DR. SATYA NARAYAN MISHRA vs SNIGDHARANI SARANGI @ MISHRA
- Court
- Odisha High Court
RSA/356/2026
ODHC010529932026
2026:OHC:210
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
RSA No. 356 of 2026
CNR No. ODHC01-052993-2026
[In the matter of an appeal under Section 100 read with Order
41 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.]
AFR
Dr. Satya Narayan Mishra ……… Appellant
Versus
Snigdharani Sarangi @
Mishra & Ors.
………. Respondents
Advocate(s) appeared in this case though hybrid mode:
__________________________________________________________
For Appellant : M/s. B.S. Panigrahi, S. Pradhan &
A.P. Bose, Advocates
For Respondents : Mr. Gopinath Mishra, Sr. Advocate
With M/s. Mohammed Akhter raza
Khan, Pragyan Paramita Mohanty,
S. Samantaray, S. Parida
__________________________________________________________
CORAM:
JUSTICE SASHIKANTA MISHRA
JUDGMENT
16.10.2026
SASHIKANTA MISHRA, J.
This is a plaintiff’s appeal against a partly reversing
judgment. The suit for partition was decreed by the trial
Court but partly reversed in appeal preferred by defendant
No.1. The present appeal seeks to assail the judgment passed
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rd
by the learned 3 Additional District and Sessions Judge,
Cuttack in RFA No. 103 of 2024 on 11.05.2026 followed by
decree on 18.05.2026 in modifying the judgment passed by
nd
learned 2 Additional Civil Judge, (Sr. Division), Cuttack on
27.12.2023 and decree passed on 06.01.2024 in C.S. (I)
No.145 of 2002.
2. For convenience, the parties are referred to as per
their respective status in the trial Court.
3.
The plaintiff-appellant’s case, briefly stated, is that
one Harihar Panchanan was the common ancestor of the
plaintiff and the defendants. His only son Baman Charan
Mishra died on 11.08.1997 leaving behind the plaintiff and
the defendants as his legal heirs. The plaintiff claims that the
Schedule-B, C and D properties were the ancestral properties
of his father and that the residential house of the family
stands over the Schedule-D property. He further claims that
the Schedule-E to L properties were the self-acquired
properties of his father and his grandfather which were
purchased in the name of his mother and siblings and that
his wife’s dowry articles under Schedule-M were also kept in
the family house. As a result of the disputes that arose
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between the parties over partition and possession of the
above properties and return of dowry articles, the plaintiff
filed the suit for partition and other reliefs.
4. The defendant no.1 to 3 filed a joint written
statement denying the plaintiff’s claims. The defendants
further pleaded that the plaintiff had relinquished his rights
over Schedule-D property in lieu of Rs. 65,000/- pursuant to
a family settlement. The defendants further claimed that
using the said amount, the plaintiff constructed a separate
house and lived apart from the family ever since, thus,
extinguishing his right over the said property on the plea of
ouster.
5. Defendant no.4, the mother of the plaintiff, filed a
separate written statement challenging the maintainability of
the suit and claiming exclusive ownership over the Schedule-
E, G and H properties which she acquired out of her
Streedhan. She further claims that the other defendants
individually own the properties recorded in their names. It is
her further case that the plaintiff relinquished his right over
the Schedule-D property basing on prior settlement and
prayed for dismissal of the suit.
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6. Basing on the rival pleadings the trial court framed
the following issues for determination: -
Whether the suit is maintainable?
“(i)
(ii) Whether there is any cause of action for filing of the
suit?
(iii) Whether the plaintiff has any locus-standi to file the
suit for partition?
(iv) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-
joinder of necessary party?
(v) Whether the plaintiff has got any share over the "D"
schedule property?
(vi) To what extent of share the plaintiff is entitled to get
in schedule "B" & "C" property?
(vii) Whether schedule "E" to "H" property are the self-
acquired property of Bimala Devi defendant No.4 and
partiable at the instance of the plaintiff?
(viii) Whether the schedule J to L property have been
acquired by other family members independently and
the plaintiff has got any share in it?
(ix) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim partition of
schedule D to L property?
(x) Whether the family settlement executed on 15.4.88
during the life time of Baman Charan Mishra is binding
on the plaintiff?
(xi) Is the plaintiff entitled to any other reliefs?”
7. The trial court took up issue Nos. (v), (vi), (vii),
(viii), (ix) and (x) for consideration jointly at the outset. After
analysing the oral and documentary evidence on record, the
trial court, inter alia, held that the plaintiff had a claim of
th
1/6 share in Schedule- B, C and D properties along with
the existing defendants and their legal heirs basing on the
fact that the property described in the document under Ext-
A (family settlement) did not match the Schedule-D property
under the plaint and that the document did not account for
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the share of the daughters. Thus, the plaintiff is entitled to
his share in the above property. The remaining issues were
decided accordingly. The suit was decreed by directing
partition of Schedule-B, C, and D properties among the
parties leaving out the properties of Schedule-E to M in view
of the admitted facts and legal impediments.
8. Feeling aggrieved, Defendant No.1(a) carried
appeal being in RFA No. 103 of 2024. The first appellate
Court, after reappreciating the evidence, modified the order
of the trial court in respect of the Schedule-D property by
holding that the plaintiff is not entitled to any share in the
partition of Schedule-D property in view the prior family
settlement.
9. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff has filed the
present second appeal, which was admitted on the following
substantial question of law: -
“(A) Whether the Family Settlement Deed dtd.15.04.1988
vide Ext.-A requires compulsory registration U/s 17 of the
Registration Act, 1908 to have its legal effect and to make
the same enforceable under law and the leamed lower
appellate Court committed an error in accepting the same as
a valid piece of evidence in the absence of registration
thereof?”
10. Heard Mr. A.P. Bose and Mr. Bhawani Shankar
Panigrahi for the Plaintiff-Appellant and Mr. G.N. Mishra,
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learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Ms. Pragyan Paramita
Mohanty, learned counsel for the Defendant-Respondents.
11. Both Mr. Bose and Mr. Panigrahi would submit
that the appellate court completely failed to appreciate the
pleadings and evidence on record in the proper perspective
to hold that the plaintiff had no share in Schedule-D
properties basing on the family settlement deed (Ext.A) dated
15.04.1988. They argue that the said document being an
unregistered one, could not have been accepted as it was
contrary to the provisions of Section-17 of the Registration
Act, 1908. It is further argued that the said deed does not
completely cover the suit properties described under
Schedule-D but the appellate court erred in presuming that
the same had been executed with respect to the said
property. Thus, the appellate court should not have accepted
the same and denied the plaintiff’s claim for partition in
Schedule-D property. They further submit that the Schedule-
D property, which also contains the residential house of the
parties is under the joint possession of the parties and that
an unregistered deed cannot be relied upon to deny partition.
Since, according to the deed, the plaintiff relinquished his
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claim/title over Schedule-D properties upon receipt of
Rs.65,000/-, it amounts to conveyance of title in favour of
the defendant no.1. This, brings it within the mischief of
Section 17. Hence, being unregistered, it could not have been
relied upon.
12. Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel, on the other
hand submits that the family settlement deed is not an
instrument of partition inasmuch as the document did not
lead to the partition within the family but is only a record of
a previous arrangement already acted upon by the members
of the family. The plaintiff has admitted such fact in the
plaint as well as in his cross-examination. The property in
question was recorded in favour of defendant No.1 basing on
the concession of the other brothers in the OLR Case acting
on the previous arrangement. Mr. Mishra further argues that
receipt of Rs.65,000/- by the plaintiff cannot be treated as
creation of new interest nor relinquishment of title/interest.
Therefore, the document does not require compulsory
registration.
13. Perusal of the evidence on record and the
judgments and decree of the lower courts reveal that the
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document under Ext.A purports to record a family settlement
between the members, who are siblings including their
father, namely, Baman Charan Mishra. Since, there is some
doubt as regards description of the property under Schedule-
D as compared to Ext-A, it would be better to deal with this
aspect at first.
14. The property is described in Ext-A as follows: -
.
“ ଭୁବନେᚧର ଟାଉେ୍ ମୁକାମନର ଏକର ୦ ୩୨ ନେସିମିଲ ᙝଳମାେ ଜରିବ
.
ବନଦାବᙜ ରହିଅଛି। ଉᘹ ଭୁବନେᚧର ଟାଉେ୍ ମୁକାମନର ଏକର ୦ ୩୨
ନର ᙝାୟୀ ପᘪା ଘର କରି ଘରବାଡି ରୂନପ ବୟବହାର କରି ସମᙜ
ଆᙛେ
ପᙌ ମାନେ ଚଳାଚଳ ନହଉଅଛୁ ”
।
A loose translation of the above recitals is
reproduced hereinbelow: -
“An area of Ac. 0.32 decimals of land situated at
Bhubaneswar Town has been settled under JARIB
Bandobast. All of us, being the parties concerned,
have constructed permanent pucca houses over the
said land and have been using the same for
residential purposes.”
The property under Schedule-D of the plaint is
described as follows: -
SCHEDULE ‘D’
District — Khurda, Tahasil — Bhubaneswar,
Mouza — Bhubaneswar Sahar
Unit No.28 — Goutam Nagar
Khatian No. 750
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Plot
Area Value
No.
477 A0.303
decimal
Rs.35,000/-
(Rupees Thirty-Five thousand)
only including buildings are
standing thereon”
The descriptions, when compared, reveal minor
discrepancies in the area. However, read as a whole including
the place where it is situated, it is seen that the property
described in the plaint schedule and in the document under
Ext.A are the same. Thus, the trial court’s reasoning that
there is mismatch of description is factually incorrect.
15. Now, the principal question that remains to be
answered is, whether Ext.A compulsorily requires
registration under Section-17 of the Registration Act to be
admissible. For reference, Section-17 is reproduced
hereinbelow: -
Documents of which registration is
“S.17-
compulsory.
(1)The following documents shall be registered, if the
property to which they relate is situate in a district in
which, and if they have been executed on or after the
date on which, Act XVI of 1864, or the Indian
Registration Act, 1866, or the Indian Registration Act,
1871, or the Indian Registration Act, 1877, or this Act
came or comes into force, namely,
(a)instruments of gift of immovable property;
(b)other non-testamentary instruments which purport or
operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish,
whether in present or in future, any right, title or
interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of
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one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable
property;
(c)non-testamentary instruments which acknowledge
the receipt or payment of any consideration on account
of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or
extinction of any such right, title or interest; and……..
xx xx xx xx”
16. Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908,
requires registration of non-testamentary instruments which
purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or
extinguish rights in immovable property of the prescribed
value. Section 17(1)(c), concerning instruments
acknowledging receipt or payment of consideration on
account of the creation or extinguishment of such rights,
must also be considered in light of the terms and legal effect
of the document. The requirement of registration must
therefore be determined by examining the substance of Ext.
A and the circumstances in which it was executed.
17. Perusal of the document under Ext-A reveals that
during the time of its preparation, the parties i.e., the
members of the family were possessing separate properties
as per the schedules appended, though initially, they were
residing jointly in the residential house at Bhubaneswar,
which corresponds to Schedule-D property. It further states
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that the plaintiff received a sum of Rs. 65,000/- from his
parents, specifically his father, (Party no.5 in the said family
settlement deed) because he had extinguished his right in the
Schedule-D property. However, the mere recital of payment
of consideration does not, by itself, establish that the
relinquishment had been completed before the document
was executed. The question is, whether the evidence on
record establishes that the family arrangement had already
been acted upon and Ext. A was drawn up only to record the
arrangement, or whether the document itself was intended to
effect the relinquishment.
18. Perusal of Ext. A, particularly page-3 thereof,
reveals that Baman Charan Mishra, described as Party No.5
in the family settlement, stated that the plaintiff, described
as Party No.1, was being paid a sum of ₹ 65,000 for building
a separate house in the place of his liking because he was
not given a share in the family house situated at
Bhubaneswar i.e. Schedule-D property. The recital thus
refers to the payment of the agreed amount to the plaintiff.
19. The aforesaid recital, read in the context of the
document as a whole, supports the defendants' case that the
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family arrangement had already been given effect to at and
that Ext. A was intended to record the arrangement, rather
than to effect it. This interpretation must, however, be
considered alongside the other recitals in Ext. A and the
evidence on record concerning the circumstances in which
the arrangement was arrived at and the payment was made.
The relevant recitals from Ext.A are reproduced hereinbelow:
“xxxxxxxxxx
ଏହିକି ᙛେ ଜି:କଟକ, ଥାନା: ଆଠଗଡ ନ୪୭୍ବର ᙛ୍ୌ: ନିଜଗଡ
ଏନ. ଏ. ସି., ୱାଡ ନ୬୍ବର ରାଧାନାଥପୁର ଶାସନᙛର ଓ ହାଲᙛର ଜି:ପୁରୀ,
ଭୁବᙛନᙫର ଟାଉନ ୍ୁକା୍ᙛର ଆେ୍ାନᘮର ବାସଽାନ ଅᙛଟ । ଆᙛେ ନ୫-୬
୍ବର ପᙌ ଉଭୟ ᙭ା୍ୀ ଼ୀ ଅଟୁ । ନ ୧, ୨, ୩, ୪୍ବର ପᙌ୍ାᙛନ ଆ୍ବ ୍ାନᘮର
ପୁ ǿ ୱାରସ ଅଟᙌି। ଆେ ନ୫୍ବର ପᙌᘮ ନା୍ᙛର ଆଠଗଡ ଥାନା ନ୪୭୍ବର
ᙛ୍ୌ:ନିଜଗଡ ରକବାᙛର ଏକ.୮୨ ᙛଡସି୍ିଲ ଉଵ ଥାନାର ନ୩୬୍ବର
ᙛ୍ୌ:ବିରକିᙛଶାରପୁର ରକବାᙛର ଏ୦.୩.୫୮ ᙛଡସି୍ିଲ ଜି: ପୁରୀ ଟାଉନ: ପୁରୀ
ପᙐି୍ ᙛାର ବାᙛଶଳି ସାହି ଏ୦.୦୩.୦୨ ଜି:ପୁରୀ ଭୁବᙛନ᙭ର ଟାଉନ ୍ୁକା୍ᙛର
ଏ୦.୩୨ ᙛଡସି୍ିଲ ଽଳ ୍ାନ ଜରିବ ବᙛଦାବ଼ ରହିଅଛି, ଉଵ ଭୁବᙛନଶବର ଟାଉନ
୍ୁକା୍ ଏ୦.୩୨ ᙛର ଽାୟୀ ପକାଘର କରି ଘରବାରୀ ରୂᙛପ ବୟବହାର କରି ଆᙛେ
ସ଼୍ ପᙌ୍ାᙛନ ଚଳାଚଳ ᙛହଉଅଛୁ । ୧, ୨, ୩, ୪୍ବର ପᙌ୍ାନᘮୁ େଥାଶଵି
ଶିᙌା ᙚଧାନ କରାଇ ଉପାଜଡନ ᙌ୍ କରାଇ ପାରି ଅଛୁ। ଭବି୍ୟତ ସୁଖ ସୁବିଧା
ନି୍ିᙈ ଆᙛେ ସ଼୍ ପᙌ ୍ାᙛନ ଏକǿᙛର ୍ିଳିତ ଭାᙛବ ଏକ ଆᙛପା୍ ବᙂନ
ପǿ ସᙘାଦନ କରି, ତଫସିଲ ସିଡୁଲ ବଳିତ ଅଂଶ ସᙘᙈିᙛର ଦାଖଲ କାର ଥାଇ
xxxxxxxxxx
ନିଜପଦᙛର ᙛଭାଗ ଦାଖଲ କରି ଆସୁଅଛୁ।
A loose translation of the above recitals is reproduced
-
hereinbelow:
“xxxxxxxxxx That our residence is at District: Cuttack,
Police Station: Athagarh, Khata No. 47, Mouza:
Nijagada N.A.C., Ward No. 6, Radhanathpur Shasan,
and presently at Bhubaneswar Town, District: Puri. We,
Party Nos. 5 and 6, are husband and wife. Party Nos.
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1, 2, 3 and 4 are our sons and heirs. There are lands
measuring Ac. 0.82 decimals at Mouza: Nijagada,
Khata No. 47, Police Station: Athagarh; Ac. 0.3.58
decimals at Mouza: Birakishorepur, Khata No. 36 of the
said police station; Ac. 0.03.02 at Baseli Sahi, Puri
Paschim Dwar, Puri Town, District: Puri; and Ac. 0.32
decimals at Bhubaneswar Town, District: Puri, in the
name of Party No. 5, which have been surveyed and
settled. On the said Ac. 0.32 decimals at Bhubaneswar
Town, we have constructed a permanent pucca house
and have been using it as a homestead, and all of us
parties have been residing and carrying on our affairs
there. We have provided Party Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 with
education to the best of our ability and made them
capable of earning. For future happiness and
convenience, we, the parties, have jointly executed a
mutual partition deed, and have been possessing and
enjoying in our own rights the respective shares of the
property described in the schedule. xxxxxxxxx”
A plain reading of the recitals show that the
members of the family were already possessing their
respective shares, more fully described in the different
schedules appended to Ext.A, which militate against the
argument that such arrangement was intended to be given
effect to for the first time upon execution of the document.
20. Now, the question is, whether such a deed requires
registration compulsorily. It would be apposite in this context
to refer to the judgment of the supreme court in the case of
Tek Bahadur Bhujil Vs. Debi Singh Bhujil and Ors., AIR
1966 SC 292 , where the following was held: -
The next contention for the appellant is that the
“12.
agreement Exhibit 3 required registration and is of no
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effect as it was not registered under the Indian
Registration Act. The trial Court and the first
appellate Court held that the Registration Act was not
in force in the area where the agreement was
executed at the time of its execution in 1942. The High
Court, on the basis of fresh evidence, was of opinion
that the matter required further elucidation and that
it was not necessary to remand the case for a finding
on the point as in its opinion this agreement did not
require registration even if the Registration Act was
in force in that area at the time of its execution. We
need not say therefore anything further about the
applicability of the Registration Act in that area, but
we have, however, still to consider the contention for
the appellant that the agreement Exhibit 3 did require
registration. If we agree with him on this point, it
would be necessary for the final disposal of the ease
that a clear-cut finding on the question of the
applicability of the Registration Act in that area be
recorded by the trial Court or the first appellate Court.
We, however, do not agree with the contention of the
appellant that the agreement Exhibit 3 required
registration
13. Family arrangement as such can be arrived at
orally. Its terms may be recorded in writing as a
memorandum of what had been agreed upon
between the parties. The memorandum need not be
prepared for the purpose of being used as a document
on which future title of the parties be founded. It is
usually prepared as a record of what had been
agreed upon so that there be no hazy notions about it
in future. It is only when the parties reduce the family
arrangement in writing with the purpose of using that
writing as proof of what they had arranged and,
where the arrangement is brought about by the
document as such, that the document would require
registration as it is then that it would be a document
of title declaring for future what rights in what
properties the parties possess. The document Exhibit
3 does not appear to be of such a nature. It merely
records the statements which the three brothers
made, each referring to others as brothers and
referring to the properties as joint property. In fact,
the appellant, in his statement, referred to
respondents 1 and 2 as two brother co-partners; and
the last paragraph said:
“We, the three brothers, having agreed over the above
statement and having made our own statements in
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the presence of the Panch called by us, and signed
and kept a copy of each of this document as proof of
it.” The document would serve the purpose of proof or
evidence of what had been decided between the
brothers. It was not the basis of their rights in any
form over the property which each brother had agreed
to enjoy to the exclusion of the others. In substance it
records what had already been decided by the
parties. We may mention that the appellant and
respondent No. 1, even under this arrangement, were
to enjoy the property in suit jointly and it is this
agreement of theirs at the time which has later given
rise to the present litigation between the two. The
document, to our mind, is nothing but a memorandum
of what had taken place and, therefore, is not a
document which would require compulsory
registration under S. 17 of the Registration Act.”
[Emphasis added]
21. In the present case, the plaintiff had already given
up his rights over the Schedule-D property before 15.4.1988
and Ext.A merely recorded the plaintiff's relinquishment of
his rights in the Schedule-D property in a written form. The
document, therefore, did not itself operate to extinguish
those rights. This is supported by the admission of the
plaintiff’s father within the settlement deed itself that the
plaintiff had given up his rights prior to creation of the
document under Ext-A as quoted hereinbelow: -
“xxxxx
ଏହି ବᙌନପ ǿ ସᙘାଦନ କରି ସᙛଚତ କରୁଅଛୁ ᙛେ ନ୫୍ବର ପᙌᘮ
ନିᚚଡାରିତ ୍ᙛତ ନ୧୍ବର ପᙌ ଭୁବନᙫର ଽିତ ବାସ ଗୃହᙛର ଅଂଶ ପାଉ ନିବାରୁ
ତାᘮର ସୁବିଧା ୍ୁତାବକ ଽାନᙛର ବାସଗୃହ ତୟାର କରିବା କାରଳ ନଗଦ
xxxxx
ଟ.୬୫,୦୦୦/- ପᘸ୍ଠି ହଜାର ଟᘮା ୍ା ǿ ପାଇᙛବ। ”
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A loose translation of the above portion is reproduced
hereinbelow: -
“xxxxxxxx. By executing this partition deed, we hereby
declare that, as determined by Party No 5, since Party
No 1 will not receive a share in the residential house
situated in Bhubaneswar, he shall receive cash of
Rs.65,000/- (Sixty-five thousand rupees only) for
constructing a residential house at a place convenient to
him. xxxxxxxxx”
Thus, the document doesn’t fall within the purview
of section-17 (1)(b) of the Registration Act.
22. Similarly, on page-3 of the document, Party No.5
stated that the consideration of Rs.65,000/- was being paid
to the plaintiff for constructing a house in a place of his liking
because he was not getting any share from the Schedule-D
property and not because of his relinquishment of his rights
itself. This Court is therefore, not inclined to accept the
contention raised that the document came into force on the
date of receipt of the amount of Rs.65,000/- as proof of
relinquishment of title. It was a sort of compensation paid to
the plaintiff for depriving him of a share of Schedule-D
property as per an arrangement already acted upon. For the
above reasons also, Ext-A cannot be treated as a document
compulsorily required to be registered.
16 17
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23. For the foregoing reasons, this court holds that the
requirement of compulsory registration under Section
17(1)(b) and (c) of the Registration Act, 1908 is not attracted
to Ext-A, the same being a memorandum of a family
arrangement already arrived at and acted upon by the parties
and not an instrument by which the plaintiff’s rights over the
Schedule-D property were extinguished for the first time.
24. Consequently, this Court finds no ground to
interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the learned
first appellate Court in respect of the Schedule-D property.
25. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.
………………………..
Sashikanta Mishra
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
th
The 16 October, 2026/ A.K. Rana, P.A.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: AJAYA KUMAR RANA
Designation: P.A.
Reason: Authentication
Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK
Date: 16-Oct-2026 18:44:53
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