Satish Chandra Lal vs The State Of Bihar

Court
Patna High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.18536 of 2013
======================================================
1.1. Kiran Kumari Daughter of Late Satish Chandra Lal, Resident of Village -
Satani Saray, Purani Basti, P.O. - Bhrigu Ashram, P.S. Kotabali, District/
Janpad - Baliya (U.P).
1.2. Kavita Kumari, Daughter of Late Satish Chandra Lal, Resident of Village -
Satani Saray, Purani Basti, P.O. - Bhrigu Ashram, P.S. Kotabali, District/
Janpad - Baliya (U.P).
1.3. Mamta Srivastava, Daughter of Late Satish Chandra Lal, Resident of Village
- Satani Saray, Purani Basti, P.O. - Bhrigu Ashram, P.S. Kotabali, District/
Janpad - Baliya (U.P).
1.4. Anita Srivastava, Daughter of Late Satish Chandra Lal, Resident of Village -
Satani Saray, Purani Basti, P.O. - Bhrigu Ashram, P.S. Kotabali, District/
Janpad - Baliya (U.P).
1.5. Saroj Srivastava Daughter of Late Satish Chandra Lal, Resident of Village -
Satani Saray, Purani Basti, P.O. - Bhrigu Ashram, P.S. Kotabali, District/
Janpad - Baliya (U.P).
1.6. Ranjani, Daughter of Late Satish Chandra Lal, Resident of Village - Satani
Saray, Purani Basti, P.O. - Bhrigu Ashram, P.S. Kotabali, District/ Janpad -
Baliya (U.P).
1.7. Anupma Srivastava, Daughter of Late Satish Chandra Lal, Resident of
Village - Satani Saray, Purani Basti, P.O. - Bhrigu Ashram, P.S. Kotabali,
District/ Janpad - Baliya (U.P).
1.8. Aarti Srivastava Daughter of Late Satish Chandra Lal, Resident of Village -
Satani Saray, Purani Basti, P.O. - Bhrigu Ashram, P.S. Kotabali, District/
Janpad - Baliya (U.P).
1.9. Archana Srivastava Daughter of Late Satish Chandra Lal, Resident of
Village - Satani Saray, Purani Basti, P.O. - Bhrigu Ashram, P.S. Kotabali,
District/ Janpad - Baliya (U.P).
1.1
0.
Vijay Shankar Srivastava son of Late Satish Chandra Lal, Resident of
Village - Satani Saray, Purani Basti, P.O. - Bhrigu Ashram, P.S. Kotabali,
District/ Janpad - Baliya (U.P).
1.1
1.
Ravi Shankar Srivastava, S/o - Late Satish Chandra Lal, S/o - Late Brijbihari
Lal (Ex- Assistant Engineer Design Division no. 1, Dehri-Rohtas Water
Resources Department Govt. of Bihar), Resident of Village - Satani Saray,
Purani Basti, P.O. - Bhrigu Ashram, P.S. Kotabali, District/ Janpad - Baliya
(U.P).
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State Of Bihar
2. The Commissioner Cum Secretary, Water Resources Department,
Government Of Bihar, Sichai Bhawan, Patna.
3. The Special Secretary, Water Resources, Govt. Of Bihar, Sichai Bhawan,
Patna

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4. The Joint Secretary Water Resources Department, Govt. Of Bihar, Patna
5. The Deputy Secretary, Water Resources Department, Govt. Of Bihar, Patna
6. The Engineer in Chief /Additional Commissioner Cum Special Secretary
Water Resources Department, Govt. of Bihar, Patna.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Shashi Shekhar Tiwary, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Amit Bhushan, AC to GP-17
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RITESH KUMAR
CAV JUDGMENT
Date: 27-10-2026
Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State.
2. The present writ petition has been filed for the
following reliefs:-
“1. That this application is being filed for
quashing the memo no. 3528 dated
09.10.1998 whereby and whereunder the
petitioner’s entitlement for several benefit
stood denied while not treating him Assistant
Engineer w.e.f. 21.12.1974 not only against
the settled proposition of law rather against
the issue specifically decided in his regard
vide L.P.A. No. 1720/95.
2. That the petitioner prays for the following
reliefs also:-
i. The respondents may kindly be directed to
treat the petitioners service as Assistant
Engineer w.e.f. 21.12.1974 for all purposes
followed by required formalities viz putting
this name at sl. no. 927(gha) in the
gradation list of July 1992 above one Ragho
Lal Junior to the petition.

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ii. That the respondents also may kindly be
directed to rectify the date of junior selection
grade (in Assistant Engineer cadre) w.e.f.
1.4.79 in place of 1.4.85 likewise other
Assistant Engineers who got benefited vide
govt. resolution no. 913 dated 3.3.88.
iii. The respondents further may kindly be
directed to give other admissible/monitory
benefits also under the canopy of legitimate
expectation so also in the opinion of this
Hon’ble court.”
3. An interlocutory application bearing I.A. No. 01 of
2021 was filed for substitution of the legal heirs of the original
writ petitioner, who died during pendency of the writ petition.
4. Vide order dated 19.01.2023 passed by a learned Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court, the Interlocutory Application bearing
I.A. No. 01 of 2021 was allowed and all the legal representatives
of the original writ petitioner was directed to be substituted in
place of him.
BRIEF FACTS
5. The brief facts, which are necessary for adjudication
of the present writ petition, are that the deceasedpetitioner was
appointed as a Junior Engineer on 02.02.1959 in the river valley
project under the Water Resources Department, Government of
Bihar and was later on accorded the permanent status by

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notification dated 21.12.1973 w.e.f. 01.11.1967. Subsequently, he
was granted the pay scale of Junior Engineer, Selection Grade
w.e.f. 01.01.1971 vide notification dated 13.12.1973. Vide letter
dated 23.11.1973, the Chief Engineer, Gandak Project sent a list of
Junior Engineers to the Bihar Public Service Commission for
getting concurrence of the Commission, for promotion of the
Junior Engineers to the post of Assistant Engineer. The name of
the deceasedpetitioner was mentioned at serial no.40 of the said
letter. Pursuant thereto, the Bihar Public Service Commission vide
its letter dated 07.02.1974 gave its concurrence to the list of the
Junior Engineers, for being promoted for the post of Assistant
Engineer. In the said list, the name of the deceasedpetitioner was at
serial no.33.
6. It is the case of the petitioners that during pendency of
the matter before the Bihar Public Service Commission, the
deceasedpetitioner was allowed to take charge of Bawni Sub-
Division as an Assistant Engineer vide letter no.50 dated
17.12.1974 and he took charge of the same on 21.12.1974. He was
granted promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer on ad-hoc
basis vide letter dated 20.08.1976. Finally, vide notification dated
05.01.1979, the deceased-petitioner was promoted as a regular
Assistant Engineer w.e.f. 20.08.1976. Final seniority list of

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Assistant Engineers of the Bihar Engineering Service Class-II was
published on 14.07.1992, wherein the deceasedpetitioner was
junior to one Ragho Lal, and since no action was taken by the
respondent authorities, he filed the writ petition before this
Hon’ble Court for placing him at serial no.931 (gha), above Ragho
Lal. The writ petition filed by the deceasedpetitioner was
numbered as C.W.J.C. No.5452 of 1994. The said writ petition
filed by him was dismissed by an Hon’ble Single Judge of this
Court vide order dated 24.11.1995. Being aggrieved with the order
dated 24.11.1995, the deceasedpetitioner was constrained to file a
Letters Patent Appeal bearing L.P.A. No.1720 of 1995. The Letters
Patent Appeal filed by the him was finally heard by an Hon’ble
Division Bench of this Court and vide order dated 05.03.1998, the
Hon’ble Division Bench, by recording that admittedly, the
appellant has been discharging the function of Assistant Engineer
from 21.12.1974 as such, his length of service as Assistant
Engineer has to be reckoned from 21.12.1974. Other argument of
the learned counsel for the State is that person senior to the
appellant would be affected cannot also be sustained in view of the
fact that as already stated above, the inter se seniority of the
appellant and his immediate senior in the gradation list is to be
maintained. The Hon’ble Division Bench proceeded to modify the

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order passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge and allowed the Letters
Patent Appeal to the extent that the appellant is directed to be
treated as working arrangement on the post of Assistant Engineer
from his initial date of appointment on the said post i.e.
21.12.1974. However, it is made clear, as has been fairly conceded
by the learned counsel for the appellant that said order in no way
will affect his inter se seniority in his own cadre. When the order
was not being complied with, the petitioner filed a contempt
petition, however vide Memo No.3528 dated 09.10.1998, issued
under the signature of the Deputy Secretary to the Government,
Water Resources Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, the
deceasedpetitioner was granted special pay to the tune of Rs.30/-
per month w.e.f. 21.12.1974, in terms of P.W.D. Code (Note-3),
from the date of additional charge of the sub-division. The
contempt petition, which was filed by the deceasedpetitioner
bearing M.J.C. No.2411 of 1999 was finally dismissed vide order
dated 25.01.2005, by an Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court
with a liberty to him that if he feels aggrieved by the said decision,
it will be open for him to challenge the same in accordance with
law. After dismissal of the contempt petition, the deceased
petitioner submitted a representation before the Secretary, Water
Resources Department, Government of Bihar, Patna on 09.06.2012

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for grant of the benefits, which have been directed to be given to
him, pursuant to the order dated 05.03.1998 passed by the Hon’ble
Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 1720 of 1995.
Ultimately, the deceased-petitioner filed the present writ petition in
2013.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
7. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that it
is not in dispute that the deceasedpetitioner discharged the duties
of the Assistant Engineer w.e.f. 21.12.1974. He submits that the
Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court, while allowing the writ
petition filed by the deceasedpetitioner had taken note of the fact
that thedeceasedpetitioner was discharging the functions of the
Assistant Engineer w.e.f. 21.12.1974 and as such, his length of
service as an Assistant Engineer has to be reckoned from the said
date. The argument of the State, that persons senior to the
deceased-petitioner would be affected was rejected by holding that
inter se seniority of the petitioner and his immediate senior in the
gradation list, has to be maintained. He submits that once the
Hon’ble Division Bench had directed that his initial date of
appointment on the post of Assistant Engineer is 21.12.1974, the
respondent authorities have got no other option, but to grant him
the benefits w.e.f. 21.12.1974 and he is entitled for payment of all

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his service related benefits, treating his initial appointment on the
post of Assistant Engineer to be 21.12.1974.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submits
that in a similar case, one Saiyad Fattah Azam Zilaniand one
another person were granted the said benefit, pursuant to the
orders passed by this Hon’ble Court in C.W.J.C. No.2617 of 1990.
The seniority list was also modified by incorporating their names
at the place, where they should have been placed. He submits that
despite directions given by this Hon’ble Court, the
deceasedpetitioner has been denied the benefits, for which he was
entitled during his service period. The respondent authorities, for
the reasons best known to them, did not accord the said benefits to
the deceasedpetitioner, despite his repeated representations,
submitted before the respondent authorities.
9. The learned counsel for the petitioners next submits
that the grounds taken by the respondent authorities in their letter
dated 09.10.1998 (the order impugned), was available to them
before the Hon’ble Division Bench, but they failed the place the
same before the Hon’ble Bench or was not going to support the
contention of the answering respondents, as such in view of the
settled proposition of law, a reason cannot be
supplemented/supplanted by fresh reasons, as has been decided in

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the case of ( Mohindhr Singh Gill and Another versus The Chief
Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others) reported in 1978
(1) SCC 405 . He submits that the law is also very well settled that
a thing which could not be done directly, also could not be done
indirectly and as such in the present matter, when the answering
respondent failed to justify their wrong, which was subject matter
of the earlier proceeding, they cannot develop a fresh reason and
defeat the legitimate cause of the deceasedpetitioner indirectly. He
next submits that since recurring loss has been caused to the
original writ petitioner, on account of passing of the order dated
09.10.1998, the question of delay could not arise, after pendency
of the writ petition for 13 years and further, the grounds taken by
the respondent authorities in rejecting the claim of the deceased
petitioner is entirely misconceived.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
10. Per contra, the learned counsel for the State, while
referring to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents
submits, that vide letter dated 20.08.1976, the deceasedpetitioner
was granted promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer on ad-hoc
basis and vide notification dated 05.07.1979 issued under the
signature of the Joint Secretary, Department of Irrigation/Water
Resources, the deceasedpetitioner and others were regularized on

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the post of Assistant Engineer w.e.f. 20.08.1976. The final
selection/gradation list of the Assistant Engineers was published
vide notification no. 2818 dated 14.07.1992. He submits that the
same issue was under consideration before this Hon’ble Court in
C.W.J.C. No.5462 of 1994 and this Hon’ble Court, after
considering the entire submissions, was pleased to reject the
submission of the deceasedpetitioner and proceeded to dismiss the
writ petition. He submits that the Hon’ble Division Bench, while
allowing the appeal preferred by the deceasedpetitioner vide order
dated 05.03.1998, recorded that the appeal is allowed to the extent
indicated above and the appellant is directed to be treated as
working on the post of Assistant Engineer from his initial date of
appointment on the said post i.e. 21.12.1974, however it is made
clear, as has been fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the
appellant, that the said order in no way will affect his inter se
seniority in his own cadre. In terms of the directions given by the
Hon’ble Division, the authorities of the department have granted
extra pay/additional pay of Rs.30/- per month, for the period
during which the deceasedpetitioner had discharged the functions
of Assistant Engineer on ad-hoc basis i.e. from 21.12.1974 till the
date of his regular promotion i.e. 20.08.1976. The contempt
petition filed by him was dismissed, with a liberty to him to assail

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the order dated 09.10.1998, however he did not avail the said
opportunity granted by the Hon’ble Division bench vide order
dated 25.01.2005 passed in M.J.C. No.2411 of 1999. He submits
that the deceasedpetitioner has preferred the present writ petition
after eight years of disposal of M.J.C. No.2411 of 1999 and after
15 years of the passing of the impugned order dated 09.10.1998,
therefore the writ petition is fit to be dismissed on the ground of
delay and laches.
11. The learned counsel for the State next submits that
the deceasedpetitioner is not entitled for counting his service from
21.12.1974 and rightly so, his services as an Assistant Engineer
has been counted w.e.f. 20.08.1976. He submits that in the event,
the date of the promotion of the deceasedpetitioner is shifted to
21.12.1974, such modification would inevitably disturb the settled
inter se seniority within the cadre of the Assistant Engineers. He
submits that the seniority, once determined in accordance with
statutory rules and established principles, cannot be unsettled on
account of retrospective claims, as the same would prejudice the
rights of other officers in the cadre and lead to administrative
imbalance. He submits that the Hon’ble Division Bench had
passed the order for shifting the date of the deceasedpetitioner
w.e.f. 21.12.1974, in view of the submissions made by the learned

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counsel for the petitioner therein that the said order of shifting in
no way will affect his inter se seniority in his own cadre. He
submits that by shifting the date of promotion of the
deceasedpetitioner w.e.f. 21.12.1974, several persons would be
affected and without impleading them as a party respondents, the
deceasedpetitioner has filed the present writ petition, which is fit
to be dismissed on account of non-joinder of parties as well as on
account of delay and laches, since admittedly he did not assail the
order dated 09.10.1998, in terms of the liberty granted to him vide
order dated 25.01.2005 and has filed the present writ petition after
eight years.
ANALYSIS/CONSIDERATION
12. Having considered the rival submission and after
going through the records it appears that the deceased petitioner
was appointed in the water resources department on 02.02.1959
and was later on accorded the permanent status on 21.12.1973
w.e.f. 01.11.1967. He was granted the pay scale of Junior
Engineer, selection grade w.e.f. 01.01.1971. Vide letter dated
23.11.1973 the list of Junior Engineers was sent to the Bihar
Public Service Commission, by the Chief engineer concerned for
getting concurrence of the Commission for promotion of the
Junior Engineers to the post of Assistant Engineers. The name of

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the deceased petitioner was in the said list. Concurrence was given
by the Commission by letter dated 07.02.1974, wherein the name
of the deceased petitioner was there. As an ad-hoc arrangement he
was allowed to take charge of Bawni Sub-division as an Assistant
Engineer vide letter dated 17.12.1974. He was granted promotion
to the post of Assistant Engineer on ad-hoc basis vide letter dated
20.08.1976 and finally vide notification dated 05.01.1979, he was
promoted as a regular Assistant Engineer w.e.f. 20.08.1976. The
final seniority list of Assistant Engineers of Bihar Engineering
Service Class-II was published on 14.07.1992, wherein the name
of the deceased petitioner was below the name of one Ragho Lal.
He filed a writ petition before this Hon’ble Court for placing
himself above Ragho Lal. The writ petition filed by the deceased
petitioner bearing CWJC No.5452 of 1994 was heard and
dismissed by an Hon’ble Single Judge of this court vide order
dated 24.11.1995. Being aggrieved with the order dated
24.11.1995, he preferred a letters patent appeal, which was
numbered as L.P.A. no.1720 of 1995. The appeal preferred by him
was finally heard by an Hon’ble Division Bench of this court and
vide order dated 05.03.1998, the order passed by the Hon’ble
Single Judge was modified by the Hon’ble Division Bench by
observing that admittedly, the appellant has been discharging the

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function of Assistant Engineer from 21.12.1974, as such, his
length of service as an Assistant Engineer has to be reckoned from
st
21 December 1974. Other argument of the learned counsel for the
State is that person Senior to the appellant would be affected,
cannot also be sustained in view of the fact that as already stated
above, the inter se seniority of the appellant and his immediate
senior in the gradation list is to be maintained. For the reasons
stated above, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above
and the appellant is directed to be treated as working arrangement
on the post of Assistant Engineer from his initial date of
appointment on the said post i.e. 21.12.1974. However, it is made
clear, as has been fairly conceded by the Learned Counsel for the
appellant, that said order in no way will affect his inter se seniority
in his own cadre. Vide memo no.3528 dated 09.10.1998, issued
under the signature of the Deputy Secretary to the Government,
Water Resources Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, the
deceased petitioner was granted special pay to the tune of Rs.30/-
per month w.e.f. 21.12.1974, in terms of the P.W.D. Code (Note-3)
from the date of taking additional charge of the Sub-division. The
deceased petitioner filed a contempt petition bearing MJC no.2411
of 1999 for non-compliance of the order dated 05.03.1998. The
contempt petition was dismissed vide order dated 25.01.2005, with

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a liberty to him that if he feels aggrieved with the decision dated
09.10.1998, it will be open for him to challenge the same in
accordance with law. From the documents on record, it transpires
that no action was thereafter taken by the deceased petitioner and
he did not take any step to assail the order dated 09.10.1998, in
terms of the liberty granted by the Hon’ble Division Bench. All of
a sudden, he filed a representation before the Secretary, Water
Resources Department, Government of Bihar, Patna on 09.06.2012
for grant of the benefits, which were directed to be given to him
wide order dated 05.03.1998 passed by the Hon’ble Division
Bench in L.P.A. no.1720 of 1995. When no action was taken by
the State authorities, he filed the present writ petition.
13. In the considered opinion of this court, once an order
was passed by the State authorities on 09.10.1998, pursuant to the
directions issued by the Hon’ble Division Bench, it was incumbent
upon the deceased petitioner to assail the same, if he was
aggrieved with it. He did not assail the same and filed a contempt
petition in 1999. The contempt petition was dismissed with a
liberty to him that if he feels aggrieved by the said decision, it will
be open for him to challenge the same in accordance with law.
Even after the liberty granted by the Hon’ble Division Bench by
its order dated 25.01.2005, he did not assail the order dated

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09.10.1998, passed by the Respondents for almost 7 years. In 2012
he submitted a representation before the Secretary of the
Department and thereafter filed the present writ petition. The
Hon’ble Division Bench had passed the order for reckoning the
services of the deceased petitioner w.e.f. 21.12.1974, on the
submission made by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant therein
(Petitioner herein), that the said order in no way will affect the
inter se seniority in his cadre. In the present case the State
respondents have filed a counter affidavit wherein they have
categorically stated that grant of benefit to the deceased petitioner
w.e.f. 21.12.1974 will affect the inter se seniority of other Assistant
Engineers and they have not been made party respondents in the
present writ petition. Therefore, in the opinion of this court the
action of the deceased petitioner in not assailing the order dated
09.10.1998 for a considerable long period of time i.e. for almost
15 years after its issuance and for almost 8 years of the liberty
granted by the Hon’ble Division Bench, without any explanation
for the delay, is fit for not granting any relief to him. Further as per
the stand of the State, the Inter se seniority in the cadre is getting
affected, which is an additional ground for not granting the relief
to the deceased petitioner, in absence of any of the affected person
being impleaded as party Respondents in the present writ petition.

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14. The law with regard to the principle of delay, laches,
waiver and acquiescence has already been settled by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in a case reported in 2015 ( 1) SCC 347
(State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. versus Arvind Kumar
Srivastava & Ors.) , wherein in paragraph nos. 22.1, 22.3 and 23,
it has been held as under:
“ 22.1. The normal rule is that when a
particular set of employees is given relief
by the court, all other identically situated
persons need to be treated alike by
extending that benefit. Not doing so
would amount to discrimination and
would be violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. This principle
needs to be applied in service matters
more emphatically as the service
jurisprudence evolved by this Court from
time to time postulates that all similarly
situated persons should be treated
similarly. Therefore, the normal rule
would be that merely because other
similarly situated persons did not
approach the Court earlier, they are not
to be treated differently.
22.3. However, this exception may not apply in
those cases where the judgment
pronounced by the court was judgment in
rem with intention to give benefit to all
similarly situated persons, whether they
approached the court or not. With such a

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pronouncement the obligation is cast
upon the authorities to itself extend the
benefit thereof to all similarly situated
persons. Such a situation can occur when
the subject-matter of the decision touches
upon the policy matters, like scheme of
regularisation and the like (see K.C.
Sharma v. Union of India [K.C. Sharma v.
Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721 : 1998
SCC (L&S) 226] ). On the other hand, if
the judgment of the court was in
personam holding that benefit of the said
judgment shall accrue to the parties
before the court and such an intention is
stated expressly in the judgment or it can
be impliedly found out from the tenor and
language of the judgment, those who want
to get the benefit of the said judgment
extended to them shall have to satisfy that
their petition does not suffer from either
laches and delays or acquiescence.
23. Viewed from this angle, in the present
case, we find that the selection process
took place in the year 1986. Appointment
orders were issued in the year 1987, but
were also cancelled vide orders dated 22-
6-1987. The respondents before us did not
challenge these cancellation orders till
the year 1996 i.e. for a period of 9 years.
It means that they had accepted the
cancellation of their appointments. They
woke up in the year 1996 only after
finding that some other persons whose

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appointment orders were also cancelled
got the relief. By that time, nine years had
passed. The earlier judgment had granted
the relief to the parties before the Court.
It would also be pertinent to highlight
that these respondents have not joined
service nor working like the employees
who succeeded in earlier case before the
Tribunal. As of today, 27 years have
passed after the issuance of cancellation
orders. Therefore, not only was there
unexplained delay and laches in filing the
claim petition after a period of 9 years, it
would be totally unjust to direct the
appellants to give them appointment as of
today i.e. after a period of 27 years when
most of these respondents would be
almost 50 years of age or above.”
15. Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in a
Judgment reported in 2024 (15) SCC 215 (Mrinmoy Maity
versus Chhanda Koley & Ors.) in paragraph nos. 9 to 13 has
held as under:
“9. Having heard rival contentions raised
and on perusal of the facts obtained in
the present case, we are of the
considered view that the writ petitioner
ought to have been non-suited or in
other words the writ petition ought to
have been dismissed on the ground of
delay and laches itself. An applicant

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who approaches the court belatedly or
in other words sleeps over his rights for
a considerable period of time, wakes up
from his deep slumber ought not to be
granted the extraordinary relief by the
writ courts. This Court time and again
has held that delay defeats equity. Delay
or laches is one of the factors which
should be borne in mind by the High
Court while exercising discretionary
powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. In a given case,
the High Court may refuse to invoke its
extraordinary powers if laxity on the
part of the applicant to assert his right
has allowed the cause of action to drift
away and attempts are made
subsequently to rekindle the lapsed
cause of action.
10. The discretion to be exercised would be
with care and caution. If the delay
which has occasioned in approaching
the writ court is explained which would
appeal to the conscience of the court, in
such circumstances it cannot be
gainsaid by the contesting party that for
all times to come the delay is not to be
condoned. There may be myriad
circumstances which gives rise to the
invoking of the extraordinary
jurisdiction and it all depends on facts
and circumstances of each case, same
cannot be described in a straitjacket

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formula with mathematical precision.
The ultimate discretion to be exercised
by the writ court depends upon the facts
that it has to travel or the terrain in
which the facts have travelled.
11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no
doubt that no fixed period of limitation
is prescribed. However, when the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ
court is invoked, it has to be seen as to
whether within a reasonable time same
has been invoked and even submitting of
memorials would not revive the dead
cause of action or resurrect the cause of
action which has had a natural death.
In such circumstances on the ground of
delay and laches alone, the appeal
ought to be dismissed or the applicant
ought to be non-suited. If it is found that
the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and
laches, the High Court ought to dismiss
the petition on that sole ground itself,
inasmuch as the writ courts are not to
indulge in permitting such indolent
litigant to take advantage of his own
wrong. It is true that there cannot be
any waiver of fundamental right but
while exercising discretionary
jurisdiction under Article 226, the High
Court will have to necessarily take into
consideration the delay and laches on
the part of the applicant in approaching
a writ court.

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12. This Court in Tridip Kumar Dingal v.
State of W.B. [Tridip Kumar Dingal v.
State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 :
(2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 119] has held to
the following effect: (SCC p. 784, paras
56-58)
“56. We are unable to uphold the contention.
It is no doubt true that there can be no
waiver of fundamental right. But while
exercising discretionary jurisdiction
under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of
the Constitution, this Court takes into
account certain factors and one of such
considerations is delay and laches on
the part of the applicant in approaching
a writ court. It is well settled that power
to issue a writ is discretionary. One of
the grounds for refusing reliefs under
Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is
that the petitioner is guilty of delay and
laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke
jurisdiction of a writ court, he should
come to the Court at the earliest
reasonably possible opportunity.
Inordinate delay in making the motion
for a writ will indeed be a good ground
for refusing to exercise such
discretionary jurisdiction. The
underlying object of this principle is not
to encourage agitation of stale claims
and exhume matters which have already
been disposed of or settled or where the

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rights of third parties have accrued in
the meantime (vide State of M.P. v.
Bhailal Bhai [State of M.P. v. Bhailal
Bhai, (1964) 15 STC 450 : 1964 SCC
OnLine SC 10 : (1964) 6 SCR 261 : AIR
1964 SC 1006] , Moon Mills Ltd. v.
Industrial Court [Moon Mills Ltd. v.
Industrial Court, 1967 SCC OnLine SC
117 : AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop
Singh v. Union of India [Bhoop Singh v.
Union of India, (1992) 3 SCC 136] ).
This principle applies even in case of an
infringement of fundamental right (vide
Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi
[Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi,
(1969) 1 SCC 110 : (1970) 25 STC 289]
, Durga Prashad v. Controller of
Imports and Exports [Durga Prashad v.
Controller of Imports and Exports,
(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath
Bose v. Union of India [Rabindranath
Bose v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC
84] ).
58. There is no upper limit and there is no
lower limit as to when a person can
approach a court. The question is one of
discretion and has to be decided on the
basis of facts before the court
depending on and varying from case to
case. It will depend upon what the
breach of fundamental right and the
remedy claimed are and when and how
the delay arose.”

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13. It is apposite to take note of the dicta
laid down by this Court in Karnataka
Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan
[Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K.
Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 : 2006
SCC (L&S) 791] whereunder it has
been held that the High Court may
refuse to exercise extraordinary
jurisdiction if there is negligence or
omissions on the part of the applicant to
assert his right. It has been further held
thereunder: (SCC pp. 325-26, paras 6-
9)
“6. Delay or laches is one of the factors
which is to be borne in mind by the
High Court when they exercise their
discretionary powers under Article 226
of the Constitution. In an appropriate
case the High Court may refuse to
invoke its extraordinary powers if there
is such negligence or omission on the
part of the applicant to assert his right
as taken in conjunction with the lapse of
time and other circumstances, causes
prejudice to the opposite party. Even
where fundamental right is involved the
matter is still within the discretion of the
Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad
v. Controller of Imports and Exports
[Durga Prashad v. Controller of
Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC
185] . Of course, the discretion has to
be exercised judicially and reasonably.

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7. What was stated in this regard by Sir
Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum
Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd
[Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper
Armstrong Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221 :
22 WR 492] (LR PC at p. 239) was
approved by this Court in Moon Mills
Ltd. v. Industrial Court [Moon Mills
Ltd. v. Industrial Court, 1967 SCC
OnLine SC 117 : AIR 1967 SC 1450]
and Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant
Regular Motor Service [Maharashtra
SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor
Service, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 54 :
(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329] .
Sir Barnes had stated: (Lindsay
Petroleum case [Lindsay Petroleum Co.
v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, (1874) LR 5
PC 221 : 22 WR 492] , LR pp. 239-40)
‘Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of
equity is not an arbitrary or a technical
doctrine. Where it would be practically
unjust to give a remedy either because
the party has, by his conduct done that
which might fairly be regarded as
equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by
his conduct and neglect he has though
perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet
put the other party in a situation in
which it would not be reasonable to
place him if the remedy were afterwards
to be asserted, in either of these cases,
lapse of time and delay are most

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material. But in every case, if an
argument against relief, which
otherwise would be just, is founded
upon mere delay, that delay of course
not amounting to a bar by any statute of
limitation, the validity of that defence
must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two
circumstances always important in such
cases are, the length of the delay and
the nature of the acts done during the
interval which might affect either party
and cause a balance of justice or
injustice in taking the one course or the
other, so far as it relates to the remedy.’
8. It would be appropriate to note certain
decisions of this Court in which this
aspect has been dealt with in relation to
Article 32 of the Constitution. It is
apparent that what has been stated as
regards that article would apply, a
fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed
in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India
[Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India,
(1970) 1 SCC 84] that no relief can be
given to the petitioner who without any
reasonable explanation approaches this
Court under Article 32 after inordinate
delay. It was stated that though Article
32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does
not follow from this that it was the
intention of the Constitution-makers
that this Court should disregard all

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principles and grant relief in petitions
filed after inordinate delay.
9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal
Jaiswal [State of M.P. v. Nandlal
Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566] that the
High Court in exercise of its discretion
does not ordinarily assist the tardy and
the indolent or the acquiescent and the
lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on
the part of the petitioner and such delay
is not satisfactorily explained, the High
Court may decline to intervene and
grant relief in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule
is premised on a number of factors. The
High Court does not ordinarily permit a
belated resort to the extraordinary
remedy because it is likely to cause
confusion and public inconvenience and
bring, in its train new injustices, and if
writ jurisdiction is exercised after
unreasonable delay, it may have the
effect of inflicting not only hardship and
inconvenience but also injustice on third
parties. It was pointed out that when
writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained
delay coupled with the creation of third-
party rights in the meantime is an
important factor which also weighs with
the High Court in deciding whether or
not to exercise such jurisdiction.”

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16. Accordingly, this court does not find any merit in the
present case, therefore the same is dismissed on the ground of
delay and laches as well as on merits.
17. Pending application, if any, shall also stand disposed
of.
(Ritesh Kumar, J)
Ajay Mishra/-
AFR/NAFR
CAV DATE 18.08.2026
Uploading Date 27.10.2026
Transmission Date NA