THE STATE OF KARNATAKA vs SMT SILESTIN C PEREIRA WO CLEMENT PEREIRA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
- 1 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD
ND
DATED THIS THE 22 DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI
WRIT PETITION NO. 106285 OF 2025 (S-KAT)
BETWEEN:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REP. BY SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF PRIMARY EDUCATION,
M.S. BUILDING,
BANGALORE – 560 001.
2. THE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY &
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS,
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
INSTRUCTION, BELGAUM – 590 006.
3. THE BLOCK EDUCATION OFFICER,
KHANAPUR TALUK, KHANAPURA,
BELGAUM DISTRICT – 590 006.
Digitally signed
by RAKESH S
HARIHAR
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench
4. THE SECRETARY KARNATAKA PROUDHA
SHIKSHANA PARIKSHA MANDALI
AND EX - OFFICIO ADDL. DIRECTOR,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION,
BELGAUM DIVISION, BELGAUM – 590 001.
…PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. SHARAD V. MAGADUM, AGA)
- 2 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
AND:
SMT. SILESTIN C. PEREIRA W/O. CLEMENT PEREIRA,
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS, WAS WORKING AS ASSISTANT
KANNADA TEACHER, GOVERNMENT MARATHI SECONDARY
SCHOOL, LONDA, KHANAPURA TALULK,
NOW UNDER DISMISSAL FORM SEVICE,
R/AT NO.110, VENLANKANI HOUSE,
SHANTINAGAR, TILKAWADI, BELAGAVI – 590 006.
…RESPONDENT
(RESPONDENT SERVED)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT IN
THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER
PASSED BY THE HON’BLE KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
TRIBUNAL, BELAGAVI BENCH IN APPLICATION, NO.96/2017 BY
ORDER DATED 07.09.2023 VIDE ANNEXURE-A TO GRANT SUCH
OTHER ORDER OR DIRECTION AS DEEMED FIT UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE.
THIS WRIT PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING B GROUP THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS
UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI
- 3 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
ORAL ORDER
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA )
The State is before the Court calling in question an order
of the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Tribunal’ for short) passed in Application
No.96/2017 in terms of its order dated 07.09.2023, whereby
the Tribunal modifies the penalty of dismissal from service to
one of compulsory retirement on the score that the employee –
the respondent herein had completed 17 years of service prior
to the employee remaining unauthorisedly absent for over 10
years so that the employee would get some terminal benefits.
2. Heard Sri. Sharad V. Magadum, learned Additional
Government Advocate appearing for the petitioners - State.
3. The respondent though served remains
unrepresented. This Court on 09.09.2026 had passed the
following order:
“Heard the learned Government Advocate.
The State challenges the order of the Tribunal
dated 07.09.2023, which modifies the penalty of dismissal
from service imposed upon the respondent to that of
compulsory retirement on the score that the respondent
had rendered 17 years of service as a teacher, which was
- 4 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
unblemished. Prima facie, the Tribunal ignores the fact
that it was not 17 years of unblemished service, but nine
years of continuous unauthorised absence that had led to
the imposition of the penalty.
There is no representation on behalf of the
respondent. Though served, she remains unrepresented.
Therefore, as a last chance, list the matter on
22.09.2026 . In the event there is no representation on
the next date of hearing, appropriate orders would be
passed on hearing the learned Government Advocate
appearing for the petitioners-State.”
Even today there is no representation on behalf of the
respondent though served. In that light, the learned Additional
Government Advocate is heard in the matter.
4. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:
4.1. The respondent is appointed as an Assistant
Teacher in Kannada in Marathi Medium Primary School at Londa
on 24.09.1982. The respondent works for about 17 years
without blemish is the claim. On and from the year 1999, the
respondent remains continuously absent on the score of
ill-health. After about 10 years of such unauthorised absence,
on 06.01.2011, the State wakes up and issues a show cause
notice to the respondent seeking to show cause as to why the
services of the respondent should not be terminated. The
- 5 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
respondent replies to the notice on 18.02.2011 enclosing the
reason for absence for over 10 years. The State, being
dissatisfied with said reply, conducts a Departmental Enquiry
and terminates the services of the respondent. This is called in
question by the respondent before the Tribunal in Application
No.8254/2014. The Tribunal by order dated 07.09.2023 allows
the said application in part by modifying the penalty of
dismissal from service to one of compulsory retirement so that
the 17 year period would not vanish in thin air and the
respondent would be entitled to certain terminal benefits.
Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, the State takes about
24 months to file the subject petition, which is filed on
16.07.2025.
5.1. The learned Additional Government Advocate would
take this Court through the documents appended to the petition
seeking to demonstrate that the respondent though served for
17 years as Assistant Teacher in the said school remained
unauthorisedly absent for over 10 years without any rhyme or
reason. No medical certificate was produced by the respondent
and no leave was sought. Therefore, owing to the absence for a
- 6 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
decade, a Departmental Enquiry was conducted and the
respondent was dismissed from service.
5.2. The learned Additional Government would submit
that the Tribunal ought not to have interfered with the case of
unauthorised absence of the respondent as it would put a
premium on the unauthorized absence by the respondent. The
learned Additional Government Advocate would further contend
that the Tribunal has also granted terminal benefits to the
respondent from the date of the service till the date of
dismissal that was imposed upon the respondent. He would
submit that the order of the Tribunal flies foul of a plethora of
judgments of the Apex Court on the issue and seeks
quashment of the said order.
6. As observed herein above, the respondent is served
and has remained unrepresented. Therefore, the learned
Government Advocate is heard in the matter.
7. We have given our anxious consideration to the
submissions made by the learned Additional Government
Advocate and have perused the material on record.
- 7 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
8. The afore-narrated facts, dates and link in the chain
of events are all a matter of record. They would not require any
iteration. The respondent joins the service as Assistant
Teacher in the said school on 24.09.1982 and works up to
19.09.1999 for 17 long years, but then remains absent
unauthorisedly for 10 long years without any rhyme or reason.
These are admitted facts. The petitioners issued a show cause
notice to the respondent. The 10 long years is to be computed
not from 1999, but from 2001. The application appends to itself
certain medical certificates and application seeking medical
leave. The medical leave is sought up to 2001. Whether it is
sanctioned or not is not produced before the Court.
9. The medical leave and all the documents produced
before the Tribunal are all undated except mentioning of the
dates in the content of the letter. Therefore, we have no
hesitation in holding that the respondent remained
unauthorisedly absent without submission of leave or its
acceptance or its sanction or medical certificate being issued by
a competent doctor or the health of the respondent being
assessed by a Medical Board pursuant to the directions of the
- 8 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
State to come to conclusion whether the unauthorised absence
was willful or otherwise. With these barred medical leave, which
was also only up to 2001 and none after 2001 up to 2011, the
penalty of dismissal comes to be issued after conduct of a
departmental inquiry. This is challenged before the Tribunal.
The Tribunal, accepting the contention of the respondent on the
ground that 17 years of service cannot be brushed aside,
passes the following order on the following reasons:
“25. The applicant joined government service in 1982
and served without any interruption until 1999 when the
saga of intermittent long absence between short periods
of reporting to duty started which went on till 2001 after
which she admittedly remained unauthorizedly absent. It
is contended by the learned counsel for the applicant
that applicant had 17 years of qualifying pensionable
service which would have earned her a pension if she
had offered to retire voluntarily in 1999. The applicant
has therefore prayed for a direction to the respondent
disciplinary authority to permit the applicant to retire
voluntarily so that she can secure the pensionary
benefits based on her 17 years’ government service. At
the hearing, it is contended that the penalty be modified
to compulsory retirement.
26. We have considered the prayer. The charge of
unauthorised absence against the applicant does not
discredit the service rendered by her in the period from
her joining service on 24-09-1982 to 7-06-2001, prior to
the unauthorised absence, in any manner, whatsoever.
However, the said period of service before the
unauthorised absence does not justify the subsequent
misconduct of unauthorised absence by absconding from
service and exoneration when the grave misconduct is
proved by her own admission.
- 9 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
27. The simple question therefore is, whether the
penalty of dismissal is proportionate to the charge in the
facts and circumstances of the case. Such a long period
of unauthorised absence through absconding is
deserving of a major penalty and the applicant cannot be
exonerated as prayed for in the application. In our view,
while the penalty of dismissal deprives her of a pension
which she would have been entitled to if she had chosen
to retire voluntarily, yet it cannot be the intention of any
respondent state and disciplinary authority to deprive
any government servant of what is legitimately due to
the government servant for the service rendered.
Therefore, we are of the considered view that the
imposition of penalty of dismissal is too harsh and
‘shocking to the conscience’, in the facts and
circumstances of the case. Ordinarily this plea ought to
have been considered by the Appellate Authority but that
was not done in view of the fact that the case was
dismissed on delay in filing the Appeal. This case has
gone on for a considerable period of time and in order to
avoid protracted litigation and delay that will be
occasioned by an order of remand to the Appellate
Authority to consider the award of penalty, we are of the
considered view that we exercise the exception right to
alter the penalty from dismissal from service to that of
compulsory retirement with effect from 8-06-2001 which
would meet the ends of justice and equity for both
parties. 28. Accordingly, we allow the application in part
and pass the following order.
ORDER
(i) The challenge to the impugned order of the
disciplinary authority is dismissed and it is
held that the disciplinary authority has
established the charge of unauthorised
absence against the applicant.
(ii) There is no infirmity in the order of the
appellate authority dismissing the appeal on
ground of Limitation to the extent that the
charge of unauthorised absence is
established against the applicant.
- 10 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
(iii) On the ground of ‘substantive justice’, the
punishment of dismissal imposed on the
applicant by the disciplinary authority is
substituted by the punishment of
compulsory retirement which will take effect
from 8-06-2001. The second respondent
disciplinary authority shall issue an order of
compulsory retirement within a period of
three months from the date of this order
and settle the pensionary benefits to which
the applicant shall be entitled as a result of
the order of compulsory retirement issued
by the disciplinary authority second
respondent, within a further period of three
months. The applicant shall be entitled to
interest at 8% per annum on the arrears of
the pensionary benefits if settled after three
months, from the date of completion of
three months from the date of this order.”
The order of the Tribunal runs blatantly counter to a plethora of
judgments rendered by the Apex Court on the issue of
unauthorised absence.
10. It becomes apposite to notice the latest judgment
of the Apex Court rendered in the case of RIFILIS
1
ENGINEERING PVT. LTD. v. ARJUN GUPTA , wherein the
Apex Court observes that termination of employment due to
unauthorised absence would not be illegal and holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
1
2026 SCC OnLine SC 1780
- 11 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
8. At the outset, we note the finding of the High
th
Court that the registered notice dated 18 May 2012 was
dispatched to the respondent-employee's permanent
address in Bihar, whereas he was residing at a different
address in Gautam Budh Nagar at the time. While this
fact has been pressed to fault the employer, we are
unable to accept that the appellant-company can be held
responsible for this. The notice was sent to the only
address available in the employer's records, which was
the address furnished by the respondent-employee
himself at the time of his appointment. An employer can
only be expected to communicate with an employee at
the address the employee has provided. If the
respondent-employee had changed his place of residence,
the obligation to inform his employer of the change rested
on him. He cannot be permitted to take advantage of his
own omission in this regard.
9. The respondent-employee claims that his
absence was due to his mother's serious illness and
that he had verbally informed his superior before
leaving. This claim is entirely unsubstantiated. No
documentary evidence has been placed on record in
support of it. More significantly, during the period
of absence, the respondent-employee did not send
a single written communication to his employer
explaining the reasons for his absence or seeking
leave. Had his explanation been genuine, he could
have sent a letter or other written intimation.
Having failed to do so, he cannot now rely solely on
an oral assertion to justify his unauthorised
absence.
10. The respondent-employee further claims that
th
he returned on 8 June 2012 and attempted to rejoin
duty but was not permitted to do so. This claim too is
unsupported by any documentary evidence.
11. We find that the respondent-employee
absented himself without authorization, failed to
send any written communication to his employer
during his absence, has led no documentary
evidence to explain his absence, and has produced
no evidence of any attempt to rejoin duty.
Therefore, the Labour Court and the High Court
- 12 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
erred in granting relief in the absence of such
evidence. The writ petition of the appellant was liable to
be allowed.
12. In view of the foregoing, the present appeal is
th
allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 13
March 2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad in Writ-C No. 8077/2024 is hereby set aside
and the writ petition stands allowed. Consequently, the
th
award of the Labour Court dated 27 October 2023
passed in Adjudication Dispute No. 361/2013 stands set
aside. The direction for reinstatement of the
respondent-employee, along with all ancillary
directions with respect to back wages and other
consequential benefits flowing therefrom, is
accordingly cancelled and the claim of the
respondent-employee stands rejected .”
Unauthorised absence is such a malady that has percolated into
service of employees, which is sans countenance and therefore
the order of the Tribunal which runs counter to law is
unsustainable. The Tribunal could not have gone on misplaced
sympathy of the respondent rendering 17 years of service and
ignoring the 10 years of unauthorised absence and grant all the
benefits. While we have found the order of the Tribunal being
contrary to law and would necessarily meet its obliteration, the
act of the State also cannot be countenanced in approaching
this Court 24 months after the passage of the order.
- 13 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
11. We are witnessing cases where the State has gone
on filing petitions against the orders of the Tribunal after a
delay of the minimum of 100 days to a maximum… The Apex
Court in a catena of judgments has held that delay cannot be
condoned merely because the State has filed the petition or
appeal or otherwise.
11.1. The Apex Court in the case of STATE OF ODISHA
v. MANAGING COMMITTEE OF NAMATARA GIRLS HIGH
2
SCHOOL , rejected the appeal filed by the State of Odisha on
the score that there was a delay of 291 days totally in filing the
appeal. The Apex Court holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
12. No cause, much less sufficient cause, has
been shown for exercise of discretion in favour of
the State of Odisha. The nature of explanation in
the application for condonation of delay is such that
with much ado, the proceedings could be closed.
13. However, since there is a long line of decisions
of this Court propounding the law that the expression
‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature in Section 5
of the Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately elastic to enable
the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which
subserves the ends of justice and in view of the
submission of Ms. Sanjana, we have considered it
appropriate to consider the matter in some depth.
2
2026 SCC OnLine SC 191
- 14 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
14. Almost four decades back, in Collector, Land
Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji , a coordinate Bench
noting that the justifiably liberal approach which this
Court has been adopting in matters instituted before it is
not being followed by the courts lower in the hierarchy,
mandated that a justice-oriented approach is indeed
called for when a ‘State’ seeks condonation of delay as
distinguished from ‘a private party’.
15. Close on the heels of Katiji (supra), Hon'ble
Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah speaking for the coordinate
Bench in G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer had
referred to Katiji (supra) in paragraph 14 and quoted the
following passage therefrom:
“When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other,
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to have
vested right in injustice being done because of a
non-deliberate delay …
It must be grasped that judiciary is
respected not on account of its power to legalise
injustice on technical grounds but because it is
capable of removing injustice and is expected to
do so.”
Immediately thereafter, in paragraphs 15 to 17, it
was held as under:
15. In litigations to which Government is a
party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps,
cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by
Government are lost for such defaults, no person
is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate
analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions
of Government are collective and institutional
decisions and do not share the characteristics of
decisions of private individuals.
16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the
same for a private citizen as for governmental
authorities. Government, like any other litigant
must take responsibility for the acts or omissions
of its officers. But a somewhat different
complexion is imparted to the matter where
Government makes out a case where public
- 15 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
interest was shown to have suffered owing to
acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its
officers or agents and where the officers were
clearly at cross-purposes with it.
17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a
particular case, constitutes “sufficient cause” for
purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be
somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the
considerations that go into the judicial verdict,
these factors which are peculiar to and
characteristic of the functioning of the
government. Governmental decisions are
proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the
process of their making. A certain amount of
latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is
rightly said that those who bear responsibility of
Government must have “a little play at the
joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on
governmental functioning — of course, within
reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial
approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It
would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put
government and private parties on the same
footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in
the very nature of governmental functioning is
procedural delay incidental to the decision-
making process. In the opinion of the High Court,
the conduct of the law officers of the Government
placed the Government in a predicament and that
it was one of those cases where the mala fides of
the officers should not be imputed to
Government. It relied upon and trusted its law
officers. …
16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra)
were consistently followed by this Court until
adoption of a different and seemingly strict
approach while dealing with applications for
condonation of delay during the last decade and a
half became discernible starting with the decision in
Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited ,
where a delay of 427 days in filing the relevant
special leave petition was not condoned. University
of Delhi v. Union of India is another decision (of a
three-Judge Bench of this Court) where delay of
916 days was not condoned. While upholding the
- 16 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
decision of the relevant high court under challenge
refusing to condone the delay of 5659 days in
presentation of an appeal under Section 54 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the heirs of a
deceased landowner, a coordinate Bench in
Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA) very
recently reiterated that the law of limitation is
founded on public policy, the object is that a legal
remedy is put to an end so that no litigation
remains pending for an indefinite period. It was
also held, departing from the earlier view, that the
merits of the case cannot be considered at the
stage of considering the application for condonation
of delay.
17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in
Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India authoring the
judgment for a coordinate Bench adopted the view
taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a
host of other decisions following the same while not
interfering with an order of condonation of delay
passed by the relevant high court. However, it was
observed that a distinction ought to be drawn
between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ that is
proffered as cause for condonation of delay. It was
also emphasized that a different approach has to be
adopted while this Court is considering an
application for condonation of delay in presentation
of an appeal/application and when it sits in appeal
over a discretionary order of the high court
granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the
case of the former, whether to condone or not
would be the only question whereas in the latter,
whether there has been proper exercise of
discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for
condonation has to be examined.
18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in
any of the decisions post Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda
(supra) adopting a liberal approach is the exasperation
and consequent lament expressed by none other than
Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of authoring a
brief order in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v.
Amateur Riders Club, Bombay and admonishing officers of
the “revenue” in not acting with promptitude. This order
- 17 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
was made within six years of the decision in Ramegowda
(supra). We can do no better than quoting the same in its
entirety hereunder:
1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda,
learned senior counsel for the Revenue.
2. This special leave petition filed on
November 16, 1993 is delayed by 264
days. For quite some time in the past, this
Court has been making observations as to
the grave prejudice caused to public
interest by appeals brought on behalf of
the Government being lost on the point of
limitation. Such observations have been
made for over a few years in the past. But
there seems to be no conspicuous
improvement as is apparent in the present
petition which is filed in November 1993.
The explanation for the delay, had better
be set out in petitioner's own words:
“( g ) The Advocate-on-Record got the
special leave petition drafted from the drafting
Advocate and sent the same for approval to
the Board on June 24, 1993 along with the
case file. ( h ) The Board returned the case file
to the Advocate-on-Record on July 9, 1993
who re-sent the same to the Board on
September 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP
was not approved by the Board. The Board
after approving the draft SLP sent this file to
CAS on October 1, 1993.”
3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing
a judicially acceptable ground for
condonation of delay. After the earlier
observations of this Court made in several
cases in the past, we hoped that the
matters might improve. There seems to
be no visible support for this optimism.
There is a point beyond which even the
courts cannot help a litigant even if the
litigant is Government which is itself under
the shackles of bureaucratic indifference.
Having regard to the law of limitation
which binds everybody, we cannot find
any way of granting relief. It is true that
Government should not be treated as any
other private litigant as, indeed, in the
- 18 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
case of the former the decisions to
present and prosecute appeals are not
individual but are institutional decisions
necessarily bogged down by the proverbial
red-tape. But there are limits to this also.
Even with all this latitude, the explanation
offered for the delay in this case merely
serves to aggravate the attitude of
indifference of the Revenue in protecting
its common interests. The affidavit is
again one of the stereotyped affidavits
making it susceptible to the criticism that
the Revenue does not seem to attach any
importance to the need for promptitude
even where it affects its own interest.
4. The application for condonation of delay
is, accordingly, dismissed. The special
leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as
barred by time.
(emphasis ours)
19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur
Riders (supra), one after the other, leaves none in doubt
that it did not take much time for this Court to lose hope.
It is absolutely clear that the law was laid down in
Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with much
optimism that matters would improve. Their Lordships,
however, found no visible support for such optimism and
the Court's patience having been tested to the extreme
limit, held that there is a point beyond which even the
courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant labouring
under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference is the
Government.
20. We have found the State of Odisha to be
utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before
the High Court but also before this Court.
Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as
time-barred by the High Court, this Court has been
approached by the State of Odisha four months
after expiry of the period of limitation.
21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed
as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of
the Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite
- 19 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
all the latitude that is shown to a “State”, we are of
the clear opinion that the cause sought to be shown
here by the State of Odisha is not an explanation
but a lame excuse. No case for exercise of
discretion has been set up.
22. The applications for condonation of delay in
filing the special leave petition and condonation of delay
in re-filing the same, thus, stand rejected, with the result
that the special leave petition stands dismissed as time-
barred.”
The Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment holds that the
State of Odisha was utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent in
filing the appeal. The Apex Court further holds that condonation
of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right, it is entirely the
discretion of the Court whether or not to condone the delay.
The Apex Court rejected the appeal filed on the score that the
cause sought to be shown by the State is not an explanation
but a lame excuse.
11.2. The Apex Court in the case of ISRAR AHMAD
3
KHAN v. AMARNATH PRASAD , has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
BELATED/DELAYED APPEALS TO DELAY/DEFEAT
IMPLEMENTATION:
3
2026 SCC OnLine SC 322
- 20 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
27. Delayed filing of appeals should be the
exception, but in recent times, the exception has
practically evolved to become the rule. Orders
passed by the Courts are not complied with for a
long time, and when Contempt Petitions are filed,
belated appeals, with tremendous delay, are
preferred.
28. The (alleged) continuing contumacious
conduct of the defaulting party is sought to be
justified on the mere production of a
Diary/Filing/Stamp Reporting Number showing that
an appeal has been preferred, so as to obtain
multiple adjournments in contempt matters.
29. We, in no uncertain terms, deprecate
these practices. It is felt that by such modus
operandi , disobedient litigants act brazenly which
has the further effect of bringing down the
authority and majesty of the Courts and the rule of
law, interfering in the administration of justice. The
same may well, in certain situations, border on
criminal contempt.
30. The High Courts should deal with such
unscrupulous litigants, more so when they happen
to be ‘State’, within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution, or like bodies, with an iron hand.
Unless the High Courts, so also this Court deal with
these aspects firmly, we run the clear risk of
erosion of the unflinching faith that the ordinary
litigants of this country repose in the Judiciary at all
levels. It is the solemn duty of all of us manning the
Courts across the hierarchy to ensure that the
public faith never wavers .”
The Apex Court holds that the High Courts should deal with
unscrupulous litigants, more so when they happen to be State
within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India or
like bodies with an iron hand.
- 21 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
11.3. A little earlier to the afore-quoted judgments of the
Apex Court in the cases of MANAGING COMMITTEE OF
NAMATARA GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL supra and ISRAR AHMED
KHAN supra , the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF
4
MADHYA PRADESH v. RAMKUMAR CHOUDHARY , has held
as follows:
“…. …. ….
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush
aside the delay occurred in preferring the second
appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on
the part of the officials functioning in the State
machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic
approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the
petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to
the fault on the part of the officials in merely
communicating the information on time, huge revenue
loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The
present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay
of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal
due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning
under the State, though valuable Government lands were
involved. Therefore, we direct the State to
streamline the machinery touching the legal issues,
offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the
Tribunal/Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the
officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s),
who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses,
etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the
Government. Such direction will have to be followed
by all the States scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter which
we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we
have noticed that whenever there is a plea for
4
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612
- 22 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private
litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right
from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay
of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the
same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days
then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it
was unable to institute the proceedings within that period
of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till
the last is of no consequence. The court is required to
consider what came in the way of the party that it was
unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It
is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of
limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the
limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not
filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must
establish that because of some event or circumstance
arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to
file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance
arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such
sufficient cause. There may be events or
circumstances subsequent to the expiry of
limitation which may further delay the filing of the
appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to
expire without the appeal being filed must be
traced to a cause arising within the period of
limitation. (See : Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of
Gujarat, (1981) 1 SCC 495 : AIR 1981 SC 733).
8. Accordingly, we dismiss this Special Leave
Petition with costs of Rs. 1,00,000/- to be
deposited by the State within a period of two weeks
from today with the Supreme Court Mediation
Centre and file proof thereof. If the said amount, as
directed, is not deposited by the State, the Registry
shall take necessary steps for recovery of the same,
in accordance with law. ”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
The Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment holds that delay
occurring due to a callous and lackadaisical attitude of the State
- 23 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15738-DB
WP No. 106285 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020149982025
cannot be condoned and therefore, dismissed the appeal filed
by the State of Madhya Pradesh with costs.
12. It is high time that the officers of the State are
mulcted with appropriate costs so that they would prefer
appeals or the petitions within time. Therefore, the cost is
₹
assessed at 25,000/- to be paid by the State to the Karnataka
Legal Services Authority within a period of 8 weeks from the
date of a receipt of a copy of this order.
13. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition
stands dismissed.
Ordered accordingly.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(HEMA KULKARNI)
JUDGE
RSH: para 1 to 9
KMV: para 10 to end
CT: ASC – List No.: 1 Sl No.: 8