Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited vs Nokia Solutions & Network India Pvt. Ltd.

$~15
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 23.02.2026
+ O.M.P. (COMM) 368/2016
MAHANAGAR TELEPHONE NIGAM LIMITED
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Saket Sikri, Mr. Vikalp
Mudgal, Mr. Arun Sanwal and
Mr. Aditya Mani Sharma,
Advocates.
versus

NOKIA SOLUTIONS & NETWORK INDIA PVT. LTD.
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Abhishek Tewari & Mr.
Utkarsh Trivedi, Advocates.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

% JUDGEMENT (ORAL)
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1. The present Petition has been instituted under Section 34 of the
1
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 , assailing the Arbitral
2
Award dated 11.03.2016 , albeit in a limited compass. The challenge
is confined to a specific finding rendered by the learned Arbitrator and
does not extend to the entirety of the Award.
2. It is pertinent to note that multiple claims and counterclaims
were adjudicated by the learned Arbitrator. However, the present
Petition is restricted solely to the rejection of Counter Claim No. 1

1
Act
2
Impugned Award
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:28.02.2026
13:59:03
O.M.P. (COMM) 368/2016 Page 1 of 4

preferred by the Petitioner, whereby the Petitioner had sought
recovery of an alleged excess payment amounting to Rs. 66,25,499/-.
The said counter-claim has been rejected on the ground that it is
barred by limitation.
3. Learned counsel for the parties are ad idem that there appears to
be an error in the manner in which the learned Arbitrator determined
the commencement of limitation. This assumes significance in light of
the categorical finding recorded in the Award that an excess payment
had, in fact, been made to the Respondent.
4. The conclusion regarding excess payment is founded upon the
reckoning of prices in terms of a letter dated 14.05.2002. In such
circumstances, to hold that the Petitioner became entitled to recover
the excess amount immediately upon completion of supplies on
10.07.1995 would be legally and logically untenable, as the basis for
computing the excess itself emerged subsequently i.e. in 2002. The
commencement of limitation, therefore, required examination in that
context.
5. Now, turning to the question of severability of the Arbitral
Award insofar as the present challenge pertains to counter Claim No.
1, leaving the remaining claims undisturbed, it becomes necessary to
advert to the principles governing partial setting aside of arbitral
awards. In this regard, reliance is placed on paragraphs 33, 34 and 35
of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gayatri Balasamy v.
3
M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited , which elucidates the
doctrine of severability. The said paragraphs are reproduced
hereinunder for ready reference:

3
2025 SCC OnLine SC 986
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:28.02.2026
13:59:03
O.M.P. (COMM) 368/2016 Page 2 of 4

“ 33. We hold that the power conferred under the proviso to Section
34(2)(a)(iv) is clarificatory in nature. The authority to sever the
“invalid” portion of an arbitral award from the “valid” portion,
while remaining within the narrow confines of Section 34, is
inherent in the court’s jurisdiction when setting aside an award.
34. To this extent, the doctrine of omne majus continet in se
minus—the greater power includes the lesser—applies squarely.
The authority to set aside an arbitral award necessarily
encompasses the power to set it aside in part, rather than in its
entirety. This interpretation is practical and pragmatic. It would be
incongruous to hold that power to set aside would only mean power
to set aside the award in its entirety and not in part. A contrary
interpretation would not only be inconsistent with the statutory
framework but may also result in valid determinations being
unnecessarily nullified.
35. However, we must add a caveat that not all awards can be
severed or segregated into separate silos. Partial setting aside may
not be feasible when the “valid” and “invalid” portions are legally
and practically inseparable. In simpler words, the “valid” and
“invalid” portions must not be inter-dependent or intrinsically
intertwined. If they are, the award cannot be set aside in part.”

6. In the aforesaid factual and legal backdrop, and bearing in mind
the limited supervisory jurisdiction exercised by this Court under
Section 34 of the A&C Act, this Court refrains from undertaking any
re-appreciation of evidence or entering into a merits-based evaluation
of the counter-claim.
7. The interference warranted in the present case is confined solely
to the legally unsustainable determination of the commencement of
limitation in respect of Counter Claim No. 1. The impugned finding
on limitation, being predicated on a date anterior to the very basis
upon which excess payment was computed, suffers from patent
infirmity and cannot be sustained.
8. At the same time, the remaining findings and determinations
rendered in the Award are independent, self-contained, and unaffected
by the said error. The impugned portion is, therefore, clearly severable
and does not form an inseparable or intrinsically intertwined part of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:28.02.2026
13:59:03
O.M.P. (COMM) 368/2016 Page 3 of 4

the other adjudications.
9. In these circumstances, and in consonance with the doctrine of
severability as recognised in Gayatri Balasamy ( supra ), this Court
deems it appropriate to set aside the Award only to the limited extent
of the rejection of Counter Claim No. 1 on the ground of limitation.
10. The present Petition, along with pending application(s), is
disposed of in the aforesaid terms.


HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J .
FEBRUARY 23, 2026/nd/va


Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:28.02.2026
13:59:03
O.M.P. (COMM) 368/2016 Page 4 of 4