THE STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH THE SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE vs RAVINDRA PRASAD

( 2026:JHHC:31467-DB )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 20 of 2026
With
I.A. No. 17338 of 2025
1. The State of Jharkhand through the Secretary, Department of Finance,
Government of Jharkhand, having its office at Project Bhawan Dhurwa,
P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand. PIN 834004.
2. The Secretary, Road Construction Department (R.C.D), Govt. of
Jharkhand, having its office at Project Bhawan Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S.
Dhurwa District Ranchi, Jharkhand. PIN 834004.
3. The Under Secretary, Road Construction Department (R.C.D), Govt. of
Jharkhand, having its office at Project Bhawan Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S.
Dhurwa District Ranchi, Jharkhand. PIN 834004.
4. The Superintending Engineer, Road Construction Department (R.C.D),
Road Circle Hazaribag having its office at nearby Jharkhand State Govt.
Bus Stand Hazaribag, P.O. GPO Hazaribag, P.S. Sadar Hazaribag
District. Hazaribag, Jharkhand PIN- 825301.
5. The Executive Engineer, Road Construction Department (R.C.D.) Road
Division Giridih having its office at Barachowk Giridih, P.O.GPO
Giridih, P.S. Sadar Giridih, District Giridih, Jharkhand PIN 815301.
... ... Appellants
Versus
Rabindra Prasad, son of Late Mahadeo Prasad, resident of village Lohsinghna
Road, Near Dr. Bhanu Shankar, Ambedkar-puri Hazaribag, P.O. Hazaribag,
P.S. Sadar Hazaribag, District Hazaribag, Jharkhand PIN-825315.
… ... Respondent
------
CORAM : HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ PRASAD
------
For the Appellants : Mr Ashok Kumar Yadav, Sr.SC-I
For the Respondent : Mr Krishna Shankar, Advocate
Mr Sahadeo Choudhary, Advocate
Ms Shoba Rani, Advocate
-----
03 /Dated: 28.10.2026
Per M.S. Sonak, C.J.
1. Heard Mr Ashok Kumar Yadav, learned Sr. S.C.-I for the appellants
and Mr Krishna Shankar who appears with Mr Sahadeo Choudhary and Ms
Shoba Rani for the respondent.
2. I.A. No. 17338 of 2025 seeks condonation of delay of 160 days in filing
the accompanying appeal.
1

( 2026:JHHC:31467-DB )
3. On perusing the averments, we condone the delay and dispose of I.A.
No. 17388 of 2025.
4. With consent, we take up the accompanying appeal for consideration.
5. The appeal is directed against the learned Single Judge’s order dated
09.04.2025 allowing respondent’s W.P.(S) No. 816 of 2021.
6. The learned Single Judge has followed the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Amresh Kumar Singh and others versus State
of Bihar and others , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 496 and has held that the
st nd rd
respondent would be entitled to 1 and 2 A.C.P. and 3 MACP with effect
from the respective dates on which he completed the qualifying years of
service. This must be reckoned from 15.04.1980, not from 23.08.2009, the date
on which the respondent cleared the departmental examination after being
appointed as an Accounts Clerk.
7. Mr Yadav attempted to distinguish the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Amresh Kumar Singh ( supra ) by submitting that this
decision only exempts the requirement of having the higher qualification
prescribed for the promotional post because the grant of the benefits under
ACP and MACP does not amount to actual promotion but is only a financial
upgradation. He submitted that, in this case, the issue was not whether the
respondent had the qualifications prescribed for the promotional post, but
whether the respondent failed to clear the departmental examination within two
years of his initial appointment in 1980.
8. With respect, we cannot appreciate the ground on which the decision of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amresh Kumar Singh ( supra ) is sought to be
distinguished. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the object of Schemes
like ACP or MACP is to compensate employees for stagnation in situ without
2

( 2026:JHHC:31467-DB )
effectuating promotion to a higher post. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that
insisting upon any qualification prescribed for the promotional post would
frustrate this object.
9. In this case, the respondent’s services were not discontinued in 1982
for alleged failure to clear the departmental examination. The respondent has
worked continuously from 15.04.1980. The benefit now awarded by the
impugned order is for the respondent’s stagnation in the post from 15.04.1980.
Incidentally, nothing on record shows that the respondent was ineligible for
further promotions, because, admittedly, the respondent cleared the
departmental examination on 23.08.2009. Therefore, the basis for
distinguishing the Hon’ble Supreme Court's decision in Amresh Kumar Singh
( supra ) does not apply to the facts of the present case.
10. Mr Yadav then referred to the State Government's resolution of
21.05.2014 - Annexure-7 at page 71 of the supplementary affidavit to submit
that the illustrations therein are at variance with the view now taken by the
learned Single Judge in the impugned order.
11. The learned Single Judge considered a resolution issued before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in Amresh Kumar Singh ( supra ).
Assuming there was any variation, the learned Single Judge was bound to
follow the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amresh Kumar Singh
( supra ), which represents the law of the land under Article 141 of the
Constitution, and has correctly done so.
12. Besides, the learned Single Judge’s view is consistent with the ratio of
Amresh Kumar Singh ( supra ) and, even otherwise, is reasonable. If accepted,
Mr Yadav’s contention would effectively wipe out almost 19 years of the
respondent’s service when awarding him the benefit of schemes such as ACP
3

( 2026:JHHC:31467-DB )
or MACP. This would frustrate the objective of such schemes as explained by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
13. In R. Saravanan v. Periyar University , 2026 INSC 1136 , the Hon’ble
Supreme Court recently held that the Letters Patent Bench is not entitled to
interfere with a writ court's decision on a mere showing of an error of fact or
law. If the writ court's decision, made in exercise of powers under Article 226
of the Constitution, furthers justice, equity, and good conscience and is not
against public policy, the Letters Patent Bench should not exercise its appellate
jurisdiction to interfere with the Writ Court’s decision. Simply put, the Letters
Patent Bench cannot interfere with the Writ Court's decision, which is
otherwise just and reasonable.
14. Accordingly, for the reasons above, we are satisfied that the impugned
order contains no error warranting interference with the exercise of our Letters
Patent jurisdiction.
15. For all the above reasons, we dismiss this appeal without any order for
costs.
16. If any I.As. are pending, they will not survive and are hereby disposed
of.
(M.S. Sonak, C.J.)

(Manoj Prasad, J.)
October 27, 2026
Ranjeet / R.Kr.
NAFR
Uploaded on 29.10.2026


4