THE REGISTRAR vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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WA No. 100207 of 2026
C/W WA No. 100100 of 2026
WA No. 100437 of 2026
WA No. 100438 of 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD
TH
DATED THIS THE 16 DAY OF OCTOBER 2026
R
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI
WRIT APPEAL NO. 100207 OF 2026 (S-REG)
C/W
WRIT APPEAL NO. 100100 OF 2026 (S-REG)
WRIT APPEAL NO. 100437 OF 2026 (S-RES)
WRIT APPEAL NO. 100438 OF 2026 (S-RES)
IN WA No. 100207/2026
BETWEEN:
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
BY ITS SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF LAW,
JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
VIDHANA SOUDHA,
BENGALURU – 560 001.
…APPELLANT
(BY SRI. GANGADHAR J.M., AAG A/W
SMT. GIRIJA S. HIREMATH, HCGP)
AND:
1. THE REGISTRAR,
KARNATAKA STATE LAW UNIVERSITY,
NAVANAGAR, HUBBALLI – 580 025.
2. DR. KHALID KHAN,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
OCC: ASST. DIRECTOR OF PE,
TH
R/O: 29, RAJATGIRI, 4 MAIN CROSS,
Digitally signed
by RAKESH S
HARIHAR
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench
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WA No. 100207 of 2026
C/W WA No. 100100 of 2026
WA No. 100437 of 2026
WA No. 100438 of 2026
DHARWAD – 580 009.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. PAVAN B. DODDATTI, ADVOCATE FOR R1)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S. 4 OF KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO ALLOW THE APPEAL AND SET
ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 20.06.2024 PASSED IN
W.P.NO.105279/2023 BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE, IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY. TO ALLOW THE WRIT
APPEAL AND SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 20.06.2024 PASSED
IN W.P. NO.105279/2023 BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE, IN
THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY AND ETC.
IN WA NO. 100100/2026
BETWEEN:
THE REGISTRAR, KARNATAKA STATE LAW
UNIVERSITY, NAVANAGAR, HUBBALLI – 580 025.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. PAVAN B. DODDATTI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
BY ITS SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LAW,
JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
VIDHANA SOUDHA, BENGALURU – 560 001.
2. DR. KHALID KHAN,
AGE: 50 YEARS, OCC: ASST. DIRECTOR OF PE,
TH
R/O: 29, RAJATGIRI, 4 MAIN CROSS,
DHARWAD – 580 009.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. GANGADHAR J.M., AAG A/W
SMT. GIRIJA S. HIREMATH, HCGP FOR R1)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S. 4 OF KARNATAKA
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C/W WA No. 100100 of 2026
WA No. 100437 of 2026
WA No. 100438 of 2026
HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO ALLOW THE APPEAL
AND SET-ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 20.06.2024 PASSED IN
W.P.NO.105279/2023 BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE, IN
THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
IN WA NO. 100437/2026
BETWEEN:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
BY ITS SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF LAW JUSTICE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, VIDHANA SOUDHA,
BENGALURU – 560 001.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. GANGADHAR J.M., AAG A/W
SMT. GIRIJA S. HIREMATH, HCGP)
AND:
1. IRANGAGOUDA B. BIRADAR,
AGE: 41 YEARS, OCC: TEMPORARY,
FULL TIME ASST. PROFESSOR
(HISTORY) KSLU,
R/O: JAMESH HOUSE, P.B. ROAD,
DHARWAD – 580 001.
2. DR. KUMUDA N. KAROGAL,
AGE: 55 YEARS, OCC: TEMPORARY
FULL TIME ASST. PROFESSOR
(ENGLISH) KSLU,
R/O: KOPP COMPOUND,
MALMADDI, DHARWAD – 580 001.
3. SHRI. GIRISHGOUDA G. PATIL,
AGE: 37 YEARS, OCC: TEMPORARY
FULL TIME ASST. PROFESSOR
(MANAGEMENT) KSLU
R/O: NEAR KPTCL OFFICE TABIB LAND,
HUBBALLI – 580 020, DIST: DHARWAD.
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WA No. 100207 of 2026
C/W WA No. 100100 of 2026
WA No. 100437 of 2026
WA No. 100438 of 2026
4. THE REGISTRAR,
KARNATAKA STATE LAW UNIVERSITY,
NAVANAGAR, HUBBALLI – 580 025,
DIST: DHARWAD.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. SUNIL S. DESAI, ADVOCATE FOR R1 TO R3;
SRI. K.L. PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R4)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S. 4 OF KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET-ASIDE THE
ORDER OF THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE DATED
07.06.2023 PASSED IN WRIT PETITION NO.103466/2021.
AND ETC.
IN WA NO. 100438/2026
BETWEEN:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
BY ITS SECRETARY,
DEPT. OF LAW, JUSTICE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, VIDHANA SOUDHA,
BENGALURU – 560 001.
2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
BY ITS SECRETARY, DEPT. OF FINANCE,
VIDHANA SOUDHA,
BENGALURU – 560 001.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. GANGADHAR J.M., AAG A/W
SMT. GIRIJA S. HIREMATH, HCGP)
AND:
1. IRANAGOUDA B. BIRADAR,
AGE: 41 YEARS,
OCC: TEMPORARY FULL TIME ASST. PROFESSOR
(HISTORY) KSLU,
R/O: JAMES HOUSE, P. B. ROAD,
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C/W WA No. 100100 of 2026
WA No. 100437 of 2026
WA No. 100438 of 2026
DHARWAD – 580 008.
2. DR. KUMUDA N. KAROGAL,
AGE: 55 YEARS, OCC: TEMPORARY,
FULL TIME ASST. PROFESSOR,
ENGLISH KSLU, R/O: KOPP COMPOUND,
MALMADDI, DHARWAD – 580 001.
3. SHRI. GIRISHGOUDA G. PATIL,
AGE: 37 YEARS, OCC: TEMPORARY,
FULL TIME ASST. PROFESSOR
MANAGEMENT KSLU,
R/O: NEAR KPTCL OFFICE TABIB LAND,
HUBBALLI – 580 020, DIST: DHARWAD.
4. THE REGISTRAR,
KARNATAKA STATE LAW UNIVERSITY,
NAVANAGAR,
HUBBALLI – 580 025,
DIST: DHARWAD.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. SUNIL S. DESAI, ADVOCATE FOR R1 TO R3;
SRI. K.L. PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R4)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S. 4 OF KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET-ASIDE THE
ORDER OF THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE DATED
05.03.2025 PASSED IN WRIT PETITION NO.100871/2025
AND ETC.
THESE WRIT APPEALS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED ON 13.10.2026 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED
THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI
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CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA )
The State has preferred the appeals in Writ Appeal No.
100207 of 2026, Writ Appeal No.100437 of 2026 and Writ Appeal
No.100438 of 2026 and the University has preferred the appeal
in Writ Appeal No.100100 of 2026, calling in question the
respective orders rendered by the learned Single Judges. The
appeals, however, come before this Court burdened with an
inordinate delay of 626 days, 1099 days, 466 days and 548
days , respectively. The enormity of the delay, and the
explanations proffered in the applications seeking its
condonation, bring to the fore a threshold question of
considerable significance: whether such prolonged and
unexplained passage of time can be permitted to stand
condoned on the mere asking, or whether the causes
projected constitute sufficient cause in the eye of law to
warrant exercise of judicial discretion. It is on this
preliminary yet pivotal issue, which goes to the very
maintainability of the appeals, that the matters were heard at
length and reserved for judgment, to determine whether the
appeals deserve to be entertained by condoning the delay or
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must meet their quietus at the threshold, on account of the
appellants' failure to satisfactorily explain the extraordinary lapse
of time.
2. Heard Sri. Gangadhar J.M., learned Additional Advocate
General appearing for the appellant in Writ Appeal Nos.100207
of 2026, 100437 of 2026 and 100438 of 2026 and for
respondent No.1 in Writ Appeal No.100100 of 2026; Sri. Pavan
B. Doddatti, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in Writ
Appeal No.100100 of 2026 and for respondent No.1 in Writ
Appeal No.100207 of 2026; Sri. Sunil S. Desai, learned counsel
appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 3 in Writ Appeal Nos.100437
of 2026 and 100438 of 2026; Sri. K. L. Patil, learned counsel
appearing for respondent No.4 in Writ Appeal Nos.100437 of
2026 and 100438 of 2026.
WRIT APPEAL NO.100207 OF 2026:
3. The State is in appeal challenging the order of the
th
learned Single Judge dated 20 June, 2024 passed in Writ
Petition No.105279 of 2023. The order of the learned Single
Judge is as follows:
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“…. …. ….
14. Admitted facts of the matter are that the
petitioner was appointed by the respondent No.2
University for the post of Assistant Director of Physical
Education and Sports on temporary full-time basis. The
said post was sanctioned post and the petitioner was
appointed pursuant to the notification that was issued
after he having informed eligibility.
15. Perusal of the service certificate dated
17.09.2021 produced at Annexure-R indicate that the
respondent No.2-University has issued the said certificate
certifying the continuation of service of the petitioner
from the year 2010 till the date of issuance of the
certificate. Though a defense in the statement of
objection as noted above at paragraph No.9 is raised
stating that the petitioner was employed at Dr. G. M. Patil
Law College, Dharwad and was on deputation, the same
remain unsubstantiated. Notice that was issued to the
petitioner as well as to the said Dr. G. M. Patil Law
College, Dharwad, by the respondent No.2-University
subsequent to filing of present petition has been replied
offering the clarification with regard to petitioner making
an attempt of joining the said Dr. G. M. Patil Law College,
Dharwad between 5.30 p.m. of 11.02.2013 and 8.00 a.m.
on 12.02.2013.
16. On query by this Court, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent No.2-University on
instructions by the Registrar who is physically present
before this Court submitted that the contents of the
service certificate dated 07.09.2021 produced at
Annexure-R are true and correct. He also confirms that
the petitioner did attend and rendered his service on
11.02.2013 and 12.02.2013 at respondent No.2
University.
17. Further, the Registrar of respondent No.2
University who is personally present before this Court and
has offered clarification to the effect that the petitioner
herein has had continuous service as per the service
certificate dated 17.09.2021 produced at Annexure-R,
thereby putting at rest the entire controversy.
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18. Necessary to note that the Act of regularizing
the services of only some employees and not of other
entitled employees, is discriminatory and violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India (Raman Kumar &
Others Vs. Union of India & Others – 2023 LiveLaw
(SC) 520).
19. In that view of the matter, there remains no
impediment for consideration of case of the petitioner as
per with the case of petitioners in W.P. No.103466/2021.
20. Accordingly, the following:
ORDER
(a) Petition is allowed.
(b) Respondent No.2-Registrar is directed to
consider the representation of the petitioner as per
Annexure-H and grant approval in the similar lines
as that of the petitioners in W.P.No.103466/2021
and forward the same to the respondent No.1 for
further process in accordance with law.
(c) Service of the petitioners shall be
regularized from the date on which the services of
petitioners in W.P.No.103466/2021 were
regularized with all consequential benefits to which
he is entitled shall be paid.
(d) Such exercise shall be done within a
period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of
the certified copy of this order.
21. In view of disposal of the petition, pending
applications, if any, does not survive for consideration.”
The order of the learned Single Judge, which forms the subject
matter of the present appeal, was one directing consideration of
the claim of the writ petitioner for regularization of service, with
effect from the very date on which the services of similarly
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situated petitioners in another writ petition had been regularized.
The claim was thus founded on the principle of parity in
treatment , seeking nothing more than the extension of a
benefit already conferred upon persons similarly circumstanced.
The learned Single Judge, while disposing of the writ petition,
directed the competent authority to undertake the exercise of
consideration within an outer limit of 12 weeks from the date
of the order . The direction was, therefore, neither open-ended
nor indefinite, but one requiring consideration within a clearly
stipulated timeframe.
3.1. The State, which was required to act upon the said
direction within 12 weeks, has instead chosen to call the order in
question before this Court after an inordinate delay of 626
days . A direction that was to receive consideration within weeks
has remained embroiled in administrative inaction for months
together, only to culminate in an appeal preferred after the lapse
of nearly two years. The contrast between the time granted for
compliance and the time consumed in mounting a challenge is
too stark to escape judicial notice. Whether this extraordinary
delay deserves the indulgence of this Court must necessarily
depend upon the sufficiency, credibility and bona fides of the
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explanation offered by the State. The application seeking
condonation of the said delay of 626 days reads as follows:
“1. The above Appeal is filed by the
Appellants/state against the Order dated 20.06.2024
passed by the learned Single Judge in
W.P.No.105279/2023.
2. It is submitted that, in the above cited case,
pursuant to the Order passed by the learned Single
Judge, the Government Advocate had opined that the
present case is a fit case wherein the Order of the learned
Single Judge has to be questioned before the Division
Bench of this Hon'ble Court in an Appeal.
3. It is submitted that, after the Judgment was
passed by the Hon'ble High Court, the officials of the
university and the Government of Karnataka have
secured the copy of the judgment and was analyzed and
assessed to initiate the further proceedings. In doing so
there has been a delay in filling of the present Appeal.
4. It is submitted that, after the copy of the
judgment was secured, the University has written to the
Government of Karnataka seeking directions in this
matter. The Government took decision to prefer an appeal
only after in depth analysis of the Judgment and
communicated the decision in the month of November
2025.
5. It is submitted that, The Government Order was
received by Advocate General Office, Dharwad on
10.10.2025 and after verifying the Documents on the
same day the correspondence was made to send original
records / required documents to file an appeal. The
required documents was received by the Advocate
General Office on 19.02.2026. Thereafter, the file was put
up for draft before Concerned Law Officer. The Concerned
Law-Officer due to day to day Court hearings could not
draft the appeal immediately. Hence there is a delay
caused in filing of this Appeal.
6. It is submitted that, there is delay of 626
days in preferring the present Appeal this is neither
intentional nor deliberative one but only due to
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aforementioned bonafide reasons. These circumstances
were beyond the control of the appellant. Hence due to
these reasons there is delay in filling the present Appeal.
7. It is submitted that, the Appellant has got a
good case on merits and if the delay days is not condoned
then the rights will be frustrated.
8. It is submitted that, it is very much just and
necessary to condone the delay days in preferring the
present appeal and the appeal is to be heard on merits.
9. It is submitted that, the delay is neither
Intentional nor deliberate but is strictly due to mandatory
administrative procedures.
10. It is submitted that, the case involves
significant questions of law regarding the Constitutional
mandate for public employment and carries a substantial
financial burden on the State exchequer.
11. It is submitted that, the Appellant has a prima
facie strong case on merits, and if the delay is not
condoned, a grave miscarriage of justice will occur by
allowing an illegal regularization to stand.
12. It is submitted that, a prima-facie case and
balance of convenience lies in favour of appellant and no
loss or hardship will be caused to the other side if the
present application is allowed.
13. It is submitted that, the delay in filing the
present appeal is not intentional but due to the reasons
stated above.
14. It is submitted that, if the accompanying
application is not allowed, the Appellants will be put to
untold hardship and on the contrary, if the accompanying
application is allowed, the same will not cause any
prejudice to the Respondents.
WHEREFORE , it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court
be pleased to allow the application for condonation of
delay and condone the delay of 626 days in filing the
above appeal in the interest of justice and equity.”
[
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The explanation proffered for condonation of delay in the case at
hand is even more appalling and wholly bereft of any
semblance of sufficient cause . The application, when stripped
of its verbosity, discloses nothing beyond the customary
movement of files from table to table, the circulation of papers
from one officer to another, and the time ostensibly consumed
by the Law Officers in putting together the requisite documents
for preferring the appeal. These are the only circumstances
projected to persuade this Court to condone an extraordinary
delay of 626 days . What is conspicuously absent is any
explanation as to why the State remained dormant for such an
extended period, despite being confronted with a judicial
direction requiring consideration of the writ petitioner's claim
within 12 weeks. Administrative procedure cannot be
permitted to masquerade as sufficient cause, nor can
bureaucratic indifference be clothed in the garb of
procedural necessity. If the mere circulation of files and
preparation of papers by Law Officers were to constitute
sufficient cause, the law of limitation would lose its meaning
whenever the State enters the portals of a Court. The State
cannot seek to transform its own administrative inertia into a
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ground for judicial indulgence. The passage of time is not
arrested by the movement of files, and the rights flowing from a
judicial order cannot be left in perpetual uncertainty at the mercy
of official correspondence. The explanation, far from accounting
for the delay, merely demonstrates the absence of the diligence
expected of a litigant, more so of the State, which is
constitutionally obligated to act fairly, responsibly and with
reasonable expedition. A delay of 626 days cannot be
condoned merely because the appellant happens to be the
State; for the majesty of law lies as much in its uniform
application as in its faithful enforcement.
WRIT APPEAL NO.100437 OF 2026:
th
4. The order under challenge is dated 7 June 2023 passed
in Writ Petition No.103466 of 2021. The relief granted to the writ
petitioners is as follows:
“…. …. ….
13. The 2nd respondent-University is an
instrumentality of the State and therefore, the orders
passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is equally binding
on them. When the petitioners or otherwise qualified for
regularization of their services, merely for the reason that
the regulations of the 2nd respondent-university or the
regulations of the UGC do not provide any provision for
regularization of the petitioner’s service, the benefit of
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regularization of their services cannot be denied to the
petitioners.
14. Under these circumstances, pending
consideration of the application filed by the petitioners
seeking regularization, the 2nd respondent-University was
not justified in issuing the impugned notification vide
Annexure – Q, dated 12.08.2021 calling applications from
the eligible candidates to fill up the posts of Assistant
Professors, which included the Posts held by the
petitioners. Therefore, the impugned notification at
Annexure – Q as well as the re-notification, dated
13.10.2021, issued by the 2nd respondent-University
insofar as it relates to filling up of the Posts of Assistant
Professors in History, English & Management subjects,
which is presently held by the petitioners cannot be
sustained. Consequently, even the endorsement issued by
the 2nd respondent-University rejecting the
representations of the petitioners seeking regularization
of their services is also liable to be quashed for the
reasons aforesaid. Accordingly, the following:
ORDER
(i) The writ petition is allowed;
(ii) The impugned notification Annexure – Q,
dated 12.08.2021, issued by the 2nd
respondent and the re-notification, dated
13.10.2021, issued by the 2nd respondent
University insofar as it relates to calling for
applications to fill up the Posts of Assistant
Professors in the subjects of History, English
& Management in the 2nd respondent-
University, which is now held by the
petitioners and the impugned endorsements
at Annexures – R, S & T, dated 01.09.2021,
issued by the 2nd respondent-University are
quashed.
(iii) A direction is issued to the respondents to
consider the case of the petitioners for
regularization, if they are qualified in terms
of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Secretary, State of
Karnataka & Others Vs. Umadevi (3) and
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others (Supra) and the said exercise shall be
done by the 2nd respondent-University
considering the representations filed by the
petitioners at Annexures – J, K, L, M, N & P
as expeditiously as possible and appropriate
orders shall be passed in accordance with
law expeditiously, but not later than a period
of three months from the date of receipt of
certified copy of this order.”
The notification dated 12-08-2021 and the subsequent re-
notification dated 13-10-2021, issued by the University inviting
applications for appointment to the posts of Assistant Professor,
were obliterated by the learned Single Judge, insofar as they
pertained to the said posts, with a consequential direction to
consider the cases of the writ petitioners for regularization of
their services. The State Government, which was arrayed as the
1st respondent in the writ petition, has chosen to call in question
the said order by preferring the subject appeal, albeit after an
inordinate delay of 1099 days . The explanation offered for
this extraordinary delay, as discernible from the application
seeking condonation of delay, reads as follows:
“1. The above Appeal is filed by the Appellants/state
against the Order dated 07.06.2023 passed by the
learned Single Judge in W.P.No. 103644/2021 (S-
Res).
2. It is submitted that, in the above cited cased,
pursuant to the Order passed by the learned Single
Judge, the Government Advocate had opined that
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the present case is a fit case wherein the Order of
the learned Single Judge has to be questioned
before the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in
an Appeal.
3. After receiving the letter and opinion from the
learned Government Advocate, the file was sent to
the Head of the Legal Cell, Revenue Department,
M.S. Building, Bengaluru. The Head of the Legal
Cell Department subsequently has given an opinion
that the Order under challenge has to be
questioned in an Appeal. Subsequently thereof, the
file sent to the Head of the Legal Cell and Ex-
officio, Deputy Secretary to Government,
Department of Law, Justice and Human Rights
(Litigation -VI) to obtain an Order to enable the
Government to challenge the order dated
07.06.2023 passed in W.P.No.103644/2021 by way
of filing an Appeal. The delay in filing the appeal is
due to following communications.
4. After receipt of the Court Order, the University sent
for the legal opinion and placed before the
syndicate on 27.08.2023 was discussed. Later, the
Registrar issued Endorsement dated 15/09/2023
after that special Syndicate meeting was convened
on 21.09.2023, then Vice-chancellor had withdrawn
the endorsement given by the Registrar on
27.09.2023. Appointment orders were issued by
the Assistant Registrar to the Respondents on
27.09.2022. The Government received the proposal
of the University on 11.10.2023. The Government
sought the clarification on 03.02.2024. On
08.02.2024 the Vice-Chancellor KSLU, wrote a
letter to government. On 18.05.2024 Government
Letter rejecting the proposal of the University for
release of the salary grants was sent to the Vice-
Chancellor KSLU. On 08.02.2024, the letter of the
University regarding release of the salary grants
was received. On 18.05.2024 Government Letter
rejecting the proposal of the University for release
of the salary grants was sent. On 29.06.2024 the
Vice-Chancellor KSLU, wrote a letter to government
again to release the grants. On 22.08.2024,
Government wrote letter to Vice-Chancellor KSLU
reiterating the opinion expressed in the letter dated
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18.05.2024. Again on 10.12.2024 the Vice-
Chancellor KSLU, wrote a letter to Government to
release the grants. On 09.01.2025, Government
wrote letter to Vice-Chancellor KSLU reiterating the
opinion expressed in the letter dated 18.05.2024 &
22.08.2024. On 13.02.2025 university wrote letter
to the e Govt. for release of the grants. On
25.06.2026 the Government Order according the
sanction to appeal against the order passed in
WP.103466/2021
5. It is submitted that, the delay in filing the present
appeal is not intentional but due to the reasons
stated above.
6. It is submitted that, if the accompanying
application is not allowed, the Appellants will be put
to untold hardship and on the contrary, if the
accompanying application is allowed, the same will
not cause any prejudice to the Respondents.
WHEREFORE , it is prayed that this Hon'ble
Court be pleased to allow the application for
condonation of delay and condone the delay of
1099 days in filing the above appeal in the interest
of justice and equity.”
A perusal of the application and the averments made therein
would reveal that the entire explanation for the delay revolves
around a labyrinth of interdepartmental correspondence between
the University and the State Government, and the seemingly
interminable movement of files from one table to another, from
one officer to the next, within the corridors of the State
administration. Beyond this familiar refrain of bureaucratic
movement and administrative correspondence, not a
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semblance of a cogent or convincing explanation is
forthcoming as to what prevented the State from approaching
this Court within the period prescribed by law. The application is
conspicuously silent on any circumstance that could legitimately
constitute sufficient cause for such prolonged inaction. The mere
movement of files cannot become a convenient sanctuary for
administrative lethargy, nor can the passage of papers through
successive official hands be elevated to the status of a legally
acceptable explanation for the passage of nearly three years.
4.1. A delay of 1099 days is not a mere irregularity in
procedure that can be wished away by invoking the
indulgence of the Court. It represents a substantial lapse of
time during which the order of the learned Single Judge
remained unchallenged. The State, merely because it is the
State, cannot claim a privileged dispensation from the discipline
of limitation. The law of limitation does not stand suspended at
the doors of Government offices, nor does the clock of limitation
cease to tick while files travel from desk to desk. To condone
such an enormous delay on the strength of such an explanation
would be to convert judicial discretion into administrative
accommodation and render the statutory prescription of
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limitation virtually otiose. The expression ‘sufficient cause’
demands an explanation that inspires judicial confidence, not a
narration of official correspondence that merely chronicles the
delay without justifying it. The delay of 1099 days, therefore,
cannot be brushed aside as inconsequential, much less
condoned as a matter of course.
WRIT APPEAL NO.100438 OF 2026:
5. The subject appeal is preferred after a delay of 466
th
days. The order of the learned single Judge is dated 5 March,
2025 passed in Writ Petition No.100871 of 2025. The order of
the learned single Judge is as follows:
“…. …. ….
9. The communications issued by the Government
are furnished along with the Writ Petition and the same
are marked as Annexures G, J and L. A perusal of the
same would reflect that the Government refused/
declined to give the financial aid stating that the
University contested the matter in Writ Petition
No.103466/2021 hence, they cannot regularize the
services of the petitioners. The reasons and the
conclusion so arrived by the Government cannot be
sustained. The order of this Court has attained finality.
The Government was also the party to the proceedings
and no appeal has been preferred by the Government.
Furthermore, the University is an appointing authority
and also has the power to regularize the services of the
employees. In compliance with the order, the University
has taken a decision and has regularized the services of
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the petitioners. The Government overlooked this aspect of
the matter and erroneously declined to give financial aid
to the University. The action on the part of the
government cannot be sustained. Hence, the petitioners
are entitled to the reliefs as sought in the writ petition.
10. The Writ of Certiorari is ordered. The
communication bearing No.LAW-KLM/85/2023 dated
18.05.2024 vide Annexure-G, the communication bearing
No.LAW-KLM/85/2023 dated 22.08.2024 vide Annexure-J
and the communication bearing No.LAW-KLM/85/2023
dated 09.01.2025 vide Annexure-L issued by the first
respondent are quashed.
11. A Mandamus is ordered directing the first
respondent to extend the benefit of the grant in aid to the
petitioners releasing the grants and also pay the arrears,
if any without seeking further clarification from the
University within 8 weeks from the receipt of the certified
copy of this order.
12. Resultantly, the Writ Petition is disposed of .”
The learned Single Judge, upon consideration of the matter, set
aside the order impugned before her, finding that the reasons
assigned by the State for declining regularization of the services
of the writ petitioners were wholly unsustainable. Consequent
upon such determination, a direction was issued to the 1st
respondent/State to extend to the writ petitioners the benefit of
grant-in-aid, to release the grants legitimately due to them and
to disburse the arrears, if any, flowing from such entitlement.
The order, therefore, was not merely one of setting aside an
administrative decision, but carried with it consequential
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directions intended to secure to the writ petitioners the benefits
of which they had been denied by an order found legally
indefensible.
5.1. The State, instead of assailing the said order within
the period prescribed by law, has chosen to approach this Court
after an inordinate delay of 466 days . An order that conferred
upon the writ petitioners the benefit of grant-in-aid and
consequential monetary relief is thus sought to be reopened
after the passage of more than fifteen months. The question that
falls for consideration at the threshold is not the correctness or
otherwise of the order of the learned Single Judge, but whether
the State has demonstrated sufficient cause to warrant
condonation of such a substantial delay. The right to prefer an
appeal is undoubtedly a creature of statute, but its
exercise is conditioned by the discipline of limitation; the
mere existence of a right of appeal does not confer a
corresponding right to approach the appellate Court at
leisure. It is in this backdrop that the explanation furnished by
the State for seeking condonation of the delay of 466 days
assumes significance. The application seeking such condonation
reads as follows:
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“1. The above Appeal is filed by the Appellants/state
against the Order dated 07.06.2023 passed by the
learned Single Judge in W.P.No. 100871/2021 (S-
Res).
2. It is submitted that, in the above cited cased,
pursuant to the Order passed by the learned Single
Judge, the Government Advocate had opined that
the present case is a fit case wherein the Order of
the learned Single Judge has to be questioned
before the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in
an Appeal.
3. After receiving the letter and opinion from the
learned Government Advocate, the file was sent to
the Head of the Legal Cell, Revenue Department,
M.S. Building, Bengaluru. The Head of the Legal
Cell Department subsequently has given an opinion
that the Order under challenge has to be
questioned in an Appeal. Subsequently thereof, the
file sent to the Head of the Legal Cell and Ex-
officio, Deputy Secretary to Government,
Department of Law, Justice and Human Rights
(Litigation -VI) to obtain an Order to enable the
Government to challenge the order dated
07.06.2023 passed in W.P.No.100871/2021 by way
of filing an Appeal. The delay in filing the appeal is
due to following communications.
4. After receipt of the Court Order, the University sent
for the legal opinion and placed before the
syndicate on 27.08.2023 was discussed. Later, the
Registrar issued Endorsement dated 15/09/2023
after that special Syndicate meeting was convened
on 21.09.2023, then Vice-chancellor had withdrawn
the endorsement given by the Registrar on
27.09.2023. Appointment orders were issued by
the Assistant Registrar to the Respondents on
27.09.2022. The Government received the proposal
of the University on 11.10.2023. The Government
sought the clarification on 03.02.2024. On
08.02.2024 the Vice-Chancellor KSLU, wrote a
letter to government. On 18.05.2024 Government
Letter rejecting the proposal of the University for
release of the salary grants was sent to the Vice-
Chancellor KSLU. On 08.02.2024, the letter of the
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University regarding release of the salary grants
was received. On 18.05.2024 Government Letter
rejecting the proposal of the University for release
of the salary grants was sent. On 29.06.2024 the
Vice-Chancellor KSLU, wrote a letter to government
again to release the grants. On 22.08.2024,
Government wrote letter to Vice-Chancellor KSLU
reiterating the opinion expressed in the letter dated
18.05.2024. Again on 10.12.2024 the Vice-
Chancellor KSLU, wrote a letter to Government to
release the grants. On 09.01.2025, Government
wrote letter to Vice-Chancellor KSLU reiterating the
opinion expressed in the letter dated 18.05.2024 &
22.08.2024. On 13.02.2025 university wrote letter
to the e Govt. for release of the grants. On
25.06.2026 the Government Order according the
sanction to appeal against the order passed in
WP.100871/2021
5. It is submitted that, the delay in filing the present
appeal is not intentional but due to the reasons
stated above.
6. It is submitted that, if the accompanying
application is not allowed, the Appellants will be put
to untold hardship and on the contrary, if the
accompanying application is allowed, the same will
not cause any prejudice to the Respondents.
WHEREFORE , it is prayed that this Hon'ble
Court be pleased to allow the application for
condonation of delay and condone the delay of 466
days in filing the above appeal in the interest of
justice and equity.”
It is the very same swan song that is sung in the subject appeal.
The application seeking condonation of delay is nothing but a
verbatim reproduction of the application filed in Writ
Appeal No.100437 of 2026 , with no discernible attempt to
furnish an explanation peculiar to the facts and circumstances of
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the present case. The familiar tale of files travelling from table to
table, papers moving from officer to officer, and administrative
formalities consuming time is once again pressed into service as
a justification for the delay of 466 days . What ought to have
been a candid and case-specific explanation of the circumstances
that prevented the State from approaching this Court within the
prescribed period has been reduced to a mechanical exercise of
replication. A copy-and-paste explanation cannot become a
passport to condonation of delay. The expression ‘sufficient
cause’ employed in the law of limitation is not an empty
incantation to be invoked through stereotyped averments; it
demands disclosure of circumstances that genuinely prevented
the litigant from acting with reasonable diligence. If identical
explanations are offered for different appeals involving different
orders and varying periods of delay, it only accentuates the
casualness with which the State has approached the solemn
obligation of explaining its default. Judicial discretion cannot be
exercised on the strength of administrative templates, nor can
the Court be expected to condone substantial delays merely
because the same familiar explanation is repeated with
unvarying regularity. The law requires an explanation for
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the delay, not a reproduction of excuses; it demands
diligence, not a demonstration of bureaucratic routine.
WRIT APPEAL NO.100100 OF 2026:
6. The University challenges the order that is subject
matter of Writ Appeal No.100438 of 2026. The University also
has preferred this appeal after 548 days of delay. The reasons
rendered by the University seeking condonation of delay of 548
days are as follows:
"1. I am the Appellant in the above matter, I am
aware of the facts and circumstances of the above
case. Hence I am swearing to the content of this
Affidavit. I state that the averments made in the
accompanying Appeal memo may be read as part
and parcel of this affidavit so as to avoid the
repetition of the same.
2. I state that after the judgment was passed by the
Hon'ble High Court, the officials of the university
have secured the copy of the judgment and was
analyzed and assessed to initiate the further
proceedings. In doing so there has been a delay in
filling of the present Appeal.
3. I state that after the copy of the judgment was
secured, the Appellant University has secured legal
opinion from the panel advocates and due to
official work load in the university the concerned
officials were not able to secure opinion in time and
give instructions to the advocate to prefer the
present Appeal. Hence there has been a delay in
preferring the present Appeal.
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4. And also I state that, the parent department i.e.
Office of the Principal Secretary to Government,
Department of Law, Justice and Human Rights,
Vidhan Soudha, Bengaluru issued letter
No.Law/KLM/135/2024 Date: 05.11.2025 which
was received on 11.11.2025 stating that the matter
decided in WP.105279/2023 needs to be appealed.
Hence, the university is filing appeal in this matter.
5. I state that, there is delay of days in preferring the
present Appeal this is neither intentional nor
deliberative one but only due to aforementioned
bonafide reason. These circumstances were beyond
the control of the university. Hence die to these
reason there is delay in filling the present Appeal.
6. I am advised to state that, the Appellant University
has got a good case on merits and if the delay days
is not condoned then the rights will be frustrated.
7. I state that, it is very much. just and necessary to
condone the delay days in preferring the present
appeal and the appeal is to be heard on merits.
8. The delay is neither intentional nor deliberate but is
strictly due to mandatory administrative
procedures, including the obtaining of legal
opinions from the panel advocates and the
subsequent Issuance of the Government Order
(LAW: 277: LSP: 2025) dates 30.09.2025
authorizing the appeal.
9. The case involve significant questions of law
regarding the Constitutional mandate for public
employment and carries substantial financial
burden on the University exchequer.
10. The Appellant has a prima facie strong case on
merits, and if the delay is not condoned, a grave
miscarriage of justice will occur by allowing an
illegal regularization to stand.
11. I state that, I have made out a prima-facie case
and balance convenience lied in my favour and no
loss or hardship will caused to the other side if the
present application is allowed.
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12. Therefore, it is most respectfully prayed that the
Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the
accompanying application, the interest of justice
and equity.”
Here again, the explanation for the delay finds place in
paragraphs 3 and 4 of the application. The entire edifice of the
plea for condonation rests upon the time ostensibly consumed in
securing legal opinion and collating the documents necessary for
preferring the appeal. A delay of 548 days is thus sought to
be explained away by the twin expressions of obtaining
legal opinion and collection of records. Neither the exercise
of securing legal opinion nor the process of gathering documents
can, by itself, furnish an inexhaustible reservoir of sufficient
cause to justify such prolonged inaction. The application does not
disclose any compelling circumstance that rendered it impossible
for the University to approach this Court with reasonable
expedition.
6.1. Legal opinion is intended to facilitate timely recourse
to law, not to become an instrument for defeating the discipline
of limitation. Likewise, the collation of documents is an incident
of litigation and cannot be elevated into a justification for
permitting an appeal to remain dormant for 548 days. The mere
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recital of administrative steps undertaken is no substitute
for an explanation of why those steps could not have been
undertaken with the diligence that the law demands. The
explanation, therefore, does little to inspire judicial confidence in
the bona fides of the delay sought to be condoned.
7. The controversy that engaged the attention of the
learned Single Judges in all these matters had its genesis in the
selection and appointment of the writ petitioners to the posts of
Assistant Professors in the year 2010, and their subsequent
claims for regularization of services and consequential service
benefits. In certain cases, the learned Single Judges directed
consideration of the claims for regularization; in others,
directions were issued for extension of salary grants, payment of
arrears and conferment of incidental benefits legitimately flowing
from such entitlement. The orders were thus concerned with the
service rights and monetary entitlements of employees who had
approached the constitutional Court seeking redressal of their
grievances. These were not cases where implementation of the
orders was demonstrated to entail such an enormous or
extraordinary financial burden upon the State exchequer as
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would, by itself, explain the prolonged reluctance to act upon
them.
7.1. What is particularly disquieting is the sequence of
events that followed. The writ petitioners, armed with orders
rendered in their favour, were compelled to institute contempt
proceedings, alleging continued non-compliance and
recalcitrance on the part of the authorities. It is only when the
spectre of contempt proceedings loomed large that the
administrative machinery appears to have awakened from
its prolonged slumber. The State and the University, which
had permitted the orders of the learned Single Judges to remain
unchallenged for months and, in some cases, for years, suddenly
found the urgency to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court. The appeals thus emerge, not in the ordinary course of
diligent pursuit of legal remedies, but in the aftermath of
proceedings initiated to secure obedience to judicial commands.
The delays range from 466 days to 1099 days , each sought to
be justified through explanations substantially revolving around
movement of files, exchange of correspondence, securing of
legal opinion and collection of documents.
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7.2. The question that consequently arises is one of
considerable significance: whether the State or its
instrumentalities, by the mere virtue of their institutional
character, can claim a latitude in matters of limitation
which the law does not ordinarily extend to other
litigants. Can administrative inertia, bureaucratic indifference
and the leisurely movement of official files constitute sufficient
cause merely because the litigant seeking indulgence is the
Government or a University? Does the law of limitation wear one
face for the citizen and another for the State? Or does the
principle of equality before law demand that every litigant,
irrespective of institutional identity, demonstrate sufficient cause
for the delay in invoking the jurisdiction of the Court?
7.3. The answer to these questions must be found not in
considerations of administrative convenience, but in the settled
principles governing the exercise of judicial discretion under the
law of limitation. The jurisprudence on the subject has witnessed
decisions of the Apex Court adopting a liberal approach where
the circumstances warranted substantial justice being preferred
over technical considerations, and equally emphatic
pronouncements declining to condone delays, even of
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comparatively shorter duration, where negligence, want of
diligence or absence of sufficient cause stood demonstrated. The
distinction lies not merely in the length of the delay, but
in the sufficiency of the cause; not in the identity of the
litigant, but in the bona fides of the explanation. It
therefore becomes necessary to traverse the judicial landscape
shaped by the Apex Court, examining the circumstances in which
indulgence has been extended to the State despite delay, and
those in which the Court has declined such indulgence
notwithstanding the comparatively modest period of delay. It is
against the backdrop of this evolving jurisprudence that the
applications seeking condonation of delay in the present appeals
must be tested.
CASES WHERE THE APEX COURT HAS CONDONED DELAY:
8. The State has relied on the following judgments where
the Apex Court has condoned the delay. I deem it appropriate to
notice the judgments relied on by the State.
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8.1. The Apex Court in the case of STATE OF HARYANA
1
v. CHANDRAMANI holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
11. It is notorious and common knowledge that
delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this
Court — be it by private party or the State — are barred
by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal
approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat
sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is
equally common knowledge that litigants including the
State are accorded the same treatment and the law is
administered in an even-handed manner. When the
State is an applicant, praying for condonation of
delay, it is common knowledge that on account of
impersonal machinery and the inherited
bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-
making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck
ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult
to understand though more difficult to approve, but
the State represents collective cause of the
community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken
by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and
encumbered process of pushing the files from table
to table and keeping it on table for considerable
time causing delay — intentional or otherwise — is a
routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape
in the process of their making decision is a common
feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not
impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State
are lost for such default no person is individually
affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is
public interest. The expression “sufficient cause”
should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism
in justice-oriented approach rather than the
technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining
every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to
and characteristic of the functioning of the
governmental conditions would be cognizant to and
requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-
oriented process. The court should decide the
matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly
1
(1996) 3 SCC 132
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without merit. No separate standards to determine
the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant
could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient
cause . The Government at appropriate level should
constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any
legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or
whether cases require adjustment and should authorise
the officers to take a decision or give appropriate
permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file
appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the
officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be
made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally,
the State cannot be put on the same footing as an
individual. The individual would always be quick in taking
the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way
of an appeal or application since he is a person legally
injured while State is an impersonal machinery working
through its officers or servants. Considered from this
perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in
this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for
condonation of the delay.”
8.2. The Apex Court in the case of STATE OF NAGALAND
2
v. LIPOK AO holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
9. What constitutes sufficient cause cannot be laid
down by hard-and-fast rules. In New India Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [(1975) 2 SCC 840] this
Court held that discretion given by Section 5 should
not be defined or crystallised so as to convert a
discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The
expression “sufficient cause” should receive a
liberal construction. In Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi
Ram [ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 : AIR 1917 PC 156] it
was observed that true guide for a court to exercise
the discretion under Section 5 is whether the
appellant acted with reasonable diligence in
prosecuting the appeal . In Shakuntala Devi Jain v.
Kuntal Kumari [(1969) 1 SCR 1006 : AIR 1969 SC 575] a
2
(2005) 3 SCC 752
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Bench of three Judges had held that unless want of bona
fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a
party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the
application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot
be refused to be condoned.
10. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Nirmala Devi [(1979) 4 SCC 365 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 996]
which is a case of negligence of the counsel which misled
a litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy, the default
in delay was condoned. In Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan
[(1969) 2 SCC 770] this Court had held that there is no
general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is
always sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is
always a question whether the mistake was bona
fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior
purpose. In that case it was held that the mistake
committed by the counsel was bona fide and it was
not tainted by any mala fide motive.
11. In State of Kerala v. E.K. Kuriyipe [1981
Supp SCC 72] it was held that whether or not there
is sufficient cause for condonation of delay is a
question of fact dependent upon the facts and
circumstances of the particular case. In Milavi Devi
v. Dina Nath [(1982) 3 SCC 366] it was held that
the appellant had sufficient cause for not filing the
appeal within the period of limitation. This Court
under Article 136 can reassess the ground and in
appropriate case set aside the order made by the
High Court or the Tribunal and remit the matter for
hearing on merits. It was accordingly allowed,
delay was condoned and the case was remitted for
decision on merits.
12. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh
[(1984) 4 SCC 66] a Bench of three Judges had held
that if the refusal to condone the delay results in
grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground
to condone the delay. Delay was accordingly
condoned. In Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji
[(1987) 2 SCC 107] a Bench of two Judges
considered the question of limitation in an appeal
filed by the State and held that Section 5 was
enacted in order to enable the court to do
substantial justice to the parties by disposing of
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matters on merits. The expression “sufficient
cause” is adequately elastic to enable the court to
apply the law in a meaningful manner which
subserves the ends of justice — that being the life
purpose for the existence of the institution of
courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has
been making a justifiably liberal approach in
matters instituted in this Court. But the message
does not appear to have percolated down to all the
other courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated
that the expression “every day's delay must be
explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach
should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a
rational, common-sense, pragmatic manner. When
substantial justice and technical considerations are
pitted against each other, cause of substantial
justice deserves to be preferred for the other side
cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being
done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no
presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately,
or on account of culpable negligence, or on account
of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by
resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
Judiciary is not respected on account of its power
to legalise injustice on technical grounds but
because it is capable of removing injustice and is
expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented
approach from this perspective, there was sufficient
cause for condoning the delay in the institution of
the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was
seeking condonation and not a private party was
altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality
before law demands that all litigants, including the
State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment
and the law is administered in an even-handed
manner. There is no warrant for according a
stepmotherly treatment when the State is the
applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned.
13. Experience shows that on account of an
impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is
directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be
subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic
methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing,
and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less
difficult to understand though more difficult to approve.
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The State which represents collective cause of the
community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status.
The courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit
and philosophy of the provision in the course of the
interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit
is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning
down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the
appeal. Delay as accordingly condoned, the order was set
aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for
disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing
to the parties. In Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra [1987
Supp SCC 339] this Court had held that the court should
not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the
application for condonation of delay. The appeal was
allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was
remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law.
14. In G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition
Officer [(1988) 2 SCC 142] it was held that no general
principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel
could be laid. The expression “sufficient cause” must
receive a liberal construction so as to advance
substantial justice and generally delays in
preferring the appeals are required to be condoned
in the interest of justice where no gross negligence
or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is
imputable to the party seeking condonation of
delay. In litigations to which Government is a party,
there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot
be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are
lost for such defaults, no person is individually
affected, but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers
is public interest. The decisions of Government are
collective and institutional decisions and do not
share the characteristics of decisions of private
individuals. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the
same for a private citizen as for governmental
authorities. Government, like any other litigant
must take responsibility for the acts, omissions of
its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is
imparted to the matter where Government makes
out a case where public interest was shown to have
suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the
part of its officers or agents and where the officers
were clearly at cross-purposes with it. It was,
therefore, held that in assessing what constitutes
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sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5, it might,
perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from
the considerations that go into the judicial verdict,
these factors which are peculiar to and
characteristic of the functioning of the Government.
Government decisions are proverbially slow
encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree
of procedural red tape in the process of their
making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore,
not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who
bear responsibility of Government must have “a
little play at the joints”. Due recognition of these
limitations on governmental functioning — of
course, within reasonable limits — is necessary if
the judicial approach is not to be rendered
unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and
unrealistic to put Government and private parties
on the same footing in all respects in such matters.
Implicit in the very nature of governmental
functioning is procedural delay incidental to the
decision-making process. The delay of over one
year was accordingly condoned.
15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by
officers/agencies proverbially at a slow pace and
encumbered process of pushing the files from table to
table and keeping it on the table for considerable time
causing delay — intentional or otherwise — is a routine.
Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process
of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore,
certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the
appeals brought by the State are lost for such
default no person is individually affected but what
in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest.
The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore,
be considered with pragmatism in a justice-
oriented approach rather than the technical
detection of sufficient cause for explaining every
day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and
characteristic of the functioning of the
governmental conditions would be cognizant to and
requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-
oriented process. The court should decide the
matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly
without merit. No separate standards to determine
the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant
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could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient
cause. The Government at appropriate level should
constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any
legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or
whether cases require adjustment and should authorise
the officers to take a decision or give appropriate
permission for settlement. In the event of decision to
file appeal, needed prompt action should be
pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal
and he should be made personally responsible for
lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on
the same footing as an individual. The individual
would always be quick in taking the decision
whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an
appeal or application since he is a person legally
injured while the State is an impersonal machinery
working through its officers or servants.
16. The above position was highlighted in State of
Haryana v. Chandra Mani [(1996) 3 SCC 132] and Special
Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma [(1996) 10
SCC 634]. It was noted that adoption of strict standard of
proof sometimes fails to protract ( sic ) public justice, and
it would result in public mischief by skilful management of
delay in the process of filing an appeal.”
8.3. The Apex Court in the case of SHEO RAJ SINGH v.
3
UNION OF INDIA holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
Analysis
29. We have heard Mr Sharma and Mr Sen,
appearing on behalf of the appellants and the
respondents, respectively, and perused the order under
challenge.
30. Considering the aforementioned decisions,
there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped
in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties and
the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to
3
(2023) 10 SCC 531
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technical considerations of delay. However, these
decisions notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation
of delay being a discretionary power available to courts,
exercise of discretion must necessarily depend
upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the
degree of acceptability of the explanation, the
length of delay being immaterial.
31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient
cause being shown or an acceptable explanation
being proffered, delay of the shortest range may
not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases,
delay of long periods can be condoned if the
explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of
course, the courts must distinguish between an
“explanation” and an “excuse”. An “explanation” is
designed to give someone all of the facts and lay
out the cause for something. It helps clarify the
circumstances of a particular event and allows the
person to point out that something that has
happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault.
Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an
“explanation” from an “excuse”. Although people tend
to see “explanation” and “excuse” as the same thing and
struggle to find out the difference between the two, there
is a distinction which, though fine, is real.
32. An “excuse” is often offered by a person to
deny responsibility and consequences when under attack.
It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just
an “excuse” would imply that the explanation proffered is
believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula
that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for
condonation of delay based on existence or absence of
sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this
stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and
not explanations, that are more often accepted for
condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest
from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure
that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts
for adjudication.
33. Be that as it may, it is important to bear in
mind that we are not hearing an application for
condonation of delay but sitting in appeal over a
discretionary order of the High Court granting the prayer
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for condonation of delay. In the case of the former,
whether to condone or not would be the only question
whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper
exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for
condonation would be the question . Law is fairly well-
settled that “a court of appeal should not ordinarily
interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts
below”. If any authority is required, we can
profitably refer to the decision in Manjunath
Anandappa v. Tammanasa [ Manjunath Anandappa
v. Tammanasa , (2003) 10 SCC 390] , which in turn
relied on the decision in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v.
Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha [ Gujarat Steel
Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha ,
(1980) 2 SCC 593 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 197] where it
has been held that:
“an appellate power interferes not
when the order appealed is not right but
only when it is clearly wrong”.
(emphasis in original)
34. The order under challenge in this appeal is
dated 21-12-2011 [ Union of India v. Sheo Raj , 2011 SCC
OnLine Del 5511] . It was rendered at a point of time
when the decisions in Katiji [ Collector (LA) v. Katiji ,
(1987) 2 SCC 107] , Ramegowda [ G. Ramegowda v. LAO ,
(1988) 2 SCC 142] , Chandra Mani [ State of Haryana v.
Chandra Mani , (1996) 3 SCC 132] , K.V. Ayisumma
[ Tehsildar (LA) v. K.V. Ayisumma , (1996) 10 SCC 634]
and Lipok AO [ State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao , (2005) 3
SCC 752 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 906] were holding the field. It
is not that the said decisions do not hold the field now,
having been overruled by any subsequent decision.
Although there have been some decisions in the recent
past [ State of M.P. v. Bherulal [ State of M.P. v. Bherulal ,
(2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 101 : (2021) 1
SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 84] is one such
decision apart from University of Delhi [ University of Delhi
v. Union of India , (2020) 13 SCC 745] ] which have not
accepted governmental lethargy, tardiness and indolence
in presenting appeals within time as sufficient cause for
condonation of delay, yet, the exercise of discretion by
the High Court has to be tested on the anvil of the liberal
and justice oriented approach expounded in the aforesaid
decisions which have been referred to above.
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35. We find that the High Court in the present case
assigned the following reasons in support of its order:
35.1. The law of limitation was founded on
public policy, and that some lapse on the part of a
litigant, by itself, would not be sufficient to deny
condonation of delay as the same could cause
miscarriage of justice.
35.2. The expression “sufficient cause” is
elastic enough for courts to do substantial justice.
Further, when substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against one another, the
former would prevail.
35.3. It is upon the courts to consider the
sufficiency of cause shown for the delay, and the
length of delay is not always decisive while
exercising discretion in such matters if the delay is
properly explained. Further, the merits of a claim
were also to be considered when deciding such
applications for condonation of delay.
35.4. Further, a distinction should be drawn
between inordinate unexplained delay and
explained delay, where in the present case, the first
respondent had sufficiently explained the delay on
account of negligence on part of the government
functionaries and the government counsel on
record before the Reference Court.
35.5. The officer responsible for the negligence
would be liable to suffer and not public interest through
the State. The High Court felt inclined to take a pragmatic
view since the negligence therein did not border on
callousness.
36. Given these reasons, we do not consider
discretion to have been exercised by the High Court in an
arbitrary manner. The order under challenge had to be a
clearly wrong order so as to be liable for interference,
which it is not.
…. …. ….
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41. Having bestowed serious consideration to the
rival contentions, we feel that the High Court's decision
[ Union of India v. Sheo Raj , 2011 SCC OnLine Del 5511]
to condone the delay on account of the first respondent's
inability to present the appeal within time, for the reasons
assigned therein, does not suffer from any error
warranting interference. As the aforementioned
judgments have shown, such an exercise of discretion
does, at times, call for a liberal and justice-oriented
approach by the courts, where certain leeway could be
provided to the State. The hidden forces that are at work
in preventing an appeal by the State being presented
within the prescribed period of limitation so as not to
allow a higher court to pronounce upon the legality and
validity of an order of a lower court and thereby secure
unholy gains, can hardly be ignored. Impediments in the
working of the grand scheme of governmental functions
have to be removed by taking a pragmatic view on
balancing of the competing interests.”
8.4. The Apex Court in the case of MOOL CHANDRA v.
4
UNION OF INDIA holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
8. OA No. 1579 of 2017 came to be filed by the
appellant seeking direction to the respondent authorities
to consider his representation and same came to be
disposed of by the Tribunal vide order dated 8-5-2017
[ Mool Chandra v. Statistics , OA No. 1579 of 2017, order
dated 8-5-2017 (CAT)] directing the respondents to
dispose of the representation dated 27-7-2015 within a
period of 90 days. This resulted in the same being
disposed of and intimation/communication was forwarded
to the appellant on 9-11-2017 informing the appellant
thereunder that representation dated 27-7-2015 has been
considered and rejected. The appellant was also intimated
that his representations had already been disposed of and
same had been intimated vide communication dated 20-
11-2016/22-11-2016 itself and also forwarded copy
4
(2025) 1 SCC 625
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thereof to the appellant along with communication dated
9-11-2017.
9. The communication dated 9-11-2017 came to be
challenged by the appellant in OA No. 3034 of 2018 as
well as the communication dated 20-11-2016/22-11-
2016. The said OA is said to have been withdrawn by the
learned counsel appearing for the appellant purportedly
without his consent and knowledge on 10-8-2018 [ Mool
Chandra v. Union of India , 2018 SCC OnLine CAT 28651].
The said order [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India , 2018 SCC
OnLine CAT 28651] of the Tribunal dismissing the OA as
withdrawn reads: ( Mool Chandra case [ Mool Chandra v.
Union of India , 2018 SCC OnLine CAT 28651], SCC
OnLine CAT paras 1-2)
“ 1 . The learned counsel for applicant
seeks permission of the Tribunal to withdraw the
OA.
2 . Permission is accorded. The OA is
dismissed as withdrawn without prejudice to the
right of the applicant to pursue his remedy in
accordance with law.”
10. The appellant claims that he came to know
about this fact, namely, withdrawal of his application
before the Tribunal only in the last week of August 2019
and immediately thereafter he had applied for certified
copy of the order dated 10-8-2018 [ Mool Chandra v.
Union of India , 2018 SCC OnLine CAT 28651] and filed
another OA No. 2066 of 2020 before the Tribunal along
with Miscellaneous Application No. 3679 of 2019 for
condoning the delay in filing the OA as he had been given
opportunity to pursue his remedy in accordance with law.
11. The application for condonation of delay came
to be rejected by the Tribunal vide order dated 10-12-
2020 [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India , 2020 SCC OnLine
CAT 17285] by observing thus : ( Mool Chandra case
[ Mool Chandra v. Union of India , 2020 SCC OnLine CAT
17285] , SCC OnLine CAT paras 3-4)
“ 3 . The delay involved is more than one
year. It is not as if the applicant was not aware
of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the OA is
filed against the order of dismissal, passed
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against him was allowed and relief was granted.
It is in compliance with the order passed by the
Tribunal, that the revised order of punishment
was passed. The appellate authority rejected the
appeal in the year 2016. It is not the case of the
applicant that he did not receive the same.
Further, the applicant was very much free to
pursue the proceedings, ever since he retired.
Except stating that his earlier counsel did not
take proper steps, the applicant did not
substantiate the reasons for delay.
4 . We are not convinced with the reasons
given in the MA. The same is accordingly
dismissed. The OA shall also stand dismissed.”
12. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant
filed Writ Petition (Civil) No. 5350 of 2022 before the
Delhi High Court which dismissed the writ petition by the
impugned order [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India , 2023
,
SCC OnLine Del 8673] [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India ,
2023 SCC OnLine Del 8674] while affirming the order
[ Mool Chandra v. Union of India , 2020 SCC OnLine CAT
17285] of the Tribunal and observed that justifiable
penalty had been imposed by the disciplinary authority.
Hence, this appeal.
Contentions of learned advocates
13. It is the contention of Shri Vardhman Kaushik,
learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the High
Court on the one hand having opined not to entertain the
writ petition on the ground of alleged unexplained delay,
yet proceeded to deal with the matter on merits of the
case, that too without affording an opportunity to the
appellant and as such the appeal deserves to be allowed
by setting aside the impugned order [ Mool Chandra v.
,
Union of India , 2023 SCC OnLine Del 8673] [ Mool
Chandra v. Union of India , 2023 SCC OnLine Del 8674].
He would further elaborate his submissions by contending
that the Tribunal had committed an error in not
condoning the delay of 425 days in filing OA No. 2066 of
2020 and the delay was due to the mistake of the
counsel, who without the knowledge and consent of the
appellant had withdrawn the earlier OA No. 3034 of 2018
and also without prejudice to the right of the appellant to
pursue his remedy in accordance with law and it is on
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account of lack of knowledge of the appellant's application
having been withdrawn and on acquiring knowledge
about such unilateral withdrawal the appellant had taken
immediate steps to prosecute his legitimate claim before
the Tribunal by filing OA No. 2066 of 2020 afresh along
with Miscellaneous Application No. 3679 of 2019 for
condonation of delay and as such the Tribunal ought to
have condoned the delay which refused to do so and the
same has been erroneously affirmed by the High Court.
He would submit that a party should not suffer for the
mistake of his counsel or the conduct of the counsel and
he has placed reliance on Rafiq v. Munshilal [ Rafiq v.
Munshilal , (1981) 2 SCC 788] and N. Balakrishnan v. M.
Krishnamurthy [ N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy ,
(1998) 7 SCC 123].
14. Shri Kaushik would further contend that the
term “ sufficient cause ” ought to receive liberal
construction by the constitutional courts to advance
substantial justice and the facts obtained in the instant
case were sufficient to hold that the delay in filing fresh
OA was not attributable to any laxity exhibited by the
appellant. On merits the learned counsel appearing for
the appellant would contend that it is an undisputed fact
that the complainant (wife of the appellant) had
withdrawn her complaint and an affidavit to the said
effect had been filed before the enquiry officer itself and
she had also not deposed before inquiry though cited as a
witness on behalf of employer and as such the finding of
the enquiry officer holding the appellant guilty of alleged
misconduct was an erroneous finding and liable to be set
aside. Hence, he prays for the appeals being allowed.
15. Per contra Shri N. Visakamurthy, learned
counsel appearing for the respondents would support the
impugned orders [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India , 2023
,
SCC OnLine Del 8673] [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India ,
2023 SCC OnLine Del 8674] and submits that purported
representations submitted by the appellant vide letters
dated 19-10-2004, 16-3-2016 and 17-3-2016, had been
examined by the Ministry and had been rejected vide OM
dated 20-11-2016/22-11-2016 and this was challenged in
OA No. 3034 of 2018 and same had been withdrawn
[ Mool Chandra v. Union of India , 2018 SCC OnLine CAT
28651] by the appellant unconditionally and as such no
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fault can be laid at the doors of the respondents. Hence,
he prays for dismissal of the appeals.
16. Having heard the learned advocates appearing
for the parties and after bestowing our careful and
anxious consideration to the rival contentions raised at
the Bar, we are of the considered view that the impugned
orders [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India , 2023 SCC OnLine
,
Del 8673] [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India , 2023 SCC
OnLine Del 8674] are not sustainable and they are liable
to be set aside for the reasons assigned hereafter.
Discussion and findings
17. It is an undisputed fact that the appellant was
issued with the article of charge alleging that he had
deserted his wife and two school-going children and was
residing along with another lady. The said disciplinary
proceedings came to be initiated on account of a
complaint lodged by the wife of the appellant. When the
enquiry officer commenced the inquiry, she filed an
affidavit stating thereunder that she had filed the
complaint under mistaken notion and she withdrew the
complaint. In fact, in the articles of charge issued to the
appellant she was cited as a witness by the respective
authority and neither she appeared before the enquiry
officer nor she had deposed in the inquiry proceedings.
Though, she had already filed an affidavit withdrawing
her complaint against the appellant, yet the enquiry
officer proceeded with the inquiry and submitted the
report as already noticed hereinabove, holding the
appellant guilty of the charge of deserting his wife and
children and exonerating him of charge of residing with
another lady. This resulted in an order of dismissal being
passed against the appellant and same was challenged
before the Tribunal in OA No. 116 of 2002 by the
appellant which came to be allowed and matter was
remitted to the disciplinary authority to pass fresh order,
which resulted in reinstatement of the appellant into
service and imposing of minor penalty, namely, stoppage
of one increment of pay for a period of one year without
cumulative effect.
18. On account of the said penalty having been
imposed on the appellant, representation was submitted
to the authorities for complete exoneration and grant of
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promotion on a par with his juniors. In the meanwhile,
the appellant attained superannuation and thereafter OA
No. 1579 of 2017 was filed for a direction to the
respondents to consider the representation which was
unattended and a direction came to be issued by the
Tribunal on 8-5-2017 [ Mool Chandra v. Statistics , OA No.
1579 of 2017, order dated 8-5-2017 (CAT)] directing the
respondents to dispose of the representation within a
period of 90 days and accordingly it was disposed of as
already noticed herein supra and intimated to the
appellant by communication dated 9-11-2017.
19. Being aggrieved, the appellant challenged the
same in OA No. 3034 of 2018. However, the counsel
appearing for the appellant is said to have withdrawn the
said OA. On the one hand the appellant claims that he
had not authorised his counsel to withdraw OA No. 3034
of 2018 and on the other hand, the learned counsel
appearing for the respondents has submitted that OA had
been withdrawn by the appellant through his counsel
without prejudice to the right of the appellant to pursue
his remedy in accordance with law. This oath against oath
cannot be tested in the absence of any proof. The fact
remains that there was no memo duly signed by the
appellant came to be filed for withdrawal of the
application before the Tribunal.
20. Be that as it may. On account of liberty having
been granted to the appellant to pursue his remedy in
accordance with law, yet another OA No. 2066 of 2020
along with an application for condonation of delay came
to be filed. The delay was not condoned by the Tribunal
on the ground that it was filed more than one year after
the impugned order came to be passed. No litigant
stands to benefit in approaching the courts
belatedly. It is not the length of delay that would be
required to be considered while examining the plea
for condonation of delay, it is the cause for delay
which has been propounded will have to be
examined. If the cause for delay would fall within
the four corners of “ sufficient cause ”, irrespective
of the length of delay same deserves to be
condoned. However, if the cause shown is
insufficient, irrespective of the period of delay,
same would not be condoned.
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21. In this background when we turn our attention
to the facts on hand, it would emerge from the records
that the appellant being aggrieved by the dismissal of OA
No. 2066 of 2020 on the ground of delay had approached
the Delhi High Court challenging the same. The High
Court on the ground of penalty imposed being a minor
penalty, refused to entertain the writ petition or in other
words confirmed the order impugned before the Tribunal
on merits.
22. This Court in Commr. v. Labour Commr.
[ Commr. v. Labour Commr. , (2009) 3 SCC 525 :
(2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 876] has taken a view that
while deciding an application for condonation of
delay the High Court ought not to have gone into
the merits of the case. It has been further held :
(SCC p. 526, para 5)
“ 5 . While deciding an application for
condonation of delay, it is well settled that
the High Court ought not to have gone into
the merits of the case and would have only
seen whether sufficient cause had been
shown by the appellant for condoning the
delay in filing the appeal before it. We
ourselves have also examined the
application filed under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act before the High Court and, in
our opinion, the delay of 178 days has been
properly explained by the appellant. That
being the position, we set aside the
impugned order of the High Court.
Consequently, the appeal filed before the
High Court is restored to its original file. The
High Court is requested to decide the appeal
on merit in accordance with law after giving
hearing to the parties and after passing a
reasoned order.”
23. If negligence can be attributed to the
appellant, then necessarily the delay which has not
been condoned by the Tribunal and affirmed by the
High Court deserves to be accepted. However, if no
fault can be laid at the doors of the appellant and
cause shown is sufficient then we are of the
considered view that both the Tribunal and the High
Court were in error in not adopting a liberal
approach or justice-oriented approach to condone
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the delay. This Court in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar
v. Shah Hyder Beig [ Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v.
Shah Hyder Beig , (2000) 2 SCC 48] has held : (SCC p.
51, para 6)
“ 6 . Incidentally this point of delay and
laches was also raised before the High Court and
on this score the High Court relying upon the
decision in Abhyankar case [ N.L. Abhyankar v.
Union of India , 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 574 :
(1995) 1 Mah LJ 503] observed that it is not an
inflexible rule that whenever there is delay,
the Court must and necessarily refuse to
entertain the petition filed after a period of
three years or more which is the normal
period of limitation for filing a suit. The
Bombay High Court in Abhyankar case [ N.L.
Abhyankar v. Union of India , 1994 SCC
OnLine Bom 574 : (1995) 1 Mah LJ 503]
stated that the question is one of discretion
to be followed in the facts and
circumstances of each case and further
stated : (SCC OnLine Bom para 22)
’ 22 . … The real test for
sound exercise of discretion by the
High Court in this regard is not the
physical running of time as such
but the test is whether by reason
of delay, there is such negligence
on the part of the petitioner, so as
to infer that he has given up his
claim or whether before the
petitioner has moved the writ
court, the rights of the third
parties have come into being
which should not be allowed to be
disturbed unless there is
reasonable explanation for the
delay.’ ”
24. Applying the aforesaid principles which
we are in complete agreement to the facts on hand
and test the same it would not detain us for too
long to set aside the impugned orders [ Mool
Chandra v. Union of India , 2023 SCC OnLine Del
,
8673] [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India , 2023 SCC
OnLine Del 8674] , inasmuch as the delay of 425
days in filing fresh OA No. 2066 of 2020 has been
succinctly explained by the appellant before the
Tribunal, namely, it has been contended that there
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was no intimation of withdrawal of the earlier OA
by his counsel and the order of withdrawal dated
10-8-2018 [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India , 2018
SCC OnLine CAT 28651] does not reflect that such
withdrawal was based on any memo duly signed by
the appellant. Further, the High Court has proceeded to
confirm the order of the Tribunal on the footing that
penalty imposed on the appellant is only a minor penalty,
namely, withholding of one increment without cumulative
effect, by completely ignoring the fact that in the earlier
round of litigation it had been clearly held that
punishment of dismissal imposed on the appellant was
totally disproportionate to the alleged act.”
8.5. The Apex Court in the case of STATE OF ODISHA v.
5
SAROJ KUMAR PRADHAN holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
5. While considering an application for condonation
of delay, it is not the length of delay but the cause for
delay which will be of paramount consideration. If the
cause shown is sufficient and would fall within the four
corners of the Section 5 of the Limitation Act, namely,
‘sufficient cause’, such delay deserves to be condoned.”
8.6. The Apex Court in the case of DEPUTY
6
COMMISSIONER AND SLAO v. S.V. GLOBAL MILL LIMITED
holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
84. At this juncture, we deem it necessary to flag
certain concerns as to how collusion takes place with the
active connivance of the officials. The very appeals before
us, approximately 530 in number, are classic examples of
such official connivance. As a matter of fact, we find that
5
SLP (C) No.25212 of 2024, decided on 17-11-2025.
6
2026 SCC OnLine SC 171
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in most of these cases, even copy applications had not
been filed within the time prescribed, pursuant to the
judgments delivered by the Reference Court. Even after
this judgment was reserved, numerous matters similar to
the present ones have come and continue to come before
us, from across the country. This clearly indicates the
lackadaisical approach in filing appeals before the High
Courts under Section 74 of the 2013 Act and the pan-
India impact of the same. Incidentally, we also find a
delay in the filing of most of the present appeals
reiterating the callousness and casual approach of the
acquiring bodies. We are also conscious of the fact that
an alleged collusion might involve different persons,
including the office of the acquiring body and that of their
counsel. The delay also exhibits a clear lack of
coordination between the two offices.
85. Accountability is an important facet in a
constitutional democracy governed by the rule of
law. When an instrumentality of the State and its
officials act with such connivance and collusion, it
not only undermines the administration of justice
but also erodes public confidence in the legal
system. The repeated failure to pursue remedies
within time cannot be brushed aside as mere
negligence and calls for fixing responsibility on the
erring officials. Even assuming that all the cases
may not involve an act of collusion, there is
certainly abject carelessness and indifference,
especially when disputes involve substantial
amounts of money. In most of these cases, it has
not been brought to our notice whether any action
has been initiated and, thereafter, taken against
the officers concerned. Certainly, the malice must
be addressed by creating a better management and
monitoring system. Accordingly, the appellant(s)
are directed to undertake appropriate measures to
avoid any delay in the filing of appeals before the
High Court or Special Leave Petitions before this
Court in the future.
Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India , (2023) 10
SCC 531
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“35. We find that the High Court in
the present case assigned the following
reasons in support of its order:
xxxxxxxxx
35.4. Further, a distinction should be
drawn between inordinate unexplained
delay and explained delay, where in the
present case, the first respondent had
sufficiently explained the delay on account
of negligence on part of the government
functionaries and the government counsel
on record before the Reference Court.
35.5. The officer responsible for the
negligence would be liable to suffer and not
public interest through the State. The High
Court felt inclined to take a pragmatic view
since the negligence therein did not border
on callousness.
xxxxxxxxx
41. Having bestowed serious
consideration to the rival contentions, we feel
that the High Court's decision [ Union of India v.
Sheo Raj , 2011 SCC OnLine Del 5511] to
condone the delay on account of the first
respondent's inability to present the appeal
within time, for the reasons assigned therein,
does not suffer from any error warranting
interference. As the aforementioned judgments
have shown, such an exercise of discretion does,
at times, call for a liberal and justice-oriented
approach by the courts, where certain leeway
could be provided to the State. The hidden
forces that are at work in preventing an
appeal by the State being presented within
the prescribed period of limitation so as not
to allow a higher court to pronounce upon
the legality and validity of an order of a
lower court and thereby secure unholy
gains, can hardly be ignored. Impediments
in the working of the grand scheme of
governmental functions have to be removed
by taking a pragmatic view on balancing of
the competing interests.””
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8.7. Drawing sustenance from the observations of the Apex
Court in the afore-quoted judgments, the learned Additional
Advocate General, Sri Gangadhar J.M. would strenuously
contend that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ must receive a
pragmatic, liberal and justice-oriented construction, rather than
being confined within the narrow precincts of a pedantic or
hyper-technical interpretation. It is his submission that the
institutional functioning of the State cannot be equated with the
decision-making process of an individual litigant. The State,
being an impersonal machinery functioning through several
departments, officers and hierarchical channels, is necessarily
beset with procedural formalities, administrative exigencies and
bureaucratic delays, which ought to receive due judicial
recognition. The learned Additional Advocate General would
further contend that it is not the length of the delay that
should weigh with the Court, but the sufficiency of the
cause that occasioned such delay . The Court, according to
him, cannot remain oblivious to the inherent administrative
lethargy and procedural complexities that characterize
governmental functioning. He would, therefore, urge that the
explanations offered by the State ought not to be rejected
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merely on account of the magnitude of the delay, and that a
liberal approach, consistent with the overarching objective of
advancing substantial justice, should inform the exercise of
discretion in favour of condonation.
9. The submissions advanced by the learned Additional
Advocate General are, indeed, amongst the finest and most
persuasive articulations that we have come across in defence of
delayed appeals preferred by the State. They reflect considerable
forensic ability and an earnest endeavour to persuade this Court
to adopt a liberal construction of the expression ‘sufficient
cause’. But, alas! Persuasiveness of advocacy cannot
supply what is conspicuously absent in the pleadings;
eloquence at the Bar cannot become a substitute for
diligence on the part of the litigant. The ingenuity of the
argument, however commendable, cannot efface the indifference
manifest in the conduct of the State, nor can the brilliance of the
submission transform routine administrative movement into
sufficient cause in the eye of law. The learned Additional
Advocate General has undoubtedly presented the State's case in
its most favourable light. Yet, the finest advocacy cannot
breathe life into an explanation that suffers from an
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inherent absence of sufficient cause. We remain
unconvinced. For, while the law may lean towards substantial
justice, it cannot bend so far as to make the discipline of
limitation subservient to bureaucratic convenience. A liberal
approach is not a licence for lethargy, and a justice-oriented
interpretation cannot be permitted to become a charter for
condoning prolonged and unexplained governmental inaction.
CASES WHERE THE APEX COURT HAS DECLINED TO
CONDONE DELAY:
10.1. Before the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF
ODISHA v. MANAGING COMMITTEE OF NAMATARA GIRLA
7
HIGH SCHOOL , the appeal is by the State of Odisha. It is
preferred after a delay of 291 days totally. The Apex Court holds
as follows:
“…. …. ….
7. It is noted that there is a delay of 123 days in
filing the special leave petition and a further delay of 96
days in re-filing the same after curing defects. In the
application for condonation of delay, the State of Odisha
seeks to explain the delay by pleading as follows:
“3. It is submitted that the Petitioner on
receipt of order of the Hon'ble High Court vide
order dated 26.04.2023 and order dated
7
2026 SCC OnLine SC 191
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21.02.2025 in F.A.O. No. 582 of 2015 and in I.A.
No. 126 of 2025 in F.A.O. No. 582 of 2015 the
petitioner considered the matter and sent it to
the law department opined that it is a fit case for
filing the present SLP against the impugned
judgments dated 26.04.2023 and order dated
21.02.2025.
4. That the delay in filing the appeal was
on account of procedural delay in obtaining
approval from the higher authority. The delay
caused is not deliberate and intentional.”
8. Ms. Sanjana Saddy, learned counsel appearing
for the State of Odisha, submits that the delay in
presenting the special leave petition is not deliberate and
having regard to the long line of decisions of this Court
advocating a liberal approach when an authority under
Article 12 of the Constitution is the petitioner seeking
condonation of delay, she urges that the delay be
condoned and this Court may direct the High Court to
th
examine the challenge to the order dated 30 December,
2013 of the Tribunal on merits, upon revival of the
appeal.
9. We had, upon hearing Ms. Sanjana, started
dictating an order of dismissal of the special leave
petition. It was then that she prayed for withdrawal of the
special leave petition. We had so recorded. However,
when we were about to rise for the day, Ms. Sanjana
prayed for recall of the order of dismissal of the special
leave petition as withdrawn; she also submitted, on
instructions, that the State of Odisha would invite a
detailed order with reasons in support of dismissal of the
special leave petition.
10. We recalled the order dismissing the special
leave petition as withdrawn and, instead, dismissed the
same as time-barred considering paragraphs 3 and 4 of
the application for condonation of delay, excerpted above,
with the observation that reasons would follow.
11.
We now proceed to assign our reasons.
12. No cause, much less sufficient cause, has
been shown for exercise of discretion in favour of
the State of Odisha. The nature of explanation in
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the application for condonation of delay is such that
with much ado, the proceedings could be closed.
13. However, since there is a long line of decisions
of this Court propounding the law that the expression
‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature in Section 5
of the Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately elastic to enable
the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which
subserves the ends of justice and in view of the
submission of Ms. Sanjana, we have considered it
appropriate to consider the matter in some depth.
14. Almost four decades back, in Collector, Land
Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji , a coordinate Bench
noting that the justifiably liberal approach which this
Court has been adopting in matters instituted before it is
not being followed by the courts lower in the hierarchy,
mandated that a justice-oriented approach is indeed
called for when a ‘State’ seeks condonation of delay as
distinguished from ‘a private party’.
15. Close on the heels of Katiji (supra), Hon'ble
Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah speaking for the coordinate
Bench in G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer had
referred to Katiji (supra) in paragraph 14 and quoted the
following passage therefrom:
“When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other,
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to have
vested right in injustice being done because of a
non-deliberate delay …
It must be grasped that judiciary is
respected not on account of its power to legalise
injustice on technical grounds but because it is
capable of removing injustice and is expected to
do so.”
Immediately thereafter, in paragraphs 15 to 17, it
was held as under:
15. In litigations to which Government is a
party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps,
cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by
Government are lost for such defaults, no person
is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate
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analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions
of Government are collective and institutional
decisions and do not share the characteristics of
decisions of private individuals.
16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the
same for a private citizen as for governmental
authorities. Government, like any other litigant
must take responsibility for the acts or omissions
of its officers. But a somewhat different
complexion is imparted to the matter where
Government makes out a case where public
interest was shown to have suffered owing to
acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its
officers or agents and where the officers were
clearly at cross-purposes with it.
17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a
particular case, constitutes “sufficient cause” for
purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be
somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the
considerations that go into the judicial verdict,
these factors which are peculiar to and
characteristic of the functioning of the
government. Governmental decisions are
proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the
process of their making. A certain amount of
latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is
rightly said that those who bear responsibility of
Government must have “a little play at the
joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on
governmental functioning — of course, within
reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial
approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It
would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put
government and private parties on the same
footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in
the very nature of governmental functioning is
procedural delay incidental to the decision-
making process. In the opinion of the High Court,
the conduct of the law officers of the Government
placed the Government in a predicament and
that it was one of those cases where the mala
fides of the officers should not be imputed to
Government. It relied upon and trusted its law
officers. …
16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra)
were consistently followed by this Court until
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adoption of a different and seemingly strict
approach while dealing with applications for
condonation of delay during the last decade and a
half became discernible starting with the decision
in Postmaster General v. Living Media India
Limited , where a delay of 427 days in filing the
relevant special leave petition was not condoned.
University of Delhi v. Union of India is another
decision (of a three-Judge Bench of this Court)
where delay of 916 days was not condoned. While
upholding the decision of the relevant high court
under challenge refusing to condone the delay of
5659 days in presentation of an appeal under
Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the
heirs of a deceased landowner, a coordinate Bench
in Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA) very
recently reiterated that the law of limitation is
founded on public policy, the object is that a legal
remedy is put to an end so that no litigation
remains pending for an indefinite period. It was
also held, departing from the earlier view, that the
merits of the case cannot be considered at the
stage of considering the application for condonation
of delay.
17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in
Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India authoring the
judgment for a coordinate Bench adopted the view
taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a
host of other decisions following the same while
not interfering with an order of condonation of
delay passed by the relevant high court. However,
it was observed that a distinction ought to be
drawn between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’
that is proffered as cause for condonation of delay.
It was also emphasized that a different approach
has to be adopted while this Court is considering an
application for condonation of delay in presentation
of an appeal/application and when it sits in appeal
over a discretionary order of the high court
granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the
case of the former, whether to condone or not
would be the only question whereas in the latter,
whether there has been proper exercise of
discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for
condonation has to be examined.
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18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in
any of the decisions post Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda
(supra) adopting a liberal approach is the exasperation
and consequent lament expressed by none other than
Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of authoring
a brief order in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v.
Amateur Riders Club, Bombay and admonishing officers
of the “revenue” in not acting with promptitude. This
order was made within six years of the decision in
Ramegowda (supra). We can do no better than quoting
the same in its entirety hereunder:
1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda,
learned senior counsel for the Revenue.
2. This special leave petition filed on
November 16, 1993 is delayed by 264
days. For quite some time in the past, this
Court has been making observations as to
the grave prejudice caused to public
interest by appeals brought on behalf of
the Government being lost on the point of
limitation. Such observations have been
made for over a few years in the past. But
there seems to be no conspicuous
improvement as is apparent in the present
petition which is filed in November 1993.
The explanation for the delay, had better
be set out in petitioner's own words:
“( g ) The Advocate-on-Record
got the special leave petition drafted
from the drafting Advocate and sent
the same for approval to the Board on
June 24, 1993 along with the case file.
( h ) The Board returned the case file to
the Advocate-on-Record on July 9,
1993 who re-sent the same to the
Board on September 20, 1993
requesting that draft SLP was not
approved by the Board. The Board
after approving the draft SLP sent this
file to CAS on October 1, 1993.”
3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing
a judicially acceptable ground for
condonation of delay. After the earlier
observations of this Court made in several
cases in the past, we hoped that the
matters might improve. There seems to
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be no visible support for this optimism.
There is a point beyond which even the
courts cannot help a litigant even if the
litigant is Government which is itself
under the shackles of bureaucratic
indifference. Having regard to the law of
limitation which binds everybody, we
cannot find any way of granting relief. It
is true that Government should not be
treated as any other private litigant as,
indeed, in the case of the former the
decisions to present and prosecute
appeals are not individual but are
institutional decisions necessarily bogged
down by the proverbial red-tape. But
there are limits to this also. Even with all
this latitude, the explanation offered for
the delay in this case merely serves to
aggravate the attitude of indifference of
the Revenue in protecting its common
interests. The affidavit is again one of the
stereotyped affidavits making it
susceptible to the criticism that the
Revenue does not seem to attach any
importance to the need for promptitude
even where it affects its own interest.
4. The application for condonation of delay
is, accordingly, dismissed. The special
leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as
barred by time.
(emphasis ours)
19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur
Riders (supra), one after the other, leaves none in doubt
that it did not take much time for this Court to lose hope.
It is absolutely clear that the law was laid down in
Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with much
optimism that matters would improve. Their Lordships,
however, found no visible support for such optimism and
the Court's patience having been tested to the extreme
limit, held that there is a point beyond which even the
courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant labouring
under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference is the
Government.
20. We have found the State of Odisha to be
utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before
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the High Court but also before this Court.
Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as
time-barred by the High Court, this Court has been
approached by the State of Odisha four months
after expiry of the period of limitation.
21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed
as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of
the Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite
all the latitude that is shown to a “State”, we are of
the clear opinion that the cause sought to be shown
here by the State of Odisha is not an explanation
but a lame excuse. No case for exercise of
discretion has been set up.
22.
The applications for condonation of delay in
filing the special leave petition and condonation of delay
in re-filing the same, thus, stand rejected, with the result
that the special leave petition stands dismissed as time-
barred.”
The Apex Court holds that the State of Odisha was utterly
lethargic, tardy and indolent. Condonation of delay cannot be
claimed as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of the
Court whether or not to condone the delay. Despite all the
latitude that is shown to a State, the Apex Court was of the
opinion that the cause sought to be shown by the State is not an
explanation but a lame excuse.
9.2. The Apex Court later in the case of ISRAR AHMAD
8
KHAN v. AMARNATH PRASAD was considering a condonation
8
2026 SCC OnLine SC 322
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petition. Alleging recalcitrant attitude on the part of the State,
the Apex Court observes as follows:
“…. …. ….
BELATED/DELAYED APPEALS TO DELAY/DEFEAT
IMPLEMENTATION:
27. Delayed filing of appeals should be the
exception, but in recent times, the exception has
practically evolved to become the rule. Orders
passed by the Courts are not complied with for a
long time, and when Contempt Petitions are filed,
belated appeals, with tremendous delay, are
preferred.
28. The (alleged) continuing contumacious
conduct of the defaulting party is sought to be
justified on the mere production of a
Diary/Filing/Stamp Reporting Number showing
that an appeal has been preferred, so as to obtain
multiple adjournments in contempt matters.
29. We, in no uncertain terms, deprecate
these practices. It is felt that by such modus
operandi , disobedient litigants act brazenly which
has the further effect of bringing down the
authority and majesty of the Courts and the rule of
law, interfering in the administration of justice. The
same may well, in certain situations, border on
criminal contempt.
30. The High Courts should deal with such
unscrupulous litigants, more so when they happen
to be ‘State’, within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution, or like bodies, with an iron hand.
Unless the High Courts, so also this Court deal with
these aspects firmly, we run the clear risk of
erosion of the unflinching faith that the ordinary
litigants of this country repose in the Judiciary at
all levels. It is the solemn duty of all of us manning
the Courts across the hierarchy to ensure that the
public faith never wavers .”
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The Apex Court holds that the High Courts should deal with
unscrupulous litigants, more so when they happen to be State
within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India or
like bodies with iron hand. Unless the High Courts, so also the
Apex Court deal with these aspects firmly, we run the clear risk
of erosion of the unflinching faith of the ordinary litigants in the
country repose in the judiciary at all levels. The duty of Courts
across all the hierarchy should be to ensure that public faith
never wavers.
9.3. The Apex Court in the case of SHIVAMMA v.
9
KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
245. As already discussed in the earlier parts
of this judgment, State or any of its
instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential
treatment in matters concerning condonation of
delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. G.
Ramegowda, Major (supra) itself acknowledges
that, ordinarily there is “ no general principle saving
the party from all mistakes of its counsel or
agents ”. Even if “ there is negligence, deliberate or
gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of
the party or its counsel there is no reason why the
opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred
appeal ”. The relevant observations read as under:—
“14. The contours of the area of discretion
of the courts in the matter of condonation of
delays in filing appeals are set out in a number of
9
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969
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pronouncements of this Court. See: Ramlal,
Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfield Ltd.;
Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari; Concord
of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi; Lala
Mata Din v. A. Narayanan; Collector, Land
Acquisition v. Katiji. There is, it is true, no
general principle saving the party from all
mistakes of its counsel. If there is
negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or
lack of bona fides on the part of the party or
its counsel there is no reason why the
opposite side should be exposed to a time-
barred appeal. ”
246. However, the reason why, this Court
nonetheless, held that acts of fraud or bad faith on
the part of its officers or agents should not be
imputed to the Government atleast for condonation
of delay was in view of the earlier position of law,
whereby the State and its instrumentalities were
not placed on the same pedestal as any ordinary
private litigant, in view of the impersonal character
of the Government as an entity.
247. But the position of law is no longer this.
As per Postmaster General (supra) and the
subsequent decisions of this Court, consideration
for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act does not and cannot vary depending
on the identity or status of the party, whether it be
the Government, a public body, or a private litigant,
so as to apply a different yardstick.
248. The subsequent decision of this Court in
Tejpal (supra), after duly taking note of the change
in position of law, specifically rejected the
contention that acts of mala fides on the part of
specific individuals should not be imputed to the
State or its instrumentalities. It held that to accept
such a proposition would amount to creating an
artificial distinction between the private parties and
the Government entities vis-à-vis the law of
limitation. The relevant observations read as under:—
“54. It seems to us that acceding to the
appellants' request on the aforesaid account
If
would also have undesirable consequences.
delay were to be condoned merely on the
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basis of a broad general assertion of
bureaucratic indifference, without requiring
demonstration of bona fides or an act of
mala fides on the part of specific
individuals, it would create an artificial
distinction between the private parties and
the Government entities vis-à-vis the law of
limitation. This would not be in conformity
with the spirit of equality before law as
guaranteed under our Constitution. Allowing
such latitude would further distort
incentives for the Government and
encourage more laxity by the bureaucracy
in its general functioning, thereby
undermining quality governance . ”
(Emphasis supplied)
249. Once the State chooses to litigate, it
must shoulder the same responsibilities and abide
by the same limitations that bind every litigant. To
permit the State to evade the consequences of
delay on the ostensible plea that the fault lay with
individual officers would amount to diluting the
rigour of limitation statutes and undermining their
very object. Such an approach would not only
privilege the State unjustly over private parties but
would also perpetuate a culture of indifference and
irresponsibility within the administration.
250. As far back as 1996, this Court in
Chandra Mani (supra) held that where the case
requires an appeal or application to be filed, despite
the delay, then prompt action should be pursued by
the officer responsible to file the appeal and he
should be made personally responsible for lapses, if
any . Thus, even if for a moment, we accept that, mala-
fide actions of few officers should not be imputed to the
Government, the position still remains that, once the
State or its instrumentality finds that, few of its officers
were negligent, it should promptly take action to file the
appeal or application, as the case may be, through its
other officers and simultaneously take action against the
delinquent officers.
251. As already observed, in the present case at
hand, despite the callousness exhibited by the Executive
Engineer, the respondent no. 1 herein took no steps
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towards mitigating the delays and ensuring that the
appeal was preferring as soon as possible. On the
contrary, the Executive Engineer was appointed to make
representations for the respondent no. 1 in the
proceedings. Even the disciplinary proceedings against
the concerned Executive Engineer came to be initiated
much later, to be precise exactly a month before the date
on which the application for condonation of delay was
filed. In such circumstances, even if we do not impute the
deliberate inaction or mala fides on the part of the
Executive Engineer to the respondent no. 1 herein, there
is nothing to show that the respondent no. 1 acted in a
reasonably diligent manner.
252. Even if the case put up by the
respondent no. 1 is to be accepted at its face value,
the respondent no. 1 could be said to have failed to
assign any genuine sufficient cause to justify the
delay from the date of receiving intimation about
the order of the First Appellate Court, passed on
15.04.2006 till the expiry of the limitation period,
which was sometime in July 2006, because it was
only in the correspondence dated 17.10.2006 that
the respondent no. 1, while acknowledging the
advice tendered by its advocate, reflected that it
would prefer a second appeal. We have little to no
hesitation in saying that on 17.10.2006, it was
already too late in the day to take any decision or
make any forms of mind. Nonetheless, the second
appeal was only filed on 10.02.2017, with a delay of
almost 11 years.
253. As already noted in the foregoing parts
of this judgment the respondent no. 1 could be said
to have failed to explain the delay on its part from
the date of the receipt of the order of the First
Appellate Court till the expiry of the limitation
period.
254. We say so because if such observations
by the High Court, to condone delay in the interest
of a State-machinery, were allowed to be sustained
by us, it would allow the State-machineries a
leeway to systematically orchestrate delays in the
guise of laxity exhibited by their authorities. Given
the majesty and colossality a State-machinery
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would hold against a private litigant, it would be
grossly unfair to a litigant, who would be
perpetually entangled in the clutches of litigation, if
enormous delays, like that of almost 11 years in the
present case, are permitted to be condoned. This
Court has never turned a blind eye to the gradients
of substantive justice.
255. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a
private party or a State when it comes to condoning
the gross delay of more than 11-years. If the
litigant chooses to approach the court long after the
lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant
provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around
and say that no prejudice would be caused to either
side by the delay being condoned
. This litigation
between the parties started in 1989. We are in 2025.
Almost 36 years have elapsed. However, till date the
respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his
decree. The High Court has made a mockery of justice by
condoning this delay of 3966 days and once again ask the
appellant to undergo the rigmarole of the legal
proceedings.
256. As far as the contention of the respondent no.
1 is concerned apropos to the merits of molding of relief
by awarding of compensation by the First Appellate Court,
the same is squarely answered by the principles
encapsulated in Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), wherein
it is categorically maintained that the court considering a
condonation of delay ought not go into the merits of the
case at hand.
257. We also wish to highlight that the High Court
applied the legal position incorrectly in the impugned
order and performed an exercise of “merit-hunting”. It
gave a prima facie relevance to the argument of the
respondent no. 1 on the grounds that the suit of the
appellant was not at all maintainable in the first place. In
paragraph 13 of the impugned order, the High Court
recorded that a semblance of right in favour of
respondent no. 1 swayed its mind to allow the
condonation of delay, and it accepted the same as a
“ sufficient cause ”. We hold such observations to be
erroneous and ex facie bad in law. Similar
contentions were rejected by this Court in State of
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Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal , (2020) 10 SCC 654,
wherein the appellant-State was seeking a
condonation of delay of 663 days. This Court sternly
noted that it will not let the courts to be forums
wherein the Government can walk-in, when it
desires, entirely ignoring the period of limitation,
and buttress reliance on cases of this Court wherein
it allowed condonation, employing its discretionary
powers, on merits or modalities of peculiarities of
those cases. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below:
“3. No doubt, some leeway is given for
the government inefficiencies but the sad part is
that the authorities keep on relying on judicial
pronouncements for a period of time when
technology had not advanced and a greater
leeway was given to the Government […]
xxx xxx xxx
5. A preposterous proposition is sought to
be propounded that if there is some merit in the
case, the period of delay is to be given a go-by.
If a case is good on merits, it will succeed in any
case. It is really a bar of limitation which can
even shut out good cases. This does not, of
course, take away the jurisdiction of the Court in
an appropriate case to condone the delay.
6. We are also of the view that the
aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we
have categorised earlier as “certificate cases”.
The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of
dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a
quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing
could be done because the highest Court has
dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this
formality and save the skin of officers who may
be at default that such a process is followed. We
have on earlier occasions also strongly
deprecated such a practice and process. There
seems to be no improvement. The purpose of
coming to this Court is not to obtain such
certificates and if the Government suffers losses,
it is time when the officer concerned responsible
for the same bears the consequences. The irony
is that in none of the cases any action is taken
against the officers, who sit on the files and do
nothing. It is presumed that this Court will
condone the delay and even in making
submissions, straightaway the counsel appear to
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address on merits without referring even to the
aspect of limitation as happened in this case till
we pointed out to the counsel that he must first
address us on the question of limitation.
7. We are thus, constrained to send a
signal and we propose to do in all matters today,
where there are such inordinate delays that the
Government or State authorities coming before
us must pay for wastage of judicial time which
has its own value. Such costs can be recovered
from the officers responsible.”
(Emphasis supplied)
258. The length of the delay is a relevant
matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether the delay
should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the
approach of the respondents, it appears that they
want to fix their own period of limitation for
instituting the proceedings for which law has
prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held
that a party has lost his right to have the matter
considered on merits because of his own inaction
for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-
deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the
case, it cannot be heard to plead that the
substantial justice deserves to be preferred as
against the technical considerations. While
considering the plea for condonation of delay, the
court must not start with the merits of the main
matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the
bona fides of the explanation offered by the party
seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient
cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of
the other side is equally balanced that the court
may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the
purpose of condoning the delay.
259. We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical consideration.
The rules of limitation are based on the principles
of sound public policy and principles of equity. We
should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging
over the head of the respondent for indefinite
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period of time to be determined at the whims and
fancies of the appellants.
260. From the above exposition of law, it is
abundantly clear that the High Court has
erroneously condoned a massive delay of 3966 days
on account of certain lapses at the administrative
levels and of there being no follow-ups in the
proceedings, along with finding certain merits in
the case of the respondent no. 1 against the
maintainability of the suit of the appellant and that
of the relief molded by the First Appellate Court. We
have no hesitation in stating that such grounds are
nowhere near to being “ sufficient cause ” as per
Section 5 of the 1963 Act. The High Court lost sight
of the fact that the precedents and authorities it
relied upon by it had delays of two-digits, or even
that of single-digit, more particularly the delay in
those cases was supported by sufficient cause. The
present case, however, stands on a very different
footing, owing to such an enormous delay. Hence,
we are not inclined to accept the condonation of the
delay by the High Court.
V. CONCLUSION
261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the
impugned order of the High Court deserves to be
set aside. Before we proceed to close this
judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it
abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and
laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for
condonation of delay, and we want to convey an
emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays
shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial
grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is
made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to
establish that it acted with bona fides and remained
vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to
justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more
particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to
obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency,
who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from
pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical
attitude.
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262. The High Courts ought not give a
legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State
authorities or its instrumentalities, and should
remain extra cautious, if the party seeking
condonation of delay is a State-authority. They
should not become surrogates for State laxity and
lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be
cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private
litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of
perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their
decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later
stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting
trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to
reopen matters with inordinate delay, until
sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts
only add insult to the injury,
more particularly in
appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its
jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.
263. Limitation periods are prescribed to
maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for
finality. More than the importance of judicial time,
what worries us is the plight of a litigant with
limited means, who is to contest against an
enormous State, and its elaborate and never-
exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve
to be disposed of at the very threshold, because,
say if a party litigating against the State, for
whatever reason, is unable to contest the
condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present
case, it reopens the lis for another round of
litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again.
As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we
assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post
to seek justice.
264. No litigant should be permitted to be so
lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by
the courts to misuse the process of law.
265. In the result, this appeal stands allowed. The
impugned judgment and order of the High Court is hereby
set aside. Apart from the costs of Rs. 25,000/- imposed
by the High Court, to be paid by the respondent no. 1 to
the appellant, we impose an additional cost of Rs.
25,000/- on the respondent no. 1, to be paid to the
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Karnataka State Legal Services Authority within a period
of four weeks from today.”
9.4. A conspectus of the afore-quoted judgments of the
Apex Court would unmistakably reveal the evolution of the law
governing condonation of delay, particularly where the State or
its instrumentalities seek the indulgence of the Court. The
journey of the law, commencing with the liberal and justice-
oriented approach in the cases of COLLECTOR, LAND
ACQUISITION, ANANTNAG v. MST. KATIJI reported in
(1987) 2 SCC 107 and G. RAMEGOWDA v. SPECIAL LAND
ACQUISITION OFFICER reported in (1988) 2 SCC 142 , has
traversed through the cases of POSTMASTER GENERAL v.
LIVING MEDIA INDIA LIMITED reported in (2012) 3 SCC
563, UNIVERSITY OF DELHI v. UNION OF INDIA reported in
(2020) 13 SCC 745, STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v.
BHERULAL reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654 and PATHAPATI
SUBBA REDDY v. SPECIAL DEPUTY COLLECTOR (LA)
reported in (2024) 12 SCC 336 , culminating in the emphatic
pronouncements in the cases of MANAGING COMMITTEE OF
NAMATARA GIRLA HIGH SCHOOL and SHIVAMMA supra .
The thread that runs through these pronouncements is
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unmistakable. The law may accommodate genuine
administrative difficulties, but it cannot countenance
administrative indifference masquerading as sufficient
cause.
9.5. The earlier latitude extended to the State was founded
upon the recognition that governmental decisions are
institutional, often passing through several layers of
administrative scrutiny. Such latitude, however, was never
intended to be boundless. What was conceived as a measure to
advance substantial justice cannot be converted into an
instrument for perpetuating bureaucratic lethargy. The
indulgence of the Court is not an inexhaustible reservoir from
which the State may draw whenever it chooses to awaken from
its administrative slumber.
9.6 The Apex Court in the case of MANAGING
COMMITTEE OF NAMATARA GIRLA HIGH SCHOOL supra has
reiterated that condonation of delay is not a matter of right and
that a distinction must be maintained between a genuine
explanation and a convenient excuse.
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9.7. In the case of SHIVAMMA supra , the Apex Court has
spoken with even greater emphasis, declaring that the identity of
a litigant, whether State or citizen, cannot determine the
standard by which sufficient cause is assessed. The constitutional
promise of equality before law would be rendered illusory if the
State were permitted to claim an immunity from limitation which
is denied to the ordinary citizen. The Apex Court has cautioned
against allowing litigants to remain perpetually entangled in
litigation merely because the State chooses to invoke appellate
remedies at its leisure.
9.8. The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of ISRAR
AHMAD KHAN supra adds yet another dimension of
considerable significance. The Apex Court has deprecated the
practice of allowing judicial orders to remain unimplemented,
only to prefer belated appeals when contempt proceedings are
instituted. Such conduct does not merely prejudice the
successful litigant; it strikes at the authority of judicial
pronouncements and threatens the public confidence upon which
the administration of justice rests. A judicial order cannot be
treated as an administrative suggestion, to be obeyed at
convenience and challenged at leisure.
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9.9. The principles emerging from these judgments admit
of little ambiguity. The length of delay is undoubtedly relevant,
but its explanation is paramount. A short delay unsupported by
sufficient cause may deserve rejection, while a longer delay
satisfactorily explained may warrant condonation. What the law
demands is not a ritualistic recital of dates, movements of files
and exchange of correspondence, but a credible demonstration
of diligence, bona fides and circumstances that genuinely
prevented timely recourse to law. The expression ‘sufficient
cause’ is elastic enough to advance justice, but not so
elastic as to accommodate indolence without end. The
judgments relied upon by the learned Additional Advocate
General and the learned counsel appearing for the University
must necessarily be understood in the light of this settled and
subsequently reinforced exposition of law.
10. The matter does not rest with judicial pronouncements
alone. The State of Karnataka is not bereft of a statutory
framework governing the conduct of its litigation. It has enacted
the Karnataka Conduct of Government Litigation Act,
2023 , (‘the Act’ for short), which came into force on
27-07-2023, with the avowed object of ensuring efficiency,
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responsibility and expedition in the conduct of governmental
litigation before Courts and statutory Tribunals. The relevant
provisions of the Act read as follows:
“…. …. ….
3. Definitions.- (1) In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires.-
…. …. ….
(g) "Law Officer" has the same meaning as in the
Karnataka Law Officers (Appointment and
Conditions of Service) Rules, 1977 ;
…. …. ….
(i) "Litigation Conducting Officer" means, in
relation to each case, the Officer in the
department concerned who is placed in
charge of the conduct of litigation in that
case;
…. …. ….
CHAPTER V
APPEAL REVIEW AND REVISION
29. Appeal by the Government.- (1) Where
orders are issued authorizing filing of appeal,
review or revision, the Litigation Conducting Officer
shall approach the concerned Law Officer and give
him necessary instruction to prepare the
memorandum of appeal, review or revision and to
present the same before the concerned Court well
within the period of limitation.
(2) The Law Officer shall examine and take all
relevant and available pleas in the memorandum and to
present it before the Court in due time. Copy of the
memorandum filed into the Court, shall be sent to the
Law Secretary, who shall examine and satisfy himself that
all relevant available pleas have been taken. In case
there is any omission or infirmity, the Law Officer shall be
directed to file additional grounds of appeal to court. The
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Law Officer shall also inform the number and particulars
of the appeal, review or revision filed to the Law
Department.
(3) Wherever an appeal, review or revision is
filed it shall be the duty of the Litigation Conducting
Officer and the Law Officer to move the Appellate
Court immediately with appropriate Interlocutory
Applications for an order of stay of the order of
Lower Court's or other appropriate relief. Such
application shall, be filed without waiting for
specific orders of the Law Department.
(4) In cases where there is delay in preferring
the appeal Memorandum of Appeal shall be
presented to the Court along with Application
seeking to condone the delay supported by proper
affidavit explaining the reasons for the delay, sworn
to by a competent Officer.
(5) Where there is delay in preferring the
appeal, review or revision, the officer responsible
for such delay, the Law Secretary shall
communicate about the lapse to the Departmental
Secretary for taking suitable action.
…. …. ….
CHAPTER VI
WRIT PETITIONS FILED AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT
…. …. ….
38. Writ Appeals.- The provision of chapter V
shall apply mutatis-mutandis to appeals against
orders in writ proceedings.”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
In terms of Section 3(1)(i) of the Act, a Litigation Conducting
Officer would be the Officer in the department concerned who is
placed in charge of the conduct of litigation in that case. Section
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29 of the Act delineates the procedure governing appeals by the
Government. Sub-section (4) of Section 29 mandates that
where there is delay in preferring the appeal, the Memorandum
of Appeal shall be presented to the Court along with application
seeking to condone the delay supported by proper affidavit
explaining the reasons for the delay, sworn to by a competent
Officer. Sub-section (5) of Section 29 mandates that where
there is delay in preferring the appeal, review or revision, the
officer responsible for such delay, the Law Secretary shall
communicate about the lapse to the Departmental Secretary for
taking suitable action. Section 38 of the Act makes the
provisions of Chapter V of the Act applicable, mutatis mutandis ,
to appeals arising from writ proceedings. The statutory
framework thus prescribes a disciplined course for governmental
decision-making for the successive stages preceding the
institution of an appeal.
11. The orders impugned in all the appeals before us were
rendered after the coming into force of the aforesaid enactment.
Yet, not one of the appeals demonstrates adherence to the
statutory discipline contemplated therein. The time limits
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prescribed for movement of files, securing opinions and taking
decisions appear to have been thrown to the winds. The State,
which enacted the law to bring order and accountability into
governmental litigation, has itself failed to demonstrate fidelity
to its mandate. The irony is unmistakable: the State
enacted a law to arrest red-tapism, but red-tapism
appears to have arrested the operation of the law.
12. The State has also issued administrative instructions
prescribing the manner in which legal opinions are to be
obtained and appeals are to be preferred. Therefore, the
difficulty is not the absence of a litigation policy, nor the want of
a statutory mechanism. The difficulty lies in the failure to
translate the statutory command into administrative action. A
law enacted by the State cannot remain a mere ornament
in the statute book, commanding obedience from
everyone except its own author. The State must be the first
to honour the discipline of the law that it has chosen to enact.
13. In the cases at hand, the explanations offered for
delays ranging from 466 days to 1099 days are variations of
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the same familiar refrain: files moved from table to table,
correspondence passed from officer to officer, legal opinions
were sought and documents were collected. These explanations
chronicle administrative activity; they do not establish sufficient
cause. What compounds the concern is that the appeals appear
to have been preferred only after the writ petitioners initiated
contempt proceedings complaining of non-compliance with the
orders of the learned Single Judges. The machinery that
remained unmoved by the judicial directions appears to have
sprung into action when confronted with the prospect of
contempt.
14. Such a practice cannot receive the imprimatur of this
Court. The successful litigant cannot be condemned to an
endless wait for the fruits of a judicial order, while the State
invokes its own administrative inefficiency as justification for
reopening the litigation. The State is expected to be a model
litigant, not a privileged procrastinator. Its obligation is to
uphold the rule of law, not to seek exceptions from its operation.
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15. We are conscious that the power to condone delay is
discretionary and must be exercised to advance substantial
justice. But substantial justice is not the exclusive preserve of
the appellant seeking condonation. It equally embraces the
rights of the successful litigant, the sanctity of judicial orders and
the finality that the law of limitation is intended to secure. A
liberal approach cannot become a one-sided indulgence that
rewards the indolent and penalizes the diligent.
16. The applications before us disclose no exceptional
circumstance, no compelling impediment and no credible
explanation that could constitute sufficient cause for the
extraordinary delays. What is presented as an explanation
is, in substance, an assortment of administrative excuses;
what is sought as judicial indulgence would, if granted,
amount to judicial endorsement of bureaucratic apathy.
17. The law cannot permit such a consequence. The State
and the University must stand before the law of limitation on the
same footing as every other litigant. To hold otherwise would be
to confer a premium upon inaction and reduce the statutory
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prescription of limitation to a matter of administrative choice.
The applications seeking condonation of delay, therefore, fail to
inspire judicial confidence and deserve rejection.
18. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no sufficient cause
demonstrated for condonation of the inordinate delays in
preferring the respective appeals. The explanations offered are
wholly inadequate to warrant exercise of discretion in favour of
the appellants. Consequently, the applications seeking
condonation of delay stand rejected and, as a necessary
corollary, all the appeals stand dismissed as barred by
limitation.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(HEMA KULKARNI)
JUDGE
BKP
CT: ASC