State Of U.P. Thru. Collector Faizabad And Another vs Shrimati Afsar Jahan And 2 Others

Court
Allahabad High Court

A.F.R.
Neutral Citation No. -
2026:AHC-LKO:81973
Reserved on: 23.10.2026
Delivered on: 16.11.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
CIVIL MISC REVIEW APPLICATION DEFECTIVE No. - 69 of 2026
State of U.P. Thru. Collector Faizabad and another
…..Applicant(s)
Versus
Shrimati Afsar Jahan and 2 others
…..Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Applicant(s) : C.S.C.,
Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : Mohd. Aslam Khan,
Court No. - 4
HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.
1. Heard Sri Pratyush Kumar, learned Additional Advocate General
assisted by Sri Nishant Shukla, learned counsel for review applicant –
State and Sri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri
Shadab Khan, learned counsel for the respondent.
2. Present review application has been filed under Rule 12 Chapter V
of Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 seeking review of the judgment
and order dated 20.08.2025 passed in Writ-C No.3000065 of 1997; Smt.
Afsar Jahan Vs. State of U.P. and others on the following grounds:
“I. Because the respondents-petitioners had the
remedy to prefer appeal under Section 13 of the Act, which
was by-passed without any cogent reasons.
II. Because the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling
on Lands Holdings Act, 1960 is a Special Enactment and
overrides the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Muslim Waqf
Act, 1960, hence, there was no requirement to issue notice
to the Board in the given circumstance.
III. Because there was nothing in the procedure laid
down in the Civil Procedure Code which required a notice
to be given to the board in a case in which there was a
contention relating to woof property. Such a provision was
to be found only in the Uttar Pradesh Muslim wants Act,
1960, which was not made applicable to the cases arising

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CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
under the Act by providing specifically or impliedly for
such an application of the said Act.
IV. Because Para 31(2) of the UP Act no. 20 of 1976
deals with a situation where "an order determining the
surplus land in relation to a tenure-holder has been made
under the Principal Act before 17.01.1975 and the
Prescribed Authority is required to redetermine the surplus
land......... only in those cases, the pending appeals under
Section 13 of the Act are deemed abated, but in the present
case, the order. dated 31.12.1974 determining the surplus
land has already been made and there was requirement to
re-determine the surplus land, hence, the order dated
31.12.1974 as well as appellate order, both are just and
sustainable in the eyes of law.
V. Because the land-in-question was not a waqf
property prior to 01.05.1959 and hence, the case of the
respondents-petitioners does not fall within certain
conditions given under the provisions contained under
Section 6(f) of the Act, so as to gain the benefit of the Act,
1960.
VI. Because the orders under challenge in the present
writ petition, have been passed after affording due
opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned and also,
after duly adhering the applicable rules and laws.
VII. Because as per the provisions contained under
Section 6 and 7 of the Act, the provisions of the Act (being
the special act) will have overriding effect over the other
general civil laws.
VIII. Because the provisions of UP Act No. 20 of 1976
have been wrongly construed by this Hon'ble Court, which
is evident from paragraphs 17 and 18 of the impugned
Judgment and Order dated 20.08.2025, resulting in
findings, which are not sustainable in the eyes of law.
IX. Because in catena of judgments, the Hori'ble
Supreme Court as well as various Hon'ble High Courts
have held that when a statutory forum is created by law for
redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be
entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.
X. Because, on the basis of above mentioned facts and
circumstance impugned Judgment and Order dated:
20.08.2025 passed by this Hon'ble Court in Writ-C No.
3000065 of 1997 titled as "Snt. Afsar Jahan Versus State of
UP arıd others" is required to be reviewed.
XI. Because, the Judgment and order under review will
also affect the merit of the case and as such the same is
liable to be reviewed.”
3. Submission of learned Additional Advocate General for the review
applicant is that the delay in filing the present Review application is

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CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
neither deliberate nor intentional, but has occurred due to bona fide
administrative procedures involved in obtaining legal opinions and
requisite approval from the competent authorities of the State
Government. The chronology of official correspondence demonstrates
that the matter was continuously pursued by the concerned authorities
and there was no wilful negligence or inaction on their part.
4. It is contended that the review applicant, immediately after the
judgment dated 20.08.2025, initiated the process of examining the
feasibility of challenging the same. However, divergent legal opinions
were received regarding the appropriate remedy, necessitating further
consultation with the learned Chief Standing Counsel and other legal
authorities. Ultimately, upon receipt of the opinion dated 21.01.2026, the
decision to file the review application was taken and requisite
permission was granted on 30.01.2026. Thereafter, necessary documents
were forwarded for filing the review application.
5. Learned Additional Advocate General submits that the delay
occasioned on account of inter-departmental correspondence,
examination of records, obtaining legal opinion and administrative
sanction constitutes sufficient cause within the meaning of limitation
law. The State, being an institutional litigant, is required to follow
prescribed administrative procedures before initiating legal proceedings,
and such procedural time cannot, in the facts of the present case, be
treated as deliberate or culpable negligence.
6. It is further submitted that the expression "sufficient cause"
deserves a liberal and justice-oriented interpretation so that substantial
justice is not defeated on technical grounds.
7. It is lastly submitted that the explanation furnished by the review
applicant is bona fide , supported by contemporaneous official
correspondence and establishes sufficient cause for the delay.
Accordingly, the learned Additional Advocate General prays that the
delay in filing the review application be condoned and the matter be

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CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
considered on merits rather than being rejected on technical grounds of
limitation.
8. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the review
applicant further submits that the judgment and order dated 20.08.2025
passed in Writ-C No. 3000065 of 1997 suffers from errors apparent on
the face of the record, inasmuch as this Hon'ble Court, while allowing
the writ petition, failed to consider the relevant statutory provisions of
the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960, the
material documentary evidence available on record and the legal
objections specifically raised by the review applicant in its counter
affidavit.
9. It is contended that the land in dispute was subjected to ceiling
proceedings, wherein the Prescribed Authority, vide order dated
31.12.1974, determined 278 Bighas 16 Biswas 15 Biswansi as surplus
land of Sri Yawar Hussain Khan. The said determination was also
subjected to statutory appellate proceedings and the appeal was
dismissed by the Civil Judge, Faizabad, vide order dated 23.04.1976.
Thus, the subsequent proceedings initiated through notices dated
20.12.1996 and 16.01.1997 were merely for taking possession of the
surplus land already determined under the ceiling proceedings and did
not involve any fresh determination or re-determination of surplus land.
10. Learned Additional Advocate General submits that this Hon'ble
Court, while passing the impugned judgment, failed to appreciate the
correct scope and applicability of paragraph 31(2) of the U.P. Imposition
of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1976, being U.P. Act
No. 20 of 1976. The said provision contemplates re-determination of
surplus land in the circumstances specified therein. However, in the
present case, the determination of surplus land had already been made by
the Prescribed Authority vide order dated 31.12.1974 and the subsequent
proceedings were only consequential proceedings for implementation of
the said determination. The failure to distinguish between re-
determination of surplus land and implementation of an already

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CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
concluded determination has materially affected the findings recorded in
the judgment under review.
11. It is further submitted that the provisions of the Ceiling Act, being
a special enactment, were required to be considered in their proper
perspective. This Hon'ble Court also failed to appreciate that the ceiling
proceedings were undertaken in accordance with the statutory provisions
governing the determination of surplus land and that the provisions of
Sections 6 and 7 of the Act were relevant for deciding the controversy.
The statutory scheme could not have been overlooked while examining
the legality of the consequential proceedings.
12. Learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the
claim of the writ petitioners regarding exemption of the land under
Section 6(f) of the Ceiling Act was not supported by legally sufficient
documentary evidence establishing that the land in question was held by
or under a public religious or charitable Waqf before 01.05.1959 and that
its income was wholly utilised for religious or charitable purposes. The
application for registration of the Waqf was submitted on 22.11.1959,
whereas the certificate under Section 29 of the U.P. Muslim Waqfs Act
was issued only on 23.03.1973. These material circumstances, together
with the documents relating to the ownership of the land executed on
08.02.1960, required consideration while determining the applicability
of the exemption claimed under Section 6(f). The relevant distinction
between the alleged creation of the Waqf and the statutory requirement
concerning the holding of land before the prescribed date was not
adequately examined.
13. It is also submitted that the Prescribed Authority, while
considering the ceiling proceedings relating to different villages, had
separately examined the claim of Waqf and accepted the exemption in
respect of land situated in village Poorey Lal Khan by order dated
30.06.1962, but did not accept the same claim in respect of the
remaining villages. The said distinction was material and required
independent consideration. The finding recorded in respect of one village

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CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
could not automatically be extended to other villages without examining
the relevant evidence and statutory requirements applicable to the
respective holdings.
14. Learned Additional Advocate General contends that the impugned
judgment also failed to consider that the respondents-writ petitioners had
an efficacious statutory remedy of appeal under Section 13 of the Ceiling
Act against the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority. They
approached this Hon'ble Court after an unexplained delay of
approximately 21 years from the appellate order dated 23.04.1976,
without establishing any legally sustainable justification for bypassing
the statutory remedy. The issue of availability of an alternative remedy
and the unexplained delay and laches were material legal objections
which required consideration before granting discretionary relief under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
15. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators
Association of India and others, reported in (2011) 14 SCC 337 ,
wherein it has been reiterated that ordinarily, where a statute provides an
effective mechanism for redressal of grievances, the aggrieved party
should avail such statutory remedy instead of bypassing the prescribed
procedure by directly invoking the writ jurisdiction. The exceptions to
this rule are also recognised; however, the circumstances justifying
departure from the ordinary rule were required to be examined in the
present case.
16. It is further submitted that the impugned judgment failed to
appreciate that the Shia Central Board of Waqf had instituted Regular
Suit No. 60 of 1980, which was decreed on 08.05.1990, and the appeal
preferred by the State Government was also dismissed. The effect and
scope of the aforesaid civil court proceedings, particularly in relation to
the statutory ceiling proceedings and the land declared surplus, were
required to be examined independently. The mere existence of
proceedings relating to the Waqf property could not dispense with the

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CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
necessity of examining the applicability of the Ceiling Act and the
statutory exemption claimed thereunder.
17. Learned Additional Advocate General submits that the notices
dated 20.12.1996 and 16.01.1997 were issued only for taking possession
of the land already declared surplus under the order dated 31.12.1974,
which had attained finality after dismissal of the statutory appeal. The
impugned judgment, without properly examining the nature and object
of the subsequent proceedings, proceeded to quash the orders passed by
the Prescribed Authority and the appellate authority, thereby materially
affecting the statutory determination of surplus land.
18. It is lastly contended that the aforesaid statutory provisions,
material documents and legal objections, which were specifically
brought to the notice of this Hon'ble Court through the counter affidavit
filed on behalf of the review applicants, have not received due
consideration in the judgment under review. The omission to consider
material statutory provisions and the legal effect of the earlier
proceedings has resulted in findings which warrant reconsideration
within the scope of the review jurisdiction. The review applicant is,
therefore, not seeking a mere rehearing of the matter or reconsideration
of the entire evidence, but seeks correction of the apparent errors and
material omissions which have affected the ultimate decision.
19. In view of the aforesaid facts and legal submissions, learned
Additional Advocate General submits that the judgment and order dated
20.08.2025 cannot be sustained in law, as the same has been rendered
without proper consideration of the relevant statutory provisions, the
earlier determination of surplus land, the applicability of Section 6(f) and
paragraph 31(2) of the Amendment Act, 1976, and the objections
relating to alternative statutory remedy and delay and laches.
20. Accordingly, learned Additional Advocate General prays that the
Review Application be allowed, the judgment and order dated
20.08.2025 passed by this Hon'ble Court in Writ-C No. 3000065 of 1997
(Smt. Afsar Jahan and another v. State of U.P. and others) be recalled and

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CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
quashed and the writ petition be dismissed, thereby restoring the orders
dated 08.04.1997, 31.12.1974 and 23.04.1976 passed by the competent
authorities. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance upon
following judgments:
a) Shia Central Board of Waqf Vs. State of U.P. and others; 1980
Law Suit (All) 324.
b) Mohd. Jahan Begun & Anr. Vs. Board of Revenue, U.P.
Allahabad and Ors.; 2016 LawSuit (All) 2979.
21. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel for the opposite party raises a
preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the Review
Application and submits that the same has been filed after considerable
delay, without furnishing any legally acceptable or sufficient explanation
for the period of delay. The administrative correspondence and
procedural formalities relied upon by the review applicant cannot, by
themselves, constitute sufficient cause, particularly when the judgment
under review was passed on 20.08.2025 and the review applicant was
fully aware of the proceedings and the relevant facts. The review
applicant cannot seek to reopen concluded proceedings merely on
account of its internal administrative difficulties.
22. It is further submitted that the scope of review jurisdiction is
extremely limited and cannot be equated with appellate jurisdiction. A
review is maintainable only where an error apparent on the face of the
record or any other ground recognised under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the
Code of Civil Procedure is established. The review applicant is, in
substance, seeking a fresh hearing and reconsideration of the findings
already recorded by this Hon'ble Court, which is impermissible in the
exercise of review jurisdiction.
23. On merits, learned Senior Counsel submits that the controversy
regarding the nature and character of the land as Waqf property had
already been examined in the earlier proceedings. The Prescribed
Authority, vide order dated 30.06.1962, had accepted the claim of Waqf
in respect of land situated in village Poorey Lal Khan, holding that the

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CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
oral Waqf had been created by Raja Yasin Ali Khan in 1936 and that the
income derived from the land was utilised for religious and charitable
purposes. Therefore, the review applicant cannot rely merely upon the
subsequent registration of the Waqf to dispute its earlier creation,
particularly when registration and creation of a Waqf are distinct matters.
24. It is contended that the mere fact that the application for
registration of Waqf was submitted on 22.11.1959 and the registration
certificate was issued on 23.03.1973 does not establish that the Waqf
itself came into existence after 01.05.1959. The review applicant has
failed to appreciate the distinction between the creation of a Waqf and its
subsequent registration. The existence of an earlier oral dedication
cannot be negated merely because its formal registration was completed
subsequently.
25. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the reliance placed by
the review applicant upon paragraph 31(2) of the U.P. Imposition of
Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1976, is misconceived.
The statutory provision has to be interpreted in the context of the
legislative scheme and the effect of the amendments upon pending
ceiling proceedings. The review applicant cannot contend that the earlier
order dated 31.12.1974 had attained absolute finality so as to exclude
examination of the subsequent proceedings, particularly when the
controversy regarding the exemption of Waqf property and the legality
of taking possession remained the subject matter of adjudication.
26. It is further submitted that the order dated 31.12.1974 and the
appellate order dated 23.04.1976 could not be treated as conclusive
against the respondents without examining the effect of the subsequent
proceedings and the decree passed by the competent civil court. The Shia
Central Board of Waqf had instituted Regular Suit No. 60 of 1980, which
was decreed on 08.05.1990 and the appeal preferred by the State
Government was also dismissed. Thus, the rights and character of the
property as Waqf property had received consideration in the civil

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CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
proceedings and the review applicant cannot seek to disregard the legal
consequences of the said adjudication.
27. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the Ceiling Act and the
provisions relating to Waqf property were required to be harmoniously
construed. Merely describing the Ceiling Act as a special enactment does
not automatically render the adjudication and findings of the competent
civil court irrelevant. The review applicant has not demonstrated any
apparent error in the judgment under review on this aspect, but is merely
attempting to re-agitate issues which were already considered while
deciding the writ petition.
28. It is also contended that the objection regarding availability of an
alternative remedy under Section 13 of the Ceiling Act does not
constitute a ground for review. The jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not ousted merely
because an alternative statutory remedy is available. The rule of
alternative remedy is a rule of self-imposed restraint and not an absolute
bar. The judgment in the case of Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular
Operators Association of India and others, reported in (2011) 14
SCC 337 , relied upon by the review applicant, itself recognises
exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy, particularly in cases
involving violation of principles of natural justice or other exceptional
circumstances.
29. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the objection
regarding delay and laches of approximately 21 years in filing the
original writ petition cannot be reopened through the present Review
Application. The said issue relates to the merits and maintainability of
the original writ proceedings and, having culminated in a final judgment,
cannot be reconsidered in review unless an apparent error is specifically
demonstrated. The review applicant has failed to establish that any such
error exists in the judgment dated 20.08.2025.
30. It is lastly submitted that the review applicant has not pointed out
any error apparent on the face of the record, discovery of any new and

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CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
important matter or evidence which, despite due diligence, was not
within its knowledge, or any other sufficient ground falling within the
ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. The grounds raised in the Review
Application essentially seek reappreciation of the material already
available on record and substitution of the findings recorded by this
Hon'ble Court with those desired by the review applicant. Such an
exercise would amount to impermissible rehearing of the writ petition.
31. Accordingly, learned Senior Counsel submits that neither the
delay in filing the Review Application deserves to be condoned nor has
the review applicant established any ground warranting exercise of the
limited review jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. The judgment and
order dated 20.08.2025 is based upon consideration of the material and
circumstances of the case and does not suffer from any error apparent on
the face of the record. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance
upon following judgments:
a) Parsion Devi and others Vs. Sumitri Devi and others; (1997) 8
SCC 715.
b) Shiv Ganesh and others Vs. State of U.P. and others; 2005 All
C.J. 2307.
c) Meera Bhanja Vs. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (Smt); (1995)
1 SCC 170.
32. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the parties and perused the material on record.
33. To resolve the controversy involved in the matter, relevant portion
of the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the parties are being
quoted below:
Judgments relied upon by learned counsel for review applicant:
a) Nivedita Sharma (Supra):
“ 11. We have considered the respective
arguments/submissions. There cannot be any dispute that
the power of the High Courts to issue directions, orders
or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus,
certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and prohibition

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CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
under Article 226 of the Constitution is a basic feature of
the Constitution and cannot be curtailed by
parliamentary legislation—L. Chandra Kumar v. Union
of India [(1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] .
However, it is one thing to say that in exercise of the
power vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution,
the High Court can entertain a writ petition against any
order passed by or action taken by the State and/or its
agency/instrumentality or any public authority or order
passed by a quasi-judicial body/authority, and it is an
altogether different thing to say that each and every
petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution must
be entertained by the High Court as a matter of course
ignoring the fact that the aggrieved person has an
effective alternative remedy. Rather, it is settled law that
when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of
grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained
ignoring the statutory dispensation.
26.   We also find that the High Court has taken cognizance
of the statement made on behalf of the counsel for the
petitioners that their clients would challenge Clause (iii)
of para 38 of the State Commission's order by filing an
appeal under Section 19 of the Act and the fact that one of
the aggrieved parties, namely, American Express Bank
Ltd. has already filed an appeal questioning para 38(iii)
of the order of the State Commission. After having noticed
that some of the petitioners were inclined to avail the
remedy of appeal against the particular portion of the
order passed by the State Commission, the High Court
should not have entertained the writ petition filed under
Article 226 of the Constitution and the miscellaneous
petitions filed under Article 227 of the Constitution and
directed them to avail remedy of appeal under Section 19
of the 1986 Act. The appeal is accordingly allowed and
the impugned order [Cellular Operators Assn. of
India   v. Nivedita Sharma, (2010) 166 DLT 558] is set
aside.”
b) Shia Central Board of Waqf (Supra):
“2. The first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner
is that the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority
were bad for want of notice to the Shia. Board under
Section 66(1) of the U.P. Muslim Waqfs Act, 1960
(hereafter referred to as the Waqf Act) which reads as
follows:
“66(1) Notice of suits, etc. by courts—In every suit or
proceeding relating to the title to Waqf property or the
right of a Mutawalli, the court shall issue notice-to the
Board at the cost of the party instituting such suit or
proceeding.”
(Emphasis supplied).
5. According to the petitioner, the respondent No. 4
himself was the Mutawalli under the Waqf. He did receive
notice and adduced evidence before the authorities. In
spite of his being Mutawalli, he never took any steps for

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CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
mutation in favour of the Waqf, in the revenue records
right from 1959 to 1973. Even according to the petitioner
the first application given by the predecessor of
respondent No. 4 to the petitioner Board was dated 22-11-
1959. Even this date was subsequent to the date
mentioned in Section 6(1)(f) of the Ceiling Act. There is
no averment even in the writ petition that the land was
held by a public religious or charitable Waqf from before
1-5-1959, the date relevant under the said clause (f).
5. The two authorities have after consideration of the
evidence recorded concurrent finding negativing the
alleged oral Waqf. This finding has not been shown to
suffer from any patent error and does not, therefore, call
for interference by this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution.”
c) Mohd. Jahan Begun & Anr. (Supra):
“5. The writ jurisdiction exercised under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is an extraordinary discretionary
jurisdiction bestowed on the High Courts. By virtue of
section 141 C.P.C. the provisions of Code of Civil
Procedure do not apply to such proceeding, therefore, the
provision for review as prescribed under Order XLVII,
Rule 1 of the said Code, stricto sensu, does not apply to
writ proceedings. There is no dearth of decisions to the
effect that such powers of review are exercised by this
Court in exercise of its inherent plenary powers to do
complete justice for which no specific provision is
required. It is also very well settled that in view of
explanation to section 141 C.P.C. the Code does not apply
to writ proceedings. Nevertheless the exercise of such
power can be guided by the Principles contained therein.
Reference may be made in this regard to the constitution
Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
Shivdeo Singh v. State of Purjab1, wherein it was held that
“it is sufficient to say that there is nothing under Article
226 of thr Constitution to preclude a High Court from
exercising the power of review which inheres in every
Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of
justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed
by it”.
11. The Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 do not contain
any substantive provision for review of a judgment passed
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India nor do they
prescribe any limitation for exercise of the inherent power
of review, nay, it could not have. The only provision is
contained in Chapter V of Part 1 which is titled
“JURISDICTION OF JUDGES SITTING ALONE OR IN
DIVISION COURTS” and Rule 12 thereto merely
prescribes the procedure as to how an application for
review of a judgment shall be presented before the
Registrar, who after doing the needful as per the said Rule.
On bare perusal of the said Rule the Court finds that it is
not a substantive provision prescribing for a review of
judgment as aforesaid. Though it states that the Registrar
shall present the same before the judge by whom such

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CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
judgment was delivered along with an office report as to
the limitation and sufficiency of Court fees it does not
mean that a limitation has been prescribed for review of a
judgment rendered under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. Chapters XXI and XXII of Part IV of the Rules of the
High Court relate to enforcement of fundamental rights
(writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus and direction or writ
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India other than a
writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus). None of the Rules
therein contain a substantive provision for reviewing a
judgment passed under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India or a limitation for the same.
12. As has already been stated herein above, the power to
review its judgment inheres in this Court as it exercises
plenary jurisdiction to do complete justice and prevent its
miscarriage. As there is no limitation prescribed for
exercise of inherent power, therefore, it would be wrong to
hold that limitation prescribed under Article 124 of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act would govern the
proceedings in question. Thus Article 124 of Limitation
Act, 1963 is not attracted to a Review Petition seeking
review of a judgment rendered under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. Having said so, the Court can not be
unmindful of the legal position that whenever no such
limitation is prescribed the action should be taken within a
reasonable period. The reasonableness of a period would
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and
no hard and fast Rule can be laid down in this regard.
13. In this case the office/registry though it appears to
have calculated the limitation, based on the provision
contained under Article 124 of the Limitation Act, which
was not applicable, made an endorsement that the Review
Petition was within time.
14. In view of the above, the preliminary objection raised
by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the opposite
parties that there is no power of review vested in the Court
for review of the judgment in question or that it was barred
by limitation is hereby rejected. In view of the aforesaid,
the requirement of filing of an application under section 5
of the Limitation Act, 1963 also does not arise though this
Court must hasten to add that an explanation for a delay
specially when it is inordinate and prejudicial to other side
ought to be offered and can be called for by the Court. In
the present case, the judgment was delivered on 27.4.2010.
The certified copy of the corrected judgment was issued on
10.8.2010 after correction having been made on
17.5.2000. The review application was filed on 11.8.2010
in the Court. Thus, the review application was not filed
with inordinate delay. In fact in para 34 a specific plea
was raised that there is no limitation for the filing of a writ
petition and there is also no limitation for the filing of a
review application. Thus, even on the basis of
reasonableness of period, considering the facts of the case,
the application for review is not liable to be thrown out,
as, it was filed within a reasonable period of judgment
passed by the Writ Court.”

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Judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent:
a) Parsion Devi and others (Supra):
“7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be
strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1
CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P.
[AIR 1964 SC 1372 : (1964) 5 SCR 174] (SCR at p. 186)
this Court opined:
“What, however, we are now concerned with is whether
the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case
did not involve any substantial question of law is an ‘error
apparent on the face of the record’). The fact that on the
earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of
facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per
se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be
erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it
would not follow that it was an ‘error apparent on the face
of the record’, for there is a distinction which is real,
though it might not always be capable of exposition,
between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which
could be characterised as vitiated by ‘error apparent’. A
review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an
erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only
for patent error.”
(emphasis ours)
8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury
[(1995) 1 SCC 170] while quoting with approval a
passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak
Sharma [(1979) 4 SCC 389] this Court once again held
that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and
have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to
review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent
on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident
and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can
hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the
record justifying the court to exercise its power of review
under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction
under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an
erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A
review petition, it must be remembered has a limited
purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in
disguise.
10. Considered in the light of this settled position we find
that Sharma, J. clearly overstepped the jurisdiction vested
in the Court under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. The
observations of Sharma, J. that “accordingly, the order in
question is reviewed and it is held that the decree in
question was of composite nature wherein both mandatory
and prohibitory injunctions were provided” and as such
the case was covered by Article 182 and not Article 181
cannot be said to fall within the scope of Order 47 Rule 1
CPC. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous

16
CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
decision and an error apparent on the face of the record.
While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the
latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review
jurisdiction. While passing the impugned order, Sharma, J.
found the order in Civil Revision dated 25-4-1989 as an
erroneous decision, though without saying so in so many
words. Indeed, while passing the impugned order Sharma,
J. did record that there was a mistake or an error apparent
on the face of the record which was not of such a nature,
“which had to be detected by a long-drawn process of
reasons” and proceeded to set at naught the order of
Gupta, J. However, mechanical use of statutorily sanctified
phrases cannot detract from the real import of the order
passed in exercise of the review jurisdiction. Recourse to
review petition in the facts and circumstances of the case
was not permissible. The aggrieved judgment-debtors
could have approached the higher forum through
appropriate proceedings to assail the order of Gupta, J.
and get it set aside but it was not open to them to seek a
“review” of the order of Gupta, J. on the grounds detailed
in the review petition. In this view of the matter, we are of
the opinion that the impugned order of Sharma, J. cannot
be sustained and we accordingly accept this appeal and
set aside the impugned order dated 6-3-1997.”
b) Shiv Ganesh and others (Supra):
“12. Even on merits the applicants have failed to make
out any case for reviewing the judgment. The scope of a
review petition has been explained by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in several decisions. Reference may be made to the
case of Meera Bhanja (Smt.) v. Nirmala Kumar
Chaudhury (Smt.) re-ported in (1995) 1 SCC 170 wherein
it has been observed as follows.
"It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by
way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the
scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1 CPC. In connection
with the limitation of the pow-ers of the Court under
Order 47, Rule 1 while dealing with similar jurisdiction
available to the High Court while seeking review of the
orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this
Court, in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam
Pishak Sharma, speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J.,
has made the fol-lowing pertinent observations (SCC p.
390, para 3).
"It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v.
State of Punjab, there is nothing in Article 226 of the
Constitu-tion to preclude the High Court from exercising
the power of review which is inherent in every Court of
plenary juris-diction to prevent miscarriage of justice or
to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But,
there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of
review. The power of review may be exercised on the
discovery of new and important matter or evidence which,
after the exercise of due diligence was not within the
knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not
be produced by him at the time when the order was made;

17
CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent
on the face of the record is found; that may also be
exercised on any analogous ground. But it may not be
exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous
on merits. That would be the province of a Court of
appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with
appellate power which may enable an appellate Court to
correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate
Court."
Order 47 Rules 1 C.P.C. providing for review reads as
under.
1. Application for review of judgment 80 (1) Any person
considering himself aggrieve- b
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed,
but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed
or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small
Causes, and who from the discovery of new and important
matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due
diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be
produced by him at the time when the decree was passed
or order made, or on account of some mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record, or for any other
sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree
passed or order made against him, may apply for a
review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree
or made the order,"
13. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision make it clear
that review petition can be field on discovery of new
important matter or evidence which even after the
exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or
would not be produced at the time when the decree or
order was passed on account of some mistake or error
apparent on the face of record or for any other sufficient
reason.
14. Thus power of review is not to be confused with the
power of appeal. The power of review cannot be exercised
on the ground that decision is incorrect or erroneous on
merits as the same lies within the ambit of a higher Court
having an appellate power which is in a position to
correct the error committed by the sub-ordinate Courts by
virtue of power of appeal conferred on the said court by
some statute.”
c) Meera Bhanja (Supra):
“8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not
by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to
the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. In
connection with the limitation of the powers of the court
under Order 47, Rule 1, while dealing with similar
jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to
review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, this Court, in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar

18
CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [(1979) 4 SCC 389 :
AIR 1979 SC 1047] , speaking through Chinnappa
Reddy, J., has made the following pertinent
observations: (SCC p. 390, para 3)
“It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v.
State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 1909] , there is nothing in
Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High
Court from exercising the power of review which inheres
in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent
miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable
errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to
the exercise of the power of review. The power of review
may be exercised on the discovery of new and important
matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due
diligence was not within the knowledge of the person
seeking the review or could not be produced by him at
the time when the order was made; it may be exercised
where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the
record is found; it may also be exercised on any
analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the
ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That
would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of
review is not to be confused with appellate power which
may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of
errors committed by the subordinate court.”
9. Now it is also to be kept in view that in the impugned
judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court has
clearly observed that they were entertaining the review
petition only on the ground of error apparent on the face
of the record and not on any other ground. So far as that
aspect is concerned, it has to be kept in view that an
error apparent on the face of record must be such an
error which must strike one on mere looking at the
record and would not require any long-drawn process of
reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two
opinions. We may usefully refer to the observations of
this Court in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan
Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale [AIR 1960
SC 137 : (1960) 1 SCR 890] wherein, K.C. Das Gupta,
J., speaking for the Court has made the following
observations in connection with an error apparent on the
face of the record:
An error which has to be established by a long-drawn
process of reasoning on points where there may
conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an
error apparent on the face of the record. Where an
alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be
established, it has to be established, by lengthy and
complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured
by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing
the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ.
15. In our view the aforesaid approach of the Division
Bench dealing with the review proceedings clearly shows
that it has overstepped its jurisdiction under Order 47,
Rule 1 CPC by merely styling the reasoning adopted by

19
CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
the earlier Division Bench as suffering from a patent
error. It would not become a patent error or error
apparent in view of the settled legal position indicated by
us earlier. In substance, the Review Bench has
reappreciated the entire evidence, sat almost as court of
appeal and has reversed the findings reached by the
earlier Division Bench. Even if the earlier Division
Bench's findings regarding C.S. Plot No. 74 were found
to be erroneous, it would be no ground for reviewing the
same, as that would be the function of an appellate
court. Learned counsel for the respondent was not in a
position to point out how the reasoning adopted and
conclusion reached by the Review Bench can be
supported within the narrow and limited scope of Order
47, Rule 1 CPC. Right or wrong, the earlier Division
Bench judgment had become final so far as the High
Court was concerned. It could not have been reviewed
by reconsidering the entire evidence with a view to
finding out the alleged apparent error for justifying the
invocation of review powers. Only on that short ground,
therefore, this appeal is required to be allowed. The final
decision dated 8-7-1986 of the Division Bench
dismissing the appeal from Appellate Decree No. 569 of
1973 insofar as C.S. Plot No. 74 is concerned as well as
the review judgment dated 5-9-1984 in connection with
the very same plot, i.e., C.S. Plot No. 74, are set aside
and the earlier judgment of the High Court dated 3-8-
1978 allowing the second appeal regarding suit Plot No.
74 is restored. The appeal is accordingly allowed. In the
facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no
order as to costs.”
34. The operative portion of the judgment and order dated 20.08.2025
is also being extracted below:
“17. On perusal of the above-extracted, it is crystal
clear that where an order determining surplus land in
relation to a tenure-holder has been made under the
principal Act before 10.10.1975, the prescribed authority
may, at any time within a period of two years from the
said date, redetermine the surplus land in accordance
with the principal Act as amended by Act No. 20 of 1976,
at any time within a period of two years from the said
date.
18. In the present case, during pendency of appeal
before the District Judge, Faizabad, U.P. Imposition of
Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1976 i.e.
U.P. Act No.20 of 1976 came into force and as per the
above-extracted provisions, the entire proceedings
pending including the appeals had to abate and the the
Prescribed Authority was empowered to issue a fresh
notice for determination of the surplus area of a tenure
holder only within a period of 2 years from 10.10.1975,
but no notice was ever issued either to Shia Central Waqf
Board or to Yawar Husain or to the petitioner and in this
view of the matter, notice issued on 20.12.1996
(Annexure-8) and 16.1.1997 (Annexure-9) are illegal and

20
CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
without jurisdiction and order passed by the Prescribed
Authority in regard to taking possession over the surplus
land is contrary to the provisions of the Act.
19. It is also pertinent of the mention that the State of
U.P. filed an appeal (Civil No.60 of 1990) before the
District Judge, Faizabad against the order dated 8.5.1990
vide which IInd Additional Civil Judge, Faizabad held
that the land in suit was waqf property and the possession
could not be disturbed in pursuance to the judgment
dated 31.12.1974 passed by the Prescribed Authority,
which was dismissed vide judgment dated 30.11.1996.
Thereafter, no second appeal was filed against the order
dated 30.11.1996 and the said order became final.
20. Considering in totalities of facts and circumstances of
this case, order dated 8.4.1997 as annexed as
Annexure-1, order dated 31.12.1974 passed by the
Prescribed Authority and order dated 23.4.1976 passed in
appeal are hereby quashed.
21. In the result, this writ petition succeeds and is
allowed.”
35. At the outset, it would be appropriate to observe that the
jurisdiction of this Court to review a judgment rendered in exercise of its
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
is well recognised. However, such jurisdiction is inherently limited and
is not intended to provide an opportunity to a litigating party to seek
rehearing of the entire controversy or to secure a different conclusion
merely because another view of the matter may be possible. The power
of review is exercised to prevent miscarriage of justice and to correct a
grave and palpable error apparent on the face of the record, but the same
cannot be converted into appellate jurisdiction.
36. In the present case, the principal grievance of the review applicant
is that this Court, while deciding Writ-C No. 3000065 of 1997 vide
judgment and order dated 20.08.2025, failed to properly appreciate the
provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings
Act, 1960, particularly Section 6(f) thereof and paragraph 31(2) of the
U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1976,
as well as the effect of the earlier ceiling proceedings culminating in the
order dated 31.12.1974 and the appellate order dated 23.04.1976. It is
also contended that the writ petition ought not to have been entertained
in view of the availability of the alternative statutory remedy under

21
CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
Section 13 of the Ceiling Act and the alleged delay of approximately 21
years in approaching this Court.
37. Before examining the aforesaid submissions on merits, it is
necessary to consider the objection raised by learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the opposite parties regarding the delay in filing the review
application. Learned Additional Advocate General has submitted that the
delay occasioned in filing the review application was attributable to
administrative correspondence, obtaining legal opinions from the
competent authorities and securing requisite approval from the State
Government. It is contended that the matter was continuously pursued
and, upon receipt of the legal opinion dated 21.01.2026, permission to
institute the review application was granted on 30.01.2026.
38. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that while
considering the explanation furnished by the State, the Court may take
into account the institutional and administrative procedures involved in
taking a decision to initiate legal proceedings. However, the status of the
litigant as a State authority does not confer any automatic entitlement to
condonation of delay, nor can administrative correspondence, by itself,
be treated as sufficient cause in every case. The explanation must
demonstrate that the delay was occasioned despite reasonable diligence
and that the applicant was not guilty of avoidable inaction.
39. In the present case, the judgment under review was delivered on
20.08.2025, whereas the decision to institute the review application was
taken only after the receipt of the legal opinion dated 21.01.2026 and
approval dated 30.01.2026. The review applicant has relied upon the
sequence of administrative correspondence to explain the intervening
period. However, the explanation furnished does not, by itself, establish
that every period of delay was unavoidable or that the review applicant
was prevented by circumstances beyond its control from approaching
this Court earlier.
40. At the same time, it is equally necessary to bear in mind that
review jurisdiction is not governed merely by a mechanical computation

22
CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
of limitation in the absence of a prescribed period applicable to such
proceedings. In this regard, the judgment relied upon by the review
applicant in the case of Mohd. Jahan Begum and another (Supra) ,
recognises that the review jurisdiction of this Court in proceedings under
Article 226 of the Constitution is inherent and that the reasonableness of
the period within which such jurisdiction is invoked has to be examined
in the facts and circumstances of each case. The said judgment, however,
does not lay down that every explanation based upon administrative
procedures must necessarily be accepted. In the present matter, the
question of delay cannot be considered in isolation from the substantive
requirement of demonstrating a legally sustainable ground for review.
41. Consequently, even assuming that the explanation furnished by the
review applicant is sufficient to explain the time taken in obtaining
administrative approval, such condonation would not, by itself, entitle
the review applicant to succeed on merits. The review application must
independently satisfy the settled requirements governing the exercise of
review jurisdiction.
42. Coming to the principal ground of challenge, it is evident that the
review applicant seeks reconsideration of the interpretation placed by
this Court upon paragraph 31(2) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on
Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1976. The submission of learned
Additional Advocate General is that the order dated 31.12.1974 had
already determined the surplus land of Sri Yawar Hussain Khan to the
extent of 278 Bighas 16 Biswas 15 Biswansi and that the subsequent
proceedings initiated through notices dated 20.12.1996 and 16.01.1997
were merely consequential proceedings for taking possession of the land
already declared surplus. According to him, no question of fresh
determination or redetermination of surplus land arose, and, therefore,
the provisions of paragraph 31(2) of the Amendment Act, 1976 could not
have been invoked to invalidate the subsequent proceedings.
43. The aforesaid submission has been considered in the light of the
findings recorded in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the judgment under review.

23
CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
This Court, while examining the statutory amendment, took note of the
legislative consequence flowing from the amendment and the
requirement of redetermination of surplus land in the circumstances
contemplated therein. It was specifically noticed that the appeal arising
out of the order dated 31.12.1974 was pending when the U.P. Act No.20
of 1976 came into force and that the statutory consequences prescribed
under the amended provisions were required to be given effect to.
44. The contention that the proceedings initiated in 1996-1997 were
merely for implementation of an earlier determination, rather than for
redetermination of surplus land, essentially invites this Court to
undertake a fresh examination of the statutory scheme, the nature of the
earlier proceedings and the legal consequences of the amendment. Such
an exercise would necessarily involve interpretation of the relevant
provisions and reconsideration of the conclusions already arrived at in
the judgment under review. Merely because the review applicant
proposes a different interpretation of the statutory provision does not
establish an error apparent on the face of the record.
45. It is also significant that the review applicant has not demonstrated
that the statutory provision relied upon was wholly overlooked or that its
application in the judgment under review suffers from an error so
manifest that it can be corrected without entering into a detailed process
of reasoning. The disagreement expressed by the review applicant with
the interpretation adopted by this Court cannot be treated as a ground for
reopening the concluded proceedings.
46. The next submission of learned Additional Advocate General
relates to the applicability of Section 6(f) of the Ceiling Act. It is
contended that the opposite parties failed to establish that the land in
question was held by or under a public religious or charitable Waqf
before 01.05.1959 and that its income was wholly utilised for religious
or charitable purposes. Emphasis has been placed upon the fact that the
application for registration of the Waqf was submitted on 22.11.1959 and
the certificate under Section 29 of the U.P. Muslim Waqfs Act, 1960 was

24
CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
issued on 23.03.1973. It is, therefore, argued that the exemption claimed
by the opposite parties was not legally sustainable.
47. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
opposite parties has submitted that the review applicant has failed to
appreciate the distinction between the creation of a Waqf and its
subsequent registration. It is contended that the Waqf in question had
been created by way of oral dedication in the year 1936 by Raja Yasin
Ali Khan and that the Prescribed Authority itself, vide order dated
30.06.1962, accepted the claim of Waqf in respect of the land situated in
village Poorey Lal Khan. Therefore, the subsequent registration of the
Waqf cannot be treated as the date of its creation.
48. Upon consideration of the rival submissions, this Court finds that
the review applicant is essentially seeking a fresh adjudication of the
factual and legal controversy relating to the creation, existence and
registration of the Waqf and the applicability of the exemption under
Section 6(f) of the Ceiling Act. The date of submission of the application
for registration and the date of issuance of the registration certificate are
circumstances which may have relevance while examining the claim of
exemption; however, those dates, standing alone, do not necessarily
establish that the Waqf itself came into existence after 01.05.1959.
49. The distinction between the creation of a Waqf and its subsequent
registration is material. The review applicant's argument that the
registration application was submitted after the prescribed date cannot,
without further examination of the evidence relating to the alleged
dedication and the nature of the property, automatically displace the
claim of an earlier Waqf. Such an examination would involve
appreciation of the material and interpretation of the statutory
requirements, which is beyond the permissible scope of review unless an
apparent error is demonstrated.
50. It is further relevant that the review applicant has referred to the
fact that the claim of Waqf was accepted in respect of village Poorey Lal
Khan but was not accepted in respect of other villages. The distinction

25
CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
between the holdings situated in different villages may have evidentiary
relevance; however, the review applicant has not established that the
judgment under review contains an apparent error merely because the
earlier proceedings treated the claim relating to different villages
differently. The question whether the evidence relating to each village
was sufficient to establish the exemption is essentially a matter of
adjudication on merits and cannot be reopened in review by undertaking
a fresh comparative assessment of the evidence.
51. The review applicant has also placed reliance upon the judgment
of this Court in the case of Shia Central Board of Waqf (Supra) . In the
said judgment, the Court considered the requirement of notice to the
Board under Section 66(1) of the U.P. Muslim Waqfs Act, 1960 and also
examined the claim of exemption under Section 6(1)(f) of the Ceiling
Act in the factual circumstances obtaining therein. The Court noticed the
absence of an averment establishing that the land was held by a public
religious or charitable Waqf before 01.05.1959 and affirmed the
concurrent findings of the authorities negativing the alleged oral Waqf.
52. The aforesaid judgment, however, cannot be read as laying down
an inflexible proposition that every claim of an earlier oral Waqf must
fail merely because the application for its registration was submitted
after 01.05.1959. The factual foundation and evidence relating to the
alleged creation of the Waqf are relevant considerations. The judgment
relied upon by the review applicant was rendered upon its own facts and
the findings recorded by the authorities in that case. It does not establish
that the findings recorded in the judgment under review are vitiated by
an error apparent on the face of the record.
53. The further argument that the Ceiling Act, being a special
enactment, overrides the provisions of the U.P. Muslim Waqfs Act, 1960,
also does not advance the case of the review applicant. Merely
describing an enactment as a special statute does not, by itself, resolve
every question concerning the interaction between two statutory
enactments. The respective provisions have to be considered in the

26
CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
context of the controversy and the statutory rights sought to be enforced.
The review applicant has not demonstrated that the judgment under
review has proceeded on an interpretation which is manifestly contrary
to the statutory provisions. The submission, in substance, seeks
reconsideration of the legal approach adopted by this Court, which
cannot be undertaken in review proceedings.
54. The question of notice to the Shia Central Board of Waqf also
requires consideration in this context. Learned Additional Advocate
General has argued that Section 66(1) of the U.P. Muslim Waqfs Act,
1960 could not be imported into the proceedings under the Ceiling Act,
as the latter is a special enactment and the provisions of the former were
not expressly incorporated therein.
55. However, the review applicant has not demonstrated that the
finding in the judgment under review regarding the legal effect of the
proceedings relating to the Waqf property is founded upon a patent error.
The mere fact that the review applicant proposes a different
interpretation of the applicability of Section 66(1) does not establish an
error apparent. The question whether notice to the Board was legally
necessary in the particular proceedings and what consequence would
follow from its non-issuance are matters involving statutory
interpretation and the nature of the proceedings. They cannot be
reconsidered in review merely because another view is canvassed by the
applicant.
56. The review applicant has also contended that the civil court
proceedings instituted by the Shia Central Board of Waqf in Regular Suit
No.60 of 1980, culminating in the decree dated 08.05.1990 and dismissal
of the State's appeal on 30.11.1996, could not have been treated as
determinative of the legality of the ceiling proceedings. According to the
review applicant, the civil court proceedings and the statutory
determination under the Ceiling Act operate in distinct fields.
57. In this regard, it is necessary to notice that paragraph 19 of the
judgment under review specifically refers to the civil court decree dated

27
CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
08.05.1990, whereby the land in suit was held to be Waqf property and
the possession thereof was held not liable to be disturbed in pursuance of
the earlier ceiling judgment dated 31.12.1974. It was further noticed that
the appeal preferred by the State against the said decree was dismissed
on 30.11.1996 and no second appeal was preferred thereafter.
58. Thus, the effect of the civil court proceedings was not an aspect
which remained wholly unnoticed by this Court. The judgment under
review specifically took note of the decree and the subsequent dismissal
of the State's appeal. The review applicant's attempt to contend that the
said decree ought to have been given a different legal effect would
require reconsideration of the implications of the civil court adjudication
vis-à-vis the ceiling proceedings. Such an exercise is not permissible in
the limited jurisdiction of review.
59. It is also pertinent to observe that the review applicant has not
demonstrated that the civil court decree had been set aside, modified or
otherwise rendered ineffective by any competent forum. In the absence
of any such material, the mere assertion that the civil court adjudication
should not have influenced the decision in the writ petition cannot
constitute an error apparent on the face of the record.
60. The next ground raised by the review applicant is that the opposite
parties had an efficacious alternative statutory remedy of appeal under
Section 13 of the Ceiling Act and that the writ petition was entertained
after an unexplained delay of approximately 21 years from the appellate
order dated 23.04.1976. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nivedita Sharma (Supra).
61. There can be no dispute with the legal proposition laid down in
Nivedita Sharma (supra) that where a statute provides an effective
mechanism for redressal of grievances, the High Court ordinarily
expects the aggrieved person to avail the statutory remedy instead of
invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution as a matter of course. However, the said principle is not an

28
CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
absolute prohibition against entertaining a writ petition in every case
where an alternative remedy exists.
62. The judgment relied upon by the review applicant itself recognises
the constitutional power of the High Court under Article 226 and
distinguishes between the existence of such jurisdiction and the
circumstances in which it should ordinarily be exercised. The rule of
alternative remedy is a rule of judicial restraint and does not operate as
an absolute ouster of the jurisdiction of this Court.
63. In the present case, the review applicant has not established that
the judgment under review is vitiated by an apparent error merely
because the objection relating to the availability of an alternative remedy
was not accepted. The issue of maintainability of the writ petition and
the circumstances warranting exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction were
matters pertaining to the original adjudication. A review application
cannot be utilised as a substitute for an appeal to reopen the
discretionary determination already made by this Court.
64. Similarly, the objection regarding delay and laches in filing the
original writ petition cannot be permitted to be raised afresh in the
present proceedings in the absence of any manifest error in the judgment
under review. The review applicant was at liberty to challenge the
judgment dated 20.08.2025 before an appropriate higher forum on any
ground which it considered legally available. However, it cannot seek
reconsideration of the entire controversy by merely describing the
conclusions recorded by this Court as erroneous.
65. This Court has also considered the judgment relied upon by
learned Additional Advocate General in the case of Mohd. Jahan
Begum . The said judgment recognises the inherent power of this Court
to review its judgments rendered under Article 226 of the Constitution
and clarifies that the principles contained in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC
may guide the exercise of such jurisdiction. It also holds that the review
jurisdiction is not governed by an inflexible period of limitation in the
absence of a specific statutory provision, although an application must

29
CMRAD No. - 69 of 2026
be filed within a reasonable period depending upon the facts and
circumstances of the case.
66. The aforesaid judgment, therefore, does not support the
proposition that a review application can be entertained for the purpose
of reconsidering the correctness of the earlier decision on merits. On the
contrary, it recognises the limited nature of the inherent review power
and the necessity of demonstrating circumstances warranting its
exercise. Thus, the reliance placed by the review applicant upon the said
judgment does not advance its case on the substantive grounds urged in
the present review application.
67. At this stage, it would be appropriate to examine the judgments
relied upon by learned Senior Counsel appearing for the opposite parties,
particularly Parsion Devi and others (Supra) , Meera Bhanja (Supra)
and Shiv Ganesh and others (Supra) .
68. In the case of Parsion Devi (supra) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has categorically held that review proceedings must remain strictly
confined to the scope of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. An error apparent on
the face of the record must be self-evident and should not require a long-
drawn process of reasoning to establish it. The Court has further
emphasised that review is not an appeal in disguise and an erroneous
decision cannot be reheard and corrected in exercise of review
jurisdiction.
69. Similarly, in the case of Meera Bhanja (supra) , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has reiterated that the power of review may be exercised
where a new and important matter or evidence, which despite due
diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be
produced earlier, is discovered, or where an error apparent on the face of
the record is established. The Court has specifically held that an error
which requires a lengthy process of reasoning on points where two views
are possible cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the
record.

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70. The principles enunciated in the aforesaid judgments are directly
attracted to the controversy involved in the present review application.
The grounds urged by the review applicant concerning the interpretation
of paragraph 31(2) of the Amendment Act, applicability of Section 6(f)
of the Ceiling Act, the legal consequences of the civil court decree, the
requirement of notice to the Waqf Board and the availability of an
alternative remedy require detailed examination and interpretation. None
of these grounds demonstrates an error which is self-evident from a mere
perusal of the judgment under review.
71. The judgment in the case of Shiv Ganesh (supra) also reiterates
that the power of review cannot be confused with appellate jurisdiction
and that the Court cannot review its judgment merely because the
applicant considers the decision to be incorrect on merits. The said
judgment further clarifies that review can be entertained only on the
grounds recognised under the settled principles governing review
jurisdiction.
71. In view of the aforesaid legal position, this Court finds that the
judgments relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for the opposite parties
lay down the correct principles governing the exercise of review
jurisdiction. The judgments relied upon by learned Additional Advocate
General, namely Nivedita Sharma (supra), Shia Central Board of
Waqf (supra) and Mohd. Jahan Begun (supra) , have been considered
in their proper perspective. However, none of them establishes that the
judgment under review suffers from an error apparent on the face of the
record or that the present case warrants exercise of the exceptional
jurisdiction of review.
72. The review applicant has also urged that the judgment under
review would affect the merits of the case and, therefore, deserves to be
reconsidered. This submission is wholly insufficient to invoke review
jurisdiction. The possibility that a judgment may have consequences
upon the rights of the parties is inherent in every adjudication. Such
consequences cannot, by themselves, constitute a ground for review. The

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applicant is required to demonstrate a specific and patent error falling
within the recognised parameters of review jurisdiction.
73. Upon an overall consideration of the grounds raised in the review
application, this Court finds that the review applicant has not brought on
record any new and important matter or evidence which, despite the
exercise of due diligence, was not within its knowledge or could not be
produced at the time of the original hearing. No mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record has been demonstrated. Rather, the
review applicant has substantially reiterated the objections and legal
submissions which it considers ought to have prevailed while deciding
the writ petition.
74. It is well settled that the mere possibility of taking a different view
on the interpretation of a statutory provision or appreciation of the
material available on record does not furnish a ground for review. Even
if two views are reasonably possible, the review jurisdiction cannot be
exercised to substitute one view for the other merely because the
applicant considers the alternative view to be more appropriate. The
finality attached to judicial decisions cannot be permitted to be disturbed
on the basis of a fresh round of arguments under the guise of review.
75. This Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that the review
application does not satisfy the essential requirements for invoking the
limited review jurisdiction of this Court. The grounds raised therein are
essentially directed against the correctness of the findings recorded in
the judgment dated 20.08.2025 and would require this Court to
undertake a fresh examination of the statutory provisions, documentary
material and factual circumstances already considered while deciding the
writ petition. Such an exercise would amount to sitting in appeal over its
own judgment, which is impermissible in law.
76. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, this Court does not find any
error apparent on the face of the record, any discovery of new and
important matter or evidence, or any other sufficient ground warranting
review of the judgment and order dated 20.08.2025 passed in Writ-C

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No.3000065 of 1997, Smt. Afsar Jahan v. State of U.P. and others. The
review applicant has failed to make out a case for recalling or modifying
the said judgment.
77. Consequently, the review application, being devoid of merit and
not disclosing any legally sustainable ground for exercise of review
jurisdiction, is hereby dismissed . The judgment and order dated
20.08.2025 passed in Writ-C No.3000065 of 1997 shall remain
undisturbed.
(Irshad Ali,J.)
November 16, 2026
Adarsh K Singh
Digitally signed by :-
ADARSH KUMAR SINGH
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench