Northern Railway Administration vs Nasruddin And Another

A.F.R.
Neutral Citation No. –
2026:AHC-LKO:80565
Reserved on: 07.10.2026
Delivered on: 05.11.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
WRIT - A No. - 6390 of 1988
Northern Railway Administration
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
Nasruddin and another
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : B.k. Shukla, Vinay Tripathi
Counsel for Respondent(s) : R.k. Shukla, J.k. Saxena, Manju
Nagaur, Mohd Burhanuddin Khan,
S.k. Bartarya, Sakshi Singh, Sameer
Singh, Umajeet Gupta
Court No. - 4
HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.
1. Heard Sri Vinay Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri
Sameer Singh, learned counsel for respondent – employee.
2. The present writ petition has been filed on following prayer(s):
“I. a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari
quashing the entire proceedings of the Industrial Tribunal
and the award contained in annexure no.1 to this petition.
II. any other writ,order or direction which this Hon’ble
Court may deem just and proper in the circumstances of the
case be passed in favour of the petitioner.
III. To allow the petition with costs throughout.”
3. Factual matrix of the case is that opposite party no.1 was initially
engaged as a casual labourer on 07.12.1975 and continued to work in the
same capacity up to 27.02.1978, in broken spells, against different
sanctions issued for execution of various kinds of work. It is the specific
case of the petitioner that opposite party no.1 never completed 240 days
of continuous service in any calendar year and, therefore, was not

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WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
entitled to the benefit of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947.
4. That the engagement of opposite party no.1 was made against
different sanctions for short durations and for specific kinds of work. At
the time of recruitment, every Khalasi or casual labourer was duly
informed about the period of sanction of the particular work against
which he was engaged and his signatures or thumb impressions were
obtained on the muster rolls in token of such information. Accordingly,
no separate notice was required to be issued upon expiry of the sanction
period. The relevant sanctions against which opposite party no.1 had
worked have been annexed as Annexure No.4 to the writ petition.
5. According to the petitioner, opposite party no.1 remained absent
from duty and did not report for further employment under the petitioner
establishment, namely, I.O.W, Barha Colony, Lucknow. His failure to
approach the establishment for a period of approximately eight years,
without raising any claim for employment or compensation, indicates
that he had either abandoned the employment or obtained some other
employment elsewhere. Thus, the burden lay upon opposite party no.1 to
establish his claim by cogent and reliable evidence.
6. The petitioner has specifically pleaded that, owing to the lapse of
more than ten years, it was not possible to verify the exact number of
days for which opposite party no.1 had remained absent without
permission, as the paid vouchers and muster rolls were preserved only
for a period of five years under the applicable railway record-retention
rules. It has further been stated that opposite party no.1 raised his claim
after approximately eight years, despite being aware that the relevant
records would no longer be available.
7. The petitioner has further stated that the paid vouchers relating to
the relevant period had been destroyed by the Division in accordance
with the directions contained in Senior Divisional Accounts Officer,
Lucknow Letter No.48 RIL/DEST/82, issued in compliance with
Railway Board's Letter No.74/AD/CR/Misc./ACC dated 10.06.1977.

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WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
Consequently, no paid vouchers relating to the relevant period were
available with the Division.
8. As per the petitioner's case, opposite party no.1 himself admitted
that his services had allegedly come to an end on 28.02.1978, whereas he
raised the industrial dispute by filing his claim statement on 05.03.1986,
after an unexplained delay of approximately eight years. The petitioner,
therefore, contested the claim on the ground of delay and laches and
specifically denied the allegations made in the claim statement.
9. The petitioner specifically denied that opposite party no.1 had
completed 240 days of continuous service either in any calendar year or
during the twelve months preceding the alleged termination of his
services. It was pleaded that the periods of employment mentioned in the
claim statement were incorrect, frivolous and unsupported by any
genuine or official documentary evidence.
10. The petitioner further contended that the services of opposite party
no.1 had neither been terminated nor had he been retrenched within the
meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. His engagement was
purely casual and against specific sanctions for limited periods and the
same automatically came to an end upon expiry of the sanctioned period
or completion of the particular work. Accordingly, the question of
reinstatement or payment of back wages did not arise.
11. The petitioner challenged the award passed by opposite party no.2
on the ground that the Labour Court had failed to consider the abnormal
and unexplained delay of eight years in raising the industrial dispute. It
was contended that the Labour Court ought to have first examined
whether the delay in raising the dispute was unreasonable and whether
any satisfactory explanation had been furnished by opposite party no.1
before proceeding to adjudicate the matter on merits. The failure to
consider this material aspect, according to the petitioner, rendered the
impugned award illegal and vitiated by non-application of mind.
12. The petitioner further pleaded that the claim of opposite party no.1
deserved to be rejected outright on the ground of delay and laches,

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WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
particularly when the alleged retrenchment had taken place on
28.02.1978 and the claim for reinstatement and wages was raised only
on 05.03.1986, without furnishing any explanation for such prolonged
inaction.
13. The petitioner also relied upon the statutory provisions governing
preservation and destruction of railway records, particularly Paragraph
121-A and Appendix IX of the Indian Railway Code for the Accounts
Department, as modified by Railway Board's Letter
No.74/AD/CR/Misc./ACS dated 10.06.1977. As per the relevant
instructions contained therein, paid vouchers and muster rolls were
required to be preserved only for a period of five years. It was, therefore,
contended that opposite party no.1, having raised his claim after
approximately eight years, could not be permitted to take advantage of
the non-availability of records that had been lawfully weeded out in
accordance with the prescribed rules. A copy of the aforesaid Railway
Board's letter has been annexed as Annexure No.5 to the writ petition.
14. The petitioner further contended that opposite party no.1 had been
engaged for casual and seasonal work against different sanctions and
was never appointed against any regular or sanctioned post. In such
circumstances, the Labour Court committed an error in directing his
reinstatement with back wages, particularly when no post existed against
which such reinstatement could be ordered.
15. The petitioner specifically pleaded that opposite party no.1 had
never completed 240 days of continuous service in any calendar year
and, therefore, he was not entitled to claim protection under Section 25-F
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Consequently, the direction for
reinstatement and payment of back wages from the alleged date of
retrenchment was stated to be perverse and legally unsustainable,
particularly in view of the casual and seasonal nature of his engagement.
16. The petitioner further asserted that a casual labourer does not hold
any substantive or regular post and, therefore, the question of
reinstatement, which presupposes the existence of a post, does not arise

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WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
in such cases. It was also contended that the engagement of temporary or
casual labour automatically comes to an end upon expiry of the period of
engagement or completion of the specific work for which such labourer
was employed.
17. According to the petitioner, opposite party no.1 had been engaged
only for a particular work and, upon completion of the said work or
expiry of the relevant sanction, his engagement automatically ceased.
There was no legal obligation upon the petitioner to provide further
employment to opposite party no.1 after completion of the sanctioned
work.
18. The petitioner also placed reliance upon Paragraph 2501 of
Chapter XXV of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual, which
defines casual labour as labour whose employment is seasonal,
intermittent, sporadic or extends over short periods. It was pleaded that
such labour is ordinarily recruited from the nearest available source and
is not governed by the conditions applicable to permanent and temporary
railway employees. On this basis, the petitioner contended that the award
directing reinstatement with back wages was contrary to the nature and
terms of engagement of opposite party no.1.
19. The petitioner has also furnished an explanation for the delay in
filing the present writ petition. It has been stated that the petitioner could
not obtain a copy of the award from the Ministry of Labour, New Delhi,
and no specific date of pronouncement of the award had been
communicated to it, as the award was required to remain confidential
until its publication in the Official Gazette. It was further stated that
opposite party no.1 did not approach the petitioner for implementation of
the award even after its publication.
20. The petitioner has stated that it continued to pursue the matter
through its counsel at Kanpur for obtaining information regarding the
decision of the Labour Court. Thereafter, the Railway Land Advocate
approached the concerned Court and obtained a certified copy of the
award on 30.11.1987, which was forwarded to the office of the

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WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
Divisional Railway Manager, Northern Railway, Lucknow, along with
his opinion, on 15.12.1987.
21. Upon receipt of the aforesaid documents, the matter was examined
by the Legal Branch of the office of the Divisional Railway Manager,
Lucknow and the competent authority ultimately decided to challenge
the award by filing the present writ petition. The relevant papers were
thereafter supplied to the Railway Advocate in January, 1988, who, upon
examining the available records, sought the case file relating to the
proceedings conducted before opposite party no.2 at Kanpur.
22. The petitioner has further explained that the aforesaid case file had
been misplaced in the chamber of the Railway Advocate at Kanpur. After
considerable efforts, the same was traced and personally delivered to the
office of the Divisional Railway Manager, Lucknow, on 27.05.1988.
Thereafter, the counsel engaged before the High Court was approached;
however, he was out of station during the summer vacation. The relevant
case file was ultimately delivered to him on 08.07.1988, whereupon the
present writ petition was prepared and filed challenging the impugned
award.
23. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the
impugned award passed by the Labour Court is legally unsustainable,
being contrary to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The
Labour Court failed to appreciate that opposite party no.1 was engaged
purely as a casual labourer against different temporary sanctions and for
specific works, in broken spells, and had no right to continue in
employment beyond the period of such engagement.
24. Learned counsel submitted that the Labour Court committed an
error in holding the alleged cessation of employment illegal without
recording any categorical finding that opposite party no.1 had completed
240 days of continuous service during the twelve months preceding the
alleged date of retrenchment, as required under Sections 25-B and 25-F
of the Industrial Disputes Act. The initial burden to establish the

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WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
requisite continuous service was upon the workman, which could not be
discharged merely by making a bald assertion.
25. It was further submitted that the Labour Court failed to examine
whether cessation of engagement upon expiry of the relevant sanction or
completion of the specific work attracted the exclusion contemplated
under Section 2(oo) of the Act. The nature, duration and terms of the
casual engagement were material considerations which ought to have
been examined before holding the petitioner guilty of illegal
retrenchment.
26. Learned counsel further contended that the industrial dispute was
raised after an unexplained delay of approximately eight years from the
alleged date of termination. Though no specific limitation period is
prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court was
required to examine the abnormal delay, absence of any satisfactory
explanation and the prejudice caused to the petitioner before granting
retrospective relief.
27. It was also submitted that the relevant paid vouchers and muster
rolls were preserved only for five years under the applicable Railway
Accounts Code and Railway Board instructions and had been destroyed
in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Therefore, no adverse
inference could have been drawn against the petitioner for non-
production of records which were lawfully weeded out, particularly
when the dispute itself was raised after expiry of the prescribed retention
period.
28. Learned counsel submitted that the Labour Court failed to
appreciate that opposite party no.1 was a casual labourer engaged for
intermittent and seasonal work and was not appointed against any
regular or sanctioned post. Consequently, the direction for reinstatement
could not have been issued mechanically without examining the nature
of engagement, availability of work and the appropriate relief
permissible in law.

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WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
29. It was further contended that the award of full back wages from
the alleged date of termination is equally unsustainable, as the Labour
Court failed to record any independent finding regarding unemployment,
absence of gainful employment or other relevant circumstances
justifying such monetary relief. Reinstatement and back wages are not
automatic consequences of every alleged violation of Section 25-F of the
Act.
30. Learned counsel lastly submitted that the impugned award suffers
from non-consideration of material pleadings and evidence, particularly
regarding the broken periods of engagement, different work sanctions,
non-completion of 240 days and unexplained delay in raising the
industrial dispute. The Labour Court, having failed to examine these
foundational legal issues and record cogent findings thereon, has passed
an award vitiated by non-application of mind and warranting
interference by this Hon'ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance upon
following judgments:
a) Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub- Division, Kota Vs. Mohan Lal; Civil Appeal No.6795 of
2013 decided on 16.08.2013.
b) Mohd. Ali vs. State of H.P. and others; Civil Appeal No.3803 of
2018 decided on 16.04.2018.
c) State of U.P. through Executive Engineer Vs. Presiding
Officer, Labour Court and another; Neutral Citation
No.2017:AHC:71972.
31. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.1 –
employee submitted that the impugned award passed by the Central
Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court is based on proper
appreciation of the evidence on record and does not suffer from any
illegality or perversity warranting interference by this Hon'ble Court.
32. It was submitted that respondent no.1 was initially appointed as a
casual labourer on 07.12.1975 and worked continuously from

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WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
22.12.1975 to 21.12.1976, thereby completing more than 240 days of
service in a calendar year. Consequently, he acquired the entitlement to
temporary status under the applicable Railway Establishment Rules and
was entitled to statutory protection under Sections 25-B and 25-F of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
33. Learned counsel submitted that the Management's own witness
had admitted before the Labour Court, on the basis of the records
produced, that respondent no.1 had completed 240 days of service.
Therefore, the petitioner cannot subsequently dispute the said factual
position, which stood established during the adjudication proceedings.
34. It was further submitted that the termination of respondent no.1
was effected verbally with effect from 28.02.1978, without issuance of
any notice, payment of retrenchment compensation or compliance with
the mandatory requirements of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes
Act. Such termination, being in violation of the statutory mandate, was
illegal and the Labour Court rightly directed reinstatement with
consequential benefits.
35. Learned counsel contended that the plea of expiry of sanction or
completion of a particular work is wholly misconceived, as respondent
no.1 was never informed that his engagement was confined to any
specific period or particular work. The petitioner also failed to produce
any appointment condition or sanction order establishing that his
engagement automatically came to an end upon expiry of a specified
period. Therefore, the petitioner cannot subsequently rely upon such an
unsubstantiated plea to justify the termination.
36. It was further submitted that non-availability of paid vouchers
cannot absolve the Management of its statutory obligations, particularly
when attendance registers, job allotment registers and other
contemporaneous records were available for verification. The petitioner
cannot take advantage of its own failure to preserve or produce relevant
employment records so as to defeat the legitimate statutory rights of the
workman.

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WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
37. Learned counsel submitted that the objection regarding delay in
raising the industrial dispute is legally untenable, as the delay had been
duly explained before the Labour Court through the continuous
correspondence undertaken by respondent no.1 through his Union. The
Labour Court considered the relevant circumstances and adjudicated the
dispute on merits. In the absence of any demonstrated prejudice or
perversity in such adjudication, the petitioner cannot seek to reopen the
matter merely on the ground of delay.
38. It was further contended that the plea of abandonment of
employment or alternative employment elsewhere is unsupported by any
evidence. Respondent no.1 was restrained from performing his duties
through verbal instructions of the concerned officer and was never
served with any written order of termination. The burden of establishing
the alleged alternative employment could not be discharged by mere
conjectures or presumptions.
39. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner's contention
regarding non-availability of a sanctioned post is contrary to the material
placed before the Labour Court, which demonstrated that fresh hands
had been engaged after cessation of the services of respondent no.1.
Such subsequent engagement indicates the availability of work and
negates the petitioner's plea that the engagement had automatically come
to an end for want of work.
40. It was also submitted that the provisions of Paragraph 2501 of the
Indian Railway Establishment Manual cannot be relied upon to defeat
the statutory protection available to respondent no.1 under the Industrial
Disputes Act. The classification of an employee as casual labour does
not, by itself, exclude the applicability of the statutory provisions
governing retrenchment. Once the requisite continuous service is
established, the employer is bound to comply with the mandatory
requirements of Section 25-F.
41. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner cannot introduce
fresh factual pleas in the writ jurisdiction which were already considered

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WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
by the Labour Court on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties. The
findings recorded by the Labour Court on the questions of continuous
service, illegal termination and entitlement to relief are findings of fact
based on the material available on record and cannot be substituted
merely because another view may be possible.
42. It was further submitted that the present writ petition itself suffers
from unexplained delay and laches. The petitioner admittedly obtained
the certified copy of the award on 30.11.1987, whereas the writ petition
was prepared and filed after considerable delay. No application seeking
condonation of delay or satisfactory explanation for the entire period of
inaction has been furnished. The petitioner, therefore, cannot seek
discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India while
itself being guilty of unexplained delay.
43. Learned counsel lastly submitted that respondent no.1 was entitled
to receive wages in terms of the award and that the petitioner could not
unilaterally withhold the same after pronouncement of the award. The
impugned award having been passed after due adjudication of the
industrial dispute and consideration of the evidence, no ground for
interference is made out. In support of his submissions, he placed
reliance upon following judgments:
a) Ajaib Singh Vs. Sirhind Cooperative Marketing cum
Processing Service Society Ltd. And another; (1996) 6 SCC 82.
b) Jeetubha Khansangji Jadeja Vs. Kutchh District Panchayat;
2022 SCC Online SC 1284.
44. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the parties and perused the material on record as well as law reports
cited by learned counsel for the parties.
45. To resolve the controversy involved in the matter, relevant portion
of the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the parties are being
quoted below:
Judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner:

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WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
a) Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board (Supra):
“20. We are clearly of the view that though Limitation
Act, 1963 is not applicable to the reference made under
the I.D. Act but delay in raising industrial dispute is
definitely an important circumstance which the Labour
Court must keep in view at the time of exercise of
discretion irrespective of whether or not such objection
has been raised by the other side. The legal position laid
down by this Court in Gitam Singh 13 that before
exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to
keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and
manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of
service, the ground on which termination has been set
aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before
grant of relief in an industrial dispute, must be invariably
followed.
21. Now, if the facts of the present case are seen, the
position that emerges is this: the workman worked as a
work-charged employee for a period from 01.11.1984 to
17.02.1986 (in all he worked for 286 days during his
employment). The services of the workman were
terminated with effect from 18.02.1986. The workman
raised the industrial dispute in 1992, i.e., after 6 years of
termination. The Labour Court did not keep in view
admitted delay of 6 years in raising the industrial dispute
by the workman. The judicial discretion exercised by the
Labour Court is, thus, flawed and unsustainable. The
Division Bench of the High Court was clearly in error in
restoring the award of the Labour Court whereby
reinstatement was granted to the workman. Though, the
compensation awarded by the Single Judge was too low
and needed to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and
circumstances is not the appropriate relief.”
b) Mohd. Ali vs. State of H.P. and others (Supra):
“11. Further, this Court, in Mohan Lal v. Bharat
Electronics Ltd. [Mohan Lal v. Bharat Electronics Ltd.,
(1981) 3 SCC 225 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 478] , in paras 10
and 12 held as under: (SCC pp. 233 & 235-36)
“10. It was, however, urged that Section 25-F is not
attracted in this case for an entirely different reason. Mr
Markendeya contended that before Section 25-F is
invoked, the condition of eligibility for a workman to
complain of invalid retrenchment must be satisfied.
According to him unless the workman has put in
continuous service for not less than one year his case
would not be governed by Section 25-F. …
12. Sub-section (2) incorporates another deeming fiction
for an entirely different situation. It comprehends a
situation where a workman is not in continuous service
within the meaning of sub-section (1) for a period of one
year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous

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WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
service under an employer for a period of one year or six
months, as the case may be, if the workman during the
period of 12 calendar months just preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually
worked under that employer for not less than 240 days.
Sub-section (2) specifically comprehends a situation where
a workman is not in continuous service as per the deeming
fiction indicated in sub-section (1) for a period of one year
or six months. In such a case he is deemed to be in
continuous service for a period of one year if he satisfies
the conditions in sub-clause (a) of clause (2). The
conditions are that commencing (sic) the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made, in case of
retrenchment the date of retrenchment, if in a period of 12
calendar months just preceding such date the workman
has rendered service for a period of 240 days, he shall be
deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one
year for the purposes of Chapter V-A. It is not necessary
for the purposes of clause (2)(a) that the workman should
be in service for a period of one year. If he is in service for
a period of one year and that if that service is continuous
service within the meaning of clause (1) his case would be
governed by clause (1) and his case need not be covered
by clause (2). Clause (2) envisages a situation not
governed by clause (1). And clause (2)(a) provides for a
fiction to treat a workman in continuous service for a
period of one year despite the fact that he has not rendered
uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has
rendered service for a period of 240 days during the
period of 12 calendar months counting backwards and just
preceding the relevant date being the date of retrenchment.
In other words, in order to invoke the fiction enacted in
clause (2)(a) it is necessary to determine first the relevant
date i.e. the date of termination of service which is
complained of as retrenchment. After that date is
ascertained, move backward to a period of 12 months just
preceding the date of retrenchment and then ascertain
whether within the period of 12 months, the workman has
rendered service for a period of 240 days. If these three
facts are affirmatively answered in favour of the workman
pursuant to the deeming fiction enacted in clause (2)(a) it
will have to be assumed that the workman is in continuous
service for a period of one year and he will satisfy the
eligibility qualification enacted in Section 25-F. On a pure
grammatical construction the contention that even for
invoking clause (2) of Section 25-B the workman must be
shown to be in continuous service for a period of one year
would render clause (2) otiose and socially beneficial
legislation would receive a set back by these impermissible
assumptions. The contention must first be negatived on a
pure grammatical construction of clause (2). And in any
event, even if there be any such thing in favour of the
construction, it must be negatived on the ground that it
would render clause (2) otiose. The language of clause (2)
is so clear and unambiguous that no precedent is
necessary to justify the interpretation we have placed on
it.”

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In view of the aforesaid principles laid down by this Court
and also the categorical findings of the High Court, the
contention of the appellant herein is not sustainable in the
eye of the law since the provisions are very clear qua the
calculation of period.
12. Further, it is an admitted position that though the
appellant worked as such till 1991 under different
work/schemes i.e. Rabi and Kharif and completed 240
days in a calendar year only during the years 1980, 1981,
1982 and 1986 to 1989 but he worked only for 195 days in
the year 1990 and 19.5 days in the immediate preceding
year of his dismissal which is below the required 240 days
of working in the period of 12 calendar months preceding
the date of dismissal, therefore, he is not entitled to take
the benefits of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and
the Division Bench of the High Court was right in
dismissing the appeal of the present appellant.”
c) State of U.P. through Executive Engineer (Supra):
“Thus, applying the above principle to the facts of this
case, I find the Labour Court has granted the relief of
reinstatement to the workman admittedly a muster roll
employee who had worked for only ten months in a
government department without keeping in view and
without recording any finding on all relevant factors
including the mode and manner of his appointment; nature
of his employment being a muster roll employee; his length
of service (which admittedly was about ten months); delay
in raising the industrial dispute and; the technical ground
to set aside the termination. Therefore, the award cannot
be sustained being contrary to the rule laid down by the
Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board Vs. Mohan Lal (Supra).
Also, in Himanshu Kumar Vidyarthi and others Vs. State of
Bihar reported in 1997 (4) SCC 391, the Supreme Court
had further held the concept of industry has to be excluded
in case of a department of Government where
appointments are regulated by statutory rules. In that case
disengagement of drivers and peons engaged against
exigency of work contrary to statutory Rules was held not
to amount to 'retrenchment under Section 25F of Industrial
Disputes Act.
The aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court has been
followed by our Court in Mohd Umar Vs. Executive
Engineer, Nagar Palika Parishad reported in 2004 (1)
UPLBEC 174 wherein, vide para 13 it was held as below:-
13. In Himanshu Kumar Vidyarthi and others Vs. State of
Bihar and others, 1997(4) SCC 391, it has been held by
the Apex Court that 'Every department of regulated by the
statutory rules, the concept of industry to that extent
stands excluded. The petitioners were not appointed to the
posts in accordance with the rules but were engaged on the
basis of need of the work. They are temporary employees
working on daily wages. Their disengagement from service
cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the

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WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
Industrial Disputes Act. The concept of retrenchment,
therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover
these employees. Since the petitioners are only daily wage
employees and have no right to their posts, their
disengagement is not arbitrary."
Thus, the award of reinstatement of the respondent, a
muster roll employee is contrary to law as it has been
made upon a belated reference and the Labour Court has
exercised it's discretion to grant relief of reinstatement
without first applying its mind to all relevant factors as
laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Assistant
Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,
Sub Division, Kota (supra) including
(i) mode and manner of appointment;
(ii) nature of employment;
(iii) length of service;
(iv) Ground on which termination was being set aside,
(v) delay in making the reference.
The labour Court ought to have considered the case of the
respondent workman on all of above factors and could
have granted relief of reinstatement only after recording
appropriate findings on those factors.”
Judgments relied upon by learned counsel for respondent No.1:
a) Ajaib Singh (Supra):
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article
137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not
applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the
relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on
the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the
employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a merely
hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court
can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone.
Even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing,
the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case
can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant
back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or
dismissal. The court may also in appropriate cases direct
the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages. Reliance of the learned counsel for the respondent
management on the Full Bench judgment of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court in Ram Chander Morya v. State
of Haryana [(1999) 1 SCT 141 (P&H) : ILR (1999) 1 P&
H 93 (FB)] is also of no help to him. In that case the High
Court nowhere held that the provisions of Article 137 of
the Limitation Act were applicable in the proceedings
under the Act. The Court specifically held “neither any
limitation has been provided nor any guidelines to
determine as to what shall be the period of limitation in
such cases”. However, it went on further to say that

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WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
“reasonable time in the cases of labour for demand of
reference or dispute by appropriate Government to labour
tribunals will be five years after which the Government
can refuse to make a reference on the ground of delay and
laches if there is no explanation to the delay”.
We are of the opinion that the Punjab and Haryana High
Court was not justified in prescribing the limitation for
getting the reference made or an application under
Section 33-C of the Act to be adjudicated. It is not the
function of the court to prescribe the limitation where the
legislature in its wisdom had thought it fit not to prescribe
any period. The courts admittedly interpret law and do
not make laws. Personal views of the Judges presiding
over the Court cannot be stretched to authorise them to
interpret law in such a manner which would amount to
legislation intentionally left over by the legislature. The
judgment of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana
High Court has completely ignored the object of the Act
and various pronouncements of this Court as noted
hereinabove and thus is not a good law on the point of the
applicability of the period of limitation for the purposes
of invoking the jurisdiction of the courts/boards and
tribunal under the Act.”
b) Jeetubha Khansangji Jadeja (Supra):
“14. In the present case, this court finds no perversity or
unreasonableness on the part of the Labour Court and the
single judge in directing the appellant's reinstatement.
Had the respondent management chosen to accept the
verdict, the appellant would have been spared the agony
of waiting for more than 10 years. In such circumstances,
the denial of backwages, has resulted in punishing him,
although the delay is attributable to the judicial process.
However, the respondent management cannot be absolved
of the primary responsibility in its litigative proclivity. In
these circumstances, the appellant shall be entitled to
backwages for a period of two years immediately
preceding, i.e., from 01.01.2020 to 01.01.2022.
15. In light of the above discussion, the impugned
judgment is hereby set aside. The appellant workman
shall be reinstated in the services of the respondent within
six weeks from today. He shall also be entitled to
backwages for a period of two years immediately
preceding, i.e., from 01.01.2020 to 01.01.2022. The
direction of the Labour Court and the learned Single
Judge for continuity of service is also restored. The
respondent management is directed to pay the backwages
as directed by this court, at current rates, within 6 weeks
from today. Hence, the appeal is allowed in above terms,
with no order as to costs.”
46. Having considered the rival submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the parties and having carefully examined the material
available on record, the principal question which arises for consideration

17
WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
is whether the award passed by the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Kanpur, suffers from any illegality,
perversity or jurisdictional error warranting interference by this Court in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
47. The case of the petitioner-Management is that the respondent-
workman was engaged as a casual labourer on 07.12.1975 and was
employed only for intermittent periods against different sanctions issued
for execution of particular works. According to the Management, the
engagement of the workman came to an end upon expiry of the period of
sanction or completion of the work for which he had been engaged. It
has, therefore, been contended that the cessation of his engagement did
not amount to retrenchment and that the provisions of Section 25-F of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, were not attracted.
48. Per contra, the case of the workman is that he had worked
continuously from 22.12.1975 to 21.12.1976, had completed the
requisite 240 days of service and was, thereafter, orally prevented from
discharging his duties with effect from 28.02.1978 without issuance of
any notice or payment of retrenchment compensation.
49. The first aspect which requires consideration is the nature of
engagement of the respondent-workman and the applicability of Section
25-F of the Act, 1947. It is not in dispute that the respondent-workman
was engaged by the petitioner-Management as a casual labourer.
However, the mere description of an employee as a casual labourer does
not, by itself, exclude the applicability of the statutory protection
available under the Act. The determinative consideration is whether the
workman satisfies the requirements of Section 25-B of the Act and
whether the cessation of his service constitutes retrenchment within the
meaning of Section 2(oo) thereof.
50. The petitioner-Management has specifically relied upon the plea
that the workman had been engaged against different sanctions for
particular works and that his engagement was neither regular nor against
any sanctioned post. Such a plea, however, cannot, by itself, establish

18
WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
that the cessation of service was covered by the exception contained in
Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act. For attracting the said exception, the
Management was required to establish that the workman had been
employed under a contract of employment for a fixed term and that the
termination of his service was occasioned by the expiry of that term or
was otherwise in accordance with a stipulation contained in the contract.
A general assertion that the engagement was against temporary sanctions
or for particular works, without establishing the relevant terms and
conditions governing the engagement, would not be sufficient to bring
the case within the exception under Section 2(oo)(bb).
51. In the present case, the petitioner-Management has relied upon the
alleged sanction periods and the fact that the workman was informed
about the duration of the work. It has also referred to the signatures or
thumb impressions obtained from the workman on the muster rolls.
However, the mere existence of different sanctions or the recording of
attendance in muster rolls does not conclusively establish that the
workman had accepted a fixed-term contract containing a stipulation that
his engagement would automatically come to an end upon expiry of a
specified period. In the absence of satisfactory proof of such contractual
stipulation, the petitioner-Management cannot claim the benefit of
Section 2(oo)(bb) merely by describing the engagement as intermittent
or work-oriented. The Labour Court was, therefore, justified in
examining the actual nature and duration of the engagement rather than
accepting the description assigned to it by the Management.
52. So far as the requirement of 240 days is concerned, Section 25-
B(2) of the Act provides the relevant statutory test for determining
whether a workman has been in continuous service for the requisite
period. The question is not merely whether the workman had completed
240 days in any earlier calendar year, but whether he had rendered the
requisite number of days of service during the twelve calendar months
immediately preceding the date with reference to which the computation
is to be made. Consequently, the period of engagement and the evidence

19
WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
relating to attendance preceding the alleged termination have to be
considered in the light of the statutory requirement.
53. Learned counsel for the petitioner has sought to contend that the
respondent-workman did not complete 240 days of service in the
relevant period and that his engagement was only in broken spells.
However, the workman placed reliance upon the records produced
before the Labour Court and the statement of the Management witness,
who, according to the workman, admitted the completion of 240 days of
service on the basis of those records. The evidentiary value of such
admission could not have been brushed aside merely on the basis of the
subsequent assertion of the Management that the engagement was
intermittent. The Labour Court was entitled to consider the testimony of
the Management witness along with the documentary material and the
other circumstances appearing on record. The petitioner has not
demonstrated that the Labour Court ignored any material evidence or
arrived at a conclusion which was wholly unsupported by the record.
54. The judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner in
the case of Mohd. Ali (Supra) , reiterates the legal position that the
requirement of 240 days under Section 25-B(2) has to be examined with
reference to the twelve calendar months immediately preceding the
alleged retrenchment. The said proposition of law is not in dispute.
However, the judgment does not lay down that the claim of a workman
must be rejected merely because the employer describes his engagement
as intermittent. The actual number of days worked has to be determined
on the basis of the evidence available in the particular case. The factual
position in the judgment relied upon by the petitioner, wherein the
workman had admittedly worked only 19.5 days during the relevant
preceding period, is distinguishable from the present case, where the
workman relied upon the Management's own records and the admission
of its witness. The said judgment, therefore, does not advance the
petitioner's case so as to warrant interference with the factual
determination made by the Labour Court.

20
WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
55. The further submission of the petitioner-Management is that the
relevant muster rolls and paid vouchers had been preserved only for a
period of five years in accordance with Paragraph 121-A and Appendix
IX of the Indian Railway Code for Accounts Department and the
Railway Board's letter dated 10.06.1977 and that the records were
thereafter lawfully destroyed. It has also been submitted that the
destruction of the records has caused serious prejudice to the
Management in defending the claim raised by the workman after a
considerable lapse of time. The submission, though relevant for
appreciating the evidentiary circumstances, cannot be accepted as a
complete answer to the workman's claim.
56. The fact that the Management was following a prescribed period
of retention of records does not, by itself, establish that the workman had
never completed the requisite period of service or that his services had
lawfully come to an end. More particularly, where the Management's
witness was examined and the available records were placed before the
Labour Court, the evidentiary value of the material actually produced
was required to be assessed. The petitioner cannot seek to displace an
admission made by its own witness merely by relying upon the
subsequent non-availability of certain records. Equally, the destruction
of records in accordance with the applicable retention policy cannot
automatically be treated as proof of the workman's case. The issue had to
be decided on the evidence which was available before the Labour Court
and there is nothing demonstrated before this Court to show that the
Labour Court adopted an impermissible approach in appreciating that
evidence.
57. The next submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that
the workman had remained absent and did not approach the
Management for further employment for nearly eight years. According
to the petitioner, such conduct indicates that the workman had
abandoned the engagement or had obtained employment elsewhere. This
submission also does not merit acceptance. Abandonment of service
cannot be inferred merely from the passage of time or from the fact that

21
WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
an employee did not approach the employer for further work. The
Management was required to establish, by cogent evidence, that the
workman had voluntarily and consciously abandoned his employment.
No such conclusion can be drawn merely on the basis of an assertion that
the workman did not report for duty or that he might have obtained some
other employment.
58. On the other hand, the workman has consistently asserted that he
was orally restrained from discharging his duties with effect from
28.02.1978. He has also disputed the allegation of voluntary
abandonment. In the absence of reliable evidence establishing that the
workman had voluntarily relinquished his engagement, the plea of
abandonment cannot be accepted as a substitute for compliance with the
statutory requirements governing termination of service. The alleged
absence of the workman, therefore, does not, in the facts of the present
case, provide a sufficient ground to invalidate the award.
59. The petitioner has also sought to emphasize that the respondent-
workman was never appointed against a regular or sanctioned post and
that his engagement was casual, seasonal and intermittent within the
meaning of the relevant provisions of the Indian Railway Establishment
Manual. The said contention, however, proceeds on an assumption that
the absence of a regular appointment takes the workman outside the
protective provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Such an assumption
is not legally sustainable. The question whether the workman was
appointed against a sanctioned post is distinct from the question whether
he was a workman entitled to the protection of the Act. The statutory
safeguards relating to retrenchment are not confined only to employees
holding regular posts. The nature of appointment may have relevance
while determining the appropriate relief, but it does not, by itself,
dispense with the obligation to comply with the statutory provisions
where they are otherwise attracted.
60. The contention that fresh hands were not engaged or that the
workman was not entitled to continue indefinitely also cannot be

22
WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
accepted as a ground to defeat his statutory claim. The workman has
asserted that fresh hands were engaged even thereafter and that the work
for which he had been engaged continued. The petitioner has not
demonstrated that the Labour Court's appreciation of the relevant
circumstances suffers from any manifest error. In any event, the issue
before the Labour Court was not whether the workman had acquired a
right to regular appointment, but whether his services had been brought
to an end in accordance with law. The award has to be examined within
that limited controversy.
61. Learned counsel for the petitioner has next placed reliance upon
the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Engineer,
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board (Supra) . In the said
judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that although no period
of limitation is prescribed for raising an industrial dispute, delay in
raising the dispute is a relevant consideration while determining the
appropriate relief. The Court emphasized that the Labour Court must
take into account the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the grounds on which the termination is
sought to be set aside and the delay in approaching the adjudicatory
forum. On the facts of that case, where the workman had worked for 286
days and raised the dispute after six years, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
considered compensation to be an appropriate relief in place of
reinstatement.
62. There can be no quarrel with the principle laid down in the case of
Mohan Lal (Supra) . Delay in raising an industrial dispute is
undoubtedly a relevant circumstance and cannot be ignored while
granting relief. However, the said judgment does not lay down an
inflexible rule that every industrial dispute raised after a considerable
lapse of time must necessarily result in denial of reinstatement or
substitution of the relief by monetary compensation. The nature of
employment, the circumstances in which the workman was disengaged,
the explanation for delay, the evidence available and the conduct of the
parties are all relevant considerations. The judgment in the case of

23
WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
Mohan Lal (Supra) was rendered on its own facts and cannot be
applied mechanically without examining the circumstances of the
present case.
63. In the present matter, the workman has relied upon
correspondence and representations made through the Union to explain
the delay in raising the dispute. The petitioner, on the other hand, has
contended that the claim was raised after nearly eight years and that such
delay has prejudiced the Management on account of the non-availability
of the old records. The delay is undoubtedly substantial and is a
circumstance which the Labour Court was required to take into
consideration. Nevertheless, delay by itself does not extinguish the right
to seek adjudication of an industrial dispute, particularly when the statute
does not prescribe a limitation period for making such a reference. The
question is whether the delay, in the circumstances of the case, is
sufficient to deny the workman relief altogether or to establish that the
award is otherwise unsustainable.
64. In this regard, the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Ajaib Singh (Supra) is of considerable relevance. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not
apply to proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act and that delay in
raising an industrial dispute, by itself, does not render the reference
invalid. It was further observed that the employer must establish actual
prejudice occasioned by the delay and that a mere assertion of prejudice
would not be sufficient. The Court also recognized that the Labour Court
may mould the relief, including by restricting or denying back wages for
the period preceding the demand, depending upon the facts and
circumstances of the case.
65. The principle laid down in the case of Ajaib Singh (Supra)
supports the proposition that the workman's claim could not have been
rejected solely on the ground that it was raised after a lapse of time.
Although the petitioner has relied upon the destruction of old records as
a circumstance of prejudice, the same has to be considered along with

24
WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
the evidence which was actually available and the findings recorded by
the Labour Court. The petitioner has not established that the delay, by
itself, rendered the adjudication impossible or that the Labour Court's
findings were vitiated on account of the non-availability of records. The
contention regarding delay, therefore, does not furnish a ground for
setting aside the award.
66. The judgment in the case of Jeetubha Khansangji Jadeja
(Supra), relied upon by learned counsel for the workman, further
reiterates that the question of delay and the grant of relief have to be
examined in the factual context of each case. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court, while considering the circumstances before it, did not find any
perversity in the order of reinstatement and also considered the effect of
delay in the judicial process while moulding the relief relating to back
wages. The said judgment does not lay down that reinstatement must
invariably follow in every case of delayed industrial dispute; rather, it
reinforces the principle that the relief has to be determined upon
consideration of the relevant facts and circumstances. The said decision,
read with Ajaib Singh (Supra) , makes it clear that delay is a relevant
factor in moulding relief, but cannot be treated as an automatic bar to
adjudication or relief.
67. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the
judgment of this Court in the case of State of U.P. through Executive
Engineer (Supra) , wherein interference was made with an award
granting reinstatement to a muster-roll employee in the circumstances of
that case. The said judgment, inter alia, refers to the decisions in the
cases of Himanshu Kumar Vidyarthi v. State of Bihar, (1997) 4 SCC
391 , and Mohd. Umar v. Executive Engineer, Nagar Palika Parishad,
2004 (1) UPLBEC 174 and emphasizes that the nature of appointment,
duration of service, manner of engagement and delay in raising the
dispute are relevant while determining the appropriate relief.
68. The aforesaid judgment also does not support the proposition that
a casual or muster-roll employee is, in every circumstance, disentitled to

25
WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
reinstatement. The relief granted by the Labour Court has to be
examined with reference to the findings recorded in the particular case
and the evidence supporting those findings. In the present matter, the
workman relied upon the records produced before the Labour Court and
the statement of the Management witness regarding the period of
service. The petitioner has not established that the Labour Court ignored
the relevant circumstances or that its findings are so unreasonable that no
judicial forum could have arrived at them. The judgment relied upon by
the petitioner, therefore, is distinguishable on its facts and does not
warrant interference with the award in the present case.
69. The question of reinstatement and back wages also requires
consideration in the light of the aforesaid principles. It is true that the
respondent-workman was engaged as a casual labourer and had not been
appointed against a regular sanctioned post. It is equally true that a
considerable period elapsed between the alleged cessation of service and
the raising of the industrial dispute. These circumstances are relevant
while determining the extent of monetary relief. However, they cannot
be considered in isolation or be used to defeat the statutory protection
available to a workman whose service has been brought to an end in
violation of the applicable provisions of the Act.
70. The Labour Court, being the adjudicatory forum entrusted with the
determination of industrial disputes, was required to assess the evidence
relating to the nature of engagement, the period of service, the
circumstances in which the workman ceased to work and the legality of
the action taken by the Management. The petitioner has not been able to
demonstrate that the Labour Court proceeded on an irrelevant
consideration, excluded material evidence, or recorded a finding which
is contrary to the evidence on record. The mere possibility of another
view being taken on the same material does not justify interference
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
71. It is also necessary to bear in mind that the jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 226 is not that of an appellate court over the findings

26
WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
recorded by the Labour Court. This Court would certainly interfere
where the award is founded upon no evidence, where material evidence
has been ignored, where the findings are perverse, or where the Labour
Court has committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record.
However, where the Labour Court has considered the rival pleadings,
examined the evidence and arrived at a conclusion on the basis of the
material available before it, the findings cannot be displaced merely
because the petitioner-Management seeks a different appreciation of the
same evidence.
72. In the present case, the petitioner has primarily sought to reopen
the factual assessment made by the Labour Court by reiterating that the
workman was engaged only in broken spells, that the relevant records
were destroyed after the prescribed retention period, that the workman
did not complete 240 days of service and that he had abandoned the
engagement. These submissions have been considered hereinabove.
None of them, either individually or collectively, establishes that the
Labour Court's award suffers from such illegality or perversity as would
justify interference by this Court. The petitioner has also failed to
establish that the cessation of engagement was covered by the exception
under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act.
73. The delay in raising the industrial dispute is a relevant
circumstance, but in view of the principles laid down in Ajaib Singh
(Supra) and the subsequent decision in the case of Jeetubha
Khansangji Jadeja (Supra) , it cannot, by itself, invalidate the reference
or render the award unsustainable. The judgment in the cases of
Assistant Engineer (Supra), Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board (Supra) and the judgment of this Court in State of U.P. through
Executive Engineer (Supra) do not prescribe an automatic consequence
of substituting reinstatement by compensation in every case involving a
casual employee or a delayed reference. The relief has to be assessed on
the facts of the particular case. The petitioner has not shown that the
Labour Court's decision in the present matter calls for interference on
that account.

27
WRIA No. - 6390 of 1988
74. For the reasons recorded above, this Court is of the considered
view that the petitioner-Management has failed to make out any ground
for exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. The award passed by the Central
Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Kanpur, does not
suffer from any patent illegality, jurisdictional error or perversity
warranting interference. The submissions advanced on behalf of the
petitioner, though carefully considered, do not dislodge the findings
recorded by the Labour Court or establish that the impugned award is
contrary to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
75. Accordingly, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed and is
hereby dismissed .
76. The award passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, Kanpur, is hereby affirmed.
77. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Irshad Ali,J.)
November 05, 2026
Adarsh K Singh
Digitally signed by :-
ADARSH KUMAR SINGH
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench