DALCHAND R MEENA vs CENTRAL EXCISE AND CUSTOMS
- Court
- Central Administrative Tribunal
: 1: OA No.120/235/2023
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
AHMEDABAD BENCH
Original Application No.120/235/2023
Reserved on: 22.09.2026
Order pronounced on: 02.11.2026
CORAM:
Hon’ble Mr. Jayesh V Bhairavia, Member (J)
Hon’ble Mr. Sanjiv Kumar, Member (A)
DALCHAND RAMNARAYAN MEENA
Aged: 54 years (DoB being 12.02.1969)
Son of Late Shri Ramnarayan Meena,
Presently serving as Superintendent of C.E. (Audit),
in the Audit Commissionerate, Vadodara
& presently residing at No.8/A, Ganga Jamuna Society
Subhanpura
VADODARA 390 023
… Applicant
(By Advocate Shri M.S. Rao)
V/s.
1. UNION OF INDIA
(Notice to be served through its Secretary to the GoI,
Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance,
Government of India,
North Block,
NEW DELHI 110 001).
2. CENTRAL BOARD OF INDIRECT TAXES & CUSTOMS
[To be represented through its Chairman, CBIC & Customs
Department of Revenue
Government of India
North Block, Secretariat Building, NEW DELHI 110 001].
3. THE PRINCIPAL CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL
GST & CENTRAL EXCISE
O/o Pr.CC, CGST & CE
Department of Revenue
Government of India
GST Bhawan, Race Course Circle,
VADODARA 390 017
4. THE COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL G.S.T. & C.E.,
Audit Commissionerate,
(the present DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY)
Second Floor,
New Central Excise Building
Near Aarki Garba Ground
Subhanpura, VADODARA 390 023
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5. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF VIGILANCE
INDIRECT TAXES & CUSTOMS
Ahmedabad Zonal Unit
th th
4 & 5 Floor,
Naranpura Telephone Exchange Building
Mangalmurti Road
Naranpura, AHMEDABAD 380 013
6. THE COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS, MUNDRA,
(Erstwhile Disciplinary Authority)
No.5-B, Port User Building (PUB)
AP & SEZ, Port Road,
MUNDRA 370 421 Gujarat
7. SHRI MOHER SINGH JEPH,
Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs,
(To be served through the Pr.CC, CGST & CE
Department of Revenue
Government of India
GST Bhawan, Race Course Circle,
VADODARA 390 017)
… Respondents
(By Advocate Shri H.D. Shukla)
ORDER
Per: Hon’ble Shri Jayesh V Bhairavia, Member (J)
1. The applicant is aggrieved by the impugned communications dated
24.03.2022, 12.04.2022, 02.01.2023 and 25.01.2023, whereby the
disciplinary authority, instead of concluding the disciplinary
proceedings initiated on 01.01.2010 in accordance with the Inquiry
Officer’s report holding all the charges as “NOT PROVED”, decided
to remit the matter for further inquiry. The applicant contends that he
has already been acquitted of the criminal charges by the learned Trial
court vide judgment dated 22.02.2017 and that the prolonged pendency
of the departmental proceedings for more than 13 years, despite the
Tribunal’s order dated 18.09.2020 and the judgment of the Hon’ble
High Court dated 24.01.2022, is arbitrary and unjustified. He further
alleges that the continued proceedings have caused serious prejudice to
his service career by denying him the benefits of MACP and
promotion to the post of Assistant Commissioner, despite his
immediate junior having been promoted. Accordingly, he seeks
quashing of the impugned communications and a direction to conclude
the disciplinary proceedings by dropping the charges.
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2. By filing the present OA under Section 19 of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant is seeking the following reliefs:-
(A) call upon the official respondents herein to forthwith place
before this Hon‟ble Tribunal, in original, all the relevant and
material documents, which gave rise to the issuance of the
impugned documents at Annexure-A/1 to Annexure-A/4 hereto:
(B) upon a close perusal and scrutiny of the aforesaid original
documents, this Hon‟ble Tribunal may be graciously pleased to:
B-1 quash and aside the, the (i) impugned decision of the applicant‟s
disciplinary authority as conveyed in the impugned
communication bearing F.No. VIGM/DE/VIG/5-2021-
pandvO/OCOMMR-CGST-ADT-VADODARA, dated 24.03.2022
at Annexure-A/1 hereto, (ii) the impugned decision of the
applicant‟s disciplinary authority as conveyed by the impugned
communication F.No. VIGM/DE/VIG/5-2021-
pandvO/OCOMMR-CGST-ADT- VADODARA, dated
12.04.2022 at Annexure-A/2 hereto (iii) the impugned decision
of the applicant‟s disciplinary authority as conveyed by the
impugned communication F.No.VIGM/DE-VIG/5-2021-
pandvO/OCOMMR-CGST-ADT- VADODARA, dated
02.01.2023 at Annexure-A/3 hereto (iv) the impugned decision
of the applicant‟s disciplinary authority as conveyed by the
impugned communication F.No.VIGM/DE/VIG/5-2021-
pandvO/OCOMMR-CGST-ADT- VADODARA, dated
25.01.2023 at Annexure-A/4 hereto, holding and declaring the
same to be vitiated in view of the law laid down by the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court of India in the case of Prem Nath Bali Vs.
Registrar reported in AIR 2016 SC pg.101, referred to
hereinabove, the consequent Circular dated 18.01.2016 issued
by the CVC, New Delhi, referred to hereinabove, as also the
Order dated 29.04.2022 passed by the Jodhpur Bench of this
Hon‟ble Tribunal in the case of Dr.Arun Kumar Mishra vs UoI
B-2 hold and declare that the Charge Memorandum bearing
F.No.II/S(Vig)/21/2009 dated 01.01.2010 at Annexure-A/5
hereto issued by the applicant‟s erstwhile disciplinary authority
shall be deemed to have lapsed for the failure of the respondent
authorities herein including the applicant‟s current disciplinary
authority to complete the disciplinary enquiry and pass final
order thereon, even after the expiry of more than 13 years of
initiation of the aforesaid Charge Memorandum dated
01.01.2010, in view of the law laid down by the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court of India in the case of Prem Nath Bali Vs.
Registrar reported in AIR 2016 SC pg.101, referred to
hereinabove, the consequent Circular dated 18.01.2016 issued
by the CVC, New Delhi, referred to hereinabove, as also the
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Order dated 29.04.2022 passed by the Jodhpur Bench of this
Hon‟ble Tribunal in the case of Dr.Arun Kumar Mishra vs UoI.
B-3 hold and declare that the applicant herein is lawfully entitled to
the grant of (i) pay upgradation under the MACP Scheme w.e.f.
23.09.2016 and also (ii) ad hoc / regular promotion to the
Group A Gazetted post of Assistant Commissioner of Central
Excise & Customs with effect from the date his immediate junior
viz. the private respondent no.7 herein came to be granted such
promotion, together with all consequential benefits flowing
therefrom including arrears of salary towards MACP and
promotion, with interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum
till the date of actual payment of such arrears.
B-4 issue appropriate directions commanding the respondents No.1,
2, 3 and 4 herein to forthwith grant to the applicant herein (i)
pay upgradation under the MACP Scheme w.e.f. 23.09.2016 and
also (ii) ad hoc / regular promotion to the Group A Gazetted
post of Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs
with effect from the date his immediate junior viz. the private
respondent no.8 herein came to be granted regular promotion,
together with all consequential benefits flowing therefrom
including arrears of salary towards MACP and promotion, with
interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum till the date of
actual payment of such arrears.
C. Impose such exemplary costs on the official respondents herein
as this Hon‟ble Tribunal may deem it fit and proper in the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case;
D. grant such other & further relief/s as may be deemed fit and
appropriate in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
present case.”
3 . FACTS OF THE CASE
3.1 The applicant, an Indian citizen belonging to the Scheduled Tribe
category and hailing from the State of Rajasthan, joined the Central
Government service on 06.04.1992 as Inspector of Central Excise and
Customs pursuant to his selection by the Staff Selection Commission.
He was initially posted at Surat and was subsequently promoted to the
post of Superintendent of Customs and Central Excise on 23.09.2002.
3.2 While the applicant was serving as Superintendent of Central Excise
and Customs in Range-III, Division-III, Ankleshwar, since 13.06.2006,
he was implicated in a CBI case on 15.05.2008 pursuant to a complaint
dated 14.05.2008 lodged by Shri Atul C. Patel, Manager of M/s Mitra
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Organics Pvt. Ltd., GIDC, Bharuch. Following his detention by the CBI
on 15.05.2008, the applicant was placed under deemed suspension,
which was revoked by the competent authority on 10.02.2009.
Thereafter, he was transferred and posted as Superintendent of Central
Excise and Customs in Surat Commissionerate-I, Surat.
3.3 On 01.01.2010, the Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs,
Surat-I, initiated major penalty disciplinary proceedings against the
applicant by issuing Memorandum No. F.No.II/S(Vig)/21/2009 dated
01.01.2010 ( Annexure A/5 refer), alleging demand and acceptance of
illegal gratification from the aforesaid complainant. The departmental
proceedings were based on the same set of facts, documents and
witnesses as those involved in CBI RC No.07(A)/2008/GNR, registered
on 15.05.2008, which culminated in CBI Special Case No.13 of 2008
following the filing of the charge-sheet on 27.12.2008. The applicant
submitted his written statement of defence denying the charges.
However, no substantial progress was made in the departmental inquiry
until 12.11.2012, when the Inquiry Officer (IO) and Presenting Officer
(PO) were appointed.
3.4 Aggrieved by the continuation of simultaneous departmental and
criminal proceedings, the applicant approached this Tribunal by filing
OA No.222 of 2013. This Tribunal, vide order dated 05.09.2013, stayed
the departmental inquiry initiated on 01.01.2010 for a period of one year
or until disposal of the criminal case, whichever was earlier. The
respondents challenged the said order before the Hon’ble High Court of
Gujarat by way of SCA No.18076 of 2013. The said writ petition was
dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court vide order/judgment dated
24.12.2013 ( Annexure A/6 refer).
3.5 Subsequently, the learned Special Judge (CBI), Court No.9, Mirzapur,
Ahmedabad, acquitted the applicant of all the charges in CBI Special
Case No.13 of 2008 vide judgment and order dated 22.02.2017
( Annexure A/7 refer). The applicant brought the said judgment to the
notice of the IO by placing a copy thereof on record.
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3.6 Upon completion of the departmental inquiry, the IO, Shri Raghuvansh
Kumar, submitted his report dated 29.08.2017 ( Annexure A/8 refer),
holding all the charges against the applicant as “NOT PROVED”. The
report was forwarded to the disciplinary authority along with forwarding
letter No. RK/IO/DCM/2013/736 dated 28.08.2017, signed by the IO on
29.08.2017 ( Annexure A/9 refer). The disciplinary authority furnished
a copy of the inquiry report to the applicant vide communication dated
13.09.2017 ( Annexure A/10 refer), inviting his representation.
Accordingly, the applicant submitted his representation dated
15.09.2017 ( Annexure A/11 refer), requesting that the departmental
proceedings be dropped.
3.7 Instead of concluding the proceedings on the basis of the inquiry report,
the erstwhile disciplinary authority, despite having agreed with the
findings of the IO, referred the matter to the Additional Director
General of Vigilance, Customs and Central Excise, Ahmedabad Zone,
for second-stage advice vide communication dated 20.11.2017
( Annexure A/12 refer). The Additional Director General (Vigilance),
vide communication dated 27.02.2018 ( Annexure A/13 refer), took the
view that the inquiry had not been conducted in accordance with the
procedure prescribed under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, and returned
the case records for necessary action.
3.8 Thereafter, the IO, vide communication dated 14.03.2018 ( Annexure
A/14 refer), informed the disciplinary authority that he would submit a
fresh inquiry report and requested that the complete case file be returned
to him. Subsequently, vide clarificatory communication dated
08.05.2018 ( Annexure A/15 refer), the IO stated that the inquiry had
been conducted in accordance with the applicable procedure.
Nevertheless, the IO issued a communication dated 31.01.2019
( Annexure A/16 refer), requiring the applicant to appear for a personal
hearing on 15.02.2019, in connection with the proposed further inquiry.
3.9 Challenging the said development and the decision to undertake a
fresh/further inquiry, the applicant filed another OA No.54 of 2019
before this Tribunal. Vide notice and interim order dated 14.02.2019
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( Annexure A/17 refer), this Tribunal directed maintenance of status quo
in respect of the departmental inquiry until 28.02.2019, and the interim
protection was extended from time to time. During the pendency of the
OA, the Directorate General of Vigilance, Ahmedabad Zonal Unit,
issued a communication dated 21.06.2019, expressing the view that the
affidavit-in-reply filed in the OA would not withstand legal scrutiny and
that the disciplinary authority should explore the possibility of filing a
fresh affidavit-in-reply.
3.10 This Tribunal, vide its detailed and reasoned final order dated
18.09.2020 ( Annexure A/1 8 refer), quashed and set aside the IO's
communication dated 31.01.2019 and directed the disciplinary authority
to take an appropriate decision on the applicant's pending representation
dated 15.09.2017 expeditiously, and not later than 60 days from receipt
of a copy of the said order. Pursuant thereto, the applicant submitted
representations dated 02.11.2020 ( Annexure A/19 refer) and
08.12.2020 ( Annexure A/20 refer), requesting a favourable decision in
compliance with the Tribunal's directions.
3.11 Despite the legal opinion dated 02.11.2020 ( Annexure A/21 refer)
furnished by the learned Central Government Standing Counsel, the
office of the erstwhile disciplinary authority referred the matter to the
Directorate General of Vigilance, Ahmedabad Zonal Unit, vide
communication dated 14.12.2020 ( Annexure A/22 refer). The
Directorate General of Vigilance, vide communication dated 21.12.2020
( Annexure A/23 refer), advised the disciplinary authority to challenge
the Tribunal's order dated 18.09.2020 before the Hon'ble High Court of
Gujarat. Accordingly, the respondents filed SCA No.6013 of 2021 on
19.03.2021. Meanwhile, the respondents also filed MA No.474 of 2020
in OA No.54 of 2019, seeking extension of time for compliance with the
Tribunal's directions. This Tribunal, vide order dated 07.01.2021
( Annexure A/24 refer), allowed the MA and extended the time for
compliance by 15 days from that date.
3.12 The Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat dismissed the said SCA No.6013 of
2021 vide final order dated 24.01.2022 ( Annexure A/25 refer) and
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directed the competent authority to take an appropriate decision in
pursuance of the Tribunal's directions within 60 days from 24.01.2022.
3.13 In purported compliance with the aforesaid judicial directions, the
disciplinary authority issued a communication dated 24.03.2022
(impugned order; Annexure A/1 refer), observing that the applicant's
acquittal in the criminal case did not ipso facto absolve him of liability
in the departmental proceedings. The authority further decided to remit
the matter to the IO for further inquiry and submission of a report in
accordance with the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The applicant sought
copies of the vigilance communications dated 27.02.2018 and
08.02.2021 vide representation dated 28.03.2022 ( Annexure A/26
refer), to enable him to make an effective representation. The request
was rejected vide communication dated 12.04.2022 (impugned order;
Annexure A/2 refer), on the ground that his representation dated
15.09.2017 had already been disposed of on 24.03.2022 and that he was
being afforded an opportunity to present his views.
3.14 In response, the applicant submitted a detailed representation dated
12.04.2022 ( Annexure A/28 refer), reiterating his request for the
relevant vigilance communications. He also submitted a further
representation dated 25.04.2022 ( Annexure A/29 refer), requesting that
the departmental inquiry be dropped. Thereafter, vide reminder
representation dated 06.06.2022 ( Annexure A/30 refer), the applicant
relied upon CBIC Headquarters Order No.29 of 2022 dated 04.05.2022
and Order No.32 of 2022 dated 12.05.2022, seeking similar relief. The
disciplinary authority subsequently issued a communication dated
25.11.2022 ( Annexure A/31 refer), requiring the applicant to appear for
a personal hearing on 07.12.2022. The applicant appeared accordingly,
and his statement was recorded ( Annexure A/32 refer). He thereafter
submitted a written representation dated 15.12.2022 ( Annexure A/33
refer), requesting a favourable decision.
3.15 On 02.01.2023, the disciplinary authority issued a communication
(impugned order; Annexure A/3 refer) requiring the applicant to
produce supporting documents in connection with the general
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examination under Rule 14(18) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The
applicant submitted his representation dated 12.01.2023 ( Annexure
A/34 refer), highlighting the prolonged pendency of the disciplinary
proceedings despite the IO's report holding all charges as not proved
and requesting a final decision on the said report.
3.16 Subsequently, vide communication dated 25.01.2023 (impugned order;
Annexure A/4 refer), the disciplinary authority forwarded to the
applicant a copy of the vigilance communication dated 28.08.2018
( Annexure A/35 refer) and called upon him to submit his representation
for further proceedings. The applicant responded by submitting a
detailed representation dated 06.03.2023 ( Annexure A/36 refer),
requesting that the departmental proceedings be dropped.
3.17 According to the applicant, despite the submission of the aforesaid
representation dated 06.03.2023, the departmental proceedings initiated
on 01.01.2010 remained pending for more than 13 years. He stated that
such prolonged pendency has caused serious prejudice to him, as he has
allegedly been denied the benefit of financial upgradation under the
Modified Assured Career Progression (MACP) Scheme and promotion
to the next Group 'A' Gazetted post of Assistant Commissioner of
Central Excise and Customs, despite his immediate junior having been
promoted. Aggrieved thereby, the applicant has filed the present OA,
being the third round of litigation, challenging the disciplinary
authority's communications dated 24.03.2022, 12.04.2022, 02.01.2023
and 25.01.2023, as detailed in Annexures A/1 to A/4, respectively.
4. Pursuant to notice issued by this Tribunal, the official respondents as
well as private respondent no.7 have filed their replies to which the
applicant has also filed his rejoinder.
5. CONTENTIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE
APPLICANT
5.1 Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the departmental
disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant vide charge
memorandum dated 01.01.2010 under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA)
Rules, 1965, have remained pending for more than 13 years, despite the
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Inquiry Officer having submitted his report dated 29.08.2017 holding all
the charges against the applicant as “NOT PROVED”. He also
contended that such an inordinate and unexplained delay in concluding
the disciplinary proceedings, particularly when the delay is not
attributable to the applicant, is arbitrary, unreasonable and contrary to
the settled principles of law. In support of his submissions, learned
counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Prem Nath Bali v. Registrar, High Court of Delhi , reported in
AIR 2016 SC 101, and the Central Vigilance Commission's Circular
No.02/01/2016 dated 18.01.2016. He further relied upon the order dated
29.04.2022 passed by the Jodhpur Bench of this Tribunal in OA
No.290/00193/2021, wherein, according to him, the departmental
charge memorandum was quashed on account of the prolonged
pendency of the disciplinary proceedings. Thus, he argued that the
proceedings in the applicant's case deserve to be treated as having
lapsed and to be brought to an end.
5.2 Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant had already been
acquitted by the learned Special Judge (CBI), Ahmedabad, vide
judgment and order dated 22.02.2017, in respect of the very same
incident and allegations forming the basis of the departmental
proceedings. According to him, the criminal case and the departmental
inquiry were founded upon the same set of facts, documents and
witnesses, and the acquittal, read with the Inquiry Officer's findings
holding all the charges as not proved, furnished sufficient grounds for
dropping the departmental proceedings. In this regard, learned counsel
placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat , reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446,
contending that continuation of the departmental proceedings in the
circumstances of the present case would be unjustified.
5.3 Learned counsel also assailed the impugned communications dated
24.03.2022, 12.04.2022, 02.01.2023 and 25.01.2023, contending that
the decisions taken by the erstwhile as well as the present disciplinary
authority suffer from arbitrariness, unreasonableness and non-
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application of mind. Learned counsel submitted that the erstwhile
disciplinary authority, while furnishing the inquiry report to the
applicant, had expressed agreement with the findings of the Inquiry
Officer. However, upon seeking second-stage advice from the
Directorate General of Vigilance, Ahmedabad Zonal Unit, the authority
proceeded to revive the inquiry on the ground that the proceedings had
not been conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
Learned counsel argued that even the Inquiry Officer, upon
reconsideration of the matter, maintained that the inquiry had been
conducted in accordance with the applicable rules and procedure.
Despite this position, the disciplinary authority decided to remit the
matter for further inquiry, acting mechanically upon the vigilance
advice instead of independently examining the record and the
applicant's representation.
5.4 Learned counsel further contended that the impugned action of the
respondents is inconsistent with the final order dated 18.09.2020 passed
by this Tribunal in OA No.54 of 2019, whereby the communication
dated 31.01.2019 issued by the Inquiry Officer was quashed and the
disciplinary authority was directed to take an appropriate decision on
the applicant's pending representation dated 15.09.2017 within the
prescribed period. Learned counsel also submitted that the respondents
challenged the said order before the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in
SCA No.6013 of 2021, which was dismissed vide order dated
24.01.2022, with a direction to take an appropriate decision within 60
days. According to learned counsel, the subsequent decision to remit the
matter for further inquiry, followed by continued proceedings despite
the applicant's repeated representations, defeats the purpose of the
judicial directions and reflects a failure to take a fair and independent
decision on the merits of the case.
5.5 Learned counsel further submitted that the prolonged pendency of the
disciplinary proceedings has caused serious and continuing prejudice to
the applicant in his service career. He pointed out that the applicant was
denied financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme, due with effect
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from 23.09.2016, on the ground that vigilance clearance had been
withheld because of the pending disciplinary proceedings. In support of
this contention, learned counsel referred to the communication dated
04.12.2017 ( Annexure A/40 refer). He submitted that the applicant was
also denied ad hoc promotion to the post of Assistant Commissioner of
Central Excise and Customs, despite his immediate junior, Shri Moher
Singh Jeph (respondent No.7), belonging to the Scheduled Tribe
category, having been granted such promotion under Office Order
No.156 of 2020 dated 24.12.2020 ( Annexure A/42 refer). Learned
counsel referred to the relevant extract of Establishment Order No.275
of 2002 dated 23.09.2002 ( Annexure A/41 refer) to establish the
applicant's relative seniority and to the respondents' RTI reply dated
26.04.2023 ( Annexure A/43 refer), wherein the applicant's promotion
case was stated to have been kept in a sealed cover on account of the
pending disciplinary proceedings. He argued that the respondents
cannot be permitted to keep the proceedings pending indefinitely,
thereby depriving the applicant of consequential service benefits and
promotional avenues.
5.6 Learned counsel also submitted that the applicant's service record has
otherwise been exemplary and that, apart from the charge memorandum
dated 01.01.2010, no other disciplinary inquiry is pending against him.
He contended that the applicant, who is due to retire on 28.02.2029,
continues to suffer adverse service consequences solely because of
proceedings that have remained inconclusive for an exceptionally long
period, notwithstanding the favourable findings of the Inquiry Officer
and his acquittal in the said criminal case. According to learned counsel,
the continued pendency of the inquiry has effectively deprived the
applicant of a fair opportunity for consideration of his financial
upgradation and promotion.
5.7 Lastly, learned counsel for the applicant prayed that the impugned
communications dated 24.03.2022, 12.04.2022, 02.01.2023 and
25.01.2023 be quashed and set aside and that the departmental
disciplinary proceedings initiated vide charge memorandum dated
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01.01.2010 be brought to an end. He further sought appropriate
consequential relief in relation to the applicant's MACP benefit and
consideration for promotion to the post of Assistant Commissioner of
Central Excise and Customs, in accordance with law.
6. CONTENTIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR OFFICIAL
RESPONDENTS
6.1 Per contra , learned counsel appearing for the official respondents by
referring to the counter affidavit submitted that the allegations levelled
by the applicant are baseless, misconceived and unsustainable in law. At
the outset, they have contended that the instant Original Application is
premature and barred by limitation. According to learned counsel, the
applicant has challenged, inter alia , the communication dated
24.03.2022 issued by the Disciplinary Authority ( Annexure R-1 refer)
and the subsequent communication dated 12.04.2022 ( Annexure R-2
refer), after a lapse of more than one year. They have relied upon
Sections 20 and 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, copies
whereof have been placed on record as Annexures R-5 and R-6 refer,
respectively. By referring to the provisions contained in Section 20 of
the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, contended that the applicant
ought to have exhausted the remedies available under the CCS (CCA)
Rules, 1965 before approaching the Tribunal. Their specific submission
is that:
“The Disciplinary Authority has yet not taken any final decision in this
case under the provisions of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Consequently, the
applicant has not exhausted all the remedies available to him under the
provisions of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and the applicant thereby has not
complied with the provisions of Section 20 of Administrative Tribunals
Act, 1985. Hence, the application of the applicant is pre-mature, not
tenable and liable to be rejected.”
6.2 Learned counsel also contended that the communications dated
24.03.2022 and 12.04.2022 were challenged after a period of
approximately fifteen months and, therefore, the Original Application is
liable to be rejected under Section 21 of the said Act.
6.3 On the merits, learned counsel submitted that the communication dated
24.03.2022 was issued after considering the applicant’s representation
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dated 15.09.2017, in compliance with the order dated 18.09.2020 passed
by the Tribunal in OA No.54/2019 and the judgment dated 24.01.2022
passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat in SCA No.6013/2021.
The relevant observations of the Hon’ble High Court are reproduced as
under:
“the Tribunal has only directed the Disciplinary Authority to take
expeditious appropriate decision in respect of the aforementioned
representation of the petitioner dated 15.9.2017. It is in this light and to
facilitate the process of taking decision by disciplinary authority,
impugned communication dated 31.1.2019 has been set aside by the
Tribunal. It would be for the disciplinary authority to take appropriate
decision in accordance with law as regard the future course of action
against the petitioner, in view of what is directed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal.”
6.4 The respondents’ counsel maintained that the aforesaid judicial orders
required the Disciplinary Authority to take an appropriate decision in
accordance with law, but did not direct that the applicant be exonerated
or that the departmental proceedings be dropped. He also contended that
the decision to remit the matter for further inquiry was taken by the
Disciplinary Authority in exercise of its powers under Rule 15(1) of the
CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.
6.5 The respondents’ learned counsel specifically disputed the applicant’s
contention that the Inquiry Officer’s report dated 29.08.2017, which
recorded the charges as “NOT PROVED”, together with his acquittal in
the criminal case on 22.02.2017, necessarily required the departmental
proceedings to be dropped. He submitted that the applicant, through his
representation dated 15.09.2017, had sought closure of the departmental
proceedings on the basis of the Inquiry Officer’s report and the
judgment of the learned Trial court ( Annexure R-7 refer).
6.6 According to the respondents’ learned counsel, however, the Inquiry
Officer’s report was incomplete and deficient because the inquiry had
been concluded by relying upon the judgment of the trial court and other
extraneous considerations, rather than by completing the inquiry in
accordance with the procedure prescribed under the CCS (CCA) Rules,
1965. The respondents have raised the following objection to the report:
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“It is noticed that the Inquiry Officer‟s report dated 28.08.2017 is
incomplete/deficient in as much as the IO had concluded the inquiry
assigned to him by the DA, on the basis of trial court order on
extraneous factors. The Inquiry has to be completed by the IO in the
manner prescribed under CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and no material from
personal knowledge having bearing on the facts of the case or of
extraneous nature should be imported to the case.”
6.7 Learned counsel for the respondents maintained that the finding
recorded by the Inquiry Officer could not, by itself, prevent the
Disciplinary Authority from examining whether the inquiry had been
conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure. In support of
the decision to remit the matter for further inquiry, the respondents have
relied upon Rule 15(1) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 ( Annexure R-8
refer). Reliance is also placed upon paragraph 7.26.4 of the Vigilance
Manual (Updated 2021), Eighth Edition ( Annexure R-9 refer), which
provides as under:
“A further inquiry may be ordered, when there are grave lacunae or
procedural defects vitiating the first inquiry”.
6.8 Reliance is also made upon the instructions issued by the Board (CBEC)
vide letter F. No. C-14010/1/2010-Ad.V dated 07.01.2011 ( Annexure
R-10 refer). The relevant extract of which is reproduced as under:
“It is further clarified that after the receipt of the Inquiry Report, the
Disciplinary Authority, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 13(1)
of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, is required to consider the Inquiry Report
and satisfy himself that the inquiry has been conducted as per the
detailed procedure prescribed under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.
If he finds any breach of the prescribed procedure, he is required to
remit the case back to the Inquiry Officer for reasons to be recorded in
writing for further inquiry and report.”
6.9 The respondents’ counsel has also relied upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Madras High Court in R. Balakrishnan v. Food Corporation
of India , W.P. No. 20896 of 2003 ( Annexure R-11 refer), to support
their submission that subsequent proceedings cannot cure an inquiry
which was not conducted in accordance with law.
6.10 The respondents’ learned counsel further contended that the acquittal of
the applicant by the said learned Trial court does not automatically
absolve him of liability in the departmental proceedings, as the two
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proceedings operate in different fields and serve different purposes. In
this regard, they have relied upon the Department of Personnel and
Training Office Memorandum dated 21.07.2016, issued from F. No.
11012/6/2007-Estt. (A-III) ( Annexure R-12 refer). According to the
respondents, paragraph 7 of the said Office Memorandum relies upon
the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v.
General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. , reported in
(2005) 7 SCC 764. The relevant para of the same reads as under:
“The two proceedings criminal and departmental are entirely different.
That they operate in different fields and have different objectives. That
acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not
ipso facto absolve the charged officer from the liability under the
disciplinary proceedings.”
On this basis, the respondents’ counsel submitted that the Disciplinary
Authority was justified in directing further inquiry so that the
allegations against the applicant could be examined in accordance with
the procedure prescribed under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Learned
counsel reiterated that the order of acquittal and the report of the Inquiry
Officer could not be treated as conclusive grounds for terminating the
departmental proceedings without first addressing the alleged
procedural deficiencies in the inquiry.
6.11 The respondents’ learned counsel thus submitted that the decision to
remit the matter for further inquiry was rightly taken by the disciplinary
authority. He submitted that the Inquiry Officer’s report dated
29.08.2017 was forwarded to the applicant on 13.09.2017 and that the
then Disciplinary Authority, by letter dated 20.11.2017, sought second-
stage advice from the Additional Director General (Vigilance), Zonal
Unit, Ahmedabad, under Rule 15(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.
The respondents’ counsel referred to the communication dated
27.02.2018 issued by the Vigilance Authority, which, according to him,
pointed out that the inquiry had not been conducted in the manner
prescribed under the applicable rules. The Inquiry Officer’s report dated
29.08.2017 ( Annexure R-18 refer).
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6.12 The respondents’ learned counsel also relied upon the letter dated
21.08.2023 issued by the Directorate General of Vigilance, Ahmedabad
Zonal Unit ( Annexure R-19 refer), to explain the role of the Vigilance
Authority relied upon the following clarification:
“The DGoV is only an advisory body in such disciplinary proceedings
matters and the final decision always rests with the Disciplinary
Authority. As per Rule 15 (3) (a) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, where it is
necessary to consult the CVC/CVO, the Disciplinary Authority shall seek
Second stage Advice before passing the order under Rule 15(5).”
6.13 The respondents’ counsel submitted that the Vigilance Authority did
not tender any advice regarding imposition of a penalty or exoneration
of the applicant because it considered that the inquiry itself had not been
conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure. He contended
that the Vigilance Authority merely identified the deficiencies for
appropriate consideration by the Disciplinary Authority, and the
ultimate decision remained within the jurisdiction of the latter.
6.14 With regard to the applicant’s allegation that the Disciplinary Authority
acted mechanically and merely followed the advice of the Vigilance
Authority, the respondents’ counsel denied the allegation and
maintained that the decision was taken after considering the applicable
rules, the inquiry record and the judicial directions issued in the earlier
proceedings. Reliance is placed upon the orders dated 18.09.2020
passed by the Tribunal and dated 24.01.2022 passed by the Hon’ble
High Court of Gujarat ( Annexure R-20 refer). According to the
respondents, the Tribunal and the Hon’ble High Court left it to the
Disciplinary Authority to determine the appropriate future course of
action in accordance with law. Learned counsel thus contended that the
decision communicated on 24.03.2022 was a decision on the applicant’s
representation dated 15.09.2017 and was not contrary to the directions
of either judicial forum. The respondents’ counsel further submitted that
the judicial orders did not record any finding exonerating the applicant
from the charges or prohibiting the Disciplinary Authority from
ordering further inquiry where permissible under Rule 15(1) of the CCS
(CCA) Rules, 1965.
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6.15 The respondents’ learned counsel justified the subsequent
communications dated 12.04.2022, 02.01.2023 and 25.01.2023 and
contended that the communication dated 12.04.2022 ( Annexure R-2
refer), was issued in response to the applicant’s request dated
28.03.2022 for copies of certain vigilance correspondence. He also
submitted that the applicant had already been informed of the proposed
course of action through the communication dated 24.03.2022 and that
the requested correspondence was not considered material to the
disposal of his representation.
6.16 As regards the communication dated 02.01.2023 ( Annexure R-3 refer),
the respondents’ counsel submitted that it was issued to obtain
supporting documents, including the daily working sheet or attendance
sheet, if any, relating to the general examination of the applicant by the
Inquiry Officer under Rule 14(18) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Their
specific contention is that the communication was intended to verify the
relevant facts and did not constitute a final determination of the
disciplinary proceedings as is stated in the reply that “ No any final
order/any final decision in the case has been passed or taken by the DA
through this correspondence letter dated 02.01.2023. However, the
applicant has challenged it before Tribunal in aforesaid O.A. which is
legally not correct and not sustainable in the eyes of law. ”
6.17 Similarly, the communication dated 25.01.2023 ( Annexure R-4 refer),
was issued to provide the applicant with a copy of the CVC
correspondence dated 28.08.2018, as referred to in the Tribunal’s order
dated 18.09.2020. The respondents have maintained that this
communication was issued in the interest of natural justice and to enable
the applicant to make his representation. Learned counsel contended
that it was not a final order in the disciplinary proceedings and could not
independently furnish a ground for interference by the Tribunal.
6.18 The respondents’ counsel further submitted that the representations
submitted by the applicant on 12.04.2022, 29.04.2022, 06.06.2022,
15.12.2022, 12.01.2023 and 06.03.2023 were considered and disposed
of by the Disciplinary Authority on 01.08.2023 which had been sent by
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email on 04.08.2023 and received physically by the applicant on
07.08.2023 ( Annexure R-13 refer). The respondents’ learned counsel
relied upon this subsequent disposal to submit that the applicant’s
grievance regarding non-consideration of his representations does not
survive in the manner alleged by him.
6.19 In response to the applicant’s contention that the departmental
proceedings have remained pending for an unreasonable period of more
than thirteen years, the respondents’ counsel disputed that the entire
delay can be attributed to the department. They have asserted that the
applicant frequently remained absent from the scheduled hearings of the
inquiry, thereby contributing to the delay. In support of this assertion,
they have referred to Daily Order Sheets Nos. 09 dated 27.01.2015, 11
dated 20.08.2015, 13 dated 17.08.2016, 14 dated 16.09.2016, 15 dated
05.10.2016, 16 dated 21.12.2016, 17 dated 11.01.2017 and 18 dated
30.01.2017 ( Annexure R-14 refer).
6.20 The respondents’ learned counsel pointed out that, at the instance of the
applicant, this Tribunal had stayed the departmental inquiry by order
dated 05.09.2013 in OA No. 222/2013 for a period of one year or until
disposal of the said criminal case, whichever was earlier ( Annexure R-
15 refer). According to the respondents, the inquiry consequently
remained stayed during the relevant period and could not proceed in the
ordinary course. Further, it is submitted that when the Disciplinary
Authority sought to address the deficiencies in the inquiry, the applicant
again approached this Tribunal by filing OA No. 54/2019, resulting in
further litigation concerning the inquiry proceedings. The respondents
have also referred to the present OA No. 235/2023 and the interim order
dated 03.08.2023, whereby the respondents were restrained from taking
action pursuant to the impugned communication dated 24.03.2022. On
this basis, he argued that the delay cannot be attributed exclusively to
the department.
6.21 The respondents’ learned counsel also contended that the decisions
relied upon by the applicant, including Prem Nath Bali v. Registrar,
High Court of Delhi (supra), G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat (supra) and
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the order dated 29.04.2022 passed by the Jodhpur Bench of the Tribunal
in OA No. 290/00193/2021, are distinguishable on facts. In support of
their submission that a judgment must be understood in the context of
its own facts, they have relied upon Ambika Quarry Works v. State of
Gujarat , reported in (1987) 1 SCC 213, and Bhavnagar University v.
Palittana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. , reported in (2003) 2 SCC 111
( Annexure R-16 refer).
6.22 On the issue of the applicant’s claim for financial upgradation under the
MACP Scheme and promotion to the Group-A post of Assistant
Commissioner, the respondents’ counsel denied that the applicant was
unlawfully deprived of any service benefit. He submitted that the grant
of MACP and promotion is governed by the applicable rules,
instructions and vigilance-clearance requirements, and that the
pendency of disciplinary proceedings is a relevant consideration under
the applicable instructions. In this regard, learned counsel relied upon
the Office Memorandum dated 02.11.2012 issued by the Department of
Personnel and Training, bearing F. No. 22034/4/2012-Estt. (D)
( Annexure R-21 refer). He referred to the circumstances in which
vigilance clearance may be withheld, namely, where a Government
servant is under suspension, where a charge sheet has been issued and
disciplinary proceedings are pending, or where prosecution for a
criminal charge is pending.
6.23 The learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the
Departmental Screening Committee, in its meeting held on 08.06.2023,
considered the applicant’s case for MACP benefits and deferred the
same because vigilance clearance had not been granted in view of the
pending disciplinary proceedings. The relevant Office Memorandum
and the material concerning the Screening Committee’s consideration
have been referred to ( Annexure R-22 refer). Their case is that the
applicable MACP instructions do not provide for grant of financial
upgradation on an ad hoc basis merely because the claim has been
deferred owing to pending disciplinary proceedings.
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6.24 The respondents’ learned counsel has relied upon paragraph 15 of the
DoPT Office Memorandum dated 22.10.2019 ( Annexure R-23 refer).
The relevant extract reads:
“If a financial up gradation under the MACPS is deferred and not
allowed after 10 years in a level, due to the reason of the employees
being unfit or due to departmental proceedinpgs, etc., this would have
consequential effect on the subsequent financial up gradation which
would also get deferred to the extent of delay in grant of first financial up
gradation.”
Learned counsel also relied upon the DoPT Office Memorandum dated
14.09.1992 concerning promotion of Government servants against
whom disciplinary proceedings are pending or whose conduct is under
investigation ( Annexure R-24 refer). According to the learned counsel,
the applicant’s claim for promotion had to be examined in accordance
with the applicable vigilance and sealed-cover instructions, and the
applicant could not claim an automatic right to promotion or MACP
while the disciplinary proceedings remained pending.
6.25 The respondents’ learned counsel also referred to the applicant’s
representation dated 21.09.2022 seeking consideration for ad hoc
promotion to the post of Assistant Commissioner under the sealed-cover
procedure ( Annexure R-25 refer). Further, the Department of Revenue
sought the vigilance status and supporting documents from the
concerned Audit Commissionerate, which furnished the requisite details
by communication dated 13.03.2023 ( Annexure R-26 refer).
6.26 The respondents’ learned counsel also relied upon the communication
dated 23.05.2023 issued by the Deputy Superintendent of Police,
CBI/ACB, Gandhinagar ( Annexure R-27 refer). According to the
learned counsel, the CBI informed the department that a criminal appeal
had been filed before the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat against the
applicant’s acquittal in Criminal Appeal No. 263/2018 and that the
appeal was pending. The respondents’ counsel, therefore, submitted that
the applicant’s service benefits had to be considered in the light of the
applicable rules and the vigilance status reflected in the official record.
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6.27 Learned counsel by referring to the para-wise comments furnished by
the Vadodara Audit Commissionerate to the Department of Revenue on
15.06.2023 ( Annexure R-28 refer), and has maintained that the
competent authority must assess each officer’s individual service record,
vigilance status and the applicable instructions before deciding a claim
for MACP or promotion. They have also relied upon the RTI reply
dated 26.04.2023, referred to in the counter-affidavit, which informed
the applicant that his promotion case had been kept in a sealed cover
because of the pending disciplinary inquiry.
6.28 Lastly, the official respondents’ counsel has maintained that the
impugned communications were issued in the course of the
departmental proceedings and were intended to ensure that the inquiry
was completed in accordance with the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. He
denied that the Disciplinary Authority acted arbitrarily, maliciously or
without application of mind. According to him, the applicant’s acquittal
in the criminal case did not automatically terminate the departmental
proceedings; the Inquiry Officer’s report was considered deficient in
procedural terms; and the Disciplinary Authority was competent to
direct further inquiry in accordance with Rule 15(1) of the CCS (CCA)
Rules, 1965. Further, the communications dated 02.01.2023 and
25.01.2023 were procedural communications and did not constitute final
orders prejudicially determining the applicant’s guilt. Thus, he prayed
that the instant OA be dismissed as premature, barred by limitation and
devoid of merit.
7. Respondent no.7 by filing reply submitted that the present OA is
explicitly directed against the orders/communications Annexure-A/1 to
A/4 . Respondent No.7 has no role, execution, or involvement either
directly or indirectly in the issuance of the impugned orders or the
administrative actions flowing therefrom. Further, a meticulous review
of the factual matrix and the grounds for relief formulated by the
applicant reveals that no direct or indirect charges, imputations, or
allegations have been leveled against Respondent No.7.
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7.1 The applicant has improperly impleaded Respondent No.7 in the array
of parties. Because no relief is claimed against Respondent No.7, nor
can his presence alter the adjudication of the core dispute, he is neither a
necessary nor a proper party, resulting in a clear case of misjoinder.
7.2 The assertions made within Paragraphs 4.01 to 4.24 of the OA do not
concern the answering Respondent. Being entirely alien to his service
record or official domain, these paragraphs call for no response or
rebuttal from Respondent No. 7. Further, Respondent No.7 has no
knowledge or awareness of the operational incidents cited in these
grounds. Lacking any administrative connection to these occurrences,
no comments are offered. The service placements highlighted by the
applicant are distinct matters of formal administrative record, verified as
follows:
o
Superintendent Promotion (2002): Respondent No. 7 was
promoted to Superintendent and positioned at Serial No. 577 of
Establishment Order No. 275 of 2002 dated 23.09.2002
(Annexure-A/41). Concurrently, the Applicant held Serial No.
575, positioned directly above Shri Sitaram Meena at Serial No.
576.
o
Assistant Commissioner Promotion (2020): Respondent No. 7
was subsequently promoted to Assistant Commissioner via
CBIC Office Order No. 156/2020 dated 24.12.2020, positioned
at Serial No. 308 ( Annexure-A/42 refer, Page 273).
o These parallel placements do not establish any conflict of
interest or actionable grievance between the Applicant and
Respondent No. 7.
7.3 In view of the complete absence of any triable issue or claimed relief
against the answering Respondent No.7, he prayed for Order the
deletion of the name of Respondent No.7 from the array of
parties/private respondents due to misjoinder.
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8. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the applicant by referring to common
rejoinder besides reiterating the above submissions submitted that the
present OA, being the third round of litigation, is maintainable and that
the applicant has been compelled to implead respondent No. 7, his
immediate junior, who has been promoted to the post of Assistant
Commissioner while the applicant has been denied promotion on
account of the pendency of the impugned disciplinary proceedings.
Learned counsel contended that the order dated 24.01.2022 passed by
the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat was in favour of the applicant and
that the respondents had failed to appreciate the Tribunal’s earlier
findings against conducting a second inquiry. Learned counsel further
submitted that the applicant was acquitted by the said learnted Trial
Court on 22.02.2017 and that the Inquiry Officer, after considering the
relevant material, held all the charges as “NOT PROVED”. Despite the
disciplinary authority having initially agreed with the inquiry report, the
proceedings were reopened at the instance of the Vigilance authorities,
resulting in an unjustified prolongation of the inquiry for more than 13
years. Relying upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
G.M. Tank (supra) and Prem Nath Bali (supra), as well as the judgment
in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan (Civil Appeal No. 7935 of 2023
decided on 04.12.2023, learned counsel argued that the respondents
could not indefinitely continue the disciplinary proceedings, particularly
when the criminal acquittal had not been stayed by the appellate forum.
Learned counsel further contended that the respondents’ reliance on the
judgment of the Hon’ble Madras High Court in R. Balakrishnan v. FCI
(supra) is misplaced, as the facts of that case were distinguishable.
Learned counsel also challenged the denial of relevant vigilance
communications, alleging that such denial prevented the applicant from
making an effective representation. Lastly, learned counsel submitted
that the prolonged pendency of the proceedings had seriously prejudiced
the applicant by depriving him of MACP benefits and promotion to the
post of Assistant Commissioner, despite his immediate junior having
been promoted. Accordingly, learned counsel prayed that the OA be
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allowed and the impugned communications be quashed, with
consequential reliefs as prayed for.
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
pleadings as well as the judgments on which the learned counsel for the
parties placed reliance.
10. It emerges from the records placed before us that the applicant joined
the Central Government service on 06.04.1992 as Inspector of Central
Excise and Customs and was subsequently promoted to the post of
Superintendent on 23.09.2002. While working as Superintendent in
Range-III, Division-III, Ankleshwar, he was implicated in a CBI case
registered on 15.05.2008 pursuant to a complaint made by Shri Atul C.
Patel, Manager of M/s Mitra Organics Pvt. Ltd. The applicant was
initially placed under deemed suspension, which was revoked on
10.02.2009. Subsequently, the Commissioner of Central Excise and
Customs, Surat-I, initiated major penalty disciplinary proceedings
against the applicant by issuing charge memorandum dated 01.01.2010
under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, alleging demand and
acceptance of illegal gratification. The allegations forming the subject
matter of the departmental proceedings arose out of the same incident
which was also investigated by the CBI in RC No.07(A)/2008/GNR and
culminated in CBI Special Case No.13 of 2008.
10.1 During the pendency of the criminal prosecution, the applicant
approached this Tribunal by filing OA No.222/2013. This Tribunal, vide
order dated 05.09.2013, stayed the departmental proceedings for a
period of one year or until disposal of the criminal case, whichever was
earlier. The operative portion of the said Order is reproduced as under:-
“13. In view of the aforenoted facts and circumstances of the matter, we
are of the view that the applicant would stand greatly prejudiced by
disclosing his defence in the departmental proceedings before he does so
in the criminal trial. We would, therefore, direct that the proceedings in
the matter with respect to Charge-sheet dated 01-1-2010 issued against
the applicant be stayed for a period of one year or till the disposal of the
criminal case, whichever is earlier. It is expected that the parties would
take all steps to ensure and cooperate for speed completion of the
criminal trial.”
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The challenge made by the respondents to the said order before the
Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in SCA No.18076/2013 was dismissed
by the Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 24.12.2013. The relevant
paras of the said Order/Judgment is reproduced as under:-
“2. Union of India, Ministry of Finance along with Commissioner of
„Central Excise, Customs and Service Tax, Surat is before this Court
challenging that order. Learned Advocate for the petitioner rightly
invited attention of the Court: to para-10 of the judgment, which reads as
under:-
“10. It is further observed from the chronology of events brought
out in the OA that there has been delay in issuance of the Charge-
sheet in the departmental proceedings for more than a year after
the filing of criminal case. Secondly that even after the issue of
Chargesheet on 01-1-2010 in the disciplinary proceedings, there
has been virtually no progress in the departmental inquiry. The
period upto 12-11-2012 (i.e. till the appointment of the new PO and
10) has not resulted in any tangible progress in the disciplinary
inquiry proceedings, it is only on or after 30-1-2013 when the
applicant asked for three months' time that the proceedings can be
stated to have actually commenced by way of fixing the preliminary
inquiry on 11-3-2013 vide letter dated 22-2-2013. Any delay in the
inquiry proceedings till 11-3-2013 cannot therefore be attributed to
the applicant. Delay has taken place on the part of the respondents
in initiating, expediting and completing the inquiry proceedings for
which the applicant cannot be faulted for the same. On the other
hand, the criminal trial has already started. According to the
pleadings in the OA, which has not been controverted by the
respondents, the complainant had been cross-examined on 27-6-
2013 and the next date fixed was 06-7-2013. Further, witnesses
were also being examined/cross examined. Three is also no
averment made in the reply of the respondents or during arguments
that the applicant can be faulted for any delay in the criminal trial.
At the same time, it is also noticed that the stage is fast
approaching when the applicant in the OA would be required to
disclose his defence before the trial Court in the criminal
proceedings.”
3. This Court is of the opinion that after having read this para-10, the
officers should have restrained themselves from opining that the order is
required to be Challenged before this court by way of petition. The Court
restrains itself from passing any order against the officer, giving him
benefit of doubt that may be on account of his over enthusiasm that he
has opined to file petition before this Court.
4. Having perused the judgment and Order passed by the Tribunal,
this Court finds that no interference is required at the hands of this
Court. In the result, the petition fails and the same is dismissed.”
10.2 The applicant was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charges by the
learned Special Judge (CBI), Ahmedabad, vide judgment and order
dated 22.02.2017 in CBI Special Case No.13 of 2008. The relevant
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paras of the said judgment of the learned Special Judge (CBI) are
reproduced as under:-
“2. Brief facts of the prosecution case are that on 14-05-2008,
Superintendent, CBI-GANDHINAGAR had received a complaint of
corruption from a person named Shri Atul C Patel so he directed to PI
Mr. A.Z.Shaikh to go Bharuch along with the team so the contrary it
appears that complainant has his own stated that he went to the office of
the accused with Rs.20,000/- In response to said accused has not stated
that come, on tomorrow with said money. Further, as discussed above, in
the absence of accused, complainant and panch no.1 got chance to sit in
chamber of the accused, possibility cannot be denied that during said
time, tainted money planted in file. Further, when panch witness gone
down to give information to CBI team about completion of transaction, at
that time, the complainant was alone and as looking to the evidence,
accused was also not in his chamber. So, during said time, what has
happened may not be within the knowledge of the panbh witness. In these
circumstances, and as looking to the Exh.33, it appears that muddamal
file of refund of the complainant is recovered from the complainant on
16-5-2008 which is appears rough copy, hence it has not given to the
accused. When any application not given to the accused then how he can
pass any order and evidence on record shows that to add any new
product no permission is required, only intimation is required in the
office of Central Excise. And as refund sanctioned by Mr. B.C Patel,
Asst. Commissioner, and it has also not duty of the accused and from
now where it transpires that accused has tried to delay in making
payment of refund. In these circumstances, looking to the entire
evidence on record, prosecution, fails to prove demand, recovery and
acceptance. Hence, presumptive under Section 20 cannot be drawn.
Further, as discussed above, the sanction accorded is mechanical and
without application of mine. Hence, prosecution fails to prove all three
issues. Hence, issue no.2 and 3 are decided in negative. Hence,
following order is passed:-
ORDER
1. The accused person-Mr. Dal Chand Meena, residing at
Q.No.20/Type- III, Central Revenue Colony, Central Revenue Colony,
Athwalines, Surat, Gujarat is under Section 232 of Cr.P.C. is hereby
acquitted from the offences u/s. 7, 3(2) r/w. 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988.
2. Bail-bond of the accused stands cancelled.
3. The accused is further directed to execute bail bond of Rs.10,000/-
„(Rupees Ten Thousand Only) with surety of the like amount in
compliance with Sec. 437A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
4. Non-valuable muddamal is ordered to be disposed off (destroyed) on
completion of appeal period.
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5. The Currency Notes of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand Only) 40
notes of denomination of Rs.500/- [muddamal article no.7/4] is hereby
ordered to deposit in Government after the expiration of the Appeal
period.
6. Muddamal Mobile Phone of Nokia Co. is ordered to be handed over
to the accused on completion of appeal period.”
(emphasis supplied)
Thereafter, the Inquiry Officer submitted his report dated 29.08.2017,
holding all the articles of charge levelled against the applicant as "NOT
PROVED". The said report was forwarded to the disciplinary authority,
and a copy thereof was furnished to the applicant vide communication
dated 13.09.2017. The applicant submitted his representation dated
15.09.2017 requesting that the disciplinary proceedings be dropped.
10.3 Instead of passing a final order on the basis of the inquiry report and the
applicant's representation, the disciplinary authority sought second-stage
vigilance advice from the Additional Director General of Vigilance,
Ahmedabad Zone, vide communication dated 20.11.2017. The
Vigilance Authority, vide communication dated 27.02.2018, expressed
certain reservations regarding the manner in which the inquiry had been
conducted and returned the case records for necessary action.
Thereafter, certain communications were exchanged between the
Inquiry Officer, the disciplinary authority and the Vigilance Authority
regarding the procedural aspects of the inquiry. The applicant
challenged the proposed further inquiry before this Tribunal by filing
OA No.54/2019. This Tribunal, vide its final order dated 18.09.2020,
quashed and set aside the communication dated 31.01.2019 issued by
the Inquiry Officer and directed the disciplinary authority to take an
appropriate decision on the applicant's representation dated 15.09.2017
expeditiously, preferably within 60 days from receipt of a copy of the
said order. The relevant extract of the said Order is reproduced as
under:-
“16. In light of the above, we are of the view that it is not open for the
disciplinary authority to take a decision for further inquiry behind the
back of applicant that too without deciding his representation dated
15.09.2017 made to the disciplinary authority in response to the inquiry
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report dated 28/29.08.2017. Since the impugned decision was based on
the dictates of the CVC, it was incumbent upon the disciplinary authority
under the provisions of Sub Rule 3 (b) of Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA)
Rules, to supply the copy of said communication of CVC to the applicant
delinquent. Failure to adhere to the said provisions, the impugned
decision suffers from infirmities and the same is vitiated. The impugned
order is also vitiated for the reason of flagrant violation of principles of
natural justice. Therefore, the impugned decision cannot be allowed to
sustain.
17. For the reasons stated above, the Order/decision under challenge
i.e. dated 31.1.2019 (Annex.A/2) is quashed and set aside. The
disciplinary authority is directed to take appropriate decision on the
th
pending representation dated 15 September, 2017 (Annex.A/1) of the
applicant expeditiously, but not later than 60 days from the date of
receipt of a copy of this order.
th
18. The interim order granted by this Tribunal vide order dated 14
February, 2019 is made absolute.
19. The 0.A. is accordingly allowed to the above extent with no order as
to costs.”
10.4 The respondents challenged the aforesaid order of this Tribunal before
the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in SCA No.6013/2021. The said
petition was dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court vide judgment dated
24.01.2022, with a direction to the competent authority to take an
appropriate decision in pursuance of the Tribunal's directions within 60
days. The operative paras of the said judgment of the Hon’ble High
Court is extracted as under:-
“4.1 There is no dispute about the fact that the communication dated
31.1.2019 impugned before the Central Administrative Tribunal is in
connection with the same inquiry in which the petitioner was exonerated,
as noted above. Be as it may.
5. We do not propose, nor it is needed, to go into the merits of the
grievance of the petitioner or about the stand the respondent authorities
may be taking in support of their subsequent action, although the
petitioner by filing affidavit-in reply to this proceedings sought to rely on
the decision of this Court in Union of India Vs. Shri Vasudevan S.
Konda being Special Civil Application No.6302 of 2019, decided on
21.1.2021 as well as in A.K.Tripathi Vs. Union of India being Special
Civil Application No.7459 of 2005 decided on 20.11.2014 to submit that
similar set of facts were dealt with by this Court in those decisions and
that the Court ruled against the authorities.
5.1 As stated above, we have not gone into, nor have examined the
merits of the case of the petitioner, more particularly, having regard to
the kind and nature of the impugned order of the Tribunal.
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6. By impugned order, the Tribunal has only directed the Disciplinary
Authority to take expeditious appropriate decision in respect of the
aforementioned representation of the petitioner dated 15.9.2017. It is in
this light and to facilitate the process of taking decision, by disciplinary
authority, impugned communication dated 31.1.2019 has been set aside
by the Tribunal, It would be for the disciplinary authority to take
appropriate decision in accordance with law as regard the future course
of action against the petitioner, in view of what is directed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal.
7. We do not see any good reason to interject with the impugned order.
Accordingly, the present Special Civil Application is summarily
dismissed.
At this stage, learned advocate for the petitioner fairly requested that
time granted by the Tribunal to decide the representation was Sixty days,
which i is over; therefore such time may be extended. The request being
reasonable, appropriate decision pursuant to the direction of the
Tribunal shall be taken by the authority concerned within sixty days to be
reckoned from today.”
10.5 Pursuant thereto, the disciplinary authority issued the impugned
communication dated 24.03.2022, deciding to remit the matter to the
Inquiry Officer for further inquiry and submission of a report in
accordance with the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The applicant's
subsequent request for copies of certain vigilance communications was
rejected vide communication dated 12.04.2022. Thereafter, the
disciplinary authority issued further communications dated 02.01.2023
and 25.01.2023, requiring the applicant to furnish documents and
submit his representation in connection with the proposed further
inquiry.
10.6 It is also not in dispute that the applicant submitted several
representations against the continuation of the disciplinary proceedings.
The respondents have stated that these representations were considered
and disposed of by the disciplinary authority vide communication dated
01.08.2023, which was communicated to the applicant through email
dated 04.08.2023 and physically received by him on 07.08.2023.
10.7 It is further evident from the pleadings that the applicant's case for
financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme and promotion to the
post of Assistant Commissioner was not considered in the ordinary
course on account of the pending disciplinary proceedings. His case for
promotion was reportedly kept in a sealed cover, whereas his immediate
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junior, respondent No.7, was granted promotion to the post of Assistant
Commissioner vide Office Order No.156/2020 dated 24.12.2020.
10.8 The applicant has, therefore, approached this Tribunal for the third time,
principally challenging the decision of the disciplinary authority to remit
the matter for further inquiry, notwithstanding the favourable findings
recorded by the Inquiry Officer, the acquittal in the said criminal case
and the considerable period which has elapsed since the initiation of the
disciplinary proceedings.
11. Having regard to the pleadings, rival submissions and the material
available on record, the following issues arise for our adjudication:
(i) Whether the present OA is maintainable, or is liable to be rejected
as premature and barred by limitation under Sections 20 and 21 of
the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985?
(ii) Whether the disciplinary authority was justified in remitting the
matter to the Inquiry Officer for further inquiry under Rule 15(1)
of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, notwithstanding the inquiry report
dated 29.08.2017 holding all the charges as "NOT PROVED"?
(iii) Whether the acquittal of the applicant by the learned Special Judge
(CBI) vide judgment dated 22.02.2017, coupled with the
favourable findings of the Inquiry Officer and the prolonged
pendency of the departmental proceedings, warrants termination of
the disciplinary proceedings?
(iv) Whether the impugned communications dated 24.03.2022,
12.04.2022, 02.01.2023 and 25.01.2023 suffer from arbitrariness,
procedural irregularity or non-application of mind?
(v) Whether the applicant is entitled to consequential consideration for
financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme and promotion to
the post of Assistant Commissioner, particularly when his
immediate junior has already been promoted?
12. So far as issue (i) as noted in para 11 above is concerned, the official
respondents have raised preliminary objections that the instant OA is
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barred by limitation under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals
Act, 1985, and premature under Section 20 thereof, as no final order
imposing a penalty has been passed by the Disciplinary Authority.
Respondent No. 7 has separately prayed for deletion from the array of
parties on the ground of misjoinder.
12.1 The Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 provides that
the Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless satisfied
that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under
the relevant service rules. However, it is well established in service
jurisprudence that Section 20 of the Act ibid is a rule of discretion and
prudence rather than an absolute jurisdictional bar. Where an employee
challenges the continuation of disciplinary proceedings as being an
abuse of process, devoid of jurisdiction, or in clear violation of Articles
14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, relegating the employee to an
unending departmental labyrinth would render judicial review illusory.
12.2 The impugned communications dated 24.03.2022 and 12.04.2022 do not
constitute routine interlocutory notices; they embody a definitive
administrative decision remitting the matter for a second/further inquiry,
brushing aside earlier judicial directions. The applicant has already
undergone two full rounds of litigation before this Tribunal (OA No.
222/2013 and OA No. 54/2019) and before the Hon’ble High Court of
Gujarat (SCA No. 18076/2013 and SCA No. 6013/2021). Forcing him
to face a repetitive inquiry before approaching this forum would amount
to endorsing administrative intransigence. The objection under Section
20 is accordingly rejected.
12.3 The respondents also contended that the communication dated
24.03.2022 was challenged after a lapse of more than one year. This
argument ignores the continuous chain of administrative actions.
Following the order dated 24.03.2022, the applicant submitted
successive representations on 28.03.2022, 12.04.2022, 25.04.2022,
06.06.2022, 15.12.2022, and 12.01.2023. The Disciplinary Authority
kept the proceedings alive by issuing fresh directives dated 02.01.2023
(seeking examination documents) and 25.01.2023 (supplying vigilance
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correspondence for further proceedings). The applicant faces a
continuous civil and financial injury through the non-conclusion of
proceedings and withholding of promotions. The cause of action is
continuous, and reckoned from the directives issued in January 2023,
the instant OA is well within the statutory period under Section 21 of
the Act ibid .
12.4 The Respondent No.7 contends that no direct charges or relief are
claimed against him. We note that admittedly respondent No. 7 is the
immediate junior belonging to the Scheduled Tribe category who was
promoted to the post of Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise and
Customs vide CBIC Office Order No. 156/2020 dated 24.12.2020.
Because the applicant seeks parity of promotion and restoration of
seniority from the date his immediate junior was promoted, Respondent
No. 7 was impleaded as a proper party to ensure that any consequential
re-fixation of seniority occurs with notice to affected parties. Since no
personal castigation or penal recovery is sought against Respondent No.
7, his presence on record does not prejudice his rights, nor does it vitiate
the proceedings for misjoinder.
13. So far as issue nos.(ii) (iii) and (iv) as noted in para 11 above are
concerned, these issues are interconnected and, therefore, are being
considered together.
13.1 The principal controversy in the present case revolves around the
decision of the disciplinary authority to remit the matter for further
inquiry despite the Inquiry Officer having submitted his report dated
29.08.2017 holding all the charges against the applicant as "NOT
PROVED".
13.2 The applicant's contention is that the disciplinary authority had no
justification to reopen the inquiry, particularly when the learned Trial
Court had already acquitted him on the same allegations and the Inquiry
Officer, after examining the departmental evidence, had returned
findings in his favour. It is further argued that the disciplinary authority
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acted mechanically upon the vigilance advice and failed to take an
independent decision on the applicant's representation.
13.3 On the other hand, the official respondents have justified the impugned
decision by placing reliance upon Rule 15(1) of the Rules of 1965.
According to them, the Inquiry Officer's report was incomplete and
deficient because the Inquiry Officer had relied upon the judgment of
the learned Court and other extraneous considerations rather than
independently completing the inquiry in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. The respondents have also placed reliance upon paragraph
7.26.4 of the Vigilance Manual and the Board's instructions dated
07.01.2011.
13.4 In order to appreciate the rival submissions, it would be appropriate to
first examine the scope and ambit of Rule 15(1) of the CCS (CCA)
Rules, 1965. The said provision reads as under:
"The disciplinary authority, if it is not itself the inquiring authority may,
for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the inquiring
authority for further inquiry and report and the inquiring authority shall
thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions
of Rule 14, as far as may be."
13.5 A plain reading of the aforesaid provision makes it evident that the
disciplinary authority is vested with the power to remit a matter for
further inquiry. However, such power is not unbridled or unfettered. The
exercise of such power is subject to two important conditions: first, the
disciplinary authority must have valid and legally sustainable reasons
for directing further inquiry; and secondly, such reasons must be
recorded in writing. The provision contemplates further inquiry and not
an unrestricted right to discard an inquiry report merely because its
findings are not acceptable to the disciplinary authority or the Vigilance
Authority.
13.6 The Hon'ble Supreme Court had occasion to examine an analogous
provision in the case of K.R. Deb v. Collector of Central Excise,
Shillong , reported in (1971) 2 SCC 102. In the said case, the Inquiry
Officer had exonerated the delinquent employee. The disciplinary
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authority, being dissatisfied with the findings, directed further inquiry
and thereafter proceeded to appoint different Inquiry Officers. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court disapproved such a course of action and held
that the statutory rules contemplate one inquiry, though further evidence
may be recorded where a serious defect has crept into the inquiry or
important witnesses were not examined for some valid reason. The
relevant observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are as follows:
"It seems to us that Rule 15, on the face of it, really provides for one
inquiry but it may be possible if in a particular case there has been no
proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept into the inquiry or
some important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry or
were not examined for some other reason, the Disciplinary Authority may
ask the Inquiry Officer to record further evidence."
The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed:
"But there is no provision in rule 15 for completely setting aside previous
inquiries on the ground that the report of the Inquiring Officer or
Officers does not appeal to the Disciplinary Authority."
13.7 The aforesaid judgment clearly establishes that the power to order
further inquiry cannot be exercised merely because the disciplinary
authority is dissatisfied with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. There
must be some identifiable and substantial defect in the inquiry
warranting further examination. The object of Rule 15(1) of the Rules of
1965 is to cure a genuine procedural deficiency and not to provide an
opportunity to the disciplinary authority to secure a report favourable to
the department after the Inquiry Officer has returned findings in favour
of the charged employee.
13.8 In the present case, the respondents have relied upon the communication
dated 27.02.2018 issued by the Vigilance Authority, wherein certain
deficiencies in the inquiry proceedings were pointed out. Their specific
contention is that the Inquiry Officer had relied upon the judgment of
the criminal court and other extraneous considerations while recording
his findings.
13.9 We are conscious of the fact that a departmental inquiry and a criminal
trial operate in different fields and are governed by different standards
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of proof. The Inquiry Officer is required to assess the evidence adduced
during the departmental inquiry on the touchstone of preponderance of
probabilities. He cannot substitute the findings of the criminal court for
his own assessment of the departmental evidence. To this extent, the
respondents' submission has legal force. However, the mere fact that the
Inquiry Officer referred to the judgment of the criminal court does not,
by itself, establish that the entire inquiry was vitiated or that a fresh
inquiry was necessarily required. It was incumbent upon the disciplinary
authority to identify the precise procedural irregularities, indicate how
those irregularities affected the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer
and record its own independent reasons for directing further inquiry.
The disciplinary authority was also required to examine whether the
alleged deficiencies could be cured by calling for further evidence or
clarification in the existing inquiry, rather than reopening the entire
matter. The distinction between further inquiry to cure a genuine defect
and a fresh inquiry to obtain a different conclusion is of considerable
significance.
13.10 We further find that the Inquiry Officer, vide communication dated
08.05.2018, had specifically maintained that the inquiry was conducted
in accordance with the applicable procedure. Thus, there were
conflicting views between the Inquiry Officer and the Vigilance
Authority. In such circumstances, the disciplinary authority was
expected to independently scrutinise the inquiry record and record its
satisfaction regarding the necessity of further inquiry.
13.11 It is also relevant that the disciplinary authority had furnished the
inquiry report to the applicant vide communication dated 13.09.2017
and had invited his representation. The applicant submitted his
representation dated 15.09.2017 seeking closure of the proceedings. The
applicant has further contended that the erstwhile disciplinary authority
had agreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer before referring the
matter for vigilance advice. If that position is borne out by the original
departmental file, it assumes considerable significance. The disciplinary
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authority could not simply abandon its earlier assessment without
recording cogent and independent reasons.
13.12 We also cannot lose sight of the fact that the Vigilance Authority is
only an advisory body. Its advice may certainly be considered by the
disciplinary authority, but the ultimate statutory responsibility for taking
a decision rests with the disciplinary authority itself. The respondents
have also acknowledged this position in their reply, particularly by
referring to the communication dated 21.08.2023. Thus, while the
disciplinary authority was entitled to seek vigilance advice, it could not
surrender its independent decision-making authority to the Vigilance
Authority. The impugned decision had to reflect the disciplinary
authority's own application of mind to the inquiry report, the evidence
on record, the applicant's representation and the alleged procedural
deficiencies.
13.13 In this context, the fact that the matter was remitted for further inquiry
only on 24.03.2022, despite the inquiry report having been submitted on
29.08.2017, is also relevant. The disciplinary authority took almost four
and a half years after receipt of the inquiry report to arrive at the
decision to remit the matter. Such a course of action, particularly when
the proceedings themselves had already remained pending for more than
twelve years, required a particularly careful and reasoned justification.
14. We now proceed to examine the effect of the applicant's acquittal in the
criminal proceedings. The applicant was acquitted by the learned
Special Judge (CBI), Ahmedabad, vide judgment dated 22.02.2017. It is
the applicant's specific case that the criminal prosecution and
departmental proceedings arose out of the same incident and were
founded upon substantially the same allegations, documents and
witnesses. The settled legal position is that acquittal in a criminal case
does not automatically absolve a Government servant from disciplinary
liability. The standards of proof in criminal and departmental
proceedings are different. However, this general proposition cannot be
applied mechanically without examining the nature of the acquittal and
the extent of identity between the two proceedings.
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14.1 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat , reported
in (2006) 5 SCC 446, considered a situation where the departmental
proceedings and the criminal prosecution were founded upon identical
facts, charges, circumstances and evidence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that where the criminal court, after a regular trial, acquitted the
employee on merits and the departmental proceedings were based on the
same evidence, allowing the adverse departmental findings to stand
would be unjust, unfair and oppressive. The relevant principle emerging
from the aforesaid judgment is that although departmental and criminal
proceedings ordinarily operate in different fields, the distinction cannot
be applied as an inflexible rule where the charges and evidence are
identical and the criminal court has recorded findings which completely
undermine the basis of the departmental action.
14.2 The Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the said principle in Ram Lal v.
State of Rajasthan , Civil Appeal No.7935 of 2023, decided on
04.12.2023, reported as 2023 INSC 1047. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
held that mere acquittal in a criminal case does not confer an automatic
right to reinstatement or other service benefits. However, where the
charges in the departmental inquiry and the criminal case are identical
or substantially similar and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances
are the same, the Court may grant relief if continuation of the
departmental findings would be unjust, unfair and oppressive. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the said judgment, observed:
"However, if the charges in the departmental enquiry and the criminal
court are identical or similar, and if the evidence, witnesses and
circumstances are one and the same, then the matter acquires a different
dimension."
The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that judicial review may
be exercised where the acquittal follows full consideration of the
prosecution evidence and allowing the departmental findings to stand
would be unjust, unfair and oppressive.
14.3 We find that the principle laid down in G.M. Tank (supra) and Ram Lal
(supra) is relevant for examining the applicant's case. However, we
would clarify that the applicant's acquittal by itself cannot be treated as
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conclusive proof of his innocence in the departmental proceedings. The
criminal appeal stated to have been filed against the acquittal is also a
relevant circumstance. Nevertheless, mere pendency of an appeal does
not, by itself, efface or suspend the judgment of acquittal unless it is set
aside or its operation is otherwise affected by an appropriate judicial
order.
14.4 In the present case, there is an additional and important circumstance.
The Inquiry Officer, after conducting the departmental inquiry, has
independently held all the charges as "NOT PROVED". Therefore, the
applicant is not relying solely upon the criminal court's judgment. He is
also relying upon the findings recorded by the departmental Inquiry
Officer on the basis of the departmental proceedings.
14.5 The official respondents, on the other hand, have not demonstrated
before us, with reference to any specific article of charge, that the
Inquiry Officer ignored any material departmental evidence or that any
particular witness or material document was not examined, resulting in a
serious defect which could not be cured otherwise than by further
inquiry. A general assertion that the Inquiry Officer relied upon
extraneous considerations cannot, without a detailed examination of the
inquiry record, furnish an adequate justification for reopening the entire
inquiry after such an extraordinary lapse of time.
15. We now turn to the question of delay, which constitutes one of the most
significant aspects of the present controversy. The charge memorandum
was issued on 01.01.2010. The inquiry report was submitted on
29.08.2017. The applicant's representation against the inquiry report
was submitted on 15.09.2017. However, the disciplinary authority took
its decision to remit the matter for further inquiry only on 24.03.2022.
Even thereafter, the proceedings continued through various
communications and representations during 2022 and 2023. Thus, the
disciplinary proceedings had remained pending for more than thirteen
years by the time the present OA was instituted. Even after submission
of the inquiry report holding all the charges as not proved, the
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respondents did not bring the proceedings to a logical conclusion for
several years.
15.1 We are conscious of the respondents' submission that the applicant also
contributed to the delay by remaining absent from certain scheduled
hearings. The respondents have relied upon Daily Order Sheets Nos.09,
11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18. They have also pointed out that the
departmental inquiry remained stayed pursuant to the orders passed by
this Tribunal in OA No.222/2013 and OA No.54/2019.
15.2 . It is true that the entire period of delay cannot automatically be
attributed to the respondents. The period during which the inquiry
remained stayed under judicial orders, as well as any delay specifically
attributable to the applicant herein , has to be taken into account.
However, the mere fact that the applicant approached the judicial forum
to protect his legal rights cannot be treated as misconduct or as a
circumstance disentitling him from complaining of unreasonable delay.
15.3 More importantly, the respondents have not satisfactorily explained why
the matter remained pending for such a considerable period even after
the submission of the inquiry report dated 29.08.2017 and the
applicant's representation dated 15.09.2017. The subsequent
correspondence between the disciplinary authority and the Vigilance
Authority, and the time taken in obtaining advice and considering the
matter, were matters within the administrative control of the department.
15.4 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. N.
Radhakishan , reported in (1998) 4 SCC 154, laid down the principles
governing delay in disciplinary proceedings. The Court held that there is
no fixed period of limitation for completing a departmental inquiry and
that the question of delay must be considered in the light of the nature of
the charges, the complexity of the inquiry, the reasons for delay and the
prejudice caused to the employee. The Hon'ble Supreme Court made it
clear that where delay is unexplained and causes prejudice to the
employee, the disciplinary proceedings may be liable to be quashed. At
the same time, the Hon’ble Supreme Court cautioned that delay cannot
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be considered in isolation and that the Court must undertake a balancing
exercise keeping in view the seriousness of the charge and the overall
circumstances of the case.
15.5 The aforesaid principles were reiterated in Prem Nath Bali v. Registrar,
High Court of Delhi , reported in (2015) 16 SCC 415. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court emphasised that departmental proceedings must be
concluded within a reasonable period and that employers should make
sincere efforts to complete them expeditiously. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court observed that, as far as possible, an inquiry should be concluded
within six months and, where unavoidable circumstances exist, within a
reasonably extended period not exceeding one year. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court observed:
"Every employer (whether State or private) must make sincere endeavour
to conclude the departmental enquiry proceedings once initiated against
the delinquent employee within a reasonable time by giving priority to
such proceedings and as far as possible it should be concluded within six
months as an outer limit. Where it is not possible for the employer to
conclude due to certain unavoidable causes arising in the proceedings
within the time-frame then efforts should be made to conclude within the
reasonably extended period depending upon the cause and the nature of
inquiry but not more than a year."
15.6 We are conscious that the aforesaid observations do not prescribe an
inflexible statutory limitation period after which every disciplinary
proceeding automatically lapses. Nevertheless, they constitute an
authoritative judicial pronouncement emphasising the obligation of the
employer to complete disciplinary proceedings within a reasonable time.
15.7 In the present case, the delay is not merely a matter of a few additional
months beyond the reasonable period contemplated by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court. The proceedings have continued for more than thirteen
years. The Inquiry Officer has already completed the inquiry and
returned findings in favour of the applicant. The respondents have not
established any compelling circumstance warranting the continuation of
the proceedings for such an extraordinary period.
15.8 The prejudice caused to the applicant is also not merely speculative. The
applicant has specifically pleaded that his case for financial upgradation
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under the MACP Scheme, due with effect from 23.09.2016, was not
processed on account of the pending disciplinary proceedings. He has
further pointed out that his case for promotion to the post of Assistant
Commissioner was kept in a sealed cover, whereas his immediate
junior, respondent No.7, was promoted to the said post vide Office
Order No.156/2020 dated 24.12.2020.
15.9 The applicant has also placed reliance upon the relevant seniority
position reflected in Establishment Order No.275 of 2002 dated
23.09.2002 and the RTI reply dated 26.04.2023. The respondents have
not disputed that the applicant's promotion case was kept in a sealed
cover because of the pending disciplinary proceedings. They have,
however, justified such action on the basis of the applicable vigilance
and promotion instructions.
16. We find that the continued pendency of the disciplinary proceedings has
had a direct and adverse impact upon the applicant's service career. The
applicant, who is due to retire on 28.02.2029, has already suffered
considerable prejudice on account of the prolonged uncertainty
surrounding the disciplinary proceedings.
16.1 We also cannot overlook the fact that the disciplinary authority's
decision dated 24.03.2022 was taken after this Tribunal had already
directed the authority to decide the applicant's representation
expeditiously and the Hon'ble High Court had further granted 60 days
for compliance. The purpose of the earlier judicial directions was to
ensure that the disciplinary authority took an appropriate and timely
decision on the pending representation. Although those orders did not
expressly direct the respondents to drop the charges, they certainly did
not authorise the respondents to keep the matter pending indefinitely.
16.2 In this context, we are of the considered view that the respondents
cannot rely upon the liberty granted by the Tribunal and the Hon'ble
High Court to take an appropriate decision in accordance with law as a
justification for prolonging the proceedings without a demonstrable and
legally sustainable reason.
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16.3 We further find that the impugned communication dated 12.04.2022,
rejecting the applicant's request for copies of vigilance correspondence,
and the subsequent communication dated 25.01.2023, forwarding
certain vigilance material, have to be examined in the context of the
applicant's right to make an effective representation. Where the
disciplinary authority proposes to rely upon material which has a
bearing on its decision to order further inquiry, the employee must be
afforded an effective opportunity to examine and respond to such
material. Furnishing the relevant vigilance correspondence at a later
stage does not, by itself, cure any earlier failure to provide an effective
opportunity, though the question of actual prejudice must also be
considered.
16.4 We have also considered the respondents' reliance upon the judgment of
the Hon’ble Madras High Court in R. Balakrishnan v. Food
Corporation of India . The said decision does not dilute the statutory
requirement under Rule 15(1) of the Rules of 1965 that reasons for
directing further inquiry must be recorded in writing. Nor does it
override the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.R. Deb
(supra). The disciplinary authority must establish a genuine procedural
defect warranting further inquiry and cannot use the provision merely to
secure a different conclusion.
16.5 The respondents have further relied upon the subsequent
communication dated 01.08.2023, stating that the applicant's various
representations were considered and disposed of. We have taken note of
this subsequent development. However, disposal of representations does
not, by itself, establish that the underlying decision to remit the matter
was legally sustainable. The legality of the decision must be tested on
the basis of the statutory provision, the reasons recorded by the
disciplinary authority and the circumstances prevailing when the
decision was taken.
16.6 On an overall consideration of the facts and circumstances, we find that
the case does not warrant another opportunity to the department to
continue the inquiry merely on the basis of a general allegation of
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procedural deficiencies. The departmental proceedings have already
continued for an exceptionally long period; the Inquiry Officer has
returned findings in favour of the applicant; admittedly, the applicant
has been acquitted in the criminal case arising out of the same incident;
and the respondents have failed to demonstrate any sufficiently
compelling reason to justify further continuation of the proceedings at
this belated stage.
17. We accordingly hold that, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
present case, the continued departmental proceedings would be
oppressive and contrary to the principles of fairness, reasonableness and
expeditious administration of disciplinary justice. The decision to remit
the matter for further inquiry, followed by the continued attempt to
proceed with the inquiry, cannot be sustained.
18. We may clarify that our conclusion is not founded upon the proposition
that every acquittal in a criminal case automatically results in dropping
of the corresponding departmental proceedings, nor do we hold that
Rule 15(1) of the Rules of 1965 does not empower a disciplinary
authority to order further inquiry in an appropriate case. Our conclusion
rests upon the cumulative effect of the favourable inquiry report, the
criminal court's judgment, the absence of a sufficiently demonstrated
justification for reopening the inquiry, the extraordinary delay and the
concrete service prejudice suffered by the applicant. Therefore, we
answer Issue Nos. (ii), (iii) and (iv) in favour of the applicant.
19. Now coming to issue No.(v) as noted in para 11 above, since in this case
we hold that the continuation of the disciplinary proceedings is
unsustainable, we now proceed to examine the consequential service
benefits claimed by the applicant, i.e., the financial upgradation under
the MACP Scheme with effect from 23.09.2016 and ad hoc/regular
promotion to the post of Assistant Commissioner from the date his
immediate junior, respondent No.7, was promoted.
19.1 The official respondents have opposed the claim by relying upon the
DoPT Office Memorandum dated 02.11.2012 and the instructions
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governing vigilance clearance and sealed-cover procedure. They have
further contended that the Departmental Screening Committee, in its
meeting dated 08.06.2023, deferred the applicant's MACP case because
of the pending disciplinary proceedings. We are of the view that once
the disciplinary proceedings are brought to an end, the applicant's case
for MACP and promotion would require fresh consideration without
treating the said proceedings as a subsisting impediment. However, it is
equally well settled that financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme
and regular promotion are governed by distinct statutory rules and
executive instructions. The mere fact that a disciplinary proceeding is
terminated does not automatically confer an indefeasible right to
financial upgradation or promotion from the date claimed by the
employee. The applicant must satisfy the applicable eligibility
conditions, including the prescribed residency period, benchmark,
vigilance requirements and other relevant service conditions.
19.2 Insofar as the applicant's promotion is concerned, the respondents have
themselves admitted that his case was kept in a sealed cover on account
of the pending disciplinary proceedings. The relevant principles
governing sealed-cover procedure, including the law laid down in
Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman , reported in (1991) 4 SCC 109,
would therefore require consideration.
19.3 The respondents shall accordingly open and consider the sealed-cover
recommendations, if any, in accordance with the applicable rules and
instructions. If the applicant is found fit and otherwise eligible, his claim
for promotion shall be considered with reference to the relevant vacancy
year and the date on which his immediate junior was promoted, subject
to the applicable rules and instructions.
19.4 Similarly, his claim for financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme
shall be reconsidered by the competent authority independently, without
treating the disciplinary proceedings which are being terminated by this
order as a subsisting ground for withholding the benefit.
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20. We make it clear that the question of grant of actual financial benefits,
notional promotion, arrears of salary and consequential seniority, if any,
shall be decided by the competent authority in accordance with the
applicable rules and the applicant's eligibility. We, therefore, answer
Issue No. (v) partly in favour of the applicant to the extent that his
claims for MACP and promotion deserve fresh consideration without
the impediment of the disciplinary proceedings being continued against
him.
21. In view of the foregoing discussion and the law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.R. Deb (supra), State of Andhra Pradesh
v. N. Radhakishan (supra), G.M. Tank (supra), Prem Nath Bali (supra)
and Ram Lal (supra), we are of the considered view that the present
case warrants interference by this Tribunal.
22. Accordingly, the instant OA is partly allowed in the following terms:
(i) The impugned communications dated 24.03.2022, 12.04.2022,
02.01.2023 and 25.01.2023, insofar as they give effect to and
facilitate the further inquiry against the applicant, are hereby
quashed and set aside;
(ii) The disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant vide
charge memorandum dated 01.01.2010 are hereby brought to an
end. The respondents shall not proceed further against the applicant
on the basis of the said charge memorandum;
(iii) The respondents shall consider the applicant's claim for financial
upgradation under the MACP Scheme with effect from 23.09.2016,
in accordance with the applicable rules and instructions, without
treating the aforesaid disciplinary proceedings as a subsisting
impediment;
(iv) The respondents shall open the sealed-cover recommendations in
respect of the applicant's promotion to the post of Assistant
Commissioner and consider his case in accordance with the
applicable rules and instructions, keeping in view the promotion
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granted to his immediate junior, respondent No.7, vide Office
Order No.156/2020 dated 24.12.2020;
(v) In the event the applicant is found eligible and fit for the aforesaid
financial upgradation and/or promotion, the consequential benefits,
including notional fixation, arrears of pay and other admissible
benefits, shall be determined and released in accordance with the
applicable rules; and
(vi) The aforesaid exercises shall be completed by the competent
authority through a reasoned and speaking order within a period of
three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this
order.
23. There shall be no order as to costs.
24. All pending MAs, if any, shall also stand disposed of accordingly.
(Sanjiv Kumar) (Jayesh V. Bhairavia)
Member (A) Member (J)
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