SRI R GANESH vs M/S MANJUNATHA INDUSTRIES

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

TH
DATED THIS THE 4 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026


BEFORE

THE HON'BLE M ` JUSTICE GEETHA K.B.

CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO. 253 OF 2024

(397(Cr.PC) / 438(BNSS))

BETWEEN:

1.
SRI R GANESH
S/O RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS
R/A NO.1917, 12TH CROSS
4TH MAIN, VIJAYANAGARA
BENGALURU-560040
…PETITIONER







(BY SRI. THIMMAIAH K H.,ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. M/S MANJUNATHA INDUSTRIES
PROPRIETOR
MANJUNATH N
S/O NARASEGOWDA K
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
R/A NO.36, PETE CHENNAPPA INDUSTRIAL ESTATE
KAMAKSHI PALYA, BENGALURU-560079
…RESPONDENT



(BY SRI. BAPAT SAMPATH VINAYAKA RAO.,ADVOCATE)
THIS CRL.RP IS FILED U/S.397 R/W 401 CR.P.C BY THE
ADVOCATE FOR THE PETITIONER PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF CONVICTION SENTENCE FOR THE
OFFENCE P/US/ 138 OF NI ACT DATED 06.11.2023 PASSED IN
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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CRL.A.NO.969/2021 BY THE LXV ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND
JUDGE, BENGALURU (CCH-66) AND THE JUDGMENT AND
ORDER OF CONVICTION PASSED IN C.C.NO.20840/2018
DATED 28.10.2021 PASSED BY THE XXII ACMM AT BENGALURU
BY ALLOWING CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION CONSEQUENTLY
ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE M ` JUSTICE GEETHA K.B.

ORAL ORDER
This is the revision petition filed by the revision
petitioner/accused under Section 397(1) read with Section
401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short,
‘Cr.P.C.’), praying to set aside the judgment of conviction
and order of sentence dated 28.10.2021 passed in C.C.
No.20840/2018 on the file of the XXII Additional Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru (in short, ‘the trial
Court’), which was confirmed in the appellate judgment
dated 06.11.2023 passed in Criminal Appeal No.969/2021
on the file of the LXV Additional City Civil & Sessions
Judge, Bengaluru City (CCH-66) (in short, ‘the appellate
Court’).
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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2. The parties would be referred with their ranks, as
they were before the trial Court, for the sake of
convenience and clarity.

3. The complainant has filed the complaint before
the trial Court under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C., praying
for punishing the accused for the offence punishable under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in
short, ‘NI Act’), in accordance with law.
4.
It is stated in the complaint that the complainant
and the accused were friends and were known to each
other for several years. Out of this relationship, the
accused approached the complainant and obtained a hand
loan of ` 12,00,000/- in cash on 15.06.2014, agreeing to
repay the said amount with interest at 1% per month. The
accused also executed an on-demand promissory note
with consideration receipt dated 15.06.2014, assuring
repayment of the amount within one year. The parents of
the complainant's wife had sold their property in March-
2014 and given the sale proceeds to her as her share. The
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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complainant had the said amount with him and, at the
request of the accused, lent the aforesaid amount to him.
The accused paid interest for a period of six months and
thereafter stopped paying the interest. Hence, the
complainant insisted to the accused to repay the aforesaid
amount. Thereafter, the accused issued the subject
cheque dated 27.04.2018 bearing No.141203, drawn on
the Karnataka State Co-operative Apex Bank Limited,
Basaveshwaranagara Branch, Bengaluru. When the
complainant presented the said cheque for encashment
through his bank on 18.05.2018, it was returned with the
endorsement ‘account closed’. Thereafter, the complainant
issued a legal notice dated 12.06.2018 calling upon the
accused to repay the loan amount within fifteen days. The
said notice was served on the accused on 19.06.2018.
However, the accused neither replied to the notice nor
.
repaid the loan amount. Hence, the complaint

5. After recording the sworn statement of the
complainant, the case was registered against the accused
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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and summons was issued to him. After appearing before
the trial Court, the accused pleaded not guilty to the
accusation levelled against him when it was read over and
explained to him.

6. Thereafter, the complainant was further
examined-in-chief.

7. Even after providing sufficient opportunities, the
complainant was not cross-examined by the accused. The
accused denied the case of the complainant in toto in his
statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., and
submitted that he would lead defence evidence. However,
despite giving sufficient time, the accused did not lead any
defence evidence.

8. The trial Court convicted the accused for the
offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and
`
sentenced him to pay a fine of 12,50,000/- out of which
`
5,000/- was ordered to be paid to the State and the
remaining amount was ordered to be paid to the
complainant as compensation.
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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9. Aggrieved by the same, the accused preferred an
appeal before the appellate Court, contending that, due to
the COVID-19 pandemic and the death of his two
brothers-in-law during the said pandemic, he could not
approach his advocate. Hence, he prayed for remand of
the matter. However, without considering the said prayer
of the accused, the appeal was dismissed. Hence, the
accused is before this Court.

10. Heard arguments.

11. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner-
Sri Thimmaiah K.H., would submit that, only due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, the accused could not cross-examine
the complainant after disposal of the application filed by
the complainant under Section 143 of the NI Act.
Furthermore, the accused lost his brothers-in-law. Hence,
he prayed for allowing the revision petition and remand
the matter to the trial Court.

12. The learned counsel for the accused would
submit that the contention of the accused is that there was
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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no loan transaction between the complainant and the
accused at any point of time. The accused stood as a
witness to the agreement of sale executed between the
complainant and one Jayamma, who is related to the
accused. Furthermore, as per the averments in the
complaint itself, the alleged cheque was issued in respect
of a time-barred debt.

13. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner
would further submit that, as per Ex.P.5, the amount was
not received by the wife of the complainant, but was
received by her mother. Hence, there was no financial
capacity for the complainant to lend a huge amount of
` 12,00,000/- in the year 2014. Hence, he prayed for
allowing the revision petition.

14. The learned counsel for the respondent, Sri
Bapat Sampath Vinayaka Rao, would submit that the
presumption in favour of the complainant has not been
rebutted by the accused either by replying to the legal
notice, or by cross-examining the complainant or by
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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leading defence evidence, despite being given sufficient
opportunities. The COVID-19 pandemic arose only after
closure of the evidence of the complainant, and the
application for recalling the complainant was allowed. Even
then, the learned counsel for the accused did not make
any efforts to cross-examine the complainant. Once the
cheque is issued by the accused, there is no question of
treating the debt as time-barred. Hence, he prayed for
dismissal of the revision petition.

15. Having heard arguments of both sides, verifying
the revision petition papers, the trial Court and the
appellate Court records , the point that arises for
consideration is:


"Whether the revision petitioner/s establish
perversity or grossly erroneousness in the judgment
of the trial Court and appellate Court or the
judgment of the trial Court and appellate Court is
glaringly unreasonable or wholly unreliable or
untenable and the judgment of the trial Court and
appellate Court considered immaterial or irrelevant
material or no material or non-consideration of any
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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relevant material or judicial discretion has been
exercised arbitrarily or capriciously?”



16. The finding of this Court on above point is in
' Negative' for the following:
REASONS

17. The revisional jurisdiction of this Court is very
limited. In this regard, this Court places reliance on the
Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Kuntegowda v/s Thurubaiah in Criminal Appeal
No.3654/2026, (Arising out of Special Leave Petition
(Criminal) No.2247 of 2024 dated 04.08.2026
2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485
reported in . In the aforesaid
judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph Nos.7.1.
to 7.3 has discussed the revisional jurisdiction of this
Court, which reads as follows:
"7.1 This Court, in the State of Maharashtra
vs. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7
SCC 659 observed that the High Court, in exercise
of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an
in-depth roving re-examination of the oral evidence
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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and medical evidence and come to a conclusion
contrary to the consistent one reached by two
courts below. In the facts of the present case, in
the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely
erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of
conviction of the trial Court and the Appellate Court
by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning
on the merits of the case and thereby erred in
setting aside the well-reasoned and correct
judgement and orders of the trial and appellate
Courts.
7.2 Upon perusal of the impugned judgment
and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the
High Court went into great detail into each of the
testimonies, documents and merits of the case
which could have been avoided especially when the
subject matter had come under its revisional
jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court,
the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of
the case, something which is generally
impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is
apparent on the face of record. In State of Kerala
vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri,
(1999) 2 SCC 452, while considering the scope of
the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court this
Court has laid down the following:
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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"5.... In its revisional jurisdiction, the High
Court can call for and examine the record of
any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying
itself as to the correctness, legality or
propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In
other words, the jurisdiction is one of
supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High
Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But
the said revisional power cannot be equated
with the power of an appellate Court nor can it
be treated even as a second appellate
jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not
be appropriate for the High Court to
reappreciate the evidence and come to its own
conclusion on the same when the evidence has
already been appreciated by the Magistrate as
well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless
any glaring feature is brought to the notice of
the High Court which would otherwise
tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. On
scrutinizing the impugned judgment of the
High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we
have no hesitation to come to the conclusion
that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in
interfering with the conviction of the
Respondent by reappreciating the oral
evidence...."
7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional
jurisdiction has been well settled by the judicial dicta
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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of this Court wherein time and again it has been
observed that the High Court shall not interfere with
the orders of the lower Court unless:
i. The order or finding of the lower Court is
perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly
unreasonable or wholly unreliable or untenable
in law.
ii. The lower Court has passed the impugned
order after considering an immaterial or
irrelevant material or no material at all.
iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant
material or the judicial discretion has been
exercised arbitrarily or capriciously."


18. Thus, only if the judgment of the trial Court
confirmed by appellate Court is perverse or grossly
erroneous, or grossly unreasonable, or wholly unreliable,
or wholly untenable, or the trial Court considered an
immaterial or irrelevant, material or no material or not at
all relevant material or judicial discretion has been
exercised arbitrarily and capriciously, the revisional Court
can interfere with such judgment.
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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19. The alleged offence in this case is the offence
under Section 138 of NI Act; to attract the offence under
Section 138 of NI Act, the complainant has to satisfy the
following ingredients:
(i) that there exists legally enforceable debt;
(ii) that the cheque was drawn from the
account of bank of the accused for the discharge in
whole or in part of any debt or other liability;
(iii) that the cheque has been presented to the
bank within a period of six months from the date on
which it is drawn or within the period of its validity,
whichever is earlier;
(iv) that cheque so issued has been returned
due to insufficiency of funds;
(v) the payee or the holder in due course of the
cheque makes a demand for the payment of the said
amount of money by giving a notice in writing to the
drawer of the cheque, within 30 days of the receipt
of information by him from the bank regarding the
return of the cheque as unpaid;
(vi) the drawer of such cheque fails to make
payment of the said amount of money to the payee
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K B GEETHA

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or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15
days of the receipt of the said notice;
(vii) Filing of the complaint within a month from
the date of expiry of the grace period of fifteen days
before a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial
Magistrate not below first class.


20. If the aforementioned ingredients are satisfied,
then there shall be a presumption under section 139 of the
N.I. Act. Always, the cheque is a bill of exchange and thus
there shall be a presumption under Section 118 of the NI
Act. There is also statutory presumption under Section 139
of NI Act that there exists legally recoverable debt and the
cheque is issued for recovery of legally recoverable debt
either wholly or in part. But the presumptions available
under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act are rebuttable
presumptions.

21. With this background, the facts of the present
case are to be analysed and to verify whether the trial
Court and the appellate Court have not examined the
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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records produced by either party or erroneously
appreciated the evidence.

22. The facts stated before the trial Court are that,
on 15.06.2014, the accused obtained a hand loan of
` 12,00,000/- from the complainant, agreeing to repay the
same with interest at 1% per month, and executed an on-
demand promissory note with consideration receipt.
However, he did not return the said amount to the
complainant. Hence, upon repeated demands, the accused
issued the subject cheque dated 27.04.2018. When the
said cheque was presented for encashment on
18.05.2018, it was returned with the endorsement
‘account closed’. Thereafter, the legal notice dated
12.06.2018 was issued to the accused, which was served
on him on 19.06.2018. However, the accused did not
repay the cheque amount. Hence, the complaint was
presented on 16.07.2018. The accused neither replied to
the legal notice nor repaid the amount. Thus, it is
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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established that the cheque was drawn on the account of
the accused and bears his signature.

23. The above facts clearly establish that the
complainant has established ingredient clause Nos. (iii) to
(vii) of Section 138 of NI Act as stated above.

24. When the complainant establishes the aforesaid
facts, then the presumption will be in favour of the
complainant under Sections 118 and 139 of NI Act that the
cheque was issued for consideration; it was issued on the
date mentioned in it; there exists legally recoverable debt
or liability and to discharge the said liability either in part
or in whole, the subject cheque was issued. However,
these presumptions are rebuttable in nature.

25. The accused can rebut these presumptions by
giving reply to the legal notice or by cross-examining the
complainant or by leading defence evidence or by all the
above three modes. However, in the present case
admittedly, the accused has not done any of the above
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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three modes and thus, the presumption in favour of the
complainant is not at all rebutted by the accused.

26. Even then, on careful perusal of the averments
made in the complaint, it is evident that the loan
transaction between the complainant and the accused took
place on 15.06.2014. According to the complainant, the
accused paid interest for a period of six months and
thereafter stopped paying the interest. Thus, the limitation
period for filing a suit for recovery of the amount due
would have expired by the end of December-2017;
whereas the subject cheque is dated 27.04.2018. Thus,
prima facie , it appears that the debt had become time-
barred. However, the time barred debt could be
acknowledged in writing and then the fresh cause of action
would arise.

27. Even in case of time barred debt, when once a
written promise is made; then it amounts to a fresh
contract. In this regard, reading of Section 25 of the
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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Indian Contract Act, 1872 (in short 'the Act') is very much
required.

28. Section 25 of the Act is extracted as follows:
25. Agreement without consideration, void, unless it is in
writing and registered or is a promise to compensate for
something done or is a promise to pay a debt barred by
limitation law.—
An agreement made without consideration is void,
unless—
(1)it is expressed in writing and registered under the law
for the time being in force for the registration of
'documents, and is made on account of natural love and
affection between parties standing in a near relation to
each other; or unless
(2)it is a promise to compensate, wholly or in part, a
person who has already voluntarily done something for
the promisor, or something which the promisor was
legally compellable to do; or unless.
(3)It is a promise, made in writing and signed by
the person to be charged therewith, or by his agent
generally or specially authorized in that behalf, to
pay wholly or in part a debt of which the creditor
might have enforced payment but for the law for
the limitation of suits.
In any of these cases, such an agreement is a contract.
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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Explanation 1.—Nothing in this section shall affect the
validity, as between the donor and donee, of any gift
actually made.
Explanation 2.—An Agreement to which the consent of
the promisor is freely given is not void merely because
the consideration is inadequate; but the inadequacy of
the consideration may be taken into account by the Court
in determining the question whether the consent of the
promisor was freely given.
Illustrations:
(a)A promises, for no consideration, to give to B Rs.
1,000. This is a void agreement.
(b)A, for natural love and affection, promises to give his
son, B, Rs. 1,000. A puts his promise to B into writing and
registers it. This is a contract.
(c)A finds B's purse and gives it to him. B promises to
give A Rs. 50. This is a contract.
(d)A supports B's infant son. B promises to pay A's
expenses in so doing. This is a contract.
(e)A owes B Rs. 1,000, but the debt is barred by the
Limitation Act. A signs a written promise to pay B
Rs. 500 on account of the debt. This is a contract.
(f)A agrees to sell a horse worth Rs. 1,000 for Rs. 10. A's
consent to the agreement was freely given. The
agreement is a contract notwithstanding the inadequacy
of the consideration.
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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(g)A agrees to sell a horse worth Rs. 1,000 for Rs. 10. A
denies that his consent to the agreement was freely
given.
The inadequacy of the consideration is a fact which the
Court should take into account in considering whether or
not A's consent was freely given.

29. A plain reading of Section 25(3) and Illustration
(e) of the said section makes it clear that even in respect
of a time barred debt, if the borrower signs a written
promise to pay the debt, it amounts to a valid contract.
Issuance of the cheque dated 27.04.2018 by the accused
is nothing but a written promise by the accused and,
therefore, constitutes a fresh contract. Hence, the present
case is maintainable even in respect of a time-barred debt.

30. In this regard, this Court places reliance on the
judgment of the co-ordinate bench of this Court in the
1
case of Sri Ganesh v/s Sri K.R.Puttaswamy at
paragraph Nos.10, 11 & 13.
"10. Having considered the material on record,
there is no dispute with regard to the initiation of

1
Crl.R.P.No.1471/2024 dd 25.09.2026
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act. The
main contention urged before this Court by the
learned counsel for the petitioner is that the cheque
issued is time barred. No doubt, the cheque is issued
after three years of the original transaction between
the parties. But with regard to the validity of the
cheque is concerned, the Court has to take note of
the fact. It has to be noted that the Kerala judgment
in the case of Sasseriyil Joseph (supra) was upheld
by the Apex Court in SLP (Crl.) No.1785/2001 with
regard to time barred debt is concerned. It is
important to note that the Apex Court only dismissed
the same and validity of the cheque has not been
discussed with regard to Section 25(3) of the ICA
and no law was laid down except confirming the said
order and hence, the very contention of the learned
counsel for the petitioner that the Supreme Court
affirming the judgment of Kerala High Court comes
to the aid of the petitioner, cannot be accepted.
11. It is also important to note that the learned
counsel for the respondent relied upon the Division
Bench judgment of Kerala High Court in the case of
Dr. K.K. Ramakrishnan (supra), wherein the earlier
judgment in the case of Sasseriyil Joseph (supra),
was not accepted by the Division Bench. It is also to
be noted that this Court in Crl.R.P.No.400/2016
while passing the judgment taken note of the
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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judgments of different High Courts as well as the
Apex Court, particularly in the case of A.V.Murthry
(supra), K. HYMAVATHI v. THE STATE OF
ANDHRA PRADESH AND ANOTHER reported in
(2023) 14 SCR 412 and several judgments were
discussed and definite finding is given considering
the judgment of Kerala High Court in the case of Dr.
K.K. Ramakrishnan (supra), RAJEEV KUMAR v.
STATE NCT OF DELHI AND ANOTHER reported in
2024 SCC Online Del 6421 , judgment of the Apex
Court in the case of S. NATARAJAN v. SAMA
DHARMAN reported in (2021) 6 SCC 413 and also
discussed the judgment of RANGAPPA v. MOHAN
passed in Crl.A.No.1020/2010, M. BALAJI v. PERIM
JANARDHANA RAO reported in 2020 SCC Online
Mad 28058 , wherein at paragraph No.60 of the said
judgment, discussed with regard to sub-section (3)
of Section 25 of ICA deals with acknowledgment time
barred debt. Having considered the material in
detail, in paragraph No.37, the Apex Court held that
furnishing of a cheque of a time barred debt
effectively resurrects the debt itself by a fresh
agreement through the deeming provision under
Section 25(3) of ICA. The original debt therefore,
through Section 25(3) of the ICA, becomes legally
recoverable and enforceable to the extent of the
amount the cheque has been given. It is further held
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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that by the act of drawing a cheque, the promisor
i.e., the drawer, is effectively stating that he has a
liability to pay the drawee. Drawing of the cheque in
itself, is acknowledgment of which would trigger the
provisions under Section 138 of NI Act. To deny a
complaint/drawee of invoking the penal provisions of
Section 25(3) of the ICA recognizing a fresh
agreement to pay, would be an unfortunate
disentitlement.
13. Having considered all these materials on
record and also the principles laid down in the
judgments referred supra, it is very clear that once
the cheque is issued, even if it is for the time barred
debt also, there is a deemed provision under Section
25(3) of Contract Act. The first contention of the
counsel appearing for the petitioner that the Trial
Court committed an error in convicting cannot be
accepted.".

31. By placing reliance on the aforesaid judgment,
this Court holds that even in case of time barred debt, the
issuance of cheque itself reveals that there is fresh
contract between the complainant and the accused.
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

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HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:61176
CRL.RP No. 253 of 2024


CNR: KAHC010087832024




32. The accused has not produced any material to
show that he has rebutted the presumptions in favour of
the complainant.

33. As far as non giving opportunity to the accused
to cross-examine the complainant, the trial Court and the
appellate Court in paragraph Nos.12 to 14 have
categorically observed in their respective judgments the
number of opportunities granted to the accused even
before the commencement of the COVID-19 pandemic.
These facts categorically establish that the accused has
not utilized the opportunities given to him to cross-
examine the complainant and to lead defence evidence.

34. Hence, the judgment of the trial Court and the
appellate Court is neither erroneous, nor perverse nor
capricious, as the Courts have considered the relevant
material evidence and have not relied upon irrelevant
evidence. Hence, the judgment of the trial Court and the
appellate Court requires no interference.

35. Hence, this Court passes the following:
Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

- 25 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:61176
CRL.RP No. 253 of 2024


CNR: KAHC010087832024



ORDER
The Criminal Revision Petition is dismissed.

Digitally Signed By:
K B GEETHA

(GEETHA K.B.)
JUDGE


SPV
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 19