The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Krishnakant Dubey

Court
Madhya Pradesh High Court

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
1 MCRC-5158-2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
th
ON THE 20 OF NOVEMBER, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 5158 of 2022
CNR No.: MPHC010051492022
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Versus
KRISHNAKANT DUBEY
Appearance:
Shri Abhinav Shrivastava - Advocate for the applicant/Lokayukt.
Shri Sanjeev Tuli - Advocate for the respondent.
ORDER
This application under Section 378(3) of Cr.P.C. seeking grant of leave
to appeal has been filed by the applicant/Special Police Establishment,
Lokayukt Organization, Bhopal, feeling aggrieved by the judgment of
acquittal dated 07.09.2021 passed in Special Case No. LOK/300002/2015 by
the Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988), Betul, whereby the
respondent/accused Krishnkant Dubey was acquitted from the charge of
offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
2. The exposition of facts, giving rise to the present application for grant of
leave to appeal, is as under:
A. The complainant Subhash Yadav (PW-4) submitted a written
complaint (Exhibit P-11) to the Superintendent of Police, S.P.E.,
Lokayukt, Bhopal on 13.03.2014 alleging that the respondent, posted as
Deputy Ranger (Range Assistant) at Chunahajuri, Tehsil Chicholi,
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
2 MCRC-5158-2022
District Betul, had registered a false forest offence case of theft of
timber against him and Shambhu Adivasi and was demanding a bribe of
Rs.15,000/- for closing the said case. The complainant was handed over
a digital voice recorder to record conversation about demand of
bribe by the accused. The complainant submitted a second application
(Exhibit P-10) along with the voice recorder on 15.03.2014, alleging
that the respondent had demanded Rs.6,000/- on 14.03.2014 and asked
him to bring the amount on 15.03.2014. A transcript panchnama
(Exhibit P-14) was prepared and FIR for offence under Section 7 of the
Act, 1988 was registered.
B. On 15.03.2014, a trap was planned in presence of panch
witnesses Anil Kumar Soni (PW-3) and M.S. Bhalavi (PW-9). Twelve
currency notes of Rs.500/- each, totalling Rs.6,000/-, were treated with
phenolphthalein powder and handed over to the complainant. The
complainant handed over phenolphthalein coated currency notes to the
accused. On arrival of the trap party at Balai Forest Chowki, the
respondent threw the tainted currency notes on the floor near the wall.
The hand wash of the respondent in sodium carbonate solution turned
light pink. The currency notes were picked up from the floor and
seized. The relevant documents relating to the forest offence case were
seized from forest guard Sitaram Dhurve vide seizure memo (Exhibit P-
23).
C. On completion of investigation and after obtaining sanction for
prosecution (Exhibit P-34), the charge-sheet was filed. Learned Special
Judge framed charges for offences punishable under Sections 7 and
13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act, 1988. The respondent
abjured guilt. In his examination under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., he
stated that he had registered a forest offence case against the
complainant for theft of timber; the compounding amount was assessed
by his superior officers; he had asked the complainant to deposit the
same through bank draft or challan but the complainant lodged a false
complaint to pressurize the forest officials. On completion of trial,
learned Special Judge held that the prosecution failed to prove the

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
3 MCRC-5158-2022
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification beyond reasonable doubt
and acquitted the respondent/ accused of all the charges vide impugned
judgment dated 07.09.2021.

3 . Learned counsel for the applicant/State, in addition to the facts and
grounds pleaded in the application, submitted that the trial Court committed
an error of fact and law in discarding the testimony of complainant Subhash
Yadav (PW-4), who supported the prosecution case in his examination-in-
chief recorded on 01.06.2016 and was declared hostile only during his cross-
examination recorded on 25.07.2016. Relying on Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari
v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1991 SC 1853, learned counsel
contended that the complainant had been won over in the interregnum period
therefore, his statement in examination-in-chief ought to have been accepted.
Learned counsel referring to the judgment in case of Neeraj Dutta V. State
(Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi) [(2023) 4 SCC 731] submits that even if the
complainant turned hostile, the prosecution has proved the allegation of
demand of illegal gratification by accused from circumstantial evidence
available on record. Learned counsel further referring to the evidence on
record submitted that the respondent had received the tainted currency notes
so his hand wash turned pink. The trial Court committed error, in paragraph
50 of the impugned judgment, in holding that the voice of accused in the
recorded conversation was not established merely because no forensic voice
examination was conducted, whereas the witnesses had identified the voices.
The transcript (Exhibit P-14) clearly established demand of Rs.6,000/- for
closure of the forest case and the demand itself constitutes an offence under
Section 7 of the Act, 1988. The Judgement of acquittal is
apparently erroneous and perverse, so leave to appeal be granted.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
4 MCRC-5158-2022
4. Learned counsel for the applicant further contended that the trial Court

erred in accepting the defence that the amount was compounding fee, as the
respondent did not take such defence at the time of trap or during
investigation; the defence being an afterthought deserves to be rejected. The
respondent, being a Deputy Ranger, had no power to compound the forest
offence under Section 68(3) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, therefore,
demand of the compounding amount was, infact, a demand of bribe. The
positive phenolphthalein test is concrete evidence of acceptance. The trial
Court ought to have raised the presumption under Section 20 of the Act,
1988. The trial Court in paragraph 64 of the impugned judgment acquitted
the respondent on the basis of technical discrepancies in the memorandam of
trap proceedings and the benefit of lacuna in investigation, such as non-
examination of forest guard Sitaram. Even where the complainant and
independent witnesses turn hostile, conviction can be based on the other
reliable circumstantial evidence. The learned counsel contends that the
learned trial court committed an error in acquitting the accused ignoring the
circumstantial evidence available on record. The matter requires
reconsideration. Therefore, leave to appeal be granted.
5 . Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the
impugned judgment is well-reasoned and is based on a proper appreciation of
the evidence on record. The presumption of innocence in favour of the
respondent stands reinforced by the judgement of acquittal. Proof of demand
of illegal gratification is sine qua non for offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)
(d) of the Act, 1988. The complainant did not support the prosecution even
in his examination-in-chief and, in cross-examination recorded on the same
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
5 MCRC-5158-2022
day, admitted that the respondent had told him that the forest case could be

compounded on deposit of Rs.6,000/- each by him and Shambhu, failing
which the challan would be filed in Court. The complainant categorically
admitted that the respondent never demanded money as bribe. The compact
disc was not accompanied by the mandatory certificate under Section 65-B
of the Evidence Act of the person who prepared it. The complainant denied
the conversation with accused before the trial Court. The complainant and
the independent panch witness Anil Kumar (PW-3) stated that the respondent
refused to accept cash and asked for a bank draft. The tainted currency notes
were not recovered from the conscious possession of the respondent, they
were found lying on the floor and the respondent was made to pick them up
before his hand wash, which explains the positive phenolphthalein test. The
prosecution witnesses Patiram Karochi (PW-1), K.S. Chauhan (PW-2) and
Murli Kumar Arya (PW-8) proved that the compounding amount of
Rs.12,000/- was determined by the competent forest officers and the
respondent was directed to recover it from the accused and his associate. The
defence was established on preponderance of probabilities from the
prosecution evidence itself. The appeal and the application for leave has no
merit.
6. Heard learned counsel for both the parties. Perused the record.
7. In case of State of Maharashtra v. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar, reported in
(2008) 9 SCC 475, following principles governing the grant of leave against
an order of acquittal were laid down-
"19. Now, Section 378 of the Code provides for filing of appeal by the State in case
of acquittal. Sub-section (3) declares that no appeal “shall be entertained except with
the leave of the High Court”. It is, therefore, necessary for the State where it is
aggrieved by an order of acquittal recorded by a Court of Session to file an
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
6 MCRC-5158-2022
application for leave to appeal as required by sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the
Code. It is also true that an appeal can be registered and heard on merits by the High
Court only after the High Court grants leave by allowing the application filed under
sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Code.
20. In our opinion, however, in deciding the question whether requisite leave should
or should not be granted, the High Court must apply its mind, consider whether a
prima facie case has been made out or arguable points have been raised and not
whether the order of acquittal would or would not be set aside.
21. It cannot be laid down as an abstract proposition of law of universal application
that each and every petition seeking leave to prefer an appeal against an order of
acquittal recorded by a trial court must be allowed by the appellate court and every
appeal must be admitted and decided on merits. But it also cannot be overlooked that
at that stage, the court would not enter into minute details of the prosecution
evidence and refuse leave observing that the judgment of acquittal recorded by the
trial court could not be said to be “perverse” and, hence, no leave should be granted.
22. In Sita Ram v. State of U.P. [(1979) 2 SCC 656 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 576] this Court
held that: (SCC p. 669, para 31)

“31. … A single right of appeal is more or less a universal requirement of the
guarantee of life and liberty rooted in the [concept] that men are fallible, that
Judges are men and that making assurance doubly sure, before irrevocable
deprivation of life or liberty comes to pass, a full-scale re-examination of the
facts and the law is made an integral part of fundamental fairness or
procedure.”
We are aware and mindful that the above observations were made in connection with
an appeal at the instance of the accused. But the principle underlying the above rule
lies in the doctrine of human fallibility that “Men are fallible” and “Judges are also
men”.
It is keeping in view the said object that the principle has to be understood and
applied.
23. Now, every crime is considered as an offence against the society as a whole and
not only against an individual even though it is an individual who is the ultimate
sufferer. It is, therefore, the duty of the State to take appropriate steps when an
offence has been committed.
24. We may hasten to clarify that we may not be understood to have laid down an
inviolable rule that no leave should be refused by the appellate court against an order
of acquittal recorded by the trial court. We only state that in such cases, the appellate
court must consider the relevant material, sworn testimonies of prosecution witnesses
and record reasons why leave sought by the State should not be granted and the order
of acquittal recorded by the trial court should not be disturbed. Where there is
application of mind by the appellate court and reasons (may be in brief) in support of
such view are recorded, the order of the court may not be said to be illegal or
objectionable. At the same time, however, if arguable points have been raised, if the
material on record discloses deeper scrutiny and reappreciation, review or
reconsideration of evidence, the appellate court must grant leave as sought and
decide the appeal on merits. In the case on hand, the High Court, with respect, did
neither. In the opinion of the High Court, the case did not require grant of leave. But
it also failed to record reasons for refusal of such leave.
xxx xxx xxx
32. Now, so far as powers of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal are
concerned, no restrictions have been imposed by the Code on such powers while
dealing with an order against acquittal. In an appeal against acquittal, the High Court
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
7 MCRC-5158-2022
has full power to reappreciate, review and reweigh at large the evidence on which the
order of acquittal is founded and to reach its own conclusion on such evidence. Both
questions of fact and of law are open to determination by the appellate court.
33. It is no doubt true that in a case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in
favour of the respondent-accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available
to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person
should be presumed innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law.
Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence
is further reinforced by the trial court (and certainly not weakened). Nonetheless, it is
not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal under
challenge is convinced that the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court is
“perverse”, it cannot interfere. If the appellate court on reappreciation of evidence
and keeping in view well-established principles, comes to a contrary conclusion and
records conviction, such conviction cannot be said to be contrary to law.
34. Recently, in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC
(Cri) 325, after considering all leading decisions on the point, one of us (C.K.
Thakker, J.) laid down the following general principles regarding powers of the
appellate court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal:

“(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider
the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or
condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence
before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling reasons’, ‘good
and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusions’,
‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an
appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in
the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to emphasise the reluctance of an
appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court
to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal,
there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption
of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is
proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having
secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on
record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded
by the trial court.”
35. The High Court, in our judgment, was not right in rejecting the application
for leave on the ground that the judgment of the trial court could not be termed
as “perverse”. If, on the basis of the entire evidence on record, the order of
acquittal is illegal, unwarranted or contrary to law, such an order can be set
aside by an appellate court. Various expressions, such as, “substantial and
compelling reasons”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”,
“glaring mistakes”, “judgment being perverse”, etc. are more in the nature of
“flourishes of language” than restricting ambit and scope of powers of the
appellate court. They do not curtail the authority of the appellate court in
interfering with an order of acquittal recorded by the trial court. The judgment
of the High Court, with respect, falls short of the test laid down by this Court in
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
8 MCRC-5158-2022
various cases referred to in Chandrappa [(2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC
(Cri) 325] . The order of the High Court, therefore, cannot stand and must be
set aside."
8. In case of Satyavir Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2010) 3

SCC 174, it was held that -
“In addition to the above re-statement of principles, the Court also referred to what
findings could be termed as ‘perverse’ so as to call for interference by the higher
court hearing the appeal against judgment of acquittal. ‘Perverse’ was stated to be a
behaviour which most of the people would take wrong, unacceptable, unreasonable
and a ‘perverse’ verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the
weight of the evidence but is altogether against the evidence. Besides, a finding
being ‘perverse’, it could also suffer from the infirmity of distorted conclusions and
glaring mistakes. In addition thereto there can be cases where for substantial and
compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances and to
avoid the ends of justice being defeated, the higher courts have to interfere with the
judgment of acquittal recorded by the lower court."
9. In case of B.Jayaraj Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2014) 13
SCC 55, the complainant did not support the prosecution, therefore, declared
hostile. The prosecution did not examine any other witness present at the
time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the
complainant to prove that money was given pursuant to the demand made by
the accused. The Supreme Court held that when the complainant has
disowned the allegation made in the complaint and in absence of other
evidence with regard to proof of demand by the accused, the evidence of the
complainant and the complaint could not be relied upon as proof of demand
by the accused. It was further held that mere possession and recovery of
currency notes from the accused without any proof of demand would not
establish the offence punishable under Sections 7 or 13(1)(d) (i) and (ii) of
the Act, 1988. It was also held that the presumption under Section 20 of the
Act, 1988, could be drawn only if there was proof of "acceptance of illegal
gratification" for which proof of demand was a sine qua non.
10. In case of P. Satyanarayana Murthy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
9 MCRC-5158-2022
reported in (2015) 10 SCC 152, the complainant died before the evidence.

The Supreme Court held that proof of demand of illegal gratification is
gravamen for offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of
the Act, 1988. Mere acceptance of any amount by way of gratification or
recovery thereof de hors the proof of demand would not be sufficient to bring
home the charge under aforesaid sections of the Act, 1988. The proof of
demand is a sine qua-non and in the absence of proof of demand, legal
presumption under Section 20 of the Act, 1988, cannot be raised.
11. In case of Hazari Lal Vs. State (Delhi Administration) reported in
(1980) 2 SCC 390, the Supreme Court observed that it is not necessary to
prove passing of money by direct evidence. The Court may presume the
existence of any fact which happened in any course of natural events, human
conduct and public business under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
The accused had taken the currency notes from his pocket and flung them
across the wall. It was proved that the currency notes were obtained from the
complainant a few minutes earlier. Considering the legal presumption,
accused was held guilty for the offence.
12. Relying on Hazari Lal (supra), the three Judge Bench of the Supreme
Court in case of N. Narsinga Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in
(2001) 1 SCC 691 held that once it was established that there was a demand
or acceptance of illegal gratification and once the foundational facts were
proved, the legal presumption for payment or acceptance of illegal
gratification for motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do official act is
applicable.
13. In case of N. Narsinga Rao (supra), the complainant and other witnesses
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
10 MCRC-5158-2022
turned hostile and denied that appellant had demanded bribe. The appellant

raised the defence that tainted currency notes were forcefully stuffed into his
pocket. The Supreme Court observed that the circumstance preceding and
succeeding the discovery of tainted currency notes from the pocket of
appellant is sufficient to draw a factual presumption that appellant had
willingly received the tainted currency notes. It was further observed that
since the prosecution has proved that appellant had accepted gratification.
The Court was under legal obligation to draw statutory presumption that
such gratification was accepted as a reward for doing the public duty. The
two witnesses examined in defence were unable to rebut the presumption
and, hence, accused was found guilty.
14. In case of Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2023) 4
SCC 731, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court considered all these
precedents to answer the reference:
"Question for consideration:
45. On consideration of the aforesaid cases, the question framed for determination by
the larger Bench is as under:
“(1) Whether, in the absence of evidence of complainant/direct or primary evidence
of demand of illegal gratification, is it not permissible to draw an inferential
deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d)
read with Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 based on other
evidence adduced by the prosecution?”
The reference was answered by holding in following terms:-
88.1. (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant
as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of
the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13 (1)(d) (i) and(ii) of the Act.
88.2. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first
prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of
fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the
nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence.
88.3. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of
illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of
direct oral and documentary evidence.
88.4. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of
illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in
mind:
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
11 MCRC-5158-2022
(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand
from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the
illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In
such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.
(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe
giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn
is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of
obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public
servant. This is an offence under Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the
demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the
prosecution as a fact in issue.
In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything
more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13 (1)(d), (i) and (ii)
respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home
the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is
accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior
demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a
payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of
obtainment under Section 13 (1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act.
88.5. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or
obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an
inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and
documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on
record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering
whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a
presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal
presumption stands.
88.6. (f) In the event the complainant turns ‘hostile’ or has died or is unavailable to
let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by
letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either
orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by
circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of
acquittal of the accused public servant.
88.7. (g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in
issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal
gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said
Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or
a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal.
Section 20 does not apply to Section 13 (1) (d) (i) and (ii) of the Act.
88.8. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is
distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a
mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.
89. In view of the aforesaid discussion and conclusions, we find that there is no
conflict in the three judge Bench decisions of this Court in B. Jayaraj and P.
Satyanarayana Murthy with the three judge Bench decision in M. Narasinga Rao,
with regard to the nature and quality of proof necessary to sustain a conviction for
offences under Sections 7 or 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act, when the direct evidence
of the complainant or “primary evidence” of the complainant is unavailable owing to
his death or any other reason. The position of law when a complainant or prosecution
witness turns “hostile” is also discussed and the observations made above would

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
12 MCRC-5158-2022
accordingly apply in light of Section 154 of the Evidence Act. In view of the
aforesaid discussion, we hold that there is no conflict between the judgments in the
aforesaid three cases.
90. Accordingly, the question referred for consideration of this Constitution Bench is
answered as under:

In the absence of evidence of the complainant (direct/primary,
oral/documentary evidence) it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction
of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d)
read with Section 13(2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the
prosecution."
15. The material on record is examined in the light of aforestated
propositions of law.
Testimony of the Complainant:
16. The principal contention of the applicant is that the complainant
Subhash Yadav (PW-4) supported the prosecution in his examination-in-
chief and was won over by the time of his cross-examination. It is settled law
that the evidence of a hostile witness is not to be effaced or discarded
altogether and may be accepted to the extent it is found trustworthy on
careful scrutiny. (see- Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari v. State of M.P. , (1991) 3
SCC 627). However, the record reveals that the factual foundation of the said
contention is absent. The trial Court in paragraphs 29 to 31 and 84 of the
impugned judgment noted that the complainant did not support the
allegations even in his examination-in-chief. He did not recollect the purpose
or contents of the application (Exhibit P-10) and gave inconsistent versions
regarding the date of demand and payment. In cross-examination recorded
on the very same day, i.e. 01.06.2016, the complainant in paragraphs 10 and
11 admitted that the respondent had told him that if the forest case was not
compounded as per rules, the challan would be filed in Court and the
compounding amount of Rs.6,000/- each was to be deposited by him and
Shambhu. the case would come to an end after such deposit of compounding
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
13 MCRC-5158-2022
amount. In paragraph 15 of his further cross-examination dated 25.07.2016,

he categorically stated that the respondent never demanded money as bribe.
Since the partial admissions favouring the defence were made on the same
day, the inference of the witness having been won over by passage of time is
not available. The trial Court, therefore, correctly distinguished the law laid
down in the judgment in Khujji (supra). The trial Court did not discard the
testimony of the complainant in its entirety rather, examined his testimony
as a whole, including the portions which are consistent with the documentary
evidence regarding the forest offence case.
17. The complaint (Exhibit P-11) and the second application (Exhibit P-10)
are not substantive evidence. They are previous statements of the
complainant which can be used only to corroborate or contradict him under
Sections 157 or 145 of the Evidence Act. (Dharma Rama Bhagare v. State of
Maharashtra, (1973) 1 SCC 537; Harkirat Singh v. State of Punjab, (1997)
11 SCC 215 relied). Mere, admission of signatures on the complaint cannot
constitute substantive proof of its contents, particularly when the
complainant admittedly referred the demand of amount to the compounding
amount of the forest offence. It is, therefore, to be examined whether the
alleged demand is otherwise established by cogent and reliable direct or
circumstantial evidence, as laid down in case of Neeraj Dutta (supra).
Electronic Evidence – Recorded Conversation and Transcript:
18. The prosecution attempted to prove the demand through the
conversation allegedly recorded on 14.03.2014 in the digital voice recorder,
the compact disc (Article A-1) prepared on 20.03.2014 and the transcript
Panchnama (Exhibit P-14). The primary evidence, original digital voice
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
14 MCRC-5158-2022
recorder or its memory card was neither produced nor played before the trial

Court, to verify the contents (recorded conversation). A compact disc being a
secondary electronic record, the certificate under Section 65(B)(4) of the
Evidence Act is a mandatory condition for its admissibility and oral evidence
cannot substitute the same. The Trap Laying Officer D.S. Raghuvanshi (PW-
5) admitted in paragraphs 34, 35 and 53 of his cross-examination that he did
not himself prepare the compact disc from the digital voice recorder. The
compact disc was prepared by an expert, who neither issued a certificate
under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act nor was examined before the trial
Court. The certificate (Exhibit P-27) was issued by TLO, D.S.
Raghuvanshi. The Trap Laying Officer D.S. Raghuvanshi (PW-5) admitted
in paragraphs 34, 35 and 53 of his cross-examination that he did not himself
prepare the compact disc from the digital voice recorder. The compact disc
was prepared by an expert, who neither issued a certificate under Section 65-
B of the Evidence Act nor was examined before the trial Court. The
certificate (Exhibit P-27) was issued by TLO, D.S. Raghuvanshi.
19. Section 65-B of the Evidence Act, provides as under:-
Admissibility of electronic records.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any information contained in an
electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or
magnetic media produced by a computer (hereinafter referred to as the computer
output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this
section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall
be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original,
as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct
evidence would be admissible.
(2) The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a computer output shall
be the following, namely:-
(a) the computer output containing the information was produced by the
computer during the period over which the computer was used regularly to
store or process information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried
on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the
computer;
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
15 MCRC-5158-2022
(b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic
record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived was
regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities;
(c) throughout the material part of the said period, the computer was operating
properly or, if not, then in respect of any period in which it was not operating
properly or was out of operation during that part of the period, was not such as
to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents; and
(d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived
from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said
activities.
3) Where over any period, the function of storing or processing information for the
purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in clause
(a) of sub-section (2) was regularly performed by computers, whether-

(a) by a combination of computers operating over that period; or
(b) by different computers operating in succession over that period; or
(c) by different combinations of computers operating in succession over that
period; or
(d) in any other manner involving the successive operation over that period, in
whatever order, of one or more computers and one or more combinations of
computers,
all the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the
purposes of this section as constituting a single computer; and references in this
section to a computer shall be construed accordingly.
(4) In any proceedings where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of
this section, a certificate doing any of the following things, that is to say,-
(a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing
the manner in which it was produced;
(b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that
electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the
electronic record was produced by a computer;
(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-
section (2) relate,
and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible official
position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management
of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any
matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall
be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of
the person stating it.
5. ..............
20. Thus, a valid certificate under Section 65-B must contain the
conditions mandated by Sub-section (2), (3) and (4) of Section 65-B of the
Evidence Act for admissibility of the electronic record. The certificate under
Section 65-B of the Evidence Act (Exhibit P-27) merely states that the
conversation recorded in voice recorder was transferred on compact disc
through laptop. It does not comply with the conditions mandated under Sub-
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
16 MCRC-5158-2022
section (2), (3) and (4) of Section 65-B of the Evidence Act. Therefore, the

certificate (Exhibit P-27) is not sufficient to attract admissibility of compact
disc containing recorded conversation. [(Rajaram Badole vs. SPE, Lokayukt)
order dated 25.01.2018 passed by the co-ordinate Bench of the High Court of
M.P. in Cr.A. No.1458/2015; Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer , (2014) 10 SCC
473; Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7
SCC 1 relied]
21. Apart from the defect of admissibility, the identity of the voices in the
recorded conversation was also not established. No scientific voice
comparison was conducted. The complainant Subhash (PW-4) was the only
witness who could identify the voices. He stated in cross-examination that he
had recorded the conversation on his own mobile phone 3-4 days prior to
13.03.2014. When the compact disc was played in Court on 25.07.2016, he
specifically denied his own voice and voice of respondent in the recorded
conversation. Rather, he denied the conversation with the respondent
altogether. The Panch witnesses, Anil Kumar (PW-3) and M.S. Bhalavi
(PW-9) could not recollect when and where they heard the compact disc or
how it was prepared. The transcript (Exhibit P-14) is derivative of
the recorded conversation. It has no independent evidentiary value once the
recording and the identity of the voices are not proved. Thus, the trial Court
in paragraphs 46 to 50 and 76 to 79 of the impugned judgment committed no
error in holding that the recorded conversation and the transcript do not
establish the demand of illegal gratification.
Trap Proceedings and Recovery:
2 2 . According to the prosecution, the respondent/respondent received the
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
17 MCRC-5158-2022
tainted currency notes and on seeing the trap party approaching, entered the

forest chowki and threw the currency notes near the wall. However, the
complainant (PW-4) deposed that when he first went to the Balai Forest
Chowki to deposit the fine, the respondent asked him to bring a bank draft in
the name of the S.D.O. (Forest), when he informed the police officials, they
asked him to leave the money at the chowki by any means and sent two
police personnel with him. The respondent refused to accept the money,
whereupon he threw the money near the wall and came out (para -16). The
independent Panch witness, Anil Kumar (PW-3) corroborated that the
complainant returned from the chowki and informed the police personnel
that the respondent had refused to accept cash and was asking for the
compounding fee by bank draft. Thus, the testimony of the independent
Panch witness supports the defence on the crucial aspect of the nature of the
demand.
23. The Trap Laying Officer, D.S. Raghuvanshi (PW-5), deposed that the
trap party saw the respondent accept the money on the road and thereafter
enter the forest building. However, this version is not recorded in the spot
map (Exhibit P-7), the action plan map (Exhibit P-22) or the final trap
Panchnama (Exhibit P-18), all of which were prepared by him. In paragraphs
39 to 43 of his cross-examination, he admitted that the place of acceptance
of the tainted currency notes on the road was not shown in the spot map. No
other member of the trap party deposed to have seen the respondent accept
the money on the road. There are also material inconsistencies amongst the
members of the trap party as to who accompanied the complainant to the
chowki and when the Panch witnesses reached the spot. The trial Court, in
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
18 MCRC-5158-2022
paragraphs 63 to 67 of the impugned judgment, rightly held that these

contradictions go to the root of the trap proceedings and render the version of
the Trap Laying Officer doubtful. These discrepancies cannot be termed as
mere technical irregularities in the preparation of the memorandum of
proceedings.
2 4 . The tainted currency notes were found lying on the floor. They were
not recovered from the person or exclusive possession of the respondent.
They were also not recovered at the instance of the respondent, but on the
information given by the complainant. The complainant Subhash Yadav
(PW-4) and the Panch witness Anil Kumar (PW-3) deposed that the
respondent was made to pick up the currency notes from the floor and place
them on the table, and that his hand wash was conducted thereafter. The
Panch witness M.S. Bhalavi (PW-9), who had picked up the currency notes,
deposed that his hands were never washed. In these circumstances, the trial
Court, in paragraphs 72 to 74 of the impugned judgment, rightly concluded
that the presence of phenolphthalein in the hand wash of the respondent
stands plausibly explained. The positive phenolphthalein test merely
establishes contact with the tainted currency notes. In the absence of proof of
demand, it does not by itself prove conscious acceptance of illegal
gratification (B. Jayaraj (supra); Jaswinder Singh v. State of Punjab, reported
in 2026 INSC 1031 and P. Somaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh , reported in
2025 INSC 1263 relied). Further, the forest guard Sitaram Dhurve was not
examined, who was admittedly present at the chowki. The trial Court, in
paragraph 75 of the impugned judgment, rightly treated this omission as a
relevant circumstance.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
19 MCRC-5158-2022
Defence of Compounding Fee:

25. It is not disputed that the respondent registered a forest offence case
(P.O.R.) under Section 26(1)(f) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 against the
complainant and Shambhu Adivasi on 09.03.2014 for six pieces of teak
timber. Thus, the respondent was instrumental in the prosecution of
complainant. However, the prosecution witnesses, i.e. Forest Ranger Patiram
Karochi (PW-1), DFO K.S. Chauhan (PW-2) and Deputy Ranger Murli
Kumar Arya (PW-8), deposed that the value of the seized timber was
assessed around Rs.14,000/- and that a compounding amount of Rs.12,000/-
was determined by the forest officers. The respondent, as the Deputy Ranger
concerned, was required to communicate the amount to the offenders and
facilitate its recovery. In paragraph 19 of his cross-examination, Murli
Kumar Arya (PW-8) admitted that the forest officers had directed the
respondent to discuss the recovery of Rs.12,000/- with the offenders ( the
complainant and his associate). The figure of Rs.6,000/- each for the two
offenders coincides with the amount allegedly demanded. The material on
record does not show that the respondent purported to compound the offence
himself. Rather, the compounding amount was determined by the competent
Forest officers and the respondent had asked the complainant to deposit it by
bank draft in favour of the S.D.O. (Forest). Thus, the demand of an amount
payable to the State through an official mode cannot be presumed to be a
demand of gratification by the public servant. The trial Court in paragraphs
81 and 82 of the impugned judgment correctly appreciated the evidence on
record to conclude that the prosecution has failed to prove the demand of
illegal gratification by the accused.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
20 MCRC-5158-2022
26. The contention of the applicant that the defence of compounding fee is

an afterthought is also not sustainable. The version that the respondent
refused to accept cash and asked for a bank draft was deposed to by the
complainant (PW-4) and the independent Panch witness Anil Kumar (PW-
3). The assessment of the compounding amount stands proved through the
prosecution witnesses (Forest Officers) and the documentary evidence. The
trial Court, in paragraphs 80 to 82 of the impugned judgment, rightly held
that the possibility of the respondent having asked the complainant to deposit
the compounding fee could not be ruled out and that such possibility is
strengthened by his refusal to accept cash.
Presumption under Section 20 of the Act, 1988:
27. The presumption under Section 20 of the Act, 1988 is a legal
presumption, but it arises only upon proof of the foundational fact that the
public servant accepted or obtained gratification. Further, Section 20 has no
application to the offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act, 1988. (Neeraj
Dutta (supra) relied). In the present case, the demand was not proved, the
voluntary acceptance was found doubtful and the tainted currency notes were
not recovered from the possession of the respondent. Rather, the plausibility
of explanation was established from the prosecution evidence itself.
Therefore, the trial Court in paragraph 83 of the impugned judgment
committed no error in declining to raise the presumption under Section 20 of
the Act, 1988.
Conclusion:
28. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of considered opinion
that the prosecution failed to establish the foundational facts of demand,
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
21 MCRC-5158-2022
voluntary acceptance or conscious obtainment of illegal gratification. The

complainant did not support the allegation of demand of bribe and attributed
the demand to the compounding of the forest offence. The recorded
conversation was not proved through admissible electronic evidence and
reliable voice identification. The independent Panch witness supported the
defence version that the respondent refused to accept cash and asked for a
bank draft in favour of the DFO. The version of the trap laying officer
regarding acceptance is contradicted by his own spot map and memorandum
of trap proceeding. The tainted currency notes were not recovered from the
possession of the respondent. The prosecution evidence itself established that
the compounding amount was determined by competent forest officers. In
these circumstances, the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Act,
1988 could not be invoked. Consequently, the view taken by the trial Court
is founded on a proper appreciation of the evidence. The findings are neither
palpably wrong nor manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. On
the contrary, the view taken is reasonable and plausible. The record does not
disclose any misreading or omission of material evidence, perversity in
reasoning or other compelling ground to interfere in the finding of acquittal.
No arguable case requiring further scrutiny or reappreciation of the evidence
is made out. (Aman Bhatia v. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 1013; N. Vijayakumar v. State of T.N. reported in (2021) 3 SCC
687 and P. Somaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh , reported in 2025 INSC
1263 relied).
29. Accordingly, leave to appeal against the judgment of acquittal dated
07.09.2021 passed by the Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act,
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:92344
22 MCRC-5158-2022
1988), Betul, in Special Case No. 02/2015 (SC LOK/300002/2015) is

declined.
30. Consequently, the M.Cr.C. is dismissed.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
b

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHARTI GADGE
Signing time: 11/20/2026
4:54:28 PM