THE STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH THE CHIEF SECRETARY vs AWADHESH KUMAR

2026:JHHC:26564-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 595 of 2025
1. The State of Jharkhand, through the Chief Secretary, Ranchi
2. The Principal Secretary, Department of Water Resources,
Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
3. The Additional Secretary, Department of Water Resources,
Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
4. The Special Secretary, Department of Water Resources,
Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
5. The Joint Secretary, Department of Water Resources,
Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
6. The Under Secretary, Department of Water Resources,
Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
….. Appellants
Versus
1. Awadhesh Kumar, S/o Mahendra Baitha, R/o near Landmark
Hotel, Flat No. 7B, Classic Sarkar Mansion, P.O. & P.S.-Lalpur,
District-Ranchi
2. Jitan Das, Technical Secretary, having his office at Office of
Chief Engineer, Rural Development, Special Zone, Rural
Works Department, FFP Bhawan, P.O. & P.S.-Dhurwa,
District-Ranchi ….. Respondents
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CORAM
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
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For the Appellants: Ms. Rishi Bharti, A.C. to A.A.G.-III
For the Res. No. 1: Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate
Mr. Chanchal Jain, Advocate
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02/02.09.2026
I.A. No. 10354 of 2025:
1. Heard Ms Rishi Bharti, learned A.C. to A.A.G.-III, for the
applicants/appellants and Mr Indrajit Sinha, Advocate, who
appears along with Mr Chanchal Jain, Advocate, for the
respondent No. 1.
2. This interlocutory application seeks condonation of delay of 204
days in filing the present appeal against the learned Single
Judge’s judgment and order dated 09.09.2024 allowing W.P.(S)
No. 7415 of 2023.
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3. Learned Single Judge’s judgment and order dated 09.09.2024
has directed retrospective promotion of the respondent No. 1 on
the date on which his junior was promoted to the post in
question.
4. The junior, who was impleaded as the respondent No. 7 in the
writ petition, has not challenged the impugned order and has
also retired from service. Therefore, we fail to appreciate why
the State has appealed the impugned order.
5. Be that as it may, we are satisfied that no sufficient cause has
been shown for the delay in instituting this appeal.
6. After the impugned order was passed on 09.09.2024, the first
effective step (if any) of placing it before the Under Secretary
was taken only on 30.12.2024, i.e., after almost four months. A
vague reason was given that elections were notified, and
department officials were involved in the process. No particulars
whatsoever have been provided. The time gap of almost four
months remains completely unexplained.
7. After that, there is the usual reference to movement of files from
table to table and officer to officer. Again, no particulars have
been provided. Besides, such movement of files, by itself, cannot
constitute sufficient cause for delaying the filing of appeals.
8. In Postmaster General and Others Vs. In Living Media
India Limited and Another, reported in (2012)3 SCC 563 ,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that delay cannot be
condoned where the Government Department or the persons
concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter
and taking appropriate steps. The Court has held that in the
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absence of a plausible and acceptable explanation, the delay
cannot be condoned mechanically merely because the
Government or a wing of the Government seeks condonation.
The claim of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several noting cannot be invariably
accepted in view of modern technologies being used and
available. It was reiterated that the law of limitation undoubtedly
binds everybody, including the Government.
9. In Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy
(D), through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 489 ,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even the length of the
delay is a relevant factor that the Court must consider when
dealing with applications for condonation of delay. The Court
noted that, from the tenor or approach of the appellants, it
appeared that they sought to fix their own period of limitation
for instituting proceedings for which the law has prescribed a
period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost its right
to have the matter considered on the merits because of its own
inaction for a long time, it cannot be presumed that the delay
was not deliberate, and in such circumstances the party cannot
be heard to plead that substantial justice deserves to be
preferred against technical considerations.
10. The Court also held that, when considering a plea for
condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of
the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the
bona fides of the explanation offered by the parties seeking
condonation. It is only if the cause assigned by the litigant is
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sufficient and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced
that the court may bring the merits of the matter into aid for the
purpose of condoning the delay. Further, the question of
limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of
limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and
equity.
11. The Hon’ble Court held that the ‘Sword of Damocles’ cannot be
kept hanging over the head of the respondent for an indefinite
period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the
appellants. The Court noted that in a plethora of decisions, it has
been said that the delay should not be excused as a matter of
generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause
prejudice to the opposite party. Where the appellants failed to
demonstrate that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting
the matter, the delay cannot be condoned. If it is found that the
delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own
negligence and casual attitude, the delay cannot be condoned
on the grounds of doing substantial justice.
12. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing
Board & Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969 , the
Hon’ble Supreme Court conveyed an emphatic message to all
the High Courts that delay should not be condoned on frivolous
and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is
made out, wherein the Statemachinery is able to establish that it
acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout.
Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said, but
courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not
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to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, which also
equally suffers the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations
due to its own lackadaisical attitude.
13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Courts ought not
give a legitimising effect to such a callous attitude of the State
authorities or their instrumentalities and should remain extra
cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State
authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity
and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of
the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be
placed in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of
their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at a later stage.
14. Applying the above principles to the gross facts of the present
case, we are satisfied that no sufficient cause has been shown
for condonation of delay in instituting the accompanying appeal.
15. Accordingly, the present interlocutory application is dismissed.
L.P.A. No. 595 of 2025:
16. As a consequence of dismissal of I.A. No. 10354 of 2025, the
present appeal and other interlocutory applications therein, if
any, shall not survive and are disposed of.

(M. S. SONAK, C.J.)

(RAJESH SHANKAR, J.)
02.09.2026
Satish/Vikas/

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