Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel vs The State Of Gujarat
- Court
- Supreme Court
2026 INSC 532
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. _______________________ OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 15537 of 2023)
BHIKHUBHAI GOVINDBHAI PATEL & ANR. … APPELLANTS
VERSUS
THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. … RESPONDENTS
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. _______________________ OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.16049 of 2023)
J U D G M E N T
VIPUL M. PANCHOLI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeals arise out of the common judgment and
Signature Not Verified
order dated 07.11.2023 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at
Digitally signed by
LOKESH ARORA
Date: 2026.05.23
13:13:11 IST
Reason:
Ahmedabad in Criminal Misc. Application No. 780 of 2010 and
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Special Criminal Application No. 620 of 2010, whereby the High
Court declined to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as
“ the CrPC ”) for quashing the criminal proceedings initiated at
the instance of respondent No. 2.
3. SLP (Crl.) No. 15537 of 2023 was filed by accused Nos. 3 and 4
and SLP (Crl.) No. 16049 of 2023 was filed by accused No. 6.
Since the appeals arise from a common judgment and involve
interconnected facts and issues, they are being disposed of by
this common judgment.
4. The brief facts as per the appellants are that the land bearing
Survey No. 157 situated at Village Panas admeasuring
approximately 5.5 acres was jointly purchased on 03.06.1957
by the six children of Nemabhai Patel, including the father of
the appellants, Govindbhai Patel and the father of respondent
No. 2, Chhaganbhai Patel. As per respondent No. 2, the said
property belonged exclusively to his Hindu Undivided Family.
5. A settlement decree dated 21.07.1987 passed in Special Civil
Suit No. 339/1985 was never acted upon and became
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unenforceable by limitation under Article 136 of the Limitation
Act. Thereafter, on 19.02.1988, the competent authority under
the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “ the
ULC Act ”) recognised ⅓ rd shares in favour of the branch of
appellants and respondent No. 2, thereby overriding the earlier
settlement decree under Section 42 of the ULC Act. According
to the appellants, this order was never challenged by
respondent No. 2.
6. It is the case of the appellants that respondent No. 2 thereafter
procured a fraudulent compromise decree dated 28.11.1988 in
Special Civil Suit No. 176/1988 by using a fictitious person
described as “Kishorbhai Govindbhai Patel” and forged
compromise documents. Based on the said decree, Mutation
Entry No. 2183 dated 01.06.1991 was mutated in the revenue
records without following the prescribed procedure under the
Gujarat Land Revenue Code, 1879.
7. The appellants instituted Special Civil Suit No. 377/2000 on
05.08.2000 seeking declaration of their ⅔ rd share in the
property. In the said suit, the High Court of Gujarat granted ad-
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interim injunction on 20.02.2002, which was subsequently
made absolute on 22.07.2003. It is the case of the appellants
that in the written statement filed by respondent No. 2 on
12.09.2000, he claimed exclusive ownership solely on the basis
of the fraudulent 1988 decree and no allegation of criminal
intimidation, extortion or forgery was made against the
appellants at that stage.
8. On 01.11.2001, accused nos. 1 to 5 executed a Power of
Attorney in favour of accused no. 6 for conducting the civil
proceedings. According to the appellants, the execution of the
Power of Attorney was consistently affirmed before various
courts and was never disputed by respondent No. 2 during the
civil litigation.
9. Subsequently, on 13.04.2003, the Mamlatdar lodged FIR No.
136/2003 against respondent No. 2 in relation to forgery
committed in the ULC Act proceedings and the fraudulent
decree obtained in Special Civil Suit No. 176/1988, pursuant
to which a chargesheet came to be filed on 10.08.2004.
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10. It is the case of the appellants that despite the subsisting
injunction order operating in their favour, respondent No. 2
lodged a complaint after a delay of about nine years before the
DCB Police Station on 21.05.2009 without making any
allegation of extortion or monetary demand. Thereafter,
suppressing the earlier complaint, respondent No. 2 lodged
another complaint before the Special Operations Group, which
came to be registered as FIR No. I-CR No. 504/2009 on
31.12.2009, under Sections 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 504,
120B, 384, 511 ans 144 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter referred to as “ the IPC ”), wherein for the first time
allegations of extortion of Rs.1.5 crores were introduced.
11. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants approached the High Court of
Gujarat by filing Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.
780/2010 with the prayer to quash the FIR No. I-CR No.
504/2009 dated 31.12.2009, wherein the High Court initially
stayed further proceedings on 29.01.2010 and later modified
the order on 14.02.2014 directing that no arrest shall be
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effected and no charge sheet shall be filed without permission
of the High Court.
12. By the impugned judgment and order dated 07.11.2023 passed
by the High Court of Gujarat in Criminal Miscellaneous
Application No. 780/2010, the High Court dismissed the
appellants’ application and permitted filing of the chargesheet.
13. The appellants thereafter approached this Court by way of the
present Special Leave Petitions challenging the refusal of the
High Court to quash the criminal proceedings.
14. Mr. Nachiketa Joshi, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants, submitted that the impugned FIR is a
misuse of criminal law to put pressure on the appellants in a
long-standing civil property dispute. The dispute regarding
Survey No. 157 has been pending before civil courts since 2000
and injunction orders were operating in favour of the
appellants. It is submitted that throughout the long civil
litigation, respondent No. 2 never alleged extortion, forgery,
intimidation or conspiracy before any civil court. Reliance is
Page 6
1
placed upon Joseph Salvaraja v. State of Gujarat ,
2
Devendra v. State of U.P. , and Pooja Ravinder Devidasani
3
v. State of Maharashtra , to contend that criminal
proceedings cannot be permitted where the dispute is
essentially civil in nature and initiation of prosecution amounts
to abuse of process.
15. It is further submitted that even if the FIR allegations are
accepted as true, none of the alleged offences are made out.
Regarding offences of forgery under Sections 465, 467, 468 and
471 of the IPC, it is argued that the Power of Attorney mentioned
in the FIR had been knowingly executed by all parties and had
been repeatedly confirmed before courts and investigating
authorities. There is no allegation that signatures were forged
or that any impersonation took place. Relying upon Mohd.
4
Ibrahim v. State of Bihar , it is argued that merely claiming
title over disputed property or executing documents relating to
1
(2011) 7 SCC 59
2
(2009) 7 SCC 495
3
(2014) 16 SCC 1
4
(2009) 8 SCC 751
Page 7
such property does not amount to creating a “false document”
under Section 464 of the IPC.
16. With respect to Section 420 of the IPC, it is argued that the FIR
does not state that any property was delivered because of
deception, which is an essential requirement for cheating.
Similarly, the allegation of extortion under Section 384 of the
IPC was said to be baseless because there is no allegation that
money or property was actually delivered due to threats.
Reliance is placed upon Isaac Isanga Musumba v. State of
5
Maharashtra , to contend that extortion is not established
unless property is delivered because of intimidation.
17. It was also argued that the first complaint dated 21.05.2009 did
not contain any allegation of extortion or demand for money.
The allegation that Rs. 1.5 crores was demanded appeared for
the first time only in the later FIR. The allegations under
Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC were also described as vague
because the FIR does not mention any specific date, place or
exact words amounting to insult or criminal intimidation.
5
(2014) 15 SCC 357
Page 8
Therefore, according to learned counsel, offences under
Sections 511 and 120-B of the IPC also cannot survive.
18. It is further argued that the FIR is based on an improved second
complaint that deliberately concealed the earlier complaint
dated 21.05.2009, the later FIR introduced entirely new
allegations of extortion after seven months. Relying on T.T.
6
Anthony v. State of Kerala , it is submitted that a second FIR
on the same cause of action is not permissible. The absence of
details such as date, time, place or witnesses for the alleged
extortion demand was said to show that the allegations were
fabricated with mala fide intention.
19. Learned counsel also stressed the unexplained delay of nearly
nine years in lodging the FIR. The incidents in question relate
to 2001, but the FIR was registered only on 31.12.2009. During
this period, respondent No. 2 never used remedies available
under the CrPC, nor approached the High Court. Importantly,
despite ongoing civil litigation up to this Court, no allegation of
forgery, extortion or conspiracy was ever raised earlier. Reliance
6
(2001) 6 SCC 181
Page 9
is placed upon Sujal Vishwas Attavar v. State of
7 8
Maharashtra , and Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P. , to argue
that such an unexplained delay and the improbabilities in the
case justify quashing of the proceedings.
20. It is argued that the High Court ignored the ULC Act Order
dated 19.02.1988, which recognised ⅓ rd shares in favour of
both branches. The High Court was also said to have relied on
an incorrect town planning statement unrelated to Survey No.
157. It is further submitted that dismissal of AFO No. 100/2002
concerned only interim injunction and did not decide ownership
rights. Additionally, it is argued that the High Court wrongly
linked the appellants with the Dimple Texofilaments
transaction, even though the disputed sale deeds were executed
by an impostor named “Durgesh Chaudhary,” against whom
the appellants themselves filed a police complaint in 2012 after
discovering the fraud. Reliance is also placed upon Anand
9
Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi) , and Abhishek v.
7
2026 INSC 442
8
(2023) 20 SCC 219
9
(2019) 11 SCC 706
Page 10
10
State of M.P. , to argue that the High Court can still quash
proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC even if a charge
sheet is filed or ready to be filed.
21. Lastly, it is argued that the High Court wrongly relied on the
criminal antecedents of the appellants while refusing to quash
the FIR. Referring again to Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P.
(supra) , it is argued that antecedents cannot replace the
requirement of proving the ingredients of the alleged offences.
It is submitted that the allegation of extortion was absent in the
original complaint and was later introduced only to harass the
appellants and deprive them of their civil rights.
22. On these grounds, learned counsel argued that the case falls
within the settle categories where proceedings should be
quashed under Section 482 of the CrPC, namely, where a civil
dispute is given a criminal colour, where a second FIR is
improperly filed, where the ingredients of offences are absent,
where there is extraordinary delay, and where the criminal
process is being abused.
10
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083
Page 11
23. Accordingly, it was prayed that the impugned judgment dated
07.11.2023 be set aside and the impugned FIR along with all
consequential proceedings be quashed in the interest of justice
and for protection of the rights of appellants under Article 21 of
the Constitution.
24. Per contra , Mr. Dhaval D. Vyas, learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2, argued that the
impugned judgment passed by the High Court is correct and
does not require any interference by this Court. The High Court
passed a detailed and reasoned order after examining a large
amount of documentary evidence collected during investigation
as well as the past conduct of the appellants. It is submitted
that the present matter is not merely a civil dispute, but
involves serious criminal offences such as forgery, cheating,
extortion and criminal conspiracy relating to valuable
immovable property.
25. At the outset, it is submitted that Survey No. 157 had
exclusively fallen to the share of the branch of Chhaganbhai
Nemabhai Patel under the compromise decree dated
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21.07.1987 passed in Special Civil Suit No. 339/1985 and all
family members acted upon this decree. It is further pointed out
that sale deeds executed by the branches of Govindbhai and
Dayarambhai during 1989-1990 also acknowledged the
partition and accepted their respective shares under the decree.
Mutation Entry No. 2183, certified on 01.06.1991, was also
made in accordance with the decree and was never challenged.
It was further argued that the later compromise decree dated
28.11.1988 in Special Civil Suit No. 176/1988 did not change
ownership of Survey No. 157 but only clarified distribution
within the branches.
26. It is further submitted that the appellants and the co-accused
had no legal right or interest in Survey No. 157, yet they
conspired to create false claims over the property by executing
forged powers of attorney and filing Special Civil Suit No.
377/2000. The Power of Attorney dated 01.11.2001 was part of
a planned conspiracy to create confusion regarding title and
enable illegal transfer of rights in the property. It was stated
that the appellants sold portions of the property to Dimple
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Texofilament without authority and later executed powers of
attorney to support those transactions.
27. It was further argued that accused No. 6 is a habitual land
grabber who follows a pattern of filing false litigation in disputed
property matters to extort money or force settlements. Learned
counsel referred to several FIRs registered against accused No.
6 involving offences under Sections 420, 465, 467, 468, 471,
384 and 120-B of the IPC. It is submitted that in many of those
cases, quashing petitions were either withdrawn or matters
were settled, which showed a repeated pattern of coercive
conduct.
28. Learned counsel also relied upon the findings of the High Court
that the appellants acted in collusion with other accused
persons to grab the property even though they knew that it
exclusively belonged to the branch of respondent No. 2 under
the 1987 decree. It is submitted the appellants knowingly
executed documents without title and thereby committed
offences of forgery, cheating and conspiracy. It is submitted that
the High Court correctly observed that dishonest intention is
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the key element of forgery and that the conduct of the accused
clearly reflected such intention.
29. Regarding the allegation of extortion, it is submitted that in
February 2002, accused No. 6 and his associates contacted
respondent No. 2 and demanded Rs. 1.5 crores or alternatively
a partnership in the property, while threatening serious
consequences if the demand was refused. It is argued that
accused No. 6 claimed to have invested large sums in the land
and tried to pressure respondent No. 2 into a settlement. These
allegations are sufficient to constitute offences under Sections
384 and 506 of the IPC and actual payment of money is not
necessary at the stage of deciding a quashing petition under
Section 482 of the CrPC.
30. As regards the delay in lodging the FIR, it is argued that the
delay was not intentional. It is submitted that because of a State
Government Circular dated 23.07.2003, which directed police
authorities not to register FIRs in civil disputes, the police
repeatedly refused to register the complaint despite repeated
representations made by respondent No. 2. Therefore, the FIR
Page 15
cannot be treated as an afterthought or a malicious
prosecution.
31. Learned counsel also disputed the reliance of the appellants on
the ULC Act proceedings and Town Planning redistribution
statements. It is argued that the ULC proceedings were based
on records as they existed in 1976 and did not consider the
later compromise decree of 1987. Similarly, the redistribution
statements relied upon by the appellants were said to be based
on incomplete records and could not override a binding civil
court decree. Therefore, the High Court rightly held that the
decree and mutation entries conclusively established
ownership in favour of the branch of respondent No. 2.
32. It is submitted that the reliance of the High Court on the
criminal antecedents of accused No. 6 is correct and it is further
clarified that the antecedents were not treated as the sole basis
for rejecting the quashing petition, but were considered together
with the evidence collected during investigation. Relying upon
Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of
Page 16
11
Maharashtra , it is argued that where investigation reveals
prima facie commission of cognizable offences, criminal
proceedings should not ordinarily be stopped at the initial
stage.
33. Accordingly, learned counsel submitted that the FIR
allegations, documentary evidence, conduct of the accused and
findings of the High Court together establish prima facie
offences under Sections 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 384, 506 and
120-B of the IPC.
34. On these grounds, it is prayed that the present appeals be
dismissed and that the criminal proceedings qua the appellants
should continue in accordance with law.
35. We have heard learned senior counsel appearing for the
respective parties at considerable length and have carefully
examined the impugned judgment and order passed by the
High Court of Gujarat as well as the material placed on record.
11
2021 SCC OnLine SC 315
Page 17
36. The principal question which arises for our consideration is
whether the High Court was justified in refusing to exercise its
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing FIR No.
I-CR No. 504/2009 dated 31.12.2009 registered with Umra
Police Station, Surat, for offences punishable under Sections
420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 504, 120-B, 384, 511 and 114 of the
IPC and the consequential criminal proceedings.
37. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the dispute between
the parties pertains to title and ownership over ancestral
immovable property bearing Survey No. 157 situated at Village
Panas, Surat. The record reveals that civil proceedings in
respect of the said property have remained pending since the
year 2000. The appellants instituted Special Civil Suit No.
377/2000 asserting their claim to ⅔ rd share in the suit
property and that the dispute has travelled through multiple
rounds of litigation before the civil courts, the High Court and
even this Court.
38. It is pertinent to note that throughout the civil litigation for
several years, respondent No. 2 never alleged commission of
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offences such as extortion, criminal intimidation, forgery or
conspiracy by the appellants. On perusal of the written
statement filed by respondent No. 2 in the civil proceedings,
being Special Civil Suit No. 377/2000, it is true that respondent
No. 2 asserted exclusive ownership over the property but did
not contain the allegation of any criminal conduct committed
by the appellants. To our minds, this circumstance is of
importance because the said allegations were levelled in the
impugned FIR and are related to events occurring in or around
the year 2001, i.e., during the period of the civil litigation.
39. On perusal of the chronology of events, it is also revealed that
respondent No. 2 initially lodged a complaint dated 21.05.2009
before the DCB Police Station. Admittedly, the said complaint
did not contain any allegation of extortion, demand of money,
criminal intimidation or threats. However, after a gap of nearly
seven months, respondent No. 2 lodged the impugned FIR dated
31.12.2009, introducing, for the first time, allegations that
accused No. 6 had demanded Rs.1.5 crores and threatened
respondent No. 2 with dire consequences.
Page 19
40. The High Court in the impugned judgment, despite noting down
this sequence of events, failed to examine the legal effect of
suppression of the earlier complaint and the material
improvement introduced in the subsequent impugned FIR. In
our view, the subsequent introduction of allegations of
extortion, demand of money and intimidation in the second
complaint materially alters the nature and complexion of the
dispute and supports the contention of the appellants that the
criminal proceedings are an afterthought intended to give
criminal colour to a longstanding civil dispute. Though
respondent No. 2 contended that the subsequent FIR merely
elaborated upon earlier allegations, we find that the allegation
of extortion, which is one of the grave accusations in the FIR,
was absent in the first complaint and surfaced only
subsequently. Thus, such material improvements cannot be
ignored while examining whether the criminal process is being
abused or not.
41. The delay in registration of the FIR is another circumstance
which cannot be ignored. The incidents in question pertain to
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the year 2001 whereas the FIR came to be registered only on
31.12.2009 after a delay of nearly eight to nine years. The High
Court accepted the explanation offered by respondent No. 2 that
a Government Circular dated 23.07.2003 discouraged
registration of FIRs involving civil disputes. In our view, the said
explanation is not wholly satisfactory. The circular itself cannot
explain the inaction by respondent No. 2 between 2001 and
2009, particularly when respondent No. 2 was actively litigating
before competent courts throughout the said period and had
access to all legal remedies including under Sections 154(3),
156(3) and 200 of the CrPC.
42. Recently, this Court, in Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P. (supra) ,
held that where delay is coupled with circumstances creating
serious doubt about the genuineness of the prosecution, the
proceedings may warrant quashing. The relevant paragraphs
read as under:
“ 36. At this stage, we would like to observe something
important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court
invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the
FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the
ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or
Page 21
vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a
duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely.
37. We say so because once the complainant decides to
proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for
wreaking personal vengeance, etc. then he would ensure
that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the
necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the
averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they
disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged
offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to
look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for
the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary
ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or
not.
38. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a
duty to look into many other attending circumstances
emerging from the record of the case over and above the
averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection
try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising
its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the
Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case
but is empowered to take into account the overall
circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the
case as well as the materials collected in the course of
investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple
FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the
background of such circumstances the registration of
multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the
issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal
grudge as alleged.”
43. We shall now examine whether the allegations contained in the
impugned FIR, even if taken at face value, disclose the
ingredients of the alleged offences.
44. Insofar as offences under Sections 465, 467, 468 and 471 of the
IPC are concerned, the principal allegation relates to the
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execution of the Power of Attorney dated 01.11.2001 by accused
Nos. 1 to 5 in favour of accused No. 6. The High Court proceeded
on the premise that since accused Nos. 1 to 5 lacked title over
the property, execution of the Power of Attorney and institution
of civil proceedings amounted to forgery. In our opinion, the
approach of the High Court is legally unsustainable. The
essential ingredient of forgery under Section 463 of the IPC is
the making of a “false document” within the meaning of Section
464 of the IPC. It is not the case of respondent No. 2 that the
signatures appearing on the Power of Attorney were forged or
fabricated and it is not alleged that the executants were
impersonated or that the document was fabricated by someone
pretending to be another person. On the contrary, the execution
of the document by accused Nos. 1 to 5 is admitted. The
consistent case of the appellants has been that they possessed
a subsisting claim and share in the ancestral property pursuant
to the ULC Act proceedings and related revenue entries.
Whether such a claim is ultimately sustainable in law or not is
a matter for adjudication before the competent civil court.
Page 23
Therefore, the High Court erred in equating a disputed claim of
title with the making of a false document.
45. The law on this issue is settled by this Court in Mohd. Ibrahim
v. State of Bihar (supra) , wherein it was held that when a
person executes a document claiming property as his own,
there is no making of a false document merely because the
claim is ultimately found to be incorrect. The relevant
paragraph reads as under:
17.
“ When a document is executed by a person claiming a
property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is
someone else nor is he claiming that he is authorised by
someone else. Therefore, execution of such document
(purporting to convey some property of which he is not the
owner) is not execution of a false document as defined under
Section 464 of the Code. If what is executed is not a false
document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then
neither Section 467 nor Section 471 of the Code are
attracted.”
46. Similarly, the ingredients of the offence of cheating punishable
under Section 420 of the IPC are also absent, i.e. to constitute
the offence of cheating, there must exist deception, fraudulent
inducement and consequential delivery of property coupled
with dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction.
There is no allegation in the FIR that respondent No. 2 delivered
Page 24
any property, money or valuable security to the appellants
pursuant to deception or inducement and importantly, the
material on record does not disclose dishonest intention at
inception. The High Court in the impugned judgment observed
that “false representation” was made by the accused persons
despite knowing that they had no title. However, the foundation
of the pending civil suit is the claim of the appellants that they
possessed ⅓ rd share in the property pursuant to the ULC Act
proceedings and related revenue records and thus, a disputed
civil claim cannot automatically be treated as fraudulent
representation so as to attract Section 420 of the IPC.
47. The allegations regarding extortion under Section 384 of the IPC
are also unsustainable. In the FIR, respondent No. 2 alleges
that accused No. 6 demanded Rs.1.5 crores or alternatively
partnership in the property. However, the FIR neither specifies
the date, place or circumstances of such demand nor there is
an allegation that respondent No. 2 actually delivered any
property or money pursuant to such threat, which as an
essential ingredient of extortion.
Page 25
48. The High Court in the impugned judgment further observed
that the accused persons “tried” to extort money and therefore
Section 511 of the IPC would apply. However, we are unable to
accept such reasoning. The allegations under Sections 504 and
506 of the IPC are also vague in nature. The FIR does not
disclose the exact words uttered, the nature of the threat
administered or the surrounding circumstances constituting
intimidation.
49. Once the substantive offences themselves are not made out, the
allegations of conspiracy under Section 120-B of the IPC
necessarily fails in the present case.
50. It is pertinent to note that the High Court has placed reliance
upon the criminal antecedents of accused No. 6 while declining
to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. The law
on the issue was settled recently by this Court in Mohd. Wajid
v. State of U.P. (supra) , wherein it has been held that criminal
antecedents cannot constitute the sole or even the primary
basis to decline quashing of criminal proceedings. The High
Court in the impugned judgment, though observing that
Page 26
antecedents were not the “sole criterion”, has made general
observations regarding “modus operandi” and “proclivity” of
accused No. 6, the pendency of earlier complaints and the
circumstance that certain proceedings had previously been
quashed on the basis of settlements. In our considered view, it
is for the Court to see whether the essential ingredients of the
alleged offences in the impugned FIR are made out or not. As
observed hereinabove, we have discussed in detail with respect
to the delay in filing the impugned FIR, absence of ingredients
of the alleged offences, the dispute is purely civil in nature and
therefore, in such circumstances, antecendents of accused No.
6, cannot be a ground for dismissal of the present appeals.
51. We are also unable to agree with the findings recorded by the
High Court regarding ownership and title over the suit property,
which are all matters squarely falling within the jurisdiction of
the competent civil court. While exercising jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the CrPC, the Court is not expected to conduct
a mini trial or adjudicate disputed questions of title and
ownership.
Page 27
52. The present case, viewed in its peculiar facts and
circumstances, constitutes all the characteristics of a civil
property dispute, which is sought to be converted into criminal
proceedings, after several years of civil litigation. We are of the
opinion that the criminal process cannot be permitted to
become a weapon of harassment and coercion in disputes
concerning title over immovable property.
53. We are conscious of the principles laid down by this Court in
the recent decision of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v.
State of Maharashtra (supra) that courts should ordinarily
refrain from interfering at the threshold stage of investigation.
However, the said judgment itself recognises that where the
allegations do not disclose the commission of cognizable
offences or where criminal proceedings manifestly amount to
abuse of process, the High Court is duty-bound to exercise its
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC.
54. The present case falls squarely within the well-settled categories
warranting interference under Section 482 of the CrPC as
Page 28
12
delineated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , namely,
where the dispute is predominantly civil in nature, where the
allegations fail to disclose the essential ingredients of the
alleged offences, where the criminal proceedings are manifestly
attended with mala fide intention, where there is extraordinary
and unexplained delay, and where continuation of the
prosecution would amount to abuse of process of court.
55. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered
opinion that the High Court, in the impugned judgment,
committed an error in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing the impugned FIR and
consequential criminal proceedings and thus warrants
interference of this Court.
56. The present appeals are accordingly allowed.
57. The impugned common judgment and order dated 07.11.2023
passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Criminal
12
AIR 1992 SC 604
Page 29
Miscellaneous Application No. 780 of 2010 and Special
Criminal Application No. 620 of 2010 is hereby set aside.
58. FIR No. I-CR No. 504/2009 dated 31.12.2009 registered with
Umra Police Station, Surat, for offences punishable under
Sections 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 504, 120-B, 384, 511 and
114 of the IPC and all consequential proceedings arising
therefrom, including any charge-sheet filed pursuant thereto,
are hereby quashed and set aside qua the appellants.
59. It is clarified that observations made hereinabove are confined
solely to adjudication under Section 482 of the CrPC and shall
not influence adjudication of pending civil proceedings
concerning title and ownership over the suit property.
60. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
………………………………J.
SANJAY KAROL
………………………………J.
VIPUL M. PANCHOLI
NEW DELHI
nd
22 May, 2026
Page 30