defendants adopted the Impugned Mark for identical or
similar digital classroom services with the intention of taking unfair
advantage of the goodwill and reputation associated with the Plaintiff’s
Marks. The Plaintiff also contended that its registrations and applications for
registration demonstrate that the expression “SMARTCLASS” is not merely
descriptive or generic, and that the Defendants’ use of the Impugned Mark
infringes its statutory rights and constitutes passing off.
14. On behalf of Defendant No. 2, it was submitted that the Plaintiff has
no exclusive rights in the expression “SMARTCLASS”, which is descriptive
of technology-enabled classroom services and is commonly used in the
relevant field. It was further contended by Defendant No. 2 that the use of
the Impugned Mark in conjunction with Defendant No. 2’s house mark


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“SAMSUNG”, a well-known trademark, distinguishes its services from
those of the Plaintiff.
15. The Plaintiff asserts an exclusive right in the expression
“SMARTCLASS” based on continuous use since 2003 and relies upon
registrations and accepted applications incorporating “SMARTCLASS” and
“DIGITAL CLASSROOM”, either independently or in conjunction with
“EDUCOMP”. The existence of such registrations and applications does not,
however, establish, of itself, that the expression “SMARTCLASS” has
acquired distinctiveness independently of the Plaintiff’s Marks. The Plaintiff
was required to adduce evidence of its use and the goodwill thereby
acquired to establish that the expression had come to be associated with its
services.
16. Despite having been afforded multiple opportunities, the Plaintiff has
not adduced any evidence to establish the distinctiveness of the expression
“SMARTCLASS”. Plaintiff’s evidence was closed by order dated
19.09.2019. Consequently, Plaintiff’s assertions concerning the extent of
use, the goodwill acquired in the common expression “SMARTCLASS” and
the association of that expression with its services remain unsubstantiated.
Further, Defendant No. 2’s application for registration of the Impugned
Mark during the pendency of the Suit does not, of itself, determine whether
the expression “SMARTCLASS” is descriptive or has acquired
distinctiveness. In the absence of evidence establishing such distinctiveness,
the Plaintiff has failed to establish an exclusive right in that expression
independently of the Plaintiff’s Marks.



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17. The claim of infringement must be determined by reference to the
rights conferred by the Plaintiff’s Marks, considered as a whole. The
Plaintiff relies upon the presence of the common expression
“SMARTCLASS” in the Plaintiff’s Marks and the Impugned Mark to allege
deceptive similarity. The competing marks, however, incorporate distinct
house marks, namely “EDUCOMP” and “SAMSUNG”, respectively.
Registration of the Plaintiff’s Marks as composite marks confers exclusive
rights in those marks taken as a whole; it does not, of itself, confer an
exclusive right in the expression “SMARTCLASS”, which forms only a part
thereof, particularly in the absence of evidence establishing its
distinctiveness. That expression cannot, therefore, be considered in isolation
from the remaining elements of the Plaintiff's Marks. The competing marks
must be assessed in their entirety, having regard to the rights established by
the Plaintiff and the overall impression conveyed by each mark, to
determine whether their similarity is likely to cause confusion or association
among the relevant public.

18. In the present case, Defendant No. 2’s use of the expression
“SMARTCLASS” does not, of itself, establish infringement. The Plaintiff
has failed to demonstrate that the Impugned Mark, considered as a whole, is
likely to cause confusion or lead the relevant public to believe that the
Defendants’ services originate from, or are associated with, the Plaintiff.
Accordingly, infringement of the rights conferred by the Plaintiff’s Marks
has not been established.
19. The precedents relied upon by the Plaintiff, namely Amritdhara
Pharmacy ( supra ), Mankind Pharma Limited (supra), Kaira District


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Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. (supra) and Moonshine
Technology Private Limited (supra ), do not advance its case. The principles
governing deceptive similarity and likelihood of confusion must be applied
with due regard to the nature of the Impugned Mark and the rights
established by the Plaintiff.
20. In the present case, the Plaintiff failed to establish any distinctiveness
in the expression “SMARTCLASS” nor demonstrated that the Impugned
Mark, considered in its entirety, is likely to cause confusion or association
among the relevant public. The mere presence of the common expression
“SMARTCLASS” in the Impugned Mark is insufficient to establish
infringement in the absence of such likelihood of confusion.
21. Accordingly, Issue No. 1 regarding the infringement of the Plaintiff’s
Mark by the Defendants is decided against the Plaintiff and in favour of the
Defendants.
Issue No. 2: Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for the Injunction prayed
for?

22. The Plaintiff seeks a decree of permanent injunction on the grounds of
infringement and passing off. The claim of infringement has already been
considered under Issue No. 1 and has been decided against the Plaintiff. The
claim of passing off, however, requires independent consideration.
23. To establish passing off, the Plaintiff was required to establish
goodwill and reputation in its services, misrepresentation on the part of the
Defendants, and damage or likelihood of damage arising therefrom. The
Plaintiff contends that the Defendants adopted the Impugned Mark to take
advantage of the goodwill and reputation associated with the Plaintiff’s


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Marks. Defendant No. 2, on the other hand, submits that the use of the
expression “SMARTCLASS” in conjunction with its house mark
“SAMSUNG” distinguishes its services from those of the Plaintiff.
24. In the present case, the Plaintiff has not adduced evidence to establish
the goodwill and reputation allegedly acquired in the expression
“SMARTCLASS” or that the expression had come to be exclusively
associated with its services. Further, the Plaintiff has not established that the
Defendants’ use of the Impugned Mark, in conjunction with the prominent
house mark “SAMSUNG”, amounts to a misrepresentation likely to deceive
the relevant public into believing that the Defendants’ services originate
from or are associated with the Plaintiff. Consequently, the essential
ingredients of passing off have not been established.
25. In view of the above, the Plaintiff has failed to establish either
infringement or passing off. Accordingly, the Plaintiff is not entitled to the
relief of permanent injunction as prayed for. Issue No. 2 is, therefore,
decided against the Plaintiff and in favour of the Defendants.
Issue No. 3: Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for Damages, if so, to what
extent?
26. The Plaintiff has sought damages on the ground that the Defendants’
use of the Impugned Mark has caused pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss to
its business and reputation. However, the Plaintiff has not adduced any
evidence to establish the alleged loss or quantify the damages claimed.
27. Further, in view of the findings under Issues Nos. 1 and 2, the
Plaintiff has failed to establish infringement or passing off by the
Defendants.


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28. In the absence of evidence establishing liability or the loss allegedly
suffered by the Plaintiff, no case for award of damages is made out.
Accordingly, Issue No. 3 is decided against the Plaintiff and in favour of the
Defendants.
Issue No. 4: Whether the Suit is bad for impleadment of Defendant No.
1, who is neither a necessary nor a proper party?
29. Defendant No. 2 contends that Defendant No. 1 had ceased to be
associated with Defendant No. 2 in December 2014 and was, therefore,
neither a necessary nor a proper party to the present Suit. The Plaintiff, on
the other hand, submits that Defendant No. 1 was part of the management of
Defendant No. 2 when the use of the Impugned Mark commenced in 2013
and cannot avoid responsibility for the acts allegedly committed during his
tenure.
30. It is an admitted position that Defendant No. 1 served as the
Managing Director of Defendant No. 2 until December 2014. The Plaintiff
alleges that the Defendants commenced using the Impugned Mark in 2013,
during Defendant No. 1’s tenure. However, the Plaintiff has not led evidence
to establish any independent role or personal involvement of Defendant No.
1 in the alleged infringement or passing off. Mere association with
Defendant No. 2 in the capacity of its Managing Director, by itself, does not
establish his personal liability for the acts alleged against the company.
31. In any event, in view of the findings under Issues Nos. 1 and 2, the
Plaintiff has failed to establish infringement or passing off by the
Defendants. Accordingly, no relief can be granted against Defendant No. 1.
Issue No. 4 is, therefore, decided in against the Plaintiff and in favour of the


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Defendant. Defendant No. 1 is directed to be deleted from the array of the
Parties.
Relief:
32. In view of the foregoing discussion, the Plaintiff has failed to
establish infringement of its registered trademarks or passing off by the
Defendants. The Plaintiff has also failed to establish its entitlement to a
decree of permanent injunction or damages. Further, no independent role or
personal involvement of Defendant No. 1 in the alleged infringement or
passing off has been established to warrant any relief against him and,
accordingly, Defendant No. 1 is deleted from the array of the Parties.
33. Accordingly, all Issues are decided against the Plaintiff and in favour
of the Defendants. Consequently, the Plaintiff is not entitled to any of the
reliefs prayed for in the present Suit.
34. The present Suit is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as
to costs.

TEJAS KARIA, J
NOVEMBER 6, 2026
Vn


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