NARENDRA SINGH vs STATE OF RAJASTHAN

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REPORTABLE
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
AT JODHPUR
Judgment reserved on:08.10.2026
Judgment delivered on:_26.10.2026
Judgment (Full) Uploaded on :_27.10.2026
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 19268/2026
CNR: RJHC010805432026 | URN: CW / 32871U / 2026
Narendra Singh S/o Shri Manvir Singh, Aged About 46 Years,
Resident Of Anshu Sharma, C-8-11-B, Patel Nagar, Bikaner - 334
003 (Raj.)
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Principal Secretary,
Department Of Local Self Government, Secretariat, Jaipur
(Raj.).
2. The Director, The Directorate Of Local Bodies, Jaipur (Raj.)
3. The Municipal Corporation, Bikaner Through Commissioner.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sanjeev Johari, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Shubhankar Johari
Mr. Gaurav Vatwani
Mr. Hardik Kachhawaha
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ayush Gehlot for
Mr. Rajesh Panwar, Sr. Adv.-cum-AAG
Mr. Pawan Bharti for
Mr. I.R. Choudhary, AAG
Division Bench
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJAY K. AGRAWAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BALJINDER SINGH SANDHU
(THROUGH V.C.)
C.A.V. Judgment
BALJINDER SINGH SANDHU, J
1. The petitioner has preferred the present Public Interest Litigation
(for short, ‘PIL’) under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, read
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with the relevant provisions of Chapter XXII-A of the Rajasthan High
Court Rules, 1952, assailing Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) No.1/2026-
27 dated 10.07.2026, issued by the Municipal Corporation, Bikaner, for
selection of a firm or agency to provide revenue augmentation
services, including survey of taxable properties, spot billing,
distribution of demand notices and collection of Urban Development
Tax. The petitioner has also challenged the
Corrigendum/Clarification/Reply to queries raised during the pre-bid
process, dated 27.07.2026.
2. The material facts emerging from the record are that the
Municipal Corporation, Bikaner, had earlier issued a tender notice
dated 13.11.2025 for surveying properties, spot billing, distribution of
demand notices and collection of Urban Development Tax. The tender
is stated to have been valued at approximately Rs.8.40 crore and to
have contemplated a contractual period of seven years. It prescribed
eligibility conditions requiring participating agencies to possess
adequate operational experience, technical capability, financial
capacity and experience in the relevant field.
3. The earlier tender dated 13.11.2025 was subsequently cancelled,
and that a fresh tender notice dated 10.07.2026 was issued for
substantially the same scope of work, stated to be valued at
approximately Rs.10 crore for a period of seven years. A pre-bid
meeting was held on 21.07.2026, and thereafter a corrigendum dated
27.07.2026 was issued making certain amendments in the bidding
documents.
4. The petitioner herein has not participated in the tender process,
and has filed the present PIL alleging that despite the stated increase
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in the value of the proposed contract, the eligibility conditions were
relaxed rather than strengthened, and specific objection has been
taken to the removal of the fixed survey target and to the alleged
dilution or deletion of the conditions relating to survey experience,
Municipal Corporation survey and collection experience, property tax
collection experience, and operation and maintenance experience.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that, the principal
grievance of the petitioner is that the eligibility conditions stipulated in
the earlier tender dated 13.11.2025 have been substantially diluted,
principally by the corrigendum dated 27.07.2026. It is contended that
the changes have weakened the technical, operational and financial
safeguards necessary for execution of the work and may permit
participation by agencies lacking the requisite competence and
experience, thereby creating an apprehension of favouritism and
arbitrariness in allotting the tender.
5. According to the petitioner, instead of strengthening the relevant
qualifications, the corrigendum further altered the tender conditions,
including the survey requirement, which has resulted in manifest
arbitrariness and illegality. It is, thus, prayed that the impugned
tender notice, the corrigendum and all consequential actions be
quashed.
6. The respondent-Municipal Corporation, Bikaner, on the other
hand has disputed the allegation that the modifications made in the
tender conditions render the procurement process arbitrary or
unlawful. It is submitted that the fixed target of 40,000 taxable
properties has been replaced by a requirement to survey all
properties, taxable and non-taxable, within the applicable municipal
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limits, having regard to the re-determination of ward boundaries and
changes in assessment parameters. The change, therefore, does not
amount to a reduction in the survey obligation.
7. It is further submitted that, by way of corrigendum, the heading
“Pre-Qualification Criteria” was substituted by “Technical and Financial
Qualification” and the qualification framework was restructured. The
requirement of experience in conducting at least 25,000 door-to-door
surveys in any one financial year during the preceding ten years has
been retained, while the requirement relating to experience in a
Municipal Corporation has been modified with reference to the three
immediately preceding financial years. The revised tender also requires
experience in at least one project involving the development or
delivery of IT software/application for an urban local body during the
last three financial years, along with an average annual turnover of
Rs.3 crore or more during the preceding three financial years. The
Corporation submits that experience in property tax collection under a
particular project and the present financial capacity of a bidder are
distinct considerations. It maintains that the revised criteria were
formulated to widen competition while ensuring relevant technical,
operational and financial capability, and that the contractual period of
seven years remains unchanged. The amendments, according to the
Corporation, were made having regard to the nature and requirements
of the work and do not render the tender conditions arbitrary or
unlawful.
8. It is, therefore, submitted that the allegation that the relevant
qualifications have been deleted is factually incorrect. The petitioner
has treated the heading or nomenclature of a particular portion of the
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tender document as though the underlying qualification itself had
disappeared, whereas the qualification criteria must be read as a
whole and not by isolating individual headings or comparing phrases
from two different procurement documents. The amendments were
made with the object of increasing competition while ensuring that
bidders possess relevant technical and operational experience. The
respondent-Corporation maintains that the present tender continues to
prescribe substantive operational, financial, technical and experiential
qualifications, and that the changes were made having regard to the
nature and requirements of the work.
9. Relying on Section 7 and 14 of the Rajasthan Transparency in
Public Procurement Act, 2012 (for short the RTPP Act), it is further
contented that the formulation of tender conditions falls primarily
within the domain of the procuring authority and the conditions
prescribed in the impugned tender bear a rational relationship with the
nature and requirements of the proposed work, and that neither the
tender notice nor the corrigendum has been shown to violate any
mandatory provision of the RTPP Act, or the Rajasthan Transparency in
Public Procurement Rules, 2013 (for short the RTPP Rules).
10. Learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation has also raised a
preliminary objection questioning the locus standi of the petitioner to
approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in
commercial matters concerning the contract/tender and challenging
the conditions of the NIT.
11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material
available on record.
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12. The question whether a stranger may, by way of a PIL, challenge
a purely commercial contract is no longer res integra. In Villianur
Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India, (2009) 7 SCC
561 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
“113. As far as second preliminary objection regarding
locus standi of the appellant to challenge the award of the
contract for the development of the Pondicherry Port to Re-
spondent 11 is concerned, this Court finds that the contract
assailed in the writ petitions is purely commercial in nature.
Neither the parties, which had participated in the process of
selection of the consultant/developer nor one of those,
which had expressed desire to develop the Pondicherry Port
but was not selected, has come forward to challenge the se-
lection procedure adopted by the Government of Pondich-
erry or the selection of Respondent 11 as developer of the
Pondicherry Port.
114. The question of locus standi in the matter of awarding
the contract has been considered by this Court in BALCO
Employees' Union v. Union of India [(2002) 2 SCC 333]. This
Court, after review of law on the point, has made following
observations in para 88 of the judgment: (SCC p. 381)
“ 88 . It will be seen that whenever the Court
has interfered and given directions while enter-
taining PIL it has mainly been where there has
been an element of violation of Article 21 or of hu-
man rights or where the litigation has been initi-
ated for the benefit of the poor and the underpriv-
ileged who are unable to come to court due to
some disadvantage. In those cases also it is the
legal rights which are secured by the courts. We
may, however, add that public interest litigation
was not meant to be a weapon to challenge the
financial or economic decisions which are taken by
the Government in exercise of their administrative
power. No doubt a person personally aggrieved by
any such decision, which he regards as illegal, can
impugn the same in a court of law, but, a public
interest litigation at the behest of a stranger ought
not to be entertained. Such a litigation cannot per
se be on behalf of the poor and the downtrodden,
unless the court is satisfied that there has been
violation of Article 21 and the persons adversely
affected are unable to approach the court.”
From the passage quoted above it is clear that the only
ground on which a person can maintain a PIL is where there
has been an element of violation of Article 21 or human
rights or where the litigation has been initiated for the bene-
fit of the poor and the underprivileged who are unable to
come to the court due to some disadvantage.”
13. In Rajeev Suri v. Delhi Development Authority , (2022) 11
SCC 1 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the locus standi of a
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third party to challenge a commercial transaction and the scope of
judicial review in such matters. The Court observed as under:
“547. It is relevant to note that the question of locus in
considering an argument of this nature cannot be sidelined.
For, such arguments call upon the Court to expand the
contours of its jurisdiction to venture into strictly private
commercial matters. A litigant, not being a party to the
transaction, cannot be heard in ordinary circumstances. What
needs to be established is substantial and demonstrable public
interest on the basis of a concrete factual position. The
jurisprudence evolved by this Court in such matters looks for
substantial public interest, to be shown on the basis of
violation of Part III or arbitrariness in Government action. In
the absence thereof, it becomes the duty of the Court to
preserve free commercial relations. Law has a substantial
interest in preserving the freedom of contract.
548. As long as there is fair play in Government action, it is
no one's concern to assail a commercial transaction by
levelling vague and unsubstantiated allegations. The genesis
of a public interest litigation lies in public interest; and public
interest lies in vindicating the rights of those who lack the
wherewithal to reach the Court to remedy injustice against
them. The tool of public interest litigation or “social interest
litigation”, as it is more appropriately called, was devised to
open the doors of the constitutional courts for remedying
glaring injustices against humans, that is, for securing
constitutional rights. It was never meant to transform the
constitutional court as a superlative authority over day-to-day
governance. Judicial time is not meant for undertaking a
roving enquiry or to adjudicate upon unsubstantiated flaws or
shortcoming in policy matters of Government of the day and
politicise the same to appease the dissenting group of citizens
— be it in the guise of civil society or a political outfit.”
14. In The Travancore Devaswom Board v. Ayyappa Spices &
Ors., (2024) 7 SCC 543 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing
with a PIL arising out of a tender, reiterated that the Courts must
exercise restraint where public interest jurisdiction is invoked in
contractual and tender matters, and that such a petition ought not to
be entertained unless the decision under challenge is shown to be
arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable, malafide or illegal.
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15. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, the
contract in question is commercial in nature and relates to the survey,
billing and collection of Urban Development Tax on behalf of the
Municipal Corporation, Bikaner. The petitioner has neither participated
in the tender process nor demonstrated that the present PIL seeks to
espouse the cause of any disadvantaged section unable to approach
the Court. No violation of fundamental rights or other substantial and
demonstrable public interest warranting entertainment of the PIL has
been established. In these circumstances, the petitioner lacks locus
standi to maintain the present PIL.
16. Although the petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of
locus standi alone, however, since the petitioner challenging the
conditions of tender has alleged that the action of the Municipal
Corporation is arbitrary and motivated by favouritism, this Court has
also examines the matter on merits. The scope of judicial review in
matters relating to the formulation of tender conditions is well settled.
17. Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Uflex Ltd. Vs. Government of
Tamil Nadu & Ors., reported in (2022) 1 SCC 165 , observed that
commercial tender matters involve an element of commercial
competitiveness, and that constitutional courts are not appellate
authorities to scrutinise as to whom the tender should be awarded,
hence the tendering authority is the best judge of its requirements.
Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:-
"42. We must begin by noticing that we are examining the
case, as already stated above, on the parameters discussed at
the inception. In commercial tender matters there is obviously
an aspect of commercial competitiveness. For every succeeding
party who gets a tender there may be a couple or more parties
who are not awarded the tender as there can be only one L-1.
The question is should the judicial process be resorted to for
downplaying the freedom which a tendering party has, merely
because it is a State or a public authority, making the said
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process even more cumbersome. We have already noted that
element of transparency is always required in such tenders
because of the nature of economic activity carried on by the
State, but the contours under which they are to be examined
are restricted as set out in Tata Cellular and other cases. The
objective is not to make the Court an appellate authority for
scrutinizing as to whom the tender should be awarded.
Economics must be permitted to play its role for which the
tendering authority knows best as to what is suited in terms of
technology and price for them."
18. Further in M/s Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka , (2012) 8 SCC 216 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that
State must be afforded sufficient latitude in formulating the conditions
of a tender document and awarding a contract, and interference by
court is not warranted unless action of tendering authority is malafide
and is misuse of statutory powers. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
summarising the legal principles governing judicial review in matters
of public tenders, observed as under:
“23. From the above decisions, the following principles emerge:
(a) The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness
in action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in
essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair play.
These actions are amenable to the judicial review
only to the extent that the State must act validly
for a discernible reason and not whimsically for any
ulterior purpose. If the State acts within the
bounds of reasonableness, it would be legitimate to
take into consideration the national priorities;
(b) Fixation of a value of the tender is entirely
within the purview of the executive and the courts
hardly have any role to play in this process except
for striking down such action of the executive as is
proved to be arbitrary or unreasonable. If the
Government acts in conformity with certain healthy
standards and norms such as awarding of contracts
by inviting tenders, in those circumstances, the
interference by courts is very limited;
(c) In the matter of formulating conditions of a
tender document and awarding a contract, greater
latitude is required to be conceded to the State
authorities unless the action of the tendering
authority is found to be malicious and a misuse of
its statutory powers, interference by courts is not
warranted;
(d) Certain preconditions or qualifications for
tenders have to be laid down to ensure that the
contractor has the capacity and the resources to
successfully execute the work; and
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(e) If the State or its instrumentalities act
reasonably, fairly and in public interest in awarding
contract, here again, interference by court is very
restrictive since no person can claim a fundamental
right to carry on business with the Government.
24. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual
matters, in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to
itself the following questions:
(i) Whether the process adopted or decision made
by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour
someone; or whether the process adopted or
decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that
the court can say: “the decision is such that no
responsible authority acting reasonably and in
accordance with relevant law could have
reached”? and
(ii) Whether the public interest is affected?
If the answers to the above questions are in the negative, then
there should be no interference under Article 226.”
19. In Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail
Corporation Ltd. , (2016) 16 SCC 818 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held that the owner or employer of a project, having authored the
tender documents, is the best person to understand and appreciate
its requirements, and that constitutional courts must defer to such
understanding unless malafides or perversity is shown. The same
principle applies to the formulation of eligibility conditions, as the
procuring entity is best placed to determine the qualifications required
for the work. Further, in Silppi Constructions Contractors v.
Union of India , (2020) 16 SCC 489 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court
reiterated that, while arbitrariness, irrationality, malafides or bias
warrant judicial interference, the Court must exercise restraint in
contractual matters and should not interfere merely because another
view is possible.
20. Role of constitutional courts in reviewing tender processes again
came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
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case of VC & MD CIDCO Vs. Shishir Realty Pvt. Ltd., reported in
(2022) 16 SCC 527, wherein it was observed as under :-
"27. Being governed under “rule of law” every action of the
State or its instrumentality while exercising its executive powers
must met the aforesaid requirements. While recognising the
existing principle of freedom to enter or not to enter into
contracts by the state and its instrumentalities, the manner,
method and motive behind the aforesaid decision can be
subjected to judicial review on the touchstone of equality,
fairness, proportionality and natural justice. The decision of the
executive must strike a balance with the alleged violation with
that of the penalty imposed.
28. This Court, in many of its orders reviewing tender
conditions, has vouched for providing sufficient discretion and
independence to administrative authorities so as to enable them
to perform their duties in the interest of the public. Further, the
observation of judicial restraint while reviewing such contracts is
a continuing trend which can be seen in a catena of cases. The
power of judicial review accorded to Constitutional Court of
India and its jurisdiction is supervisory.”
“30. In this context, this court in Tata Cellular v. Union of
India, observed certain principles elucidated as under (SCC
pp.687-88, para 94)
“94. The principles deducible from the above are:
(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in
administrative action.
(2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but
merely reviews the manner in which the decision
was made.
(3) The court does not have the expertise to
correct the administrative decision. If a review of
the administrative decision is permitted it will be
substituting its own decision, without the
necessary expertise which itself may be fallible.
(4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be
open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to
tender is in the realm of contract. Normally
speaking, the decision to accept the tender or
award the contract is reached by process of
negotiations through several tiers. More often than
not, such decisions are made qualitatively by
experts.
(5) The Government must have freedom of
contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is
a necessary concomitant for an administrative
body functioning in an administrative sphere or
quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision
must not only be tested by the application of
Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including
its other facts pointed out above) but must be free
from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated
by mala fides.
(6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy
administrative burden on the administration and
lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure.”
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31. These principles acquire importance as the efficacy of
commercial activities in the public sector increases greatly. It
appears that public interest litigation has opened a large
window to entertain any tender, regardless of scale, which are
now sought to be challenged as a matter of routine. Such
disruption could hardly have been the objective of expanding
the need of Constitutional Review. Close scrutiny of minute
details, contrary to the view of the tendering authority, makes
execution of contracts in the public sector a cumbersome
exercise. Often, it is the case that parties entertain the idea of
a long-drawn-out litigation at the very threshold itself. The
purpose of imbibing the spirit of competition in a process such
as that of the bidding process, is lost in this meandering
exercise and delays suffered due to pending litigation. This
causes great disadvantage to the government and public sector
in general. This Court, in appropriate cases while interpreting
the contract, can restrict the review mechanism by not inuring
to the interpretation so provided by third parties or parties
competing for the tender, unless the impugned interpretation is
shown to be gross abuse of law. The object of judicial review
cannot be that in every contract where some parties lose out, a
second opportunity is provided to such parties to pick holes so
as to disqualify successful parties, on grounds which even the
party floating the tender find to be without merit. With this
brief background on the standard of judicial review, we may
analyze the case at hand.”
21. The principles emerging from the aforesaid judgments are that
judicial review under Article 226 examines the legality and fairness of
the decision-making process, and not the merits of the decision. The
tendering authority is entitled to frame eligibility conditions according
to the nature and requirements of the work, provided they are not
arbitrary, discriminatory, malafide or contrary to law. A tender cannot
be interfered with merely because its conditions have been modified,
or because different conditions could have been prescribed.
22. Sections 7 and 14 of the RTPP Act, relied upon by the
respondent, are to the same effect. Section 7 empowers the procuring
entity to determine the professional, technical, managerial and
financial qualifications required of bidders. Section 14 recognises
experience, reliability, professional and technical competence as
relevant considerations. The prescription of eligibility conditions,
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therefore, lies primarily within the domain of the procuring entity,
subject to fairness, transparency and non-arbitrariness.
23. The petitioner’s case on merits is that, despite the increase in
the value of the contract, the eligibility conditions have been diluted,
principally by the corrigendum dated 27.07.2026. The grievance is
directed against the removal of the fixed survey target and the alleged
deletion of the conditions relating to survey experience, Municipal
Corporation survey and collection experience, property tax collection
experience, and operation and maintenance experience. According to
the petitioner, the revised conditions no longer correspond to the scale
and the seven-year duration of the work. The respondent-Corporation,
in its reply, has answered each of these allegations.
24. Having regard to the limited scope of judicial review in such
matters, this Court is not required to examine the adequacy of each
eligibility condition. It is sufficient to see whether the revised
conditions, read as a whole, are arbitrary or bear no rational relation
to the work. As regards the survey, the fixed target of 40,000 taxable
properties has been replaced by a requirement to survey all
properties, taxable and non-taxable, within the applicable municipal
limits. With the ward limits having been re-determined, a fixed figure
was liable to become inaccurate. The change thus enlarges, rather
than reduces, the survey obligation.
25. As regards the eligibility criteria, the respondent-Corporation has
explained that, by way of the corrigendum, the heading
“Pre-Qualification Criteria” was substituted by “Technical and Financial
Qualification”, and the qualification framework was restructured
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accordingly. The petitioner has proceeded on the basis of the earlier
heading and has alleged that the relevant qualifications have been
deleted. However, the revised criteria are required to be examined as
a whole rather than by comparing the headings or isolated expressions
appearing in tender document.
26. The revised tender retains the requirement of experience in
conducting at least 25,000 door-to-door surveys in any one financial
year during the preceding ten years. The requirement relating to
experience in a Municipal Corporation has been modified with
reference to the three immediately preceding financial years, namely,
2023–24, 2024–25 and 2025–26. The tender further requires
experience in at least one project during the last three financial years
involving the development or delivery of IT software/application for an
urban local body in India, as well as an average annual turnover of
Rs.3 crores or more during the preceding three financial years. The
Corporation has also explained that experience in property tax
collection under an earlier project and the financial capacity of a
bidder are distinct considerations, the former relating to the nature of
work previously undertaken and the latter being assessed on the basis
of turnover. Thus, the alteration of the heading and restructuring of
the qualification framework cannot, by themselves, lead to the
conclusion that the relevant qualifications have been deleted. The
question is whether the revised criteria, considered in their entirety,
bear a rational relationship to the nature and requirements of the work
and are free from arbitrariness, malafides or any violation of law.
Having regard to the explanation furnished by the Corporation and the
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material on record, the petitioner has failed to establish that the
revised eligibility criteria suffer from any such infirmity.
27. As regards the corrigendum dated 27.07.2026, Rules 46 and 47
of the RTPP Rules, read with Section 23 of the RTPP Act, permit the
procuring entity to clarify and modify the bidding documents before
the deadline for submission of bids. The record indicates that it was
issued after the pre-bid meeting held on 21.07.2026 and before the
stipulated deadline for submission of bids. The petitioner has not
demonstrated any violation of the applicable statutory procedure
governing the amendment of bidding documents. In the absence of
any such violation, or any material showing that the amendment was
arbitrary or intended to favour a particular bidder, the issuance of the
corrigendum does not, by itself, warrant interference.
28. The allegation of favouritism is not supported by any material on
record. The petitioner has not demonstrated that any of the impugned
eligibility conditions was framed or modified to favour a particular
bidder or to keep out any bidder, or that the revised criteria are
arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law. In the absence of material
establishing any such infirmity, the apprehension expressed by the
petitioner remains speculative and does not furnish a ground for
interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
29. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the
petitioner lacks locus standi to maintain the present PIL challenging a
purely commercial tender process. Even on merits, the petitioner has
failed to establish that the tender notice dated 10.07.2026 or the
corrigendum dated 27.07.2026 is arbitrary, discriminatory, malafide or
contrary to the RTPP Act and the applicable Rules.
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[2026:RJ-JD:50221-DB] [CW-19268/2026]
30. The writ petition accordingly fails, and is hereby dismissed. All
pending application(s) ,if any, also stand disposed of.
31. There shall be no order as to costs.
(BALJINDER SINGH SANDHU),J (SANJAY K. AGRAWAL),CJ
59/Hanuman Ram
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