Sarvesh Security Services Pvt. Ltd. vs Institute Of Human Behavior Resource And Allied Sciences

$~48
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of decision: 15.05.2026

+ O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 557/2025, I.A. 6604/2026 & I.A.
6605/2026
SARVESH SECURITY SERVICES PVT. LTD. .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Manish Vashisht, Senior
Adv with Mr. Rikky Gupta, Ms.
Ananya Singh, Mr. Uday Malhotra,
Mr. Vedansh Vashisht and Mr.
Swapan Singhal, Advocates.
Versus

INSTITUTE OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR RESOURCE AND ALLIED
SCIENCES .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Tushar Sannu, Standing Counsel
with Ms. Ankita Bhadauriya and Ms.
Akansha Vidyarthi, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AVNEESH JHINGAN
AVNEESH JHINGAN, J. (ORAL)

1. This application is filed under Section 29A of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short „the Act‟) seeking extension of the
mandate of the arbitrator.
2. The brief facts are that the petitioner was awarded a contract for
providing security services to the respondent. Dispute arose between the
parties to the lis . The agreement provided for dispute resolution through
arbitration. Arbitration was invoked at the instance of the petitioner. The
arbitration proceedings were conducted under the aegis of Delhi
International Arbitration Centre (DIAC). This court vide order dated
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:CHANCHAL
Signing Date:19.05.2026
10:36:02
O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 557/2025 Page 1 of 7

06.09.2024 extended the mandate of the arbitrator till 01.11.2024.Vide email
dated 30.10.2024, the arbitrator informed the parties that in view of the
intervening holidays from 31.10.2024 to 03.11.2024, arbitral award (for
brevity „the award‟) would be pronounced at the DIAC premises on
04.11.2024. The award was pronounced on 04.11.2024. The respondent
challenged the award under Section 34 of the Act and one of the grounds
was that the award was passed after expiry of the mandate.
2.1 During the pendency of the petition under Section 34 of the Act, the
petitioner on 22.07.2025, filed an application under Section 29A of the Act
seeking extension of the mandate. The application was dismissed by this
Court vide order dated 18.08.2025. The petition under Section 34 of the Act
was allowed and the award was set aside, having been passed after the
expiry of the mandate. The appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 37 of
the Act impugning the order under Section 34 of the Act was dismissed.
2.2 The dismissal of the appeal and application under Section 29A of the
Act was challenged. The Supreme Court in Civil Appeal no. 2346-47 of
2026 arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 264 and 4175 of 2026 titled as Sarvesh
Security Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Institute of Human Behaviour and Allied
Sciences (IBHAS) decided on 19.02.2026 set aside the orders of this Court
and restored the application under Section 29A(5) of the Act. The
operational part of the order is reproduced below:

“In the light of the decision of this court in C. Velusamy (supra),
it is imperative that the extension application filed by the
appellant is reconsidered, in terms of what has been stated in the
aforestated paragraph. Pending such exercise, the arbitral award
cannot be set at naught, as we have already noted that the only
ground that weighed with the learned Judge to do so was the
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:CHANCHAL
Signing Date:19.05.2026
10:36:02
O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 557/2025 Page 2 of 7

fact that the award was pronounced after expiry of the mandate.
Needless to state, if the occasion arises for the respondent to
again file an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, it
would be at liberty to raise all grounds available to it, including
those raised earlier and not considered.
We, accordingly, allow both the appeals, setting aside the order
dated · 15.10.2025 passed by the Division Bench of the High ·
Court, dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant under
Section 37 of the 1996 Act, as well as the common order dated
18.08.2025 passed by the learned Judge, allowing the
respondent's application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, and
dismissing the appellant's application under Section 29A(5) of
the 1996 Act. The said application shall stand restored to the
file.
The arbitral award shall, however, remain unenforceable,
pending consideration afresh of the appellant's extension
application, that is, O.M.P. (Misc.)(Comm.) No. 557/2025, in
accordance with law and the decision of this Court in C.
Velusamy (supra). It is left open to the parties to raise all
contentions before the learned Judge.”

(Emphasis supplied)

2.3 Consequent to the restoration by the Supreme Court, the matter is
taken up today.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the arbitration
proceedings were done under the aegis of DIAC and the award was to be
pronounced at the DIAC premises. It is submitted that the award was ready
within the extended period but could not be pronounced on account of the
intervening holidays and therefore extension of the mandate is necessitated.
Reliance is upon the decision of the Supreme Court in C. Velusamy Vs. K.
Indhera , 2026 INSC 112 to contend that this court has the power to extend
the mandate even after pronouncement of the award.
4. Per contra , extension of the mandate cannot be mechanically granted
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:CHANCHAL
Signing Date:19.05.2026
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O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 557/2025 Page 3 of 7

and no sufficient cause exists for extension of the mandate. Reliance is
placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Balwant Singh Vs. Jagdish
Singh and Ors. , (2010) 8 SCC 685 and Basawaraj & Anr. Vs. Special Land
Acquisition Officer , (2013) 14 SCC 81 to contend that the delay attributable
to the inaction of a party to redress the grievance cannot constitute a
sufficient cause. It is contended that the present petition was filed at belated
stage during the pendency of the petition filed by the respondent under
Section 34 of the Act.
4.1 It is submitted that the petitioner remained a fence sitter and waited
for the outcome in the award. The argument is that if the award had been in
favour of the respondent, no application under Section 29A of the Act would
have been filed. Submission is that the extension of mandate will not make
the award enforceable.
5. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to quote the relevant
paragraph of the decision of the Supreme Court in C. Velusamy (supra)

“23. In conclusion, we hold that an application under Section
29A(5) for extension of the mandate of the arbitrator is
maintainable even after the expiry of the time under Sections
29A(1) and (3) and even after rendering of an award during that
time. Such an award is ineffective and unenforceable. But the
power of the court to consider extension is not impaired by such
an indiscretion of the arbitrator. While considering the
application, the Court will examine if there is sufficient cause
for extending the mandate, and in the process, it may impose
such terms and conditions as the situation demands. The Court
will also take into account other factors such as reduction of the
fee of the arbitrator under proviso to Section 29A(4) and also
impose costs on parties if the fact situation so demands.
Substitution is an option for the Court as the provision itself
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:CHANCHAL
Signing Date:19.05.2026
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O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 557/2025 Page 4 of 7

says, “it shall be open for the Court to substitute”, and it will be
exercised carefully. If the mandate is extended, the arbitral
tribunal will pick up the thread from where it was left, and
seamlessly continue the proceeding from the stage at which the
mandate had expired, and conclude within the time granted.”
(Emphasis supplied)
6. The issue emphasized by learned counsel for the respondent is that
there is no sufficient cause shown and that this court should not come to the
rescue of a party who waited for the outcome of the award and thereafter
initiated proceedings seeking extension of the mandate of the arbitrator. The
contentions lack merit.

7. The mandate of the arbitrator was till 01.11.2024. There is no reason
for this court to reject the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner
that the award was to be pronounced at the premises of DIAC. It is not
challenged that from 31.10.2024 till 03.11.2024, DIAC office remained
closed on account of Diwali holidays. The petitioner cannot be blamed for
non-pronouncement of the award till 01.11.2024 i.e., within the extended
mandate period. Even otherwise there cannot be quarrel with the proposition
that where technicalities are pitted against substantial justice, the latter
prevails. The delay in pronouncement of the award is consequent of
intervening holidays.
8. The reliance placed upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in
Balwant Singh (supra) and Basawaraj & Anr . (supra) by the respondent is
of no avail and are not applicable in the facts of the present case. There is no
intentional inaction on the part of the applicant. The case in hand deals with
a situation where last day of mandate was a holiday in DIAC and on opening
day the award was pronounced.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:CHANCHAL
Signing Date:19.05.2026
10:36:02
O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 557/2025 Page 5 of 7

9. The contention that the petition for extension of mandate was filed
after awaiting the outcome of the arbitration proceedings is noted to be
rejected. Under Section 29A(5) of the Act, there is no restriction either for
the claimant or the respondent to seek the extension of the mandate. Delay
in seeking extension of the mandate cannot be attributed to any particular
party.
10. The contention that the petition was filed belatedly during pendency
of the petition under Section 34 of the Act has no merit. There is no period
of limitation prescribed for filing the petition under Section 29A of the Act.
In C. Velusamy Vs. K. Indhera (supra) it is held that mandate of tribunal
can be extended after expiry of period and even if award is rendered after
expiry. The power of the court to extend the mandate despite rendering of
award would not be constricted by filing of the petition u/s 34 against the
award.
11. Merely as the outcome of the arbitration proceedings was known to
the parties and with extension of the mandate one of the ground to challenge
award under Section 34 of the Act may not survive, cannot be the
consideration for rejection of the prayer for extension more so, on court
being satisfied that sufficient cause exists.
12. The contention raised with regard to the validity of the award and the
effect of extension qua the award dated 04.11.2024 need not be dilated
upon. The restoration before this court is of the application under Section
29A of the Act and for the reasons recorded hereinabove the application is
allowed.
13. In facts and circumstances of the case, no case is made out for
imposition of any conditions of reduction of the arbitrator fee or substitution
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:CHANCHAL
Signing Date:19.05.2026
10:36:02
O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 557/2025 Page 6 of 7

of the arbitrator, taking into account that the award was ready and delay in
pronouncement was due to Diwali holidays.
14. The application is allowed and the prayer made therein is granted.


AVNEESH JHINGAN, J
MAY 15, 2026/Pa
Reportable:- Yes
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:CHANCHAL
Signing Date:19.05.2026
10:36:02
O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 557/2025 Page 7 of 7