KALACHAND PAUL & ANR vs STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR

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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE

Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Ananya Bandyopadhyay

C.R.R. 54 of 2014
Kalachand Paul & Anr.
-Vs-
The State of West Bengal & Anr.

For the Petitioners : Mr. Sourav Chatterjee
Mr. Soumya Nag

For the State : Ms. Faria Hossain
Mr. Anand Keshari

Judgment on : 29.06.2026

Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J.:-
1. The instant revisional application has been filed by the petitioners for
quashing of proceedings being G.R. No.1566/2010 pending before the
Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bongaon, North 24 Parganas,
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arising out of Bongaon Police Station Case No.542 of 2010 dated 23
November, 2010 under Sections 419/420/468/120B of the Indian Penal
Code and all orders passed therein including the order dated 27.09.2012
passed by the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bongaon, North
24 Parganas, thereby taking cognizance of offences punishable under
Sections 419/420/468/120B of the Indian Penal Code against the
petitioners in connection with the aforesaid case.

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2. The petitioners trace the genesis of the controversy to the commercial
activities of petitioner no.2, the sole proprietor of M/s. B.J. Traders, an
enterprise engaged in the import and export of diverse commodities.
Petitioner no.1 acted as the constituted attorney of the said proprietary
concern and represented its affairs in relation to the transactions forming
the subject matter of the present proceedings.
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3. The petitioners state that on or about 30 June, 2009, M/s. B.J. Traders
lawfully imported 127.715 metric tonnes of betel nuts, packed in 1,435 bags,
from Bangladesh through the authorised channel at the Petrapole Land
Customs Station. The customs clearing formalities were entrusted to M/s.
Akshoy Kumar Ghosh & Sons, described in the petition as Opposite Party
No.2, which functioned as the customs clearing agent for the imported
consignment.

4. According to the petitioners, after remaining at the customs station for
several months, the consignment was released by the Customs Authorities
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on 3 January, 2010. The goods were distributed amongst thirteen vehicles,
and on the very same date thirteen transit declarations were issued, each
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remaining operative until 23 January, 2010.
5. The petitioners explain that the prolonged detention of the goods between
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30 June, 2009 and 3 January, 2010 exposed the betel nuts to adverse
climatic conditions, causing a substantial portion of the consignment to
become damp and partially rotten. The transporter, S.B.S. Transport,
immediately communicated the deteriorated condition of the cargo to the

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petitioners by its letter dated 4 January, 2010, seeking necessary
directions.

6. Faced with the deteriorated condition of the imported goods, the petitioners
assert that the damaged betel nuts first required segregation, drying and
restoration before they could be commercially marketed. Such an exercise
was inherently laborious and time-consuming, rendering the validity period
of the transit declarations wholly inadequate for completion of the process.
7. In these circumstances, the petitioners addressed a representation dated
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22 January, 2010 to the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes,
Barrackpore Range, praying for extension of the transit declarations relating
only to five out of the thirteen vehicles, since the consignments contained in
the remaining eight vehicles had already proceeded beyond the territorial
limits of West Bengal. The petitioners emphasise that West Bengal merely
served as a transit corridor for transportation of the goods from Bangladesh
to Maharashtra, and accordingly extension was sought exclusively for the
five vehicles whose consignments remained stationary because of their
damaged condition.
8. The petitioners maintain that despite the representation having been
submitted well before expiry of the transit declarations, no decision granting
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extension was communicated until 5 April, 2010. Owing to such
administrative inaction, and having regard to the deteriorating condition of
the goods, the remaining consignments were ultimately sold within Kolkata.
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9. Thereafter, the Joint Commissioner, by notice dated 22 April, 2010, called
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upon Opposite Party No.2 to produce the five vehicles on 5 May, 2010 for

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consideration of the prayer for extension, indicating that failure to comply
might invite proceedings under Section 79 of the West Bengal Value Added
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Tax Act, 2003. The petitioners state that by 30 April, 2010, the purchasers,
namely Sukanya Traders and Shardha Traders, had already discharged their
respective tax liabilities arising out of the purchases.
10. The petitioners further state that both the proprietary concern and Opposite
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Party No.2 separately replied on 4 May, 2010, furnishing a detailed
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explanation regarding the factual circumstances. Subsequently, on 12 May,
2010, the petitioners deposited Rs.1,30,815/- towards taxes payable to the
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Government of West Bengal, and by communication dated 13 May, 2010,
informed the Joint Commissioner of such payment.
11. The petitioners contend that notwithstanding these developments, the Joint
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Commissioner issued a show cause notice dated 12 May, 2010 to Opposite
Party No.2 alleging contravention of Sections 73 and 76(1) of the West
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Bengal Value Added Tax Act, 2003, directing appearance on 2 June, 2010,
and indicating that failure to comply could result in determination of the
market value of the goods and imposition of penalty under Section 79 of the
said Act.
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12. Simultaneously, by order dated 13 May, 2010, the Joint Commissioner
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rejected the petitioners' earlier application dated 22 January, 2010 seeking
revalidation or extension of the transit declarations.
13. Although neither the proprietary concern nor the present petitioners were
themselves made noticees in the proceedings under the Value Added Tax
Act, the petitioners nevertheless addressed a comprehensive representation

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dated 9 June, 2010, placing the factual position before the authorities.
Despite such clarification, penalty proceedings culminated in an order dated
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17 August, 2010, whereby Opposite Party No.2 was directed to pay
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Rs.13,27,916/- on or before 17 September, 2010.
14. The petitioners allege that the initiation of criminal proceedings was a direct
sequel to the adverse fiscal proceedings against Opposite Party No.2. They
assert that, in order to shift the financial burden of the penalty and to
pursue a personal vendetta, Opposite Party No.2 filed an application under
Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Learned
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Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bongaon, on 16 November, 2010.
Pursuant to the Magistrate's direction, Bongaon Police Station Case No.542
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of 2010, dated 23 November, 2010, came to be registered under Sections
419, 420, 468 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners.

15. The First Information Report, as summarised in the petition, alleges that
although Opposite Party No.2 had acted as the authorised customs clearing
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agent and had duly delivered the consignment to the petitioners on 3
January, 2010, five transit declarations were thereafter allegedly submitted
before the Commercial Tax authorities by falsely employing the name of
Opposite Party No.2 and by forging the signatures of its employees, including
Sri Avijit Sarnakar. The complaint imputes impersonation, forgery,
conspiracy and fraudulent conduct to the petitioners, asserting that the
forged transit declarations shifted liability for the ensuing tax proceedings
upon Opposite Party No.2.

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16. The petitioners emphatically dispute these accusations and maintain that
they constitute nothing more than a retaliatory measure devised after the
penalty proceedings under the Value Added Tax Act had reached an adverse
conclusion. They point out that Opposite Party No.2 itself challenged the
transit declarations, the penalty proceedings and the penalty order before
the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal by filing Revision Case No. RN-859 of
2010 under Section 8 of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987,
wherein both the proprietary concern and petitioner no.1 were impleaded as
respondents. The petitioners submit that this course of conduct
unmistakably demonstrates that the dispute was fundamentally fiscal and
administrative, with the criminal process subsequently invoked as a
collateral instrument.
17. Apprehending arrest, the petitioners obtained anticipatory bail from this
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Court in C.R.M. No.8087 of 2012 by order dated 21 June, 2012. Thereafter,
upon completion of investigation, the Investigating Agency submitted Charge
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Sheet No.445 of 2012 dated 28 July, 2012 under Sections 419, 420, 468
and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, whereupon the Learned Additional Chief
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Judicial Magistrate, Bongaon, by order dated 27 September, 2012, took
cognizance of the alleged offences.
18. The petitioners contend that the First Information Report suffers from
conspicuous delay, having been instituted only after substantial fiscal
liability had been imposed upon Opposite Party No.2. Such chronology,
according to the petitioners, imparts considerable force to the inference that
the criminal prosecution is merely a retaliatory expedient conceived to

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escape the consequences of the proceedings under the West Bengal Value
Added Tax Act.

19. It is further asserted that every allegation regarding the authenticity of the
transit declarations could appropriately be examined within the statutory
proceedings pending before the taxation authorities and the Tribunal.
Consequently, recourse to criminal prosecution amounts to a misuse of the
criminal process for securing an advantage in pending fiscal litigation.
20. The petitioners finally submit that even if every allegation contained in the
First Information Report and the accompanying materials is accepted at its
highest, the essential constituents of the offences punishable under Sections
419, 420, 468 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code remain absent. The
allegations, according to them, disclose neither deception nor inducement
constituting cheating, nor the foundational elements of forgery or criminal
conspiracy attributable to the petitioners. The prosecution is therefore
described as a mala fide exercise conceived for harassment and vengeance
rather than for vindication of criminal justice. On these premises, the
petitioners invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking quashing of the First Information
Report, the charge-sheet and the consequential criminal proceedings to
prevent abuse of the process of the Court and to secure the ends of justice.
21. The revisional application invites the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of
this Court for examining the legal sustainability of G.R. Case No.1566 of
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2010 arising out of Bongaon Police Station Case No.542 of 2010 dated 23
November, 2010, presently pending before the Learned Additional Chief

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Judicial Magistrate, Bongaon, North 24 Parganas, wherein cognizance has
been taken of offences punishable under Sections 419, 420, 468 and 120B of
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the Indian Penal Code by order dated 27 September, 2012.
22. The Learned Advocate representing the petitioners submits that the criminal
prosecution has emerged, not from any genuine criminal design, but as a
sequel to proceedings initiated under the West Bengal Value Added Tax Act,
2003, against the customs clearing agent, namely the Opposite Party No.2.
According to the petitioners, the criminal law has been invoked as an
instrument to transfer the fiscal consequences arising out of administrative
proceedings upon persons who had neither fabricated documents nor
practised deception upon any authority.
23. The factual background, as delineated by the petitioners, commences with
the business activities of petitioner no.2, the sole proprietor of M/s. B.J.
Traders, a concern engaged in import and export of commodities. Petitioner
no.1 acted as the constituted attorney of the said proprietary concern and
conducted its commercial affairs.
24. During the ordinary course of business, the concern imported approximately
127.715 metric tonnes of betel nuts from Bangladesh through the Petrapole
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Land Customs Station on 30 June, 2009. The import was carried out
through lawful customs channels and supported by the requisite commercial
invoices and import documentation. For facilitating customs clearance, M/s.
Akshoy Kumar Ghosh & Sons, the present Opposite Party No.2, had been
formally appointed as the authorised customs clearing agent, a fact

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evidenced by the communication addressed to the Superintendent of
Customs prior to commencement of the transaction.

25. The Learned Advocate submits that the subsequent chain of events
originated entirely from administrative delay rather than any omission
attributable to the petitioners. Although the imported consignment had
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reached the customs station on 30 June, 2009, the Customs Authorities
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permitted release of the goods only on 3 January, 2010. Transit
declarations in respect of thirteen vehicles transporting the consignments
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were simultaneously issued with validity extending only up to 23 January,
2010.
26. According to the petitioners, this prolonged interval of more than six months
compelled the consignments to remain stationary inside the vehicles during
the monsoon and succeeding months, exposing the goods to moisture,
rainfall and varying climatic conditions. The inevitable consequence was
gradual deterioration of a substantial quantity of betel nuts, many becoming
partially rotten and water-soaked, thereby rendering immediate
transportation and commercial distribution impracticable.
27. The transporter, namely S.B.S. Transport, communicated the prevailing
condition by its letter dated 4th January, 2010, requesting immediate
instructions from the petitioners. Faced with consignments requiring
segregation, drying and preservation before further transportation could be
attempted, the petitioners contend that the validity period of the transit
declarations became insufficient for completion of the contemplated
movement.

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28. Recognising this practical impediment before expiry of the transit
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declarations, the petitioners addressed a representation dated 22 January,
2010 to the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Barrackpore Range,
praying for extension of the transit declarations in respect of only five
vehicles. Eight vehicles had already crossed beyond the territorial limits of
West Bengal during the currency of the declarations, leaving merely five
consignments within the State.
29. The application expressly disclosed that West Bengal merely constituted a
transit corridor for transportation of the imported goods towards
Maharashtra and candidly narrated the reasons compelling extension of the
declarations. According to the petitioners, this application remained pending
without any administrative determination for several months.
30. The Learned Advocate submits that while the authorities maintained
complete silence regarding the pending application, the condition of the
remaining consignments progressively deteriorated. Commercial prudence
demanded disposal of the damaged goods before total destruction rendered
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the entire consignment worthless. Consequently, on 5 April, 2010, the
petitioners sold the consignments contained in the remaining five vehicles
within Kolkata through regular commercial invoices.
31. Far from concealing the transaction, the petitioners contend that every
statutory liability arising from the local sale stood duly discharged. The
purchasers deposited commercial taxes upon their respective purchases on
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30 April, 2010. Thereafter, petitioner no.2 independently deposited a
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further sum of Rs.1,30,815/- towards tax on 12 May, 2010 and promptly

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informed the Commercial Tax Authorities by written communication dated
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13 May, 2010.

32. According to the petitioners, despite these disclosures, the Joint
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Commissioner, by notice dated 22 April, 2010, required production of the
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five vehicles on 5 May, 2010 for consideration of extension of the transit
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declarations. Separate replies dated 4 May, 2010 were submitted both by
the petitioners' concern and by the customs agent explaining that the goods
had already been disposed of after prolonged administrative inaction and
after payment of the applicable taxes.
33. The petitioners maintain that these explanations failed to receive objective
consideration. Instead, the Joint Commissioner issued a show cause notice
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dated 12 May, 2010 against the customs clearing agent under the
provisions of the West Bengal Value Added Tax Act. On the very next day,
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namely 13 May, 2010, the application seeking extension or revalidation of
the transit declarations was rejected, notwithstanding that the request had
remained pending for almost five months.
34. Although the petitioners themselves were never subjected to proceedings
under the Value Added Tax Act, they nevertheless addressed a detailed
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communication dated 9 June, 2010 explaining every factual circumstance
and reiterating that taxes had already been deposited. Despite such
explanation, the authorities proceeded against the customs agent,
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culminating in a penalty order dated 17 August, 2010 imposing liability of
Rs.13,27,916/-.

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35. The Learned Advocate submits that the genesis of the present criminal
prosecution is traceable to this fiscal proceeding. According to the
petitioners, immediately after the penalty order, the customs agent sought to
divert the statutory liability by initiating criminal proceedings against the
petitioners. An application under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure came to be filed before the Learned Additional Chief Judicial
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Magistrate, Bongaon on 16 November, 2010. Acting upon the Magistrate's
direction, Bongaon Police Station Case No.542 of 2010 dated 23rd
November, 2010 was registered for investigation under Sections 419, 420,
468 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code.
36. The First Information Report alleges that after delivery of the imported
consignments together with the relevant documents by the customs clearing
agent, the petitioners fabricated five transit declarations by forging the
signatures of employees attached to the office of Opposite Party No.2 and
thereafter utilised those documents before the Commercial Tax Authorities,
thereby shifting liability arising out of the tax proceedings upon the customs
agent.
37. The petitioners categorically deny every allegation of fabrication or forgery
and submit that the accusations rest exclusively upon conjecture, devoid of
legally admissible material capable of sustaining criminal prosecution. The
Learned Advocate for the petitioners submits that the investigation, when
examined through the prism of the charge-sheet itself, reveals deficiencies of
such magnitude that the continuation of the prosecution would amount to a
departure from the settled discipline governing criminal jurisprudence.

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According to the petitioners, the materials collected during investigation fail
to establish even the foundational facts necessary for constituting the
offences alleged in the First Information Report.
38. The principal accusation against the petitioners rests upon the allegation
that five transit declarations had been fabricated by forging the signatures of
employees attached to the office of the Opposite Party No.2. Such allegation,
it is argued, necessarily attracts the statutory ingredients embodied in
Sections 463, 464 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution,
therefore, carries the burden of establishing, through legally admissible
evidence, that a false document came into existence within the meaning of
Section 464 and that the petitioners were responsible for making such
document with the requisite criminal intention.
39. The Learned Advocate submits that the investigation has failed at the very
threshold to collect the primary evidence necessary for such determination.
Attention is invited to the charge-sheet, which discloses that the
Investigating Agency never seized the original transit declarations or any
original document alleged to have been forged. Instead, photocopies were
collected from the office of the Opposite Party No.2. The prosecution has
thus proceeded without securing the very documents which constitute the
substratum of the accusation.
40. According to the petitioners, criminal liability founded upon forgery cannot
rest upon copies when the originals neither form part of the investigation nor
remain available for forensic examination. The alleged forged writings
constitute the corpus of the prosecution case. Their absence deprives the

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Court of the opportunity to ascertain whether any interpolation, alteration or
fabrication had, in fact, occurred. Equally, the defence stands deprived of the
valuable safeguard of challenging the authenticity of the alleged writings
through recognised scientific methods.
41. The Learned Advocate further submits that the investigation omitted to
secure the opinion of a handwriting expert. No disputed signatures were
forwarded to any forensic laboratory for comparison with admitted writings.
No scientific examination was undertaken to ascertain authorship of the
alleged signatures. The list of witnesses accompanying the charge-sheet also
reveals that no handwriting expert has been cited as a prosecution witness.
42. According to the petitioners, this omission assumes decisive significance
because the allegation of forgery necessarily involves determination of
authorship. Mere assertion by the complainant that signatures are
fabricated cannot substitute scientific examination where the prosecution
itself attributes authorship of the alleged forged documents to identified
individuals.
43. The petitioners contend that the investigation has thus proceeded upon
assumption rather than demonstrable proof. The prosecution has neither
collected the originals nor secured expert examination nor produced any
witness capable of identifying the alleged handwriting through legally
recognised methods. The evidentiary foundation indispensable for sustaining
the accusation of forgery consequently remains absent.
44. The Learned Advocate submits that even assuming the prosecution proceeds
to trial, the evidentiary deficiency remains incapable of rectification upon the

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existing materials. What survives are merely photocopies obtained during
investigation. Such photocopies, standing by themselves, cannot
automatically acquire the character of admissible evidence. Secondary
evidence becomes receivable only after fulfilment of the statutory conditions
contemplated under the Indian Evidence Act. Unless the existence, custody
and loss or other legally recognised circumstances concerning the originals
are satisfactorily established, photocopies possess no independent
evidentiary value capable of proving execution or fabrication of a disputed
document.
45. Accordingly, the petitioners submit that the prosecution presently possesses
neither the primary evidence nor the legal foundation necessary for
introducing secondary evidence during trial. Continuation of the criminal
proceeding despite such inherent evidentiary deficiency would merely
prolong litigation without advancing the cause of justice.
46. The Learned Advocate places considerable reliance upon the decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj , reported in
(2018) 7 SCC 581 . Particular emphasis has been laid upon paragraphs 25
and 30 of the judgment.
47. It is submitted that the Supreme Court has authoritatively declared that
liability for forgery attaches only to the maker of the false document. The
statutory language embodied in Sections 463 and 464 of the Indian Penal
Code admits no enlargement through inferential reasoning or equitable
considerations. Criminal liability cannot be extended merely because an
individual may have derived some advantage from a document alleged to be

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false. The prosecution must establish, through cogent evidence, that the
accused himself made the false document or participated in its creation in
the manner contemplated by law.
48. The Learned Advocate submits that the ratio of Sheila Sebastian (supra)
directly governs the present prosecution. Even if the allegations contained in
the First Information Report are accepted in their entirety, the investigation
has produced no material identifying either petitioner as the maker of the
alleged transit declarations. No original writings exist before the Investigating
Agency. No scientific comparison has been undertaken. No witness has
identified the handwriting. Consequently, the statutory ingredients
constituting forgery remain wholly absent.
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49. Reliance is also placed upon the order dated 10 May, 2022 passed by the
Coordinate Bench in the present revisional application, wherein the Learned
State Advocate was directed to obtain instructions explaining how
prosecution under Sections 419, 420, 468 and 120B of the Indian Penal
Code could proceed when the prosecution itself possessed no original
documents for reliance. According to the petitioners, this judicial direction
reflects the conspicuous evidentiary vacuum apparent upon the face of the
record.
50. Proceeding to the allegation of cheating, the Learned Advocate submits that
the ingredients constituting offences under Sections 419 and 420 of the
Indian Penal Code remain equally absent.
51. To constitute the offence of cheating, there must exist deception at the
inception of the transaction coupled with fraudulent or dishonest

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inducement resulting in delivery of property or alteration of legal position by
the person deceived. Such dishonest intention must accompany the very
commencement of the transaction and cannot emerge as a subsequent
consequence of commercial disagreement or administrative proceedings.
52. According to the petitioners, the factual narrative narrated by the
complainant itself demonstrates that the import transaction had reached
completion long before initiation of proceedings under the West Bengal Value
Added Tax Act. The customs clearing agent had admittedly discharged his
contractual obligation by completing customs formalities and handing over
the consignments together with all relevant documents. Every commercial
relationship between the parties stood concluded prior to commencement of
the subsequent fiscal proceedings.
53. The allegation subsequently advanced relates exclusively to alleged
fabrication of transit declarations in connection with tax proceedings. Such
allegation, even if assumed to be factually accurate for purposes of
argument, does not disclose any fraudulent representation practised upon
the complainant at the inception of the contractual relationship. Neither the
First Information Report nor the charge-sheet attributes any initial deception
whereby the complainant was persuaded to part with property or assume
legal obligations.
54. The Learned Advocate therefore submits that the indispensable statutory
ingredients constituting cheating remain entirely absent. Criminal
prosecution cannot be sustained merely because subsequent fiscal liability

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has generated disputes between parties who had previously entered into a
lawful commercial arrangement.

55. According to the petitioners, the sequence of events unmistakably
demonstrates that the criminal proceeding followed immediately after the
penalty order passed against the Opposite Party No.2 under the provisions of
the West Bengal Value Added Tax Act. The chronology itself, it is submitted,
furnishes the surrounding circumstances indicating that the criminal
process has been employed as a retaliatory measure for transferring civil and
fiscal liability upon the petitioners.
56. The Learned Advocate finally submits that every circumstance emerging from
the investigation, the charge-sheet and the accompanying materials
demonstrates absence of the essential ingredients constituting the offences
alleged. Continuation of the criminal prosecution in such circumstances
would convert the criminal process into an instrument for perpetuating a
commercial dispute arising from fiscal proceedings rather than prosecuting
conduct amounting to an offence recognised by law.
57. The petitioners, therefore, pray that this Court, in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction, may interdict further continuation of the criminal proceeding
and secure the ends of justice by quashing the First Information Report, the
charge-sheet, the order taking cognizance and every consequential
proceeding arising therefrom.
58. The Learned Advocate representing the State submitted that the proceedings
should not be quashed at such a nascent stage pending trial.

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59. The controversy presented for adjudication extends beyond the bare recital of
allegations contained in the First Information Report. The materials placed
before the Court discloses a sequence of commercial transactions, statutory
proceedings under a fiscal enactment, and the subsequent initiation of
criminal prosecution. The central enquiry, therefore, is whether the
allegations, viewed in the light of the accompanying materials collected
during investigation, disclose the constituent elements of the offences
alleged, or whether the criminal proceeding has travelled beyond the
legitimate frontiers of criminal law into a field essentially governed by
statutory fiscal remedies.
60. The inherent jurisdiction preserved under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure constitutes one of the enduring safeguards against
misuse of the criminal process. The jurisdiction neither substitutes the
function of the Trial Court nor authorises meticulous appreciation of
evidence at the threshold. Its true office lies in preserving the purity of
judicial process where continuation of criminal proceedings would defeat the
administration of justice rather than advance it. The jurisdiction is invoked
with restraint, yet restraint cannot mature into judicial indifference where
the materials placed before the Court fail to disclose the legal foundation of
the prosecution.
61. A criminal Court derives jurisdiction not merely because allegations have
been narrated in the First Information Report but because those allegations,
if accepted at their highest, disclose every statutory ingredient constituting
the offences alleged. Criminal law visits conduct with penal consequences

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only after the constituent elements defined by the legislature are
demonstrably present. The Court, therefore, bears the responsibility of
examining whether the factual assertions satisfy the legal architecture of the
penal provisions invoked.
62. The factual chronology emerging from the present record possesses
considerable significance. The import of the betel nut consignment through
the Petrapole Land Customs Station, the appointment of Opposite Party No.2
as the customs clearing agent, the prolonged delay preceding release of the
consignments, the deterioration of the imported goods during that interval,
the petitioners' request seeking extension of transit declarations, the
prolonged administrative silence, the subsequent disposal of the damaged
consignments upon payment of taxes, and finally the initiation of
proceedings under the West Bengal Value Added Tax Act, all stand reflected
from contemporaneous records. These events preceded the institution of the
criminal complaint.
63. The penalty proceeding initiated under Section 79 of the West Bengal Value
Added Tax Act culminated in an adverse determination against the customs
clearing agent. It is only thereafter that the application under Section 156(3)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure came to be presented before the Learned
Magistrate. The chronology, by itself, may not determine criminal liability;
nevertheless, chronology frequently illuminates the surrounding
circumstances within which criminal proceedings emerge. Temporal
proximity between fiscal adjudication and criminal prosecution becomes a

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relevant circumstance while examining whether the criminal process has
been employed for a purpose recognised by criminal jurisprudence.

64. The record further reveals that the complainant simultaneously invoked the
jurisdiction of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal challenging the very fiscal
proceedings from which the present dispute originates. The statutory remedy
available under the specialised fiscal legislation was thus consciously
pursued. Such conduct demonstrates that the dispute substantially
concerns the correctness of the proceedings initiated under the taxing
statute and the liability arising therefrom.
65. The existence of a civil or fiscal remedy does not, by itself, exclude criminal
liability where the factual foundation independently satisfies the ingredients
of a penal offence. Equally, the mere invocation of penal provisions cannot
convert every commercial or statutory dispute into a criminal prosecution.
The distinction rests not upon the nomenclature employed by the parties but
upon the presence or absence of the statutory ingredients constituting the
alleged offence.
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66. The Supreme Court, in State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. ,
formulated illustrative categories where exercise of the inherent jurisdiction
becomes necessary to preserve the integrity of judicial process. Those
illustrations neither constitute exhaustive principles nor rigid formulae. They
continue, however, to provide valuable guidance while examining whether
criminal proceedings disclose genuine prosecutorial purpose or merely

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1992 SCC (Cri) 426

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represent an attempt to secure collateral advantage through invocation of
the criminal law.

67. The petitioners rely principally upon Categories 6 and 7 of the principles
formulated in Bhajan Lal (Supra) . The submission deserves careful
examination.
68. Category 6 contemplates situations where the statutory framework itself
provides a complete mechanism for adjudication of the dispute. The
materials placed before this Court reveal that proceedings under the West
Bengal Value Added Tax Act had already commenced, notices had been
issued, replies submitted, tax deposited, penalty imposed and statutory
remedies invoked before the Taxation Tribunal. Every question concerning
validity of the transit declarations, liability arising from transportation of
goods and fiscal consequences flowing therefrom became the subject of
adjudication before authorities constituted under the taxing statute.
69. The existence of such statutory proceedings does not automatically eclipse
criminal jurisdiction. Nevertheless, where the criminal allegations
substantially arise from the very issues pending before the specialised
statutory forum, the Court owes a duty to ascertain whether the prosecution
truly discloses an independent criminal offence or merely reproduces
allegations already embedded within fiscal adjudication.
70. The sequence of events assumes further significance because the allegation
of forgery itself emerged only after initiation of penalty proceedings. The
complaint attributes criminal responsibility to the petitioners upon the
premise that forged transit declarations shifted liability upon the customs

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clearing agent. Whether such allegation possesses legal substance
necessarily depends upon the materials collected during investigation and
not merely upon the language employed in the complaint.
71. The prosecution has invoked Section 468 of the Indian Penal Code. The
offence presupposes the existence of forgery as defined under Sections 463
and 464. A document becomes false only when the statutory conditions
embodied in Section 464 stand fulfilled. The legislature has consciously
employed precise language while defining the expression "making a false
document". Criminal liability consequently attaches only after the
prosecution establishes, through legally admissible evidence, that the
accused participated in creation of such document in the manner
contemplated by the statute.
72. The distinction assumes considerable importance because criminal
jurisprudence recognises no doctrine of constructive forgery. Mere benefit
arising from a document, mere possession of a document, or mere use of a
document cannot, by themselves, satisfy the statutory definition where
authorship remains unproved. The legislative text preserves a clear
distinction between making a false document and deriving subsequent
advantage from it.
73. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sheila Sebastian v. R.
Jawaharaj (Supra) reiterates this principle with remarkable clarity. The
Supreme Court held that liability for forgery attaches to the maker of the
false document. The statutory language cannot be enlarged by inferential
reasoning so as to include persons whose participation in creation of the

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document remains legally unestablished. Penal provisions demand strict
fidelity to legislative expression because criminal liability carries
consequences affecting personal liberty and reputation.
74. Applying these principles to the present record, the Court notices that the
prosecution has not placed before the Court the original transit declarations
alleged to have been forged. The investigation proceeded without recovery of
those documents. No scientific comparison of disputed signatures with
admitted writings has been undertaken. The charge-sheet discloses no
opinion of any handwriting expert. No forensic material has been collected
identifying either petitioner as the author of the disputed signatures.
75. These are not matters touching the weight of evidence alone. They relate to
the very existence of the evidentiary foundation upon which the allegation of
forgery rests. Where authorship of the alleged false document constitutes the
central issue, absence of the primary document together with absence of
scientific examination assumes considerable legal significance while
examining whether continuation of prosecution serves the ends of justice.
76. The controversy presented before this Court also invites examination of a
principle that repeatedly engages judicial attention, namely, the distinction
between liability arising under a fiscal statute and criminal culpability
attracting the penal consequences of the Indian Penal Code. The distinction
is neither semantic nor procedural. It represents a foundational doctrine
preserving the integrity of criminal jurisprudence while respecting the
legislative architecture governing specialised statutory enactments.

25
77. The West Bengal Value Added Tax Act, 2003 constitutes a self-contained
fiscal legislation regulating levy, assessment, collection and recovery of tax
together with adjudication of disputes arising therefrom. The enactment
prescribes a complete statutory mechanism enabling the competent
authority to examine transportation of goods, validity of transit declarations,
assessment of tax, determination of penalty and appellate or revisional
scrutiny before specialised forums constituted for that purpose. Every stage
of fiscal adjudication proceeds within a carefully structured statutory
framework designed by the legislature.
78. The materials placed before this Court reveal that the authorities functioning
under the said enactment exercised their statutory powers by initiating
proceedings under Section 79 of the Act. Notices were issued, explanations
were invited, replies were submitted and a reasoned order imposing penalty
eventually came to be passed against the customs clearing agent.
Dissatisfied with such determination, the complainant invoked the
jurisdiction of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal by preferring the statutory
revision contemplated under the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987.
The very issues relating to the transit declarations, the movement of the
consignments and the fiscal consequences arising therefrom thus became
the subject of adjudication before the specialised statutory forum.
79. This sequence assumes considerable significance. A legislature which
creates a specialised adjudicatory framework simultaneously manifests its
intention that disputes falling within that framework shall ordinarily receive
examination by the authorities possessing technical expertise in the

26
concerned field. Such legislative design neither excludes criminal jurisdiction
where a genuine offence is disclosed nor authorises parallel invocation of the
penal law merely because fiscal proceedings have culminated adversely
against one of the parties.
80. Criminal liability cannot emerge merely because fiscal liability has been
determined. A taxing statute concerns itself with collection of revenue,
determination of statutory obligations and recovery of public dues. Criminal
law, on the other hand, visits conduct with penal consequences only after
the constituent elements of an offence defined by the legislature stand
established. The source, object and consequences of the two jurisdictions
remain fundamentally distinct.
81. The Court cannot overlook that the allegations of forgery surfaced only after
the penalty proceeding culminated in an adverse order against the
complainant. Prior thereto, the controversy revolved entirely around
transportation of goods, validity of transit declarations, extension of their
operative period and the fiscal implications arising from movement of the
imported consignments. The subsequent introduction of allegations under
Sections 419, 420, 468 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code did not alter the
essential character of the dispute unless the materials collected during
investigation independently disclosed every statutory ingredient constituting
those offences.
82. A criminal prosecution cannot derive legitimacy merely because allegations
employ expressions such as "forgery", "cheating" or "conspiracy". The Court
must ascertain whether the factual foundation corresponding to those legal

27
expressions finds support from legally admissible material. Criminal
jurisprudence has consistently maintained that nomenclature cannot
substitute substance. Penal liability flows not from the language employed in
the complaint but from satisfaction of the statutory ingredients enacted by
Parliament.
83. The present record reveals that the investigation has failed to recover the
original transit declarations alleged to have been forged. No forensic
comparison has been undertaken. No handwriting expert has examined the
disputed signatures. No witness has identified either petitioner as the maker
of the alleged false documents. The allegation of cheating similarly remains
detached from the indispensable requirement of deception operating at the
inception of the transaction. The accusation of conspiracy remains equally
bereft of material indicating any meeting of minds directed towards
commission of an illegal act.
84. Against this evidentiary background, the Court cannot permit the fiscal
proceedings to furnish the sole foundation for continuation of criminal
prosecution. Acceptance of such a proposition would obliterate the carefully
maintained distinction between statutory liability and penal culpability.
Every adverse fiscal determination could thereafter be transformed into a
criminal proceeding merely by attributing allegations of forgery or deception
without satisfying the statutory requirements governing those offences. Such
an approach would enlarge the field of criminal law far beyond the limits
contemplated by the legislature.

28
85. The Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that criminal law must preserve
its character as an instrument for redressing genuine criminal conduct and
cannot become a means for securing strategic advantage in disputes
substantially governed by civil, commercial or statutory adjudication. The
jurisdiction preserved under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
exists precisely to prevent such transmutation where the criminal process
ceases to advance the administration of justice and instead becomes
ancillary to another contest already receiving adjudication before the forum
designated by statute.
86. The facts of the present case demonstrate that the complainant actively
pursued the statutory remedies available under the fiscal enactment by
challenging the penalty before the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal and
thereafter seeking settlement of the dispute before the same forum. Such
conduct fortifies the conclusion that the controversy fundamentally
remained one concerning fiscal liability. The subsequent invocation of
criminal jurisdiction, unsupported by the essential evidentiary foundation
required for prosecution under the Indian Penal Code, cannot be permitted
to survive merely because the complaint employs language suggestive of
criminality.
87. The distinction between statutory liability and criminal culpability
constitutes a vital safeguard preserving the legitimacy of both jurisdictions.
Fiscal statutes protect the public revenue; criminal law protects society
against conduct which the legislature has declared to be offences. Conflation
of these distinct fields would neither advance tax administration nor

29
strengthen criminal justice. It would instead expose commercial participants
to penal prosecution in circumstances where the legislature intended
specialised statutory adjudication.
88. Viewed through this jurisprudential lens, the present prosecution appears to
derive its vitality from the adverse fiscal determination rather than from
independent evidence disclosing commission of offences punishable under
the Indian Penal Code. Continuation of such proceedings would therefore
blur the carefully preserved boundary separating fiscal adjudication from
criminal prosecution, a consequence that the law neither contemplates nor
encourages.
89. The jurisdiction preserved under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure occupies a distinctive position within the criminal justice system.
It neither constitutes an appellate forum for appreciation of evidence nor
authorises premature adjudication upon disputed questions of fact. The
jurisdiction exists to preserve the integrity of judicial process, prevent
misuse of criminal proceedings and secure the ends of justice where
continuation of prosecution would cease to possess a legally sustainable
foundation.
90. The exercise of such jurisdiction has consistently been guided by principles
evolved through judicial precedent. Beginning with R.P. Kapur v. State of
2
Punjab and receiving comprehensive exposition in State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal (Supra) , the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that where
the allegations contained in the First Information Report, together with the

2
1960 SCC OnLine 21: (1960) 3 SCR 388

30
materials collected during investigation, fail to disclose the constituent
elements of the offences alleged, the High Court owes a constitutional and
statutory obligation to intervene. Such intervention neither trenches upon
the jurisdiction of the Trial Court nor substitutes appreciation of evidence. It
merely ensures that criminal law remains confined within the limits
prescribed by statute.
91. The decision in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of
3
Maharashtra reiterates that the High Court should ordinarily refrain from
entering upon appreciation of disputed facts while exercising jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Code. At the same time, the judgment does not
diminish the duty of the Court to ascertain whether the allegations, even if
accepted in their entirety, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence.
92. Judicial restraint cannot mature into judicial abdication where the materials
collected during investigation fail to satisfy the statutory ingredients
constituting the alleged offences. The principle received further elucidation in
4
Haji Iqbal @ Bala v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others . The Supreme
Court recognised that where surrounding circumstances reveal that criminal
proceedings have been instituted for collateral purposes or as a consequence
of another dispute receiving adjudication before a competent forum, the High
Court is not confined to a mechanical reading of the First Information
Report. The chronology of events, the conduct of the parties,
contemporaneous documents and the investigative materials collectively
illuminate the true character of the prosecution. The inherent jurisdiction

3
(2021) 19 SCC 401
4
(2024) 15 SCC 776

31
would lose much of its efficacy if the Court were compelled to disregard
circumstances that plainly emerge from the record and instead remain
confined to isolated recitals contained in the complaint.
93. The jurisprudence governing allegations of forgery stands equally well
settled. Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj (Supra) authoritatively explains that
criminal liability under Sections 463 and 464 of the Indian Penal Code
attaches only to the maker of the false document. The statutory definition
admits no enlargement through inference or assumption. Before prosecution
under Section 468 can legitimately continue, the investigation must disclose
material capable of identifying the accused as the author of the false
document. Such requirement is not a matter touching merely the sufficiency
of evidence; it forms part of the very legal foundation of the offence itself.
94. Examined against these settled principles, the present prosecution reveals
deficiencies extending beyond disputed factual assertions. The investigation
has failed to recover the original transit declarations alleged to have been
forged. No scientific examination of the disputed signatures has been
undertaken. No handwriting expert has been associated with the
investigation. No forensic opinion forms part of the charge-sheet. The
prosecution thus seeks to establish forgery without the very evidence
ordinarily indispensable for proving authorship of the alleged false
documents.
95. The allegation of cheating stands upon no firmer foundation. The commercial
relationship between the parties had already culminated in delivery of the
imported consignments after completion of customs formalities. The

32
complaint does not disclose deception practised at the inception of that
relationship or dishonest inducement resulting in delivery of property. The
subsequent fiscal proceedings under the West Bengal Value Added Tax Act
cannot retrospectively convert a completed commercial transaction into the
offence of cheating unless the statutory ingredients prescribed under
Sections 415 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code distinctly emerge from the
materials collected during investigation.
96. The allegation of criminal conspiracy similarly remains unsupported by
foundational facts. The record contains no material revealing concerted
deliberation, prior arrangement or any circumstance from which a meeting of
minds may legitimately be inferred. Mere repetition of the statutory
expression "conspiracy" cannot substitute proof of the constituent elements
required by law.

97. The Court remains conscious that meticulous evaluation of evidence belongs
to the province of trial. Yet there exists a fundamental distinction between
appreciation of evidence and examination of the existence of legally
admissible material constituting the basis of prosecution. Where the
investigation itself does not disclose the elementary materials necessary for
establishing the statutory ingredients of the offences alleged, continuation of
the criminal proceeding would merely postpone the inevitable while
subjecting the accused to the burdens of a prosecution lacking legal
foundation.
98. The power preserved under Section 482 of the Code is designed precisely to
avert such consequences. The dignity of criminal jurisprudence is preserved

33
not merely by ensuring that offenders are prosecuted, but equally by
ensuring that the coercive machinery of criminal law is not employed where
the legislative requirements constituting the alleged offences remain absent.
Liberty, reputation and fair administration of justice stand protected only
when the criminal process is permitted to proceed upon legally sustainable
foundations and not upon conjecture, assumption or consequences flowing
from proceedings governed by an altogether different statutory regime.
99. The cumulative effect of the factual chronology, the investigative record and
the governing legal principles leads this Court to the inescapable conclusion
that the prosecution does not disclose the essential ingredients constituting
the offences punishable under Sections 419, 420, 468 and 120B of the
Indian Penal Code. The continuation of the criminal proceeding would
therefore neither advance the cause of criminal justice nor fulfil the
legislative purpose underlying the penal provisions invoked. Judicial
intervention, in such circumstances, becomes necessary to preserve the
sanctity of the criminal process and to maintain the distinction between
suspicion and legally demonstrable culpability.
100. The allegations constituting the offence of cheating deserve equally careful
scrutiny. Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code contemplates deception
practised upon a person, accompanied by fraudulent or dishonest
inducement resulting in delivery of property or alteration of a valuable
security or legal position. Such fraudulent intention must exist at the
inception of the transaction. Subsequent developments arising from

34
contractual performance or statutory adjudication do not, by themselves,
retroactively infuse the original transaction with criminality.

101. The factual narrative presented by the complainant reveals that Opposite
Party No.2 acted as the authorised customs clearing agent engaged by the
petitioners for completing customs formalities. The import transaction
proceeded through recognised statutory channels. Upon completion of
customs formalities, the consignments together with the accompanying
documents were admittedly delivered to the petitioners. The contractual
obligations undertaken by the customs agent thereby reached their logical
conclusion. No allegation has been advanced that, at the inception of the
commercial relationship, the petitioners practised deception or induced the
complainant to undertake customs clearance by any fraudulent
representation.

102. The grievance subsequently projected by the complainant arose only after
proceedings under the West Bengal Value Added Tax Act culminated in a
penalty order against the customs clearing agent. The complaint attributes
such fiscal liability to alleged misuse of transit declarations. Even if such
allegation is accepted solely for the limited purpose of examining the First
Information Report, the same does not satisfy the statutory ingredients
constituting cheating. The complaint does not disclose any inducement
leading to delivery of property by the complainant, nor does it reveal any
representation made at the commencement of the transaction that was false
to the knowledge of the petitioners. The essential legal architecture of
Sections 415 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code thus remains absent.

35
103. The allegation under Section 419 of the Indian Penal Code proceeds upon
the premise of cheating by personation. The record placed before this Court
contains no material suggesting that either petitioner falsely represented
himself to be another person before any authority or induced any individual
by assuming a false identity. Mere assertion that signatures appearing upon
certain documents were not genuine cannot, without further material, satisfy
the constituent elements of personation contemplated by the statute.
104. The allegation of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of the Indian Penal
Code equally lacks substantive foundation. Conspiracy postulates a prior
meeting of minds directed towards commission of an illegal act or a lawful
act through illegal means. Direct evidence of conspiracy seldom becomes
available; nevertheless, the existence of circumstances pointing towards
concerted action remains indispensable. Suspicion, however strong, cannot
substitute the legal requirement of material indicating conscious
participation in a common design.
105. The investigation conducted in the present case has produced no
circumstance demonstrating communication, planning or coordinated
conduct from which a criminal conspiracy may reasonably be inferred. Apart
from reproducing the allegations contained in the complaint, the charge-
sheet remains silent regarding any material establishing the existence of an
agreement between the petitioners or between the petitioners and any third
person for commission of the alleged offences. The accusation under Section
120B, therefore, remains a bare legal conclusion unsupported by
foundational facts.

36
106. The Learned Counsel for the petitioners has also placed reliance upon the
decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Haji Iqbal @ Bala (Supra) . The
principle emerging from the said decision deserves careful application. The
Supreme Court has observed that while exercising jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court is not constrained to
remain confined within the four corners of the First Information Report
where surrounding circumstances unmistakably reveal that criminal
proceedings have been initiated for collateral purposes. The Court is
competent to examine the attending circumstances, the chronology of events
and the materials collected during investigation for ascertaining the true
character of the prosecution.
107. Applying the aforesaid principle to the present record, the sequence of events
acquires considerable significance. The petitioners approached the
Commercial Tax Authorities seeking extension of the transit declarations
before expiry of their validity. The authorities remained silent for several
months. During that period the imported goods, according to the
contemporaneous communications placed on record, continued to
deteriorate. Taxes arising from the subsequent sale of the goods were
deposited. Proceedings under the fiscal statute thereafter culminated in
imposition of penalty upon the customs clearing agent. It is only after such
determination that the application under Section 156(3) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure came to be presented.
108. The complainant thereafter invoked the statutory jurisdiction of the West
Bengal Taxation Tribunal by challenging the penalty proceedings themselves.

37
Materials placed before this Court further disclose that the complainant
subsequently sought settlement of the fiscal dispute before the Tribunal and
satisfied the penalty imposed under the taxing statute. These circumstances
do not, by themselves, determine criminal liability. They nevertheless furnish
the surrounding factual landscape within which the criminal prosecution
came into existence and cannot be ignored while examining the legitimacy of
the continuation of the proceedings.
109. The cumulative effect of these circumstances persuades this Court that the
controversy substantially originates from fiscal proceedings governed by a
self-contained statutory framework. The criminal allegations derive their
genesis from the consequences flowing from those proceedings rather than
from any independent criminal design demonstrable through legally
admissible material.
110. The principles illustratively formulated in State of Haryana & Ors. v.
Bhajan Lal & Ors. (Supra) continue to provide valuable guidance. The
present prosecution bears close resemblance to the categories where
criminal proceedings deserve judicial intervention because the allegations,
even if accepted at their highest, fail to disclose the constituent elements of
the offences alleged and where the surrounding circumstances indicate that
the criminal process has been invoked for securing collateral advantage
arising out of another dispute. Criminal law cannot be permitted to become
an instrument for exerting pressure in matters essentially governed by
specialised statutory adjudication.

38
111. This Court remains conscious that the inherent jurisdiction is exercised with
circumspection. Such jurisdiction cannot substitute appreciation of evidence
during trial. At the same time, compelling an accused to undergo the rigours
of a criminal trial where the investigation itself fails to disclose the legal
ingredients of the alleged offences would amount to permitting the process of
the Court to travel beyond the limits prescribed by law. The object of
criminal procedure is to secure justice, not to perpetuate proceedings lacking
a legally sustainable foundation.
112. The investigation in the present case has failed to secure the original
documents forming the basis of the allegation of forgery. No forensic
examination has been undertaken. No expert evidence has been collected.
The materials gathered during investigation do not identify either petitioner
as the maker of any false document. Equally, the allegations fail to disclose
deception at the inception of the commercial transaction or circumstances
constituting personation or criminal conspiracy. The prosecution, therefore,
remains deficient in respect of every principal offence forming the basis of
the charge-sheet.
113. In these circumstances, continuation of G.R. Case No.1566 of 2010 arising
out of Bongaon Police Station Case No.542 of 2010 would not advance the
administration of criminal justice. Judicial intervention thus becomes
necessary to preserve the distinction between criminal culpability and
statutory fiscal liability and to ensure that the criminal process retains its
character as an instrument for redressing genuine offences rather than
becoming a means for advancing collateral objectives.

39
114. Accordingly, the revisional application succeeds.

115. In view of the above discussions, the criminal proceeding being G.R. Case
No.1566 of 2010 arising out of Bongaon Police Station Case No.542 of 2010
rd
dated 23 November, 2010, together with Charge Sheet No.445 of 2012
th th
dated 28 July, 2012, the order dated 27 September, 2012 taking
cognizance and every consequential proceeding arising therefrom, stands
quashed.
116. The revisional application being CRR 54 of 2014 is, accordingly, allowed.
117. The criminal revisional application being CRR 54 of 2014 stands disposed of.
Connected application, if any, also stands disposed of.
118. Case Diary, if any, to be returned.
119. There is no order as to costs.
120. Let the copy of this judgment be sent to the Learned Trial Court as well as
the police station concerned for necessary information and compliance.
121. All parties shall act on the server copy of this judgment duly downloaded
from the official website of this Court.
(Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J.)