Manjeet Singh Ahluwalia vs State Of Nct Of Delhi And Ors

$~62
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
# CNR No. DLHC010406812026
+ CRL.M.C. 6392/2026
Date of decision: 31.08.2026.
IN THE MATTER OF:-
MANJEET SINGH AHLUWALIA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Pranay Sharma, Advocate.
versus
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Naresh K. Chahar, APP along
with SI Ranbir, PS Lajpat Nagar.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV
J U D G M E N T
PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J. (ORAL)

CRL.M.A. 26738/2026
1. Exemption allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2. The application stands disposed of.
CRL.M.C. 6392/2026
3. By way of the present petition filed under Section 528 read with
Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [“BNSS”]
(corresponding to Sections 482/483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 [“Cr.P.C.”]), the petitioner assails the order dated 09.03.2026 passed
by the Additional Sessions Judge-05, South-East District, Saket Courts, New
Delhi in Cr. Rev. No. 588/2025 [“impugned revisional order”], whereby the
Revisional Court dismissed the petitioner’s revision and affirmed the order
Signature Not Verified
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Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:NEHA CHOPRA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
19:32:59

dated 29.08.2025 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class-01, South-
East District, Saket Courts [“impugned trial court order”], dismissing the
petitioner’s application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. (corresponding
Section 175(3) BNSS) seeking a direction for registration of an FIR against
respondent nos. 2 to 4.
4. The factual matrix, as borne out from the record, is that the petitioner
claims to be the owner of the ground floor and basement of property bearing
No. E-3, Lajpat Nagar-II, New Delhi, whereas respondent no. 2, who is
stated to be the petitioner’s real brother, claims ownership/co-ownership of
the said property. It is the petitioner’s case that on 19.03.2024, respondent
no. 2, in league with respondent nos. 3 and 4 and certain unidentified
persons, and allegedly in connivance with police officials, trespassed into
the property and attempted to forcibly install an electricity meter on the third
floor without the petitioner’s consent. It is further alleged that, on being
resisted, the accused persons criminally intimidated the petitioner and his
staff and hurled communally charged and religiously offensive remarks at
them.
5. On the police at PS Lajpat Nagar allegedly failing to register an FIR
despite a written complaint addressed to the Deputy Commissioner of
Police, South-East District, the petitioner approached the JMFC-01, Saket
Courts, under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., seeking a direction to the SHO, PS
Lajpat Nagar, to register an FIR under Sections
120B/503/506/166/295A/298 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 against the
accused persons. Notice was issued to the police. In response thereto, the
Investigating Officer filed an Action Taken Report [“ATR”] dated
05.09.2024.
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Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:NEHA CHOPRA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
19:32:59

6. The ATR, which is part of the record before both the Courts below,
records the following material aspects:-
“5. ATR states:
a) The police presence on 19.03.2024 was in response to a DD entry
regarding a quarrel, not to assist accused no.1.
b) The BSES team was present with a valid work order for the
installation of a meter requested by the owner, Sarabjit Singh
Ahluwalia.
c) The complainant, Manjeet Singh Ahluwalia, himself created a
hindrance, used abusive language against the police, and prevented
the installation.
d) No meter was installed that day, and no unlawful entry into the
complainant's premises was made by police or BSES staff.
e) The dispute is essentially a civil property dispute between two
brothers, which has previously led the police to initiate preventive
proceedings under Sections 107/150 CrPC.”

7. Upon consideration of the aforesaid ATR and the material placed by
the petitioner, the JMFC, vide the impugned trial court order dated
29.08.2025, dismissed the Section 156(3) application, holding, in substance,
that the matter was in the nature of a civil dispute, that the identity of the
accused persons was already known, that the evidence relied upon was
within the reach of the petitioner, and that no police investigation was,
therefore, warranted.
8. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred Cr. Rev. No. 588/2025
before the Additional Sessions Judge-05, Saket Courts. The Revisional
Court, vide the impugned revisional order dated 09.03.2026, after adverting
to the allegations and the ATR, held as follows:
“The Court finds that Ld. JMFC properly appreciated the allegations in
view of ATR filed by police and reached the right conclusion that this was
not [a] fit case for ordering registration of FIR; the allegations did not
justify the same. There was no illegality, unreasonableness or impropriety
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Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:NEHA CHOPRA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
19:32:59

in the impugned order. There is no merit in [the] revision petition and it is
dismissed.”
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner, assailing the concurrent orders, has
broadly urged that the complaint, on its face, discloses commission of
cognizable offences under Sections 120B, 503/506, 166, 295A and 298 IPC,
and registration of FIR was therefore mandatory and that the ATR itself
discloses complicity of the local police, whose own staff have been arrayed
as accused, thereby vitiating reliance placed on it.
10. It is further submitted that the impugned revisional order is cryptic
and non-speaking, having disposed of the revision in two sentences without
independently engaging with the specific allegations or the ATR’s internal
inconsistencies and that the discretion under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has been
exercised arbitrarily and without recording cogent reasons for declining
investigation into serious allegations.
10. Per contra, learned APP for the State supports the concurrent findings
of the Courts below and submits that the contemporaneous ATR, which has
gone unrebutted on facts material to the controversy, itself establishes that
the police response on 19.03.2024 was occasioned by a DD entry regarding
a quarrel and not by any design to assist respondent no. 2 and that the BSES
team was present pursuant to a valid work order issued at the instance of the
owner; that no meter was, in fact, installed and no unlawful entry was
effected; and that the petitioner, on the contrary, is recorded to have
obstructed the police and the BSES officials and used abusive language. It is
submitted that the dispute is essentially of a civil, property-related character
between two brothers, already the subject matter of preventive proceedings
under Sections 107/151 Cr.P.C., and does not warrant invocation of the
Signature Not Verified
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Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:NEHA CHOPRA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
19:32:59

criminal process.
11. It is well settled that registration of an FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C.
is mandatory where the information discloses commission of a cognizable
offence, and no preliminary inquiry is ordinarily permissible at that stage.
The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari v.
1
Government of Uttar Pradesh , held that no preliminary inquiry is
permissible “if the information discloses commission of a cognizable
offence”, though it carved out limited categories, including
matrimonial/family disputes, commercial offences and cases of abnormal
delay, where a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain
whether a cognizable offence is disclosed at all. This principle was reiterated
by the Supreme Court in Sindhu Janak Nagargoje v. State of
2
Maharashtra , where the Court set aside a High Court order declining
directions for registration of an FIR, on a finding that the complaints in that
case did disclose a cognizable offence.
12. The scope of the Magistrate’s power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
3
was elaborated by the Supreme Court in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. ,
where it was held that the power is wide, and includes implied ancillary
powers to direct registration of an FIR and to monitor investigation, “they
are implied in the above provision” referring to Section 156(3). The Court
simultaneously held that an aggrieved person must ordinarily exhaust the
remedy of approaching the concerned SHO under Section 154(3)/senior
police officer under Section 36 Cr.P.C. before invoking the jurisdiction of
the Magistrate, and that recourse to a writ court ought not to be had directly.

1
(2014) 2 SCC 1.
2
Criminal Appeal No. SLP (Crl.) No. 5883 of 2020, decided on 08.08.2023.
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Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:NEHA CHOPRA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
19:32:59

4
13. In Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P . , it was further held that every
application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. must be supported by an affidavit
sworn by the applicant, the Court observing that “a stage has come in this
country” where such applications ought no longer to be entertained without
responsibility being fixed on the applicant, so as to deter applications filed in
a routine manner to harass persons named therein.
14. The threshold that emerges from the above authorities is thus
fourfold: (a) the complaint must, on a prima facie reading, disclose the
ingredients of a cognizable offence; (b) the applicant must have exhausted
the remedy under Sections 154(1)/154(3) Cr.P.C. before invoking Section
156(3); (c) the application must be supported by an affidavit; and (d) the
dispute must not fall within a category, such as a matrimonial, commercial
or essentially civil dispute, where a preliminary inquiry rather than
straightaway registration is the appropriate course.
15. It is well settled that the bar under Section 397(3) Cr.P.C. does not, by
itself, extinguish the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, since such
jurisdiction is saved, and not conferred, by the Code. The Supreme Court in
5
Mohit @ Sonu v. State of U.P. , while considering the interplay between
Sections 397 and 482 Cr.P.C., held that “ inherent powers contained in
Section 482 would not be available to defeat the bar ” only where the order
impugned is itself the subject of an express statutory bar. Where, however,
no such express bar operates, as in the case of a second revision under
Section 397(3), the inherent jurisdiction remains available, to be exercised
with circumspection. This position is consistent with the earlier view of the

3
(2008) 2 SCC 409.
4
(2015) 6 SCC 287.
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Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:NEHA CHOPRA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
19:32:59

6
Supreme Court in Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. S. Bargarappa , and in
7
Asghar Khan v. State of U.P . , that while a second revision by the same
party is impermissible, this Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr.P.C. is not thereby ousted, though it cannot be exercised as though this
Court were sitting as a second revisional forum.
16. This jurisdiction is, however, to be exercised sparingly and only in
exceptional circumstances, to correct a manifest illegality, a jurisdictional
error, or a miscarriage of justice in the order of the Revisional Court, and not
merely because a different view was reasonably possible on the same
material. Reliance in this regard is also placed by the petitioner on the
requirement that judicial orders be reasoned, as explained in Kranti
8
Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan , where it was observed that
the face of an order affecting the rights of parties must not be like the
9
“ inscrutable face of a sphinx ”, and in State of U.P. v. Battan , where it was
held that “ reasons introduce clarity in an order ”.
17. The absence of elaborate reasoning in an order of a Revisional Court
is, no doubt, a relevant consideration. It does not, however, by itself
constitute the exceptional circumstance warranting interference under
Section 528 BNSS/Section 482 Cr.P.C., where the record independently
sustains the conclusion arrived at, and a remand on that ground alone would
serve no purpose beyond formality.
18. Tested against the aforesaid framework, this Court finds no infirmity,
much less an exceptional circumstance, warranting interference with the

5
(2013) 7 SCC 789.
6
(1995) 4 SCC 41.
7
AIR 1981 SC 1697.
8
(2010) 9 SCC 496.
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Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:NEHA CHOPRA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
19:32:59

concurrent orders of the Courts below.
19. In so far as the threshold under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is concerned,
the ATR dated 05.09.2024, which forms part of the record and whose
contents have not been shown to be inherently improbable or fabricated. The
ATR further records that the dispute is essentially a civil, property-related
dispute between real brothers, already the subject matter of preventive
proceedings under Sections 107/151 Cr.P.C. On this material, the
ingredients of the offences under Sections 120B, 503/506, 166, 295A and
298 IPC are not , prima facie , made out, and the dispute falls squarely within
the category of civil-flavoured disputes in respect of which the Supreme
Court in Lalita Kumari (supra) has recognised that a preliminary inquiry,
rather than straightaway registration of an FIR, is the appropriate course. No
case for interference on this ground is, therefore, made out.
10
20. As regards reliance placed on Sajal Bose v. State of West Bengal,
this Court finds the reliance to be misconceived. That decision was rendered
in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C./Section 528 BNSS
to quash a chargesheet, where CCTV footage forming part of the
chargesheet itself was found to “completely belie the allegation of their
participation” in the offence, and the Supreme Court accordingly held that
continuation of proceedings, in the face of such exculpatory and
unimpeachable material, would be an abuse of process. That principle
operates in the converse direction to the one urged by the petitioner. It is
authority for the proposition that unimpeachable contemporaneous material
must be given due weight, whether it inculpates or, as here, exculpates.

9
(2001) 10 SCC 607.
10
2026 INSC 322.
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By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:NEHA CHOPRA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
19:32:59

Applied to the present facts, the very principle relied upon by the petitioner
supports the conclusion reached by the Courts below, since the
unimpeachable contemporaneous material on this record, namely the DD
entry and the ATR, cuts against the petitioner’s version.
21. In view of the above, this Court finds no exceptional circumstance
warranting interference with the concurrent findings recorded by the JMFC
and the Revisional Court.
22. At this stage, there is no justification in directing for registration of
FIR under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The nature of the investigation would not
require any seizure on an aspect which cannot be gone into by the Court
under Section 200 Cr.P.C.
23. The petition, being devoid of merit, is accordingly dismissed
24. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.


PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J
AUGUST 31, 2026
Tr/NK

Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:NEHA CHOPRA
Signing Date:01.09.2026
19:32:59