Rameshwar Dutt Awasthi vs State Of U.P. And 4 Others

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
WRIT - C No. - 43237 of 2018
AFR
Reserved on 20.11.2025
Delivered on 08.05.2026
Rameshwar Dutt Awasthi
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and 4 others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Bidhan Chandra Rai, Sanjay Kumar
Nigam
Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C.
HON'BLE SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J.
HON'BLE SUDHANSHU CHAUHAN, J.

(Delivered by Hon’ble Saral Srivastava,J.)
1. Heard Sri Bidhan Chandra Rai, learned Senior Advocate assisted
by Sri Sanjay Kumar Nigam, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri
Rajeshwar Tripathi, learned Chief Standing Counsel-II for the State-
respondents.
2. The petitioner by means of the present writ petition has assailed
the order dated 26.04.2017 passed by the respondent no.2-Additional
Chief Secretary, Government of U.P. Lucknow whereby the application
of the petitioner for extension of the lease deed has been rejected.
3. The facts, in brief, are that one Bhulli Maharaj S/o Hari Kishore
Awasthi proprietor of M/s Bhulli Maharaj & Sons, Shankargarh, District
Allahabad was granted a mining lease over an area of 47.06 hectare in
Village Janwa, Tehsil Bara, District Allahabad for extraction of Silica

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Sand and minerals under the Mines and Minerals (Development and
Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act, 1957') read with
the provisions of Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred
to as ‘Rules, 1960’) for a period of ten years commencing w.e.f.
16.06.1979 to 15.06.1989.
4. The petitioner, thereafter, was granted first renewal under Section
8(2) of the Act, 1957 read with Rules, 1960 for a further period of ten
years commencing w.e.f. 16.06.1989 to 15.06.1999. Based upon the
same, the lease deed was executed on 13.12.1993 pursuant to the
Government Order dated 23.04.1991.
5. Before expiry of the lease period, the petitioner submitted an
application on 12.06.1998 for renewal of the lease for a further period of
twenty years.
6. The Additional District Magistrate (Administration) vide notice
dated 18.06.2011 directed the petitioner to submit Environment
Clearance Certificate. The petitioner, thereafter, applied for Environment
Clearance Certificate. The petitioner was granted NOC for mining of
Silica Sand on 03.09.2012 by the Divisional Director, Social Forestry
Department, Allahabad.
7. The Additional District Magistrate (Administration) in the light of
the NOC dated 03.09.2012 made a recommendation dated 12.11.2013 to
the Director, Geology and Mining for renewal of the mining lease for a
further period of twenty years.
8. Further it is the case of the petitioner that the Director, Geology
and Mining on 27.06.2014 taking note of recommendation letter dated
12.11.2013 made a recommendation to the Principal Secretary,
Department of Geology & Mining, Lucknow for renewal of lease for a
period of twenty years.
9. Based on the said recommendation, the Additional District
Magistrate (Administration), Allahabad on 20.09.2014 requested the
Controller General, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur to submit report in
the matter of renewal application dated 12.06.1998.

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10. According to the petitioner, the mining plan was approved on
16.07.2015, and the Environment Clearance Certificate was granted on
06.01.2016. In the meantime, the Central Legislature passed MMDR
(Amendment) Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Amendment Act,
2015’).
11. By the said amendment, Section 8A was inserted in the Act, 1957
to provide for regulating the period of mineral other than those specified
in Part-A and Part-B of the First Schedule. The Central Government
issued a D.O. with a direction to take necessary steps without any delay
to implement the Amendment Act, 2015
12. When the respondents did not pass any order on the application of
petitioner for renewal of lease, the petitioner approached this Court by
filing Writ-C No.52665 of 2016 (Rameshwar Dutt Awasthi Vs. State of
U.P. and 2 Others) with the following prayer:-
“i. Pass appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of
mandamus directing that the tenure of petitioner's mining lease over
an area of 47.06 hectare in Village Janwa, Tehsil Bara in District
Allahabad stood extend for a period of 50 years pursuant to the
provisions of Section 8A (6) of the MMDR Amendment Act, 2015;
ii. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus
restraining the District Magistrate, Allahabad, from interfering
mining operations and also to issue the transit permit (Form-G) for
dispatch of silica sand by the petitioner;
iii. Issue such other and further writ, order or direction which this
Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the
case; and
iv. Award the cost of the writ petition.”
13. This Court by judgement and order dated 25.01.2017 disposed of
the aforesaid writ petition directing the petitioner to fulfill the formality
as envisaged under the U.P. Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Rules, 1963’), and thereafter, the application
of the petitioner would be dealt with as per law within next three months
by the competent authority under Rules, 1963.

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14. The petitioner in compliance of the said judgement submitted
representation to the authority requesting for extension of the lease deed
which was rejected by the respondent no.2 by impugned order.
15. A counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents specifically
stating therein that the mining lease in respect of Silica Sand was granted
for an area of 47.06 hectare in favour of Sri Bhulli Maharaj S/o Hari
Kishore Awasthi proprietor of M/s Bhulli Maharaj and Sons, Police
Station Shankargarh, District Prayagraj .
16. Further case of the respondents in counter affidavit is that Sri
Bhulli Maharaj S/o Hari Kishore Awasthi proprietor of M/s Bhulli
Maharaj died on 09.07.2005. Thus, after the death of sole proprietor, the
firm ceased to exist.
17. In suit bearing Original Suit No.417 of 1997 (Bhulli Maharaj &
Sons and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Others) after death of Bhulli
Maharaj, two persons namely, Rameshwar Dutt Awasthi and Dr. Ganesh
Dutt Awasthi, both sons of Late Bhulli Maharaj had moved substitution
application and their names have been substituted in place of Bhulli
Maharaj in the aforesaid suit.
18. There is no declaration by any competent Court of law declaring
the petitioner, namely, Rameshwar Dutt Awasthi as the sole proprietor of
the firm namely, M/s Bhulli Maharaj & Sons, in whose favour the
mining lease was granted. It is stated that petitioner has nowhere
disclosed in the writ petition as to how he became the only proprietor
and his brother Dr. Ganesh Dutt Awasthi has not declared successor of
M/s Bhulli Maharaj & Sons.
19. On 10.02.2015, the Central Government issued a notification
notifying Silica Sand along with some other minerals as minor mineral.
It is stated that after declaration of Silica Sand as minor mineral, the
provision of Section 14 of the Act, 1957 came into play, and the
provisions of Sections 5 to 13 of the Act, 1957, inclusive of Section 8
and Section 8A are not applicable with respect to Silica Sand.

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20. The State Government by exercising powers under Section 15 of
the Act, 1957, amended the provisions of Rules 1963 and added a new
Chapter IX in Rules, 1963 vide U.P. Minor Mineral (Concession)
(Fourteen Amendment) Rules, 2016 dated 29.06.2016 providing
procedure for grant of mining lease of Silica Sand besides other minerals
notified by the Central Government vide Notification dated 10.02.2015.
21. There is no provision for second renewal of mining lease under
Chapter IX of Rules, 1963. It is stated that the order dated 26.04.2017
has been passed in view of the rules and procedure applicable on the date
of decision of the writ petition of petitioner. It is also averred that the
grounds taken by the petitioner are wholly misconceived and are not
tenable in the eye of law, therefore, the writ petition lacks merit and does
not warrant any interference by this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
22. Challenging the impugned order, learned counsel for the petitioner
has submitted that after incorporation of Section 8A in the Act, 1957, the
power of renewal of lease of the State Government has been done away
with, therefore, the State Government has no power either to reject or
accept the application for renewal of lease w.e.f. 12.01.2015 i.e. the date
of incorporation of Section 8A in the Act, 1957.
23. It is further contended that by virtue of operation of Section 8A,
the petitioner’s lease stood extended for 50 years from 1979, and
therefore, the respondent no.2 has wrongly treated the case of the
petitioner for renewal of lease deed. He further contends that petitioner’s
right to extension of lease deed is not precluded by Section 8A (9) of the
Amendment Act, 2015.
24. It is lastly urged that impugned order is colourable exercise of
power by the State Government which is contrary to the statute.
25. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his argument has
relied upon the following judgements:-
(i). Common Cause Vs. Union of India and Others (2016) 11 SCC 455;

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(ii). V.S. Charati Vs. Hussein Nhanu Jamadar (Dead) By LRS. (1999)
1 SCC 273;
(iii). National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India
Ltd. and Another Vs. Union of India and Others (2003) 5 SCC 23;
(iv). Neelima Srivastava Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2021)
17 SCC 693;
(v). State of Tamil Nadu Vs. State of Kerala and Another (2014) 12
SCC 696;
(vi). M.P. Housing and Infrastructure Development Board and
Another Vs. K.P. Dwivedi (2022) 3 SCC 783.
26. Rebutting the aforesaid contention, learned Chief Standing
Counsel-II has contended that in the earlier Writ-C No.52665 of 2016,
this Court has categorically held that after the Silica Sand has been
declared minor mineral, its mining operation would be covered under the
provisions of Rules, 1963, and in case petitioner intends to carry out
mining of minor mineral, then he will have to abide by the terms and
conditions provided under Rules, 1963.
27. He contends that Section 4 of the Act, 1957 provides that no
person can undertake mining operations in any area except in accordance
with terms and conditions of mining lease granted under the Act and
Rules made thereunder.
28. He further contends that Rule 3 of Rules, 1963 provides that
mining operations should be under mining lease or mining permit
granted under the Rules. It is submitted that since this Court has
categorically held in the earlier writ petition that the petitioner in order
to carry out mining operation of minor minerals has to fall in line with
terms and conditions of Rules, 1963, therefore, it is manifest that this
Court has not concluded that even if Rules, 1963 does not permit the
second renewal of lease or extension of lease, the petitioner is entitled to
get it.

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29. It is submitted that operative portion of the order passed by this
Court in the earlier writ petition of the petitioner clearly discloses the
intention of the Court that the Court has left the matter for the authorities
to deal with the application of petitioner as per Rules, 1963, and in such
view of the fact, the respondent no.2 has not committed any illegality in
rejecting the application of petitioner as second renewal of lease of Silica
Sand is not permissible under Rules, 1963.
30. He further submits that it is the case of the petitioner that his lease
is covered under Section 8A(6) of the Act, 1957. He submits that to take
the benefit of Section 8A(6), petitioner has to comply with all the terms
and conditions of lease deed. It is contended that petitioner had not
complied with all terms and conditions of the lease in order to avail the
benefit of Section 8A(6) of the Act, 1957.
31. He further contends that petitioner was supposed to have an
Environment Clearance Certificate in view of the notification of the year
1994 issued by the Government of India for running mining lease of
major mineral, but the petitioner did not have any Environment
Clearance Certificate due to which, the petitioner was stopped from
carrying mining operation in the year 2011, therefore, petitioner’s
mining lease was not operational on the date of induction of Section 8A
in the Act, 1957 by the Amendment Act, 2015.
32. He further contends that the petitioner’s application dated
12.06.1998 for renewal of lease deed was not valid because petitioner
did not enclose the mining plan as per Rules, 1960 applicable on the
major minerals along with the application.
33. To buttress the said contention, he submits that second renewal
application under Rules, 1960 was required to be submitted in Form-J.
He submits that as per Serial X (c) of Form-J, the mining plan was also
not enclosed. Accordingly, he contends that Section 8A(6) is not
attracted in the case of petitioner and thus, he could not be granted the
benefit of deemed extension on account of pendency of renewal
application as per Section 8A(6).

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34. He further contends that the petitioner has based his claim on Rule
24A (6) which was incorporated in Rules, 1960 by the Mineral
Concession (Second Amendment) Rules, 1994 by Notification dated
27.09.1994. He submits that the benefit of Rule 24A (6) was applicable
in case of first renewal application and not applicable in case of second
renewal application as has been held by the Apex Court in the case of
Goa Foundation Vs. Union of India and Others (2014) 6 SCC 590.
35. He submits that that the petitioner’s argument regarding deemed
extension is based on Section 8(3) of the Act, 1957, and for availing the
benefit of said section, the primary condition is that there has to be an
order passed by the State Government recording specific finding that
renewal is necessary in the interest of mineral development. He submits
that unless such condition is complied with, there could not be any
second renewal. Accordingly, he submits that interpretation of rule
should be in consonance and in harmony with the Act, 1957 and
therefore, if petitioner is extended the benefit of Rule 24A for the
purpose of second renewal, such benefit would be contrary to the intent
of legislature as provided under Section 8A(6) of the Act, 1957.
36. He contends that the finding of this Court in the earlier writ
petition of the petitioner regarding benefit of Section 8A(6) of the
Amendment Act, 2015 to the petitioner is contrary to the intent of
legislature and the case of Goa Foundation (supra) , and therefore, is not
binding upon the authority.
37. He further contends that it is settled in law that once the policy is
changed by the Government, then all the leases have to be granted as per
new policy i.e. through e-tender-cum-e-auction, therefore, petitioner’s
claim regarding deemed extension on the basis of pendency of renewal
application cannot be considered.
38. We have considered the rival submissions of learned counsel for
the parties and perused the record.
39. The undisputed facts as emanates from the record are that the
petitioner was granted lease for mining of Silica Sand mineral over an

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area of 47.06 hectare in Village Janwa, Tehsil Bara, District Allahabad
for a period from 16.06.1979 to 15.06.1989.
40. The petitioner, thereafter, was granted first renewal under Section
8(2) of the Act, 1957 read with Rule 24A (1) of the Rules, 1960 for a
term of ten years vide Government Order dated 23.04.1991. The lease
deed regarding first renewal was executed on 13.12.1993.
41. Before expiry of first renewal, the petitioner applied for second
renewal under Section 8(3) of the Act, 1957 for a period of twenty years.
The mining of the petitioner was closed for want of Environment
Clearance Certificate vide notice dated 18.06.2011. The petitioner
obtained forest clearance on 03.09.2012.
42. The Mining Officer, Allahabad issued No Dues Certificate on
31.10.2013. The Additional District Magistrate (Administration),
Allahabad recommended the renewal of mining lease for a term of
twenty years on 12.11.2013. The mining plan of the petitioner was
approved on 16.07.2015. In the meantime, Section 8A was inducted in
the Act, 1957 by the Amendment Act, 2015. When the lease of the
petitioner was not extended, the petitioner approached this Court by
filing Writ-C No.52665 of 2016 (Rameshwar Dutt Awasthi Vs. State of
U.P. and Others) with the prayer extracted above.
43. The Coordinate Bench of this Court in the aforesaid writ petition
has recorded following finding with regard to grant of benefit of Section
8A (6) to the petitioner:-
“Consequently, in the facts of the case, the fact of the matter is that
second renewal application moved on 12.6.1998 at no point of time the
said application in question has been rejected, nor the lease in question
has been determined, nor the lease in question has lapsed and,
accordingly, once the regime of renewal has been replaced by
introducing the provisions of deemed extension of lease period, the
petitioner is entitled for the benefit of the statutory provisions as
contained under Section 8A (6) of the MMDR Amendment Act, 2015.

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Apex Court in the case of Sulekhan Singh & Company and others Vs.
State of U.P. and others, 2016 (2) AWC 1102 (SC), has clarified the
legal position that merely because a renewal application has been
moved an incumbent has no vested right to get its renewed. Here, in the
present case, the fact of the matter is that it is true that renewal
application has been moved but the fact of the matter is that said
renewal application has been pending and during pendency of the
same the Central Government has come up with the statutory
provisions in the shape of Section 8A in the MMDR Amendment Act,
2015 for extending the life span of the lease in question subject to
fulfillment of the other terms and conditions as provided for.
There is difference between the extension of lease and renewal of lease.
The difference in between two expression has been subject matter of
interpretation before the Apex Court in the case of Gajraj Singh Etc.
Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, 1997 (1) SCC 650, wherein
Apex Court mentioned that grant of renewal is a fresh grant though it
breaths life into the operation of previous lease. In the case of
extension the same lease continues in force during additional period by
the performance of stipulated act. Said view has been reiterated with
approval in the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Nirmla Ben S. Mehta, 2016
JT (6) 508. Viewed from this perspective, under the scheme of things
provided for the power of State Government to grant or refuse renewal
has been done away with in respect of minerals other than those
specified in Part A and Part B of the First Schedule under Section 8A
of the 2015 Act and, thereafter, on the expiry of lease period the lease
would be put up for auction as per the procedure specified in the Act.
Section 8A (5) and 8A (6) of the 2015 Act uses categorical expression
"shall be extended, shall be deemed to have been extended". The effect
and impact of deeming provision has been subject matter of
consideration by the Apex Court in the case of Bhavnagar University
Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill and others, 2003 (2) SCC 111, wherein Apex
Court has followed the judgement in the case of East End Dwellings
Co. Ltd. Vs. Finsbury Borough Council, 1951 (2) All England Reports
587, as under;

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"If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real,
you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as
real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of
affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or
accompanied it."
There is no reason for us not to extend the said benefit to the petitioner
on the strength of the statutory provisions introduced through Section
8A (6) of the 2015 Act and the claim of petitioner would be covered by
the same and petitioner's lease would be deemed to have been extended
subject to the condition that all the terms and conditions of lease have
been complied with. The further larger issue that is engaging our
attention as on date is that with the passage of time when the claim of
petitioner is being considered by us there are subsequent developments,
that have so taken place, and what would be its impact in carrying out
mining activity is a further issue to be considered by us.”
44. The Coordinate Bench of this Court in the aforesaid writ petition
has held that after Silica Sand has been declared minor mineral, the
petitioner in order to carry out the mining operations of the said mineral
has to abide the terms and conditions provided in Rules, 1963 to carry
out the mining operations. The relevant extract of the judgement is
reproduced herein-below:-
“Earlier silica sand was a major mineral and same was covered by the
provisions of 1957 Act read with the provisions of 1960 Rules but after
notification dated 10.2.2015 has been made by the Central Government,
same has been declared as a minor mineral and as of now the silica sand
being declared as minor mineral its mining operation would be covered
by the provisions of 1963 Rules and under the 1963 Rules, that have been
so framed, in case petitioner intends to carry out mining operations
pertaining to minor mineral, then he will have to abide by the terms and
conditions provided for under 1963 Rules. Section 4 of MMDR Act
provides for that no person can undertake mining operations in any area,
except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of mining
lease granted under the Act and the Rules made thereunder. Rule 3 of the
1963 Rules clearly provides that mining operations should be under

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mining lease or mining permit granted under these rules. For ready
reference Rule 3 is extracted below:-
" Mining operations to be under a mining lease or mining permit- (1)
No person shall undertake any mining operations in any area within
the State of any minor minerals to which these rules are applicable
except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a
mining lease or mining permit granted under these rules:
Provided that nothing shall affect any operations undertaken in
accordance with the terms and conditions of mining lease or permit
duly granted before the commencement of these rules.
Explanation:- For the purposes of this rule manual digging or manual
extraction of ordinary clay, ordinary earth for making bricks and
pottery shall not be treated as mining operations;
Provided that pit created by such digging or extraction should not be
deeper than two meters.
(2) No mining lease or mining permit shall be granted otherwise than
in accordance with the provisions of these rules."
A bare perusal of Rule 3 would go to show that no person should
undertake any mining operations in any area within the State of any
minor minerals to which these rules are applicable except under and in
accordance with the terms and conditions of a mining lease or mining
permit granted under these rules and the proviso in question only
exempts such mining operations wherein mining lease or permit has been
granted before the commencement of these rules. Once in exercise of
authority conferred under Clause (e) of Section 3 of 1957 Act the Central
Government has declared silica sand as a minor mineral, then in
consonance with the Rule 3 of 1963 Rules the petitioner can carry out
mining operations of minor minerals only in consonance with the rules
in question, then in view of this fact it may be true that the lease period
of petitioner would stand extended by operation of law under Section 8A
(6) for winning minerals other than those specified in Part A and Part B
of the First Schedule subject to fulfillment of other terms and conditions
but once with the passage of time in exercise of statutory power a major
mineral has been declared as minor mineral and petitioner, as on date, is

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interested in carrying out mining activity of minor mineral, then he will
have to fall in line in consonance with the provisions of 1963 Rules.
Chapter IX has been introduced in 1963 Rules by means of amendment
named as the U.P. Minor Mineral (Concession) (Fourteenth Amendment)
Rules, 2016 wherein the provisions of said Chapter has been made
applicable in reference of silica sand also notified by Central
Government as minor mineral.
Once Central Government consciously in exercise of its statutory power
has placed silica sand in the category of minor mineral under Clause (e)
of Section 3 of 1957 Act and power to make rules in that regard is vested
by Section 15 (1) in the State Government while power to make rules
with respect to minerals as defined by Clause (a) of Section 3 is vested by
Section 13 (1) in the Central Government and Section 14 clearly
provides that Section 13 will not apply to quarry leases, mining leases or
other mineral concessions in respect of minor mineral, then net effect of
the same is that silica sand being declared as a minor mineral, its mining
activity will have to be in consonance with the 1963 Rules. The new state
of affairs which have been brought into existence by declaration made
under clause (e) of Section 3 of 1957 Act has to be given its full effect
and no rider or exception can be read in the same. Old lease of
petitioner would require modification, as on date, as there is no such
provision on the line of Section 16 of 1957 Act available that permitted
modification of lease granted before 25.10.1949 and gave breathing time
to holders of mining leases to bring the said lease in line with the
provisions of 1957 Act and the Rules framed thereunder within two years
from the period specified therein and during the said interregnum period,
the period of such lease was permitted to continue to operate. Once there
is no such provision which enables the term of existing lease to be
altered, then as already deliberated above, even though petitioner's
claim would fall within the parameter of Section 8A (6) of 1957 Act but
as the lease accorded in his favour has been for mineral as specified
under 1960 Rules and as of now Central Government has consciously
included said mineral in the category of minor mineral and thus
necessarily by operation of law governance of said mineral has to be one
under 1963 Rules, then the provisions of 1957 Act and 1963 Rules
cannot be permitted to be ignored.”

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45. At this stage, it would be apposite to reproduce Section 8A of the
Amendment Act, 2015:-
“8A. Period of grant of a mining lease for minerals other than
coal, lignite and atomic minerals. - (1) The provisions of this section
shall apply to minerals other than those specified in Part A and Part
B of the First Schedule.
(2) On and from the date of the commencement of the Mines and
Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, all
mining leases shall be granted for the period of fifty years.
(3) All mining leases granted before the commencement of the Mines
and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015
shall be deemed to have been granted for a period of fifty years.
(4) On the expiry of the lease period, the lease shall be put up for
auction as per the procedure specified in this Act.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (2), (3) and
sub-section (4), the period of lease granted before the date of
commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and
Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, where mineral is used for captive
purpose, shall be extended and be deemed to have been extended up
to a period ending on the 31st March, 2030 with effect from the date
of expiry of the period of renewal last made or till the completion of
renewal period, if any, or a period of fifty years from the date of
grant of such lease, whichever is later, subject to the condition that
all the terms and conditions of the lease have been complied with.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (2), (3) and
sub-section (4), the period of lease granted before the date of
commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and
Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, where mineral is used for other
than captive purpose, shall be extended and be deemed to have been
extended up to a period ending on the 31st March, 2020 with effect
from the date of expiry of the period of renewal last made or till the
completion of renewal period, if any, or a period of fifty years from
the date of grant of such lease, whichever is later, subject to the

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condition that all the terms and conditions of the lease have been
complied with.
(7) Any holder of a lease granted, where mineral is used for captive
purpose, shall have the right of first refusal at the time of auction
held for such lease after the expiry of the lease period.
(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, the period of
mining leases, including existing mining leases, of Government
companies or corporations shall be such as may be prescribed by
the Central Government.
(9) The provisions of this section, notwithstanding anything
contained therein, shall not apply to a mining lease granted before
the date of commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development
and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, for which renewal has been
rejected, or which has been determined, or lapsed."
46. The petitioner claims that since the second renewal application of
mining lease was submitted by the petitioner twelve months before the
date on which the lease was due to expire, therefore, he is entitled to the
benefit of Section 8A (6) of the Amendment Act, 2015.
47. This Court while deciding the earlier writ petition of the petitioner
has recorded that second renewal application was filed by the petitioner
on 12.06.1998 and at no point of time, the said application has been
rejected nor the lease of the petitioner has been determined nor the lease
of the petitioner has lapsed, and once the legitimate renewal has been
replaced by inducting the proviso of deemed extension of lease period,
the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Section 8A(6) of the
Amendment Act, 2015, but at the same time this Court has also recorded
on the internal page-25 of the earlier judgement that “the claim of the
petitioner would be covered by the same and petitioner’s lease would be
deemed to have been extended subject to condition that all the terms and
conditions of the lease have been complied with”.
48. So it is manifest from the aforesaid quoted portion of the earlier
judgement of this Court that the petitioner’s lease would be deemed to be

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extended subject to the condition that all the terms and conditions of the
lease have been complied by him.
49. The petitioner submitted application for second renewal of lease
deed on 12.06.1998 under Rule 24A of the Rules, 1960. Rule 24A(1)
requires the applicant to submit an application for renewal in Form-J.
Rule 24A of the Rules, 1960 is reproduced herein-below:
“2 4-A. Renewal of mining lease- (1) An application for the renewal of
a mining lease shall be made to the State Government in Form J, at
least twelve months before the date on which the lease in due to
expire, through such officer or authority as the State Government may
specify in this behalf.
(2). The renewal or renewals of a mining lease granted in respect of a
mineral specified in Part 'A' and Part 'B' of the First Schedule to the
Act may be granted by the State Government with the previous
approval of the Central Government.
(3). The renewal or renewals of a mining lease granted in respect of a
mineral not specified in Part 'A' and Part 'B' of the First Schedule to
the Act may be granted by the State Government:
Provided that before granting approval for second or subsequent
renewal of a mining lease, the State Government shall seek a report
from the Controller General, Indian Bureau of Mines, as to whether it
would be in the interest of mineral development to grant the renewal
of the mining lease:
Provided further that in case a report is not received from Controller
General, Indian Bureau of Mines in a period of three months of receipt
of the communication from the State Government, it would be deemed
that the Indian Bureau of Mines has no adverse comments to offer
regarding the grant of the renewal of mining lease.
(6) If an application for first renewal of a mining lease made within
the time referred to in sub-rule (1) is not disposed of by the State
Government before the date of expiry of the lease, the period of that
lease shall be deemed to have been extended by a further period of
two years or till the State Government passes order thereon,
whichever is earlier.

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WRIC No. - 43237 of 2018
Provided that the leases where applications for first renewal of mining
lease have been made to the State Government and which have not
been disposed of by the State Government before the date of expiry of
lease and are pending for disposal as on the date of the notification of
this amendment, shall be deemed to have been extended by a further
period of two years from the date of coming into force of this
amendment or till the State Government passes order thereon or the
date of expiry of the maximum period allowed for first renewal,
whichever is the earliest:
Provided further that the provisions of this sub-rule shall not apply to
renewal under sub-section (3) of section 8 of the Mines and Minerals
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (67 of 1957).
(8). Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1) and sub-rule
(6) and application for the first renewal of a mining lease, so declared
under the provisions of Section 4 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Mining
Concession (Abolition and Declaration as Mining Lease) Act, 1987,
shall be made to the State Government in Form J before the expiry of
the period of mining lease in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 5 of
the said Act, through such officer or authority as the State
Government may specify in this behalf:
Provided that the State Government may, for reasons to be recorded in
writing and subject to such conditions as it may think fit, allow
extension of time for making of such application upto a total period
not exceeding one year.
(9). If an application for first renewal made within the time referred to
in sub-rule (8) or within the time allowed by the State Government
under the proviso to sub-rule (8), the period of that lease shall be
deemed to have been extended by a further period till the State
Government passes orders thereon or the date of expiry of the
maximum period allowed for first renewal, whichever is earlier.
(10). The State Government may condone delay in an application for
renewal of mining lease made after the time limit prescribed in sub-
rule (1) provided the application has been made before the expiry of
the lease.”

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50. This Court in the earlier judgement did not deal with the issue as
to whether the petitioner complied with the terms and conditions of the
lease so as to avail the benefit of Section 8A(6) of the Amendment Act,
2015. However, this Court recorded a categorical finding that the said
benefit is available to the petitioner if he complies with the terms and
conditions of the lease deed.
51. The lease of the petitioner was up to 15.06.1999. The petitioner
after expiry of term of lease deed on 15.06.1999 continued to do mining
upto 18.06.2011 by taking advantage of Rule 24A (6) of the Rules, 1960
up till 18.06.2011, when he was issued notice by the Mining Officer to
stop mining for want of Environment Clearance Certificate. So, the
petitioner after the lapse of his lease continued mining without the
Environment Clearance Certificate.
52. At this stage, it is also relevant to scrutinize whether the
application filed by the petitioner for second renewal was a valid
application in the eyes of law. This question goes to the root of the
matter to find out whether based on such renewal application, petitioner
could be granted benefit of Section 8A (6) of the Amendment Act, 2015.
53. The application for renewal under Rule 24A(1) of Rules, 1960 is
to be submitted in Form-J. Clause-2 (7) of Form-J requires “number and
date” of the valid clearance certificate of payment of mining dues.
54. Several information which the petitioner was supposed to submit
while submitting application in Form-J were not supplied by the
petitioner which is evident from the following column of Form-J
submitted by the petitioner:-
“(Form J)
The required particulars are given below:
(ii) Is the applicant a
private/individual/private/company/p
ublic company/firm or association.
Private/Individual
(iii) In case applicant is
Indian
(a) an individual, his national.
(b) a private company, the nationality

19
WRIC No. - 43237 of 2018
x
of all members of the company
alongwith place of registration.
(c) a public company, the nationality
of director, the percentage of shares
capital held by Indian national
alongwith place of incorporation.
x
(d) Firm or a association, the
nationality of all the partners of the
firm or members of the association.
x
(iv) Profession or nature of business of
applicant
Money and Trade
(v) Omitted
1(vi) Omitted
Number and date of the valid
clearance certificate of payment of
mining dues (copy enclosed).
Applied for clearance
certificate of payment
of mining dues and
will send as soon as
received by me.
2(vii)
3(vii) Number and date of Income Tax
clearance certificate from Income
Tax Officer (attached) an affidavit,
that upto date Income Tax returned
as prescribed under the Income Tax
Act, 1961 have been filed and the tax
due including the tax on account of
self assessment has been paid.
Copy of Income Tax
clearance certificate
dated 12.06.1998 is
attached herewith.
(a(viii) Particulars of the mining licence of
which renewal is desired.
Mining lease of Silica
Sand at village Janwa
(Bara) Allahabad of
47.06 Hectare for 10
years date of execution
is 16.06.1979.
(b) Details of previous renewal granted,
if any.
The first renewal
granted by G.O.
No.1172/18-12-91-
55/89 dated 23.4.99.
Date of execution is
13.12.93.
(ix) Period for which renewal of mining
lease is required.
For twenty (20) years.
(x) Whether renewal is desired for the
whole or part of lease hold.
Whole of lease land.
4(xa) Does the applicant continue to have
surface rights over the area of the
land for which he requires renewal of
The surface right is
partly owned by
applicant. The rest

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WRIC No. - 43237 of 2018
the mining lease. belonged to the Govt.
which in laws of lease
applicant can use on
payment of prescribed
rate as per schedule.
(b) If not has he obtained the consent of
the owner and occupier for
undertaking mining operation. If so,
the consent of the owner and
occupier of the land obtained in
writing be filed.
Consent of owner had
been already filed at
the time of first
renewal.
(xb) Particulars of the areas mineral-
wise, in each state duly supported by
affidavit for which the applicant or
any person joint in interest which
him.
The details are given
in accompanying
affidavit.
(a)
Already holds under mining lease:
Only one lease whose
renewal is applied
here.
The applicant has
applied for mining
lease of Silica Sand for
small area in village
Bhaisahi and
Lakhnauti, but yet has
not been granted.
Has already applied for but not
granted, or
(b)
(c)
Being applied for simultaneously.
(xc)
A mining plan which shall include-
The approved mining
plan and map etc. had
been filed on 4.7.89 at
the time of renewal
and new mining
scheme is being
processed and will be
filed later as soon as is
ready.
(a) The plant of the showing the
nature and extent of the mineral
body, spot of spots where the
excavation is to be done in the first
year and its extent, a detailed cross-
section and detailed plan of spot(s) of
excavation based on prospecting date
gathered by the applicant a tentative
scheme of mining for the period of
the lease.
(b) The details of geology and
lithology of the area the extent of
manual mining and through machines
(c) Annual programme and plan of
the excavation from year to year and
(d) The plan of the area showing
natural water courses limit of
reserved and other forestares and

21
WRIC No. - 43237 of 2018
density of trees assessment of impact
of mining activity of Forest, land
surface and Environment including
air and water pollution, and details
of the scheme for restoration of the
same by aforestation, land
reclamation, use of pollution control
devices.
55. The aforesaid fact discloses that on the date of submitting renewal
application, certain necessary information which the petitioner was
required to submit while filing the application for second renewal was
not supplied. The second renewal application of the petitioner was not
complete in all respects on which the authority could proceed to consider
to grant the second renewal.
56. As per own case of the petitioner, the petitioner obtained ‘No
Dues Certificate’ on 31.10.2013. The petitioner got the mining plan
approved on 16.07.2015 and the Environment Clearance Certificate was
granted to the petitioner on 06.01.2016.
57. The aforementioned necessary documents required at Serial No.2
(vii) and 4 (xc) which the petitioner was supposed to supply with Form-J
at the time of submission of form on 12.06.1998 but were not supplied.
The pleading in the writ petition is silent to the effect that the petitioner
had made any effort to provide aforesaid documents immediately so as
to complete his renewal application in all respects to enable the
authorities to consider the renewal application nor there is any pleading
in the writ petition explaining the reasons for the inordinate delay of 16
years in filing the aforesaid documents. Therefore, it can be presumed
that the petitioner did not make any effort to provide the aforesaid
information/documents so as to complete his second renewal application
in all respects for about more than 16 years.
58. Section 8A has been inducted in the Act, 1957 by Amendment Act,
2015 w.e.f. 12.01.2015 when the Ordinance was published in the Official

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WRIC No. - 43237 of 2018
Gazette on 12.01.2015 and was replaced by Amendment Act, 2015 vide
Notification dated 27.03.2015.
59. In the case of Goa Foundation (supra) , the Apex Court has
categorically held that Rule 24 A(6) is applicable to first renewal and not
to second renewal. The Apex Court further held that sub-rule (6) of Rule
24A of Rules, 1960 cannot be applied to second renewal under sub
section (3) of Section 8 of the Act, 1957 inasmuch as renewal under sub
section (3) of Section 8 requires the State Government to record specific
reason that renewal is in the interest of mineral development. Paragraph
no. 28 of the said judgement is reproduced herein below:-
“28. The MC Rules have been made under Section 13 of the MMDR
Act by the Central Government and obviously could not have been
made in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Sub-rule
(6) of Rule 24A of the MC Rules provides that
“24-A. (6) If an application for the renewal of a mining lease made
within the time referred to in sub-rule (1) is not disposed of by the State
Government before the date of expiry of the lease, the period of that
lease shall be deemed to have been extended by a further period till the
State Government passes order thereon.”
This sub-rule cannot apply to a renewal under sub-section (3) of
Section 8 of the MMDR Act because the renewal under this provision
cannot be made without express orders of the State Government
recording reasons for renewal in the interest of mineral development.
In other words, so long as there is a right of renewal in the lessee
which in the case of a mining lease is for a maximum period of twenty
years, the provision regarding deemed extension of a lease can
operate, but if the right of renewal of a mining lease is dependent upon
the State Government forming an opinion that in the interest of mineral
development it is necessary to do so and the State Government
recording reasons therefor, a provision regarding deemed extension till
orders are passed by the State Government on the application of
renewal cannot apply. We are, therefore, of the opinion that sub-rule
(6) of Rule 24-A of the MC Rules will apply to a case of first renewal
under sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the MMDR Act other than a case
covered under sub-rule (9) of Rule 24-A of the MC Rules, but will not
apply to renewal under sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the MMDR Act.
In our view, the deemed mining leases of the lessees in Goa expired on
22.11.1987 under sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Abolition Act and
the maximum of 20 years renewal period of the deemed mining leases

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WRIC No. - 43237 of 2018
in Goa as provided in sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the MMDR Act
read with sub-rules (8) and (9) of Rule 24-A of the MC Rules expired
on 22.11.2007.”
60. So the continuance of mining operation by the petitioner under the
shelter of Rule 24A(6) was illegal in view of the judgement of the Apex
Court in the case of Goa Foundation (supra) which categorically held
that Rule 24A (6) is not applicable in case of second renewal.
61. Even in the case of Common Cause (supra), the Apex Court in
paragraph no.16 has held that in case of second and subsequent renewal,
the amended Rule 24A (6) would not extend the lease period. Paragraph
no.16 of the said judgement is reproduced herein-below:-
“16. One clarification is imperative at this stage. After the passing of
the order on 21.4.2014, in the Goa Foundation case, subsisting “first
renewals” under Rule 24-A would expire on the completion of a
further period of twenty years after the expiry of the period
contemplated under the original grant, or as interpreted above. There
was no similar automatic grant of “second renewals” after Goa
Foundation case. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, the
conclusion recorded hereinabove should be deemed to be relevant
only with reference to the grant of “first renewals”. It is necessary to
reiterate that in Goa Foundation case, this Court had held that
second renewals would be subject to an order passed by the State
Government recording reasons that it was in the interest of mineral
development to do so. Needless to mention that a second or
subsequent renewal also required the previous approval of the
Central Government – as provided for under Section 8(4) of the
MMDR Act. The amendment to Rule 24-A made on 18.7.2014, more
particularly, the second proviso to sub-rule (6) leaves no room for
any doubt that the automatic extension postulated with reference to
the first renewal would not apply to the second or subsequent
renewals. It is therefore necessary to further conclude that in cases of
second and subsequent renewals, the amended Rule 24A(6) would not
extend the lease period for a further period of two years from the date
of amendment. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, in relation to
renewal sought under Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act (read with Rule

24
WRIC No. - 43237 of 2018
24-A(6) of the Mineral Concession Rules – amended on 18.7.2014),
all second renewals which were assumed to be subsisting by State
Governments would expire with effect from the date of the judgment
in Goa Foundation case i.e. 21.4.2014, and expressly, with effect
from 18.7.2014 when the second proviso to Rule 24-A(6) provided
accordingly. Unless of course, the Government had passed an express
order in writing as mandated under Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act,
extending the subsisting mining lease by a second or subsequent
renewal.”
62. However, the Apex Court in the case of Common Cause (supra)
saved the leaseholders who applied for second renewal and no renewal
order was passed on their application and they continued to do mining
by taking advantage of Rule 24A (6) of Rules, 1960 after noticing the
object of induction of Rule 8A in the Act, 1957.
63. By accepting the contention of leaseholders that term ‘renewal has
been rejected’ ‘on determination’ and ‘lapse’ used in Section 8A (9) are
the terms used for different contingencies/situations/exigencies under the
Act, 1957 and Rules, 1960. The Apex Court repelled the contention of
the petitioner in the said case that Section 8A(9) can be legitimate basis
for excluding the applicability of Section 8A where the period of lease of
renewal had expired prior to 12.01.2015.
64. In the context of the present case, it would also be relevant to
reproduce para-29, 30 & 31 of the judgement of the Apex Court in the
case of Common Cause (supra):-
“29. From a perusal of the extract reproduced above, it is apparent
that the insertion of Section 8-A into the MMDR Act was to address
the hardship faced by leaseholders, besides other reasons, due to the
second and subsequent applications for renewal remaining
unattended at the hands of the State Government. The instant
amendment to the MMDR Act introduced a uniform original grant
period of fifty years for all mining leaseholders. It also excluded
renewal(s) after the expiry of the original lease period. Accordingly,
no renewal application can now be filed (after 12.1.2015). Under
sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 8-A, in our view such

25
WRIC No. - 43237 of 2018
leaseholders, who had moved applications for renewal of
captive/non-captive mines would be entitled to continue up to
31.3.2030/31.3.2020. The “Objects and Reasons” for the
amendment to the MMDR Act aim at remedying the position which
emerged upon the interpretation of the provisions of the MMDR Act
as they existed hitherto before. The instant amendment was also
directed at remedying the grievances of the mining industry due to
“second and subsequent renewals” remaining pending. And also,
because the provisions of law relating to renewals had been found to
be wanting. The above view is also endorsed by the fact that Section
8-A(9) deals with a situation wherein “…renewal has been
rejected...”. It is therefore apparent that sub-sections (5) and (6) of
Section 8-A of the amended MMDR Act are aimed at situations
wherein an application for renewal (validly made) has remained
unattended. Therefore, for no fault of the leaseholder he would be
subjected to an arbitrary prejudice. It needs to be clarified that since
an application for renewal cannot be filed after 12.1.2015, an
application for renewal as would be treated as having been validly
made, ought to have been made before 12.1.2015. We are of the view
that out of the three contingencies contemplated under Sections 8-
A(5) and 8-A(6) referred to above the first of the contingencies
positively pertains to a situation wherein applications validly made
for renewal were pending without any final decision at the hands of
the State Government. Because in the absence of a renewal
application, the leaseholder can be taken to have already expressed
his disinterest to continue mining operations. Therefore logically, the
words “… with effect from the date of expiry of the period of renewal
last made…”, should relate to an expired lease prior to 12.1.2015 in
relation to which a valid application for renewal had already been
made.
30. We also feel persuaded in accepting the contention advanced at
the hands of learned counsel representing the leaseholders that the
words “… with effect from the date of expiry of the period of renewal
last made...” cannot be overlooked. In our considered view, there is
no ambiguity in the aforesaid words. The plain reading of the quoted
words can lead to one and only one inference, namely, that the

26
WRIC No. - 43237 of 2018
situation contemplated under sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 8-A
of the amended MMDR Act (wherein both the above words have
been used), includes a situation when the lease period contemplated
by a renewal is scheduled to expire before 31.3.2030/31.3.2020. We
are satisfied in clarifying that the situation contemplated by the use
of the aforesaid words would extend to a leaseholder who had moved
a valid application for renewal to the State Government which was
yet to be considered and disposed of prior to 12.1.2015. The instant
situation is not excluded by the contingencies contemplated under
Section 8-A(9) of the amended MMDR Act. For the reasons recorded
in the instant paragraph, as also, in the preceding paragraphs
(wherein Section 8-A of the amended MMDR Act has been
considered and interpreted), we are satisfied to hold that the
applicability of Section 8-A of the amended MMDR Act need not
only extend to leaseholders whose original lease/renewal lease
period had not expired but would also extend to leaseholders whose
term of lease/renewal had expired prior to 12.1.2015 and the
leaseholder(s) concerned had moved a valid application for renewal
at least twelve months before the leaseholder’s existing lease
(original, first, second or subsequent) was due to expire, and whose
application has not been considered and rejected.
31. Irrespective of the position noticed herein above, it is imperative
for us to clarify that the benefit of extension of the lease period
postulated under Section 8-A of the MMDR Act is available, subject
to a further overriding condition, namely, “…that all the terms and
conditions of the lease have been complied with”. A leaseholder who
does not satisfy any of the required conditions of the lease, as for
instance the postulated clearances/approvals/consent would not be
entitled to the benefits extended under sub-section (5) or (6) of
Section 8-A of the amended MMDR Act.”
65. The Apex Court in the paragraphs, reproduced above, in Common
Cause (supra) has categorically held that the application for renewal of
lease must be a valid application. So the benefit of Section 8A(6) can be

27
WRIC No. - 43237 of 2018
extended to the petitioner if the application of the petitioner for renewal
was valid.
66. In the instant case, we have already noted above that information
required in the column in Form-J was not supplied by the petitioner at
the time of filing application for renewal of lease. Rule 24A(1) of Rules,
1960 requires application for renewal to be filed at least twelve months
before the date on which the lease is due to expire. The Rule does not
contemplate an application to be valid even if it does not contain all the
information sought in the said application.
67. In our opinion, under Rule 24A(1), the object for providing the
time frame of twelve months for filing the application for renewal of
lease before it was due to expire is that the competent authority should
have sufficient time to process the application for renewal in accordance
with the procedure provided under Rules, 1960, so that appropriate order
is passed on the renewal application, and if the decision is taken by the
Central Government to renew the lease under Section 8A(3) of the
Amendment Act, 2015, it should be done within time in order to avoid
the break in continuity of lease, so that the leaseholders may not suffer
any loss, and at the same time, the State should also not suffer any loss
of revenue.
68. It is also pertinent to note that the benefit of Section 8A(6) of the
Amendment Act, 2015 can be provided to the leaseholder if he did not
breach the terms and conditions of lease.
69. The Coordinate Bench of this Court in the earlier writ petition of
the petitioner though has held that the rider contemplated under Section
Section 8A(9) of the Amendment Act, 2015 will not come in the way of
petitioner in getting the benefit of Section 8A(6), but the Coordinate
Bench has categorically held that petitioner will get the benefit of
Section 8A(6) of Amendment Act, 2015 provided the petitioner has not
committed breach of any terms and conditions of lease.
70. So the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the earlier judgement has
not given the absolute benefit of Section 8A(6) to the petitioner, and

28
WRIC No. - 43237 of 2018
mandated that lease of the petitioner is extended for 50 years under
Section 8A(6) rather Coordinate Bench of this Court put a rider that
petitioner shall be entitled to benefit of Section 8A(6) provided the terms
and conditions of the lease has not been breached.
71. In the present case, admittedly, the lease of the petitioner had
expired on 15.06.1999. Thereafter, no lease deed was in existence. In
such situation, it cannot be ascertained whether petitioner has violated
any terms and conditions of the lease.
72. In a situation where lease deed has expired and an application had
been submitted for renewal of lease deed, and there is no lease deed in
existence, but the petitioner continued to carry out mining operation
without any lease, in such situation, the Court is supposed to lift the veil
and find out the true intention of the legislature in incorporating the
words “all the terms and conditions of the lease deed have been
complied with”.
73. In our opinion, the above mentioned words in Section 8A(6) have
been incorporated with an intention that where renewal application has
been submitted and an order is yet to be passed, the mining operation
should be carried out after complying with all the relevant provisions of
the Act and Rules, and if there is non-compliance of any rule or
provision of the Act, it implies that all the terms and conditions of the
lease deed have not been complied with.
74. The reason why we say so is that the lease deed incorporates all
the requirements of law on fulfilling of which the mining operation can
be carried out, and if there is no lease deed in existence then obviously,
the intention of the legislature is that the mining operation should be
conducted as per law.
75. Even in the case of Common Cause (supra) , the Apex Court has
held that benefit of Section 8A(6) can be extended to those leaseholders
whose applications have been found valid.

29
WRIC No. - 43237 of 2018
76. The valid application means that the application should conform
with all the requirements of law, and if it is not in conformity with law,
such application cannot be said to a valid application in law.
77. Now, we proceed to analyze in the light of aforesaid fact whether
the petitioner has complied with the aforesaid requirement for availing
the benefit of Section 8A(6) of the Amendment Act, 2015.
78. While submitting Form-J, the petitioner did not obtain the mining
plan. The petitioner neither submitted ‘No Dues Certificate’ nor mining
plan. Admittedly, ‘No Dues Certificate’ was submitted by the petitioner
on 31.10.2013 and the mining plan was approved on 16.07.2015.
79. The petitioner filed his renewal application on 15.06.1998, and the
petitioner continued the mining operation without having a valid mining
plan about 13 years, whereas it was incumbent upon the petitioner to
submit mining plan along with an application in Form-J for renewal of
lease by 15.06.1998.
80. The petitioner obtained the mining plan on 16.07.2015. Section
8A has been promulgated by the Ordinance dated 12.01.2015 which was
later on replaced by an Act vide notification dated 27.01.2015. So, the
application of the petitioner was defective and not as per law till
16.07.2015 when the mining plan was approved. Therefore, in the
absence of valid application of renewal submitted by the petitioner for
renewal of lease, there was no occasion for the authority to consider and
process such application till it is complete in all respect.
81. In view of the categorical finding of the Apex Court in the case of
Common Cause (supra) in paragraph no.30, extracted above, the
renewal application should be a valid application whereas the
petitioner’s application by any stretch of imagination in view of the
aforesaid fact can be said to be a valid application.
82. Further, the petitioner carried out mining operations without
mining plan after expiry of lease deed on 15.06.1999 which clearly
implies that petitioner did not fulfill the requirements under Section

30
WRIC No. - 43237 of 2018
8A(6) of Amendment Act, 2015 that the leaseholder has to comply with
all the terms and conditions of the lease.
83. It is one of the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that
once this Court in earlier writ petition of the petitioner has held that
petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Section 8A(6) even if the said
finding is incorrect, that shall be binding upon the parties as the earlier
judgement in writ petition of petitioner has not been assailed by the
respondents and same has attained finality, therefore, it is not open to the
respondents to contend that petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of
Section 8A(6), and in this respect, he has placed reliance upon the
judgment of Apex Court in the case of V.S. Charati (supra). Paragraph
no.9 of the said judgement is reproduced herein below:-
“9. It is submitted by the respondent that the Agricultural Lands
Tribunal was not right in dropping proceedings under Section 32-G.
Its order of 31.5.1961 is bad in law. He relied upon a decision of the
Bombay High Court in the case of Nago Dattu Mahajan Vs.
Yeshodabai Huna Mahajan (1976) 78 Bom LR 427 where this Court
had held that under Section 31, the landlords have a choice to avail
of one of the two provisions of resumption, namely, either Section
31(1) or Section 31(3). No landlord can avail of both the
provisions. Learned counsel for the respondent, therefore, contends
that in the present case, the appellant having exercised his choice
under Section 31(1), could not have urged in the proceedings under
Section 32-G his disability as a minor under Section 31(3). The
order of 31.5.1961 of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal, however,
was not challenged by the respondent. The order of 31.5.1961 has
become final and the decision rendered by the Agricultural Lands
Tribunal as between the appellant and the respondent is binding on
both the parties. A decision, simply because it may be wrong, would
not thereupon become a nullity. It would continue to bind the
parties unless set aside. The effect of the decision of 31.5.1961 on
the parties, therefore, cannot be ignored. In the present case, since
the tenant could not complete his purchase by reason of the
proceedings under Section 32-G being dropped, he cannot now

31
WRIC No. - 43237 of 2018
contend that the decision has no legal effect or that the proceedings
under Section 32-G ought to have been completed and, therefore, he
should be looked upon as a purchaser.”
84. There is no quarrel to the aforesaid proposition of law elucidated
by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case.
85. In the case in hand, the aforesaid principle is not applicable
inasmuch as in the earlier case of the petitioner, the Coordinate Bench
has not given the absolute mandate that petitioner is entitled to the
benefit of Section 8A(6) rather this Court put a rider in the light of
requirement of Section 8A(6) that petitioner is entitled to benefit of
Section 8A(6) provided the terms and conditions of the lease have been
complied with.
86. So the direction of granting benefit of Section 8A(6) was not
absolute by the Coordinate Bench of this Court and the said finding has
not attained finality as discretion is left to the authority to see whether
terms and conditions of the lease deed have been complied with, and on
compliance of said condition, the authorities are mandated to extend the
benefit of Section 8A(6) and lease of the petitioner is deemed to be
extended for 50 years.
87. We have interpreted the term “all the terms and conditions of the
lease deed have been complied with” and we have held that petitioner
did not comply with all the conditions of the lease deed.
88. Even as per own case of the petitioner, the mining plan of the
petitioner was approved on 16.07.2015 after about 18 years from the
date of filing of application by the petitioner for renewal of lease and
after about six months from the date Section 8A has been incorporated in
the Act, 1957 by Amendment Act, 2015.
89. Thus, in view of the specific finding recorded by the Apex Court
in paragraph no.30 of the judgement of Apex Court in the case of
Common Cause (supra) that benefit of Section 8A(6) can be extended
only if renewal application is valid whereas in the present case, we have
already held above that renewal application submitted by the petitioner

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was not valid in the eyes of law. Thus, even as per the case of Common
Cause (supra) , the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of Section
8A(6).
90. For the reasons detailed above, we are of the view that principle of
res-judicata as invoked by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not
attracted in the present case for the reason that the findings of
Coordinate Bench of this Court in the earlier judgement passed in earlier
writ petition of the petitioner regarding extension of benefit of Section
8A(6) to the petitioner was conditional as it was subject to the condition
that the petitioner fulfilled the terms and conditions of the lease deed.
91. Since, we have already held that earlier judgement of the
Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of petitioner was conditional
as the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Section 8A(6) of the
Amendment Act, 2015 subject to the condition that ‘all the terms and
conditions of the lease deed have been complied with’, therefore, the
Court has granted liberty to the authorities to treat the lease deed of the
petitioner deemed to be extended if terms and conditions of the lease
deed have been complied with, therefore, this Court did not grant
automatic extension of lease to petitioner.
92. In such view of the fact, the judgement of Apex Court in the case
of National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India
Ltd. (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner
wherein Apex Court held that a judicial decision which has become final
inter parties cannot be set at naught by legislative action and the
judgement of the Apex Court Court in the case of Neelima Srivastava
(supra) wherein it has been laid down by the Apex Court that it is not
permissible for the parties to reopen the concluded judgements of the
Court, are not applicable in the facts of the present case.
93. It has also been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that
by Amendment Act, 2015, the power of State Government to renew the
lease has been done away with, and therefore, after commencement of
Amendment Act, 2015, second renewal application stood exhausted, and

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the lease of the petitioner stands automatically extended by virtue of
operation of law, thus, rejection of renewal application by the respondent
is per se illegal as the lease of the petitioner stood extended
automatically by virtue of operation of law.
94. It is pertinent to note that lease stands extended by virtue of
operation of law after the Amendment Act, 2015 only in those cases
where the lessee meets the requirement of Amendment Act, 2015 and not
in cases where the lessee does not meet the requirement of Amendment
Act, 2015.
95. The petitioner claims that his lease is extended for 50 years by
virtue of operation of law under Section 8A(6) of the Amendment Act,
2015.
96. We have deliberated above that renewal application of the
petitioner was not a valid renewal application in the eyes of law
inasmuch as no mining plan was enclosed with the renewal application.
Further, the mining plan was obtained by the petitioner as per his own
case on 16.07.2015 after enforcement of Amendment Act, 2015. The
petitioner obtained the Environment Clearance Certificate on 06.01.2016
after enforcement of Amendment Act, 2015. Thus, it is evident from the
aforesaid fact that petitioner’s application for renewal of lease was not a
valid application and further, the petitioner was doing mining till 2011
without a mining plan.
97. To carry out valid mining operation, there has to be a mining plan,
therefore, it is obvious that petitioner’s mining operation till 2011, when
he was stopped by respondents from doing mining, was in breach of
law, therefore, petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of Section 8A(6) as
extension of said benefit was subject to condition that “all the terms and
conditions of the lease deed have been complied with”. Thus, the
aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner lacks
substance and is accordingly rejected.
98. So far as the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that
petitioner’s right to extension of lease is not precluded by virtue of

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Section 8A(9) of the Amendment Act, 2015 as the lease of the petitioner
cannot be treated to have lapsed is concerned, though it is correct that
the respondent no.2 has illegally held in the absence of any specific
order holding lease has lapsed that the lease of the petitioner has lapsed,
and this finding is contrary to the judgement of the Apex Court in the
case of Common Cause (supra) wherein the Apex Court in paragraph
no.35 has held that ‘it is apparent from a perusal of sub-rule (1)
extracted above that the State Government is mandated to pass an order
and thereby declare that a mining lease had lapsed. It is also the
mandate of sub-rule (1) aforesaid that such an order passed by the State
Government must be communicated to the leaseholder. On a conjoint
reading of Section 4-A(4) and Rule 28(1), we are satisfied to hold that a
mining lease under Section 4-A(4) would not be deemed to have lapsed
till the State Government passes an order declaring the mining lease to
have lapsed and further communicates the same to the leaseholder’.
99. Even if the aforesaid finding of the authority is incorrect, but that
would not come to rescue of the petitioner. We shall deal with reason for
the said finding at the appropriate place.
100. The second ground on which the application of the petitioner has
been rejected is that Chapter-IX of Rules, 1963 incorporated in the
Rules, 1963 by Notification No.2229/LXXXVI-2016-130-2015 dated
29.06.2016 does not provide any provision for second renewal of lease
and petitioner also could not demonstrate that there is any provision
under Chapter-IX of the Rules, 1963 providing for grant of lease of
Silica Sand etc., we are of the view that the said finding of the authority
is correct. The aforesaid finding has been assailed by the petitioner on
the ground that since the lease of the petitioner stood extended by virtue
of Amendment Act, 2015, therefore, it is not a case of renewal of lease
and thus, the authority has erroneously treated the case of the petitioner
to be a case of renewal of lease.
101. We may note that the contention of learned counsel for the
petitioner may have substance provided the petitioner was entitled to the
benefit of Section 8A(6) of the Amendment Act, 2015. We have detailed

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above the reason why the petitioner’s case does not fall within the ambit
of Section 8A(6) of the Amendment Act, 2015, therefore, even if the
authority has erroneously treated the case of the petitioner to be a case of
renewal of lease, but that would not benefit the petitioner.
102. It would be apposite to mention that this Court has repeatedly held
that even if an order is illegal or not as per law, the Court may refuse to
issue any writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the
reason that the Court while exercising power under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India shall not issue futile writs.
103. In the case in hand, we have found that renewal application of the
petitioner was not valid as he did not comply with the requirement of
law so as to enable the authorities to consider the said renewal
application, and even on the date of Amendment Act, 2015, the
deficiency or defect in renewal application was not removed as the
mining plan was obtained by the petitioner as per his own case on
16.07.2015 and Environment Clearance Certificate was obtained on
06.01.2016, therefore, even as per the case of Common Cause (supra) ,
the petitioner’s application for renewal of lease was no application in the
eye of law. Therefore, even if we quash the impugned order and remand
the matter, the petitioner cannot get the benefit of Section 8A(6) of the
Amendment Act, 2015. Thus, we are not inclined to interfere with the
impugned order on the settled principle of law that the Court should not
issue futile writs.
104. Thus, for the reasons given above, the writ petition lacks merit and
is, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.
(Sudhanshu Chauhan,J.) (Saral Srivastava,J.)
May 8, 2026
Sattyarth/NS
Digitally signed by :-
SATTYARTH ANAND
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad