Naveen Kumar Verma & Anr. vs State
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
th
Date of reserving: 06 May, 2026
th
Date of Decision: 15 September 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
+ CRL.A. 677/2004
NAVEEN KUMAR VERMA & ANR. .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Dharmendra Vashishtha, Mr.
Sumit Kalra, Ms. Yashika Malhotra,
Advs.
versus
STATE .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Mukesh Kumar, APP for the
State with SI Anil Kumar, PS Okhla
Industrial Area.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIMAL KUMAR YADAV
JUDGMENT
VIMAL KUMAR YADAV, J.
1. Challenged in this appeal is the judgement dated 16.8.2004 passed by
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala House Courts, in Sessions case
No. 41/03, arising out of FIR No. 208/2003 registered at Police Station,
Okhla Industrial Area, under Section 498-A/304-B/34 Indian Penal Code,
1860 (hereinafter referred to as „IPC‟), whereby the Appellants, Naveen
Kumar Verma and his brother, accused Ajay Kumar Verma, were convicted
for the offences punishable under Section 304-B/498A IPC and through the
order on sentence dated 17.08.2004 they were sentenced to undergo
Rigorous Imprisonment („RI‟) for 10 years for the offence punishable under
Section 304-B IPC and 3 years RI and a fine of Rs. 5,000/- for the offence
under Section 498-A, in default of payment of fine, to undergo six months
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Simple Imprisonment („SI‟). Both sentences were ordered to run
concurrently. The Appellants were granted benefit of set-off under section
428 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 („Cr.P.C‟).
2. The third accused, Smt. Kaushalya Devi (mother-in-law of the
deceased) who was tried jointly with the Appellants for the same offences,
was acquitted by the Ld. Trial Court by extending her the benefit of doubt.
Her acquittal has not been assailed by the State before this Court and has
thus, attained finality.
3. The gravamen of the prosecution is that on 10.04.2003, on receipt of
an information in Police Station Okhla Industrial Area from Police Control
Room (PCR) about a lady having committed suicide by hanging in House
No. 21 or 31, I Block, Railway Colony, Tughlakabad, New Delhi, DD
No.13-A was recorded. Thereafter, SI Ramjas Pandey who along with
Constable Satender, reached the said house. One lady (by the name of Vinita
@ Kamlesh) was found hanging from the ceiling fan of the room. As per the
record, information was also given to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM).
The dead body was sent for post-mortem examination.
4. It emerges from the record that on 11.04.2003, SDM recorded the
statement of Ramesh Chand Verma, father of the deceased Vinita @
Kamlesh, wherein he stated inter alia that his daughter Vinita was married to
accused Naveen Kumar Verma as per Hindu rites and ceremonies on
29.11.2002; that the marriage failed to bring happiness to the couple and
soon after the marriage Vinita remained depressed in her matrimonial home;
that Naveen Kumar Verma and his brother, accused Ajay Kumar Verma,
used to beat her off and on and demand dowry to the tune of Rs.50,000/-;
and that on 10.04.2003, Pankaj (brother of Appellants) came to the parental
house of Vinita at about 4:30 PM and informed her parents that Vinita was
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not well, asking Ramesh Chand Verma to accompany him. It further
emerges that Ramesh Chand Verma suspected and blamed Naveen Kumar
Verma, Ajay Kumar Verma and their mother Kaushalya Devi, and alleged
that all three accused, acting in tandem, had killed Vinita. Further, the SDM
also recorded the statement of Shanti Devi, mother of the deceased, wherein
she stated that soon after the marriage, the in-laws used to beat her daughter
and demand dowry of Rs.50,000/-, and that accused Ajay wanted to have
illicit relations with the deceased. On this basis, FIR No. 208/2003 was
registered u/s 304-B, 498-A and 34 IPC. After completion of investigation,
chargesheet was filed against the accused.
5. The Accused pleaded not guilty to the charge framed under section
498A read with section 34 IPC & section 304B IPC read with 34 IPC and
claimed trial. In order to substantiate its case, prosecution examined 13
witnesses. Accused pleaded their innocence while explaining their position
in their statement under section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(Cr.P.C.) and examined 4 witnesses in their defence. Vide impugned
judgment and order on sentence, the Learned Additional Sessions Judge
convicted the Appellant and sentenced them, as referred hereinbefore, while
acquitting Smt. Kaushalya Devi.
6. Feeling aggrieved, the present appeal has been preferred. Learned
counsel for the Appellants contended that the learned Additional Sessions
Judge erred in convicting the Appellant on the basis of unconvincing
evidence on record, the judgment being bad on facts and in law and
consequently liable to be set aside.
7. It was submitted that the Trial Court failed to appreciate that all the
prosecution witnesses were closely related to the deceased and were
interested witnesses, and that no independent witness has been examined. It
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was further submitted that the Trial Court did not accord equal weightage to
the defence witnesses, casually rejecting their testimony without
appreciating that the issues of credibility and trustworthiness apply with
equal force to defence evidence. Reliance was placed, in particular, on the
testimony of Savitri, who had mediated the marriage and was known to both
families and would ordinarily have been the first person to be approached in
the event of any discord. However, she was not cited as a witness by the
prosecution; the defence, however, examined her, and she deposed that the
deceased was living happily. Her testimony was rejected by the Trial Court
without due consideration.
8. It was submitted that the entire testimony of PW-1 to PW-5 regarding
demand and harassment was based on what had allegedly been told to them
by the deceased, without any independent corroborative or medical
evidence, and did not specify the detailed particulars like any date or time. It
was pointed out that despite the couple having visited relatives, and vice
versa, at least twenty times within a span of four and a half months, none of
the witnesses deposed of having seen any injury or sign of beating on the
deceased, nor did any of them state that any of the accused had personally
made a demand from them or that they had ever confronted Appellant no.1
or Appellant no.2 regarding the alleged demands, beatings, or attempt to
establish illicit relations.
9. It was submitted that it stood admitted that no dowry was demanded
or given at the time of marriage, that no police complaint or panchayat was
convened despite the seriousness of the allegations, and that no specific
dowry article or amount was ever identified, the allegations being vague and
general in nature. It was argued that even as per the prosecution's own
version, the alleged demand and cruelty were stated to have commenced
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only in January 2003, with no extraordinary ill-treatment or intervening
change in circumstances brought on record to explain the escalation leading
to the incident on 10.04.2003. It was further submitted that the concept of
cruelty varies from individual to individual and that no wilful conduct of
such a nature as was likely to drive the deceased to commit suicide had been
established.
10. It was submitted that although the deceased is alleged to have
informed the witnesses about a demand of Rs.50,000/-, she never asked
them to actually pay the amount, nor did the parents ever pay any sum or
confront any accused regarding the alleged demand; nor did the deceased,
before taking such a drastic step, choose to call any relative or her parents,
or ever expressed her unwillingness to return to her matrimonial home,
despite her parents' residence being merely 3.5 km away. It was argued that
if she was being subjected to such cruelty as alleged, there ought to have
been fresh or old injury marks on her person.
11. It was submitted that the prosecution introduced, for the first time
during the trial, the allegation of a telephonic call made by the deceased to
her mother on 08.04.2003 asking her, in a fearful tone, to come with money,
a fact conspicuously absent from the statements recorded before the SDM or
the police, and thus, a material improvement reflecting the interested and
vengeful nature of the witnesses, which the Trial Court failed to take into
account. It was further submitted that the witnesses were shown to have
made improvements at every successive stage; before the SDM, before the
police, and before the Court which aspect the Trial Court read in a casual
manner with a pre-determined mind.
12. It was submitted that no specific role was attributed to the Appellants
beyond a vague and general allegation of beatings, and that there existed no
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legal evidence, direct or circumstantial, connecting the Appellant with the
offences under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC, much less any material to
establish a prior meeting of minds or agreement between the accused. It was
further submitted that the Trial Court, having found the very same evidence
trustworthy, could not have convicted the Appellant while acquitting a co-
accused on that very evidence, and that the burden lay upon the prosecution
to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and not upon the defence to prove
innocence; the conviction, being founded on surmises and conjectures rather
than legal evidence, was accordingly liable to be set aside. Reliance was
placed on Shoor Singh vs. Uttarakhand JT 2024 (9) SC 625 ; Manohar Lal
vs. Haryana, AIR 2014 SC 2555 ; Shobhit Kumar Mittal vs. Uttar Pradesh
AIR 2025 SC 4653 ; State vs. Aftab & Anr . Dt. 17.2.206; State vs. Rakesh
& Ors. 2012 (2) JCC 1334 ; Murari Lal and Ors. vs. State dt. 19.11.2025.
13. Countering the submissions made by the learned counsel for the
Appellants, learned APP for the State has stood by the impugned judgment
and asserted that the evidence of PW-1 to PW-5 was consistent on the core
allegations of beating and demand of Rs. 50,000/-, and mere relationship
with the deceased does not render their testimony unworthy of credit, more
so where the alleged cruelty occurred within the four walls of the
matrimonial home, then the natural witnesses are ordinarily drawn from the
deceased's own family. It is further submitted that the statements Ex. PW-
1/A and Ex. PW2/A were recorded by an independent authority, the SDM
(PW-6), within a day of the incident, well before any opportunity for
prolonged deliberation or embellishment. Further, the marriage (29.11.2002)
and death (10.04.2003) were separated by barely four and a half months,
which satisfies the proximity test under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act
enabling the Court to raise a presumption against the Appellants. The
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Appellants offered no explanation of the circumstances of death within their
special knowledge, and that Appellant No. 1's plea of the deceased's illicit
relationship with Rakesh was found by the Trial Court to be false and a
fabricated defence, itself indicative of a guilty mind; and that the infirmity
which persuaded the Trial Court to acquit Smt. Kaushalya Devi i.e. the
absence of any allegation against her in the earliest statement was specific to
her case and does not extend to the Appellants, against whom consistent,
specific and unwavering allegations of beating and dowry demand were
levelled from the very first statement.
14. The principal issues that arise for consideration before this Court is
whether the prosecution has been able to establish beyond reasonable doubt
that the deceased Vinita was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the
Respondents in connection with demand of dowry soon before her death so
as to attract the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC,
and whether the judgment of conviction dated 16th August, 2004 passed by
the ld. Trial Court suffers from any perversity warranting interference by
this Court in appellate jurisdiction. In this context, reference can be made to
the judgment titled as “ Gurdip Singh vs. State of Punjab ” 2013 IV AD
(CRI.) (S.C.) where the mandatory requirements to prove a case under
section 304B has been laid down, which are as under:-
5. “Dowry death” in the Penal Code, 1860 was introduced under
Section 304-B as per Act 43 of 1986. Under the said provision, if a
married woman dies,
(i) on account of burns or bodily injury or dies otherwise than
under normal circumstances,
(ii) such death occurs within seven years of marriage,
(iii) it is shown that she was subjected to cruelty or harassment
by her husband or any relative,
(iv) such cruelty or harassment be soon before her death, and
(v) such cruelty or harassment by the husband or his relative be
for, or in connection with, demand for dowry,
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such death is called “dowry death” under Section 304-B IPC and the
husband or relative shall be presumed to have caused the dowry death.
Section 498A of IPC deals with the offence of cruelty by the husband or
relative. If a married woman is subjected to cruelty by the husband or
his relative, he is liable for conviction under Section 498A. There is no
requirement under Section 498A that the cruelty should be within seven
years of marriage. It is also not invariably necessary under Section
498A that the cruelty should be in connection with the demand for
dowry. It is interesting to note that Section 498A was introduced as per
Act 46 of 1983 to “suitably deal effectively not only with cases of dowry
deaths but also cases of cruelty to married women by their in-laws”
and Section 304B was introduced as per Act 43 of 1986 to make the
penal provisions “more stringent and effective”.
15. The prosecution case primarily rests upon the testimonies of PW-1
Ramesh Chand Verma (father of the deceased), PW-2 Smt. Shanti Devi
(mother of the deceased), PW-3 Yogesh Verma (brother of the deceased),
PW-4 Narender Kumar (Uncle of the deceased), and PW-5 Sunita (sister of
the deceased), all of whom sought to establish that the deceased was
subjected to cruelty and harassment in connection with demand of Rs.
50,000 soon before her death.
16. Ramesh Chand Verma (PW-1), in his statement Ex. PW-1/A recorded
before Sh. A.K. Singh, SDM, stated that since her marriage, his daughter
had remained unhappy at her in-laws' house, as both her husband and
brother-in-law used to beat her and demand dowry amounting to ₹50,000.
He further stated that on 10.4.2003, the brother-in- law of his daughter
(Pankaj) came to their house at around 4:30 p.m. and informed them that the
deceased was unwell. Shortly thereafter, the police called and informed
them that Vinita had died. He further stated that he suspected Naveen
(husband), Ajay Kumar (brother-in-law), and Kaushalya Devi to be
responsible for his daughter's death. In his deposition before the Court, he
testified that his daughter died on 10.04.2003. Two days prior her death, on
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08.04.2003, she had made a phone call to her mother and, in a fearful tone,
asked her to come to her with money. He further stated that Ajay used to
harass her with the intention of establishing illicit relations with her. In
cross-examination, he stated that the demand for dowry had started right
after the marriage, in the month of January itself, and when they visited her
in-laws' house, the demand was made from them there as well. The beatings
and harassment, too, had begun in January. The demand of 50,000/- was
made from the deceased and she informed them of this demand. He had
complained about this to the mediator, Savitri Devi, who happens to be the
niece of Kaushalya Devi (deceased's mother-in-law). He stated that he had
informed the police about the phone call made on the 08.04.2003; however,
when confronted with his own statement recorded before the police, this fact
was found not to have been mentioned therein.
17. PW-2 Smt. Shanti Devi also deposed that after the marriage of her
daughter with Naveen on 29.11.2002, her in-laws started harassing her for
dowry, demanding ₹50,000. Whenever her daughter visited, she complained
about this demand of ₹50,000. She stated that the demand began from
January and was also made over telephone calls, though she could not recall
the specific date. She was confronted with her statement Ex. PW2/DA,
wherein this fact was not mentioned. PW-3 Yogesh Verma corroborated the
testimony of PW-1 and PW-2, and further stated that on 08.04.2003, a
telephonic call was received, in which she told them that she was being
beaten on account of the demand of ₹50,000. PW-4 Narender Kumar
deposed that the deceased was his niece, and that she used to make
telephonic calls to him regarding the harassment being meted out to her by
her in-laws over the demand of ₹50,000. He further stated that he had
approached her in-laws to counsel them against harassing her. PW-5 the
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sister of the deceased corroborated the testimony given above, and stated
that the harassment started on January 2003, for the demand of 50,000.
18. Certain variations have appeared in the testimonies of these witnesses
as to when the demand was made and with regard to the telephonic call
dated 08.04.2003. However, what remains consistent throughout is the
demand of ₹50,000 from the accused. The demand was specific both in
quantum (₹50,000) and in kind (cash), as deposed to by PW-1, PW-2, PW-3,
PW-4, and PW-5. A perusal of the statements recorded before the police
under Section 161 Cr.P.C., the statement before the SDM, and the
depositions before the Court reveals no material variations; rather, they
remain consistent throughout.
19. The contention that the abovementioned witnesses are „interested
witnesses‟ does not warrant rejection of their testimony. Such offences occur
within the four walls of the matrimonial home, where independent witnesses
are seldom available, and family members are the natural recipients of the
victim's complaints. The law draws a distinction between an "interested"
witness (one with a personal stake, such as enmity) and a "related" witness
(one naturally privy to events); relationship alone cannot discredit testimony
that is otherwise consistent and credible. The observations made in Rajesh
Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200 are as follows:
31. A related witness cannot be termed as an interested witness per se.
One has to see the place of occurrence along with other
circumstances. A related witness can also be a natural witness. If an
offence is committed within the precincts of the deceased, the presence
of his family members cannot be ruled out, as they assume the position
of natural witnesses. When their evidence is clear, cogent and
withstood the rigour of cross examination, it becomes sterling, not
requiring further corroboration. A related witness would become an
interested witness, only when he is desirous of implicating the accused
in rendering a conviction, on purpose.
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20. As regards DW-3 (the mediator/matchmaker of the marriage/niece of
the deceased‟s mother-in-law), her testimony that she was unaware of any
harassment carries limited value. A newly married woman would not
ordinarily confide the strains of her matrimonial life to the very person who
brought about the match, and who, by the nature of her role, stands closer to
the husband‟s side than to the deceased. The Trial Court assessment that her
evidence “does not carry much value” for this reason cannot be said to be
unreasonable.
21. The contention that the defence witnesses were denied equal weight is
not borne on a fair reading of the impugned judgement. DW-1 and DW-2
were the co-accused and Appellant testifying in their own defence, whose
evidence necessarily fell to be weighed against their interest in the outcome.
DW-4‟s testimony that the marriage was a happy one stands on the same
footing as that of DW-3; both are persons unlikely to have been privy to
what transpired within the four walls of the matrimonial home.
22. It is also a matter of common human experience, of which this Court
cannot loose sight of that individuals differ in speech, manner and
disposition, and that the face a person presents to the world is seldom an
accurate mirror of the discord that may exist within the home. It is not
unusual indeed, it is the ordinary course of human conduct for a spouse to
project before neighbours, relatives, or persons outside the immediate family
a picture of domestic harmony, however troubled the reality within may in
fact be; few are inclined to have the unhappiness of their matrimonial life
whispered about by outsiders. The mere fact that the deceased chose to
appear content before persons such as DW-3 and DW-4, who stood away
from the matrimonial home is, therefore, no ground to doubt or discredit the
testimony of family members who, by reason of their proximity and
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continuous association with her, were in a position to speak to the actual
state of affairs. Such reticence reflects, at best, the deceased‟s own reserve
and social inhibition, and nothing more; it cannot be read as corroborating a
version of marital bliss, nor can it be permitted to outweigh direct and
consistent evidence to the contrary.
23. It is further true that PW-1 and PW-3 deposed about a telephonic call
made on 08.04.2003, recording the distress call made by the deceased to her
mother to bring the dowry so demanded. PW-1 was confronted in cross-
examination with his police statement, wherein this fact was not recorded.
As for PW-3, no such contradiction was put to him. Further, the recipient of
the call, the deceased's mother, PW-2 specifically deposed that a telephonic
call was made, but could not recall when. These particulars were not found
in their earlier statements, that is, before the SDM (recorded on 11.04.2003)
and the police (recorded on 12.04.2003), and the name of Smt. Kaushalya
Devi surfaced only in the statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. These are
precisely the improvements which weighed with the Trial Court in
extending the benefit of doubt to Smt. Kaushalya Devi. However, the core of
the prosecution's case, that Appellant No. 1 and Appellant No. 2 used to beat
the deceased and had demanded Rs. 50,000/- in dowry, remained consistent
across the statements before the SDM, under Section 161 Cr.P.C., and in the
deposition before the Court. The law does not require the prosecution's
witnesses to depose with the precision of a stopwatch, particularly where, as
here, their statements before the Court were recorded several months after
the incident. Normal discrepancies arising from the lapse of memory, the
trauma of a daughter‟s or sister‟s death, and the rigours of cross-examination
are not to be equated with material contradictions striking at the root of the
prosecution‟s case. It is only the material infirmity that vitiates a conviction.
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It is in relation to discrepancies of that kind, lapses of memory and matters
of detail that surface only in the course of trial, rather than the wholesale
fabrication of the central allegation, that the settled position of law
cautioning against scrutiny of minor discrepancies which may usefully be
noticed. In Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2025) 3 SCC 378 , the
court while relying on Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat
(1983) 3 SCC 217 held as under:
“5. … We do not consider it appropriate or permissible to enter
upon a reappraisal or reappreciation of the evidence in the
context of the minor discrepancies painstakingly highlighted by
the learned counsel for the appellant. Overmuch importance
cannot be attached to minor discrepancies. The reasons are
obvious:
„(1) By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a
photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It
is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen.
(2) Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by
events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence
which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties
therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details.
(3) The powers of observation differ from person to person.
What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement
might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might
go unnoticed on the part of another.
(4) By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation
and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them.
They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is
unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape-recorder.
(5) In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time duration of
an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by
guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of
interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very
precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends
on the time-sense of individuals which varies from person to
person.
(6) Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately
the sequence of events which takes place in rapid succession or
in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or
mixed up when interrogated later on.
(7) A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by
the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination made
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by the counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused
regarding sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination
on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness
sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish
or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and
honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him — perhaps it
is a sort of a psychological defence mechanism activated on the
spur of the moment.”
24. The learned counsel for the Appellant has also relied upon the
absence of physical injuries on the deceased, as no such injuries were
recorded in the post-mortem report. However, this contention does not, by
itself, negate the allegations of cruelty or dowry-related harassment. In Sukh
Chand & Anr. v. State of NCT of Delhi , 2026 SCC OnLine Del 6287 , the
Delhi High Court, while considering a similar contention regarding the
absence of injury marks, suicide note and incriminating substances in the
viscera, observed that such circumstances relate to the manner and cause of
death and do not, by themselves, negate allegations of cruelty or dowry-
related harassment. The Court further observed that the absence of any prior
complaint by the deceased could not, at the stage of framing of charge,
outweigh the material subsequently collected during investigation. Thus, the
absence of visible bodily injuries may bear upon an allegation of physical
assault, but cannot, by itself, rule out cruelty or harassment within the
meaning of Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC.
25. To constitute a “dowry death” punishable under Section 304-B IPC,
the prosecution is required to establish the essential ingredients, as discussed
hereinabove. The expression “otherwise than under normal circumstances”
is wide enough to include a suicidal death. Once the abovementioned
ingredients are proved, the presumption under Section 113-B would arise
against the accused persons. However, the presumption under Section 113-B
of the Indian Evidence Act arises only upon the prosecution establishing,
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beyond reasonable doubt, the foundational facts constituting an offence
under Section 304-B IPC. The initial burden, therefore, remains upon the
prosecution to establish that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by the accused, for or in connection with the demand for dowry,
and that such cruelty or harassment occurred soon before her death. Once
these foundational facts are established, the statutory presumption under
Section 113-B is attracted against the accused.
26. In the present case, it is undisputed that the deceased died of hanging
on 10.04.2003, i.e., within about four and a half months of a marriage
solemnized on 29.11.2002. This fact is borne out by the post-mortem report
of Ex.PW-7/A. Thus, the first and second ingredient of Section 304-B IPC
i.e. an unnatural death within 7 years of marriage stands squarely established
and was, in fact, not seriously disputed before this Court. However, the core
issue which arises for consideration is whether the prosecution has been able
to establish that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment soon
before her death in connection with demand of dowry.
27. The testimonies of PW-1, PW-2, PW-2, PW-3, PW-4, PW-5 reveal
the specific demand of dowry that is, 50,000/- made after the marriage. The
allegations regarding the demand of 50,000/- was consistent in their
statements recorded under Section 161, statement recorded by the Sub-
Divisional Magistrate (SDM) and deposition before the court, accompanied
by the alleged beatings, taunting and harassment. Under the circumstances,
the factum of harassment to the deceased on account of non-fulfilment of
demand of dowry is proved.
28. The next question is whether soon before her death the deceased was
subjected to any harassment for, or in connection with demand of dowry.
Reliance was placed by the Learned Counsel of the Appellants on Manohar
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Lal v. State of Haryana (2014) and Shobhit Kumar Mittal v. State of Uttar
Pradesh (2025) , which are required to and must be considered in context. In
Manohar Lal’s case (supra), the conviction was set aside because none of
the witnesses, including the complainant's own mother, spoke of harassment
"soon before death" in connection with dowry, the allegation being wholly
general. Shobhit Kumar Mittal was a case of quashing of an FIR at the
threshold under Section 482 Cr.P.C., where the Complaint itself, without
more, disclosed no specific act. In the present case, unlike in Manohar Lal,
the demand is specific both in quantum (Rs. 50,000/-) and in kind (a cash
demand, described by more than one witness), and is spoken to consistently
by 5 witnesses from the earliest point in time. The circumstance that PW- 2,
in the course of her testimony, explained the demand as being connected
with setting up a business does not take it outside the definition of dowry,
since a demand connected with the marital relationship does not cease to be
a dowry demand merely because the purpose disclosed for it is “business”
rather than “personal use”. The Trial Court's reliance on the principle that
Section 304-B IPC does not require proof of any concluded “agreement” to
give dowry, a demand alone being sufficient, correctly states the law and
requires no interference.
29. The expression „soon before her death‟ occurring in Section 304-B
IPC has been the subject of consistent judicial elaboration. In State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Jogendra, (2022) 5 SCC 401, the court placing reliance
on Kans Raj v. State of Punjab , (2000) 5 SCC 207 observes as follows:
„15. … “Soon before” is a relative term which is required to be
considered under specific circumstances of each case and no
straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. This
expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. The term
“soon before” is not synonymous with the term “immediately
before” and is opposite of the expression “soon after” as used and
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understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act.
These words would imply that the interval should not be too long
between the time of making the statement and the death. It
contemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier noticed, has to
be understood and determined under the peculiar circumstances of
each case. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing
the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not
restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of
conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the
cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have
persisted, it shall be deemed to be “soon before death” if any other
intervening circumstance showing the non-existence of such
treatment is not brought on record, before such alleged treatment
and the date of death. It does not, however, mean that such time
can be stretched to any period. Proximate and live link between the
effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential
death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The demand of
dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the
date of death should not be too remote in time which, under the
circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough.‟ Thus,
there must be a nexus between the demand of dowry, cruelty or
harassment, based upon such demand and the date of death. The
test of proximity will have to be applied. But it is not a rigid test. It
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and calls for a
pragmatic and sensitive approach of the court within the confines
of law.”
In the present case, the entire span of the marriage was barely four
and a half months, and the beating and demand are alleged to have persisted,
off and on, through that period. Even accepting, for the sake of argument,
the Appellants' submission (drawn from PW-5's testimony) that the phase of
harassment is traceable to January 2003, that still leaves an interval of a little
over 3 months to the death on 10.04.2003 well within the “proximity”
requirement. The Trial Court's invocation of the presumption under Section
113-B of the Evidence Act cannot, therefore, be faulted.
30. Undoubtedly, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence
Act is rebuttable at the hands of the Accused by adducing evidence and
discharging the reverse burden cast upon them, but in the present case the
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defence has failed to do so for a threefold reason. Firstly, the plea that the
Appellants were not present in the house at the relevant time, which if
established could have gone some distance towards rebutting the
presumption, was not substantiated by any independent or reliable evidence
and was rightly found by the Trial Court to lead "nowhere." Secondly, the
plea sought to be raised that the deceased was under stress on account of her
own alleged illicit relationship with one Rakesh, which was clearly intended
to suggest an alternative cause for her death, was found to be an
afterthought, inasmuch as no such suggestion was ever put to the relevant
prosecution witnesses so as to test its veracity, and the same stood squarely
belied by the admission of the defence's own witness, DW- 1, who conceded
in cross-examination that she had never seen Rakesh in the company of the
deceased. Thirdly, the conduct of the youngest son of Smt. Kaushalya and
brother of Appellant no.1 and 2 namely Pankaj, who on the date of the
incident informed PW-1 that the deceased was merely unwell rather than
disclosing that she had in fact died, remained wholly unexplained, and
instead of aiding the defence, this conduct constituted a telling circumstance
operating against the Appellants. In these circumstances, far from
discharging the reverse burden placed upon them, the explanations offered
by the Appellants, being false and unsubstantiated, only served to reinforce
the presumption of guilt arising under Section 113-B, and the presumption
must accordingly be held to stand un-rebutted. Apart from that, clear and
categorical evidence of witnesses leaves no doubt about the complicity of
the Appellants.
31. In view of the foregoing reasons, the conviction dated 16.08.2004 and
order of sentence dated 17.08.2004 under Section 304B and 498A is
maintained.
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32. As a result, the appeal stands dismissed bereft of any substance.
33. Appellants viz. Naveen Kumar Verma and Ajay Kumar Verma are
called upon to surrender forthwith to undergo the remaining sentence.
Needless to say that they shall be entitled to the benefit of set off under
Section 428 Cr.P.C.
34. Copy of the judgment be transmitted to the learned Trial Court and
Prison Authorities for information and necessary compliance.
VIMAL KUMAR YADAV, J
SEPTEMBER 15, 2026/ bj/VS/NY
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