Union Of India And Others vs Sube Singh And Others
- Court
- Punjab and Haryana High Court
CWP No. 36903 of 2026 (O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
(125) CWP No. 36903 of 2026 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 05.11.2026
Union of India and others ......Petitioners
Versus
Sube Singh and others .....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH
Present: Mr. Ashutosh Dhankar, Senior Panel Counsel with
Mr. Shikhar Kataria, Advocate
for the petitioners.
Mr. Avinit Avasthi, Addl. Standing Counsel
for respondents No. 2 to 4-UT., Chandigarh. .
KIRTI SINGH , J. (ORAL)
1. The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227
of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of the order dated 03.03.2025
(Annexure P-1) passed by the Controlling Authority under the Payment of
Gratuity Act, 1972-cum-Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central),
Chandigarh (respondent No. 2), and the order dated 10.03.2026 (Annexure
P-7) passed by the Appellate Authority-cum-Deputy Chief Labour
Commissioner (Central), Chandigarh.
2. The facts, in brief, are that respondent No. 1-Sube Singh was
initially engaged as a Beldar on muster-roll basis with the Central Public
Works Department (CPWD) on 18.07.1985. He continued to work on muster
roll till 14.04.1994, whereafter his services were regularized with effect from
15.04.1994. Upon regularization, he became a regular Government
employee governed by the Central Civil Services Pension Rules. He
thereafter continued in regular service and superannuated on 28.02.2023
GURPREET SINGH
2026.11.13 14:42
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Chandigarh
from the post of Multi-Tasking Staff. At the time of his retirement,
CWP No. 36903 of 2026 (O&M) -2-
respondent No. 1 was drawing salary of Rs.52,824/- per month, including
Basic Pay of Rs.37,200/- with Dearness Allowance. His retirement gratuity
for the regular service rendered from 15.04.1994 to 28.02.2023, amounting
to Rs.7,65,948/-, was duly paid under the Central Civil Services Pension
Rules, 2021. Respondent No. 1 thereafter raised a claim for payment of
gratuity in respect of his earlier muster-roll service from 18.07.1985 to
14.04.1994 under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (for short, 'the Act of
1972'). The Controlling Authority, vide order dated 03.03.2025, directed the
petitioners to pay a sum of Rs.2,74,278/- along with simple interest at the
rate of 10% per annum, by taking into consideration the wages drawn by
respondent No. 1 at the time of his retirement in the year 2023. Aggrieved
against the said order, the petitioners preferred a statutory appeal under
Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972, accompanied by an application seeking
condonation of delay and a stay application. However, vide order dated
10.03.2026, the Appellate Authority returned the appeal without entertaining
the same, primarily on the ground that it had been filed beyond the
prescribed period of limitation and that the gratuity amount awarded by the
Controlling Authority had not been deposited. Hence, the present petition.
3. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners submits that the
petitioners do not dispute the entitlement of respondent No. 1 to gratuity for
the period of his muster-roll service from 18.07.1985 to 14.04.1994.
However, the grievance is with regard to the manner in which the said
gratuity has been computed by the Controlling Authority. It is contended that
the Controlling Authority erroneously took into consideration the wages
drawn by respondent No. 1 at the time of his retirement in the year 2023,
whereas gratuity for the muster-roll period could only be calculated on the
basis of the last wages drawn by him before grant of regular status in April,
GURPREET SINGH
2026.11.13 14:42
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Chandigarh
CWP No. 36903 of 2026 (O&M) -3-
1994. In this regard, reliance has been placed upon the Directorate General,
CPWD Office Memorandum dated 20.11.2023 (Annexure P-3), which
provides for payment of gratuity in respect of service rendered on muster-
roll/daily-rated basis on the basis of the last wages drawn before grant of
temporary status. It is submitted that respondent No. 1 was drawing wages
of Rs.1,530/- per month at the relevant time and, accordingly, the gratuity
payable to him works out to Rs.7,944/- along with applicable interest at the
GPF rate. Learned counsel further submits that the Controlling Authority
failed to consider the aforesaid Office Memorandum while determining the
amount payable to respondent No. 1.
4. With regard to the delay in filing the statutory appeal, it is
submitted that the matter was required to be processed through various
administrative channels for obtaining approval and legal vetting. The delay
was neither intentional nor deliberate but occurred on account of
administrative procedures and the time taken in collecting the relevant
records and obtaining requisite approval from the competent authority. The
petitioners, accordingly, filed the appeal on 17.02.2026 along with an
application seeking condonation of delay. It is, thus, prayed that the
impugned orders be quashed and set aside.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents No. 2 to 4 has
opposed the prayer made in the present petition.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused
the material available on record.
7. The principal question which arises for consideration is whether
the Appellate Authority was justified in declining to entertain the statutory
appeal on the ground that the same had been filed beyond the period
prescribed under Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972.
GURPREET SINGH
2026.11.13 14:42
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Chandigarh
CWP No. 36903 of 2026 (O&M) -4-
8. A perusal of Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972 reveals that an
appeal against an order passed by the Controlling Authority may be
preferred within sixty days from the date of receipt of the order. The first
proviso empowers the appropriate Government or the Appellate Authority,
as the case may be, to extend the said period by a further period of sixty
days, if satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from
preferring the appeal within the initial period. Thus, the statutory provision
prescribes an outer limit of 120 days for preferring an appeal against an
order passed by the Controlling Authority.
9. The aforesaid provision is a special provision governing the
limitation for filing appeals under the Act of 1972. The Appellate Authority,
therefore, cannot extend the period of limitation beyond the maximum
period expressly permitted by the statute.
10. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment of the
Division Bench of this Court in The Punjab State Cooperative Supply &
Marketing Federation Ltd. v. Appellate Authority under the Payment of
Gratuity Act and others, LPA-1000-2021 (O&M), decided on 07.12.2022,
wherein, after considering the provisions of Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972
and the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963, it was held that the
Appellate Authority has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal beyond the
outer limit of 120 days. It was further held that the provisions of the
Limitation Act cannot be invoked to enlarge the period specifically
prescribed under the Act of 1972. The contention raised by learned senior
counsel that Section 5 read with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963
would confer an additional power upon the Appellate Authority to condone
the delay beyond the period of 120 days, therefore, cannot be accepted. The
statutory scheme under Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972 specifically provides
GURPREET SINGH
2026.11.13 14:42
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Chandigarh
CWP No. 36903 of 2026 (O&M) -5-
not only the initial period of limitation but also the maximum extent to
which the delay can be condoned. Once the legislature has prescribed an
outer limit, the same cannot be enlarged by invoking the general provisions
of the Limitation Act.
11. Adverting to the facts of the present case, the order passed by
the Controlling Authority is dated 03.03.2025. Significantly, in the
application seeking condonation of delay accompanying the statutory appeal,
the petitioners themselves have stated that the certified copy of the order was
received on 03.03.2025. The appeal, however, was filed only on 17.02.2026.
The Appellate Authority, while passing the impugned order dated
10.03.2026, has also recorded that the appeal was received on 17.02.2026,
after 351 days from the receipt of the impugned order. Thus, even if the
period of limitation is reckoned from the date of receipt of the order, as
contemplated under Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972, the appeal was clearly
beyond the maximum period of 120 days prescribed under the statute.
12. The explanation furnished by the petitioners that the delay
occurred on account of movement of the file through various administrative
channels, obtaining approval from the competent authority and legal vetting
of the appeal, cannot confer upon the Appellate Authority a jurisdiction
which is otherwise circumscribed by the statutory provisions. The
requirement of obtaining administrative approval or completing internal
departmental formalities cannot enlarge the period of limitation expressly
prescribed by the legislature. Once the outer limit of 120 days had expired,
the Appellate Authority had no power to condone the delay, irrespective of
the explanation furnished by the petitioners.
13. There is yet another aspect of the matter. The second proviso to
Section 7(7) of the Act of 1972 specifically provides that no appeal by an
GURPREET SINGH
2026.11.13 14:42
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Chandigarh
CWP No. 36903 of 2026 (O&M) -6-
employer shall be admitted unless, at the time of preferring the appeal, the
appellant either produces a certificate of the Controlling Authority to the
effect that the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under sub-section
(4) has been deposited or deposits such amount with the Appellate Authority.
In the present case, the Appellate Authority has specifically recorded that the
amount awarded by the Controlling Authority had not been deposited along
with the appeal. The statutory requirement, therefore, was also not complied
with by the petitioners.
14. It is true that the petitioners have raised a grievance with regard
to the computation of gratuity by the Controlling Authority and have placed
reliance upon the CPWD Office Memorandum dated 20.11.2023 (Annexure
P-3). However, the said contentions pertain to the merits of the
determination made by the Controlling Authority. Once the statutory appeal
itself was filed beyond the maximum period prescribed under Section 7(7) of
the Act of 1972, the Appellate Authority could not have examined those
issues on merits.
15. This Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227
of the Constitution of India, cannot ordinarily substitute itself for the
statutory Appellate Authority or extend a period of limitation which the
legislature has expressly restricted. The petitioners have failed to show any
jurisdictional error or procedural illegality in the impugned order warranting
interference by this Court.
16. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no ground
to interfere with the order dated 10.03.2026 (Annexure P-7) passed by the
Appellate Authority-cum-Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central),
Chandigarh.
17. Consequently, the present writ petition is dismissed.
GURPREET SINGH
2026.11.13 14:42
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Chandigarh
CWP No. 36903 of 2026 (O&M) -7-
18. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand
disposed of.
(KIRTI SINGH)
JUDGE
th
November 05 , 2026
Gurpreet Singh
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
GURPREET SINGH
2026.11.13 14:42
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Chandigarh