ALVIN NITHYANANDH vs SRUTHY SURESH BABU
- Court
- Kerala High Court
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE JOBIN SEBASTIAN
TH
FRIDAY, THE 18 DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2026 / 27TH BHADRA, 1948
CRL.MC NO. 7248 OF 2026
AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 27.06.2026 IN CMP 1/2026 IN MC
NO.77 OF 2026 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS -IV,
KOZHIKODE
PETITIONERS/RESPONDENTS 4 AND 5:
1 ALVIN NITHYANANDH
AGED 36 YEARS
FLAT 2E2, 2ND FLOOR, GIRIRAJ APARTMENTS, 11,
ALTAMOUNT ROAD, CUMBALA HILL, MUMBAI, PIN - 400026
2 ROSHNI RAJIV
AGED 36 YEARS. FLAT E2, 2ND FLOOR, GIRIRAJ APARTMENTS,
11, ALTAMOUNT ROAD, CUMBALA HILL, MUMBAI, PIN - 400026
BY ADVS.
SMT.MITHA SUDHINDRAN
SRI.RIJI RAJENDRAN
SHRI.R.S.DIWAAGAR
SHRI.BHARADWAJARAMASUBRAMANIAM R.
SMT.SOORYA M.
SMT.NASRIN WAHAB
SMT.DEVIKA SANTHOSH KUMAR
RESPONDENT/PETITIONER:
SRUTHY SURESH BABU
AGED 40 YEARS, THEERTHAM, RAJEEV NAGAR,
PUTHIYARA POST,
KOZHIKODE, PIN - 673004
BY ADVS.
SRI.P.JERIL BABU
SHRI.SRINATH GIRISH
SRI.P.N.HARISH BABU
THIS CRIMINAL MISC. CASE HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
09.09.2026, THE COURT ON 18.09.2026 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
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“C.R.”
ORDER
This petition is filed by respondent Nos. 4 and 5 in M.C. No. 77
of 2026 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-IV,
Kozhikode. The said M.C. was instituted by the petitioner therein seeking
various reliefs under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005 (hereinafter referred to as “the PWDV Act”).
2. I heard the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the
learned counsel for the respondent.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the
proceedings initiated against the petitioners/respondent Nos. 4 and 5
under Section 12 of the PWDV Act are actuated by ulterior motives and
that there is absolutely no material to establish that, at any point in time,
the petitioners herein resided in a shared household with the alleged
aggrieved person. According to the learned counsel, in order to array a
person as a respondent in a proceeding under the PWDV Act, it must be
established that such person is or has been in a domestic relationship with
the aggrieved person. It was further submitted that, apart from certain
general and omnibus allegations, no specific or serious acts of domestic
violence have been attributed to the petitioners herein. Therefore,
according to the learned counsel, the fourth and fifth respondents, who
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are the brother-in-law and sister-in-law of the petitioner, cannot, by any
stretch of imagination, be brought within the definition of “respondent”
under Section 2(q) of the PWDV Act. The learned counsel further
submitted that, unless it is established that the alleged perpetrator of
domestic violence and the aggrieved person lived together in a shared
household, being related by consanguinity, marriage, adoption, or through
a relationship in the nature of marriage, or as family members living
together as a joint family, the petitioners herein cannot be treated as
respondents for the purposes of the PWDV Act. It was urged that there
are neither pleadings nor materials to indicate that the petitioners herein
ever lived together with the aggrieved person in a shared household or
that they were members of a joint family residing together. According to
the learned counsel, the petitioners were arrayed as respondents without
any legal basis and solely with the intention of harassing them. It was
therefore submitted that the proceedings initiated against the petitioners
amount to an abuse of the process of law and are liable to be quashed at
the threshold.
4. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that
there are specific allegations against the petitioners herein. It was further
submitted that the question as to whether the acts of domestic violence
alleged in the petition were in fact perpetrated by the petitioners is a
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matter which can be conclusively determined only after a full-fledged trial
and, therefore, termination of the proceedings at the threshold would be
unjustified. The learned counsel further contended that a petition invoking
the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as “the BNSS”) to
quash proceedings arising from an application under Section 12 of the
PWDV Act is not legally maintainable, as such proceedings are
predominantly civil in nature. On these grounds, the learned counsel
sought dismissal of the present Crl. M.C.
5. As evident from the records, the petitioner in the original M.C.
approached the jurisdictional Magistrate by filing an application under
Section 12 of the PWDV Act seeking various reliefs under the provisions of
the said Act. In the said application, the husband of the petitioner was
arrayed as the first respondent. The second and third respondents are the
parents of the first respondent, while the fourth and fifth respondents are
the brother-in-law and sister-in-law of the petitioner. It is respondent Nos.
4 and 5 who have approached this Court by filing the present petition,
seeking quashing of the proceedings against them, mainly on the ground
that they had never lived with the petitioner in a shared household at any
point in time and, consequently, could not be said to have been in a
domestic relationship with her. According to the petitioners, therefore,
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they could not legally be brought within the definition of “respondent”
under the PWDV Act, and the proceedings against them are liable to be
quashed.
6. Undisputedly, this Court possesses inherent jurisdiction under
Section 528 of the BNSS, which corresponds to Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, to pass such orders as may be necessary to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice. However, such jurisdiction is extraordinary in nature and is to be
exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional circumstances. The
power cannot be exercised merely because a person against whom
proceedings under the PWDV Act have been initiated takes the stand that
the allegations contained in the application are false, frivolous or
exaggerated.
7. In Vijayalekshmi Amma V. K. (Dr.) and Another v. Bindu V.
and Others [2010 (1) KLT 79], this Court held that a petition under
Section 12 of the PWDV Act seeking reliefs thereunder is predominantly
civil in nature and that, ordinarily, the High Court should not invoke its
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such
proceedings. It was further held that a party against whom proceedings
have been initiated under the Act has an adequate remedy before the
jurisdictional Magistrate and, therefore, interference by the High Court is
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ordinarily unwarranted.
8. However, in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal [2025
KHC Online 6517], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the High Court
can exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash
proceedings emanating from an application under Section 12(1) of the
PWDV Act pending before the Magistrate. At the same time, having regard
to the object and purpose of the PWDV Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
cautioned that such power must be exercised with due care and
circumspection and that interference would ordinarily be warranted only in
cases of gross illegality or where continuation of the proceedings would
result in manifest injustice.
9. Thus, it is clear that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of
the BNSS, corresponding to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., is available, in
appropriate cases, to quash proceedings arising from an application under
Section 12 of the PWDV Act. However, such jurisdiction is to be exercised
only where the materials on record clearly demonstrate that continuation
of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law or
that interference is necessary to secure the ends of justice. The mere
existence of disputed questions of fact or a contention that the allegations
are false would not, by itself, justify such interference.
10. Keeping the above principles in mind, while reverting to the case
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at hand, it is to be noted that the main contention raised by the
petitioners, who are respondent Nos. 4 and 5 in the original M.C., is that
they had never lived together with the alleged aggrieved person at any
point in time and, consequently, there was no domestic relationship
between them, which, according to the petitioners, is a sine qua non for
initiating proceedings against them under the PWDV Act.
11. In order to examine the said contention, it is necessary to
consider whether the petitioners could, in law, be arrayed as respondents
in the proceedings pending before the learned Magistrate. In this context,
Section 2(q) of the PWDV Act defines the expression “respondent” as
follows:
“respondent” means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a
domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the
aggrieved person has sought relief under this Act:
Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the
nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the
husband or the male partner;
12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Hiral P. Harsora and Others
v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora and Others [2016 (5) KHC 15],
considered the expression “adult male person” under Section 2(q) of the
PWDV Act and held that there was no rational basis for restricting the
expression “respondent” to adult males alone. It was consequently held
that a woman can also be arrayed as a respondent in proceedings under
the PWDV Act.
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13. Significantly, in the present case, the petitioners do not contend
that a woman cannot be arrayed as a respondent in a proceeding under
the PWDV Act. Their specific contention is that there is nothing in the
application to establish that they were in a domestic relationship with the
aggrieved person at any point in time. Therefore, it becomes necessary to
examine the statutory definition of “domestic relationship” contained in
Section 2(f) of the PWDV Act, which reads as follows:
“domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons
who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared
household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or
through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are
family members living together as a joint family;
14. A bare reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that, in
order to bring a person within the ambit of a “domestic relationship”, it
must be established that the parties live, or have at any point in time lived,
together in a shared household and that their relationship falls within one
of the categories contemplated under the provision, namely, consanguinity,
marriage, a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption, or being
family members living together as a joint family. The provision, however,
does not require the parties to be presently residing together. The statutory
requirement is satisfied if they had lived together in a shared household at
any point in time.
15. In the present case, it is significant that the application filed
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under Section 12 of the PWDV Act does not state anywhere that
respondent Nos. 4 and 5, who are the brother-in-law and sister-in-law of
the petitioner, had lived with the petitioner at any point in time. There are
no pleadings indicating that the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 had ever shared a
household with the petitioner in the original M.C. or that they had lived
together with her as members of a joint family.
16. This Court is cognizant of the fact that proceedings under the
PWDV Act are not to be tested by applying the strict standards of pleadings
applicable to a civil suit. Nevertheless, an application seeking relief under
the PWDV Act must disclose, at least in substance, the foundational facts
constituting a domestic relationship. The statutory requirement cannot be
dispensed with altogether. If an application is completely silent as to when
the sister-in-law and her husband resided with the aggrieved person,
whether they were members of a common household, or whether they had
ever shared a household with the aggrieved person, and merely arrays
them as respondents on the basis of omnibus allegations, such persons
cannot be brought within the statutory definition of “respondent” in the
absence of any material indicating the existence of a domestic relationship.
There must be some factual foundation, either in the pleadings or in the
materials accompanying the application, indicating that the parties had
lived together in a shared household at some point in time. The absence of
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a detailed or technically worded pleading may not, by itself, be fatal;
however, the complete absence of any factual foundation regarding the
existence of a domestic relationship cannot be overlooked.
17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Satish Chander Ahuja v.
Sneha Ahuja [ 2020 (5) KHC 496], had considered in detail the use of the
expression “lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship.” In
paragraph 63 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court observed that the
words “lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship” have to be
given its normal and purposeful meaning. The living of a woman in a
household has to refer to a living which has some permanency. Mere
fleeting or casual living at different places shall not make a shared
household.
18. In the present case, there is not even a pleading, much less any
supporting material, to indicate that respondent Nos. 4 and 5 had ever
lived with the petitioner in a shared household. The omnibus allegations
against them, in the absence of any factual foundation demonstrating the
existence of a domestic relationship as contemplated under Section 2(f) of
the PWDV Act, cannot be treated as sufficient to sustain the proceedings
against them.
19. In the circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that
the materials on record do not disclose the existence of any domestic
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relationship between the petitioner and respondent Nos. 4 and 5. In the
absence of such a foundational requirement, continuation of the
proceedings against them under the PWDV Act would amount to an abuse
of the process of law and would warrant interference in exercise of the
inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS.
Resultantly, this Crl.M.C. is allowed. The proceedings against the
petitioners, who are respondent Nos. 4 and 5 in M.C. No. 77 of 2026 on
the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-IV, Kozhikode, are hereby
quashed. It is made clear that the proceedings in the said M.C. shall
continue against the remaining respondents in accordance with law.
Sd/-
JOBIN SEBASTIAN
JUDGE
SFS
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APPENDIX OF CRL.MC NO. 7248 OF 2026
PETITIONER ANNEXURES
Annexure-A APPLICATION IN MC 77/2026 PENDING ON
THE FILES OF THE JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE
OF FIRST CLASS - IV, KOZHIKODE.
Annexure-B E- COURTS STATUS OF MC NO. 77/2026
Annexure-C TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER PASSED
IN CMP 01/2026 IN MC NO. 77/2026
Annexure C(a) TYPED COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED
27.06.2026 PASSED IN CMP 01/2026 IN MC
NO. 77/2026 PENDING ON THE FILES OF
JFCM-IV, KOZHIKODE
Annexure-D NOTICE SERVED ON THE PETITIONERS IN MC
NO. 77/2026
Annexure-E E- COURTS STATUS OF OP NO. 211/2023
Annexure-F E- COURTS STATUS OF OP NO. 864/2023
Annexure-G COPY OF THE AADHAR CARDS OF THE
PETITIONERS