Mr Kimti Lall Jain vs Suez Water Technologies And Solutions & Ors.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Order reserved on : 03.11.2026
Order delivered on: 18.11.2026
#
CNR No. DLHC010394222026
+ O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 354/2026 & I.A. 22929/2026
MR KIMTI LALL JAIN .....Petitioner
versus
SUEZ WATER TECHNOLOGIES AND SOLUTION & ORS.
.....Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner : Mr. Arvind Nigam, Senior Advocate with Mr.
Nakul Dewan, Senior Advocate alongwith Mr.
Manmeet Singh, Ms. Palak Nagar, Ms. Sadhvi
Kumar, and Mr. Namaan Shafi, Advocates.
For the Respondents : Mr. Jayant Mehta, Senior Advocate with
Mr.Ganesh Chandru, Mr. Siddharth Agrawal,
Mr. Shashwat Dhyani, Ms. Kesang T. Doma,
and Mr. Om Shelat, Advocates for R-2 to 4.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE TUSHAR RAO GEDELA
O R D E R
18.11.2026
TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J.
1. The present petition has been filed under Section 9(1)(i) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Act” ) seeking the following prayers:
“a. Pass an order directing Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 to deposit with
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 1 of 32
the Registry of this Hon'ble High Court, in an interest-bearing
account, all amounts that Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 are/ become
entitled to receive in respect of Project Nos. 707, 195, 222 and 323,
pursuant to the proceedings pending before this Hon'ble High Court
in O.M.P. (COMM) 19/2021, O.M.P. (COMM) 153/2023, O.M.P.
(COMM) 235/2022 and O.M.P. (COMM) 368/2020 and amounts in
respect of Project No.212 pursuant to proceedings pending before
the Ld. District Court, Lucknow so as to secure the entitlements and
interest of the Petitioner as on the date of filing of this Petition;
b. In the alternative to prayer (a) above, direct Respondent Nos. 3
and 4 to furnish a bank guarantee from a scheduled commercial
bank, in favour of the Registry of this Hon'ble Court, for an amount
not less than INR 128,79,98,675 (being the value of the Subject
Funds presently deposited with the Registry of this Hon'ble Court
and the Ld. District Court, Lucknow inclusive of interest as on 31
July 2026) in respect of Project Nos. 707, 195, 222, 323 pursuant to
the proceedings pending before this Hon'ble High Court in O.M.P.
(COMM) 19/2021, O.M.P. (COMM) 153/2023, O.M.P. (COMM)
235/2022 and O.M.P. (COMM) 368/2020, and in respect of Project
No. 212 pending before the Ld. District Court, Lucknow, with liberty
to the Petitioner to apply for enhancement of the said bank
guarantee to reflect any further accretion by way of interest or
additional recoveries pending disposal of the Section 34 Petition
c. In the meantime, pending deposit of the amounts withdrawn /
received by Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 under prayer (a) and (b), pass
an order restraining the Respondents from alienating, encumbering,
transferring, selling, disposing of, parting with possession of, or
creating any third-party right, title or interest of any nature
whatsoever in respect of their respective movable and immovable
assets, investments, entitlements, and properties of any nature to the
extent of INR 156,46,04,632 (Indian Rupees One Hundred Fifty-Six
Crores Forty-six Lakhs Four Thousand Six Hundred Thirty-two
only) which is the PRM claimed under Claim No.1;
d. Pass an order restraining the Respondent No. 1 and 2 from
diluting its interest in Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 till the pendency of
the Section 34 Petition;
e. Pass an order directing the Respondents to disclose on oath all
properties, investments, assets, receivables, and entitlements (both
movable and immovable and, in case of encumbered properties and
assets, the extent of encumbrance) as on the date of passing of the
Impugned Award and as on the date of filing of this Petition;
f. Pass urgent ex parte interim and ad-interim protective orders in
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 2 of 32
favour of the Petitioner in terms of the prayers; and
g. pass such other order and/ or direction as this Hon'ble Court may
deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and in
the interest of justice.”
BRIEF FACTS:
2. The petitioner, Mr. Kimti Lall Jain, and his family members were
the promoters and held 100% of the share capital of respondent
no.3/Driplex Water Engineering Private Limited, and respondent
no.4/Driplex Water Engineering International Private Limited. The
petitioner was approached by the Suez Group of France for acquisition
of respondent no.3 and 4 through their Indian Group companies,
Degremont Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as ‘ DPL’ ) and Suez
Environment India Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as ‘SEIPL’ )
(hereinafter collectively referred to as ‘the Acquirers’ ). Pursuant to the
same, the parties entered into the following agreements (hereinafter
collectively referred to as the ‘Transaction Documents’ ):
a. Share Purchase Agreement dated 04.12.2015, between the
Acquirers and the petitioner and Mrs. Nidhi Jain for acquisition
of respondent no.3.
b. Share Purchase Agreement dated 04.12.2015, between the
Acquirers and Mrs. Asha Jain and Mrs. Nidhi Jain for acquisition
of respondent no.4.
c. Share Holder Agreement dated 04.12.2015, between the
Acquirers, the petitioner, Mrs. Nidhi Jain and respondent no.3.
d. Share Holder Agreement dated 04.12.2015, between the
Acquirers, Mrs. Asha Jain, Mrs. Nidhi Jain and respondent no.4.
e. Framework Agreement dated 04.12.2015 between the
Acquirers, the petitioner, Mrs. Nidhi jain, Mrs. Asha Jain and
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 3 of 32
respondent nos.3 and 4.
3. As per the Share Purchase Agreements (hereinafter referred to as
‘the SPA’ ), the transfer of shares was to be done in two tranches, with
the first tranche of 76% shares (hereinafter referred to as ‘ CD-1 Shares’ )
to be transferred on 01.03.2016 and the second tranche of 24% shares
(hereinafter referred to as ‘ CD-2 Shares’ ) to be transferred on
01.03.2019, i.e., the ‘Final Completion Date’. Pertinently, at the time of
signing of the Transaction Documents, certain payments with respect to
the past contracts of respondent nos.3 and 4 were pending as detailed
under Annexure “C” of the SPA. The said payments, described as Past
Retention Money (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ PRM’ ) were to be
closed by 01.03.2019 and in the event the same was not done by
01.03.2019, the parties were to agree on a suitable mechanism as per
Clause 10.6 of the Framework Agreement (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
FA’ ) for the payment of the unrecovered PRM. Pertinently, the pricing
mechanism of CD-2 Shares contemplated the PRM in its calculation.
4. The CD-1 Shares were transferred to the acquirers on 01.03.2016
for a total consideration Rs.122,02,82,200/-. The petitioner had been
made a director of respondent nos.3 and 4 under an Employment
Agreement till 01.03.2019 to, inter alia, facilitate collection of the PRM,
after which he ceased to be in the employment of respondent nos.3
and 4.
5. On 01.03.2019, the CD-2 shares were transferred to the acquirers
and a payment of Rs.68,75,54,198/- was made. However by 01.03.2019,
i.e., the Final Completion Date, all the payments pertaining to the PRM
had not been recovered, and as such, the parties entered into a
Supplementary Framework Agreement on 01.03.2019 (hereinafter
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 4 of 32
referred to as ‘the SFA’ ) as per Clause 10.6 of the FA for the mechanism
of recovering and sharing of the remaining PRM as detailed in Schedule
III of the SFA.
6. According to Clause 2.3 of the SFA, the petitioner would seek to
recover the remaining PRM after issuance of Power of Attorney
(hereinafter referred to as ‘PoA’ ) in favour of the petitioner. The said
recovery of PRM was to be done within 49 months, i.e., by 31.03.2023.
Further, the SFA mandated the Acquirers to provide the petitioner
unrestricted access to records, statutory books and Financial Statements
and information of respondent nos.3 and 4. In pursuance of the same, the
parties signed a General Agreement on 17.05.2021 (hereinafter referred
to as ‘the GA’ ), wherein the parties agreed that specific PoA for each
client/project shall be issued to the petitioner for a period of one year and
shall be automatically renewed for another one year. Further renewal
was subject to ‘mutual agreement’ as long as PRM under the SFA was
not recovered. The respondents issued a PoA to the petitioner on
01.08.2021 which expired on 31.03.2023 and was never renewed.
7. During the currency of the SFA and the PoA, the petitioner was
able to secure favourable arbitral awards in respect of Project Nos.707,
195, 222, 323 and 212 before 31.03.2023, which awards were challenged
by the respective third parties under Section 34 of the Act. The petitioner
had further sought enforcement of the awards in Project Nos.707 and
323 under Section 36 of the Act. In the said proceedings, the third parties
deposited amounts totalling to Rs.38,91,62,075/- as detailed in the table
below:
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 5 of 32
Project Client Awarded
Amount (in
INR)
Amount deposited in Court
(in INR ) /Date of Deposit
323 BHEL 16,41,10,141 15,97,42,552 16.09.2021
707 NTPC 13,91,46,137 15,43,27,611 14.09.2021
195 NLC 13,37,99,219 2,16,40,781 22.05.2023
222 MRPL 17,86,71,413 5,34,51,131 22.06.2022
212 UPRVUNL 7,88,21,709 - -
Total 69,45,48,619 38,91,62,075
The petitioner was not able to pursue the said challenges on behalf of
respondent nos.3 and 4 in the absence of a valid PoA. Further
discussions between the parties regarding the extension of PoA beyond
31.03.2023 were not fruitful and the same was neither extended, nor a
new PoA was issued.
8. Disputes arose between the parties regarding the collection of
PRM and issuance of PoA and the petitioner invoked arbitration vide
notice dated 27.11.2023. After the constitution of the learned Arbitral
Tribunal, filing of the respective statement of claim, statement of
defence and rejoinder, and hearing the parties, the learned Arbitral
Tribunal passed the final Award on 18.04.2026, which was corrected by
the Memorandum of Corrections on 08.06.2026. The learned Arbitral
Tribunal rejected the petitioner’s claim nos.1, 2 and 8 while partially
allowed claim nos.3, 5, 6 and 7. The petitioner has challenged the Award
under Section 34 of the Act in O.M.P. (COMM) 355/2026, seeking the
setting aside of the rejection of claim nos.1, 2 and 8 in its entirety and
claim nos.6 and 7 partially.
9. In August, 2017 SWEIPL had transferred its shares in respondent
nos.3 and 4 to respondent no.1, i.e., Suez Water Technologies and
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 6 of 32
Solutions. Respondent no.1 was renamed to Veolia Water Technologies
and Solutions, i.e., respondent no.2, however, the parties never sought
amendment of the memo of parties.
10. In the present petition, the petitioner is seeking protection of the
amounts deposited with the Court by third parties in their respective
proceedings under Section 34 and Section 36 of the Act with respect to
Project Nos. 323, 707, 195 and 222, during the pendency of O.M.P.
(COMM) 355/2026, in the event respondent nos.3 and 4 are successful in
the said proceedings.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER:
11. Appearing for the petitioner Mr. Arvind K. Nigam, learned senior
counsel, at the outset, would submit that the present petition involves a
prayer pertaining to preservation of only a portion of the amounts due
under claim no.1 of arbitral Award dated 18.04.2026, which has been
challenged before this Court in O.M.P. (COMM) 355/2026. Thus, he
would restrict his submissions only qua the said portion.
12. In so far as the issue as to whether an unsuccessful party before
the arbitral proceedings is entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 9
of the Act post the Award is concerned, the same is no more res integra
according to learned senior counsel,3 having regard to the principles
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd.
vs. Haresh N. Sanghavi and Ors. reported in (2026) SCC OnLine SC
670 . Hence there is no doubt on the maintainability of the present
petition.
13. Adumbrating the background facts, learned senior counsel, after
having taken the Court through the record, submitted that it would be
necessary to understand as to whether the nomenclature “Past Retention
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 7 of 32
Money” is an ingredient forming part of the sale consideration of the
shares. He would submit that under the SPA dated 04.12.2015, “Past
Retention Money CD-2”, is expressly defined and forms a component of
the CD-2 pricing mechanism. According to learned senior counsel,
Clause 3 of the SPA provides that Acquirer Price CD-2 is to be adjusted
by PRM CD-2 and the Acquirer Price Per Share CD-2 is calculated by a
formula which is expressly stated, according to learned senior counsel,
the said formula expressly incorporates the recovered PRM into the
Share Price payable by the seller. On the other hand, learned senior
counsel would submit that the FA dated 04.12.2015 addresses the
converse situation, namely the PRM not recovered by the Final
Completion Date. He would submit that Clause 10.6 of the FA records
that subsequently recovered PRM is to be shared between the target
companies and petitioner in the ratio of 20/80 and payable upon
recovery. Read harmoniously, the SPA and FA, according to learned
senior counsel, together create a single coherent commercial mechanism
that is PRM recovered prior to Final Completion is reflected directly in
the CD-2 share price whereas PRM recovered thereafter remains
contractually payable to the petitioner through the Agreed Sharing
Mechanism. He would submit that this was recorded in the SFA dated
01.03.2019.
14. In consonance with the aforesaid regime as expressed in the
various contractual documents executed between the parties, the
petitioner pleaded in the arbitration that PRM essentially constituted part
of the sale consideration and not consideration for services. He would
stoutly contend that the respondents attempted to characterize the said
PRM as a mere ‘top up’ payment, that too for the first time during oral
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 8 of 32
arguments before the learned Tribunal, which was contrary to and
inconsistent with the pricing provisions contained in the SPA and FA.
He would forcefully contend that the learned Arbitral Tribunal clearly
agreed with the submissions of the petitioner and held as a finding of fact
that the PRM essentially relates to sale consideration and not services.
He would substantiate the said argument by contending that once PRM
forms part of a binding pricing formula for a share transfer, the PRM
cannot be relegated as “top up payment”.
15. In addition to the aforesaid, learned counsel also would submit
that the target companies were valued and acquired on the basis that the
identified PRM receivables remained uncertain as to timing and
realisation. In other words, learned senior counsel would contend that
had the receivable been treated as fully realisable on the date of the
transaction, necessarily, the valuation and purchase price would have
been higher.
16. Mr. Nigam, learned senior counsel, next contended that even
otherwise on facts, the respondent had failed in observing the timelines
stipulated as per Clause 2.3.2 of the SFA which obligated the
respondents to issue requisite Power of Attorney (PoAs) in favour of the
petitioner with effect from 01.03.2019 for the recovery of PRM. This
was envisaged on account of the fact that in terms of Clause 2.2 of the
SFA the petitioner’s powers to negotiate settlements and pursue
arbitrations on behalf of the target companies were withdrawn on
01.03.2019 as the petitioner ceased to hold any shares in the target
companies and had stepped down as the Managing Director. According
to him, Clause 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 of the SFA required an effective recovery
period of 49 months from the date of issuance of the PoAs rather than a
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 9 of 32
period curtailed by the respondents’ delay in issuing them. In other
words, learned senior counsel would contend that though 2.3.1 stipulated
a fixed period, the same would, however, be read as subject to Clause
2.3.2, wherein respondents were required to issue PoAs to the petitioner
for effective discharge of his obligations under both the agreements.
17. Mr. Nigam, learned senior counsel, stated that in terms of Clause
2.3.2 of the SFA the parties entered into a GA on 17.05.2021
whereunder the respondents were mandatorily obligated to issue PoAs
valid for one year which were to be automatically renewed for a further
year and thereafter renewed by mutual agreement for as long as the PRM
is not recovered. He would submit that in this context the respondents
took 29 months till 02.08.2021 to issue any PoA at all and issued PoAs
only for 10 of the 18 Schedule III projects. He would further submit that
the respondents never renewed the PoAs beyond 31.03.2023, though the
terms of the GA carried the validity to atleast 01.08.2023. He would
contend that while the learned Arbitral Tribunal found that the PoAs
were valid till 01.08.2023 by operation of the GA in para 104 of its
Award, the learned Arbitral Tribunal accepted the respondents’ argument
that the PoAs expired by efflux of time on 31.03.2023. This, according
to learned senior counsel, is ex facie contrary and contradictory. Learned
senior counsel further contended that the submission of the respondent
that issuance of a PoA in 2017 in favour of Mr. D.D. Goyal would be a
substitute for the PoA as required under Clauses 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.5 of
the SFA, is untenable.
18. Mr. Nigam, learned senior counsel would submit that the
conclusion of the learned Arbitral Tribunal that recovery of PRM would
constitute as “contingent” on the premise that it depended on the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 10 of 32
outcome of pending litigation and subsequent challenges under Section
34 of the Act, is contradictory to the leaned Arbitral Tribunal’s own
finding that PRM is sale consideration payable for the shares already
transferred. Thus, according to him, the conclusion is unsustainable. He
would vociferously submit that a contractual entitlement to consideration
for a completed transfer of shares does not become a mere contingency
merely because the mechanism for its recovery involves legal
proceedings. As an example, learned senior counsel would submit that
recovery of 65% of the claim no.1 under the Vivad Se Vishwas II
(Contractual Disputes) Scheme (hereinafter referred to as “ VSV
Scheme ”) cannot be said to be speculative as the said scheme provides
no discretion to the public counter party to accept or reject a claim under
Rs.500 crores. In any case, he would submit that, the subject matter of
the present petition are four arbitral awards in favour of the target
companies and the monies have been deposited in Court.
19. Mr. Nigam, learned senior counsel strongly urged that the
contention of the respondent that 31.03.2023 is a cut off date, beyond
which the petitioner’s right over PRM gets extinguished, is completely
untenable and contrary to the contractual regime. He would emphasise
that, under the GA, each PoA was renewable as long as the PRM is not
recovered. Thus, the condition was tied to the continued non-recovery of
PRM and not a fixed date. Therefore, the emphasis that 31.03.2023 is a
cut off date beyond which the petitioner would be disentitled for its share
in the PRM, is untenable. He pointed out that, though this is central to
the basic dispute, the learned Arbitral Tribunal did not render even a
single finding on the delay attributable to the respondent in issuing
PoAs. Moreover, according to him, the PRM, as argued above,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 11 of 32
constituted one of the ingredients of the sale consideration, thus, could
not be eschewed from the share price of the shares.
20. While referring to Clauses 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 in the context of the
award, he would contend that the learned Arbitral Tribunal did not
appreciate in the correct perspective that both the clauses have to be read
not only in conjunction but also harmoniously. In that, while Clause
2.3.1 stipulated a 49 month period for compliance, it is the provisions of
Clause 2.3.2 which contemplated issuance of PoAs by the respondent.
He would submit that it is a matter of fact that PoAs were issued after a
delay of 29 months which should have been necessarily taken note of by
the learned Arbitral Tribunal and eschewed from the 49 month period as
stipulated in Clause 2.3.1. Learned senior counsel would contend that if
so eschewed, it is logical that payments received by the respondents or
deposited in Court beyond 31.03.2023 should also enure to the benefit of
the petitioner in the ratio contractually decided. This not having been
done, learned senior counsel would submit, the impugned award suffers
from perversity or illegality which goes to the root of the matter.
21. Learned senior counsel also emphasized that the learned Arbitral
Tribunal did not take into consideration the attendant correspondences
and negotiations and all the transaction documents and the interjection of
COVID during the subsistence of the agreements had effectively
prevented any meaningful discussion on extension of the recovery
mechanism while simultaneously engaging the petitioner on collateral
issues. According to him, the learned Arbitral Tribunal did not examine
whether the conditions sought to be imposed by the respondents
fundamentally altered the commercial bargain.
22. Learned counsel would submit that in any case, so far as the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 12 of 32
present petition is concerned, the deposits on which interim protection
orders are sought pertain to the past projects which got finalized before
31.03.2023 barring Project No.195 where the deposit was made on
26.04.2023 but the award was passed way back on 08.11.2022. In other
words, according to him, the right of entitlement of the petitioner had
already crystalized. Thus, to the said extent, interim protection orders
may be passed.
23. Learned senior counsel next contended that petitioner has a good
case on merits in its challenge under Section 34 of the Act to the
impugned award and, there are in existence, rare and compelling
circumstances under Section 9 of the Act for grant of interim relief.
Though this was not argued at length or in detail during the hearing,
however, alongwith the written note, the petitioner had stated as under:
a. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has failed to make any
finding on which party caused the 29 months delay in issuing
PoAs and breached Clause 2.3 of the SFA despite noting the
competing contentions.
b. There is internal inconsistency in the finding by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal in para 104 of the impugned award that the PoAs
remained valid till 01.08.2023 and in para 105 that the
arrangement expired on 31.03.2023 by efflux of time.
c. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has unreasonably adopted the
respondents’ “mutual agreement” construction over the
petitioner’s, without engaging the anti-otiosity principle applicable
to the words “as long as the PRM is not recovered.”
d. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has rejected the petitioner’s
reliance on case laws, including Mrs. Chandnee Widya Vati
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 13 of 32
Madden v. Dr. C.L. Katial reported in (1964) 2 SCR 495 on
contingent contracts, in a single unreasoned sentence after the
respondents had themselves abandoned the contingency argument
at the 08.10.2025 hearing.
e. The learned Arbitral Tribunal has failed to examine the
petitioner’s VSV Scheme quantification methodology (a minimum
65% recovery on awarded amounts, aggregating Rs.49.75 Crore)
before dismissing the claim as speculative.
f. The learned Arbitral Tribunal’s is silent on tax/FEMA
consequences flowing from its own finding that the PRM is capital
sale consideration.
g. There is inconsistency in the learned Arbitral Tribunal
Tribunal’s finding that the 49 month period in Clause 2.3.1 of the
SFA is sacrosanct while the issuance of PoA under Clause 2.3.2 is
not sacrosanct.
24. In the context of precarious financial position of the respondent
nos.3 and 4, learned senior counsel would rely on the Director’s Reports
of respondent no.4 for financial year 2022-23 and 2023-24 which
disclose the sale of two factories in Haridwar, while the financial
statements of respondent no.3 for financial year 2022-23, 2023-24 and
2024-25 show losses of Rs.30.04 Crore, Rs.50.29 Crore and Rs.28.58
Crore respectively. Learned senior counsel contends that additionally,
the financial report of respondent no.4 for the financial year 2024-25
shows cash losses of Rs.3.31 Crore and also confirms that respondent
no.4 holds no property, plant, equipment or immoveable assets. Learned
senior counsel would submit that it is amply clear that respondent nos.3
and 4 are not in the pink of health and there exists a real possibility of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 14 of 32
further corporate restructuring, capital alteration or dilution of the Suez
Group's shareholding in respondent nos.3 and 4.
25. Apart from the above, it is submitted that respondent no.1 and 2
are French companies against whom enforcement in India would be
difficult. It was emphatically stressed that while on one hand the
petitioner has fully performed under the SPAs, the respondents continue
to unlawfully withhold the PRM-linked consideration. It is further
submitted that the monies which have been already deposited in this
Court can be simply kept preserved which would not cause any
disruption to the business of the respondent or any irreparable harm.
26. He relies upon the judgement of the Bombay High Court in Oil
and Natural Gas Corporation Limited vs. Afcons Gunanusa Joint
Venture, rendered in Comm. Arbitration Petition No.20173/2026 where
the Bombay High Court granted post award relief under Section 9 of the
Act when the Arbitral Tribunal therein had made a finding of delay
against a contractor but refused to give the consequent relief of
liquidated damages. Learned senior counsel would contend that in the
present case the impugned award has a similar infirmity by making the
finding that PRM was in the nature of sale consideration while ignoring
the consequential legal corollary that the respondents were bound to
facilitate the recovery of the same. He distinguishes the judgement in Oil
and Natural Gas Corporation Limited vs. Swiber Offshore
Construction PTE Limited, rendered in Comm. Arbitration Petition
No.17832/2026.
CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT NO.2 TO 4:
27. Appearing for the respondent Mr. Jayant Mehta, learned senior
counsel, at the outset, objected to the very maintainability of the present
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 15 of 32
petition. He would strongly contend that post the judgement in Home
Care Retail (supra) even though an unsuccessful party is recognized to
be entitled to file a petition under Section 9 of the Act, post the award,
yet the same has to be in “ rare and compelling circumstances ”. He
would contend that not a single argument has been addressed by the
petitioner nor any demonstrable rare and compelling case has been made
out at all. In the absence of the only and crucial threshold required to be
discharged by the petitioner, the petition fails and ought to be dismissed.
28. In the aforesaid context, learned senior counsel would submit that
the petitioner is seeking an interim measure of protection relatable to
claim no.1 before the learned Arbitral Tribunal. He would submit that
this particular claim has been unambiguously rejected by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal. In fact, according to him, the learned Arbitral Tribunal
found as a fact that the entitlement to PRM and the sharing mechanism
was valid and subsisting only till 31.03.2023, beyond which the said
arrangement expired by efflux of time. The learned Arbitral Tribunal
also found as a fact that the GA dated 17.05.2021 did not extend or
modify the arrangement for recovery of PRM and noted that there was
no mutual agreement to issue PoAs beyond 31.03.2023. It also
concluded that the claim was based on contingencies and, therefore, and
rightly so, could not be granted by the learned Arbitral Tribunal. He
would submit that even the argument based on the VSV Scheme was
found to be mere speculation on which no order could be passed. In the
said light, Mr. Mehta, learned senior counsel would forcefully contend
that these are findings of fact and observation of the learned Arbitral
Tribunal on interpretation of the contractual documents, which cannot be
interfered with by this Court under Section 34 much less under Section 9
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 16 of 32
of the Act.
29. From the aforesaid, learned senior counsel would submit that as a
consequence the petitioner neither has an adjudicated nor a subsisting
contractual right to protect. Even if it is assumed that the petitioner
would succeed in its challenge under Section 34 of the Act, and the
award is set aside, at best, the petitioner would be entitled only to re-
arbitrate the dispute. In other words, according to him, even if the best
case of the petitioner is taken at its face value, there is no way that this
Court could, either under Section 9 or under Section 34, grant an award
of Rs.156 crores to the petitioner, which was the claim no.1. In any case,
learned senior counsel would submit that the said monies have been
deposited by third parties as a pre-condition of stay in their own petitions
under Section 34 of the Act against the awards passed in favour of
respondent no.3/DWE, which are not parties before this Court. Thus,
prayers (b) and (c) seek security for a money claim that already stands
rejected. According to learned senior counsel, this clearly cannot be a
rare and a compelling case as contemplated in Home Care Retail
( supra ).
30. Relying on Swiber (supra), learned senior counsel would contend
that a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, in a similar
situation, refused post-award relief to an unsuccessful party even in
circumstances where the opposite party was in liquidation, holding that a
mere apprehension alone cannot create a legal right. The Court is also
stated to have observed that if liquidation by itself were treated as
sufficient, the higher threshold prescribed by Supreme Court in Home
Care Retail (supra) would lose its significance. According to learned
senior counsel, there is no rationale or nexus with the security that is
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 17 of 32
sought and the amounts that have been deposited in Court by third
parties. He would submit that the ratio laid down in Swiber (supra) was
in fact upheld in Afcons (supra) .
31. On merits, learned senior counsel would contend that no prima
facie case is made out. Learned senior counsel would submit that as
observed and noted by the learned Arbitral Tribunal, claim no.1 is not
only contingent but also speculative. He would submit that none of the
PRM Cases have attained finality on the basis whereof Rs.156 crores are
claimed under claim no.1. In this regard, he would submit as under:
a. Rs.68,40,26,148/- relates to Project Nos.195, 707, 323 and
222 where the counterparties’ petitions under Section 34 of the
Act are pending before this Court;
b. Rs.8,14,55,488/- relates to Project No.212, where the award
was set aside on 02.08.2024 and no appeal was filed.
c. Rs.79,91,22,996/- relates to Project Nos.216, 202 and 226,
where there is no award at all and the petitioner has computed his
share on respondent no.3’s claim amounts with interest at 15% per
annum.
32. Learned senior counsel would submit that a fallacious and a
vexatious submission with respect to the dissipation and alleged sale of
fixed assets of respondent no.3 and 4 have been urged. He would submit
that the petitioner relied on the Director's Report for the years ending
31.03.2023 and 31.03.2024 as also on the losses shown in the financial
statements up to the year ending 31.03.2025, however, pertains to a
period prior to the passing of the award. He would submit that the
petitioners have not placed on record any document post the award
demonstrating any dissipation or irreparable harm in the aforesaid
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 18 of 32
context.
33. Learned senior counsel further submits that the award in the
instant case arises out of an International Commercial Arbitration as
respondent no.2 is a company incorporated under the Laws of France. He
would submit that the scope of judicial interference in such arbitrations
is narrow and is governed by restricted statutory parameters and thus the
grounds of patent illegality are not relevant. Relying on Swiber (supra)
he would submit that when a challenge is governed by restricted
statutory parameters, the Courts must proceed with caution before
granting interim protection founded upon submissions directed against
the merits of the award.
34. So far as the submission that it was the respondents who delayed
the issuance of PoAs for 29 months is concerned, learned senior counsel
would contend that the petitioner itself did not disclose the existence or
continued use of the PoA executed in the year 2017 and the respondents
became aware only upon review of the case files provided by the
petitioner’s counsel in February, 2024. It was asserted by learned senior
counsel that a PoA dated 25.09.2017, issued by the petitioner himself on
behalf of respondent no.3 in favour of Mr. D.D. Goyal remained not only
valid but was also continuously used to pursue Schedule III PRM Cases
throughout the period which the petitioner now falsely describes as one
of total incapacity.
35. Learned senior counsel would contend that petitioner’s reliance on
para 155 of the award is misconceived. He reiterated that para 155
relates only to claim no.7 concerning TDS deduction whereas the present
petition is based on unsuccessful claim no.1. He would submit that the
learned Arbitral Tribunal’s reference to PRM as “capitals of gains” was
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 19 of 32
purely in the context of TDS deductibility. In fact, according to him, the
learned Arbitral Tribunal accepted the respondent’s case that PRM
recovery was permissible only till 31.03.2023, that too after a detailed
consideration of extensive arguments and documentary evidence of the
parties. He would submit that in view of the categorical factual findings
based on documentary evidence, no interim measure of protection can at
all be passed nor can the petition be held to be maintainable. Thus, he
would submit that the petition be dismissed as non-maintainable.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS:
36. This Court has heard the extensive arguments of Mr. A.K. Nigam
and Mr. Nakul Dewan, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr.
Jayant Mehta, learned senior counsel for the respondent, and with their
valuable assistance examined the records and considered the judgements
relied upon by the parties.
37. Having heard learned senior counsel, it appears that the core issue
predicated whereon, the present petition under Section 9 of the Act has
been preferred, is the covenants of the SFA dated 01.03.2019. So far as
the SPA is concerned, the PRM and PRM CD-2 concluded with the final
Acquirer Price per Share (hereinafter referred to as “ the APS ”) as on
01.03.2019. It is clear from the records as also the award that the
petitioner has received the consideration in respect of CD-1 Shares and
CD-2 Shares on or by 01.03.2019. Undeniably, the claim no.1 pertained
to the PRM which was not recovered till 01.03.2019. It cannot be
disputed by the petitioner, that the execution of the SFA was necessitated
on account of only the unrecovered PRM post the Final Completion Date
as envisaged in the SPA. The SFA in para ‘F’ clearly envisages revision
of the understanding of the parties only in relation to the PRM. Thus, this
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 20 of 32
Court is required to consider the issues pertaining and limited to the
PRM not recovered on or by 01.03.2019.
38. The genesis of this PRM, apart from the SPA, is the FA dated
04.12.2015, which was contemporaneously executed alongwith other
Transaction Documents. Amongst others, Clause 10.6 governed the
procedure and mechanism for recovery and forthwith payment to the
petitioner the past retention money that are not recovered until the Final
Completion Date under the SPA. The ratio of share of the petitioner and
respondents was also specified. The said clause also specified that the
Acquirers would provide to the petitioner and his authorised
representatives an unrestricted access to past records, statutory books
and financial statements of respondent nos.3 and 4. This document is a
precursor to the SFA executed on 01.03.2019 which is after the Final
Completion Date. Consequently, what was not recovered as PRM till the
Final Completion Date, was sought to be revised and continued under
the SFA as mutually agreed between the parties.
39. It is not denied that, with respect to the unrecovered PRM, the
SFA is the only governing document apart from the GA. The relevant
and core provisions of the SFA undeniably are Clauses 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and
2.3.2A. The same are extracted hereunder:
“2.3.1. The Parties hereby agree and acknowledge that Mr. Jain
shall endeavor to recover the past retention money to be received by
either of the Companies whether related to past contracts,
receivables on account of any outstanding claims, tax refunds etc.,
details of which have been more specifically listed in Schedule Ill
hereto ("Past Retention Money Book Value"), for a period of 4
(four) years and 1 (one) month commencing from March 1, 2019
("Term"). SUEZ or the Companies shall pay to Mr. Jain the Past
Retention Money in accordance with this Clause 2.3.
2.3.2. SUEZ shall and shall ensure that the Companies shall
provide Mr. Jain and his authorised representative(s), (i)
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 21 of 32
unrestricted access to past records, statutory books and financial
statements of the Companies and assistance, information, for the
purposes of recovery of Past Retention Money. Further, each of the
Companies shall issue a power of attorney in favour of Mr. Jain and
in case of his death/incapacitation to Mr. Manu Jain (son of Mr.
Jain), as maybe required for satisfactory closure of the contracts for
recovery of Past Retention Money and closure of past contracts as
specified in Schedule III.
2.3.2A. The Parties further agree that the recovered Past Retention
Money Book Value (minus Permissible Deductions) shall be shared
between Mr. Jain and the relevant Company in the ratio of 70:30
respectively (i.e. 70% of the said amount shall be payable to Mr.
Jain ("Mr. Jain PRM 1") and 30% of the said amount to be retained
by the relevant Company), till expiry of the Term. The Parties
further agree that, during the Term, in case Mr. Jain recovers
anything over and above the Past Retention Money Book Value
("Past Retention Money Over and Above"), the same shall be shared
between Mr. Jain and the relevant Company in the ratio of 80:20
respectively (i.e. 80 % of the said amount shall be payable to Mr.
Jain ("Mr. Jain PRM 2") and 20% of the said amount to be retained
by the relevant Company).”
40. Clause 2.3.1 empowers the petitioner to recover the PRM in
respect of aspects covered under Schedule III of the SFA for a total
period of 4 years and 1 month, i.e. , 49 months. It also contemplates
respondent no.1 or the respondent nos.3 and 4 shall pay to the petitioner
the PRM in accordance with Clause 2.3 of SFA. Clause 2.3.2 envisages
the responsibilities and duties of respondents to provide requisite
documentation etc. for the purposes of recovery of PRM. For such
purposes, it contemplates issuance of PoA to the petitioner for closure of
past contracts specified in Schedule III. Clause 2.3.2A manifestly
provided the calculation and percentage of share of the petitioner and the
respondents.
41. The aforesaid clauses leave no doubt that the petitioner was
required to make an endeavour to recover the PRM to be received by
either respondent nos.3 or 4, whether related to past contracts,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 22 of 32
receivables on account of outstanding claims, tax refunds etc., for a
period of four years and one month commencing from 01.03.2019. It
was further provided that respondent nos.1 and 2 or respondent nos.3 and
4 would pay to the petitioner, the PRM in accordance with Clause 2.3.
As to how the petitioner would proceed and the requirement of
respondent nos.1 and 2 to ensure that respondent nos.3 and 4 would
provide unrestricted access to past records for the purposes of PRM, was
clearly specified in Clause 2.3.2 of the SFA. For the purposes of Clause
2.3.2, respondent nos.3 and 4 were required to issue PoA in favour of the
petitioner for the satisfactory closure of the contracts for recovery of
PRM, etc. Although both the parties had hotly contested as to whether
the 49 months period concluded on 31.03.2023 as per the respondent or
continued further for a period of 29 more months on account of lack of
timely issuance of PoAs as contended by the petitioner, this Court need
not examine or consider the said issue in detail at the moment since the
three deposits unambiguously and undoubtedly have been deposited
before 31.03.2023. So far as the fourth deposit is concerned, although the
deposit is post 31.03.2023, however, according to the petitioner, it was
on account of his efforts and exertions completed and concluded prior to
31.03.2023 that the amount was deposited by third party on 22.05.2023,
and thus, entitling the petitioner to the contractual ratio as decided
between the parties even for this deposit too.
42. In this context it would also be relevant to consider the GA which
appears to have been executed pursuant to and in aid of Clause 2.3.2 of
the SFA. The clauses of GA reiterate the terms and conditions prescribed
by Clause 2.3.2 of the SFA.
43. A cumulative and conjoint reading of the SFA and GA indicates
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 23 of 32
that the parties envisaged that once the SPA was concluded with the
Final Date of Completion and the balance payment of the remaining
Shares (CD-2) to the extent of 24% was also paid, a mechanism to
recover the unrecovered PRM, may need to be worked out afresh. It is
this unrecovered PRM which appears to have been made subject matter
of claim no.1 of the Statement of Claim.
44. Whether the unrecovered PRM formed part of the Sale
Consideration of the Shares or not; or whether respondents violated or
were in breach of the conditions of clauses of SFA or GA or not; or
whether PoAs were not issued in time and with delay, would be a subject
matter of the petition under Section 34 of the Act. It is also pertinent to
note that the award is an International Commercial Arbitration Award,
and this Court may have restrictive powers to examine or interfere with
the same.
45. What is to be seen and considered by this Court at this stage is
whether the petitioner is entitled to seek any interim protection qua the 4
deposits made by third parties in this Court on account of their
challenging the arbitral awards under Section 34 of the Act or some
proceedings under Section 36 of the Act.
46. It is not disputed that the amounts referred to in the petition are as
a result of the efforts, follow up and exertions of the petitioner. The said
amounts have been deposited by third parties pursuant to orders passed
by this Court either in proceedings under Section 34 initiated by the third
parties or under Section 36 initiated by the petitioner. Barring one
deposit which was made on 22.05.2023, the remaining three deposits
have been made prior to 31.03.2023. This factual position has not been
denied by the respondents before this Court. The assertion that these fall
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 24 of 32
within PRM, cannot be disputed having regard to the clauses of the SPA,
FA, SFA and the GA.
47. Although the respondents contended that these deposits do not
form PRM and rather are “top up payments”, however there is neither
any clause nor any document produced or placed on record to
substantiate the said contention. This being only an oral submission,
cannot withstand the scrutiny of law having regard to the fact that
respondents do not dispute execution of the SPA, the FA, the SFA or the
GA. In view of the overwhelming documentary evidence in the form of
written agreements, the oral submission is eschewed from consideration.
Thus, there is no steam in the said contention which is unpersuasive, and
thus, unmerited. The only logical conclusion one can reach after
eschewing the aforenoted submission is that the deposits made in this
Court by third parties, would form PRM.
48. For clarity it is noted that the petitioner in the present petition has
restricted his relief to these four deposits only. To make it abundantly
clear, the table depicting the date and amount of deposits and the parties
which have made such deposits is extracted hereunder:-
Project Client Awarded
Amounts on
date of
Award (in
Amount deposited in Court
Amount of
award with
interest upto
31.07.2026 (in
(in INR)/ date of deposit
INR)
INR)
323 BHEL 16,41,10,141 15,97,42,552 16.09.2021 51,16,24,740
707 NTPC 13,91,46,137 15,43,27,611 14.09.2021 21,33,24,371
195 NLC 13,37,99,219 2,16,40,781 22.05.2023 20,10,59,500
222 MRPL 17,86,71,413 5,34,51,131 22.06.2022 24,13,04,310
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 25 of 32
212 UPRV
7,88,21,709 - - 12,06,85,753
UNL
Total 69,45,48,619 38,91,62,075 1,28,79,98,675
49. It is altogether another matter as to whether the respondent nos.2
and 3 or the third parties would ultimately win or lose the challenge
under Section 34 of the Act laid by the third parties to the Arbitral
Awards which have been passed in favour of respondent nos.3 and 4 and
claimed by the petitioner to be a result and consequence of his efforts
and exertions. At the moment, an ascertainable amount has indeed been
deposited by third parties qua the very same Arbitral Awards which are
stated to be the result of petitioner’s efforts. This assertion of the
petitioner has not been disputed by the respondents. An amount
deposited by the third parties on the orders of this Court in their
respective petitions under Section 34 of the Act whether to the extent of
50 % or 75 % of the Arbitral Award, clearly is in pursuance of and as a
result of the efforts and exertions of the petitioner. Looked at it in
another way, had the respondents filed petitions under Section 36 of the
Act for enforcement of the very same Arbitral Awards challenged by the
third parties, and pursuant thereto certain deposits had been made by the
third parties on or before 31.03.2023, could it be concluded that the
petitioner is disentitled from claiming his share of the deposits. In the
considered and humble opinion of this Court the petitioner would surely
be entitled to his share, given the circumstances.
50. The petitioner relies upon the Director’s Report for FY 2022-23
and FY 2023-24 to indicate that respondent no.4 has placed its two
factories for sale twice, and respondent no.3’s financial statements
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 26 of 32
record losses of Rs.30.04 crores for FY 2022-23 and Rs. 50.29 crore for
FY 2023-24 and Rs.28.58 crore for FY 2024-25, coupled with the
Financial Statement of respondent no.4 for FY 2024-25 confirming that
it holds no property, plant, equipment or immovable assets to
demonstrate the precarious financial condition of respondent nos.3 and 4.
It is clearly apprehended that there exists a real possibility of further
deterioration of financial health and restructuring or dilution of Suez
Group’s shareholding which may impact the claims of the petitioner. The
respondents, on the other hand, except to state that no documents post
the award have been filed by the petitioner before the Court, have neither
disputed the said financial status/description, nor the sanctity of the
documents. In the absence of best evidence which could have been
produced by respondent nos.3 and 4, the undenied documents have to be
considered for their worth. As a consequence, the documents do indicate
the precarious financial condition of the respondent nos.3 and 4.
51. In that view of the matter, it is clear that the petitioner has been
able to demonstrate a higher threshold of a strong, prima facie, case in
his favour. Having regard to the undisputed fact that the four deposits,
subject matter of the present petition, made in this Court by third parties
do constitute PRM, and having regard to the clauses of the SFA read in
conjunction with the GA, and the admitted position that the said awards
under which such deposits have been made are on account of the efforts
and exertions of the petitioner, balance of convenience is tilted in favour
of the petitioner. The petitioner is most likely to suffer irreparable injury
in case an appropriate interim protection orders are not passed in his
favour.
52. Having said that, it is not every case where strong prima facie case
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 27 of 32
as contemplated in Home Care Retail (supra) is made out, that the
unsuccessful party is entitled to an interim protection orders under
Section 9 of the Act, but only those which fall within the term “ rare and
compelling case ”. This position was echoed by this Court in Thor
Ventures (OPC) Private Limited vs. Nyeq Technologies Private Limited
reported in (2026) SCC Online Del 8483 . This Court in Thor Ventures
(supra) laid down the following tests predicated on the law laid down in
Home Care Retail (supra) :
“41. The controversy regarding an unsuccessful party seeking
interim protection under the provisions of Section 9 of the Act, post
the passing of the arbitral award is no more res integra. The
Supreme Court in Home Care retail (supra), speaking through his
Lordship Justice Manmohan has eloquently and eruditely postulated
various circumstances which may require to be examined by a Court
considering a petition under Section 9 of the Act, invoked by an
unsuccessful party. That an unsuccessful party to the arbitration
proceedings is entitled to invoke Section 9 of the Act, is
unambiguous. That the onus of such an unsuccessful party to
establish, prima facie, the ingredients of the triple test, is at a higher
pedestal, in the post award situation than at the pre award scenario,
is manifest. In other words, the tests may have more rigors for the
unsuccessful party. The Supreme Court also required the Courts to
examine whether vacation of the protection post award would
“result in irreversible prejudice”, in the sense to leave such a party
remediless. The judgment also cautions that grant of protection
orders in post award condition in favour of the unsuccessful party
can only be considered in “rare and compelling circumstances”.
That too, when passing of such orders are considered by the Court
as would “prevent irreparable prejudice and preserve the efficacy
of the challenge proceedings”. To make things unambiguous, the
relevant paragraphs of Home Care retail (supra) are extracted
hereunder:
“49. Even applying the test of purposive interpretation, ‘a
party’ must mean any party to the arbitration agreement.
This Court can envisage situations where a party that has
lost in arbitration may nonetheless require interim
protection. For instance, where an arbitral award has been
rendered without proper notice to a party, or where a party
is able to prima facie demonstrate that the award has been
induced or tainted by fraud or corruption. In such situations,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 28 of 32
the Court may not only stay the award but also grant interim
measures under Section 9 of the Act to balance the
equities.Similarly, in certain cases, an unsuccessful party
may have obtained interim protection during the arbitral
proceedings, such as an order restraining invocation of a
bank guarantee. Upon the rendering of the arbitral award,
such interim protection ordinarily stands vacated. However,
the unsuccessful party may challenge the award under
Section 34 of the Act and obtain a stay on the enforcement of
the arbitral award under Section 36(3) of the Act. In such
circumstances, immediate removal of interim protection, for
example, in relation to a bank guarantee, may result in
irreversible prejudice to the unsuccessful party whose
challenge to the arbitral award is pending adjudication.
50. Further, the Courts are not disabled from granting
‘non prejudicial’ interim relief in favour of an unsuccessful
party in arbitral proceedings, particularly where such relief
does not affect the enforceability of the award but merely
preserves ancillary rights pending adjudication under
Section 34 of the Act as was sought in the case of Wind
World (India) Ltd. (supra).
51. Another interesting conundrum may be where a party is
partially successful, inasmuch as, part of its claims are
allowed but as a consequence of a higher amount of counter-
claim being allowed, it is branded as an unsuccessful party
in accordance with Dirk India (supra) and is not in a
position to prevent the other party from selling its assets
after the award has been rendered. It is possible that in
Section 34 proceedings, the arbitral award may be modified
to the extent that the counter-claim is set aside and severed
from the award. However, without interim relief, assets may
dissipate rendering final success illusory.
52. Consequently, in rare and compelling cases, it may
be necessary to permit the unsuccessful party to invoke
Section 9 of the Act to seek continuation of the existing
interim protection. This assumes greater significance, as
noted earlier, in light of the decision in Gayatri Balasamy
(supra) which recognises the Court's power under Section 34
of the Act to modify an arbitral award, including the power
to sever ‘the “invalid” portion from the “valid” portion of
the award’.
xxx xxx xxx
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 29 of 32
59. Needless to say, the grant of interim relief under
Section 9 of the Act will continue to be guided by well-
established principles, namely, the existence of a prima facie
case, balance of convenience, and likelihood of irreparable
harm or injury. This Court, in Essar House (P) Ltd. v.
Arcellor Mittal Nippon Steel India Limited, (2022) 20 SCC
178 : (2022) 235 Comp Cas 242, has held as under:
“47. Section 9 of the Arbitration Act confers wide
power on the Court to pass orders securing the
amount in dispute in arbitration, whether before the
commencement of the arbitral proceedings, during
the arbitral proceedings or at any time after making
of the arbitral award, but before its enforcement in
accordance with Section 36 of the Arbitration Act.
All that the Court is required to see is, whether the
applicant for interim measure has a good prima facie
case, whether the balance of convenience is in favour
of interim relief as prayed for being granted and
whether the applicant has approached the court with
reasonable expedition.
xxx xxx xxx
60. Undoubtedly, the threshold for grant of interim relief
will be higher in the case of an unsuccessful party in
arbitration seeking such relief. In rare and compelling cases,
permitting the unsuccessful party to invoke Section 9 of the
Act would prevent irreparable prejudice and preserve the
efficacy of the challenge proceedings. However, the rights of
such a party cannot be curtailed merely on the apprehension
of possible misuse of a statutory provision.”
xxx xxx xxx
63. Having noted the above, this Court is now enjoined to
examine as to whether the facts which have arisen in the present
case would commend themselves as “rare and compelling” so as to
pass any interim protection orders in favour of the petitioner.
Undoubtedly, the threshold for grant of interim relief is higher in
case of an unsuccessful party in the arbitration proceedings. This
flows from the judgment in Home Care retail (supra). At the same
time, while laying down the aforesaid proposition, the Supreme
Court, in Home Care retail (supra), guided the court exercising
powers under Section 9 to invoke the said provision to “prevent
irreparable prejudice and preserve the efficacy of the challenge
proceedings.” So much so, that the Supreme Court also laid down
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 30 of 32
that the rights of such a party cannot be curtailed merely on the
apprehension of possible misuse of a statutory provision. It is these
principles which ought to guide a court exercising powers under
Section 9 invoked by an unsuccessful party.
64. That the petitioner has instituted a petition under Section 34
of the Act challenging the Arbitral Award dated 26-9-2026 is by
itself, not a “rare and compelling” circumstance. That the petitioner
has filed the present petition under Section 9 seeking interim
directions, too by itself, is also not a “rare and compelling”
circumstance. Such action may be initiated by an unsuccessful party
under most circumstances and is not a rarity. Thus, what are the
rare and compelling circumstances tempered with prevention of
irreparable prejudice and preservation of the efficacy of the
challenge proceedings, is to be examined.
xxx xxx xxx
67. Reading the facts along with the amendments to SRA, it
appears that in case the petitioner is able to demonstrate that the
conclusion of LSL as a sham document is based on no evidence and
the said document itself is held to be a valid and creditworthy
document, it would be able to establish its “readiness and
willingness” which is a necessary concomitant of Section 16(c) of
the SRA. This is all the more relevant as the discretion which was
hereto before available with the Court having been taken away,
instead, specific performance having been mandated read with the
omission/substitution of erstwhile Section 14(1)(a) SRA and
tempered with the analysis made hereinabove, could be a
“compelling” circumstance to prevent not only “irreparable
prejudice” but also at the same time, “preserve the efficacy of the
challenge proceedings” under Section 34 of the Act.
68. Another compelling and rare circumstance appears to be
that of the respondent having no other properties/assets other than
the two subject properties which, if not preserved, may render the
proceedings under Section 34 of the Act redundant and infructuous.
As observed above, the mere filing of a petition under Section 34
itself is neither rare nor compelling, however, read with the
aforesaid observations and analysis, coupled with the dicta of the
Supreme Court, interim orders to ensure preservation of the efficacy
of the challenge, in the present piquant facts, may have to be
passed.”
53. In the present case and to the mind of this Court, no such “ rare or
compelling case ” has at all been made out by the petitioner. The
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 31 of 32
circumstances observed above in regard to the issues to be decided in the
petition under Section 34 of the Act, do not fall within such ambit. The
submissions of the petitioner to make out a case for falling within the
ambit of a “rare and compelling case” is not extraordinary. The
cumulative and conjunctive consideration of the arguments appear to
partake the nature of challenge to the arbitral award rather than
demonstrating any rare or compelling case. Moreover, to some extent,
preservation of deposits may be a good ground, however, efficacy of the
challenge under Section 34 of the Act to the arbitral award, is neither
diluted nor compromised. The petitioner has already arrayed the Holding
Company of respondent nos.3 and 4 as party respondent nos.1 and 2 and
therefore, in case it succeeds in its challenge to the arbitral award, the
further proceedings or execution etc., can still continue. In the
considered opinion of this Court, no such “rare and compelling case" has
at all been made out by the petitioner for an ad interim injunction of the
nature sought.
54. Thus, while this Court holds that the petitioner is indeed entitled to
an interim order, however, is unable to grant the same in view of the
ratio in Home Care Retail Mart (supra) and Thor Ventures (supra) on
the question of not meeting the standard of “rare and compelling case”.
55. Resultantly, the interim prayer is denied.
56. Reply if any, be filed by the respondents within 3 weeks.
Rejoinder thereto, before the next date of listing.
57. List on 14.12.2026 alongwith O.M.P. (COMM) 355/2026.
TUSHAR RAO GEDELA
(JUDGE)
NOVEMBER 18, 2026/ rl
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:18.11.2026
18:27:00
O.M.P.(I)(COMM) 354/2026 Page 32 of 32