EMPLOYERS IN RELATION TO THE MANAGEMENT OF LAKHIMATA COLLIERY UNDER MUGMA AREA OF M/S E C L, vs THEIR WORKMAN, SRI ANIL RAJWAR, REPRESENTED BY THE ASSISTANT JOINT GENERAL SECRETARY,
- Court
- Jharkhand High Court
- Case type
- LETTER PATENTS APPEAL
- Decided on
- 24-03-2026
<div> <br /> <br /> ( 2026:JHHC:8272-DB ) <br /> <b>IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI</b> <br /> <b>L.P.A. No. 130 of 2025 </b> <b> </b> <br /> <br /> Employers in relation to the Management of Lakhimata Colliery under Mugma <br /> Area of M/s ECL (Eastern Coalfields Limited), through its General Manager, <br /> having its office at Mugma Aare, Post Office- Mugma, Police Station- Nirsa, <br /> District-Dhanbad. …. Appellant <br /> Versus <br /> Their Workman, Sri Anil Rajwar, represented by the Assistant Joint General <br /> Secretary, Jharkhand Janta Mazdoor Union (JJMU), Vishwakarma Colony, <br /> Nutandih, Post Office- Jagjiwan Nagar, Police Station-Saraidhela, District- <br /> Dhanbad, Jharkhand. …. Respondent <br /> <br /> ------ <br /> <b>CORAM : HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE </b><br /> <b> HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR </b><br /> <b> </b> <b> </b> <b> </b> <b> </b> ------ <br /> For the Appellant : Mr Rajesh Lala, Advocate <br /> ----- <b> </b><br /> <b>05 /Dated: 24.03.2026 </b><br /> 1. Heard Mr. Rajesh Lala, learned counsel for the appellant. <br /> 2. This appeal challenges the learned Single Judge's judgment and order <br /> dated 12.07.2024, dismissing the appellant's W.P.(L) No. 3479 of 2022 <br /> questioning the Tribunal's Award dated 11.10.2021 in Reference No. 23 of <br /> 2008. <br /> 3. By the Award dated 11.10.2021, the Central Government Industrial <br /> Tribunal No.I, Dhanbad held that the respondent-worker’s dismissal from <br /> service was neither legal nor justified and directed the worker's reinstatement <br /> without any back wages. The learned Single Judge has upheld the Tribunal's <br /> Award dated 11.10.2021 and dismissed the appellant's writ petition by <br /> directing the appellant to pay costs of Rs. 25,000/-. <br /> 4. Mr Lala, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant <br /> could not have been faulted for not holding any inquiry into the misconduct of <br /> unauthorized absence of the worker. He submitted that the worker admitted to <br /> the absence and in such circumstances, there was no necessity of holding any <br /> 1 <br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> ( 2026:JHHC:8272-DB ) <br /> enquiry. Therefore, on the ground that no enquiry was held or that the enquiry <br /> was defective, no relief could have been granted to the worker. He relied on <br /> <b><i>Dharmarathmakara Raibahadur Arcot Ramaswamy Mudalair Educational </i></b><br /> <b><i>Institution Vs. Educational Appellate Tribunal and Another</i></b> , <b>(1997) 7 SCC </b><br /> <b>332</b> to support this contention. <br /> 5. Without prejudice, Mr Lala submitted that the only document based <br /> upon which the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge have granted relief to <br /> the worker was a medical prescription dated 04.06.2011. He submitted that this <br /> document was a forgery or fabrication, because it bears the date of 17.11.2011, <br /> below the doctor’s signature. He, therefore, submits that the finding of the <br /> Tribunal is vitiated by perversity and warrants interference. <br /> 6. Mr Lala submitted that in this case, the reference was barred under <br /> Section 2A (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, because the grievance <br /> about termination was raised more than five years after the date of termination. <br /> Alternatively, Mr Lala submitted that even a reference under section 10 must <br /> be made within a reasonable period, and since it was not made within a <br /> reasonable period, the reference itself was incompetent. <br /> 7. We have considered Mr Lala's submissions, but we do not find merit in <br /> any of them. <br /> 8. Insofar as the issue of limitation is concerned, the learned Single Judge <br /> has correctly held that this was not a case of an application under Section 2A <br /> by the worker, but rather a case in which the Union raised an industrial dispute <br /> and sought a reference under Section 10 of the ID Act. Such a reference was <br /> ultimately made by the appropriate Government, and the reference order was <br /> not even challenged by the appellant. <br /> 2 <br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> ( 2026:JHHC:8272-DB ) <br /> 9. Besides, this can hardly be called a belated or a stale reference in the <br /> facts of the present case. It is not as if the workers or the union were indolent <br /> in the matter. They were agitating the issue of what they perceived to be an <br /> illegal and unfair termination. The appropriate Government, if, after <br /> considering all such circumstances, deemed it appropriate to make a reference, <br /> we can hardly fault the appropriate Government or declare that the reference <br /> proceedings were incompetent, even in the absence of any challenge to the <br /> same by the appellant. <br /> 10. As regards the contention about failure to hold an enquiry or holding of <br /> a defective enquiry, which was bereft of any principles of natural justice, we <br /> must observe that the worker merely stated that he was indeed absent because <br /> of his illness and now that he has become fit, he should be allowed to resume <br /> his duties. Such a statement can hardly be regarded as an admission of <br /> “unauthorised absence”. <br /> 11. At the highest, what was admitted was the absence. However, there was <br /> no admission about such absence being unauthorised. On the contrary, the <br /> worker raised specific concerns about his ill health and consequent inability to <br /> attend to duties. <br /> 12. Therefore, by completely misconstruing the worker's statement, the <br /> appellant could not have either done <b> </b> away with the enquiry or held an enquiry <br /> which was completely defective. In this case, though, the burden was on the <br /> appellant to establish the worker's misconduct; the appellant chose not to <br /> examine any witness in the inquiry or the so-called inquiry. <br /> 13. There are concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal and the <br /> learned Single Judge on the aspect of failure to hold an enquiry or a defective <br /> enquiry. These concurrent findings are supported by the evidence on record <br /> 3 <br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> ( 2026:JHHC:8272-DB ) <br /> and therefore can hardly be styled as “perverse findings”. In this letters patent <br /> appeal, therefore, we are loath to interfere with such findings of fact, now that <br /> no case of perversity has been made out. <br /> 14. The final contention that the medical certificate is a forgery, or <br /> fabrication is also entirely misconceived. Firstly, requiring this Court to <br /> evaluate evidence is nothing but an attempt to convert this Court into an <br /> Appellate Forum, which it is not. Secondly, from the perusal of the <br /> prescription/certificate, it is apparent that it was in the nature of a case paper <br /> prepared by the doctor. It bears several dates, perhaps indicating when the <br /> worker followed up with the doctor and obtained prescriptions. Far from <br /> suggesting any forgery or fabrication, this document indicates that the worker <br /> was indeed unwell and visited the doctor regularly for follow-up. <br /> 15. In the case of <b><i>Dharmarathmakara Raibahadur Arcot Ramaswamy </i></b><br /> <b><i>Mudalair Educational Institution </i></b> ( <i>supra</i> ), the factual situation was not even <br /> remotely comparable to that in the present case. There was a clear and <br /> categorical admission about the unauthorised absence. Here, there was no such <br /> admission. The admission was only about the absence, and an explanation was <br /> offered for the absence. Therefore, the observations in paragraph 8 upon which <br /> reliance was placed will not assist the appellant in the present case. <br /> 16. For the above reasons, now we are satisfied that none of the contentions <br /> raised on behalf of the appellant has any merit and warrants interference in this <br /> appeal. However, before we part, we must refer to another disturbing feature <br /> of this matter. In this case, the Tribunal made the impugned award on <br /> 11.10.2021 and directed the workers' reinstatement. Even though no interim <br /> relief was granted by the learned Single Judge of this Court, the appellant, <br /> which is a Public Sector Undertaking, chose to disregard the Award with <br /> 4 <br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> ( 2026:JHHC:8272-DB ) <br /> impunity and not to reinstate the worker. The worker, ultimately, attained the <br /> age of superannuation on 31.08.2023. <br /> 17. The appellant, to date, has not paid wages for the period between <br /> 11.10.2021 and 31.08.2023 on the grounds that there was no direction for <br /> payment of this amount. This is a grossly unfair approach by a public sector <br /> undertaking that litigates using taxpayers’ funds. There was no question of <br /> issuing such a direction because the Tribunal expected its Award would be <br /> faithfully implemented by the appellant unless, of course, any interim relief <br /> was granted or the award was overturned by this Court. <br /> 18. Even before the learned Single Judge, the learned counsel for the <br /> appellant fairly admitted that no interim relief had been granted. To date, the <br /> appellant has not paid wages for the period from 11.10.2021 to 31.08.2023. <br /> Therefore, while we dismiss this appeal, with costs of Rs. 25,000/-, we direct <br /> the appellant to deposit in this Court the back wages for the period between <br /> 11.10.2021 (the date of the Tribunal’s award) and 31.08.2023 (i.e. the date on <br /> which the worker attained the age of superannuation), within four weeks with <br /> due intimation to the worker who, possibly, on account of penury, has not been <br /> able to attend to this Court proceedings. <br /> 19. If there is a delay in depositing the above amount together with the costs <br /> awarded by the learned Single Judge and the costs awarded in this appeal <br /> within four weeks from today, then, this amount will carry interest at the rate <br /> of 9% per annum, which shall, of course, be without prejudice to any action <br /> under the contempt of Courts Act that will have to be taken against the CMD <br /> of the appellant. Besides, the interest component will have to be personally <br /> paid by the CMD. <br /> 5 <br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> ( 2026:JHHC:8272-DB ) <br /> 20. A copy of this order must be immediately placed before the CMD, <br /> because very often, a defence is taken that some other officers were handling <br /> the matter, and the CMD had no knowledge about the same. Such defences are <br /> most often taken in contempt proceedings initiated for failure to comply with <br /> orders of Tribunals and Courts, with impunity. <br /> 21. The above amount should be deposited in this Court on or before the <br /> th<br /> 24 of April 2026, unless, of course, any interim relief is secured in the <br /> meantime. <br /> 22. Though the appeal is dismissed, to mitigate the workman's sufferings, <br /> we direct the Registry to place the matter under the caption ‘For Orders’ for <br /> consideration of compliance. <br /> <br /> <b>(M.S. Sonak, C.J.) </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b> <b> </b> <b> </b> <b> </b> <b> </b> <b> </b> <b> </b> <b> </b> <b> (Rajesh Shankar, J.) </b><br /> March 24, 2026 <br /> Ranjeet / R.Kr. <br /> NAFR <br /> Uploaded on 25.03.2026 <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> 6 <br /> </div>