ABBVIE HEALTHCARE INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED vs APEX COMMITTEE FOR PHARMA MARKETING PRACTICES

Court
Karnataka High Court

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU


TH
DATED THIS THE 5 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ

WRIT PETITION NO. 25995 OF 2026 (GM-RES)

BETWEEN

ABBVIE HEALTHCARE INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED
THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR,
KALYAN SATTARU
LEVEL 6 AND 7, PRESTIGE OBELISK,
NO. 3, KASTURBA ROAD, BENGALURU,
KARNATAKA, 560001, INDIA
COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER THE
COMPANIES ACT, 1956
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI. UDAYA HOLLA., SR. COUNSEL FOR
SMT. MAITREYI B. KANNUR., ADVOCATE)

AND











1. APEX COMMITTEE FOR PHARMA MARKETING PRACTICES

THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN,
DEPARTMENT OF PHARMACEUTICALS
RD
ROOM NO. 340B, A-WING, 3 FLOOR,
SHASTRI BHAWAN, DR. RAJENDRA PRASAD ROAD,
NEW DELHI-110001


2. DEPARTMENT OF PHARMACEUTICALS

THROUGH ITS SECRETARY
RD
ROOM NO. 340B, A-WING, 3 FLOOR,
SHASTRI BHAWAN, DR. RAJENDRA PRASAD ROAD,
NEW DELHI-110001


3. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF INCOME TAX (INVESTIGATION)
CENTRAL REVENUE BUILDING ANNEXE,
QUEEN'S ROAD, BENGALURU - 560001.

4. REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES, BENGALURU
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
05/11/2026, 17:29, Bengaluru
Verified

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KENDRIYA SADAN, 2 FLOOR
'E' WING, KORAMANGALA,
BANGALORE - 560034

….RESPONDENTS
(V/O/D 19.08.2026;
SMT. NAYANATARA B.G., CGC FOR R1, R2 & R4;
SRI. Y.V. RAVIRAJ., ADVOCATE FOR R3)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT,
ORDER OR DIRECTION IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI OR ANY
OTHER APPROPRIATE WRIT, ORDER OR DIRECTION QUASHING AND
SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER DATED DECEMBER 23, 2024, BEARING
ACPMP NO. 01/2024 PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO. 1, THE APEX
COMMITTEE FOR PHARMA MARKETING PRACTICES (ANNEXURE A)
AND ETC.
THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS AND HAVING
BEEN RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 29.08.2026, THIS DAY, THE
COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ

CAV ORDER


1. The Petitioner is before this Court seeking for the
following reliefs:
A. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature
of certiorari or any other appropriate writ,
order or direction quashing and setting aside
the order dated December 23, 2024 bearing
ACPMP no. 01/2024 passed by Respondent
no. 1, the Apex Committee for Pharma
Marketing Practices (Annexure A)

B. Issue a writ, order or direction quashing and
setting aside all proceedings, references,
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
05/11/2026, 17:30, Bengaluru
Verified

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communications, notices, inquiries,
investigations, and actions initiated
pursuant to, in furtherance of, or on the
basis of the impugned order, including
proceedings initiated by Respondent nos. 3
and 4 vide summons dtd summons dtd
January 13,2026 ITBA/INV/S/131/25-26
/1084731119 (1) Annx-AA Summons Dtd
February 9, 2026 ITBA/INV/S/131/25-26
/1085748590(1) Annx-DD, Notice Dtd May
12, 2026 Bearing ROCB/206(4) / Inquiry/
Abbvie / IIOIOO596 (Annx-JJ) National or
State Medical Councils, or any other
authority;

C. Issue a writ, order or direction restraining
the Respondents, their officers, servants,
agents, and any authority acting pursuant to
or in furtherance of the impugned order
from taking any coercive or precipitative
steps against the Petitioner,

D. Pass such other and further orders as this
Honble court may deem fit in the facts and
circumstances of the present case.

2. When the petition was filed, the Petitioner had
sought a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated
23.12.2024 bearing ACPMP No.1 of 2024, passed by
Respondent No.1-the Apex Committee for Pharma
Marketing Practices and for interim relief staying the
operation of said order. An amendment application
was filed and allowed, pursuant to which the
Petitioner sought stay of consequential proceedings
initiated by Respondent No. 4, Registrar of
Companies (“ ROC ”), vide notice dated 12.05.2026 at
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
05/11/2026, 17:30, Bengaluru
Verified

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Annexure JJ, and summons by Respondent No.3,
dated 13.01.2026 and 09.02.2026 at Annexure-AA
and Annexure-DD, respectively.

3. It is after the said amendment that the petition was
to be taken up for consideration; since both the
counsels submitted that the matter could be taken
up for final hearing rather than consideration of
interim relief, this Court took up the matter for final
hearing.

4. Sri. Udaya Holla., learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the Petitioner, submits that;

4.1. On 12.12.2014, Respondent No. 2, Department
of Pharmaceuticals (hereinafter referred to, for
the sake of convenience, brevity, and
identification, as “ DOP ”), had issued the
Uniform Code for Pharmaceutical Marketing
Practices, 2014 (hereinafter referred to, for the
sake of convenience, brevity and identification,
as “ UCPMP 2014 ”), which governed
pharmaceutical marketing practices. It is
submitted that, subsequently, another Uniform
Code was issued in 2024 , known as “Uniform
Code for Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices,
2024 (hereinafter referred to, for the sake of
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
05/11/2026, 17:30, Bengaluru
Verified

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convenience, brevity and identification, as
“ UCPMP 2024 ”).

4.2. Learned Senior Counsel submits that both
UCPMP 2014 and UCPMP 2024 are voluntary
Codes governing the Marketing Practices of the
Indian pharmaceutical industry. UCPMP 2014
also refers to the Indian Medical Council
(Professional Conduct) Etiquette and Ethics
Regulations, 2002 (hereinafter referred to, for
the sake of convenience, brevity and
identification, as “ IMC Regulations 2002 ”).

4.3. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the code
of Conduct for Doctors and Professional
Association Doctors in relation to the
pharmaceutical and allied health sector would
be governed by both the UCPMP and the IMC
Regulations. The Petitioner had engaged certain
Healthcare Professionals (hereinafter referred
to, for the sake of convenience, brevity and
identification, as “ HCPs ”) under a Professional
Services Agreement. His submission is that
these agreements were for legitimate medical
knowledge dissemination and related
professional activities.
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
05/11/2026, 17:30, Bengaluru
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4.4. The Petitioner manufactures various medical
devices, which are imported and marketed in
India after obtaining appropriate regulatory
approvals. These devices fall under the Class C
medical devices category and require consistent
training and support to ensure better patient
outcomes . The manner in which the said
devices are used would have a direct bearing
on the success of the treatment. Therefore, the
skills of the HCP administering such injections
are of paramount importance. It is for that
reason that the Petitioner seeks to ensure that
the HCPs are trained in using such injectable
products in a proper manner as per the
product's directions for use.

4.5. Learned Senior Counsel’s submission is that, if
the HCP were not to administer the said
injections in a proper manner, there could be
rare but serious adverse events associated with
such intravascular injections of dermal fillers in
the face and tissue compression, including
temporary or permanent vision impairment or
cerebral ischemia.
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
05/11/2026, 17:30, Bengaluru
Verified

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4.6. It is for that reason, Learned Senior Counsel
submits that even the packaging of the said
products bears a disclaimer and/or a warning
that the product should only be used by
medical practitioners who have appropriate
training and experience in injection techniques,
and it is for that reason that only HCPs who are
trained by the Petitioner use the said products.
He submits that the HCPs not only trained
themselves, but after such training, trained
other doctors in India, ensuring that the
patients receive safe, competent and properly
administered treatment.

4.7. In this regard, Professional Services
Agreements (hereinafter referred to, for the
sake of convenience, brevity and identification,
as “ PSAs ”) are entered into with the HCPs and
some of the training is provided abroad at
various international conferences. Two of the
conferences which are the subject matter of the
present lis are the International Master Course
on Ageing Science, 2024 (hereinafter referred
to, for the sake of convenience, brevity and
identification, as “ IMCAS 2024 ”) held from
01.02.2024 to 03.02.2024 and the Aesthetic
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
05/11/2026, 17:30, Bengaluru
Verified

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and Anti-ageing Medicine World Congress, 2024
(hereinafter referred to, for the sake of
convenience, brevity and identification, as
“ AMWC 2024 ”) held from 26.03.2024 to
29.03.2024.

4.8. Learned Senior Counsel’s submission is that the
Petitioner therefore ensures that HCPs who
have entered into a PSA with the Petitioner
participate in conferences like the above and,
for that purpose, the Petitioner takes care of
the expenses of booking the flight tickets,
accommodation, etc.

4.9. Though UCPMP 2024 had come into force,
learned Senior Counsel submits that companies
such as the Petitioner were transitioning from
UCPMP 2014 and that some commitments had
been entered into before UCPMP 2024 came
into force. It is therefore contended that UCPMP
2014 applied to those commitments .

4.10. Learned Senior Counsel’s submission is that a
PSA is only for the purpose of training and is
not predicated or dependent on the HCP's
recommending, administering or prescribing the
Petitioner’s products; such factors do not have
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
05/11/2026, 17:30, Bengaluru
Verified

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any determinative effect on the HCPs to attend
such conferences. He further submits that the
PSAs do not influence the HCPs' decisions or
choices regarding the use of the Petitioner's
products or that of similar products by other
companies and therefore nothing to do with any
business promotion on the part of the
Petitioner.

4.11. Insofar as the IMCAS 2024 is concerned, six
HCPs attended the conference, which was
conducted by renowned independent
international association and attended by more
than 18,000 HCPs from across the world. He
submits that the Petitioner had not organised
the conference, nor did it have any role or
control in determining the location of the
conference. The Petitioner only provided the
logistics for booking tickets, stay in Paris, etc.

4.12. Learned Senior Counsel relies on Clause 9 of
the UCPMP 2014, which is reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
9. Committee for Complaint Handling:
9.1 There will be a committee for handling the
complaints named as 'Ethics Committee for
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
05/11/2026, 17:30, Bengaluru
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Pharma Marketing Practices (ECPMP) in each of
the associations
9.2 The committee will have 3 members,
represented by the Executive Head of the
companies or a nominee from the Executive
Head, but not below the rank of Director in the
Board of Company
9.3 In case of conflict of interest, the Head of
the association will decide 3 members. who will
handle the complaint
9.4 There will be a review committee for
handling the review of the decisions of ECPMP, if
any of the parties (complainant or Respondent)
desire so. This committee will be named as
"Apex Ethics Committee for Pharmaceuticals
Marketing Practices (AECPMP) and will consist of
5 members, represented by the Executive Head
of the companies or a nominee from the
Executive Head, but not below the rank of
Director in the Board of Company. The members
of the committed will be nominated by the Head
of the Association.


4.13. Referring to Clause 9, Learned Senior Counsel
submits that a Committee for handling
complaints, namely, the Ethics Committee for
Pharma Marketing Practices (hereinafter
referred to, for the sake of convenience, brevity
and identification, as “ ECPMP ”) is to be
constituted in each Association, which would
have three members represented by the
Executive Head of the companies or a nominee
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
05/11/2026, 17:30, Bengaluru
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from the Executive Head, but not below the
rank of Director in the Board of the Company.

4.14. Learned Senior Counsel refers to Clause 10 of
the UCPMP 2014 and submits that the
procedure for lodging a complaint has been
detailed therein; the said Clause 10 is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference;
10. Lodging of Complaints
10.1 All complaints, related to the breach of the
Code should be addressed to the "Ethics
Committee for Pharma Marketing Practices
(ECPMP)", "Chief Executive Officer", "Name of
Association".
10.2 All complaints related to an activity of
breach of the Code should, to the extent
practicable, be made at one time. The complaint
must be made within six months of the alleged
breach of the Code, with a maximum of another
six months for reasonable delay that can be
explained in writing. Related complaints may be
clubbed together by the Ethics Committee to
save time and expedite disposal.
10.3 Complaints must be in writing and for each
case The Complainant should:
i. identify himself (whether a company, entity or
an individual) with a full mailing address (email
and mobile telephone no).
ii. identify the company, which is alleged to have
breached the Code, including the name of any
company personnel, product, or products, which
are specifically involved.
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
05/11/2026, 17:30, Bengaluru
Verified

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iii. give the details of the activity which is alleged
to be in breach of the Code, give the date of the
alleged breach, clauses of the Code which are
alleged to have been breached, and provide
supporting evidence of the alleged breach(es).
10.4 A non-refundable amount of Rs.1,000/ is to
be deposited by the complainant along with the
complaint. The respective association will
elaborate on their website how this payment is
to be made. No pseudonymous or anonymous
complaints or those made without the prescribed
fee will be entertained.
10.5 When the complaint is from a
pharmaceutical company, the complaint must be
signed or authorized in writing by the company's
managing director or chief executive officer or a
person at an equivalent level.
10.6 When it appears from media reports (other
than letters to the editor of a publication) that a
Company may have breached the Code, the
matter may be treated as a complaint, and the
committee may request the concerned
publication for further information, and the
source or the correspondent may be treated as
the complainant.
10.7. Any complaint received by the Department
of Pharmaceuticals may also be forwarded to the
concerned Association for necessary action. In
such cases, the concerned Association will take
up the matter further with the complainant
concerned. The Department may order a special
audit for the purpose.

4.15. By referring to Clause 10.3, Learned Senior
Counsel’s submission is that the complainant
should identify himself with full mailing address
and if the complaint is from a Pharmaceutical
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
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Company, the complaint must be signed or
authorised in writing by the Company's
Managing Director, Chief Executive or a person
of equivalent rank. The complaint must also the
clauses of the Code alleged to have been
breached.

4.16. Learned Senior Counsel refers to Clause 11 of
the UCPMP 2014 which is reproduced hereunder
for easy reference;
11. Handling of Complaints
11.1 Once a complaint is lodged, the process of
enquiry should be taken up and completed by
the ECPMP. The decision of the Committee will
be made by majority. In case of conflict of
interest, the member/s concerned should recuse
themselves from the proceedings.
11.2 When the Committee receives information
from which it appears that a company may have
contravened the Code, the managing director or
chief executive officer of the company concerned
will be asked to provide a complete response to
the matter.
11.3 To assist companies in ensuring that a
complete response is submitted, the Committee
may suggest to the Respondent company the
relevant supporting material to be supplied, and
it shall be the responsibility of the Respondent
company to ensure that a full response is
submitted within the stipulated timeframe.
11.4 Associations may engage the services of
professional auditors to facilitate better and
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
05/11/2026, 17:30, Bengaluru
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independent examination towards arriving at an
informed decision.
11.5 The Respondent company shall submit its
comments and supporting documents to the
Committee in not more than 30 days after
receipt of notice from the Committee.
11.6 The company against which the complaint
is made should provide supporting evidence
even if it thinks that the Code has not been
breached.
11.7 The Committee should render a decision
within 90 days of the receipt of complaint, and
having done so, it should promptly notify the
parties of its decision, the reasons thereof in
writing and send it by recorded mail.
11.8 Where the Committee decides there is no
breach of the Code, or that matter of complaint
is not within the scope of the Code, the
complainant will be so advised in writing,
including advice on the appropriate forum to
approach in such cases.
11.9 Where the Committee, after enquiry,
decides that there is a breach of the Code, the
complainant and the Respondent company will
be so advised in writing, including the remedial
steps that need to be taken in this regard
11.10 If no appeal is filed within the stipulated
period, the decision of the ECPMP shall be final
and binding, and adherence to such decision
shall be a condition of continued membership of
the Association. The decisions shall also be
uploaded on the website of the Association and
the Department of Pharmaceuticals.

4.17. Learned Senior Counsel submits that it is a
procedure under Clause 11 which is required to
be followed insofar as the handling of the
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
05/11/2026, 17:30, Bengaluru
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complaint is concerned. Once a committee
passes an order, it is required to be followed,
and it is final, subject to Clause 13.4, which
provides for an appeal. The review of decisions
is in terms of Clause 13, which is reproduced
hereunder for easy reference;
13. Appeal
13.1 If a party to the complaint is dissatisfied
with the decision of the ECPMP, it may file an
appeal before an Apex Committee for Pharma
Marketing Practices (ACPMP) headed by the
Secretary, Department of Pharmaceuticals,
having a Joint Secretary and a Finance Officer
dealing with the subject as its members.
Explanation: The expression 'party to the
complaint' means the complainant or the
Respondent entity, and the expression 'decision
of the ECPMP' includes a lack of decision thereof,
or inordinate delay in reaching such a decision.
13.2 The time limit for filing such an appeal will
ordinarily be 15 days, with an additional 15 days
of reasonable time delay permitted for reasons
to be recorded in writing.
13.3 The ACPMP will give a notice to both the
parties, and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard, give a final decision
or ruling within six months.
13.4 The ACPMP may prescribe any penalties or
make a reference to an appropriate agency or an
authority of the Government in accordance with
para-12 above.
13.5 The decision in appeal shall be final and
binding on both the parties.
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
05/11/2026, 17:30, Bengaluru
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4.18. Learned Senior Counsel’s submission is that a
review of the decision can only be sought by
complying with Clause 13 and not otherwise.
Against this background, he submits that the
DOP received an anonymous complaint,
accompanied by documents, on 21.05.2024.
The complaint alleged unethical marketing
practices and a breach of the UCPMP by the
Petitioner, on the ground that it had provided
travel tickets and hotel accommodation for
extravagant pleasure trips under the guise of
conferences held in Paris and Monaco for 30
doctors connected with medical aesthetics and
anti-ageing products. Despite the anonymous
nature of the complaint, the DOP forwarded it
to the Ethics Committee for appropriate action.

4.19. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the OPPI
released its findings on 20.09.2024 and found
no irregularity in the Petitioner’s sponsorship.
However, the Apex Committee passed the
following order:
10. Upon perusal of the facts and after hearing
M/s. AbbVie at length, the Apex Committee is of
the opinion that M/s. AbbVie has violated the
Uniform Code for Pharmaceutical Marketing
Practices by sponsoring foreign vacations to
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
05/11/2026, 17:30, Bengaluru
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Monaco and Paris for 30 HCPs in violation of the
codal provisions. Therefore, in exercise of
powers conferred by the UCPMP 2024:
i. The Apex Committee reprimands M/s. AbbVie
Healthcare India Pvt Ltd for unethical marketing
practices. A copy of this order be published on
the website in accordance with the provisions
contained therein.
ii. The Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) is
requested to evaluate the tax liability of M/s.
AbbVie Healthcare India Pvt Ltd along with 30
HCPS and take action in accordance with the
provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961 read
with the subordinate circulars issued in this
regard.
iii. The National Medical Council (NMC) is
requested to take action against the 30
offending HCPs as per Indian Medical Council
(Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics)
Regulations, 2002.

4.20. His submission is that, firstly, once the
reprimand had been issued, no further action
could be taken by any authority. Secondly, in
the present matter, notices have been issued by
the Registrar of Companies when there is no
direction by the Committee to the ROC to issue
any notices. Thirdly, that even that order could
not have been passed, since the complaint was
anonymous in nature.

4.21. By referring to Clause 10, Learned Senior
Counsel’s submission is that any complainant
Digitally Signed By:
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ought to identify himself and provide the
complete postal address; without such
identification and without such details being
furnished, the complaint could not have been
processed. The DOP could not have forwarded
the complaint to the Ethics Committee for
taking any action. The Ethics Committee should
also have considered this aspect and refrained
from taking any action on an anonymous
complaint, so the foundational requirement was
for the complainant to be identified and if the
complainant was a pharmaceutical company,
the complaint was required to comply with the
additional requirement of being signed or
authorised signed or authorised in writing by
the Company's Managing Director or Chief
Executive or a person of equivalent rank. In the
present case, admittedly, the complaint being
anonymous, neither DOP nor the Ethics
Committee could have proceeded on the same.

4.22. Lastly, Learned Senior Counsel’s submission is
that similar issues have been considered by the
Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Dr. Kiran Ninad
Hebbalkar & Ors. v. ACPMP [WP(C)
No.10370/2026 and CM. APPL No.48020/2026].
Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
05/11/2026, 17:30, Bengaluru
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The Hon'ble Delhi High Court has, vide order
dated 04.08.2026, stayed the operation of the
impugned order dated 23.12.2024 insofar as it
directed the initiation of action against the
petitioners in that case.

4.23. Learned Senior Counsel also refers to the
decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in
Dr Jagdish Jadavbhai Sakhiya v. Gujarat
Medical Council & Anr. [Spl. Civil Appl.
No.9821/2026 dt.27.07.2026] and submits that
the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat also observed
that the company which organised the
conference had merely been reprimanded,
whereas the Petitioners, who were medical
practitioners, had been subjected to harsher
punishment. It therefore granted interim relief
in the proceedings against the doctors . His
submission is that the Hon'ble Delhi High Court
and the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court having
stayed the proceedings on those grounds would
also apply to the present matter.

4.24. Sri.Udaya Holla, learned Senior Counsel,
submits that the notice issued by the Ministry
of Corporate Affairs on 12.05.2026 is also
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based on the order passed by the Apex
Committee on 23.12.2024. In particular,
paragraph (ix) of the notice makes a clear and
categorical reference to the order passed by the
Apex Committee for Pharma Marketing
Practices in ACPMP No. 1 of 2024 , dated
23.12.2024, in the matter concerning the
Petitioner under UCPMP 2024.

4.25. Paragraph (x) of the notice further records, with
reference to the order dated 23.12.2024 passed
by the Apex Committee, that the company had
spent Rs. 1.91 crores on travel tickets and hotel
accommodation for what were described as
“extravagant pleasure trips under the guise of
conferences”. On this basis, he submits that the
action has been taken in pursuance of the Apex
Committee’s order and that the Ministry of
Corporate Affairs has no independent basis for
taking such action. It was merely because there
was a reprimand which had been issued that
the Petitioner did not challenge the order of the
Apex Committee, since it did not serve any
purpose. However, the MCA, now acting on the
order of the Apex Committee, having initiated
separate proceedings, the Petitioner has no
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option but to challenge the order of the Apex
Committee, as well as the notice issued by the
MCA.

4.26. Learned Senior Counsel reiterates that neither
the Ethics Committee nor the Apex Committee
could have taken up the matter when the
complaint was anonymous, there being a
specific embargo. In this regard, he relies
particularly on Clause 10 of UCPMP 2024, which
requires the complainant to be identified and to
provide full particulars. The UCPMP 2024, more
particularly Clause 10, is reproduced hereunder
for easy reference;
10. Lodging of Complaints
10.1 All complaints, related to the breach of the
Code should be addressed to the "Ethics
Committee for Pharma Marketing Practices
(ECPMP)", "Chief Executive Officer”, “Name of
Association"
10.2 All complaints related to an activity of
breach of the Code should, to the extent
practicable, be made at one time. The complaint
must be made within six months of the alleged
breach of the Code, with a maximum of another
six months for reasonable delay that can be
explained in writing. Related complaints may be
clubbed together by the Ethics Committee to
save time and expedite disposal.
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10.3 Complaints must be in writing and for each
case The Complainant should:
i. identify himself (whether a company, entity or
an individual) with a full mailing address (email
and mobile telephone no).
ii. identify the company, which is alleged to have
breached the Code, including the name of any
company personnel, product, or products, which
are specifically involved.
iii. give the details of the activity which is alleged
to be in breach of the Code, give the date of the
alleged breach, clauses of the Code which are
alleged to have been breached, and provide
supporting evidence of the alleged breaches).
10.4 A non-refundable amount of Rs.1,000/ is to
be deposited by the complainant along with the
complaint. The respective association will
elaborate on their website how this payment is
to be made. No pseudonymous or anonymous
complaints or those made without the prescribed
fee will be entertained.
10.5 When the complaint is from a
pharmaceutical company, the complaint must be
signed or authorized in writing by the company's
managing director or chief executive officer or a
person at an equivalent level.
10.6 When it appears from media reports (other
than letters to the editor of a publication) that a
company may have breached the Code, the
matter may be treated as complaint, and the
committee may request the concerned
publication for further information, and the
source or the correspondent may be treated as
the complainant.
10.7 Any complaint received by the Department
of Pharmaceuticals may also be forwarded to the
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concerned Association for necessary action. In
such cases, the concerned Association will take
up the matter further with the complainant
concerned. The Department may order a special
audit for the purpose.

4.27. By referring to Clause 10.4 of the UCPMP 2024,
Learned Senior Counsel’s submission is that no
pseudonymous or anonymous complaints or
those made without the prescribed fee will be
entertained. He submits that, since Clause 10.4
expressly prohibits the entertainment of
pseudonymous or anonymous complaints and
the complaint in the present case is admittedly
anonymous, neither the Ethics Committee nor
the Apex Committee nor the Ministry of
Corporate Affairs can initiate action on its basis .

4.28. Learned Senior Counsel refers to the decision of
the Ethics Committee, which is reproduced
hereunder for easy reference;
PRELIMINARY ISSUES TO BE DECIDED AT
THE THRESHOLD
Issue No. 1
Whether the two Conferences subject matter in
the instant Complaint will fall under the purview
of UCPMP 2024 and/or UCPMP 2014?
OPPI ECPMP Decision
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In our considered view, the allegations involving
the two Conferences, which are the subject
matter of the instant Complaint will be governed
by UCPMP 2014, and not UCPMP 2024, which
was notified on March 12,2024.
IMCAS 2024 which was held from February 1 to
3, 2024, will clearly fall within the purview of
UCPMP 2014.
As regards AMWC 2024, which was held between
March 26-29, 2024, the OPPI ECPMP is of the
opinion that it too comes under the purview of
UCPMP 2014 for the following reasons:

a. Immediately after the issuance of UCPMP
2024, the DoP convened consultations
with the pharmaceutical industry
associations (OPPI, IPA and IDMA)
wherein requests were made across-
board by all pharma associations for a
grace period for complying with UCPMP
2024. OPPI, vide its representation dated
April 17, 2024, requested the DoP to
inter alia provide for transition time till
June, 2024.

We understand that it is because of the
said requests that DoP Circular 1 of 2024
dated May 28, 2024 was issued. Circular
1 of 2024 provided for a separate and
stand-alone prospective self-declaration
format (to be signed by executive heads
of the Companies) for FY 2024-25 w.e.f.
April 1, 2024 through to March 31, 2025
which was to be submitted by June 30,
2024 to the respective associations i.e.,
OPPI, in this case. Therefore, it can be
stated that since the self-declaration to
be made by the Executive Heads
declaring/undertaking compliance of
UCPMP 2024 did not pertain to the period
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March 13-March 31, 2024 of the
Financial Year 2023-24, it is not
applicable for the said period during
which AMWC 2024 was held.

ISSUE No. 2
Whether the OPPI ECPMP can entertain an
anonymous complaint under UCPMP 2014?
OPPI ECPMP Decision
No. The instant Complaint being anonymous
cannot be entertained under the provisions of
UCPMP 2014.
Para 10.3 (i) of UCPMP 2014 requires the
complainant to identify himself (whether a
company or an individual) with a full
mailing address (fax number, if possible,
mobile telephone nos.).... Para 10.4 requires
deposit of a non-refundable amount of
Rs.1,000/-.
While UCPMP 2014 does not expressly prescribe
that an anonymous or pseudonymous complaint
without the same prescribed fee of INR 1000
cannot be entertained, it essentially does
expressly require disclosure of the complainant's
name and deposit of fee.

ISSUES DECIDED ON MERITS
ISSUE No. 3
Whether Allergan's engagement with HCPs
under PSAs is permissible under UCPMP
2014?
OPPI ECPMP Decision
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Yes. As per the interpretation of the Note to Para
7 of UCPMP 2014 read with Regulation 6.8.1 (g)
of the MCI Code, 2002, a pharmaceutical
company can have a relationship with HCPs
within the scope of Regulation 6.8.1 (g) of the
MCI Code.
Further, unlike Paras 6 and 6.2 (i) of UCPMP
2024, there were no express provision UCPMP
2014 in respect to CME or a provision prohibiting
such conferences to take place in foreign
locations.
Para 7.1 and Para 7.2 of UCPMP 2014 disallows
travel and hospitality to an HCP respectively,
unless such an HCP is a speaker at a CME/CPD.
However, a proviso to Para 7 provides that
"Where there is any item missing, the code of
MCI as per "Indian Medical Council (Professional
Conduct, etiquette and ethics) Regulation, 2002
as amended from time to time will prevail."
Regulation 6.8.1 (g) of the MCI Code does allow
a medical practitioner to work for pharmaceutical
companies in a wide variety of capacities-
advisory capacities, as consultants, as
researchers, as treating doctors, or in any other
professional capacity.
" Regulation 6.8.1 : In dealing with
Pharmaceutical and allied health sector
industry…
g) Affiliation : A medical practitioner may work
for pharmaceutical and allied healthcare
industries in advisory capacities, as consultants,
as researchers, as treating doctors or in any
other professional capacity. In doing so, a
medical practitioner shall always:
(i) Ensure that his professional integrity and
freedom are maintained.
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(ii) Ensure that patients' interests are not
compromised in any way.
(iii) Ensure that such affiliations are within the
law.
(iv) Ensure that such affiliations/employments
are fully transparent and disclosed."
To examine this issue further, OPPI ECPMP
sought for the copies of the PSAs signed with the
concerned 30 HCPs. The PSAs along with copies
of CV, Questionnaire on education, relevant
publication, research experience, scientific
knowledge etc. of HCPs were provided by
Allergan.
The OPPI ECPMP examined the PSAs and related
documents and found the following:
i. That selection of the HCPs met the selection
criteria. (see below under Issue No. 4)
ii. The PSAs were duly executed with individual
HCPs (in their professional capacity).
iii. All PSAs have categorical post-conference
commitment for the HCPs for a period of one
year from the effective date of the PSAs of
providing educational training Knowledge
Dissemination Activity as per the requirements
of Allergan, which in most cases is due by
January/March 2025.
iv. Further, all PSAs have defined "Services for
the HCPs, ie, to conduct Knowledge
Dissemination Activity.
v. Furthermore, the 'Compensation' clause states
that it includes payment of programme
participation fee, along HCPs travel, hotel
accommodation and legitimate meal expenses
and that no other fee or compensation shall be
payable to the HCPs to conduct the Knowledge
Dissemination Activity.
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OPPI ECPMP is of the considered view that in the
absence of any specific provision on industry
engagement with HCPs in their professional
capacity in UCPMP 2014, the provisions of the
MCI Code would become applicable, rendering
the said arrangements with the HCPs under the
PSAs legally valid.
However, the OPPI ECPMP directs Allergan to
furnish the information in respect of the
Knowledge Dissemination to be undertaken by
the 30 HCPs towards fulfilment of their obligation
under the said 30 PSAs prior to March 31, 2025,
within two months thereafter i.e., by May 31,
2025.

ISSUE No. 4
Whether the identification of HCPs for the
two Conferences was based on sales
generated for Allergan by the 30 HCPs
Sales in 2023?
OPPI ECPMP Decision
OPPI ECPMP examined the 'Sales & Expense
Tracker for AbbVie in India: 2024' (Annexure 3)
filed with the Complaint with details in respect of
2023 AbbVie business and the collated sales
data from its distributors titled 'HCP Sales data'
for the year 2023 provided by Allergan to the
OPPI ECPMP and find that the figures are similar
if not the same.
OPPI ECPMP sought further information from
Allergan on September 16, 2024 regarding
internal policy/SoP on maintenance of sales
records to HCPs.
Allergan provided the extracts of it's internal
policy in relation to interaction with HCPs, and
specifically in relation to PSAs with HCPs to the
OPPI ECPMP on September 18, 2024.
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Allergan has stated that its internal policy in
relation to interaction with HCPs, and specifically
in relation to professional services engagement
with HCPs is aligned with the Uniform Code of
Pharmaceutical Practice (UCPMP) 2014 and
UCPMP 2024, OPPI guidelines and directions
issued from time to time, and industry practices.
The OPPI ECPMP's considered view is that the
business generated by the HCPs in 2023 was not
the determining criteria for the selection of the
HCPs for attending the two conferences in 2024
for the following reasons:
i. The selection of HCPs was based on a defined
and objective selection process. Qualifications
were examined, vetted and approved by the
company's Medical Affairs team Annexure B to
Allergan’s response dated August 26, 2024. HCP
Selection Questionnaire on education, relevant
publication, research experience scientific
knowledge etc. based on speciality of the HCP's,
examination of detailed, curriculum vitae and
read with 'Levels and Tiers assigned to such
HCPs basis Experience and Skills, Medical
Approval for participation in the respective
conferences as shared by Allergan along with it's
response dated September 2, 2024
ii. All the PSAs have an express provision stating
that the PSA is not intended to influence HCP's
decisions or choices regarding the use of, or
prescription of Allergan's products; or the HCPs
are not required to demonstrate any preference
in prescribing or recommending AbbVie's
products as a consequence of the PSAs.
The relevant clause in the PSAs is reproduced
below:
1.2.1 "The Parties acknowledge that:
(a) the consideration provided by AbbVie in the
form of the compensation (including the
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payment of the monetary compensation, if any)

is not conditional upon Counterparty
recommending, administering or prescribing
AbbVie products and has not been determined in
any manner which takes into account the volume
or value of any referrals or business between
Counterparty and AbbVie; and
(b) nothing in this agreement is intended to (i)
influence Counterparty's medical decisions or
choices regarding the use of, or prescription of
AbbVie's products; or (ii) cause Counterparty to
demonstrate any preference in prescribing or
recommending AbbVie's products as a
consequence of AbbVie entering into this
Agreement.
iii. The criterion for Selection and Qualifications
outlined in the extracts of Allergan's Internal
Policy for engaging HCPs, as shared on
September 18, 2024 have the following specific
clauses:
•
Individuals contracted for Professional
Services must be selected based on
objective criteria and should be
chosen by personnel qualified to
assess the expertise and ability of the
individual to effectively provide the
requested Professional Services.

•
Individuals may not be selected for
Professional Services as an incentive
to prescribe, purchase, use, or
recommend AbbVie Products.

•
The number of individuals contracted
must not be greater than the number
reasonably necessary to achieve the
legitimate business need

Further, under the section on 'Legitimate
Business Need', the internal policy also
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Prescribes that 'services may not be offered or
given with the intent to reward. induce, or in
exchange for, an explicit or implicit agreement
or understanding that AbbVie Products will be
used, purchased, leased, ordered, prescribed.
recommended, or arranged for or provided
formulary or other preferential or qualifying
status.
In this context, OPPI ECPMP also wishes to state
here that even Clause 7.4 of the OPPI Code 2019
permits engagement of services from HCPs and
inter alia states that the members can engage
HCPs as consultants and advisors for services
provided certain criteria are met. The criteria
inter alia include:
a) A written contract or agreement must be
agreed in advance of the commencement of the
services which specifies the nature of the
services to be provided and the basis for
payment of those services.
b) A legitimate need for the services must be
clearly identified and documented in advance.
c) The criteria for selecting consultants must be
directly related to the identified need and the
consultants must have the expertise necessary
to provide the service.
d) The hiring of the consultant to provide the
relevant service must not be an inducement to
prescribe, recommend, purchase, supply, and/or
administer any medicine.
ISSUE NO. 5
Whether the alleged tax evasion by Allergan by
claiming these expenses as marketing
promotional expenses is a violation of UCPMP
2014?
OPPI ECPMP Decision
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No. There are no Income Tax (IT) related
provisions in UCPMP 2014.
It is important to recognise that even under
UCPMP 2024, OPPI ECPMP understands that the
decision/s under the Income Tax Act, 1961 is to
be taken by the IT authorities and not by the
association ECPMP.
In the light of the above, Allergan should assess
its liability under the Income Tax (IT) Act. 1961
and applicable Circulars thereunder [Explanation
3 to Section 37(1) and Circular 12 of 2022 in
respect of Section 194 R (2) of the IT Act 1961,
if applicable] and it has time till October 31,
2024 to file its return for FY 23-24.
OPPI ECPMP decides and disposes off the
Anonymous Complaint dated May 21, 2024
accordingly.

4.29. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the Ethics
Committee while answering Issue No.1 had
come to a categorical finding that the complaint
will be governed by the UCPMP 2014 and not
UCPMP 2024. The UCPMP 2024 was notified on
12.03.2024, and the conferences were held
prior to that date. While answering Issue No.2,
the Ethics Committee has come to a categorical
conclusion that an anonymous complaint cannot
be entertained under the provisions of UCPMP
2014. While answering issue No.3, the Ethics
Committee has categorically held that the
Petitioner's engagement with HCPs under the
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PSA is permissible under UCPMP 2014. Insofar
as the purposes mentioned in Regulation No.6
are concerned, Clause 6 of the UCPMP 2014 is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference;
6. Gifts
6.1 No gifts, pecuniary advantages or benefits in
kind may be supplied, offered or promised to
persons qualified to prescribe or supply drugs,
by a pharmaceutical company or any of its
agents i.e. distributors, wholesalers, retailers
etc.
6.2 Gifts for the personal benefit of healthcare
professionals and family members(both
immediate and extended) such as tickets to
entertainment events) also are not be offered or
provided.

4.30. While answering Issue No.4, the Ethics
Committee came to a conclusion that the
business generated by the HCPs in 2023 was
not the determining criterion for the selecting
the HCPs to attend the two conferences, and
while answering Issue No.5, it categorically
came to a conclusion that there is no tax
evasion by the Petitioner in claiming the
expenses of marketing promotional expenses.

4.31. Learned Senior Counsel’s submission is that
once the Ethics Committee has passed the
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above order, neither the Petitioner nor the
anonymous complainant had sought review of
the said order. Learned Senior Counsel
therefore submits that the Apex Committee
could not have reviewed the ECPMP’s decision
as a suo motu appeal and passed the impugned
order.

4.32. Be that as it may, Learned Senior Counsel again
reiterates that the order of the Apex Committee
was not challenged by the Petitioner, since it
was only an order of reprimand and the
reprimand as such was accepted by the
Petitioner. Now that the MCA has issued a
notice in furtherance of the said order calling
upon the Petitioner to furnish various
documents and is proposing to conduct an
enquiry which is not envisaged or permitted by
the Ethics Committee or by the Apex
Committee, the Petitioner is challenging those
orders also.

4.33. He relies on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in Union of India and Ors. v Ram
Lakhan Sharma [(2018) 7 SCC 670],
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particularly paras 24 and 33, which have been
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
24. The disciplinary proceedings are quasi-
judicial proceedings and the Enquiry Officer
is in the position of an independent
adjudicator and is obliged to act fairly,
impartially. The authority exercising quasi-
judicial power has to act in good faith without
bias, in a fair and impartial manner.
Xxx
33.The Division Bench after elaborately
considering the issue summarised the principles
in para 16 which is to the following effect:
“16. We may summarise the principles thus:
(16) The Enquiry Officer, who is in the
position of a Judge shall not act
as a Presenting Officer, who is in
the position of a prosecutor.
(ii) It is not necessary for the disciplinary
authority to appoint a Presenting Officer in each
and every inquiry. Non-appointment of a
Presenting Officer, by itself will not vitiate the
inquiry.
(iii) The Enquiry Officer, with a view to arrive at
the truth or to obtain clarifications, can put
questions to the prosecution witnesses and also
the defence witnesses. In the absence of a
Presenting Officer, if the Enquiry Officer puts any
questions to the prosecution witnesses to elicit
the facts, he should thereafter permit the
delinquent employee to cross-examine such
witnesses on those clarifications.
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(iv) If the Enquiry Officer conducts a regular
examination-in-chief by leading the prosecution
witnesses through the prosecution case, or puts
leading questions to the departmental witnesses
pregnant with answers, or cross-examines the
defence witnesses or puts suggestive questions
to establish the prosecution case against the
employee, the Enquiry Officer acts as prosecutor
thereby vitiating the inquiry.
(v) As absence of a Presenting Officer by itself
will not vitiate the inquiry and it is recognised
that the Enquiry Officer can put questions to any
or all witnesses to elicit the truth, the question
whether an Enquiry Officer acted as a Presenting
Officer, will have to be decided with reference to
the manner in which the evidence is let in and
recorded in the inquiry.
Whether an Enquiry Officer has merely acted
only as an Enquiry Officer or has also acted as a
Presenting Officer depends on the facts of each
case. To avoid any allegations of bias and
running the risk of inquiry being declared as
illegal and vitiated, the present trend appears to
be to invariably appoint Presenting Officers
except in simple cases. Be that as it may.”

4.34. By relying on Ram Lakhan Sharma, Learned
Senior Counsel submits that the Enquiry Officer,
being an independent adjudicator in quasi-
judicial disciplinary proceedings, is required to
act fairly and impartially and cannot assume
the role of a Presenting Officer.
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4.35. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that
Respondent No.4 has not acted independently
but has acted as per the instructions received.

4.36. He relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in Union of India v Mahendra Singh
[2022 SCC OnLine SC 909], particularly para 15
and 16, which have been reproduced hereunder
for easy reference:
15. A three Judge Bench of this Court in a
judgment reported as Chandra Kishore Jha
v. Mahavir Prasad, held as under:

“17…............ It is a well-settled salutary
principle that if a statute provides for a
thing to be done in a particular manner,
then it has to be done in that manner
and in no other manner. (See with
advantage: Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor
I(1935-36) 63 IA 372 : AIR 1936 PC 253
(2)), Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of
V.P. [AIR 1954 SC 322: 1954 SCR 1098],
State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh [AIR 1964
SC 358 : (1964) 1 SCWR 57].) An election
petition under the rules could only have
been presented in the open court up to 16-
5-1995 till 4.15 p.m. (working hours of the
Court) in the manner prescribed by Rule 6
(supra) either to the Judge or the Bench as
the case may be to save the period of
limitation. That, however, was not done…

16. The said principle has been followed by
this Court in Cherukuri Mani v. Chief
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Secretary, Government of Andhra
Pradesh11 wherein this Court held as under:

“14. Where the law prescribes a thing to
be done in a particular manner
following a particular procedure, it shall
be done in the same manner following
the provisions of law, without deviating
from the prescribed procedure …


4.37. By relying on Mahendra Singh , Learned
Senior Counsel submits that where the
applicable statutory provisions or rules
prescribe a particular procedure for undertaking
an action, the authority concerned is bound to
adhere to the procedure so prescribed and
cannot act in deviation therefrom. Applying the
aforesaid principle to the facts of the present
case, Learned Senior Counsel contends that the
impugned action, having been taken without
following the procedure mandatorily prescribed
under the applicable rules, is contrary to law
and cannot be sustained. It is, therefore,
submitted that the impugned action is liable to
be set aside for non-compliance with the
prescribed procedure.

4.38. He relies upon Sudarshan V. Biradar v. State
of Karnataka [2023 SCC OnLine Kar 178],
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particularly para 14, which has been
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
14. As observed hereinabove, it is trite law
that the Rule making power conferred
upon by the parent Act cannot travel
beyond the mandate of the parent Act .
The view of mine in this regard is fortified by
the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
1
UNION OF INDIA v. A. SRINIVASAN wherein
the Apex Court considers the entire spectrum
of the law rendered from time to time and
holds that a provision therein was contrary to
the provision contained in the enabling Act.
The Apex Court has held as follows:

“21. At this stage, it is apposite to state about
the rule-making powers of a delegating
authority. If a rule goes beyond the rule-
making power conferred by the statute, the
same has to be declared ultra vires. If a rule
supplants any provision for which power has
not been conferred, it becomes ultra vires. The
basic test is to determine and consider the
source of power which is relatable to the rule.
Similarly, a rule must be in accord with
the parent statute as it cannot travel
beyond it.

22. In this context, we may refer with profit to
the decision in General Officer Commanding-
in-Chief v. Subhash Chandra Yadav [(1988) 2
SCC 351 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 542 : (1988) 7 ATC
296 : AIR 1988 SC 876] wherein it has been
held as follows : (SCC p. 357, para 14)

“14. … before a rule can have the effect of a
statutory provision, two conditions must be
fulfilled, namely, (1) it must conform to the
provisions of the statute under which it is
framed; and (2) it must also come within
the scope and purview of the rule-making
power of the authority framing the rule. If
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either of these two conditions is not
fulfilled, the rule so framed would be
void.”

23. In Delhi Admn. v. Siri Ram [(2000) 5 SCC
451 : AIR 2000 SC 2143] it has been ruled
that it is a well-recognised principle that the
conferment of rule-making power by an
Act does not enable the rule-making
authority to make a rule which travels
beyond the scope of the enabling Act or
which is inconsistent therewith or
repugnant thereto.

24. In Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar
Singh Raghuvanshi [(1975) 1 SCC 421 : 1975
SCC (L&S) 101 : AIR 1975 SC 1331] the
Constitution Bench has held that : (SCC p.
433, para 18)

“18. … statutory bodies cannot use the
power to make rules and regulations to
enlarge the powers beyond the scope
intended by the legislature. Rules and
regulations made by reason of the specific
power conferred by the statute to make rules
and regulations establish the pattern of
conduct to be followed”.

25. In State of Karnataka v. H. Ganesh
Kamath [(1983) 2 SCC 402 : 1983 SCC (Cri)
514 : AIR 1983 SC 550] it has been stated
that : (SCC p. 410, para 7)

“7. … It is a well-settled principle of
interpretation of statutes that the conferment
of rule-making power by an Act does not
enable the rule-making authority to make
a rule which travels beyond the scope of
the enabling Act or which is inconsistent
therewith or repugnant thereto.”

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26. In Kunj Behari Lal Butail v. State of H.P.
[(2000) 3 SCC 40 : AIR 2000 SC 1069] it has
been ruled thus : (SCC p. 46, para 13)

“13. It is very common for the legislature to
provide for a general rule-making power to
carry out the purpose of the Act. When such a
power is given, it may be permissible to
find out the object of the enactment and
then see if the rules framed satisfy the
test of having been so framed as to fall
within the scope of such general power
confirmed. If the rule-making power is
not expressed in such a usual general
form then it shall have to be seen if the
rules made are protected by the limits
prescribed by the parent Act.”

27. In St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v.
National Council for Teacher Education [(2003)
3 SCC 321 : AIR 2003 SC 1533] it has been
observed that : (SCC p. 331, para 10)

“10. A regulation is a rule or order prescribed
by a superior for the management of some
business and implies a rule for general course
of action. Rules and regulations are all
comprised in delegated legislations. The
power to make subordinate legislation is
derived from the enabling Act and it is
fundamental that the delegate on whom
such a power is conferred has to act
within the limits of authority conferred by
the Act. Rules cannot be made to supplant
the provisions of the enabling Act but to
supplement it. What is permitted is the
delegation of ancillary or subordinate
legislative functions, or, what is fictionally
called, a power to fill up details.”

28. In Global Energy Ltd. v. Central Electricity
Regulatory Commission [(2009) 15 SCC 570]
this Court was dealing with the validity of
clauses (b) and (f) of Regulation 6-A of the
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Central Electricity Regulatory Commission
(Procedure, Terms and Conditions for Grant of
Trading Licence and Other Related Matters)
Regulations, 2004. In that context, this Court
expressed thus : (SCC p. 579, para 25)

“25. It is now a well-settled principle of law
that the rule-making power ‘for carrying out
the purpose of the Act’ is a general delegation.
Such a general delegation may not be held to
be laying down any guidelines. Thus, by
reason of such a provision alone, the
regulation-making power cannot be exercised
so as to bring into existence substantive rights
or obligations or disabilities which are not
contemplated in terms of the provisions of the
said Act.”

29. In the said case, while discussing further
about the discretionary power, delegated
legislation and the requirement of law, the
Bench observed thus : (Global Energy Ltd.
case [(2009) 15 SCC 570], SCC p. 589, para
73)

“73. The image of law which flows from this
framework is its neutrality and objectivity : the
ability of law to put sphere of general decision-
making outside the discretionary power of those
wielding governmental power. Law has to provide a
basic level of ‘legal security’ by assuring that law is
knowable, dependable and shielded from excessive
manipulation. In the contest of rule-making,
delegated legislation should establish the structural
conditions within which those processes can
function effectively. The question which needs to be
asked is whether delegated legislation promotes
rational and accountable policy implementation.
While we say so, we are not oblivious of the
contours of the judicial review of the legislative
Acts. But, we have made all endeavours to keep
ourselves confined within the well-known
parameters.”

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30. In this context, it would be apposite to
refer to a passage from State of T.N. v. P.
Krishnamurthy [(2006) 4 SCC 517] wherein it
has been held thus : (SCC p. 529, para 16)

“16. The court considering the validity of a
subordinate legislation, will have to consider
the nature, object and scheme of the enabling
Act, and also the area over which power has
been delegated under the Act and then decide
whether the subordinate legislation conforms
to the parent statute. Where a rule is directly
inconsistent with a mandatory provision of the
statute, then, of course, the task of the court
is simple and easy. But where the
contention is that the inconsistency or
non-conformity of the rule is not with
reference to any specific provision of the
enabling Act, but with the object and
scheme of the parent Act, the court
should proceed with caution before
declaring invalidity.”

31. In Pratap Chandra Mehta v. State Bar Council
of M.P. [(2011) 9 SCC 573], while discussing about
the conferment of extensive meaning, it has been
opined that : (SCC p. 604, para 58)

“58. … The Court would be justified in giving
the provision a purposive construction to
perpetuate the object of the Act, while
ensuring that such rules framed are within the
field circumscribed by the parent Act. It is also
clear that it may not always be absolutely
necessary to spell out guidelines for delegated
legislation, when discretion is vested in such
delegatee bodies. In such cases, the language of
the rule framed as well as the purpose sought to be
achieved, would be the relevant factors to be
considered by the Court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
It is further germane to notice the judgment of the
Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the
case of KALLU KHAN v. STATE OF MADHYA
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2
PRADESH , wherein the Division Bench considers
the very enactment, which reads as follows:

“15. For the regulation of registration of births and
deaths and matters connected therewith,
Parliament has enacted the Registration of Births
and Deaths Act, 1969. Different procedures were
prescribed under Chapter III-Registration of Births
and Deaths and section 13 deals with Delayed
Registration of Births and Deaths. Same is
reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:—

“13. Delayed registration of births and deaths.
—
(1) Any birth of which information is given to the
Registrar after the expiry of the period specified
therefore, but within thirty days of its occurrence,
shall be registered on payment of such late fee as
may be prescribed.

(2) Any birth or death of which delayed information
is given to the Registrar after thirty days but within
one year of its occurrence shall be registered only
with the written permission of the prescribed
authority and on payment of the prescribed fee and
the production of an affidavit made before the
notary public or any other officer authorised in this
behalf by the State Government.

(3) Any birth or death which has not been
registered within one year of its occurrence,
shall be registered only on an order made by a
Magistrate of the first class or a Presidency
Magistrate after verifying the correctness of
the birth or death and on payment of the
prescribed fee.

(4) The provisions of this section shall without
prejudice to any action that may be taken against a
person for failure on his part to register any birth or
death within the time specified therefore and any
such birth or death may be registered during the
pendency of any such action.”

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16. Certain penalties have also been prescribed
under section 23 of the Act of 1969 to those
persons who may fail without any reasonable cause
to give information which it is his duty to give
under any of the provisions of sections 8 and 9. He
may face imposition of penalty as prescribed.
Similarly, power to prosecute (section 25) and
power to compound offences (section 24) are also
provided under the frame work of Act of 1969.
Therefore, it is clear that any noncompliance or
omission to give information attracts
penalties/penal provisions.

17. Act of 1969 gives power to the State
Government to make rules as per section 30 of the
Act of 1969. Same bears significance in the set of
factual set up of present case. For ready reference
section 30 of the Act of 1969 is reproduced
hereinbelow:—

“30. Power to make rules. — (1) The State
Government may, with the approval of the Central
Government, by notification in the Official Gazette,
make rules to carry out the purpose of this Act.
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the
generality of the foregoing provision, such rules
may provide for—

(a) the forms of registers of births and deaths
required to be kept under this Act;

(b) the period within which and the form and the
manner in which information should be given to the
Registrar under section 8’

(c) the period within which and the manner in
which births and deaths shall be notified under
sub-section (1) of section 10;

(d) the person from whom and the form in
which a certificate as to cause of death shall be
obtained;

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(e) the particulars of which extracts may be
given under section 12;

(f) the authority which may grant
permission for registration of a birth or
death under sub-section (2) of section 13;

(g) the fees payable for registration made
under section 13;

(h) the submission of reports by the Chief
Registrar under subsection (4) of section 4;

(i) the search of birth and death registers and
the fees payable for such search and for the
grant of extracts from the registers;

(j) the forms in which and the intervals at
which the returns and the statistical report
under section 19 shall be furnished and
published;

(k) the custody, production and transfer of the
registers and other records kept by Registrars;

(1) The correction of errors and the
cancellation of entries in the register of births
and deaths;

(m) any other matter which has to be, or may
be, prescribed. (3) Every rule made under this
Act shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is
made, before the State Legislature.”

18. If section 13(3) and 30(f)(g) are seen
in juxtaposition then it makes the
legislative intent clear that by section
13(3) of the Act of 1969, Parliament has
given the authority to Judicial Magistrate
First Class (or Presidency Magistrate) to
verify the correctness of the birth or
death if not registered within one year of
its occurrence and understandably so
because after one year dispute and
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discrepancies may occur in respect of
date of birth or death of a person.

19. As per section 15 of Juvenile Justice
(Protection and Care of Children) Act, 2015;
wherein, person above 16 years but below 18
years if commits heinous offence then after
due procedure as prescribed may be tried in
Children's Court rather than before Juvenile
Justice Board. Age of prosecutrix assumes
importance in matters of POCSO Act and to
avoid all these complications, section 13 of Act
of 1969 provides mechanism for verification of
claim regarding correctness of birth or death
beyond one year of its occurrence, before the
Judicial Magistrate First Class only and not
before the Executive Magistrate.

20. Perusal of section 30 of Act of 1969
reveals that authority/power to make
rules to the State Government has been
given by the Parliament in respect of
section 13(2) and in respect of fees
payable for registration ismade under
section 13. But very specifically, section
13(3) is not under the purview of Rule
Making Authority of State Government. In
fact, sub-section (2) of section 30 starts
with following words:— “In particular,
and without prejudice to the generality of
the foregoing provision, such rules may
provide for”, therefore, State Government
can make rules as per the letter and spirit
of section 30 and 13(3) of Act of 1969
only and cannot go beyond that.

21. In the State of Madhya Pradesh, in
exercise of powers conferred by section 30 of
the act of 1969, State Government made rules
namely M.P. Registration of Births and Deaths
Rules, 1999. Earlier rules with the
nomenclature Registration of Births and
Deaths M.P. Rules, 1973 were repealed by the
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Rules of 1999, therefore, at present Rules of
1999 are in existence.

22. Here, Rule 9 is worth consideration
because it gives authority for delayed
registration and fee payable. Rule 9 of Rules of
1999 is reproduced hereinbelow for ready
reference:—

“9. Authority for delayed registration and
fee payable therefore. — (1) Any birth or
death of Which information is given to the
Registrar after the expiry of the period
specified in Rule 5 but within thirty days of its
occurrence, shall be registered on payment of
a late fee of rupees two.
(2) Any birth or death of which information is
given to the Registrar after thirty days but
within one year of its occurrence, shall be
registered only with the written permission of
the office authorised in this behalf and on
payment of a late fee of rupees five and on the
officer authorised in this behalf by the State
Government.

(3) Any birth or death which has not been
registered within one year of its
occurrence, shallbe registered only on an
order of a Magistrate of the first class or
an Executive Magistrate and on payment
of a late fee of rupees ten.”

23. Perusal of Rule 9(3) indicates that with
Magistrate of First Class (apparently JMFC),
the authority of Executive Magistrate has
also been inserted which if is read in
consonance with section 13(3) and
section 30(2)(f) and (g) of Act of 1969
then it gives an impression that Act no
where provides any authority to Executive
Magistrate to deal with delayed
registration, but Rules included him.

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28. Rule 13(3) in specific terms gives
authority to Magistrate of First Class (or a
Presidency Magistrate) to exercise
authority for delayed registration but
nowhere gives any authority to Executive
Magistrate. Even otherwise, spirit of
section 13(3) indicates that correctness
of birth or death is to be made after due
verification by JMFC and that verification
can only be made by way of a judicial
proceeding, may be it a summery
proceeding, but certainly as per
recognized principles of adjudication.

29. JMFC has all the necessary tools including
to call witnesses, requisition of record from
any public authority, compelling the
attendance of officers/witnesses and
appreciating the rival submissions and
evidence beside other tools of adjudication.
Executive Magistrate is not equipped with such
adjudicatory tools including the authority as
referred above. Therefore, understandably,
legislative intent under section 13(3) was to
confer jurisdiction over JMFC only and not
otherwise.

30. Careful reading of section 30 of Act of
1969 if seen in juxtaposition to section 20
of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it makes
the case further clear that State
Government could not have framed Rules
contrary to the directions contained in
section 30 of Act of 1969. In other words,
the Attempt cannot exceed the Authority.
Section 20 of General Clauses Act, 1897 is
reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:—

“Section 20. Construction of notifications
etc., issued under enactments. — Where,
by any Central Act or regulation, a power to
issue any notification, order, scheme, rule,
form or bye-law is conferred, then expressions
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used in the notification, order, scheme, rule,
form, or byelaw, if it is made after the
commencement of this act, shall unless there
is anything repugnant in the subject or
context, have the same respective meaning as
in the Act or Regulation conferring the power.”

(Emphasis supplied)

The Apex Court in a judgment rendered on
16.12.2022 in the case of KERALA STATE
3
ELECTRICITY BOARD v. THOMAS JOSEPH has
held as follows:

“66. At this stage, it is apposite to state about
the rule making powers of a delegating
authority. If a rule goes beyond the rule
making power conferred by the statute,
the same has to be declared invalid. If a
rule supplants any provision for which
power has not been conferred, it becomes
invalid. The basic test is to determine and
consider the source of power, which is
relatable to the rule. Similarly, a rule must be
in accord with the parent statute, as it cannot
travel beyond it.

67. Delegated legislation has come to stay as
a necessary component of the modern
administrative process. Therefore, the question
today is not whether there ought to be
delegated legislation or not, but that it should
operate under proper controls so that it may
be ensured that the power given to the
Administration is exercised properly; the
benefits of the institution may be utilised, but
its disadvantages minimised. The doctrine of
ultra vires envisages that a rule making
body must function within the purview of
the rule making authority conferred on it
by the parent Act. As the body making
rules or regulations has no inherent
power of its own to make rules, but
derives such power only from the statute,
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it has to necessarily function within the
purview of the statute. Delegated
legislation should not travel beyond the
purview of the parent Act. If it does, it is
ultra vires and cannot be given any effect.
Ultra vires may arise in several ways; there
may be simple excess of power over what is
conferred by the parent Act; delegated
legislation may be inconsistent with the
provisions of the parent Act or statute law or
the general law; there may be non-compliance
with the procedural requirement as laid down
in the parent Act. It is the function of the
courts to keep all authorities within the
confines of the law by supplying the doctrine of
ultra vires.

68. In this context, we may refer with profit to
the decision in General Officer Commanding-
in-Chief v. Dr. Subhash Chandra Yadav,
(1988) 2 SCC 351, wherein it has been held as
follows:—

“14. ….before a rule can have the effect of
a statutory provision, two conditions must
be fulfilled, namely, (1) it must conform
to the provisions of the statute under
which it is framed; and (2) it must also
come within the scope and purview of the
rule making power of the authority
framing the rule. If either of these two
conditions is not fulfilled, the rule so
framed would be void…..”

69. In Additional District Magistrate (Rev.)
Delhi Admn. v. Siri Ram, (2000) 5 SCC 451, it
has been ruled that it is a well recognised
principle that the conferment of rule-making
power by an Act does not enable the rule-
making authority to make a rule which travels
beyond the scope of the enabling Act or which
is inconsistent therewith or repugnant thereto.

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70. In Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar
Singh Raghuvanshi, (1975) 1 SCC 421, the
Constitution Bench has held that:
“ 18 .….These statutory bodies cannot use the
power to make rules and regulations to
enlarge the powers beyond the scope intended
by the Legislature. Rules and regulations made
by reason of the specific power conferred by
the statute to make rules and regulations
establish the pattern of conduct to be followed.
…”

71. In State of Karnataka v. H. Ganesh
Kamath, (1983) 2 SCC 402, it has been stated
that:

“ 7. …..It is a well-settled principle of
interpretation of statutes that the conferment
of rule-making power by an Act does not
enable the rule-making authority to make a
rule which travels beyond the scope of the
enabling Act or which is inconsistent therewith
or repugnant thereto.”

72. In Kunj Behari Lal Butail v. State of H.P.,
(2000) 3 SCC 40, it has been ruled thus:—

“ 13. It is very common for the legislature to
provide for a general rule-making power to
carry out the purpose of the Act. When such a
power is given, it may be permissible to find
out the object of the enactment and then see if
the rules framed satisfy the test of having
been so framed as to fall within the scope of
such general power confirmed. If the rule-
making power is not expressed in such a usual
general form then it shall have to be seen if
the rules made are protected by the limits
prescribed by the parent act…….”

73. In St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v.
Regional Director, National Council for Teacher
Education, (2003) 3 SCC 321, it has been
observed that:
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“ 10. A regulation is a rule or order prescribed
by a superior for the management of some
business and implies a rule for general course
of action. Rules and regulations are all
comprised in delegated legislation. The power
to make subordinate legislation is derived from
the enabling Act and it is fundamental that the
delegate on whom such a power is conferred
has to act within the limits of authority
conferred by the Act. Rules cannot be made to
supplant the provisions of the enabling Act but
to supplement it. What is permitted is the
delegation of ancillary or subordinate
legislative functions, or, what is fictionally
called, a power to fill up details…..”

74. In Global Energy Limited v. Central
Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2009) 15
SCC 570, this Court was dealing with the
validity of clauses (b) and (f) of Regulation 6-A
of the Central Electricity Regulatory
Commission (Procedure, Terms and Conditions
for Grant of Trading Licence and other Related
Matters) Regulations, 2004. In that context,
this Court expressed as under:—

“ 25. It is now a well-settled principle of law
that the rule-making power “for carrying out
the purpose of the Act” is a general delegation.
Such a general delegation may not be held to
be laying down any guidelines. Thus, by
reason of such a provision alone, the
regulation-making power cannot be exercised
so as to bring into existence substantive rights
or obligations or disabilities which are not
contemplated in terms of the provisions of the
said Act.

75. In the aforementioned case, while
discussing further about the discretionary
power, delegated legislation and the
requirement of law, the Bench observed thus:

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“ 73. The image of law which flows from this
framework is its neutrality and objectivity : the
ability of law to put sphere of general decision-
making outside the discretionary power of
those wielding governmental power. Law has
to provide a basic level of “legal security” by
assuring that law is knowable, dependable and
shielded from excessive manipulation. In the
contest of rule-making, delegated legislation
should establish the structural conditions
within which those processes can function
effectively. The question which needs to be
asked is whether delegated legislation
promotes rational and accountable policy
implementation. While we say so, we are not
oblivious of the contours of the judicial review
of the legislative Acts. But, we have made all
endeavours to keep ourselves confined within
the well-known parameters.”

76. In this context, it would be apposite to
refer to a passage from State of T.N. v. P.
Krishnamurthy, (2006) 4 SCC 517 wherein it
has been held thus:—

“ 16. The court considering the validity of a
subordinate legislation, will have to consider
the nature, object and scheme of the enabling
Act, and also the area over which power has
been delegated under the Act and then decide
whether the subordinate legislation conforms
to the parent statute. Where a rule is directly
inconsistent with a mandatory provision of the
statute, then, of course, the task of the court
is simple and easy. But where the contention is
that the inconsistency or nonconformity of the
rule is not with reference to any specific
provision of the enabling Act, but with the
object and scheme of the parent Act, the court
should proceed with caution before declaring
invalidity.”

77. In Pratap Chandra Mehta v. State Bar
Council of Madhya Pradesh, (2011) 9 SCC 573,
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while discussing about the conferment of
extensive meaning, it has been opined that:

“ 58. ….The Court would be justified in giving
the provision a purposive construction to
perpetuate the object of the Act, while
ensuring that such rules framed are within the
field circumscribed by the parent Act. It is also
clear that it may not always be absolutely
necessary to spell out guidelines for delegated
legislation, when discretion is vested in such
delegatee bodies. In such cases, the language
of the rule framed as well as the purpose
sought to be achieved, would be the relevant
factors to be considered by the Court.”

78. In Dr. Mahachandra Prasad Singh v.
Chairman, Bihar Legislative Council, (2004) 8
SCC 747, this Court explained the concept of
delegated legislation thus:

“ 13. …..Underlying the concept of delegated
legislation is the basic principle that the
legislature delegates because it cannot directly
exert its will in every detail. All it can in
practice do is to lay down the outline.

This means that the intention of the
legislature, as indicated in the outline (that is
the enabling Act), must be the prime guide to
the meaning of delegated legislation and the
extent of the power to make it. The true extent
of the power governs the legal meaning of the
delegated legislation. The delegate is not
intended to travel wider than the object of the
legislature. The delegate's function is to serve
and promote that object, while at all times
remaining true to it. That is the rule of primary
intention. Power delegated by an enactment
does not enable the authority by regulations to
extend the scope or general operation of the
enactment but is strictly ancillary. It will
authorise the provision of subsidiary means of
carrying into effect what is enacted in the
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statute itself and will cover what is incidental
to the execution of its specific provision. But
such a power will not support attempts to
widen the purposes of the Act, to add new and
different means of carrying them out or to
depart from or vary its ends. (See Section 59
in chapter “Delegated Legislation” in Francis
rd
Bennion's Statutory Interpretation, 3
Edn.)…….”

79. In McEldowney v. Forde, [1971] A.C. 632 :
[1969] 3 WLR 179, Lord Diplock explained the
role of the Courts in this area in the following
words:

“The division of functions between Parliament
and the courts as respects legislation is clear.
Parliament makes laws and can delegate part
of its power to do so to some subordinate
authority. The courts construe laws whether
made by Parliament directly or by a
subordinate authority acting under delegated
legislative powers. The view of the courts as to
whether particular statutory or subordinate
legislation promotes or hinders the common
weal is irrelevant. The decision of the courts as
to what the words used in the statutory or
subordinate legislation mean is decisive.
Where the validity of subordinate legislation
made pursuant to powers delegated by Act of
Parliament to a subordinate authority is
challenged, the court has a threefold task :
first, to determine the meaning of the words
used in the Act of Parliament itself to describe
the subordinate legislation which that authority
is authorised to make, secondly, to determine
the meaning of the subordinate legislation
itself and finally to decide whether the
subordinate legislation complies with that
description.”

80. A delegated power to legislate by
making rules or regulations ‘for carrying
out the purpose of the Act’, is a general
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delegation without laying down any
guidelines; it cannot be exercised so as to
bring into existence the substantive rights
or obligations or disabilities not
contemplated by the provisions of the Act,
2003 itself . The Court, considering the
validity of a subordinate legislation, will have
to consider the nature, object and scheme of
the enabling Act, and also the area over which
power as has been delegated under the Act
and then decide whether the subordinate
legislation conforms to the parent statute.

81. It is important to keep in mind that
where a rule or regulation is directly
inconsistent with a mandatory provision
of the statute, then, of course, the task of
the Court is simple and easy . But where the
contention is that the inconsistency or non-
conformity of the rule is not with reference to
any specific provision of the enabling Act, but
with the object and scheme of the parent Act,
the Court should proceed with caution before
declaring the same to be invalid.

82. Rules or regulation cannot be made to
supplant the provisions of the enabling
Act but to supplement it. What is
permitted is the delegation of ancillary or
subordinating legislative functions, or,
what is fictionally called, a power to fill up
details.

83. A Constitution Bench of this Court in the
case of Sukhdev Singh (supra), while
explaining the fine distinction between a rule
and regulation and also the power of the
delegate authority to frame such rules or
regulations has made few very important
observations which we must take notice of and
quote as under:

“11. The contentions on behalf of the
employees are these. Regulations are
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made under the statute. The origin and
source of the power to make regulations
is statutory. Regulations are self-binding
in character. Regulations have the force
of law inasmuch as the statutory
authorities have no right to make any
departure from the regulations.

12. Rules, regulations, schemes, bye-
laws, orders made under statutory
powers are all comprised in delegated
legislation. The need for delegated
legislation is that statutory rules are
framed with care and minuteness when
the statutory authority making the rules
is after the coming into force of the Act in
a better position to adapt the Act to
special circumstances. Delegated
legislation permits utilisation of
experience and consultation with
interests affected by the practical
operation of statutes.
xxxxxxxxx

14. Subordinate legislation is made by a
person or body by virtue of the powers
conferred by a statute. Bylaws are made in the
main by local authorities or similar bodies or
by statutory or other undertakings for
regulating the conduct of persons within their
areas or resorting to their undertakings.
Regulations may determine the class of cases
in which the exercise of the statutory power by
any such authority constitutes the making of
statutory rules.

15. The words “rules” and “regulations” are
used in an Act to limit the power of the
statutory authority. The powers of statutory
bodies are derived, controlled and restricted by
the statutes which create them and the rules
and regulations framed thereunder. Any action
of such bodies in excess of their power or in
violation of the restrictions placed on their
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powers is ultra vires. The reason is that it goes
to the root of the power of such corporations
and the declaration of nullity is the only relief
that is granted to the aggrieved party.


18. The authority of a statutory body or public
administrative body or agency ordinarily
includes the power to make or adopt rules and
regulations with respect to matters within the
province of such body provided such rules and
regulations are not inconsistent with the
relevant law. In America a “public agency” has
been defined as an agency endowed with
governmental or public functions. It has been
held that the authority to act with the sanction
of Government behind it determines whether
or not a governmental agency exists. The rules
and regulations comprise those actions of the
statutory or public bodies in which the
legislative element predominates. These
statutory bodies cannot use the power to
make rules and regulations to enlarge the
powers beyond the scope intended by the
Legislature. Rules and regulations made
by reason of the specific power conferred
on the statute to make rules and
regulations establish the pattern of
conduct to be followed. Rules are duly
made relative to the subject-matter on
which the statutory bodies act
subordinate to the terms of the statute
under which they are promulgated.
Regulations are in aid of the enforcement
of the provisions of the statute. Rules and
regulations have been distinguished from
orders or determination of statutory
bodies in the sense that the orders or
determination are actions in which there
is more of the judicial function and which
deal with a particular present situation.
Rules and regulations on the other hand
are actions in which the legislative
element predominates.
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(Emphasis in original)

33. The Apex Court again considers the entire
spectrum of the law and lays down that
Statutory Bodies cannot use the power to
make rules to enlarge the powers beyond the
scope intended by the legislature. Any action
of the State in excess of their power would be
declared a nullity on the ground of it being
ultra vires the Act.


4.39. By relying on Sudarshan V. Biradar , Learned
Senior Counsel submits that, in the absence of
any recommendation or direction to Respondent
No. 4, the latter has exceeded its authority and
cannot conduct an inquiry . It is contended that
any action taken by the State authority in
exercise of a power not conferred by the parent
enactment, would be ultra vires and legally
unsustainable. Applying the aforesaid principle
to the notice issued by the Ministry of
Corporate Affairs on 12.05.2026, learned Senior
Counsel submits that the notice derives its
authority from the Apex Committee’s order
dated 23.12.2024 . Since there is a clear and
categorical reference made to the order passed
by the Apex Committee for Pharma Marketing
Practices in ACPMP No.1 of 2024 dated
23.12.2024 in the matter of the Petitioner
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under the UCPMP 2024 at para (ix), and since
the order merely reprimanded the Petitioner
and did not direct an inquiry, he submits that
the notice is without jurisdiction and liable to be
set aside.

4.40. Learned Senior Counsel’s submission therefore
is that the above petition is required to be
allowed and the reliefs sought for granted.

5. Smt.Nayanatara.B.G., learned counsel appearing for
Respondents No.1, 2 and 4 submits that:

5.1. The impugned order dated 23.12.2024 at
Annexure-A of the Apex Committee has neither
been passed in the Review jurisdiction nor in
the Appellate jurisdiction.

5.2. Learned Counsel for Respondents No.1, 2 and 4
submits that the entire manner in which the
matter was proceeded with is different. Her
contention is that a complaint was received by
the Department of Pharmaceuticals (DOP) and
not addressed to the Ethics Committee or the
UCPMP. The complaint was forwarded by the
DOP to the Ethics Committee as also the Apex
Committee to take action, and in that
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background, she submits that Clause 10 of
either the UCPMP of 2014 or UCPMP of 2024
would not be applicable to the present facts and
situation.

5.3. Learned Counsel for Respondents No.1, 2 and 4
also refers to Rule 9 of the UCPMP 2024, which
is reproduced hereunder for easy reference;
9. Ethics Committee for Pharma Marketing
Practices
9.1 All the Indian Pharmaceutical Associations
will upload the UCPMP on their website along
with the detailed procedure for lodging of
complaints which will be linked to the UCPMP
portal of the Department of Pharmaceuticals.
9.2 There will be a committee for handling
complaints named as "Ethics Committee for
Pharma Marketing Practices (ECPMP)" in each
Association, chaired by its Chief Executive
Officer. The Committee will have three to five
members, and its composition will be approved
by the Board of the Association and prominently
placed on its website.
9.3 If a complaint received in a particular
association is not concerned with its members,
the receiving association will input the abstract
of the complaint and will duly transfer the
complaint to such other association where the
Respondent company is a member of the other
association.
9.4 In case of companies, who are not members
of any Association, or member of more than one
Association, the complaint should ordinarily be
handled by the Pharma Industry Association to
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whom the complainant has addressed the
complaint; and where necessary, it will seek
guidance from the Department of
Pharmaceuticals.
9.5 All pharma associations will share on their
website the details of complaints received i.e.
the nature of complaint, the company against
whom the complaint has been made, the present
status of the complaint, including action taken
by the ECPMP, and such details should remain
uploaded for five years. Such details should also
be uploaded on the UCPMP portal of the
Department of Pharmaceuticals.


5.4. By relying on Rule 9, Learned Counsel for
Respondents No.1, 2 and 4 submits that it
relates to complaints received by the
Association and not the DOP, the ECPMP in
each Association, chaired by its Chief Executive
Officer, considers complaints received by that
Association .

5.5. Learned Counsel for Respondents No.1, 2 and 4
refers to Rule 10 of UCPMP 2024, which is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
10. Lodging of Complaints
10.1 All complaints, related to the breach of the
Code should be addressed to the "Ethics
Committee for Pharma Marketing Practices
(ECPMP)", "Chief Executive Officer". "Name of
Association".
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10.2 All complaints related to an activity of
breach of the Code should, to the extent
practicable, be made at one time. The complaint
must be made within six months of the alleged
breach of the Code, with a maximum of another
six months for reasonable delay can be
explained in writing. Related complaints may be
clubbed together by the Ethics Committee to
save time and expedite disposal.
10.3 Complaints must be in writing and for each
case The Complainant should:
i. identify himself (whether a company, entity or
an individual) with a full mailing address (email
and mobile telephone no).
ii. identify the company, which is alleged to have
breached the Code, including the name of any
company personnel, product, or products, which
are specifically involved.
iii. give the details of the activity which is alleged
to be in breach of the Code, give the date of the
alleged breach, clauses of the Code which are
alleged to have been breached, and provide
supporting evidence of the alleged breach(es).
10.4 A non-refundable amount of Rs.1,000/- is
to be deposited by the complainant along with
the complaint. The respective association will
elaborate on their website how the payment is to
be made. this. No pseudonymous or anonymous
complaints or those made without the prescribed
fee will be entertained.
10.5. When the complaint is from a
pharmaceutical company, the complaint must be
signed or authorized in writing by the company's
managing director or chief executive officer or a
person at an equivalent level.
10.6 When it appears from media reports (other
than letters to the editor of a publication) that a
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company may have breached the Code, the
matter may be treated as complaint, and the
committee may request the concerned
publication for further information, and the
source or the correspondent may be treated as
the complainant.
10.7 Any complaint received by the
Department of Pharmaceuticals may also be
forwarded to the concerned Association for
necessary action. In such cases, the
concerned Association will take up the
matter further with the complainant
concerned. The Department may order a
special audit for the purpose.


5.6. Relying on Rule 10, Learned Counsel for
Respondents No.1, 2 and 4 submits that this
Rule applies to complaints relating to breach of
the Code which are addressed to the Ethics
Committee and it is only with regard to those
complaints that the complainant is required to
be identified and to provide a full mailing
address, and Clause 10.4 expressly prohibits
the entertainment of pseudonymous or
anonymous complaints or complaints made
without the prescribed fee.

5.7. Learned Counsel for Respondent No.1, 2 and
4’s submission is that the procedure for lodging
of complaints under the UCPMP 2024 in terms
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of Rule 10 is for complaints lodged under the
UCPMP to the Ethics Committee and the same
cannot be extended to a complaint received by
the DOP under Clause 10.7.

5.8. Learned Counsel for Respondents No.1, 2 and 4
refers to the order dated 24.08.2024 passed by
the Section Officer (Policy) of the Department
of Pharmaceuticals, Ministry of Chemicals and
Fertilisers, Government of India, which clearly
mentions that the Department of
Pharmaceuticals vide OM dated 25.06.2024 had
referred a complaint to the OPPI against its
member, the Petitioner herein, as per para 10.7
of UCPMP 2024.

5.9. The OPPI had subsequently sought guidance on
the matter from the DOP, stating that the
complaint was anonymous. The DOP, vide its
letter dated 11.08.2024, invited the concerned
stakeholders, viz., the Ethics Committee of
OPPI and the Petitioner, to appear before the
Apex Committee under UCPMP 2024. On that
day, though the Director General of OPPI had
appeared with another member of the Ethics
Committee, the Managing Director of the
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Petitioner did not attend the meeting. The
Director General of OPPI had requested more
time to receive input from the Petitioner, and
the Apex Committee had also decided, in
accordance with para 10.7, to conduct a Special
Audit of the Petitioner, whose office is located
in Bangalore, and an Internal Audit Team of the
DOP was directed to conduct the Special Audit.

5.10. Learned Counsel for Respondent No.1, 2 and
4’s submission is that the aspect of anonymity
was considered by the DOP and the DOP,
having considered the seriousness of the issue,
had referred the matter to the Apex Committee
in terms of Clause 10.7, which has been
extracted above. Learned Counsel for
Respondents No.1, 2 and 4 submits that in
terms of Clause 10.7, any complaint received
by the DOP may also be forwarded to the
concerned Association for necessary action and
the Department may order a Special Audit for
the purpose.

5.11. Learned Counsel for Respondents No.1, 2 and 4
submits that apart from forwarding the
complaint to the concerned Association for
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necessary action, the DOP also ordered a
Special Audit on 02.09.2024 in terms of
Annexure-M, directing the Petitioner to furnish
the various documents indicated therein and
informed the Petitioner that an internal audit
team had been constituted by the DOP to
conduct the special audit of the Petitioner. The
audit team would be headed by Dr Ranjitha
from the Office of the Chief Controller of
Accounts, Department of Pharmaceuticals,
Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilisers. The
Petitioner was informed that some members of
the audit team would visit the Petitioner to
collect and verify the various documents as
stated therein.

5.12. Learned Counsel for Respondents No.1, 2 and 4
submits that the said letter of 02.09.2024 had
been received by the Petitioner, the Petitioner
had replied on 04.09.2024 stating that all the
necessary documents and information had been
supplied to the OPPI, the information sought in
the Special Audit Letter went beyond the initial
request received from the OPPI and the
allegations mentioned in the anonymous
complaint and on that basis it was contended
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that the Petitioner had indicated that it was
under no obligation to share the supporting
documents requested by the Special Audit
Team. Nevertheless, it furnished all the
requested documents and details. A clarification
was sought from DOP regarding the audit
process and its procedural aspects by
requesting a meeting with DOP.

5.13. Learned Counsel for Respondents No.1, 2 and 4
submits that thereafter various audit memos
have been issued viz., Audit Memos No.1, 2, 3,
4 and 5 on 05.09.2024. The said Audit Memos
No.1 to 5 were replied to by the Petitioner on
06.09.2024, placing its comments on record. By
way of letter dated 09.09.2024, the Senior
Accounts Officer had sought certain further
details from the Petitioner and also issued Audit
Memos No.6 and 7 on 09.09.2024. By way of
Audit Memo No.6, a specific query was raised to
provide the details of the deductions/rebates
claimed while calculating the applicable Income
Tax for the Financial Year 2022-23 to 2023-24,
and by way of Audit Memo No.7, a specific
query was raised regarding the list of medical
devices and drugs sold by the Petitioner,
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breakdown of sales expenses, categorization of
the medical devices, association of the
Petitioner with IMCAS 2024 and AMWC 2024,
the training imparted by the doctors who
attended IMCAS 2024 and AMWC 2024.

5.14. Learned Counsel for Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and
4 submits that the Petitioner replied to these
details and audit memos on 10.09.2024;
thereafter, a corrigendum to Audit Memo No. 7
and Audit Memo No. 8 was issued on
10.09.2024, which the Petitioner replied to on
12.09.2024. She submits that along with the
said reply, various documents and emails were
enclosed with the reply.

5.15. Learned Counsel for Respondents No.1, 2 and 4
draws a distinction between the order of the
Ethics Committee and the Special Audit Report.
Though these aspects were going on in parallel,
the Special Audit was being conducted by the
audit team appointed by the DOP. The Ethics
Committee was hearing the matter in respect of
the complaint, in furtherance of which the
Ethics Committee passed its order on
20.09.2024. The Special Audit Committee also
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submitted a separate report on 20.09.2024 to
the Secretary, DOP.

5.16. By referring to the Special Audit Report,
Learned Counsel for Respondents No.1, 2 and 4
submits that the main objective of the Special
Audit was to fact-check and scrutinize the
veracity of the allegations made against the
Petitioner in the complaint received by the DO
and referred to the OPPI under para 10.7 of the
UCPMP 2024.

5.17. Learned Counsel for Respondents No.1, 2 and 4
submits that the report considered the
contravention of the Guidelines of the UCPMP
by sending 30 doctors to luxury destinations
like Paris and Monaco in early 2024 by Business
Class, involving stays in 5-star hotels, even
though they were not speakers at the
conferences. The Petitioner claimed these
expenses as marketing costs, and the doctors
received untaxed benefits, which were passed
on to the patients who face higher treatment
costs.

5.18. Learned Counsel for Respondents No.1, 2 and 4
submitted that the audit report is a detailed
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report of nearly 20 pages by virtue of which all
the data was fact-checked, and the final the
report concluded that the Petitioner had
included the expenditure on Continuing Medical
Education (CME)/Continuing Professional
Development (CPD) for income-tax purposes
for FY 2022-23, and that no HCP had served as
a speaker at IMCAS Paris 2024 or AMWC
Monaco 2024 . Learned Counsel for Respondents
No.1, 2 and 4 therefore submits that there
being a violation of the UCPMP and the IMC
regulations, action was required to be taken.

5.19. This Special Audit Report had been forwarded
to the Petitioner, who responded to it on
12.10.2024. In the reply, it was again
reiterated by the Petitioner that an anonymous
complaint could not be looked into by the DOP.
The UCPMP 2024 was not applicable to IMCAS
Paris, which was held from 01.02.2024 to
03.02.2024, before UCPMP 2024 was notified
on 12.03.2024. AMWC, Monaco was held from
26.03.2024 to 29.03.2024, shortly after the
notification. Hence, the Petitioner had
contended that there ought to be a transitional
grace period up to 30.06.2024 since all the
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bookings, etc. had been made prior to UCPMP
2024 coming into force. It was denied that
there was any contravention of the UCPMP
2014, etc.

5.20. In furtherance of the said reply, the Apex
Committee convened a meeting on 21.10.2024,
at which representatives of the Petitioner, the
Director General of OPPI and officials of the
Department of Pharmaceuticals were present.
Upon examination of the documents and the
submissions made, the Committee issued its
order dated 07.11.2024 . Upon examining the
documents, the Apex Committee formed the
opinion that there were apparent breaches of
para 7.1 and 7.2 of UCPMP 2014, para 6.2.1,
8.2 and 8.3 of UCPMP 2024 and para 6.8.1 (b)
and (c) of the IMC Regulations, 2002 and
directed the Petitioner to offer comprehensive
assistance to underprivileged patients who were
receiving treatment at Central Army Hospitals
(including life-saving medications or surgeries)
for an amount equivalent to the violations
confirmed by the Special Audit Team within 12
months from the date of the order.
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5.21. Learned Counsel for Respondents No.1, 2 and 4
submits that the Petitioner responded to the
said order on 10.12.2024, denying any violation
and rejecting the proposed remedial action. Her
submission, therefore, is that it is not only the
order of the Ethics Committee; the order of the
Apex Committee is also relevant .

5.22. Insofar as the Apex Committee is concerned,
Learned Counsel for Respondents No.1, 2 and 4
submits that in terms of Clause 10.7 of UCPMP
2024, any complaint received by the DOP could
be forwarded to the concerned association for
necessary action and in such cases, the
concerned association would take up the matter
further with the complainant concerned.
However, Learned Counsel for Respondents
No.1, 2 and 4 submits that Clause 10.7 also
provides for the department to order a Special
Audit for the purpose, which is what was
ordered and on the basis of the report of the
Special Audit Committee, the matter was taken
up by the Apex Committee. Learned Counsel for
Respondents No.1, 2 and 4 refers to Section
206 of the Companies Act 2013, which is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
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206. Power to call for information,
inspect books and conduct inquiries.—
(1) Where on a scrutiny of any document
filed by a company or on any information
received by him, the Registrar is of the
opinion that any further information or
explanation or any further documents
relating to the company is necessary, he
may by a written notice require the
company—
(a) to furnish in writing such information or
explanation; or
(b) to produce such documents, within such
reasonable time, as may be specified in the
notice.
(2) On the receipt of a notice under sub-
section (1), it shall be the duty of the
company and of its officers concerned to
furnish such information or explanation to
the best of their knowledge and power and
to produce the documents to the Registrar
within the time specified or extended by
the Registrar:
Provided that where such information or
explanation relates to any past period, the
officers who had been in the employment
of the company for such period, if so called
upon by the Registrar through a notice
served on them in writing, shall also
furnish such information or explanation to
the best of their knowledge.
(3) If no information or explanation is
furnished to the Registrar within the time
specified under subsection (1) or if the
Registrar on an examination of the
documents furnished is of the opinion that
the information or explanation furnished is
inadequate or if the Registrar is satisfied
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on a scrutiny of the documents furnished
that an unsatisfactory state of affairs exists
in the company and does not disclose a full
and fair statement of the information
required, he may, by another written
notice, call on the company to produce for
his inspection such further books of
account, books, papers and explanations
as he may require at such place and at
such time as he may specify in the notice:
Provided that before any notice is served
under this sub-section, the Registrar shall
record his reasons in writing for issuing
such notice.
(4) If the Registrar is satisfied on the basis
of information available with or furnished
to him or on a representation made to him
by any person that the business of a
company is being carried on for a
fraudulent or unlawful purpose or not in
compliance with the provisions of this Act
or if the grievances of investors are not
being addressed, the Registrar may, after
informing the company of the allegations
made against it by a written order, call on
the company to furnish in writing any
information or explanation on matters
specified in the order within such time as
he may specify therein and carry out such
inquiry as he deems fit after providing the
company a reasonable opportunity of being
heard:
Provided that the Central Government
may, if it is satisfied that the circumstances
so warrant, direct the Registrar or an
inspector appointed by it for the purpose to
carry out the inquiry under this sub-
section:
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Provided further that where business of a
company has been or is being carried on
for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose, every
officer of the company who is in default
shall be punishable for fraud in the manner
as provided in section 447.
(5) Without prejudice to the foregoing
provisions of this section, the Central
Government may, if it is satisfied that the
circumstances so warrant, direct inspection
of books and papers of a company by an
inspector appointed by it for the purpose.
(6) The Central Government may, having
regard to the circumstances by general or
special order, authorise any statutory
authority to carry out the inspection of
books of account of a company or class of
companies.
(7) If a company fails to furnish any
information or explanation or produce any
document required under this section, the
company and every officer of the company,
who is in default shall be punishable with a
fine which may extend to one lakh rupees
and in the case of a continuing failure, with
an additional fine which may extend to five
hundred rupees for every day after the first
during which the failure continues


5.23. Learned Counsel for Respondents No.1, 2 and 4
submits that independent of those proceedings
before the Ethics Committee or OPPI and/or the
Apex Committee, the Registrar has the power
under Section 206 to call for information,
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inspect books and conduct enquiries by way of
a written notice.

5.24. Learned Counsel for Respondent No.1, 2 and
4’s submission is that, irrespective of the Ethics
Committee reprimanding the Petitioner and the
Apex Committee imposing a penalty of the like
amount as spent on the HCPs, the conduct of
the business and the affairs of the company
require a further enquiry by the ROC since
there are other issues relating to the operation
of the company which the ROC can look into
and in that background, she submits that the
notice issued by the ROC on 12.05.2026 at
Annexure-JJ is proper and correct. What is only
sought for are the balance sheets, financial
reports, audit reports, minutes of the meetings,
etc., which could easily be provided by the
Petitioner. There is no need for the Petitioner to
refrain from or object to such providing of the
documents. If the Petitioner had nothing to
hide, then the documents, if in favour of the
Petitioner, would enure to the benefit of the
Petitioner.
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5.25. Learned Counsel for Respondents No.1, 2 and 4
submits that the due procedure in respect of
the said enquiry under Chapter XIV of the
Companies Act 2013 would be followed and
complied with.

5.26. Her submission is that no doctor can avail of
free travel and accommodation under the
Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct,
Etiquette and Ethics) Regulation 2002 and in
this regard, Learned Counsel for Respondents
No.1, 2 and 4 relies on Regulation 6.8, which is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
6.8 Code of conduct for doctors in their
relationship with pharmaceutical and allied
health sector industry"
The Section 6.8.1(b) shall be substituted in
terms of Notification published on 01.02.2016 in
Gazette of India, as under:-
(b) Travel Facilities A medical practitioner shall
not accept any travel Facility inside the country
or outside, including rail, road, air, ship, cruise
tickets, paid vacation, etc. from any
pharmaceutical or allied healthcare industry or
their representatives for self and family
members for vacation or for attending
conferences, seminars, workshops, CME
Programme. etc. as a delegate.
(iii) Action to be taken by the Council for
violation of Section 6.8, as amended vide
notification dated 10/12/2009, shall be
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prescribed by further amending the Section
6.8.1 as under:-

SECTION ACTION
6.8.1 In dealing with
Pharmaceutical and allied
health sector industry, a
medical practitioner shall follow
and adhere to the stipulations
given below:-


Gifts more than Rs. 1,000/-
upto Rs 5,000/-
a) Gifts. A medical practitioner
shall not receive any gift from
any pharmaceutical or allied
health care industry and their
sales people or representatives
Censure


Gifts more than Rs. 5,000/-
upto Rs 10.000/ Removal
from Indian Medical Register
or State Medical Register for 3
(three) months
Gifts more than Rs 10.000 Rs
50.000 Removal from Indian
Medical Register State Medical
Register for six months
Gifts more than Rs 50,000/-
Rs 1,00,000/ Removal from
Indian Medical Register of
State Medical Register for
(one) year
Gifts more than Rs 100,000/-
Removal for a period of more
than (one) year from Indian
Medical Register or State
Medical Register
b) Travel facilities A medical
practitioner shall not accept
any travel facility inside the
country or outside, including
rail. road, air, ship, cruise
Expenses for travel facilities
more than Fis 1.000/ upto Rs
5.000/- Censure
Expenses for travel facilities
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tickets, paid vacations etc from
any pharmaceutical or allied
healthcare industry or their
representatives for self and
family members for vacation or
for attending conferences,
seminars, workshops CME
programme etc. as a delegate
more than Ro 5.000/- upto Rs
10.000/ Removal from Indian
Medical Register or State
Medical Register for 3 three
months.
Expenses for travel facilities
murs than Ra 10,000/- to Ra.
50,000/- Removal from Indian
Medical Register or State
medical Register for 6 (six)
months


Expenses for travel facilities
more than Rs. 50,000/- to Rs.
1,00,000/-Removal from
Indian Medical Register or
State Medical Register for 1
(one) year
Expenses for travel facilities
more than Ra 1,00,000/-
Removal for a period of more
than 1 (one) year from Indian
Medical Register or State
Medical Register
Expenses for Hospitality more
than Rs. 1,000/- upto Rs.
5,000/- Censure
c) Hospitality. A medical
practitioner shall not accept
individually any hospitality like
hotel accommodation for self
and family members under any
pretext
Expenses for Hospitality more
than Rs. 5,000/- upto Rs.
10,000/- Removal from Indian
Medical Register or State
Medical Register for 3 (three)
months

Expenses for Hospitality more
than Rs 10.000/- to Rs.
50,000/- Removal from Indian
Medical Register or State
medical Register for 6 (six)
months
Expenses for Hospitality more
than more than Rs. 50,000/-
to Rs. 1,00,000/ Removal
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from Indian Medical Register
or State Medical Register for 1
(one) year
Expenses for Hospitality more
than Rs. 1,00,000/- Removal
for a period of more than 1
(one) year from Indian
Medical Register or State
Medical Register.
Cash or monetary grants more
than Rs. 1,000-upto Rs 5,000
Censure
d) Cash or monetary grants- A
medical practitioner shall not
receive any cash or monetary
grants from any
pharmaceutical and allied
healthcare industry for
individual purpose in individual
capacity under any pretext
Funding for medical research
study etc can only be received
through approved institutions
by modalities laid down by
law/rules/guidelines adopted
by such approved institutions
in a transparent manner It
shall always be fully disclosed
Cash or monetary grants more
than Rs 5,000/- to Rs 10,000
Removal from Indian Medical
Register of State Medical
Register for 3 (three) months
Cash or monetary grants more
than Rs. 10,000 50,000-
Removal from Indian Medical
Register of State Medical
Register for six) months
Cash or monetary grants more
than more than Rs. 5,.000/-
to Rs 1,00,000 Removal from
Indian Medical Register or
State Medical Register for 1
(one) year

Cash or monetary grants more
than Rs 1,00,000/- Removal
for a period of more than 1
(one) year from Indian
Medical Register or State
Medical Register

e) Medical Research A medical
practitioner may carry out,
participate in work in research
projects funded by
pharmaceutical and allied
healthcare industries A medical
practitioner is obliged to know
that the fulfilment of the
First time censure, and
thereafter removal of name
from Indian Medical Register
or State Medical Register for a
period depending upon the
violation of the clause

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following items (i) to (vii) will
be an imperative for
undertaking any research
assignment/project funded by
industry-for being proper and
ethical. Thus, in accepting such
a position a medical
practitioner shall
(i) Ensure that the particular
research proposal(s) has the
due permission from the
competent concerned
authorities
(ii) Ensure that such a research
project(s) has the clearance of
national/ state/institutional
committees/bodies ethics
(iii) Ensure that it fulfils all the
legal requirements prescribed
for medical research.
(iv) Ensure that the source and
amount of funding is publicly
disclosed at the beginning itself
(v) Ensure that proper care
and facilities are provided to
human volunteers, if they are
necessary for the research
project(s).
(vi) Ensure that undue animal
experimentations are not done
and when these are necessary
they are done in a scientific
and a humane way
(vii) Ensure that while
accepting such assignment
medical practitioner shall have
the freedom to publish the
results of the research in the
greater interest of the society
by inserting such a clause in
the MoU or any other
documents/agreement for any
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such assignment.
f) Maintaining Professional
Autonomy In dealing with
pharmaceutical and allied
healthcare industry a medical
practitioner shall always ensure
that there shall never be any
compromise either with his/her
own professional autonomy
and/or with the autonomy and
freedom of the medical
institution
First time censure, and
thereafter removal of name
from Indian Medical Register
or State Medical Register

First time censure, and
thereafter removal of name
from Indian Medical Register
or State Medical Register for a
period depending upon the
violation of the clause.
g) Affiliation: A medical
practitioner may work for
pharmaceutical and allied
healthcare industries in
advisory capacities, as
consultants, as researchers, as
treating doctors or in any other
professional capacity In doing
so, a medical practitioner shall
always

(i) Ensure that his professional
integrity and maintained.
freedom are
(ii) Ensure that patients
interest are not compromised
in any way.
(iii) Ensure that such
affiliations are within the law
(iv) Ensure that such
affiliations/employments are
fully transparent and disclosed.
h) Endorsement -A medical
practitioner shall not endorse
any drug or product of the
industry publically. Any study
conducted on the efficacy or
otherwise of such products
shall be presented to and/or
through appropriate scientific
bodies or published in
appropriate scientific journals
First time censure, and
thereafter removal of name
from Indian Medical Register
or State Medical Register

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in a proper way.



5.27. By relying on Regulation 6.8, Learned Counsel
for Respondent No.1, 2 and 4’s submission is
that no medical practitioner shall accept any
travel facility inside the country or outside,
including rail, road, air, ship and cruise tickets,
paid vacation etc., from any pharmaceutical or
allied health care industry or their
representatives for self and family members for
vacation or for attending conferences,
seminars, workshops, CME programs, etc. as a
delegate. Her submission is that the HPAs in
the present matter, being delegates, could not
have accepted any of those facilities provided
by the Petitioner.

5.28. Learned Counsel for Respondent No.1, 2 and
4’s submission is also that, knowing fully well
Regulation 6.8, the Petitioners could not have
provided those benefits to those doctors
(HCPs), thereby violating Regulation 6.8. She
therefore submits that the action taken by the
Respondent is proper and correct; there is no
enquiry required to be held.
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5.29. Insofar as the decisions of the Hon'ble Delhi
High Court and Hon'ble Gujarat High Court are
concerned, she submits they were interim
orders. The matter being heard, finally, those
decisions would not be applicable to the present
matter. Her submission is also that those
petitions have been filed by the HPAs and not
by the Petitioner and the reasoning given
therein would not be applicable to the present
facts.

5.30. On the above basis, Learned Counsel for
Respondents No.1, 2 and 4 submits that the
above petition is required to be dismissed.

6. Sri.Y.V.Raviraj., learned counsel for Respondent
No.3-Income Tax Department, would submit that;

6.1. The powers of the Income Tax Department are
separate and distinct from those of the OPPI.
He submits that the fact that the Ethics
Committee of the OPPI or the Apex Committee
has passed an order does not deprive the
Income Tax Department of the power to initiate
proceedings under the applicable provisions of
the Income Tax Act, where a violation is
disclosed.
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6.2. Learned counsel for Respondent No.3’s
submission therefore is that the reprimand
made by the Ethics Committee and/or remedial
measures suggested by the Apex Committee
will not come in the way of the Income Tax
Department exercising its jurisdiction under the
appropriate provision of the Income Tax Act. He
therefore submits that the above petition is
required to be dismissed.

7. Sri. Udaya Holla., learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the Petitioner, would firstly submit that;

7.1. Learned Senior Counsel again reiterates that
the complaint was anonymous; the entire
proceedings were initiated on the basis of an
anonymous complaint, which could not have
been acted upon by any of the authorities . His
submission is that even if it were to be
contended that DOP had constituted a Special
Audit Committee, the Special Audit has not
been conducted by the relevant qualified
auditors. He refers to Clause 14 of UCPMP 2024
which is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference;

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14. Miscellaneous
14.1 The Department of Pharmaceuticals may,
for furtherance of the provisions of this Code, or
for removal of difficulties in its operation, may
issue standing orders from time to time which
will be considered an integral part of this Code
14.2 The provisions of this Code, unless
exempted, or to the extent modified by standing
orders, shall apply mutatis mutandis to medical
devices and companies or entities manufacturing
or dealing with the sale and distribution of such
products.
14.3 The Department of Pharmaceutical will
notify a panel of auditors, either audit firms of
standing empanelled by the CAG or commercial
audit firms of repute having an experience of
dealing with such matters.
14.4 Finally, the Chief Executive Officer of the
company itself is responsible for adherence to
this Code, and a self-declaration in the format
given in the annexurs shall be submitted by the
executive head of the company within two
months of the end of every financial year to the
Association for uploading on their website, or
directly on the UCPMP portal of the Department
of Pharmaceuticals in case he is not a member of
such a body, or a member of more than one
such bodies.

7.2. By referring to Clause 14.3, Learned Senior
Counsel’s submission is that the Department of
Pharmaceuticals was required to notify a panel
of auditors, either audit firms of standing
empanelled by the CAG or reputed Commercial
Audit Firms having experience in dealing with
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such matters. It is from a list of those
empanelled auditors that the special audit team
had to be constituted with the consent and
concurrence of the Petitioner. The unilateral
appointment of the auditors to the Special Audit
Team do not satisfy the requirement of
Regulation 14.3.

7.3. Learned Senior Counsel submits that even a
delegate learns a lot during the course of a
conference. It is not only a speaker or a
presenter at the conference who can be said to
be learning. In fact, his submission is that the
speaker or presenter already knows the subject
presents it to those who do not; it is the
delegate who learns from the speakers and
presenters. It is for that reason that the
Petitioner had recommended the HPAs to
attend the said conference who have learned
from the said conference and have utilised the
learning during the course of their practice.

8. Smt.Nayanatara.B.G., learned counsel appearing for
Respondents No.1, 2 and 4, submits in her Sur-
rejoinder that:
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8.1. The Indian Medical Council (Professional
Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations,
2002 specifically prohibit a delegate from
accepting any benefit. Whether he learns from
the conference or not, is irrelevant once the
Regulations prohibit such acceptance of benefit.

8.2. Learned Counsel for Respondent No.1, 2 and
4’s submission, insofar as the Special Audit
Team is concerned, is that under Clause 10.7,
the DOP can order a Special Audit, which is not
covered by or governed by Clause 14.3. There
is no requirement for any consent or
concurrence to be obtained from the Petitioner
for such an audit. Regulation 14.3 stands
independent of 10.7, is her submission.

8.3. On all the above grounds, she submits that the
petition is required to be dismissed.

9. Heard Sri.Udaya Holla., learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the Petitioner, Smt.Nayanatara B.G.,
learned counsel appearing for Respondents No. 1, 2
and 4; and Sri. Y. V. Raviraj, learned counsel for
Respondent No. 3. Perused the papers.

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10. The points that would arise for determination are:

(i) Whether the impugned order dated
23.12.2024 passed by the Apex Committee
for Pharma Marketing Practices in ACPMP
No. 01/2024 is liable to be quashed on the
ground that the proceedings were initiated
on the basis of an anonymous complaint,
having regard to the provisions of the
Uniform Code for Pharmaceutical
Marketing Practices, 2014 and 2024?
(ii) Whether the Apex Committee was justified
in proceeding against the Petitioner and
passing the impugned order dated
23.12.2024, notwithstanding the findings
and decision of the Ethics Committee for
Pharma Marketing Practices dated
20.09.2024, and whether such action was
permissible in the absence of an appeal or
review in accordance with the applicable
Code?
(iii) Whether the proceedings initiated by the
Department of Pharmaceuticals, including
the special audit and the consequential
action taken by the Registrar of Companies
under Section 206 of the Companies Act,
2013, are without jurisdiction or otherwise
unsustainable in law on the grounds urged
by the Petitioner?
(iv) Whether the Petitioner has made out
grounds for quashing the impugned order
dated 23.12.2024 and the consequential
proceedings, including the summons dated
13.01.2026 and 09.02.2026 issued by the
Income Tax Department and the notice
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dated 12.05.2026 issued by the Registrar
of Companies, and for grant of the
consequential reliefs sought in the writ
petition?
(v) What Order?


11. This Court answers the above points as follows:

12. Answer to Point No. (i): Whether the impugned
order dated 23.12.2024 passed by the Apex
Committee for Pharma Marketing Practices in
ACPMP No. 01/2024 is liable to be quashed on
the ground that the proceedings were initiated
on the basis of an anonymous complaint,
having regard to the provisions of the Uniform
Code for Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices,
2014 and 2024?


12.1. Sri Udaya Holla, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the Petitioner, submits that the
proceedings originated from an unsigned
complaint received by the Department of
Pharmaceuticals (DOP) on 21.05.2024. The
impugned order itself describes the complaint
as anonymous. According to learned Senior
Counsel, this fact is admitted.

12.2. He relies on Clause 10 of the Code. Clause
10.3(i) requires every complainant, whether a
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company, an entity or an individual, to disclose
his identity, full mailing address, e-mail address
and mobile telephone number. Clause 10.4
provides that no pseudonymous or anonymous
complaint, or complaint made without the
prescribed fee of Rs.1,000/-, shall be
entertained. Clause 10.5 further requires a
complaint made by a pharmaceutical company
to be signed or authorised in writing by its
Managing Director or Chief Executive Officer.
Learned Senior Counsel submits that
identification of the complainant is a mandatory
condition for initiating the complaint process. In
its absence, the complaint could not be acted
upon.

12.3. On this basis, he submits that the DOP could
not have forwarded the complaint to the Ethics
Committee; the Ethics Committee could not
have acted upon it; and neither the Apex
Committee nor the Ministry of Corporate Affairs
could have proceeded on its basis. He contends
that the Code imposes an express prohibition
and that every authority dealing with the
complaint was bound by it.
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12.4. He points out that the Ethics Committee for
Pharma Marketing Practices of the OPPI
(ECPMP), in its decision dated 20.09.2024,
framed this very question as Issue No.2 and
answered it against entertaining the complaint.
The ECPMP held that an anonymous complaint
could not be entertained under UCPMP 2014, as
Clause 10.3(i) requires the complainant to
identify himself and Clause 10.4 prescribes
payment of the requisite fee.

12.5. He submits that UCPMP 2014 governs both
conferences. IMCAS 2024 was held from
01.02.2024 to 03.02.2024, before UCPMP 2024
was notified on 12.03.2024. Although AMWC
2024 was held from 26.03.2024 to 29.03.2024,
the commitments relating to the conference
had been made earlier and the industry was
still in a transitional period. The ECPMP
accepted this position while answering Issue
No.1. He also submits that both Codes are
voluntary codes of marketing practice.

12.6. In his rejoinder, learned Senior Counsel
reiterates that the entire proceedings rest on an
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anonymous complaint and that no authority
could have acted upon it.

12.7. He relies on Union of India v. Mahendra
Singh [2022 SCC OnLine SC 909] (paragraphs
15 and 16) for the principle that where the law
requires an act to be done in a particular
manner, it must be done in that manner and in
no other. He submits that the Code prescribes
the manner in which a complaint must be
lodged and that the prescribed procedure was
not followed.

12.8. Smt. Nayanatara B.G., learned counsel
appearing for Respondents No.1, 2 and 4,
submits that the complaint was not addressed
to the Ethics Committee or to any Association.
It was received by the DOP. She contends that
Clause 10 of neither Code applies to a
complaint received by the DOP.

12.9. She refers to Clause 9 of UCPMP 2024 and
submits that it deals with complaints received
by an Association. Such complaints are to be
dealt with by the ECPMP of the concerned
Association, chaired by its Chief Executive
Officer.
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12.10. She further refers to Clause 10 of UCPMP 2024
and submits that it governs complaints
addressed to the Ethics Committee. The
requirement to identify the complainant and the
prohibition against entertaining anonymous
complaints apply to that category of
complaints. They do not apply to a complaint
received by the DOP.

12.11. She relies on Clause 10.7, which permits the
DOP to forward a complaint received by it to
the concerned Association for necessary action
and also empowers the Department to order a
special audit. She refers to the order dated
24.08.2024 passed by the Section Officer
(Policy) of the DOP, which records that the
complaint had been referred to the OPPI by an
office memorandum dated 25.06.2024 under
Clause 10.7. The OPPI thereafter sought
guidance from the DOP because the complaint
was anonymous. By letter dated 11.08.2024,
the DOP called upon the Ethics Committee of
the OPPI and the Petitioner to appear before
the Apex Committee. The Managing Director of
the Petitioner did not attend the meeting.
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12.12. She submits that the DOP considered the fact
that the complaint was anonymous but, having
regard to the seriousness of the allegations,
referred the matter to the Apex Committee
under Clause 10.7 and also ordered a special
audit.

12.13. She points out that, when the special audit
report was furnished to the Petitioner, its reply
dated 12.10.2024 raised the same objection
regarding anonymity. The Apex Committee
heard the Petitioner's representatives on
07.11.2024, along with the Director General of
the OPPI and officials of the DOP.

12.14. The issue under this Point is limited. The
question is whether the anonymous nature of
the complaint can prevent the DOP from taking
it up and referring the matter to the Apex
Committee, having regard to Clauses 10.3 and
10.4 of the Code.

12.15. The material facts are not in dispute. The DOP
received a complaint on 21.05.2024 along with
supporting documents. The impugned order
describes those documents as “AbbVie's
internal records, featuring a sales and expense
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tracker”, containing the cost of each doctor's
travel, together with copies of flight tickets and
hotel booking vouchers. The impugned order
describes the complaint as “an anonymous
complaint”. Learned counsel for Respondents
No.1, 2 and 4 does not contend that the
complaint identified its author. Her case is that
the complaint was received by the DOP and was
not addressed to the Ethics Committee. She
therefore submits that Clauses 10.3 and 10.4 of
either Code do not apply, but that Clause 10.7
is applicable.

12.16. The subsequent steps are also clear from the
submissions and the record. The DOP referred
the complaint to the OPPI by office
memorandum dated 25.06.2024. The order
dated 24.08.2024 passed by the Section Officer
(Policy) of the DOP records that the reference
was made under Clause 10.7 of UCPMP 2024.
When the OPPI sought guidance from the DOP
on the ground that the complaint was
anonymous, the DOP, by letter dated
11.08.2024, called upon the Ethics Committee
of the OPPI and the Petitioner to appear before
the Apex Committee. The Managing Director of
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the Petitioner did not attend. The DOP ordered
a special audit on 02.09.2024. The ECPMP
decided the complaint on 20.09.2024, and the
special audit team submitted its report to the
Secretary of the DOP on the same date. As
recorded in the impugned order, the Apex
Committee heard the Petitioner on 30.09.2024
and 21.10.2024. The Respondents also refer to
a meeting held on 07.11.2024. The impugned
order was passed on 23.12.2024.

12.17. These events show that the matter proceeded
on two distinct tracks. The first was the
complaint referred to ECPMP of the OPPI. The
second was the action taken by the DOP, which
led to the proceedings before the Apex
Committee. The legal effect of anonymity must
be examined separately in relation to these two
tracks.

12.18. Both sides proceed on the basis that the Codes
are not statutes. The Petitioner describes them
as voluntary codes, and the Respondents do
not dispute that description. The forwarding
letter accompanying UCPMP 2014 states that
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the Code is to be voluntarily adopted by the
industry.

12.19. That does not make the Codes meaningless or
reduce them to private rules of the
Associations. UCPMP 2024 was issued on
12.03.2024 under the signature of the
Secretary to the Government of India,
Department of Pharmaceuticals. The Code
assigns several functions directly to the DOP.
Under Clauses 9.1 and 9.5, the Associations
must link their complaint procedures to the
UCPMP portal of the DOP and upload details of
complaints. Clause 9.4, which deals with
companies that belong to no Association or to
more than one Association, permits the
concerned Association to “seek guidance from
the Department of Pharmaceuticals”, where
necessary. Clause 10.7 provides for the
forwarding of complaints received by the DOP
and empowers the Department to order a
special audit. Under Clause 12(v),
recommendations to Government agencies are
to be made “through the Department of
Pharmaceuticals”. Clause 13.1 places the
Secretary of the DOP at the head of the Apex
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Committee. Clauses 14.1 and 14.3 respectively
empower the DOP to issue standing orders and
notify a panel of auditors.

12.20. The DOP is therefore an integral part of the
framework created by UCPMP 2024. It issued
the Code and is entrusted with the
administration of its machinery. The provisions
must be read in that context.

12.21. The Code governing the complaint procedure
must first be identified. The complaint was
received on 21.05.2024. UCPMP 2024 had been
issued on 12.03.2024 and was in force when
the complaint was received. The DOP forwarded
the complaint under Clause 10.7 of UCPMP
2024 and ordered the special audit under the
same provision. The impugned order also states
that it was passed under UCPMP 2024.

12.22. The procedure followed in receiving and dealing
with the complaint must therefore be examined
under UCPMP 2024. A separate question arises
as to which Code governs the conduct alleged
at the two conferences. The ECPMP held that
UCPMP 2014 governed both conferences,
whereas the impugned order examines the
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conduct with reference to UCPMP 2014 and
UCPMP 2024. That question concerns the
alleged substantive breaches. It does not
determine the present Point. As explained
below, the result on the issue of anonymity is
the same under either Code.

12.23. The relevant provisions of UCPMP 2024 read as
follows:
“9.1 All the Indian Pharmaceutical Associations
will upload the UCPMP on their website along
with the detailed procedure for lodging of
complaints which will be linked to the UCPMP
portal of the Department of Pharmaceuticals.”
“10.1 All complaints, related to the breach of the
Code should be addressed to the "Ethics
Committee for Pharma Marketing Practices
(ECPMP)", "Chief Executive Officer", "Name of
Association".”
“10.3 Complaints must be in writing and for each
case The Complainant should: i. identify himself
(whether a company, entity or an individual)
with a full mailing address (email and mobile
telephone no).”
“10.4 A non-refundable amount of Rs. 1,000/is
to be deposited by the complainant along with
the complaint. The respective association will
elaborate on their website how this payment is
to be made. No pseudonymous or anonymous
complaints or those made without the prescribed
fee will be entertained.”
“10.6 When it appears from media reports (other
than letters to the editor of a publication) that a
company may have breached the Code, the
matter may be treated as complaint, and the
committee may request the concerned
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publication for further information, and the
source or the corRespondent may be treated as
the complainant.”
“10.7 Any complaint received by the Department
of Pharmaceuticals may also be forwarded to the
concerned Association for necessary action. In
such cases, the concerned Association will take
up the matter further with the complainant
concerned. The Department may order a special
audit for the purpose.”

12.24. These provisions distinguish between a
complaint lodged with an Association and a
complaint received by the DOP. A complaint
lodged with an Association must be addressed
to its Ethics Committee, must identify the
complainant and must be accompanied by the
prescribed fee of Rs.1,000/. Clause 10.4
expressly provides that an anonymous
complaint or a complaint made without the
prescribed fee will not be entertained.

12.25. Clause 10.7 deals separately with a complaint
received by the DOP. It permits the DOP to
forward such a complaint to the concerned
Association and empowers the Department to
order a special audit. The distinction between
these two routes is central to the present issue.

12.26. Clauses 10.1 to 10.5 govern complaints lodged
with an Association. Clause 10.1 specifies the
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authority to which such a complaint must be
addressed, namely the ECPMP of the
Association. Clause 10.2 prescribes the period
within which the complaint must be lodged.
Clause 10.3 sets out the particulars that the
complainant must provide. Clause 10.4 requires
payment of the prescribed fee and expressly
excludes anonymous complaints and complaints
without the fee. Clause 10.5 specifies the
authority by whom a complaint made on behalf
of a pharmaceutical company must be signed or
authorised.

12.27. Read together, these provisions regulate the
procedure by which a person lodges a
complaint with an Association and the
Association's Ethics Committee decides whether
to entertain it. The Association collects the fee,
specifies the manner of payment on its website
and decides whether the complaint is to be
entertained. This is the setting in which the
requirement to identify the complainant and the
prohibition against anonymous complaints
operate.
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12.28. The Respondents are therefore right in
submitting that Clauses 10.1 to 10.5 apply to
complaints lodged with the Ethics Committee of
an Association. This reading is consistent with
Clause 9.1, which requires each Association to
publish the detailed procedure for lodging
complaints on its website.

12.29. The requirement of an identified complainant
and a prescribed fee serves a clear purpose at
the Association level. An Association represents
companies in the pharmaceutical industry. Its
Ethics Committee should not be required to
entertain allegations against a company when
the person making those allegations remains
unidentified and bears no responsibility for
them. Otherwise, a competitor could invoke the
complaint mechanism without disclosing its
identity or paying the prescribed fee. Clauses
10.3 and 10.4 prevent that misuse and protect
member companies from unaccountable
complaints.

12.30. That rationale justifies the restriction on
complaints lodged with an Association. It does
not justify extending the same restriction to a
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Government department that receives
information about a possible breach and has
the power to verify that information
independently.

12.31. Clause 10.7 addresses a different situation and
uses different language. It applies to “…any
complaint received by the Department of
Pharmaceuticals”. It does not require the
complainant to satisfy Clause 10.3. Nor does it
state that an anonymous complaint received by
the DOP cannot be acted upon. It provides that
such a complaint “may also be forwarded” to
the concerned Association. The words “may
also” make forwarding an additional course of
action and do not confine the DOP to that
course alone.

12.32. Clause 10.7 also gives the DOP an independent
power to “order a special audit for the
purpose”. A special audit enables the
Department to verify the information received.
That power would serve little purpose if the
DOP could act only on a complaint that had
already satisfied the requirements applicable to
a complaint lodged with an Association. In that
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situation, the Association's Ethics Committee
would deal with the complaint under Clauses
10.1 to 10.5.

12.33. Clause 10.7 therefore creates a separate
channel for complaints received by the DOP.
The requirements in Clauses 10.3 and 10.4 do
not automatically apply to complaints received
through that channel.

12.34. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner points
out that Clause 10.7 appears under the heading
“Lodging of Complaints” and refers to “the
complainant concerned”. Neither circumstance
changes the meaning of the provision.

12.35. Clause 10 is not a single, undifferentiated
procedure. Clause 10.6 itself provides a
separate mechanism for complaints arising
from media reports. It permits the committee
to treat the matter as a complaint and to treat
the source or correspondent as the
complainant. The Code thus provides for
different forms of complaint intake and
prescribes the procedure applicable to each.
The common heading does not import the
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requirements of Clause 10.3 into every sub-
clause.

12.36. The expression “the complainant concerned” in
Clause 10.7 occurs in the sentence dealing with
the action to be taken by the Association after
the DOP forwards a complaint. It describes the
Association's role after the reference. It does
not prohibit the DOP from examining
information received from an unidentified
source.

12.37. The manner in which the matter was handled in
this case confirms this distinction. When the
OPPI found that the complaint was anonymous,
it sought guidance from the DOP. The DOP
thereafter proceeded on its own track, called
upon the concerned parties to appear before
the Apex Committee and ordered a special
audit. Clause 9.4, though dealing with a
different situation, also recognises that an
Association may seek guidance from the DOP
when necessary.

12.38. If Clauses 10.3 and 10.4 were intended to bind
the DOP when it received a complaint, Clause
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10.7 would have said so. It does not. The Court
cannot add such a restriction to the provision.

12.39. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner next
submits that this interpretation would allow a
person who cannot lodge an anonymous
complaint with an Association to bypass Clause
10.4 by sending the same complaint to the
DOP. This argument does not give effect to the
distinction drawn by the Code.

12.40. The route through the DOP is expressly
recognised by Clause 10.7. It is not a device to
defeat Clause 10.4. The two routes have
different safeguards. The DOP does not have to
accept the complaint as true. It can verify the
information through a special audit. The
company against which the allegations are
made can be called upon to respond. In the
present case, the Petitioner received the audit
memos and submitted replies to them. It was
also furnished with the audit report and given
an opportunity of being heard.

12.41. Further, Clause 10.4 was not bypassed in the
proceedings before the Association. The ECPMP
framed Issue No.2 and held that an anonymous
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complaint could not be entertained. It is not
disputed that the Petitioner obtained the benefit
of that decision. This Court agrees with the
Petitioner that proceedings before the ECPMP
could not rest on an anonymous complaint. The
ECPMP was right in declining to entertain it on
that basis.

12.42. That conclusion, however, concerns the
jurisdiction and procedure of the ECPMP. It
does not prevent the DOP from acting
independently under Clause 10.7. The
prohibition applicable to complaints lodged with
an Association cannot be extended to the DOP's
separate channel.

12.43. The Respondents submit that the DOP
considered the anonymous nature of the
complaint but proceeded because of the
seriousness of the allegations. The impugned
order records that “…despite the anonymity of
the complaint, the allegations against the
company were severe”.

12.44. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner is
right that the seriousness of an allegation
cannot authorise an Association to disregard
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Clause 10.4. But that is not what happened
here. The DOP did not waive or relax Clause
10.4. The clause does not impose the same
restriction on the DOP when it receives a
complaint under Clause 10.7.

12.45. The DOP decided that the information
warranted verification. The complaint was
accompanied, according to the impugned order,
by the Petitioner's internal records, a sales and
expense tracker, flight tickets and hotel
booking vouchers. The Department was entitled
to examine that material and determine
whether a special audit was necessary. The
Petitioner has neither pleaded nor established
that this decision was arbitrary or actuated by
bad faith. There is no basis for this Court to
substitute its assessment for that of the DOP on
whether the material warranted an audit.

12.46. The impugned order does not proceed on the
assumption that the anonymous complaint was
true. It records that the Special Audit
Committee examined the allegations, that the
Petitioner responded to the audit report and
that the Apex Committee heard the Petitioner
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on 30.09.2024 and 21.10.2024. The Petitioner
also placed its explanations before the
Committee, including the Professional Services
Agreements and its contention regarding the
date from which UCPMP 2024 applied. The
Respondents further state that the Petitioner
was heard on 07.11.2024.

12.47. The Petitioner has not contended before this
Court that it was denied a hearing or that it was
not furnished with the audit material. The
record therefore shows that the impugned
order followed an inquiry conducted by the
DOP, in which the Petitioner participated. The
order does not rest solely on the anonymous
complaint.

12.48. For the present Point, it is sufficient to hold that
the anonymous nature of the initial complaint
does not, by itself, invalidate the proceedings
undertaken by the DOP under Clause 10.7.

12.49. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner relies
on Union of India v. Mahendra Singh [2022
SCC OnLine SC 909] (paragraphs 15 and 16).
In paragraph 15, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
reiterated the settled principle:
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“It is a well-settled salutary principle that if a
statute provides for a thing to be done in a
particular manner, then it has to be done in that
manner and in no other manner.”

12.50. The Hon'ble Supreme Court quoted paragraph
17 of Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir
Prasad [(1999) 8 SCC 266] in support of that
proposition:
“17………………..It is a well-settled salutary
principle that if a statute provides for a thing to
be done in a particular manner, then it has to be
done in that manner and in no other manner.
(See with advantage : Nazir Ahmad v. King
Emperor [(1935-36) 63 IA 372 : AIR 1936 PC
253 (2)], Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of
V.P. [AIR 1954 SC 322 : 1954 SCR 1098], State
of U.P. v. Singhara Singh [AIR 1964 SC 358 :
(1964) 1 SCWR 57].) An election petition under
the rules could only have been presented in the
open court up to 16-5-1995 till 4.15 p.m.
(working hours of the Court) in the manner
prescribed by Rule 6 (supra) either to the Judge
or the Bench as the case may be to save the
period of limitation. That, however, was not
done…………….”

12.51. In paragraph 16, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
further stated:
“Where the law prescribes a thing to be done in
a particular manner following a particular
procedure, it shall be done in the same manner
following the provisions of law, without deviating
from the prescribed procedure”.

12.52. That paragraph refers to paragraph 14 of
Cherukuri Mani v. Chief Secretary,
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Government of Andhra Pradesh [ (2015) 13
SCC 722] .
“14. Where the law prescribes a thing to be done
in a particular manner following a particular
procedure, it shall be done in the same manner
following the provisions of law, without deviating
from the prescribed procedure………….”

12.53. The principle is clear: where a rule prescribes
the manner in which an act must be done, the
prescribed manner must be followed. The
decision in Mahendra Singh concerned a
statutory requirement. The present case
concerns voluntary Codes. Even applying the
principle to these Codes, it does not assist the
Petitioner. The Petitioner must first establish
that Clauses 10.3 and 10.4 prescribe the
procedure applicable to a complaint received by
the DOP. They do not. Clause 10.7 specifically
governs complaints received by the DOP. It
permits forwarding to the concerned
Association and empowers the Department to
order a special audit. The record shows that the
DOP referred the complaint by office
memorandum dated 25.06.2024 and ordered a
special audit on 02.09.2024. The DOP therefore
acted under the provision applicable to the
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complaint it had received. The principle in
Mahendra Singh does not advance the
Petitioner's case.

12.54. UCPMP 2014 also requires consideration. Clause
10.3(i) requires the complainant to “identify
himself (whether a company or an individual)
with a full mailing address”. Clause 10.4
prescribes the same fee of Rs.1,000/-. Clause
10.7 provides that a complaint received by the
DOP “will also be forwarded to the concerned
Association for necessary action” and that the
Association “will further take up the matter with
the complainant directly”.

12.55. Unlike UCPMP 2024, UCPMP 2014 does not
expressly state that anonymous complaints will
not be entertained. The ECPMP itself noted this
distinction while considering the complaint.
UCPMP 2014 also does not confer on the DOP
the express power to order a special audit. Its
review mechanism provides for review by an
Apex Ethics Committee of the industry under
Clauses 9.4 and 13. That body is distinct from
the Apex Committee constituted under UCPMP
2024.
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12.56. The Petitioner's case is no stronger under
UCPMP 2014. Although Clause 10.3(i) requires
identification of the complainant, the Code does
not contain the express prohibition against
anonymous complaints found in Clause 10.4 of
UCPMP 2024. In any event, UCPMP 2024
governed the procedure followed by the DOP
when it received the complaint on 21.05.2024.
It is therefore unnecessary to base the
conclusion on UCPMP 2014.

12.57. The Petitioner did not abandon its objection
regarding anonymity. Learned counsel for
Respondents No.1, 2 and 4 acknowledges that
the Petitioner raised the objection in its reply
dated 12.10.2024. Her account of the
Petitioner's reply dated 04.09.2024 is that the
Petitioner objected to the audit seeking
documents beyond the scope of the complaint
but nevertheless produced the documents. No
Respondent has pleaded waiver. The finding on
this Point rests on the interpretation of the
Code and not on any waiver by the Petitioner.

12.58. The Petitioner also contends that the prohibition
in Clause 10.4 prevented the Apex Committee,
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the Ministry of Corporate Affairs and the
Registrar of Companies from acting on the
anonymous complaint. This submission is
untenable.

12.59. Clause 10.4 is a provision of the Code. It is not
a provision of the Companies Act, 2013. A
voluntary Code cannot curtail a power
conferred by Parliament under a statute.
Section 206(4) of the Companies Act, 2013,
extracted under Point (iii), empowers the
Registrar to act when he is satisfied “on the
basis of information available with or furnished
to him or on a representation made to him by
any person”. The provision does not require the
person furnishing the information to be
identified.

12.60. Further, the notice dated 12.05.2026 states
that the Registrar acted pursuant to an order of
the Ministry dated 21.01.2026, as considered
under Point (iii). The Petitioner has also not
identified any provision of the Income-tax Act,
1961, which prohibits the Income Tax
Department from acting on information
received from an unidentified source.
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12.61. The impugned order cannot be quashed merely
because the complaint received by the DOP was
anonymous. Clauses 10.3 and 10.4 of UCPMP
2024 govern complaints lodged with the Ethics
Committee of an Association. They do not
prohibit the DOP from receiving information in
the form in which it is received, verifying it
through a special audit under Clause 10.7 and
placing the matter before the Apex Committee.

12.62. This Court answers Point No. (i) by holding that
the anonymous nature of the complaint is not a
ground for quashing the impugned order.
Clauses 10.3 and 10.4 of UCPMP 2024 apply to
complaints lodged with the Ethics Committee of
an Association. Proceedings before the ECPMP
could not rest on an anonymous complaint.
Those provisions, however, do not bar the DOP
from receiving a complaint, verifying the
information through a special audit under
Clause 10.7 and placing the matter before the
Apex Committee. The position under UCPMP
2014 does not support the Petitioner's
challenge either.
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13. Answer to Point No. (ii): Whether the Apex
Committee was justified in proceeding against
the Petitioner and passing the impugned order
dated 23.12.2024, notwithstanding the findings
and decision of the Ethics Committee for
Pharma Marketing Practices dated 20.09.2024,
and whether such action was permissible in the
absence of an appeal or review in accordance
with the applicable Code?


13.1. Sri Udaya Holla, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the Petitioner, submits that the
Code provides a two-tier mechanism for dealing
with complaints. The Ethics Committee of the
concerned Association decides the complaint. A
party dissatisfied with that decision may
challenge it only in the manner prescribed
under Clause 13. The Apex Committee can
exercise appellate jurisdiction only when an
appeal is filed in accordance with that Clause. It
cannot reopen or reconsider a decision of the
ECPMP on its own.

13.2. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner takes
the Court through the decision of the ECPMP
dated 20.09.2024. On Issue No.1, the ECPMP
held that UCPMP 2014 governed both
conferences. On Issue No.2, it held that an
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anonymous complaint could not be entertained.
On Issue No.3, it held that the engagement of
doctors under Professional Services Agreements
was permissible under UCPMP 2014, read with
Regulation 6.8.1(g) of the IMC Regulations
2002. On Issue No.4, it held that the sales
generated by the doctors in 2023 were not the
criterion for selecting them. On Issue No.5, it
held that no tax evasion was involved and that
questions relating to tax liability fell within the
domain of the Income Tax authorities. He also
refers to Clause 6 of UCPMP 2014, which deals
with gifts.

13.3. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner
submits that neither the Petitioner nor the
anonymous complainant filed an appeal or
sought a review of the ECPMP's decision. The
decision therefore attained finality under the
Code. The Apex Committee could not assume
appellate jurisdiction in the absence of an
appeal. Nor could it treat the proceedings as a
suo motu appeal. He points out that the ECPMP
found no irregularity in the Petitioner's
sponsorship, whereas the Apex Committee
reached the opposite conclusion.
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13.4. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner
further submits that the reprimand was the
only action taken against the Petitioner under
the Code. The Petitioner did not challenge it
earlier because it accepted the reprimand as
such and no further consequence followed. It
approached this Court only after the Ministry of
Corporate Affairs initiated separate proceedings
on the basis of the impugned order.

13.5. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner relies
on Union of India v. Mahendra Singh [2022
SCC OnLine SC 909] (paragraphs 15 and 16)
for the principle that, where a procedure is
prescribed for doing an act, the authority must
follow that procedure.

13.6. Smt. Nayanatara B.G., learned counsel
appearing for Respondents No.1, 2 and 4,
submits at the outset that the impugned order
was passed neither in appellate jurisdiction nor
in review jurisdiction. She contends that the
Petitioner proceeds on an incorrect
understanding of the nature of the proceedings
before the Apex Committee.
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13.7. Learned counsel appearing for Respondents
No.1, 2 and 4 explains that the DOP received
the complaint and forwarded it to the OPPI
under Clause 10.7 by an office memorandum
dated 25.06.2024. Since the complaint was
anonymous, the OPPI sought guidance from the
DOP. By letter dated 11.08.2024, the DOP
called upon the Ethics Committee of the OPPI
and the Petitioner to appear before the Apex
Committee. The Managing Director of the
Petitioner did not attend. The Director General
of the OPPI sought more time. The Apex
Committee thereafter decided to conduct a
special audit under Clause 10.7.

13.8. The special audit was ordered on 02.09.2024.
Learned counsel appearing for Respondents
No.1, 2 and 4 refers to the documents sought
by the audit team, the audit memos issued to
the Petitioner and the Petitioner's replies dated
04.09.2024, 06.09.2024, 10.09.2024 and
12.09.2024. Learned counsel appearing for
Respondents No.1, 2 and 4 submits that the
proceedings before the ECPMP and the special
audit were separate and were conducted
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simultaneously. Both processes were completed
on 20.09.2024.

13.9. Learned counsel appearing for Respondents
No.1, 2 and 4 refers to the special audit report,
which is nearly 20 pages long. According to the
report, the Petitioner had sponsored 30 doctors
to Paris and Monaco, provided business-class
air travel and accommodation in five-star
hotels, and none of the doctors was a speaker
at the conferences. The report also records that
the Petitioner treated the expenditure as
marketing expenditure.

13.10. The report was furnished to the Petitioner,
which submitted its reply on 12.10.2024. The
Apex Committee convened a meeting on
21.10.2024, at which representatives of the
Petitioner, the Director General of OPPI and
officials of the DOP were present. Upon
examination of the documents and the
submissions made, the Committee issued its
order dated 07.11.2024 . It found apparent
violations of Clauses 7.1 and 7.2 of UCPMP
2014, Clauses 6.2.1, 8.2 and 8.3 of UCPMP
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2024, and Regulation 6.8.1(b) and (c) of the
IMC Regulations 2002.

13.11. Learned counsel appearing for Respondents
No.1, 2 and 4 submits that the Apex Committee
gave the Petitioner an opportunity to take
remedial action by supporting underprivileged
patients for an amount equal to the violations
quantified by the Special Audit Team, within 12
months. The Petitioner declined that proposal
by its communication dated 10.12.2024 and
denied any violation. According to Learned
counsel appearing for Respondents No.1, 2 and
4, the proceedings before the Apex Committee
must therefore be considered independently of
the decision of the ECPMP.

13.12. Learned counsel appearing for Respondents
No.1, 2 and 4 submits that Clause 10.7
authorised the DOP to forward the complaint to
the Association and to order a special audit.
The DOP exercised those powers. The matter
was thereafter placed before the Apex
Committee on the basis of the special audit
report. She also submits that the Apex
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Committee imposed a penalty equivalent to the
amount spent on the doctors.

13.13. Sri Y.V. Raviraj, learned counsel appearing for
Respondent No.3, submits that the powers of
the Income Tax Department are independent of
the powers exercised by the OPPI or the Apex
Committee. An order passed by either
committee does not curtail the statutory powers
of the Income Tax Department.

13.14. This Point concerns the authority of the Apex
Committee and the effect of the ECPMP's
decision dated 20.09.2024. The Petitioner's
case rests on the premise that the ECPMP's
decision ended the matter and that the Apex
Committee could act only upon an appeal under
Clause 13. The Respondents contend that the
DOP had initiated an independent process
under Clause 10.7 and that the impugned order
was the outcome of that process.

13.15. The two processes must be examined
separately. The ECPMP dealt with the complaint
within the OPPI's internal mechanism. The DOP,
on the other hand, acted on a complaint
received directly by it, ordered a special audit
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and placed the resulting material before the
Apex Committee. The question is whether the
ECPMP's decision brought the latter process to
an end.

13.16. The material facts are not in dispute. The DOP
received the complaint on 21.05.2024, along
with supporting documents. It forwarded the
complaint to the OPPI by office memorandum
dated 25.06.2024. The OPPI sought guidance
from the DOP because the complaint was
anonymous. The DOP, by letter dated
11.08.2024, called upon the Ethics Committee
of the OPPI and the Petitioner to appear before
the Apex Committee. The special audit was
ordered on 02.09.2024.

13.17. The ECPMP delivered its decision on
20.09.2024. The special audit report was also
submitted on that date. The report found that
the Petitioner had sponsored 24 doctors to Paris
and six doctors to Monaco, at a total
expenditure of Rs.1,91,24,991/- towards travel
and accommodation. It recorded that the
doctors were not speakers at the conferences
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and concluded that the expenditure violated the
relevant provisions of the Codes.

13.18. The Apex Committee heard the Petitioner on
30.09.2024 and 21.10.2024, as recorded in the
impugned order. The Respondents also state
that the Committee met on 07.11.2024. The
Petitioner had an opportunity to respond to the
audit report and to explain the Professional
Services Agreements on which it relied. The
Committee also gave the Petitioner an
opportunity to consider taking remedial action
by supporting underprivileged patients. The
Petitioner declined that proposal by its
communication dated 10.12.2024. The
impugned order was thereafter passed on
23.12.2024.

13.19. The chronology establishes that the DOP's
proceedings were initiated and substantially
progressed independently of the ECPMP's
decision. The special audit was not initiated
after the ECPMP's decision. It had been ordered
before that decision and was completed on the
same date.
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13.20. The relevant provisions of UCPMP 2024 must be
read together.

13.21. Clause 10.7 provides:
“Any complaint received by the Department of
Pharmaceuticals may also be forwarded to the
concerned Association for necessary action. In
such cases, the concerned Association will take
up the matter further with the complainant
concerned. The Department may order a special
audit for the purpose.”

13.22. Clause 11.10 provides:
“If no appeal is filed within the stipulated period,
the decision of the ECPMP shall be final and
binding, and adherence to such decision shall be
a condition of continued membership of the
Association. The decisions shall also be uploaded
on the website of the Association and the
Department of Pharmaceuticals.”

13.23. Clause 12, under the heading “Penalties and
Reference”, provides:
“Once it is established that a breach of the Code
has been made by an entity, the Committee can
propose one of the following actions against the
erring entity: ...”

13.24. Clause 12(ii) provides:
“To reprimand the entity and publish full details
of such reprimand.”

13.25. Clause 12(v) provides:
“In cases where disciplinary, penal, or remedial
action lies within the domain of any agency or
authority of the Government in accordance with
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the statute, the Committee may send its
recommendations to such agency or authority
through the Department of Pharmaceuticals.”

13.26. Clause 13.1 provides:
“If a party to the complaint is dissatisfied with the
decision of the ECPMP, it may file an appeal before
an Apex Committee for Pharma Marketing Practices
(ACPMP) headed by the Secretary, Department of
Pharmaceuticals, having a Joint Secretary and a
Finance Officer dealing with the subject as its
members.”

13.27. The Explanation to Clause 13.1 states:
“The expression 'party to the complaint' means
the complainant or the Respondent entity, and
the expression 'decision of the ECPMP' includes a
lack of decision thereof, or inordinate delay in
reaching such a decision.”

13.28. Clause 13.4 provides:
“The ACPMP may prescribe any penalties or
make a reference to an appropriate agency
or an authority of the Government in
accordance with para-12 above.”

13.29. Clause 13.5 provides:
“The decision in appeal shall be final and binding
on both the parties.”

13.30. These provisions establish two distinct features
of UCPMP 2024. First, Clause 10.7 creates an
independent channel for complaints received by
the DOP and expressly empowers it to order a
special audit. Secondly, Clauses 12 and 13
provide for action on the establishment of a
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breach and identify the Apex Committee as the
Government-level committee empowered to
deal with such matters, including the
prescription of penalties and references to
statutory agencies.

13.31. The provisions of UCPMP 2014 also require
consideration because the ECPMP held that the
conduct at both conferences was governed by
that Code.

13.32. Clause 9.4 of UCPMP 2014 provides for an
industry-level review committee, namely the
Apex Ethics Committee for Pharma Marketing
Practices (AECPMP), consisting of five members
nominated by the Head of the Association.
Clause 13.1 provides:
“If a party to the complaint is dissatisfied with
the decision of ECPMP, it may request for review
of the decision from AECPMP. Any party
requesting a review of decision of ECPMP shall
notify the same to the Head of the Association.”

13.33. Clause 11.12 provides:
“If there is no request for review within the
stipulated period (clause 13.4), the decision of
ECPMP shall be final and binding, and adherence
to the decision shall be a condition of continued
membership of the Association. The decisions
shall be uploaded on the website of the
Association.”
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13.34. UCPMP 2014 thus provided for review within
the industry mechanism. UCPMP 2024 replaced
that arrangement with an Apex Committee
headed by the Secretary of the DOP. The 2024
Code also expressly recognised the DOP's
power to order a special audit. The change in
the composition and role of the apex body is
significant. The Apex Committee under UCPMP
2024 is a Government-level body within the
enforcement structure of the Code, unlike the
industry-level review committee under UCPMP
2014.

13.35. The Petitioner's argument does not give effect
to Clause 10.7. The words “may also be
forwarded” are significant. They show that
forwarding a complaint to an Association is an
additional course of action. The DOP is not
required to confine itself to forwarding the
complaint. The same Clause separately
empowers the Department to order a special
audit.

13.36. The power to order a special audit would be
ineffective if the DOP were required to accept
the decision of the Association's Ethics
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Committee as conclusive, even where the
Department's independent audit disclosed
material indicating a breach. Clause 10.7 must
be given a meaningful operation. It authorises
the DOP to verify the information received by it
through an audit. The Department is not
required to abandon that exercise merely
because the Association's Ethics Committee has
reached a different conclusion.

13.37. In the present case, the DOP exercised this
power before the ECPMP delivered its decision.
The two proceedings were conducted
independently. The audit report was not a
review of the ECPMP's decision. It was the
result of an inquiry ordered by the DOP under
Clause 10.7.

13.38. The finality contemplated by Clause 11.10 of
UCPMP 2024 does not extend to the DOP's
independent proceedings. The Clause makes
the ECPMP's decision final and binding and
expressly connects adherence to that decision
with continued membership of the Association.
It governs the conclusion of the complaint
process within the Association.
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13.39. The DOP was not a party to the complaint
within the meaning of Clause 13.1. The
Explanation identifies the parties as the
complainant and the Respondent entity. The
DOP was neither. It was therefore not required
to file an appeal against the ECPMP's decision
before exercising the power expressly conferred
on it by Clause 10.7.

13.40. The same position follows under UCPMP 2014.
Clause 11.12 makes the ECPMP's decision final
within the Association's complaint mechanism.
It does not state that the decision binds the
DOP or prevents the Government from
examining information received by it. The
finality of the ECPMP's decision cannot be
enlarged to confer immunity from the DOP's
independent examination.

13.41. There is an additional circumstance which
defeats the Petitioner's reliance on the ECPMP's
decision. The ECPMP itself held under Issue
No.2 that the anonymous complaint could not
be entertained. It nevertheless proceeded to
record its views on the merits under Issues
No.3 to 5.
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13.42. Once the ECPMP held that the complaint could
not be entertained, its subsequent observations
on the merits could not operate as a binding
adjudication against the DOP. Those
observations were made in the course of the
Association's internal process. They did not
determine the legality of the DOP's independent
action under Clause 10.7. The Petitioner cannot
rely on the ECPMP's rejection of the complaint
to prevent the DOP from examining the
underlying material through a separate process
which the 2024 Code expressly permits.

13.43. The ECPMP's decision remained relevant to the
Association's own complaint mechanism. It did
not conclude the DOP's proceedings.

13.44. The Petitioner treats the Apex Committee's
proceedings as a second round of adjudication
on the same complaint. That is not the correct
characterisation. The DOP had received the
complaint in its own capacity. It ordered a
special audit. The audit team examined the
Petitioner's records and reported its findings.
The Petitioner was then given an opportunity to
respond before the Apex Committee. The
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Committee considered the audit report and the
Petitioner's explanations.

13.45. The Apex Committee did not sit in appeal over
the ECPMP's decision. It did not set aside that
decision, modify it or direct the OPPI to alter its
records. It considered the outcome of the DOP's
separate inquiry. The fact that the two
processes concerned the same underlying
events does not make them the same
proceeding. The source of the inquiry, the
material considered and the authority
exercising the relevant function were distinct.

13.46. The Petitioner's contention that the Apex
Committee could act only upon an appeal under
Clause 13 is also too narrow. Clause 13.1
provides a remedy to a party dissatisfied with
the decision of the ECPMP. It identifies the
composition of the ACPMP and establishes the
appellate procedure. It does not state that the
Apex Committee can function only when a
private party files an appeal. Nor does it state
that the DOP's independent powers under
Clause 10.7 cease once an Association's Ethics
Committee delivers its decision.
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13.47. Clause 12 uses the expression “the Committee”
and provides for action once a breach of the
Code is established. It includes reprimand and
publication under Clause 12(ii), as well as
recommendations to Government agencies
under Clause 12(v). Clause 13.4 expressly
recognises the power of the ACPMP to prescribe
penalties or make references in accordance
with Clause 12.

13.48. These provisions must be read together. Clause
10.7 enables the DOP to obtain and verify
material through a special audit. Clause 12
provides for action when a breach is
established. Clause 13 identifies the Apex
Committee, headed by the Secretary of the
DOP, and expressly recognises its power to
prescribe penalties and make references. The
Code does not prohibit the DOP from placing
the outcome of its independent audit before the
Apex Committee for consideration.

13.49. The appellate jurisdiction under Clause 13 is
one specific function of the Apex Committee. It
does not extinguish the DOP's independent role
under Clause 10.7 or prevent the Apex
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Committee from considering the outcome of the
DOP's own inquiry under the enforcement
framework of the Code.

13.50. The structure of UCPMP 2024 supports this
interpretation. Clause 9.4 permits an
Association, in specified cases, to seek guidance
from the DOP. Clause 9.5 requires Associations
to upload details of complaints and action taken
by the ECPMP on the DOP's UCPMP portal.
Clause 10.7 authorises the DOP to receive
complaints and order special audits. Clause 12
provides for reprimands and references to
Government agencies. Clause 13 establishes
the Apex Committee under the Secretary of the
DOP. Clause 14.1 enables the DOP to issue
standing orders for furtherance of the Code.
Clause 14.3 requires the DOP to notify a panel
of auditors. Clause 14.4 makes the Chief
Executive Officer of the company responsible
for compliance and requires a declaration of
compliance.

13.51. Clause 14.2 is also relevant. It provides that
the Code applies, unless exempted or modified
by standing orders, mutatis mutandis to
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medical devices and the companies or entities
manufacturing or dealing with their sale and
distribution. The Petitioner's activity in relation
to the medical devices in question therefore
falls within the framework of the 2024 Code.

13.52. The Code is not confined to a private complaint
mechanism operated by industry Associations.
It creates an integrated system in which the
Associations handle complaints, the DOP
receives and verifies information, special audits
may be ordered, and the Government-level
Apex Committee deals with the resulting issues.
The Petitioner's interpretation would reduce
Clause 10.7 to a mere forwarding provision and
deprive the DOP's independent audit power of
its intended function.

13.53. The fact that Clause 13.4 refers to penalties in
an appeal does not alter this conclusion. Clause
13.4 specifically states the powers available to
the ACPMP when deciding an appeal. It does
not contain an express prohibition against the
DOP's separate enforcement process under
Clause 10.7. Nor does it state that the options
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under Clause 12 can be considered only after
an appeal is filed.

13.54. The Petitioner seeks to convert the appeal
procedure into a restriction on the
Department's independent role. The Code does
not support that construction. The appeal
procedure protects a party's right to challenge
an ECPMP decision. The DOP's special audit
procedure serves a different purpose: it enables
the Government Department to verify
information received by it and act on the result
in accordance with the Code.

13.55. The two powers can operate together. The
ECPMP's decision may remain final within the
Association's process, while the DOP may
complete its own inquiry and the Apex
Committee may consider the findings under the
Code's enforcement framework. There is no
inconsistency in that construction.

13.56. The impugned order must also be viewed in the
context of the proceedings that preceded it. The
complaint was supported by documents
described in the order as the Petitioner's
internal records, sales and expense tracker,
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flight tickets and hotel booking vouchers. The
Special Audit Committee examined the material
and reported that the Petitioner had incurred
Rs.1,91,24,991/- towards travel and
accommodation for 30 doctors for the two
conferences.

13.57. The impugned order records that the audit
findings were put to the Petitioner. The
Petitioner furnished replies to the audit memos
and subsequently submitted its response to the
audit report dated 20.09.2024. It was heard by
the Apex Committee on 30.09.2024 and
21.10.2024. The Respondents also state that
the Committee met on 07.11.2024. The
Petitioner placed its explanation based on the
Professional Services Agreements and the
nature of the conferences before the
Committee.

13.58. The Committee also offered the Petitioner an
opportunity to take remedial action by
supporting underprivileged patients. The
Petitioner rejected the proposal by its
communication dated 10.12.2024 and denied
any breach. The impugned order was passed
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after considering the audit findings and the
Petitioner's stand.

13.59. The order was therefore not based on the
anonymous complaint alone. It followed an
independent audit and an opportunity to the
Petitioner to explain the material. The
anonymous source of the initial information
does not invalidate the subsequent process.

13.60. The Petitioner also points out that the
impugned order does not identify the specific
Clause under which it was passed. The
authority for the action must be found in the
Code read as a whole. The provisions discussed
above provide the necessary framework: Clause
10.7 enables the DOP's independent inquiry;
Clause 12 provides for reprimand and
reference; and Clauses 13.1 and 13.4 establish
the Apex Committee and recognise its powers
under the Code.

13.61. The impugned order records that the DOP had
acted under Clause 10.7, that a special audit
had been conducted, that the Petitioner had
been heard and that the Committee had
considered the audit findings. The omission to
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cite every enabling provision does not
invalidate an order where the authority for the
action is traceable to the Code and the action
falls within its scheme.

13.62. The Petitioner relies on Union of India v.
Mahendra Singh [2022 SCC OnLine SC 909]
(paragraphs 15 and 16). The relevant extracts
have already been set out under Point (i),
paragraph 33, and need not be repeated.

13.63. The principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court is that, where the law prescribes the
manner in which an act must be done, the
authority must follow that manner. That
principle does not assist the Petitioner. The DOP
followed the procedure specifically provided for
a complaint received by it. It forwarded the
complaint to the OPPI, ordered a special audit
under Clause 10.7 and gave the Petitioner an
opportunity to respond to the findings.

13.64. The Petitioner relies on Clause 13 as though it
were the only procedure available to the DOP
and the Apex Committee. Clause 13, however,
governs an appeal by a party to the complaint.
The impugned order did not purport to be an
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appeal decision. It arose from the DOP's
separate inquiry. The procedure prescribed for
an appeal cannot be imported into a distinct
process which the Code separately recognises
under Clause 10.7.

13.65. The principle in Mahendra Singh requires
compliance with the applicable procedure. It
does not require an authority to follow a
procedure meant for a different proceeding.

13.66. Paragraph 9 of the impugned order records that
the Apex Committee gave the Petitioner “an
opportunity” to consider remedial action by
supporting underprivileged patients for an
amount equal to the violations computed by the
Special Audit Team. It also records that the
Petitioner rejected the proposal by its
communication dated 10.12.2024. The
operative part in paragraph 10 contains a
reprimand and two requests to Government
authorities. It does not impose a monetary
penalty or direct the Petitioner to support
patients.

13.67. The Court therefore proceeds on the operative
order as passed. The reprimand and its
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publication are contemplated by Clause 12(ii).
The requests to the Central Board of Direct
Taxes and the National Medical Council fall
within the nature of recommendations
contemplated by Clause 12(v). The order does
not impose a monetary penalty of
Rs.1,91,24,991/-.

13.68. The Petitioner submits that it did not challenge
the impugned order earlier because the order
contained only a reprimand, which the
Petitioner had accepted. This does not advance
its case on the jurisdictional issue. The
Petitioner's communication dated 10.12.2024,
as recorded by the Respondents, rejected the
proposal for remedial action and denied any
violation. The Petitioner chose not to challenge
the reprimand at that stage.

13.69. The finding on this Point rests on the provisions
of the Code and the nature of the DOP's
independent proceedings. The Petitioner's
decision not to challenge the reprimand
immediately does not alter the interpretation of
the Code.
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13.70. The Petitioner further submits that, once the
reprimand was issued, no further action could
be taken by any authority. That proposition is
incorrect. The impugned order does not confer
or take away statutory powers. Clause 12(v)
expressly contemplates recommendations to
Government agencies where disciplinary, penal
or remedial action falls within their statutory
domain.

13.71. The Central Board of Direct Taxes, the Income
Tax Department, the Registrar of Companies
and the National Medical Council must act
under their respective statutes and regulations.
They are not bound by the factual findings of
the Apex Committee and must form their own
opinions on the material placed before them.

13.72. The position that emerges from the Codes and
the record is clear.

13.72.1. The DOP was competent under Clause
10.7 of UCPMP 2024 to receive the
complaint, forward it to the OPPI and
order a special audit.
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13.72.2. The ECPMP's decision dated 20.09.2024
attained finality within the Association's
complaint mechanism. That finality did
not prevent the DOP from completing its
independent inquiry under Clause 10.7.

13.72.3. The special audit was ordered before the
ECPMP delivered its decision. The audit
and the proceedings before the ECPMP
were separate processes. The audit
report was not an appeal against the
ECPMP's decision.

13.72.4. The DOP's independent role under
Clause 10.7 must be read with Clauses
12 and 13. The Code provides for
reprimand and publication under Clause
12(ii), recommendations to Government
agencies under Clause 12(v), and an
Apex Committee headed by the
Secretary of the DOP under Clause 13.1.
Clause 13.4 recognises the Apex
Committee's power to prescribe
penalties or make references in
accordance with Clause 12.
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13.72.5. The Apex Committee did not set aside or
modify the ECPMP's decision. It
considered the findings of the DOP's
independent audit and the Petitioner's
response. Its action was not an appellate
reversal of the ECPMP's decision.

13.72.6. The impugned order did not impose a
monetary penalty or bind the statutory
agencies to take action. It reprimanded
the Petitioner, directed publication in
accordance with the Code and made
requests to Government agencies to act
under their respective laws.

13.73. The Petitioner's challenge rests on treating the
ECPMP's decision as a complete bar to any
further action. The Code does not support that
interpretation. Clause 11.10 makes the ECPMP's
decision final within the Association's complaint
mechanism. Clause 10.7 independently
empowers the DOP to examine a complaint
received by it and to order a special audit. The
latter power does not cease merely because the
Association's Ethics Committee has delivered its
decision.
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13.74. The Apex Committee acted on the DOP's
independent inquiry, not in appeal over the
ECPMP's decision. The Code must be read as an
integrated scheme. Clauses 10.7, 12 and 13,
read with the DOP's supervisory and
implementation functions under Clause 14,
permit the Department to examine the audit
findings through the Apex Committee and to
take the action contemplated by the Code. The
absence of an appeal by a party to the ECPMP
proceedings does not invalidate this separate
process.

13.75. The Petitioner was furnished with the audit
material, responded to the audit memos and
report, and was heard by the Apex Committee.
The impugned order followed that process. It
does not reopen or reverse the ECPMP's
decision within the Association's mechanism.
The Petitioner has therefore not established
that the Apex Committee acted without
authority or that the impugned order is liable to
be quashed on this ground.

13.76. This finding is confined to the authority of the
DOP and the Apex Committee to proceed on the
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DOP's independent inquiry. The correctness of
the findings relating to the alleged breaches,
the application of the respective Codes to the
two conferences and the legality of the
consequential proceedings are considered under
the other Points.

13.77. This Court answers Point No. (ii) by holding that
the Apex Committee was justified in proceeding
on the basis of the DOP's independent inquiry
and in passing the impugned order dated
23.12.2024, notwithstanding the decision of the
ECPMP dated 20.09.2024. The ECPMP's decision
was final within the Association's complaint
mechanism but did not bind the DOP or prevent
it from exercising its independent power under
Clause 10.7 of UCPMP 2024. The Apex
Committee acted on the audit findings and the
Petitioner's response; it did not sit in appeal
over or set aside the ECPMP's decision. The
absence of an appeal or review under Clause 13
does not invalidate the impugned order.

14. Answer to Point No. (iii): Whether the
proceedings initiated by the Department of
Pharmaceuticals, including the special audit
and the consequential action taken by the
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Registrar of Companies under Section 206 of
the Companies Act, 2013, are without
jurisdiction or otherwise unsustainable in law
on the grounds urged by the Petitioner?


14.1. Sri Udaya Holla, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the Petitioner, advances two sets
of submissions. The first concerns the special
audit ordered by the DOP. The second concerns
the inquiry initiated by the Registrar of
Companies (ROC).

14.2. On the special audit, he submits that, even if
the DOP had the power to constitute a Special
Audit Committee, the audit was not conducted
by qualified auditors. He relies on Clause 14.3
of UCPMP 2024, which requires the DOP to
notify a panel of auditors comprising either
audit firms of standing empanelled by the CAG
or reputed commercial audit firms having
experience in dealing with such matters. He
contends that the audit had to be conducted by
auditors drawn from that panel and that the
Petitioner’s consent and concurrence were
necessary. According to him, the unilateral
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appointment of the audit team did not comply
with Clause 14.3.

14.3. On the ROC’s notice dated 12.05.2026, learned
Senior Counsel submits that it is based entirely
on the impugned order. He refers to paragraph
(ix) of the notice, which specifically refers to
the order passed by the Apex Committee in
ACPMP No.01/2024. Paragraph (x) refers to the
expenditure of Rs.1.91 crores on travel tickets
and hotel accommodation for what the Apex
Committee described as “extravagant pleasure
trips under the guise of conferences”. He
contends that the ROC has acted only on the
basis of the impugned order and that the
Ministry of Corporate Affairs had no
independent basis to initiate an inquiry.

14.4. He further submits that the impugned order
contains no direction or recommendation to the
ROC. It merely reprimands the Petitioner.
Neither the ECPMP nor the Apex Committee
contemplated or authorised an inquiry by the
ROC. The ROC has therefore acted without
jurisdiction, and its notice and consequential
proceedings are liable to be quashed.
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14.5. He relies on Union of India and Others v.
Ram Lakhan Sharma [(2018) 7 SCC 670]
(paragraphs 24 and 33). He submits that
disciplinary proceedings are quasi-judicial in
nature and that the officer conducting an
inquiry must act as an independent and
impartial adjudicator. Such an officer cannot
also act as the presenting officer. He contends
that Respondent No.4 has not acted
independently and has merely followed
instructions received from the Ministry.

14.6. He relies on Union of India v. Mahendra
Singh [2022 SCC OnLine SC 909] (paragraphs
15 and 16) for the principle that, where a
particular procedure is prescribed, the authority
must follow that procedure. He submits that the
impugned action was taken without following
the mandatory procedure prescribed by law.

14.7. He also relies on Sudarshan V. Biradar v.
State of Karnataka [2023 SCC OnLine Kar
178] (paragraph 14). He submits that the rule-
making power of an authority cannot extend
beyond the parent enactment. Since the
impugned order contains no direction or
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recommendation to the ROC, he contends that
Respondent No.4 has exceeded its authority by
initiating an inquiry. Any action taken by a
statutory authority without the authority of the
parent enactment, according to him, is ultra
vires and unsustainable in law.

14.8. On the merits of the proposed inquiry, learned
Senior Counsel submits in his rejoinder that a
delegate also gains knowledge by attending a
conference. It is not only the speaker who
learns from the conference. Indeed, the
delegate attends to learn from the speakers
and applies that knowledge in professional
practice. The Petitioner sponsored the doctors
for that purpose, and the doctors thereafter
used the knowledge gained to train other
doctors.

14.9. Smt. Nayanatara B.G., learned counsel
appearing for Respondents No.1, 2 and 4,
makes the following submissions.

14.10. On the special audit, she relies on Clause 10.7
of UCPMP 2024, which empowers the DOP to
order a special audit. The DOP exercised that
power by its order dated 02.09.2024. The audit
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was conducted by an internal audit team of the
DOP, headed by Dr. Ranjitha of the Office of
the Chief Controller of Accounts. The Petitioner
was informed of the audit by letter dated
02.09.2024 (Annexure-M). The letter set out
the documents required and informed the
Petitioner that members of the team would visit
its office. The Petitioner furnished the
documents, though under protest, and
submitted replies to the audit memos. The
relevant dates and details are considered under
Point (ii). The purpose of the audit was to verify
the allegations and examine the underlying
records.

14.11. In her sur-rejoinder, learned counsel submits
that the power to order a special audit under
Clause 10.7 is distinct from the requirement
under Clause 14.3 to notify a panel of auditors.
Clause 14.3 does not govern every special audit
ordered under Clause 10.7. Neither provision
requires the consent or concurrence of the
company being audited.

14.12. On the ROC's notice, learned counsel relies on
Section 206 of the Companies Act, 2013. She
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submits that the ROC has independent
statutory power to call for information, inspect
the books of account and conduct an inquiry by
issuing a written notice. These powers do not
depend on the proceedings before the ECPMP,
the OPPI or the Apex Committee.

14.13. She further submits that the affairs and
conduct of the Petitioner's business require
examination independently of the reprimand
issued by the Apex Committee. The ROC is
entitled to examine other aspects of the
company's functioning. The notice dated
12.05.2026 seeks financial statements, reports,
audit details, board minutes and other company
records. The Petitioner is required to furnish
those records so that the ROC can examine the
company's affairs.

14.14. Learned counsel submits that the inquiry will be
conducted in accordance with the procedure
prescribed under Chapter XIV of the Companies
Act, 2013.

14.15. She also relies on Regulation 6.8 of the IMC
Regulations 2002. She submits that a medical
practitioner cannot accept free travel or
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hospitality from a pharmaceutical company for
attending a conference as a delegate. The
doctors sponsored by the Petitioner were
delegates and could not lawfully accept those
benefits. The Petitioner was aware of the
Regulation and could not have provided such
benefits. In her sur-rejoinder, she reiterates
that the Regulation prohibits a delegate from
accepting the benefits and that the fact that a
delegate may also acquire knowledge at the
conference does not alter the prohibition.

14.16. This Point has two parts. The first concerns the
special audit ordered by the DOP under UCPMP
2024. The second concerns the notice dated
12.05.2026 issued by the ROC under Section
206 of the Companies Act, 2013. The two
matters arise under different legal provisions
and must be examined separately.
SPECIAL AUDIT ORDERED BY THE DOP

14.17. The power of the DOP to order a special audit is
expressly contained in Clause 10.7 of UCPMP
2024. UCPMP 2014 contains no corresponding
provision. The special audit in the present case
was ordered on 02.09.2024, after UCPMP 2024
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had been issued. The DOP invoked Clause 10.7
for that purpose.

14.18. Clause 10.7 provides:
“Any complaint received by the Department of
Pharmaceuticals may also be forwarded to the
concerned Association for necessary action. In
such cases, the concerned Association will take
up the matter further with the complainant
concerned. The Department may order a special
audit for the purpose.”

14.19. The provision expressly empowers the DOP to
order a special audit in relation to a complaint
received by it. As held under Point (i), this is an
independent power of the Department. It is not
dependent on the complaint satisfying the
requirements applicable to complaints lodged
directly with an Association.

14.20. The Petitioner's objection is based on Clause
14.3 of UCPMP 2024, which reads:
“14.3 The Department of Pharmaceutical
will notify a panel of auditors, either audit
firms of standing empanelled by the CAG
or commercial audit firms of repute having
an experience of dealing with such
matters.”

14.21. According to the Petitioner, the audit team had
to be selected from this panel and the
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Petitioner's consent and concurrence were
required before the audit could be conducted.

14.22. This interpretation does not follow from the
language of the two provisions. There are three
reasons for rejecting the Petitioner's
submission.

14.22.1. Clause 10.7 expressly confers the power
to order a special audit. Clause 14.3
requires the DOP to notify a panel of
auditors. The latter provision does not
state that every special audit ordered
under Clause 10.7 must necessarily be
conducted by a firm drawn from that
panel. It does not say that the audit
power under Clause 10.7 can be
exercised only through an empanelled
external audit firm. The Petitioner seeks
to introduce a restriction which neither
provision contains. The two provisions
deal with distinct matters: Clause 10.7
confers the power to order a special
audit, while Clause 14.3 requires the
Department to notify a panel of auditors.
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14.22.2. Neither Clause 10.7 nor Clause 14.3
requires the consent or concurrence of
the company subjected to audit. A
special audit is an independent fact-
finding exercise undertaken by the
Department to verify information
received by it. If the audit depended on
the consent of the company being
examined, the exercise of the
Department's power would depend on
the cooperation of the very entity whose
records are to be examined. The Code
does not impose such a condition, and
the Court cannot introduce one.

14.22.3. The Petitioner has not placed any
material to establish that the officers
who conducted the audit lacked the
necessary qualifications or experience.
The audit was conducted by an internal
team of the DOP headed by an officer
from the Office of the Chief Controller of
Accounts. The Petitioner has not
identified any specific qualification which
the members of the team lacked, nor
has it shown that any member was
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incompetent to examine the relevant
records.

14.23. The Petitioner also participated in the audit. It
furnished documents and submitted replies to
the audit memos dated 06.09.2024,
10.09.2024 and 12.09.2024. It received the
audit report and submitted a further reply on
12.10.2024. This participation does not
dispense with compliance with the Code, but it
is relevant to the question of prejudice. The
Petitioner has not shown how the composition
of the audit team impaired its ability to respond
to the audit or affected the fairness of the
exercise.

14.24. The objection based on Clause 14.3 therefore
fails. The special audit was ordered by the DOP
under Clause 10.7, a provision which expressly
confers that power. The Petitioner has not
established that the audit was conducted by an
incompetent team, that the DOP acted outside
its authority or that the procedure adopted
caused prejudice.

14.25. There is also no specific prayer seeking to
quash the special audit as an independent
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action. The audit was ordered on 02.09.2024,
before the impugned order dated 23.12.2024.
It was not a proceeding initiated pursuant to
the impugned order. The audit report is
material considered by the Apex Committee. It
records, among other things, that none of the
doctors was a speaker and that the expenditure
was treated as marketing expenditure.
NOTICE ISSUED BY THE REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES

14.26. The second part concerns the notice dated
12.05.2026 issued by the ROC. The notice is
headed:
“Inquiry in the matter of ABBVIE
HEALTHCARE INDIA PRIVATE
LIMITED ... u/s 206(4) of the
Companies Act, 2013.”

14.27. The relevant provisions of Section 206 of the
Companies Act, 2013, read as follows:
“ 206. Power to call for information, inspect
books and conduct inquiries.—
(1) Where on a scrutiny of any document filed by
a company or on any information received by
him, the Registrar is of the opinion that any
further information or explanation or any further
documents relating to the company is necessary,
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he may by a written notice require the
company—
(a) to furnish in writing such information or
explanation; or
(b) to produce such documents, within such
reasonable time, as may be specified in the
notice.”

14.28. Sub-section (4) provides:
“(4) If the Registrar is satisfied on the basis of
information available with or furnished to him or
on a representation made to him by any person
that the business of a company is being carried
on for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose or not in
compliance with the provisions of this Act or if
the grievances of investors are not being
addressed, the Registrar may, after informing
the company of the allegations made against it
by a written order, call on the company to
furnish in writing any information or explanation
on matters specified in the order within such
time as he may specify therein and carry out
such inquiry as he deems fit after providing the
company a reasonable opportunity of being
heard:
Provided that the Central Government may, if it
is satisfied that the circumstances so warrant,
direct the Registrar or an inspector appointed by
it for the purpose to carry out the inquiry under
this sub-section: ...”

14.29. These provisions confer distinct but related
powers on the Registrar. Under Section 206(1),
the Registrar may call for further information,
an explanation or documents where scrutiny of
the company's filings or information received by
him makes such material necessary.
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14.30. Section 206(4) provides for an inquiry where
the Registrar is satisfied, on the basis of
information available to him or furnished by any
person, that the company's business is being
carried on for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose,
is not in compliance with the Companies Act, or
that investor grievances are not being
addressed. The Registrar must inform the
company of the allegations by a written order,
specify the matters on which information or
explanation is required and provide a
reasonable opportunity of being heard before
carrying out the inquiry.

14.31. The first proviso also empowers the Central
Government, where the circumstances warrant,
to direct the Registrar or an appointed inspector
to conduct the inquiry. The source of these
powers is the Companies Act itself. They are
independent of the powers exercised under
UCPMP.

14.32. The Petitioner's principal objection is that the
ROC's notice is founded only on the impugned
order and that the Apex Committee did not
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direct the ROC to initiate an inquiry. The notice
itself does not support that contention.

14.33. The first paragraph of the notice dated
12.05.2026 states:
“WHEREAS, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has
ordered Inquiry into the affairs of the company
under section 206(4) of the Companies Act,
2013, hereinafter referred to as ‘Act’, vide Order
No. CL-II-08/122/2025-O/o DGCoA-MCA dated
21.01.2026.”

14.34. The second paragraph states that the notice is
“in compliance of the directions of the Ministry”
issued:
and requires the company to furnish the
specified information within 15 days.

14.35. The notice thus identifies the source of the
inquiry as the order of the Ministry of Corporate
Affairs dated 21.01.2026, bearing Order No.
CL-II-08/122/2025-O/o DGCoA-MCA. The
notice refers to an order made under Section
206(4), which contains the power of the Central
Government to direct the Registrar or an
inspector to conduct an inquiry.

14.36. The Central Government's order dated
21.01.2026 has not been placed before this
Court. It has not been challenged in these
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proceedings. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs,
which issued that order, is not a party to this
petition. This Court cannot presume the
contents or the reasons recorded in that order,
nor can it declare the order invalid without the
order itself and without hearing the authority
which issued it.

14.37. The impugned order of the Apex Committee is
mentioned in two of the fifteen requisitions in
the ROC's notice, namely items (ix) and (x).
Item (ix) refers to the order dated 23.12.2024
and calls upon the Petitioner to furnish details
of the events leading to it, together with
information on whether the company complied
with the order or challenged it. Item (x) refers
to the expenditure of Rs.1.91 crores on travel
tickets and hotel accommodation for the
doctors and calls upon the Petitioner to explain
the accounting treatment of that expenditure.

14.38. Item (xi) seeks the Professional Services
Agreements and details of payments made to
the healthcare professionals. It does not
depend on the impugned order. The remaining
requisitions seek information concerning
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financial statements, qualifications of auditors,
board minutes, bank accounts, key managerial
personnel, related-party transactions, directors,
remuneration and pending litigation.

14.39. The notice therefore does not rest exclusively
on the impugned order. It seeks information on
several aspects of the Petitioner's affairs under
the Companies Act. The reference to the Apex
Committee's order in two of the fifteen
requisitions does not establish that the entire
inquiry is founded on that order.

14.40. The submission that the ROC could not act
because the Apex Committee did not issue a
direction or recommendation to it is
misconceived. The ROC does not require a
direction from the Apex Committee to exercise
powers conferred by Section 206. The statutory
provision permits the Registrar to act on
information received by him or information
available with him. It does not make a
recommendation from the Apex Committee or
any other body a condition for initiating an
inquiry.
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14.41. The Apex Committee's order may constitute
information available to the ROC. The ROC is
entitled to take note of that information while
considering whether an inquiry is necessary.
Equally, the Registrar must exercise his own
statutory judgment and follow the procedure
prescribed by Section 206. The impugned order
does not confer jurisdiction on the ROC; that
jurisdiction comes directly from the Companies
Act.

14.42. The Petitioner relies on Sudarshan V. Biradar
v. State of Karnataka [2023 SCC OnLine Kar
178] (paragraph 14). The paragraph begins
with the principle:
“It is trite law that the Rule making power
conferred upon by the parent Act cannot travel
beyond the mandate of the parent Act”.

14.43. It also reproduces the following passage from
Kerala State Electricity Board v. Thomas
Joseph [ 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1737 ] (decided
on 16.12.2022, paragraph 67):
“Delegated legislation should not travel beyond
the purview of the parent Act. If it does, it is
ultra vires and cannot be given any effect.”
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14.44. Paragraph 14 also reproduces passages from
Union of India v. A. Srinivasan [ (2012) 7
SCC 683 ] (paragraph 21); Kallu Khan v. State
of Madhya Pradesh [ 2022 SCC OnLine MP
243 ] (paragraph 15); General Officer
Commanding-in-Chief v. Subhash Chandra
Yadav [(1988) 2 SCC 351] (paragraph 14);
Delhi Administration v. Siri Ram [(2000) 5
SCC 451]; Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram
Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi [(1975) 1 SCC
421] (paragraph 18); State of Karnataka v.
H. Ganesh Kamath [(1983) 2 SCC 402]
(paragraph 7); Kunj Behari Lal Butail v.
State of Himachal Pradesh [(2000) 3 SCC
40] (paragraph 13); St. Johns Teachers
Training Institute v. National Council for
Teacher Education [(2003) 3 SCC 321]
(paragraph 10); Global Energy Ltd. v.
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission
[(2009) 15 SCC 570] (paragraphs 25 and 73);
State of Tamil Nadu v. P. Krishnamurthy
[(2006) 4 SCC 517] (paragraph 16); Pratap
Chandra Mehta v. State Bar Council of
Madhya Pradesh [(2011) 9 SCC 573]
(paragraph 58); Dr. Mahachandra Prasad
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Singh v. Chairman, Bihar Legislative
Council [(2004) 8 SCC 747] (paragraph 13);
and McEldowney v. Forde [1971 A.C. 632].

14.45. The principle stated in those authorities is that
delegated legislation must remain within the
limits of the parent statute. A rule or regulation
cannot confer a power which the statute itself
does not permit.

14.46. That principle does not assist the Petitioner.
The authorities cited concern subordinate
legislation made under a statute and the limits
of the rule-making power. The ROC has not
relied on any delegated legislation to initiate
the present inquiry. The ROC relies on Section
206 of the Companies Act, 2013, and on the
order of the Central Government referred to in
the notice. The Petitioner has not established
that the ROC has acted under a rule which
travels beyond the parent Act. Nor has it shown
that Section 206 does not authorise the inquiry.

14.47. The principle in Sudarshan v. Biradar remains
applicable in the sense that the ROC must act
within the limits of Section 206. This Court has
directed that the inquiry be conducted strictly in
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accordance with that provision. But the absence
of a recommendation from the Apex Committee
does not make the ROC's action ultra vires. The
statutory source of the ROC's authority is
Section 206 itself.

14.48. The Petitioner also relies on Union of India
and Others v. Ram Lakhan Sharma [(2018)
7 SCC 670] (paragraphs 24 and 33). The
Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
“The disciplinary proceedings are quasi-judicial
proceedings, and the Enquiry Officer is in the
position of an independent adjudicator and is
obliged to act fairly, impartially.” (Paragraph
24.)

14.49. It further held:
“The Enquiry Officer, who is in the position of a
Judge shall not act as a Presenting Officer, who
is in the position of a prosecutor.” (Paragraph
33)

14.50. The principle is that the officer who adjudicates
a disciplinary charge must act independently
and must not combine the role of adjudicator
with that of prosecutor.

14.51. That decision does not invalidate the present
notice. It concerned a departmental disciplinary
inquiry in which the same officer had taken part
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in presenting the evidence and adjudicating the
charge. The ROC's notice dated 12.05.2026 is
not a final finding or an order imposing liability.
It calls for information and documents as part
of an inquiry. No finding has yet been recorded
against the Petitioner.

14.52. The Petitioner has not pleaded or produced
material to show that the ROC has prejudged
the matter, acted as a prosecutor or taken any
step which would prevent an independent
consideration of the Petitioner's explanation.
The contention that the ROC acted “as per the
instructions received” does not by itself
establish bias or lack of independence. The first
proviso to Section 206(4) expressly permits the
Central Government to direct the Registrar or
an appointed inspector to conduct an inquiry.
Acting on such a direction is contemplated by
the statute.

14.53. The principle in Ram Lakhan Sharma will
govern the manner in which the Registrar
conducts the inquiry and reaches a conclusion.
Nothing in this judgment permits the Registrar
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to prejudge the matter or to act otherwise than
fairly and impartially.

14.54. The Petitioner also relies on Union of India v.
Mahendra Singh [2022 SCC OnLine SC 909]
(paragraphs 15 and 16). The principle in that
decision has already been extracted under Point
(i), paragraph 33, and need not be repeated.

14.55. Applied to Section 206(4), the principle requires
the Registrar to follow the statutory procedure.
He must be satisfied on the basis of information
available to him; inform the company of the
allegations by a written order; specify the
matters on which information or explanation is
sought; and conduct the inquiry after giving the
company a reasonable opportunity of being
heard.

14.56. The Petitioner has not identified any particular
step in that procedure which the ROC has
already failed to follow. In particular, it has not
established at this stage that the notice or the
inquiry has resulted in a final finding without
the company being informed of the allegations
and given an opportunity to respond. The
challenge is principally that the ROC had no
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authority to act in the absence of a
recommendation from the Apex Committee. For
the reasons already stated, that submission is
incorrect.

14.57. Learned counsel for Respondents No.1, 2 and 4
has stated that the procedure prescribed under
Chapter XIV of the Companies Act, 2013, will
be followed. This statement is recorded and
shall bind Respondent No.4. The inquiry must
be conducted strictly in accordance with Section
206(4), including by informing the Petitioner in
writing of the allegations against it, specifying
the matters on which information or
explanation is sought and giving it a reasonable
opportunity of being heard.

14.58. The notice is not being upheld as a finding
against the Petitioner. It is upheld as an
initiation of inquiry under the statutory power,
subject to strict compliance with the procedure
prescribed by the Act.

14.59. The ROC must identify the allegations and the
matters requiring examination in the manner
prescribed by Section 206(4). The present
judgment does not authorise an unrestricted
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inquiry into matters unrelated to the statutory
requirements.
REGULATION 6.8 OF THE IMC REGULATIONS AND
THE NATURE OF THE SPONSORSHIP

14.60. Learned counsel for Respondents No.1, 2 and 4
relies on Regulation 6.8 of the IMC Regulations
2002 to explain why an inquiry into the
expenditure is warranted. The Petitioner
responds that a doctor attending a conference
as a delegate also acquires knowledge. The
relevant provisions of Regulation 6.8.1 read as
follows:
“(b) Travel Facilities A medical practitioner shall
not accept any travel Facility inside the country
or outside, including rail, road, air, ship, cruise
tickets, paid vacation, etc. from any
pharmaceutical or allied healthcare industry or
their representatives for self and family
members for vacation or for attending
conferences, seminars, workshops, CME
Programme. etc. as a delegate.”
“(c) Hospitality. A medical practitioner shall not
accept individually any hospitality like hotel
accommodation for self and family members
under any pretext.”

14.61. The provisions are clear. A medical practitioner
attending a conference as a delegate cannot
accept travel facilities or hotel accommodation
from a pharmaceutical or allied healthcare
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company. The prohibition applies to the
benefits specified in the Regulation. It is not
displaced merely because the doctor may
acquire knowledge during the conference.

14.62. The relevant distinction is the capacity in which
the doctor attends the conference. The
Regulation prohibits acceptance of the specified
benefits by a doctor attending as a delegate. It
does not turn on whether the doctor learns
from the speakers or derives professional
benefit from attending.

14.63. UCPMP 2024 imposes a corresponding
obligation on pharmaceutical companies.
Clauses 8.2 and 8.3 provide:
“8.2 Travel: Companies or their representatives,
or any person acting on their behalf, should not
extend travel facilities inside or outside the
country, including rail, air, ship, cruise tickets,
paid vacations, etc., to healthcare professionals
or their family members (both immediate and
extended) for attending conferences, seminars,
workshops etc., unless the person is a speaker
for a CME or a CPD Program.”
“8.3 Hospitality: Companies or their
representatives, or any person acting on their
behalf, should not extend hospitality like hotel
stay, expensive cuisine, resort accommodation
etc., to healthcare professionals or their family
members (both immediate and extended) unless
the person is a speaker for a CME or a CPD
program.”
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14.64. UCPMP 2014 contains corresponding restrictions
in Clauses 7.1 and 7.2, which read:
“7.1 Travel facilities: Companies or their
associations/representatives or any person
acting on their behalf shall not extend any travel
facility inside the country or outside, including
rail, air, ship, cruise tickets, paid vacations, etc.,
to HealthCare Professionals and their family
members for vacation or for attending
conference, seminars, workshops, CME
programme etc. as a delegate. It is hereby
clarified that in any seminar, conference or
meeting organized by a pharmaceutical company
for promoting a drug or disseminating
information, if a medical practitioner participates
as a delegate, it will be on his/her own cost.”
“7.2 Hospitality: Companies or their
associations/representatives shall not extend
any hospitality like hotel accommodation to
Healthcare Practitioners and their family
members under any pretext.”


14.65. Read together, the Codes and the IMC
Regulations address both sides of the same
transaction. The Regulations prohibit a medical
practitioner from accepting the specified
benefits when attending as a delegate. The
Codes prohibit a pharmaceutical company from
providing those benefits.

14.66. UCPMP 2014 expressly restricts travel facilities
to a healthcare professional attending as a
delegate and prohibits hotel accommodation
under any pretext. UCPMP 2024 prohibits travel
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and hospitality for attending conferences,
seminars and workshops, subject to the stated
exception for a speaker at a CME or CPD
programme.

14.67. The Petitioner's submission that a delegate also
learns from a conference does not answer the
prohibition. The relevant question is whether
the doctor attended as a delegate or as a
speaker, or whether the engagement fell within
a distinct permissible professional arrangement.

14.68. The Petitioner relies on Regulation 6.8.1(g),
which permits a medical practitioner to work for
pharmaceutical and allied healthcare industries
in a professional capacity. The provision reads:
“g) Affiliation: A medical practitioner may work
for pharmaceutical and allied healthcare
industries in advisory capacities, as consultants,
as researchers, as treating doctors or in any
other professional capacity. In doing so, a
medical practitioner shall always:
(i) Ensure that his professional integrity and
freedom are maintained.
(ii) Ensure that patients' interests are not
compromised in any way.
(iii) Ensure that such affiliations are within the
law.
(iv) Ensure that such affiliations/employments
are fully transparent and disclosed.”
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14.69. Regulation 6.8.1(g) permits a medical
practitioner to render professional services to a
pharmaceutical company as a consultant,
adviser, researcher, treating doctor or in
another professional capacity. That permission
is subject to the safeguards expressly set out in
the provision. It requires professional integrity,
protection of patient interests, compliance with
law and full transparency.

14.70. The provision does not grant a general
exemption from the restrictions on travel and
hospitality. A company cannot treat every
arrangement described as a consultancy or
professional services agreement as falling
within Regulation 6.8.1(g). The substance of
the engagement, the services actually rendered
and the benefits provided must be examined.

14.71. Three aspects of the present record are
relevant.

14.71.1. First, the Petitioner does not dispute that
it arranged and paid for the air travel
and hotel accommodation of the doctors
who attended IMCAS 2024 and AMWC
2024. Its case is that the doctors had
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entered into Professional Services
Agreements and were required to
acquire knowledge at the conferences
and thereafter train other doctors.

14.71.2. Secondly, the Petitioner has not
contended in its submissions that the 30
doctors were speakers at either
conference. Its explanation is that they
attended as part of the professional
engagements and that even a delegate
gains knowledge by attending a
conference. That explanation does not,
by itself, establish that the doctors were
engaged in the capacity contemplated by
Regulation 6.8.1(g).

14.71.3. Thirdly, the Petitioner's written position
statement dated 27.03.2026 submitted
to the Income Tax Department places
the doctors in a separate category
described as “HCPs who attended events
under KDA engagements”. It
distinguishes that category from “HCPs
engaged as speakers” for events
organised by the Petitioner. The
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statement asserts that the Petitioner did
not intend to sponsor those doctors as
“passive delegates”. This distinction in
the Petitioner's own statement confirms
that the nature of the engagements and
the capacity in which the doctors
attended require examination.

14.72. The real factual issue is whether the doctors
attended the conferences as delegates or under
genuine Professional Services Agreements
falling within Regulation 6.8.1(g). That question
must be decided on the basis of the
agreements, the nature of the services
undertaken, the actual participation of the
doctors at the conferences and the work
performed by them thereafter. The ECPMP, the
Special Audit Committee and the Apex
Committee reached different conclusions on this
issue.

14.73. If the competent authority finds that the
expenditure was incurred in breach of the
applicable provisions, the further question of
how that expenditure was recorded in the
Petitioner's books and financial statements, and
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whether it was properly claimed in its tax
returns, must be examined by the ROC and the
Income Tax Department under their respective
statutes. The ECPMP's decision or the impugned
order cannot replace the independent
assessment required of those authorities.

14.74. UCPMP 2024 itself recognises that expenditure
incurred on such events remains subject to the
Income Tax Act. Clause 6.2(v) provides:
“Entities incurring expenditure on such events, as well as
participants and speakers, must comply with the relevant
provisions of the Income Tax Act 1961 as amended from time
to time.”

14.75. This provision makes it clear that UCPMP does
not displace the Income Tax Act. The company
and the doctors remain subject to the
requirements of the tax law. The ECPMP also
recognised this position while answering Issue
No.5, when it held that questions of tax liability
fell within the domain of the Income Tax
authorities.
EFFECT OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER ON THE ROC'S
INQUIRY
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14.76. The effect of the impugned order on items (ix)
and (x) of the ROC's notice must be clarified.
Those two items refer to the Apex Committee's
order. Item (ix) calls upon the Petitioner to
explain the circumstances leading to the order
and whether the Petitioner complied with or
challenged it. Item (x) refers to the expenditure
of Rs.1.91 crores and calls upon the Petitioner
to explain how the expenditure was accounted
for.

14.77. The ROC is entitled to take note of the
impugned order as information available to it.
However, the findings recorded by the Apex
Committee and the Special Audit Committee
are not binding findings of fact for the purpose
of the inquiry under Section 206(4). The
Petitioner is entitled to dispute those findings
before the ROC. The ROC must consider the
Petitioner's explanation and the supporting
documents and arrive at its own conclusion.

14.78. Items (ix) and (x) of the notice must therefore
be read in that manner. Item (xi), which seeks
the Professional Services Agreements and
payment details, and the other requisitions
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seeking company records do not depend on the
impugned order. They remain within the scope
of the inquiry, subject to the requirements of
Section 206.

14.79. The Petitioner's submission that the ROC's
inquiry was neither envisaged nor permitted by
the ECPMP or the Apex Committee does not
assist it. The ROC's authority does not arise
from either committee. It arises from Section
206 of the Companies Act, 2013. The Codes
cannot curtail a statutory power conferred by
Parliament.

14.80. The ROC must nevertheless act within Section
206. The impugned order cannot be treated as
a final finding binding on the ROC, and the
Registrar must independently examine the
material and the Petitioner's response. Subject
to that requirement, the inquiry cannot be
quashed merely because the Apex Committee
did not direct the ROC to initiate it.

14.81. The authorities relied upon by the Petitioner do
not establish that the special audit or the ROC's
notice is without jurisdiction. Sudarshan v.
Biradar is distinguishable because it concerns
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the limits of delegated legislation. Ram Lakhan
Sharma states the requirement of fairness and
impartiality in a quasi-judicial inquiry, but the
ROC's notice is at the stage of calling for
information and no final finding has been
recorded. Mahendra Singh requires strict
compliance with the procedure prescribed by
the governing law. That principle is preserved
by directing the ROC to comply strictly with
Section 206(4).

14.82. In the above circumstances, the special audit
ordered by the DOP is not shown to be without
jurisdiction. Clause 10.7 expressly empowers
the DOP to order a special audit. Clause 14.3
does not require that every such audit be
conducted only by an external firm drawn from
the notified panel, nor does it require the
company's consent or concurrence. The
Petitioner has also failed to establish that the
audit team was incompetent or that the audit
caused prejudice.

14.83. The ROC's notice dated 12.05.2026 is founded
on Section 206(4) of the Companies Act, 2013,
and refers to the Central Government's order
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dated 21.01.2026. The absence of a direction
from the Apex Committee does not invalidate
the notice. The ROC has independent statutory
powers to call for information and conduct an
inquiry. The impugned order is only one source
of information referred to in two of the fifteen
requisitions; it is not shown to be the sole basis
of the inquiry.

14.84. The inquiry must, however, be conducted
strictly in accordance with Section 206(4). The
ROC must inform the Petitioner in writing of the
allegations, specify the matters on which
information is sought and give the Petitioner a
reasonable opportunity of being heard. The
Registrar must form his own opinion and must
not treat the findings of the Apex Committee or
the Special Audit Committee as binding. The
treatment of the expenditure in the Petitioner's
books and tax returns is for the ROC and the
Income Tax Department to determine
independently under their respective statutes.

14.85. This court answers Point No. (iii) by holding
that the special audit ordered by the DOP is not
vitiated merely because the auditors were not
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drawn from a panel under Clause 14.3 of
UCPMP 2024. The ROC's notice dated
12.05.2026 is founded on Section 206(4) of the
Companies Act, 2013, and is not liable to be
quashed for want of a direction or
recommendation from the Apex Committee.
The ROC must conduct the inquiry strictly in
accordance with Section 206(4), inform the
Petitioner in writing of the allegations, give it a
reasonable opportunity of being heard and form
its own view without treating the findings in the
impugned order as binding.

15. Answer to Point No. (iv): Whether the
Petitioner has made out grounds for quashing
the impugned order dated 23.12.2024 and the
consequential proceedings, including the
summons dated 13.01.2026 and 09.02.2026
issued by the Income Tax Department and the
notice dated 12.05.2026 issued by the Registrar
of Companies, and for grant of the
consequential reliefs sought in the writ
petition?


15.1. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the
Petitioner manufactures medical devices falling
under Class C, which are imported and
marketed in India after obtaining the requisite
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regulatory approvals. These devices are
injectable products used on the face. Their safe
and effective use requires regular training of
healthcare professionals. An incorrect injection
may cause rare but serious complications,
including loss of vision. The packaging itself
carries a warning that the products should be
used only by medical practitioners having
appropriate training and experience.

15.2. For this reason, the Petitioner entered into
Professional Services Agreements with doctors.
The doctors received training and were
thereafter expected to train other doctors in
India. Some of this training took place at
international conferences, including IMCAS
2024, held from 01.02.2024 to 03.02.2024,
and AMWC 2024, held from 26.03.2024 to
29.03.2024. The Petitioner paid for their travel
and accommodation.

15.3. He submits that the Professional Services
Agreements were intended exclusively for
training. They were not linked to the doctors
recommending, administering or prescribing the
Petitioner's products. Nor did they influence the
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doctors' professional choices. The engagements
therefore had no connection with business
promotion.

15.4. He further submits that IMCAS 2024 was
organised by a reputed independent
international organisation and attended by
more than 18,000 doctors from across the
world. Six doctors sponsored by the Petitioner
attended that conference. The Petitioner neither
organised the conference nor had any control
over the choice of its venue.

15.5. Learned Senior Counsel also submits that the
pharmaceutical industry was in the process of
transitioning from UCPMP 2014 to UCPMP 2024
and that commitments made before the new
Code came into force were governed by UCPMP
2014.

15.6. Learned Senior Counsel relies on the order
dated 04.08.2026 passed by the Hon'ble Delhi
High Court in Dr. Kiran Ninad Hebbalkar &
Ors. v. ACPMP [W.P.(C) No.10370/2026 and
C.M. Application No.48020/2026]. By that
order, the operation of the impugned order
dated 23.12.2024 was stayed insofar as it
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directed action against the Petitioners in that
case.

15.7. He also relies on the order dated 27.07.2026
passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in
Dr. Jagdish Jadavbhai Sakhiya v. Gujarat
Medical Council and Another [Special Civil
Application No.9821/2026]. According to him,
the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat noticed that
the pharmaceutical company which organised
the conference had only been reprimanded,
whereas the doctors were subjected to more
serious action. On that basis, proceedings
against the doctors were stayed. He submits
that the same consideration applies to the
present case.

15.8. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that
the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has no
independent basis to proceed against the
Petitioner. The notice dated 12.05.2026 issued
by the Registrar of Companies, as well as the
summonses dated 13.01.2026 and 09.02.2026
issued by the Income Tax Department, are
founded on the impugned order. The Petitioner
did not challenge the impugned order earlier
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because it contained only a reprimand. It
approached this Court when the Ministry and
Department began acting on the basis of that
order. He therefore seeks the reliefs prayed for
in the writ petition.

15.9. Smt. Nayanatara B.G., learned counsel
appearing for Respondents No.1, 2 and 4,
submits that the orders of the Hon'ble Delhi
High Court and the Hon'ble High Court of
Gujarat are interim orders. The proceedings
before those Courts have not been finally
decided. She also points out that those
petitions were filed by doctors and not by the
Petitioner. The issues arising in proceedings
against doctors are distinct from those arising
in the present petition filed by the
pharmaceutical company.

15.10. She submits that the notice issued by the
Registrar of Companies is lawful, that the
inquiry is necessary and that the writ petition
deserves to be dismissed. Her detailed
submissions regarding the Registrar's notice
have been considered under Point (iii).
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15.11. Sri Y.V. Raviraj, learned counsel appearing for
Respondent No.3, the Income Tax Department,
submits that the powers of the Income Tax
Department are independent of those exercised
by the OPPI or the Apex Committee. A decision
of the Ethics Committee or the Apex Committee
does not prevent the Income Tax Department
from initiating proceedings under the Income
Tax Act, 1961, where the material warrants
such action.

15.12. He further submits that neither the reprimand
issued under the Code nor the remedial
measures suggested by the Apex Committee
can restrict the Income Tax Department from
exercising its statutory powers. He seeks
dismissal of the writ petition.

15.13. The question under this Point concerns the
reliefs sought by the Petitioner. The Petitioner
seeks three principal forms of relief: first,
quashing of the impugned order dated
23.12.2024 under prayer A; secondly, quashing
of the consequential proceedings, including the
summonses issued by the Income Tax
Department and the notice issued by the
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Registrar of Companies, under prayer B; and
thirdly, a direction restraining the Respondents
from taking coercive or precipitate steps under
prayer C.

15.14. The legality of the impugned order has already
been considered under Points (i) and (ii). The
special audit and the notice issued by the
Registrar of Companies have been considered
under Point (iii).

15.15. This Point therefore addresses the grounds for
the reliefs sought, the two Income Tax
summonses, the effect of the impugned order
on other authorities, the decisions of the
Hon'ble Delhi High Court and the Hon'ble High
Court of Gujarat, and the Petitioner's
entitlement to the consequential reliefs.

15.16. The Petitioner has not established either of the
grounds on which it seeks to quash the
impugned order.

15.17. The first ground is that the proceedings
originated from an anonymous complaint. As
held under Point (i), the anonymous nature of
the complaint did not prevent the DOP from
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receiving the information and examining it
under Clause 10.7 of UCPMP 2024. The DOP
was also entitled to order a special audit and
refer the matter to the Apex Committee.

15.18. The second ground is that the Apex Committee
could not proceed in the absence of an appeal
or review against the decision of the ECPMP
dated 20.09.2024. As held under Point (ii), the
Apex Committee acted on the DOP's
independent reference and did not sit in appeal
or review over the ECPMP's decision. The
finality of the ECPMP's decision within the
Association's complaint mechanism did not
prevent the DOP from exercising its
independent functions under the Code.

15.19. The Petitioner has not contended that it was
denied an opportunity of hearing before the
Apex Committee. It has not established bias on
the part of the Committee or bad faith on the
part of the DOP. The proceedings were
undertaken on the basis of the material
gathered through the special audit, and the
Petitioner was given an opportunity to respond.
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15.20. The grounds urged under Points (i) and (ii)
therefore do not justify quashing the impugned
order. Prayer A is liable to be refused.
SUMMONSES ISSUED BY THE INCOME TAX
DEPARTMENT

15.21. The two summonses issued by the Income Tax
Department are dated 13.01.2026 and
09.02.2026. Both were issued by the Deputy
Director of Income Tax (Investigation) and are
titled:
“Summons to Assessee/Witness under Section
131(1A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.”

15.22. Both summonses state that the Petitioner's
attendance is required in connection with
proceedings under the Income Tax Act, 1961.

15.23. The first summons, concerning Assessment
Year 2024-25, requires the Petitioner to attend
on 20.01.2026 and produce documents relating
to the conferences held in Paris and Monaco,
the expenditure incurred on them, the names
and PAN details of the doctors; details of travel
and hospitality expenses; income tax returns,
balance sheets and financial statements for
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several assessment years; bank accounts and
statements, and details of foreign assets.

15.24. The second summons, dated 09.02.2026,
requires the Petitioner to attend on 13.02.2026
and furnish the PAN details of 11 doctors out of
the 30 whose details had not been provided
earlier. It also calls for ledger extracts, with
narration, relating to expenditure recorded
under the head “Other Expenses” in note 27 to
the statement of profit and loss for Assessment
Years 2021-22 to 2025-26.

15.25. Both summonses state that failure to comply
may attract a penalty of Rs.10,000/- under
Section 272A(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act,
1961, for each default.

15.26. The summonses themselves invoke Section
131(1A) and refer to Section 272A(1)(c) of the
Income Tax Act, 1961. However, neither side
has advanced a detailed submission on their
scope. The Petitioner has also not challenged
the authority of the issuing officer under the
provisions mentioned in the summonses.
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15.27. The Court therefore confines its examination to
the ground actually urged by the Petitioner,
namely, that the summonses are proceedings
initiated on the basis of the impugned order
and that the Income Tax Department cannot
proceed independently after the Apex
Committee has dealt with the matter. No
broader interpretation of Sections 131(1A) or
272A(1)(c) is called for in this petition.

15.28. The Petitioner has not established that the two
summonses were issued pursuant to, in
furtherance of, or solely on the basis of the
impugned order. Its case rests mainly on the
fact that paragraph (ii) of the operative part of
the impugned order requested the Central
Board of Direct Taxes to evaluate the tax
liability of the Petitioner and the 30 doctors.
That circumstance does not establish that the
summonses were issued because of that
request.

15.29. Neither summons refers to the impugned order,
the Apex Committee or UCPMP. Both
summonses state that the Petitioner's
attendance and production of documents are
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required in connection with proceedings under
the Income Tax Act. They seek information
concerning the Petitioner's financial affairs as
an assessee. A substantial part of the
information sought, including tax returns, bank
accounts, foreign assets and ledger extracts for
several years, is not confined to the two
conferences or to the findings in the impugned
order.

15.30. Paragraph (ii) of the operative part of the
impugned order states that the Central Board of
Direct Taxes:
“is requested to evaluate the tax liability of M/s.
AbbVie Healthcare India Pvt Ltd along with 30
HCPs and take action in accordance with the
provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961 read
with the subordinate circulars issued in this
regard.”

15.31. The language is clear. The Apex Committee
made a request; it did not issue a direction to
the Income Tax Department. A request or
recommendation does not compel the receiving
authority to act. The authority must examine
the matter under its own statute and decide
whether action is warranted.
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15.32. This is consistent with Clause 12(v) of UCPMP
2024, which permits the Committee to send
recommendations to a government agency
where the matter falls within that agency's
statutory jurisdiction. The receiving agency
remains governed by its own law.

15.33. Whether the Income Tax Department issued
the summonses because of the impugned order
or on the basis of other information is a
question of fact. No material has been placed
before this Court to establish that the impugned
order was the source of the proceedings. A writ
court cannot record a finding on that question
without supporting material.

15.34. The ECPMP itself, while deciding Issue No.5,
recognised that questions relating to tax
liability fall within the jurisdiction of the Income
Tax authorities. The Petitioner relies on the
ECPMP's decision. It cannot accept the ECPMP's
conclusion when it favours its case and reject
the part recognising the independent
jurisdiction of the tax authorities.

15.35. The Income Tax Department has also expressly
stated before this Court that its powers are
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distinct from those of the OPPI and the Apex
Committee. The position is correct. The
Association's committee and the tax authorities
operate under different legal frameworks. A
decision under the Code does not determine the
liability of an assessee under the Income Tax
Act.

15.36. The Petitioner's own written position statement
dated 27.03.2026, submitted to the Income
Tax Department, records its response to the
summonses and sets out its case on the
deductibility of the expenditure incurred in
connection with the healthcare professionals.
The Petitioner has therefore placed its
explanation before the tax authorities and is
participating in those proceedings.

15.37. Whether the expenditure was incurred wholly
and exclusively for business purposes, whether
it is deductible under the Income Tax Act and
whether the relevant amounts were correctly
disclosed in the Petitioner's returns are matters
for the Income Tax Department to determine
under that Act . The Petitioner is entitled to
raise all objections available to it before the
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assessing or investigating authority and before
the appropriate statutory forum.

15.38. No ground is made out for quashing the
summonses dated 13.01.2026 and 09.02.2026.
They expressly invoke the Income Tax Act and
call for information and documents in
connection with proceedings under that Act.
The Petitioner has not established that they are
founded solely on the impugned order or that
the Income Tax Department is bound by the
findings of the ECPMP or the Apex Committee.

15.39. The request made by the Apex Committee to
the Central Board of Direct Taxes does not
curtail the Department's statutory powers. The
Department must decide the tax treatment of
the expenditure independently, on the material
before it and in accordance with the Income
Tax Act. Neither the decision of the ECPMP nor
the impugned order determines that question.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE NATIONAL MEDICAL
COUNCIL AND OTHER AUTHORITIES

15.40. Prayer B also seeks quashing of proceedings
before the National Medical Council, State
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Medical Councils and “any other authority”. The
National Medical Council is not a party to this
petition, nor are the concerned doctors before
this Court. The impugned order merely requests
the National Medical Council to take action
against the 30 doctors under the Indian Medical
Council (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and
Ethics) Regulations, 2002.

15.41. That request does not compel the Council to
take action. The Council must decide for itself
whether the material warrants proceedings
under its governing Regulations and must
follow the procedure prescribed by those
Regulations. It must also afford the concerned
doctors the opportunity required by law.

15.42. The doctors are not parties to the present
petition. The Court therefore makes no order on
the legality of any proceedings initiated against
them and expresses no opinion on their
individual rights or liabilities. The doctors who
have approached the Hon'ble Delhi High Court
or the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat must
pursue their remedies in those proceedings.
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15.43. The impugned order cannot be treated as a
final determination of misconduct by the
doctors. Any competent medical authority must
independently examine the material and act in
accordance with the applicable Regulations.
NOTICE ISSUED BY THE REGISTRAR OF
COMPANIES

15.44. The notice dated 12.05.2026 issued by the
Registrar of Companies has already been
examined in detail under Point (iii). It is not
liable to be quashed merely because the
impugned order refers to the expenditure
incurred on the doctors. The notice records that
the Ministry of Corporate Affairs ordered an
inquiry under Section 206(4) of the Companies
Act, 2013, by order dated 21.01.2026.

15.45. The inquiry is founded on the statutory power
under Section 206(4) and the Central
Government's order. It does not depend solely
on the impugned order. The Registrar is
required to proceed strictly in accordance with
Section 206(4), inform the Petitioner in writing
of the allegations, specify the matters on which
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information is sought and provide a reasonable
opportunity of being heard.

15.46. As held under Point (iii), items (ix) and (x) of
the notice must be treated as seeking
information with reference to the impugned
order, and not as treating its findings as
binding conclusions against the Petitioner. The
Registrar must form an independent view on
the material and the Petitioner's explanation.
That direction is sufficient to protect the
Petitioner's right to contest the allegations
before the Registrar. No further relief is
warranted under this Point.
ORDERS OF THE HON'BLE DELHI HIGH COURT
AND THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT

15.47. Learned Senior Counsel relies on the order
dated 04.08.2026 passed by the Hon'ble Delhi
High Court in Dr. Kiran Ninad Hebbalkar &
Ors. v. ACPMP [W.P.(C) No.10370/2026 and
C.M. Application No.48020/2026]. The
submission before this Court is that the Hon'ble
Delhi High Court stayed the operation of the
impugned order dated 23.12.2024 insofar as it
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directed action against the Petitioners in that
case.

15.48. Learned Senior Counsel also relies on the order
dated 27.07.2026 passed by the Hon'ble High
Court of Gujarat in Dr. Jagdish Jadavbhai
Sakhiya v. Gujarat Medical Council and
Another [Special Civil Application
No.9821/2026]. The Hon'ble High Court of
Gujarat noticed the difference between the
action taken against the pharmaceutical
company and the action proposed against the
doctors and stayed the proceedings against the
doctors.

15.49. Neither order advances the Petitioner's case.
Both are interim orders. An interim stay does
not finally decide the merits of the controversy.
The petitions in those cases were filed by
doctors challenging action against them,
whereas the present petition is filed by the
pharmaceutical company challenging the
reprimand and the consequential proceedings
against it.

15.50. The legal position of a pharmaceutical company
challenging a reprimand is distinct from that of
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a medical practitioner challenging proposed
disciplinary action by a medical council. The
Hon’ble Delhi High Court’s order stays the
impugned order only insofar as it directs action
against the Petitioners in that case, namely, the
doctors. It does not follow that the order must
also be quashed at the instance of the company
in the present proceedings.

15.51. The orders of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court and
the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat deserve due
respect. They are; however, interim orders
passed in proceedings involving different
Petitioners and different reliefs. They do not
bind this Court to grant the reliefs sought by
the Petitioner. The parity argument concerning
the comparative treatment of the company and
the doctors relates to the proceedings against
the doctors. Those doctors are not before this
Court, and the Petitioner cannot seek relief on
their behalf.

15.52. The Court has therefore not relied on either
interim order in deciding the present petition.

15.53. The Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari against
the impugned order and the consequential
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proceedings. The grounds urged for quashing
the impugned order have failed under Points (i)
and (ii). The grounds urged against the special
audit and the ROC's notice have failed under
Point (iii). The Petitioner has also failed to
establish that the Income Tax summonses were
issued solely on the basis of the impugned
order or that the other statutory authorities are
bound by the findings recorded by the Apex
Committee.

15.54. The impugned order records the Petitioner's
reprimand and directs publication in accordance
with the Code. It also makes requests to the
Central Board of Direct Taxes and the National
Medical Council. Those requests do not bind the
receiving authorities. Each authority must act
under its own statute or Regulations and form
its own opinion on the material before it.

15.55. The Petitioner was given an opportunity to
place its explanation before the Apex
Committee. It has not established denial of
hearing, bias or bad faith. The record also does
not establish that the consequential
proceedings are without statutory authority.
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The Income Tax Department and the Registrar
of Companies are required to examine the
relevant expenditure and the Petitioner's affairs
under their respective statutes. Quashing the
impugned order would not remove the statutory
obligation of those authorities to examine
matters falling within their jurisdiction.

15.56. The Court is conscious that the reprimand and
its publication have consequences for the
Petitioner. However, the order does not itself
determine tax liability, impose a penalty under
the Companies Act or record professional
misconduct against the doctors. The requests
made to the statutory authorities are not
binding directions. Those authorities must
independently consider the material and follow
the procedure prescribed by law.

15.57. In these circumstances, the Petitioner has not
established any ground for exercising the writ
jurisdiction of this Court to quash the impugned
order or restrain the statutory authorities from
carrying out their lawful functions.

15.58. The Petitioner has not established grounds for
quashing the impugned order dated
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23.12.2024, the summonses dated 13.01.2026
and 09.02.2026, or the notice dated
12.05.2026. The statutory authorities must
proceed independently, under the laws
governing them, and in accordance with the
safeguards specified under Points (iii) and (iv).
The Petitioner is free to raise all objections
available to it before those authorities and
before the appropriate statutory forums.

15.59. The prayer for a restraint against coercive or
precipitate action is also not made out. No
ground has been established to prevent the
Respondents from exercising their lawful
powers. The consequential reliefs sought by the
Petitioner must therefore be refused.

15.60. This Court answers Point No. (iv) by holding
that the Petitioner has not made out grounds
for quashing the impugned order dated
23.12.2024, the summonses dated 13.01.2026
and 09.02.2026 issued by the Income Tax
Department, or the notice dated 12.05.2026
issued by the Registrar of Companies. The
statutory authorities shall act independently
and in accordance with their respective
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governing laws. The consequential reliefs and
the prayer for restraint are refused.

16. Answer to Point No. (v): What Order?

16.1. In view of the answers to the Points No. (i) to
(iv), this court passes the following:
ORDER

(i) The writ petition is dismissed .


(ii) Respondent No.3 may proceed in accordance
with the Income Tax Act, 1961, on the basis of
its independent assessment. The Petitioner is
free to raise before the officer concerned, and
before the proper forum, any objection that is
open to it.


(iii) The notice dated 12.05.2026 issued by
Respondent No.4 is not quashed. The inquiry
shall be conducted strictly in accordance with
Section 206(4) of the Companies Act, 2013,
including by informing the Petitioner in writing
of the allegations against it, specifying the
matters on which information is sought, and
giving the Petitioner a reasonable opportunity
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of being heard. The Petitioner shall furnish its
reply to the notice within four weeks from the
date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, and
it is free to raise before Respondent No.4 any
objection that is open to it.

This Court has been assisted by Ms. Harshada R.B.,
Law Clerk, in reviewing this judgment.


Digitally Signed By:
SURAJ GOVINDA RAJ
05/11/2026, 17:32, Bengaluru

Verified
(SURAJ GOVINDARAJ)
JUDGE






SR
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 68