Inox Wind Limited & Anr. vs Jasdan Energy Private Limited & Anr.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 25.08.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 02.09.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010190262026
+ O.M.P. (COMM) 217/2026, I.A. 12200/2026, I.A. 12201/2026
& I.A. 12202/2026
INOX WIND LIMITED & ANR. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Ratik Sharma, Ms.
Muskan Agarwal, Mr.
Yashvardhan Singh Gohil &
Mr. Parth Sindhwani, Advs.
versus
JASDAN ENERGY PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Amit Sibal, Sr. Adv. with
Ms. Ashima Obhan, Mr.
Amardeep Singh, Ms. Yogita
Rathore, Mr. Ankit Handa, Mr.
Darpan Sachdeva, Mr. Aiman
Klee, Mr. Vinay Tripathi, Ms.
Stuti Mehrotra & Mr. Tushar
Chauhan, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AVNEESH JHINGAN
J U D G M E N T
I.A. 12199/2026 in O.M.P. (COMM) 217/2026
1. This application is filed under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the Act’) seeking condonation
of delay of twenty-seven days in filing the petition under Section 34 of
the Act.
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Signed By:CHANCHAL
Signing Date:02.09.2026
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2. Brief facts are that the arbitral proceedings between the parties
to the lis culminated in an award dated 11.12.2025, served upon the
parties on 12.12.2025. The petitioners/judgement debtors (hereinafter
‘judgement debtor’) on 15.12.2025, informed the respondents/decree
holders (hereinafter ‘decree holder’) that interpretation of certain
aspects of the award under Section 33(1)(b) of the Act is needed. The
decree holder objected to the request on 16.12.2025. Subsequently, on
08.01.2026 the judgement debtor filed an application seeking
interpretation of the award. The decree holder on 10.01.2026 filed a
reply thereto stating that in the absence of their consent, the
application for interpretation is not maintainable.
2.1 The period of ninety days under Section 34(3) of the Act
reckoned from the date of service of the award, expired on
11.03.2026. The decree holder on 18.03.2026 filed the enforcement
petition. On 20.03.2026, this court rejected the preliminary objection
raised by the judgement debtor predicated on the pendency of an
application under Section 33 of the Act and issued directions to
deposit the entire award amount and to file an affidavit of assets. On
08.04.2026, the judgement debtor instituted the petition under
Section 34 of the Act along with an application seeking condonation
of delay.
2.2 The petition filed under Section 34 of the Act was returned with
objections and was re-filed on 13.04.2026 and thereafter on
28.04.2026. The order of this court dated 20.03.2026 was challenged
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Signed By:CHANCHAL
Signing Date:02.09.2026
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by the judgement debtor by filing a special leave petition (SLP)
wherein the following order was passed on 04.05.2026:
“1. Having heard the learned Senior Counsels
appearing for the parties, we are of the considered view
that the matter requires to validity kept pending for
consideration and particularly, in the backdrop of an
application under sub-section (3) of Section 36 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("1996 Act")
having been filed for stay of the award and it is yet to
be adjudicated by the jurisdictional Court, as such, at
this juncture we refrain from expressing any opinion as
it is likely to prejudice the rights of either of the
parties. However, in order to balance the equities
particularly, when the respondents herein having been
successful in securing the award in their favour, we
direct the petitioners herein to deposit a sum of Rs.
30,00,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty Crores Only) within
three weeks from today before the jurisdictional High
Court which is examining the application filed under
sub-section (3) of Section 36 of the 1996 Act.
2. It is needless to state that the High Court without
being influenced by any of the observations either
made in the earlier proceedings or by the Executing
Court or by this Court shall independently consider the
application filed under Section 36(3) of the 1996 Act
on its own merits and all questions including the
question of maintainability of the said application is
kept open to be urged by both the parties.
3. It is also stated that on account of the petition filed
under Section 34 of the 1996 Act having been
belatedly, an application under sub-section (3) of
Section 34 of the 1996 Act is said to have been filed
for condonation of delay. Hence, said application shall
also be decided by the jurisdictional High Court in
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Signed By:CHANCHAL
Signing Date:02.09.2026
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accordance with law and on its own merits. It is also
needless to state that the payment or release of the
amount would be governed by the orders that may be
passed in the application filed under Section 36(3) of
the 1996 Act and necessarily appropriate orders may
be passed in that regard if so required.
4. List after three weeks.”
2.3 The directions of the Supreme Court were complied with and a
sum of rupees thirty crores was deposited in this court on 31.07.2026.
An application for withdrawal of the amount was filed in the
enforcement petition and was allowed by the order dated 25.08.2026.
3. Learned counsel for the judgment debtor contends that the
application filed under Section 33(1) of the Act was responded to by
the decree holder but was neither considered nor disposed of by the
arbitral tribunal (for short ‘the tribunal’). The argument is that during
the pendency of the application under Section 33(1) of the Act, the
judgement debtor awaited the adjudication and consequently there is a
delay in filing the petition under Section 34 of the Act. It was a bona
fide belief that the limitation for filing the petition under Section 34 of
the Act shall commence from the date of adjudication of the
application under Section 33 of the Act. It is contended that in the
enforcement proceedings, a specific objection was raised that the
enforcement petition is pre-mature and upon rejection of the objection
the petition under Section 34 of the Act was filed within a reasonable
time. It is canvassed that refusal to condone the delay would render
the judgement debtor remediless despite the delay being bona fide .
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Signed By:CHANCHAL
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The submission is that the court has the discretion to condone the
delay up to thirty days in case of sufficient cause.
4. Per Contra, the application filed by the judgement debtor was
under Section 33(1)(b) and not under Section 33(1)(a) of the Act and
was not maintainable in the absence of the consent of the other party.
The submission is that the failure to file the petition under Section 34
of the Act within the prescribed period was an intentional and dilatory
tactic reflecting negligence on the part of the judgement debtor in
pursuing the statutory remedy. The contention is that the judgement
debtor has not asserted that the application filed was for seeking
rectification of an error or ambiguity contemplated under Section 33
of the Act. Section 33(2) of the Act is relied upon to contend that an
application filed under Section 33(1) of the Act is to be considered by
the tribunal within thirty days from the receipt of the request. The
argument is that the period of thirty days expired during the limitation
period for filing the petition under Section 34 yet the petition under
Section 34 was not filed within three months from receipt of the
award.
4.1 It is further contended that the thirty days period for deciding
the application under Section 33 expired on 07.02.2026 and the
limitation to file the petition under Section 34 of the Act expired on
11.03.2026 and there is no explanation for not filing the petition
within this period. The contention is that though the petition under
Section 34 of the Act was filed on 08.04.2026 but a copy thereof was
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not supplied to the decree holder till 28.04.2026. Reliance is on the
e-mail dated 09.04.2026 wherein the judgement debtor brought to
notice of the tribunal the order dated 20.03.2026 passed by this court
but there was no request made for deciding the application under
Section 33 of the Act and this proves that it is not a case of bona fide
delay.
4.2 The decision of the Supreme Court in Geojit Financial Services
Ltd. Vs. Sandeep Gaurav 2025 SCC OnLine 1811, the decision of
Division Bench of this court in Delhi Development Authority Vs. M/s.
Integrated Techsystems Pvt. Ltd , 2026 SCC OnLine Del 4214, the
decisions of this court in Public Works Department, Govt. of NCT of
Delhi Vs. M/s. Shyam Sunder Tyagi, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 5360,
Union of India Vs. M/s Azfarduddin Engineers and Govt.
Contractor , 2026 SCC OnLine Del 5656, Sushil Pandit Vs. Adsert
Web Solutions Pvt. Ltd , 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3452, Union of India
and Ors. Vs. Nav Bhart Nirman Company and Anr ., 2003 SCC
OnLine Del 837, CMI Limited Vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd.,
O.M.P 266/2004 are relied upon to buttress the argument that delay in
invoking the statutory remedy under Section 34 should not be
condoned in the absence of a bona fide and sufficient explanation.
4.3 The Supreme Court in Geojit Financial Services Ltd. (supra) is
relied upon to contend that filing of an application not maintainable
under Section 33 of the Act cannot constitute sufficient cause for
condoning the delay in filing a petition under Section 34 of the Act.
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Signed By:CHANCHAL
Signing Date:02.09.2026
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5. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length.
6. Learned counsel for the parties are ad idem that in view of
paragraph 2 of the order dated 04.05.2026 passed by the Supreme
Court, the present application for condonation of delay is to be
considered by this court independently without being influenced by
any observations made in the earlier proceedings or in the
enforcement proceedings and that the application should not be kept
pending due to pendency of the SLP.
7. Under Section 34(3) of the Act, the limitation for filing a
petition under Section 34 of the Act is three months from the receipt
of the arbitral award. The proviso thereto empowers the court to
entertain the petition within a further period of thirty days, on an
applicant being prevented by sufficient cause. In other words, the
delay up to thirty days in case of sufficient cause can be condoned by
this court and not beyond.
8. Admittedly, the delay in the case in hand is less than thirty days
i.e. of twenty-seven days. The issue of maintainability of the
application under Section 33(1)(b) in the absence of consent of the
other party need not be dilated upon for deciding the present
application for condonation of delay.
9. The relevant dates mentioned above are not disputed by the
parties. There was no consent given by the decree holder but the fact
remains that on 08.01.2026, the judgement debtor filed an application
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under Section 33(1)(b) of the Act and this was responded to by the
decree holder by filing a reply on 10.01.2026. The tribunal under
Section 33(2) of the Act is obligated to consider the request made
under Section 33(1) of the Act within thirty days of its receipt. There
is no distinction made in Section 33(2) with regard to the application
made under clause (a) or (b) of sub-section 33(1). The fact remains
that the application was not considered by the tribunal.
10. The argument that the judgement debtor deliberately and
negligently delayed filing the petition under Section 34 of the Act or
adopted dilatory tactics has no merit. In the enforcement proceedings,
the judgement debtor raised a preliminary objection of pendency of
the application under Section 33 of the Act. Upon rejection of the
objection by this court albeit , the judgement debtor challenged that
order before the Supreme Court but within eighteen days thereof filed
the petition under Section 34 of the Act. In such circumstances, the
delay in filing the petition cannot be held to be dilatory tactics or
negligence in pursuing the statutory remedies. The fact remains that
the remedies were being availed by the judgement debtor at every
stage from filing of an application under Section 33(1) of the Act;
raising the preliminary objection in the enforcement proceedings;
challenging the order of this court dated 20.03.2026 and in the
meantime filing the petition under Section 34 of the Act.
11. The contention of learned counsel for the decree holder that
under Section 33(2) of the Act, the tribunal had to decide the request
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under Section 33(1) within thirty days and that there was no occasion
thereafter for the judgement debtor not to file the petition under
Section 34 of the Act, is of no avail. The petition is filed with a delay
of twenty-seven days and the matter would have been different if the
delay had been of more than thirty days. The issue at this stage is not
the consequence of non-consideration of the request under Section
33(1) of the Act within thirty days. The only pin-pointed controversy
is as to whether twenty-seven days delay in filing the petition under
Section 34 of the Act for the reasons mentioned in the application
including the filing of the application under Section 33(1) is a
sufficient cause or not for condonation?
12. The argument of the learned counsel for the decree holder that
by bringing on record of the tribunal the order of this court dated
20.03.2026, without any specific request by the judgement debtor for
deciding the application under Section 33(1) of the Act, the judgement
debtor cannot claim bona fide conduct, is misconceived. The relevant
portion of the e-mail dated 09.04.2026 is reproduced below:
“Following the respondents’ application under Section
33(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,
and the Claimants’ subsequently reply, the Claimants
filed an execution petition before the Hon’ble High
Court of Delhi. This matter was heard on March
20,2026.
Please find attached the order passed by the Hon’ble
High Court for the Tribunal’s record.”
13. The submission of the learned counsel of the decree holder that
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although the petition under Section 34 of the Act was filed on
08.04.2026 but the copy thereof was served upon the decree holder on
28.04.2026, is of no avail. The decree holder has not pressed the case
that it was a non-est filing. The objections were raised by the registry
of this court were removed by the judgement debtor and thereafter the
petition was listed.
14. There cannot be a quarrel with the proposition that the power of
the court under Section 34(3) of the Act to condone the delay is to be
exercised keeping in view the paramount objective of the Act i.e. an
expeditious and time-bound conclusion of the arbitration proceedings.
The condonation of delay in arbitration matters is to be considered
with a comparatively more strict approach as compared to Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963. Be that as it may, the proviso to Section
34(3) of the Act empowers the court to condone the delay up to thirty
days on existence of a sufficient cause. The delay is of twenty-seven
days and it is duly explained that there was a sufficient cause
preventing the judgement debtor from filing the petition under Section
34 of the Act.
15. In all fairness the judgements relied upon by the learned counsel
for the decree holder are being dealt with hereinafter:
15.1 In Union of India Vs. M/s Azfarduddin Engineers and Govt.
Contractor (supra), the internal departmental delay was held not to
constitute sufficient cause for condoning the delay of twenty-nine days
in filing the petition under Section 34 of the Act. This decision does
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Signed By:CHANCHAL
Signing Date:02.09.2026
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not address the circumstances arising in the present case.
15.2 In Public Works Department, Govt. of NCT of Delhi (supra),
the explanation that the arbitral record was voluminous was not found
to be a sufficient cause in absence of particulars furnishing as to how
the volume of the record prevented timely removal of the Registry’s
objections. The decision is not applicable to the facts of the present
case.
15.3 In case of CMI Limited (supra), this court considered the matter
on merits and noted that an application under Section 33 of the Act
was filed after six months of passing of the award whereas under
Section 33 of the Act, the limitation for filing application is within
thirty days of the receipt of the award. The prayer for condonation of
delay was accordingly rejected. In the present case, the application
under Section 33(1) of the Act was filed within the prescribed period.
15.4 The decision of the Division Bench of this court in case of
Delhi Development Authority Vs. M/s. Integrated Techsystems Pvt.
Ltd (supra) wherein the internal departmental movement of the file
and the time consumed therein was not considered to be a sufficient
cause for condoning the delay of sixty-nine days in filing the appeal
under Section 37 of the Act also dealt with the challenge to acceptance
of the application under Section 33(1)(b) of the Act. The challenge
was allowed and it was held that the arbitral tribunal had no
jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 33(1)(b) of the
Act when the other party had denied the consent to vest jurisdiction
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upon the tribunal. This decision is relevant to the issue of
maintainability of an application under Section 33(1)(b) of the Act.
15.5 The Supreme Court in Geojit Financial Services Ltd (supra)
held as under:
“35. We summarize our conclusion as under:-
(i) Where an application under Section 33 of the
1996 Act has not been filed, the legislature
was conscious enough to state that it would be
the date of the receipt of the award which
would earmark the commencement of
limitation for an application for setting aside
of an award in terms of Section 34 of the 1996
Act. Whereas, in the case where an
application under Section 33 of the 1996 Act
has been filed, the legislature was conscious
enough to lay down that it would be the date
of disposal of such request or application, that
would be the starting point for calculation of
limitation.
(ii) Where such an application under Section 33
of the 1996 Act is filed, irrespective of
whether the arbitral tribunal upon considering
such application, either makes or does not
make any correction or modification or
choose to render or to not render an additional
award in terms of Section 33 of the Act, 1996,
the starting point or the period of limitation
for challenging the same under Section
application under Section 33 by the arbitral
tribunal, as long as the application under
Section 33 of the 1996 Act had been filed
within the prescribed period of limitation
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under sub-section (1) thereto AND with
notice to the other party. Any other
interpretation to the contrary, would do
violence to plain and Unambiguous language
used in Section 34 sub-section (3) of the 1996
Act.
(iii) In the aforesaid scenario, neither the date of
passing of the original award or date of
receipt of the same by the party nor the date
of receipt of the corrected award or date of
receipt of the decision of the arbitrator
disposing the application under Section 33 of
the 1996 Act is of any significance. What is of
significance, under Section 34 sub-section (3)
of the Act, 1996 is the date on which the
application or request under Section 33 came
to be disposed by the arbitral tribunal.
(iv) In the same breath, where a request is made
under Section 33 of the 1996 Act, it is
immaterial for the purpose of computation of
limitation under Section 34 sub-section (3)
whether such request fell within the purview
of the said provision or not. What is material
is only that such request was made in the
manner delineated under Section 33 i.e., it
fulfilled the twin conditions of being made; (I)
"within thirty days from the receipt of the
arbitral award" and (II) "with notice to the
other party" stipulated therein.”
16. The Supreme Court in Geojit Financial Services Ltd. (supra)
held that in case of an application under Section 33 filed within thirty
days of receipt of the award and with notice to the other party, the
limitation for filing a petition under Section 34 shall commence from
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the date of disposal of the application irrespective of the outcome of
the application under Section 33. In case of non-filing of an
application under Section 33 the limitation for filing a petition under
Section 34 shall commence from the date of receipt of the award. The
legislature consciously stipulated that in case of filing of the
application under Section 33 the limitation clock shall start clicking
from the disposal of the application irrespective of the fact that the
arbitral tribunal makes correction or modification or not whereas in
case in hand, the request is for condonation of delay under Section
34(3) and not that the limitation should be computed from the disposal
of the application under Section 33 of the Act.
17. In view of the above discussion, there is a sufficient cause
explained for condoning the delay of twenty-seven days in filing the
petition under Section 34. The delay is condoned and the application
is allowed.
O.M.P. (COMM) 217/2026, I.A. 12200/2026, I.A. 12201/2026 &
I.A. 12202/2026
18. Put up on 28.09.2026 along with OMP(ENF.) (COMM)
56/2026.
AVNEESH JHINGAN, J
SEPTEMBER 02, 2026/Pa
Reportable:- Yes
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Signed By:CHANCHAL
Signing Date:02.09.2026
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