Ca Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary vs Adani Infrastructure And Developers Private Limited

REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 629
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. ……………./2026
@ D.No.5988/2026


CA RAMCHANDRA DALLARAM CHOUDHARY …APPELLANT


VERSUS


ADANI INFRASTRUCTURE AND DEVELOPERS …RESPONDENT
PRIVATE LIMITED




J U D G M E N T



DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

1. This is an appeal under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
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Code, 2016 , at the instance of the liquidator of a corporate debtor under
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liquidation. Under challenge is the judgment and order dated 08
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December, 2025 passed by the National Company Law Appellate
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Tribunal, Principal Bench at New Delhi in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No.2316
of 2024.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
MANIK KUMAR
Date: 2026.06.08
17:14:21 IST
Reason:

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IBC
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impugned order
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NCLAT

2. Having regard to the point on which we propose to decide the appeal, we
see no reason to comment on the correctness or otherwise of the
impugned order.

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3. The appeal was presented on 29 January 2026, beyond the period of
limitation prescribed in sub-section (1) of Section 62, IBC but within the
grace period stipulated in sub-section (2) thereof. Office reported a delay
of 7 (seven) days in filing the appeal. An application seeking condonation
of the said delay has been filed. Office had also marked the appeal
defective. Upon curing the defects, the appeal came to be re-filed after
a further delay of 82 (eighty-two) days for which a separate application
seeking condonation of delay in re-filing has also been filed.
4. At the outset, it must be borne in mind that the scheme of limitation
under the IBC is a strict and time-bound one. The concept of condonation
of delay itself is alien to the statutory framework beyond the period
expressly contemplated under the statute. Section 62 of the IBC permits
an appeal to be filed before this Court within 45 (forty-five) days, with a
further grace period of only 15 (fifteen) days, and that too, only upon
sufficient cause being shown. Thus, the outer limit statutorily permissible
is 60 (sixty) days, beyond which the appeal itself becomes barred and
the Court’s jurisdiction to condone the delay ceases.
5. The importance of strict adherence to timelines under the IBC has been
enunciated by this Court succinctly in its decision in Mobilox
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Innovations (P) Ltd. v. Kirusa Software (P) Ltd. as follows:

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(2018) 1 SCC 353
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36. … Even in appeals to the Supreme Court from the Appellate
Tribunal under Section 62, 45 days' time is given from the date of
receipt of the order of the Appellate Tribunal in which an appeal to
the Supreme Court is to be made, with a further grace period not
exceeding 15 days. The strict adherence of these timelines is of
essence to both the triggering process and the insolvency resolution
process. … .


6. Time bound resolution is the essence of the IBC was reiterated in respect

of an appeal under Section 61 thereof in Kalparaj Dharamshi v. Kotak
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Investment Advisors Limited in the following words:
158. This Court has held, that it is not open to the adjudicating
authority or appellate authority to reckon any other factor other than
specified in Sections 30(2) or 61(3) of the I&B Code. It has further
been held, that the commercial wisdom of CoC has been given
paramount status without any judicial intervention for ensuring
completion of the stated processes within the timelines prescribed by
the I&B Code. … .
(emphasis ours)

7. Reference can also be made to the decisions in National Spot
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Exchange Ltd. v. Dunar Foods Ltd. (Resolution Professional) , V.
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Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat & Power Ltd and Tata Steel Limited v. Raj
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Kumar Banerjee and Others which, though arising in the context of
appeals under Section 61 of the IBC, reaffirm that condonation of delay
beyond the period expressly prescribed by the statute itself would be
impermissible.
8. Furthermore, this Court in PEC Ltd. v. M/s Phulchand Exports
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Private Ltd. held pithily as follows:

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(2021) 10 SCC 401
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(2022) 11 SCC 761
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(2022) 2 SCC 244
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(2025) 9 SCC 483
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Civil Appeal (Diary) No. 37293 of 2022
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1 There is a delay of 21 days in filing the appeal under Section 62 of
the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016. The delay is beyond the
maximum period which is condonable in terms of the statute.
2 Hence, the civil appeal is dismissed on the ground of limitation.
3 Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

9. In Saturn Ventures and Advisors Pvt. Limited v. S.
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Gopalakrishnan , delay of two days in presentation of an appeal under
Section 62 of the IBC was not condoned reasoning that the Court has no
power to condone the delay.
10. Let us now ascertain what the position is under the Supreme Court Rules,
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2013 . Sub-rules (3) and (4), of Rule 6 of Order VIII, SCR, lay down
the regime governing re-filing of, inter alia , petitions and appeals after
curing defects. A period of 28 (twenty-eight) days is earmarked for curing
of defects. A litigant not curing the defects within 28 (twenty-eight) days
may re-file the petition or the appeal, as the case may be, together with
an application seeking condonation of re-filing delay. Needless to
observe, condonation of re-filing delay for petitions and appeals is
discretionary.
11. Is it open to this Court [where an appeal under Section 62, IBC is filed
within time, i.e., 45 (forty-five) days or beyond the said period but before
expiry of 60 (sixty) days as contemplated in the sub-sections thereof and
are marked defective, for whatever reason] to condone the delay in re-
filing of the appeal when the defects pointed out are not cured within 28

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2025 SCC OnLine SC 2484
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SCR
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(twenty-eight) days? This was the question we posed to Mr. Fernandes,
learned senior counsel for the appellant to answer.
12. Mr. Fernandes contends that the appellant is a neutral officer acting under
the aegis of this Court for the benefit of all stakeholders as well as the
corporate debtor under liquidation and having regard to the nature of
duties imposed on him, the insignificant delay in filing the appeal as well
as re-filing thereof ought to be considered liberally rather than strictly.
He also contends, notwithstanding that the defects were not cured within
28 (twenty-eight) days of such defects being notified, this Court’s power
to condone re-filing delay of any number of days beyond 28 (twenty-
eight) days is not fettered and if sufficient cause be shown to exist, which
did preclude a party from acting within the timelines provided in the IBC,
re-filing delay of any length of time is invariably condoned. According to
him, under the SCR, delay in re-filing after curing of the defects is treated
differently from delay in initial filing. If initially the appeal is filed within
45 (forty-five) days, or even within the grace period of 15 (fifteen) days
and sufficient cause for condonation of filing delay is shown, the Court
would generally condone the delay – in filing and re-filing - if the same
is satisfactorily explained.
13. Mr. Fernandes has, in this connection, invited our attention to a
coordinate Bench decision between the same parties in CA Ramchandra
Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure & Developers (P)
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Ltd. where re-filing delay in filing an appeal before the NCLAT under

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2025 SCC OnLine SC 1406
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Section 61 of the IBC was condoned. Particular reliance was placed on
the following passages:
9. Be that as it may, it is well-recognised principle of law that the
courts view applications relating to lawyer's lapses more leniently
than applications relating to litigant's lapses. The classic example is
the difference in approach of courts to applications for condonation
of delay in filing an appeal and applications for the condonation of
delay in refilling the appeal after rectification of defects. Useful
reference may be made to the decision of the co-ordinate Bench of
this Court in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi
Amma [(2008) 8 SCC 321; 2008 SCC OnLine SC 1049.]
10. Having regard to the fact that the appellant despite limitations
had done all that was necessary for filing of the appeal within 30
days, and then 15 days, i.e., within the prescribed and extended
period of limitation, respectively, as well as dependency of the
appellant on its lawyers who, in turn, were dependent on their clerk
to refile the appeal, and there were some missteps contributing to
the present situation, coupled with the fact that the issue sought to
be raised by the appellant in the appeal filed before the National
Company Law Appellate Tribunal, if answered in its favour, would
enure to the benefit of the debtors, and also that better justice is
always achieved when a lis is decided on a contested hearing rather
than on default, we need to take an overall view of the matter. We
are of the considered opinion that the words “sufficient cause” in this
case ought to have been construed liberally and that interest of
justice would be best served if, upon condonation of delay in refilling
of the appeal, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal proceeds
with the hearing of the appeal on merits. Ordered accordingly.

14. We propose to advert to the decision in CA Ramchandra Dallaram
Choudhary (supra) a little later.
15. Having regard to the statutory scheme of the IBC, since validated by this
Court in numerous decisions by holding that the strict timelines are
meant to prevent misuse by dilatory tactics, it is difficult to accept Mr.
Fernandes’ contention. It is axiomatic that an appeal under Section 62 of
the IBC to be regarded as having been instituted within the prescribed
period of 45 (forty-five) days must be a defect-free appeal, which is
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capable of being acted upon by the Registry for being immediately placed
before the appropriate Bench for consideration. Any appeal which is not
filed within the stipulated period in a form shorn of defects, for all
practical and legal purposes, remains a defective appeal.
16. Can or should a litigant be permitted to circumvent the rigours of
limitation by filing a defective appeal as a device to save limitation and,
thereafter, to opt to cure the notified defects at leisure? Can or should
this Court countenance such a practice? The answers to both questions
have to be a resounding ‘NO’. To hold otherwise would defeat the object
of the IBC and render nugatory the discipline of timelines engrafted both
in Section 62 as well as the SCR. Any such practice of filing a defective
appeal, if encouraged, could result in a litigant dragging the process of
re-filing for months and still being heard on his application for condoning
re-filing delay premised on the ground that the IBC says nothing about
re-filing delay and that the SCR being a procedural law must be read in
a manner to aid the rendering of substantive justice to a party who is
shown to be above board.
17. Consequently, no litigant can be permitted to subvert the statutory
scheme by seeking condonation of re-filing delay beyond the period of
28 (twenty-eight) days after having initially lodged a defective appeal.
Once the window of 60 (sixty) days prescribed by the IBC, followed by
the window of 28 (twenty-eight) days in re-filing the appeal upon curing
of defects permitted by the SCR is shut, the right to appeal stands
extinguished.
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18. The argument that the SCR does not impose a cap beyond which re-filing
delays cannot be condoned and, hence, it is the acceptability of the cause
shown amounting to ‘sufficient cause’ which is and should be decisive,
irrespective of the length of time taken to cure the defects, is equally
unimpressive. The SCR is the subordinate legislation in the field and
whenever the IBC and the SCR clash, the latter cannot override the
express provisions of the former. The IBC must prevail being the
statutory edict. Though indisputable that the standards for examining a
prayer for condoning a re-filing delay is certainly less rigorous than a
filing delay but such standard would stand true and be applicable for the
general laws, like proceedings arising from the Codes of Civil and
Criminal Procedure, as well as from remedies provided by the
Constitution of India. Section 62, IBC is, however, a complete code in
itself for filing of appeals and is different from other laws. An appeal
under Section 62, IBC does not remain alive after the 28 (twenty-eight)
day period allowable under the SCR for curing defects and the lis would
stand frozen once the defects are not cured within such period. An
extended window cannot be granted de hors the legislative intent behind
stipulation of the strict timelines in the IBC.
19. We may also observe that the fact of the appellant being a neutral officer
acting under the aegis of this Court for the benefit of all stakeholders and
the corporate debtor under liquidation is not sufficient for us to invoke
our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution to
dilute or override the express statutory timeframes engrafted under the
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IBC. Pertinently, the IBC does not mark a different threshold for officers
like the appellant and hence, reading words into the statute which are
not used by the legislature would not be a permissible interpretational
exercise.
20. Moving on to the decision in CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary
(supra), which has been pressed into service by Mr. Fernandes, the
peculiar factual matrix of the said appeal assumes significance and
warrants a recapitulation of the events.
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a. Appellant had earlier challenged the order dated 21 June, 2024
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passed by the National Company Law Tribunal before the NCLAT
in an appeal under Section 61, IBC. However, the appeal before
the NCLAT itself was not filed within the prescribed period and was
beset by delay in re-filing.
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b. Vide its order dated 6 February, 2025, the NCLAT declined to
condone the delay. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant approached
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this Court by filing an appeal under Section 62, IBC. This Court,
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by its order dated 5 May, 2025, set aside the order of the NCLAT
and remanded the matter for consideration on merits, whereupon
the NCLAT proceeded to decide the appeal and delivered the
impugned order.

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NCLT
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Civil Appeal No. 5106 of 2025
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c. Significantly, while concluding its order dated 5 May, 2025, this
Court specifically recorded that such order is not to be treated as
a precedent.
21. It would, therefore, appear that notwithstanding the indulgence shown
by this Court to the self-same appellant at an earlier stage, the appeal
presently under consideration has been re-filed after substantial delay.
The explanation for the re-filing delay reads as follows:
4. That it is most humbly submitted that essentially the delay in
refiling arose due to an internal oversight within the Office of the
Liquidator. While the defects were duly communicated by the
Registry, a concerned officer within the Liquidator's office either
mistakenly believed that the requisite details had already been
conveyed or did not promptly relay them to the Advocate-on Record.
It is also pertinent to mention that this officer has since left the
position, leading to a gap in communication. The delay, thus, was
neither intentional nor negligent but arose from a bona fide
administrative lapse within the office.
(emphasis ours)

22. The circumstance that this Court had earlier interdicted refusal of the
NCLAT to condone the delay in re-filing the appeal under Section 61 of
the IBC does not advance the appellant’s case, rather even on a cursory
comparison of the two situations, it only accentuates the reason as to
why the earlier exercise of discretion cannot be extended to the present
proceedings. While setting aside the order of the NCLAT, this Court had
emphasized the differing degrees of liberality, which ought to be
extended in the cases of lapses attributable to the advocate-on-record
and to the litigant, as far as re-filing delay is concerned. It was in this
factual milieu, the controversy warranted examination on merits, thereby
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necessitating the condonation of delay in re-filing of the appeal before
the NCLAT and restoration of the appeal before it.
23. The decision in CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary (supra)
reiterates the principle which must guide the exercise of judicial
discretion in matters of condonation of delay. The present case stands on
an entirely different pedestal, wherein the appellant seeks condonation
not merely of delay in re-filing but also of delay in invoking the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 62, IBC. Importantly so, the
appellant approaches this Court after having availed the benefit of a
liberal construction of “sufficient cause” at the previous stage of the same
litigation. A litigant who has once secured indulgence in relation to delay
cannot legitimately proceed on the assumption that further defaults
engendered at the next appellate stage would automatically attract a
similar exercise of discretion. To hold otherwise would render the law of
limitation under the IBC progressively elastic at every successive stage
of challenge, defeating the legislative objective of expedition and finality.
24. Restating what has already been enunciated, the appellant can derive no
advantage from the earlier order condoning the delay in re-filing the
appeal under Section 61, IBC before the NCLAT. That exercise of
discretion was confined to the peculiar facts of that case and cannot be
construed as a warrant for repeated indulgence. The discipline of
limitation, particularly in the context of the IBC, does not countenance
serial condonations of delay across successive appellate stages. Having
once availed the benefit of a liberal approach, the appellant cannot
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legitimately seek a further relaxation when the present appeal under
Section 62 is itself beset by delay both in filing and in re-filing.
25. To sum up our discussion, 45 (forty-five) days is available under sub-
section (1) of Section 62, IBC from date of receipt of the order of the
NCLT to file an appeal involving a substantial question of law before this
Court. As per sub-section (2), subject to sufficient cause being shown,
the Supreme Court may allow an appeal to be filed within 15 (fifteen)
days after the expiry of the said 45 (forty-five) days but not beyond.
Curing of defects arising out of a defectively filed appeal under Section
62, IBC is permissible within 28 (twenty-eight) days of notification
thereof by the Registry. If the defects are cured within 28 (twenty-eight)
days, the appeal would deserve registration upon removal of the “D No.”.
However, there being no scope for curing defects after lapse of the period
of 28 (twenty-eight) days in respect of an appeal under Section 62, IBC,
filing of an application for re-filing delay does not arise. Consequently, no
question of condonation of delay [even for a day beyond 60 (sixty) days
(in case of an appeal which, apart from the little delay in filing beyond
45 (forty-five days), is otherwise defect-free) and 28 (twenty-eight) days
(in case of a defective appeal)] arises for consideration.
26. Thus, the legal position being settled beyond cavil, it is unnecessary for
us to venture into the merits of the explanations furnished in support of
the applications for condonation of delay in filing and re-filing herein.
Where the statute itself erects an insurmountable jurisdictional bar, no
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enquiry into the adequacy of the cause shown would alter the legal
consequence that inexorably follows.
27. Apart from what has been held above, upon a perusal of the applications
seeking condonation of delay in filing and in re-filing, we find sufficient
cause not having been shown to satisfactorily explain the delay(s).
Absent any cogent or convincing justification, the delay(s) in both the
filing of the defective appeal and re-filing of the appeal are not liable to
be condoned.
28. Be that as it may, the defective appeal stands dismissed as time-barred
having been filed beyond the maximum period condonable in terms of
the IBC.
29. Connected applications too stand dismissed.



………..……………………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)



…….……..…………………………J.
(SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA)
NEW DELHI;
JUNE 01, 2026.









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