Sanjeev vs Indore Municipal Corporation Indore

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
1 WP-23838-2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANDEEP N. BHATT
WRIT PETITION No. 23838 of 2022
CNR No.: MPHC020295332022
SANJEEV
Versus
INDORE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION INDORE AND ANR
Appearance:
Senior Advocate Shri Vishal Baheti along with Shri Harshit Sharma,
counsel for the petitioner.
Shri Amol Shrivastava, learned counsel for the respondents /Indore
Municipal Corporation.
Reserved on : 03/11/2026
Delivered on : 06/11/2026
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------
Whether approved for reporting : Yes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ORDER
1/ Present petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226
of the Constitution of India seeking following reliefs/ prayers :
(i) Respondents be directed not to physically throw out the petitioner from the
property in question ie. 1/7 MG. Road Indore and the respondents may be restrained
from interfering, with the peaceful and vacant possession of the petitioner.
Gi) Quash the impugned order dated 13.10.2022 (Annexure P/30) and to allow this
petition with costs.
(iii) Grant such other relief which may be deemed fit by this Hon'ble Court to the
petitioner.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
2 WP-23838-2022
2/ The following circumstances are chronologically noted to

appreciate the challenge to the impugned order:
Dates Events
Lease Agreement in perpetuality (P-1) was executed befoes P.R.
Bhandarkar and then ruler of Indore, His Highness Maharaja Holkar.
There is clear term in the heading of the lease that the land in
question was vested with the lessorie High Highness Maharaja
Holkar and thus, they have fall and unqualified right to grant the
same in perpetual lease. Note- The total lease was for an area of
30084 Sq feet

15.08.1919
Boundaries identified in the map of the cemetery and the remaining
area of 3280 Sq. feet between the Cemetery and compound of Dr.
P.R. Bhandarkar. (P-2).
Note-Reference was made in the earlier Writ petition decided in
favour of the petitioner.
17.02.1922
Gazette notification for closing of Cemetery (P3) Thus the Cemetery
14.09.1927
was closed.
Sale deed executed by L. Rs of DPR. Bhandarkar in favour
of Smt. Kaushalyabai Gawde for total land of 86415 Sq. feet
consisting of 56331 Sq. feet being free hold and 30084 Sq. feet
leasehold land.
Note- On the basis of the aforesaid sale deed, name of Smt.
Kaushalyabai Gawde was recorded in the Indore Municipal
Corporation Indore as Owner.
02.05.1941
Building permission granted by the Indore Municipal Corporation
Indore for petroleum outlet on the subject property admeasuring
11824 Sq. feet (Presently owned by the petitioner) out of the 30084
Sq. feet leasehold land in favour of Standard Vacuum Oil Company
on the basis of the sale deed dated 02.05.1941.

17.11.1960
Building Permission for Gas- Godown granted by the Indore
Municipal Corporation Indore in favor of Smt. Kaushalyabai Gawde
recognizing her title and completion certificate was also granted.
09.09.1971
Note The said property is adjoining to the property of the petitioner
and the same is situated on leasehold property i.e. 30084 Sq. feet.
Building permission granted by the Indore Municipal Corporation
Indore for petroleum outlet on the subject property admeasuring
11824 Sq. feet.
13.10.1972
28.05.1983
Town & Country planning sanctioned sub division of plots on the
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
3 WP-23838-2022
leasehold property of 30084 Sq. feet.
Note- The subject property is numbered as 11/7 and remaining
portion numbered as 11/5, 11/6 M.G. Road Indore and cemetery
portion shown separately and there is 20 feet wide road between the
cemetery land and the subject property of the petitioner.

23.08.1985
Building permission granted by the Indore Municipal Corporation
Indore in favour of Samarjeet Kaur & others which is part of the lease
hold property bearing 11/5.
Note- This property included leasehold property and minor part of
freehold property.
31.03.2007
Town & Country planning sanctioned lay out of the petitioner on the
subject property

12.11.2012
Sub Divisional Officer Indore issued NOC regarding the
location of the property between the revenue survey no. 403/1 to
403/33 which is recorded as State Government Property in the
Revenue records.
Building officer rejected building plan of the petitioner on the subject
property.
03.12.2013
W.P. No. 1502/2015 against the aforesaid order allowed by this
Hon'ble Court and it has been held that the subject property is owned
by then Ruler and the Corporation has been directed to grant building
permission.

10.11.2016
Note- In this order, it has also been held that the subject property is
not the part of the Cemetery land.
W.A. No. 20/2017 dismissed by the Division Bench of this Hon'ble
Court and the order of Hon'ble Single Judge was affirmed.
02.03.2017
The Hon'ble Supreme Court issued notices in the matter and SLP
(Civil) No. 23769/2017 is pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court
of India.
25.08.2017
16.08.2022
Respondent no. 1/ Corporation issued notice for termination of lease.
17.08.2022
Reply to the notice by the petitioner stating that the respondent no. 1
has no jurisdiction to cancel the lease as the State government is the
lessor of the property and Indore Municipal corporation has no right,
title over the subject property.
23.08.2022
Application for deferment of hearing by the petitioner before the
respondent no. I on account of pendency of the SLP before the
Hon'ble Supreme Court.
22.09.2022
Impugned order of the respondent no. 1, whereby the respondent no.
1 herself assumes title over the property AND lease agreement was
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
4 WP-23838-2022
cancelled on the ground of violation of the terms and conditions of
the lease.
Note- The respondent no.1 in the impugned order considered the
subject property to be graveyard property and lease was cancelled on
the ground that the petitioner has been restricted under the lease
agreement for land use and the petitioner is running a café on the
subject property.


13.10.2022
14.10.2022 Writ Petition before this Hon'ble Court.
This Hon'ble Court issued notices in the matter and Status Quo has
18.10.2022
been directed to be maintained.
IA No. 6660/2026 filed by the petitioner for impleading the State as
24.06.2026
Party in the present petition.
Reply to the petition filed by the respondents.
09.09.2026
Reply to IA No. 6660/2026 filed by the respondents and objecting to
16.09.2026
the impleadment of the State in the present petition.
23.09.2026. Rejoinder to the petition filed by the petitioner.
3/ The facts giving rise to present petition, in nutshell is as under :
a) That the petitioner's father is the bonafide purchaser of the property
in question through registered sale deed dated 24.03.1988 (Annexure
P-14). The petitioner's predecessor in title was earlier granted
permission to construct a petrol pump on the land in question on
17.11.1960 (Annexure P-5 & 6) by the respondents. Thereafter,
further permission was granted on 13.10.1972, 28.05.1983 &
16.05.1984 (Annexure P-7 to P-11) for construction of different
structure and the said petrol pump was closed in the year 2010.
b) Thereafter, the petitioner has applied for sanction of commercial lay
out from the office of town & country planning department Indore who
was please to sanctioned the lay out on 12.11.2012 (Annexure P-15 &
16) for commercial purpose as the road in question was commercial in
Indore Development Plan 2021. Thereafter the petitioner has filed
building plan before the respondents and the said building plan has
been rejected by the building office vide order dated 09.02.2015
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
5 WP-23838-2022
(Annexure P-17) The aforesaid order was challenged in W.P. No.

1502/2015 before this Hon'ble Court and this Hon'ble Court vide
Order dated 10.11.2016 (Annexure P-18) allowed the said writ petition
and quashed the order dated 09.02.2015 and the respondents were
directed to grant building permission. In the said Order in Para 29, it
has clearly been held that piece of land was leased out by His Highness
Maharaja Holkar and the petitioner's property was not situated on any
part of cemetery land. The aforesaid order was challenged in W.A. No.
20/2017 and the said writ appeal was dismissed vide order dated
02.03.2017. In view of the aforesaid orders passed by this Hon'ble
Court, it is clear that the petitioner's has not violated any terms &
conditions of the lease and the petitioner is also entitled for grant of
building permission for commercial purpose.
c) That, the Indore Municipal Corporation being aggrieved by the
aforesaid orders preferred a SLP (Civil) No. 23769/2017 before the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and the said SLP is pending for final
adjudication. SLP order is Annexure P-20.
d) That during the pendency of the said SL.P, the respondents has
proceeded to assume title of the property in itself without getting its
right so declared from a competent court issued a notice dated
16.08.2022 (P-21) & 17.08.2022 (P-22) alleging violation of lease
condition. The petitioner submitted reply to the notice on 20.08.2022
(P-23) and stated that there was serious dispute about title and
relationship of lessor & lessee. Without considering the reply of the
petitioner, the respondent no. 1 has passed the impugned order dated
13.10.20222 (P-30) and the lease was cancelled and the petitioner was
directed to hand over the possession of the property within 15 days.
The aforesaid order is illegal and in violation of the principles of
natural justice. The said order is under challenge in the present
petition.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
6 WP-23838-2022
4/ Learned counsel for the petitioner, by way of filing synopsis and

oral argument, has submitted that from Perusal of the lease agreement dated
15.08.1919 (P-1), it is clear that the said lease was not executed by the Indore
Municipal Corporation Indore but was executed by the then ruler of the
Holkar State at relevant time through Superintendent of Municipality. Thus,
it is clear that there is no ownership of the Indore Municipal Corporation
over the said property. The relevant clause of the lease deed is reproduced as
under:
"This indenture made this 15th day of August 1919 between the
superintendent, Indore Municipality on behalf of High Highness the Maharaja
Holkar (herein called the lessor which expression shall be deemed to include
his successor in office) of the one part and Dr. Prabhakar Ramkrishna
Bhandarkar of Indore (hereinafter called the lessee which term shall include his
heirs, executors, administrators and assigns) of the other part witnessed that
whereas the piece of land hereinafter mentioned is vested in lessor by virtue of
his office and whereas he has such full and unqualified right to grant the same
in perpetual lease and whereas the lessee as agreed to receive the same in
perpetual lease according to the stipulation hereinafter mentioned, the lessor
and the lessee by this present mutually agree as follows."
5/ Learned counsel has further contended that in view of the above
facts, it is clear that the lessor is the High Highness the Maharaja Holkar and
Superintendent has executed the lease on his behalf. The Indore Municipal
Corporation is able to establish ownership of the property, it cannot assume
title in itself and issue notice of termination to the petitioner. It is further
submitted submitted that the Indore Municipal Corporation Indore is also
fully aware of the fact that the property being Plot No. 11/7 has been sold to
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
7 WP-23838-2022
the petitioner's father through Registered Sale deed dated 24.03.1988 and

being legal heir, the petitioner became the owner of the property. It is further
submitted that in the impugned order, it has been mentioned by the
respondent no. I that the lease deed has been executed by the Superintendent,
Indore Municipality on the authority of His Highness, Maharaja Holkar. The
petitioner submits that it is clear admission on the part of the respondent no.
1 that the lease agreement has been executed on the authority of His
Highness Maharaja Holkar. The same fact has been mentioned in the order
dated 09.02.2015 by the Building Officer that the lease has been executed by
High Highness and thus the respondent no. I has no jurisdiction to cancel the
lease agreement on the ground of violation of the terms and conditions of the
lease. Even, otherwise, the lease was valid as reservation was made and
Government (Holkar State) granted the land through Superintendent as its
agent. It is Darbar Sanad and not a municipal lease under section 36 of
Indore Municipality Act 1909. Such perpetual lease is valid and heritable,
transferable and creates permanent interest. Such lease is binding upon the
Indore Municipal Corporation.
6/ Learned counsel has further submitted that the Corporation has
filed reply to the rejoinder on 28.10.2026 before this Hon'ble Court and it has
been contended that as per copy of extract dated 18.06.1917 (R-1), the
Holkar State had transferred all the lands and open sites with the municipal
limits which were not the private property and not in possession of any
department of the state to the Indore Municipality vide notification dated
18.06.1917. It is submitted that no notification number or notification or
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
8 WP-23838-2022
Hazur Shri Shankar Order no. 214 dated 19.05.17 has been placed on record

by the respondents to demonstrate the fact that any such transfer has been
made. The said document does not support the case of the respondents as the
petitioner has filed a notification no. 25 dated 14.09.1927 issued by the State
government for closing of the burial ground. It is submitted that if any such
transfer was made on 18.06.1917, then there was no occasion for the High
Highness to issue the notification no. 25 for closing of the burial ground. In
these set of facts, the respondents have wrongly contended that the subject
property was municipal property and the lease in question was municipal
lease. It is also submitted that the aforesaid notification dated 18.06.1917
does not find place in the impugned order dated 13.10.2022 and title was
claimed on the ground that all lands of graveyards, cemetery and burial
grounds under the municipal limit will be vested in the corporation. In the
reply to rejoinder, a completely new case has been set up on the basis of the
notification which is ex-facie appears to be typed copy having no legs to
stand.
7/ In view of the aforesaid, it is submitted that the Corporation has
wrongly interpreted the provisions of lease and assume his title in the
impugned order cancelling the lease of the petitioner. No document of title
has been submitted by the Corporation nor there was any vesting of land
after independence in the year 1947. The Indore Municipal Corporation was
established by virtue of M.P. Municipal Corporation Act 1956 and the lease
in question was prior to that date and hence at no point of time, it can be said
that the Corporation has jurisdiction to cancel the lease in question. It is
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
9 WP-23838-2022
submitted that the petitioner or his predecessor in title has not paid any lease

rent to the respondents and as such the contention made in the impugned
order that lease rent was paid by the original previous lessee has no
foundation to stand as none of the lease rent receipts has been brought on
record by the respondents. Even, no notice of any kind was issued to the
original lessee and his assignees demanding arrears of lease rent. The
respondents have wrongly stated in its reply to rejoinder that the predecessor
in title of the petitioner has admitted the ownership of the respondents in the
sale deed dated 02.05.1941. A bare perusal of the sale deed would go to
show that reference was made to the lease deed dated 15.08.1919 and
contents of the said document would clearly establish that the lease was
executed on behalf of His Highness. As such, there was no such admission
on the part of the predecessor in title of the petitioner. The provisions of
Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act pare not applicable to the facts
of the present case.
8/ It is further submitted that as per section 82 & 83 of the M.P.
Municipal Corporation Act 1956, the Corporation is possessing the list of
immoveable properties held by it which is kept in register. No such list or
register has been filed to demonstrate that the subject property was vested in
the Indore Municipal Corporation. It is not in dispute that the subject
property was not transferred or gifted by the State government to the Indore
Municipal Corporation. As such, the Indore Municipal Corporation has no
title or right over the subject property to invoke the powers for cancellation
of the lease in question. It is further submitted that the petitioner is not a
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
10 WP-23838-2022
tenant of Indore Municipal Corporation. The petitioner's predecessor is

perpetual lessee of erstwhile Holkar State, now State of MP. The Indore
Municipal Corporation cannot evict the petitioner under the Act of 1956 and
ownership still with State and petitioner's and his predecessor have
permanent occupancy right. On breach of conditions, State can resume but
with give notice and compensation for structure. It is further submitted that
after merger of Holkar State in the year 1948, the Holkar State lands became
Madhya Bharat Govt. and then State of MP. The subject plot bearing old no.
11/7 (new no. 17) M.G. Road Indore is part of Khasra No. 403. The said
Khasra no. 403 has been recorded as Government land in the revenue record
maintained under the M.P. Land Revenue Code 1959. The entire Khasra no.
403 in divided in to 24 parts and the name of the government is standing in
the entire record. In Khasra No. 403/1665, it is mentioned as Cemetery and
area is 0.045 hectare i.e. 4400 Sq. feet. It is thus, clear that the petitioner's
subject plot is not the part of the Cemetery and has rightly been decided by
this Hon'ble Court in earlier round of litigation. The Khasra No. 403/1664
admeasuring 0.008 hectare and Khasra No. 403/1663 admeasuring 0.032-
hectare, name of Municipality Indore is standing and name of Hotel Princess
Palace was mentioned in column no. 12. The subject plot is the property
situated in between the Khasra No. 403/1 to 403/33 which can be cleared
from the NOC dated 03.12.2013 issued by the Sub Divisional Officer Indore.
9/ It is further submitted that the petitioner has applied for
demarcation of the subject property before the Tahsildar who vide order
dated 29.03.2012 allowed the demarcation of the property and confirmed that
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
11 WP-23838-2022
the subject plot is part of Khasra No. 403. It is thus clear from the record that

it is undisputed fact that the subject land was leased out by His Highness
Maharaja Holkar and therefore the said land vested in the State government
after independence in the year 1947 and merger of princely state in to
republic of India. The respondents cannot reopen the aforesaid proposition
and to contend that the subject land vested in the Indore Municipal
Corporation. The government property cannot be said to be open land vested
in the Indore Municipal Corporation Indore.
10/ It is submitted that the conditions of the lease deed dated
15.8.1919 stipulate that there shall be no construction over the graves and the
said land shall be used only for gardening purposes. The said clause 3 and 6
of the lease deed clearly establishes that the purpose of the said restriction
was to protect the burial grounds and the same does not apply to the
separated part of the lease hold land, which is clearly separated from the
Cemetery land admeasuring 4407 sq ft by a 20 ft. wide road as per the Map
dated 7.2.1922 and the map approved by the Joint Director, Town and
Country Planning. Indore dated 23.8.1985, which had also demarcated the
plots numbered as 11/5, 11/6 and 11/7 and separately indicated the cemetery
away from the property of the petitioner.
11/ Further, the notices so issued to the petitioner base themselves on
an erroneous interpretation of the lease deed and seek to apply the provisions
of the clause 3 of the lease deed, prohibiting the construction on the land of
the cemetery, to be applicable on the entirety of the lease hold property.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
12 WP-23838-2022
12/ It is further submitted that the lease was executed on 15.8.1919,

when the boundaries of the cemetery had not been demarcated. The said
boundaries were subsequently demarcated and a plan dated 7.2.1922 was also
prepared. Further the land remaining unsold/unleased beyond the cemetery
measuring 3280 Sq. feet was also sold to Dr. Bhandarkar in 1922 itself
which shows and establishes that there was no cemetery beyond what was
described in the map dated 7.2.1922. In any case, the cemetery was ordered
to be closed vide government of His Highness Maharaja Holkar notification
dated 14.9.1927. On 2.5.1941, Dr. Bhandarkar had executed a registered sale
deed in favour of one Smt. Kaushalyabai Gawade for the complete land
area admeasuring 86415 sq ft., which included the leased area as well as the
area out rightly purchased by him. In the year 1960, 1972 & 1983, the Indore
Municipal Corporation Indore had itself granted permission for
establishment of petroleum outlet, shed & store/toilet on the land which was
the subject matter of the lease. Gas Godown was then constructed over the
plot bearing no. 11/6, Horizon residency (16 flats) on Plot of 11/5 part of
leased land which was in operation since then. The Indore Municipal
Corporation had thus itself permitted commercial use of the property. No
notice of termination till date was given to owner of plot no. 11/5 and as
such hostile discrimination has been done.
13/ It is further submitted that the master plan is binding on the
corporation and once a building plan is submitted for approval, it has to
consider the permitted user under the master plan and cannot sit in appeal
over the master plan and contend that the user indicated in the master plan
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
13 WP-23838-2022
was erroneous. The user indicated in the lease (which is a contract) gets

superseded by operation of law under the master plan and once the user is
defined in law, no reliance can be placed on the terms of the lease deed to
restrict the user as the same would then be contrary to the master plan.
14/ Hence, in light of the submissions above, wherein admittedly,
the land in question of the petitioner forms a part entirely separate from the
land of the cemetery. and the lease conditions governing the cemetery in
question not applying to the parcel of the land of the petitioner and the grant
of building permissions by the corporation to other parcels of land forming
part of the lease hold property; the acts of the Indore Municipal Corporation
is ex-facie illegal.
15/ The petitioner also submits that the respondents have relied upon
the judgment delivered in the case of Sajni dio Dwarkadas Bajaj Versus
Indore Development Authority & others 2012(1) MPLJ 53does not apply in
this case as the petitioner has challenged the impugned order on the ground
that the respondent have no jurisdiction to cancel the lease agreement as the
land in question belonging to the State. There is no disputed question
involved in the present case and all the documents relied upon hy the
petitioner is admitted documents and therefore the writ petition is
maintainable. The reliance upon Sajni Bajaj is misplaced. The Division
Bench neither upheld the cancellation of lease nor declared the action of IDA
to be legally valid. On the contrary, it expressly kept the validity of
cancellation open for adjudication before the competent forum. The ratio was
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
14 WP-23838-2022
confined to the proposition that disputed questions concerning breach of

lease covenants and consequential civil rights could not ordinarily be
adjudicated in writ jurisdiction and independently. that IDA could not resort
to extra judicial dispossession. The present case stands on a different footing
so far as the challenge concerns the statutory jurisdiction and legality of the
exercise of the power by the authority and compliance with the mandatory
procedure prescribed by law. Sajni Bajaj therefore cannot be treated as an
authority validating the impugned action.
16/ The petitioner also submits that the respondents have erred in
passing the impugned order as no reasonable opportunity of hearing was
given to the petitioner. The action of the respondents is illegal, without
jurisdiction and malafide, when the SLP was pending before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India, there was no occasion to issue any notice for
cancellation of the lease. The respondents have taken the law in their hand
by assuming to be title holder and issue the impugned notice which is ex
facie illegal and without jurisdiction. It is therefore prayed that this petition
may kindly be allowed and the petition filed by the petitioner may kindly be
allowed by quashing the impugned order dated 13.10.2022 (Annexure P/30).
The respondents may be restrained from interfering with the possession of
the petitioner from the property in dispute.
17/ Per-contra, learned counsel for the respondents/ Municipal
Corporation, by way of filing synopsis and oral argument, has opposed the
present petition on following grounds :
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
15 WP-23838-2022
A. Petitioner has an alternative remedy for his relief against
dispossession.

At the outset, it is submitted that the Petitioner's main grievance
was against forceful dispossession which is borne out from the
relief clause. It is submitted that the Petitioner's apprehension of
being dispossessed without following due process of law is
misconceived and denied. Any action for eviction is governed by
the procedure prescribed under Section 5 of the M.P. Lok Parisar
(Bedakhali) Adhiniyam, 1974, which provides for hearing by the
competent authority, with a further appeal under Section 9 against
the decision of the competent authority. The Respondents will
certainly invoke the said provision for taking possession. The
competent authority can look into all the grounds raised by the
Petitioner. In the presence of an alternative and efficacious
statutory remedy, and the grievance being purely anticipatory
without any violation of the prescribed procedure, the present
petition does not warrant interference by this Hon'ble Court.
B. Petition involves disputed questions of law which cannot be decided
in writ jurisdiction under Article 226,
The Petitioner assails the cancellation of the lease dated
15.08.1919 which requires determination of factual issues such as
whether the conditions of the lease were breached and whether the
Petitioner's use of the property was permissible, all of which are
factual disputes affecting the rights arising out of lease deed and
cannot be adjudicated in a writ jurisdiction. [para 14,16, 19 of
Sajni d/o Dwarkadas Bajaj v. Indore Development Authority Ors.,
2012 (1) MPLJ 53; para 27, 28 of State of U.P. Ors. v. Maharaja
Dharmander Prasad Singh & Ors., (1989) 2 SCC 505]
C. Inconsistent/Contradictory pleas raised by the Petitioner.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
16 WP-23838-2022
The Petitioner first acknowledges that his rights come from
subsequent transfers under the original lease deed dated
15.08.1919, which under Section 1080) of the Transfer of Property
Act, could only transfer leasehold rights, not ownership

Petitioner claims full ownership through the sale deed dated
24.03.1988, though the sale deed neither refers to the original
lease deed of 1919 nor shows that the property was ever converted
from leasehold to freehold.
In the rejoinder, the Petitioner raises an entirely new plea that
the land vested in the State Government after independence and
that the State is therefore the lessor.
The plea regarding the State being the lessor was never raised
before the authority in reply dated 20.08.2022 nor in previous
proceedings and is raised for the first time, only to change the
nature of the is from an issue of cancellation of let title dispute
between the State and the Respondent Corporation.
The State has never asserted its claim over the subject property.
The Petuimer cannot step into the shoes of the State to assert a title
which has never been asserted by the State or any of its
department.
The assertion that the property belongs to the State is clearly
contradictory to the recitals of the lease deed and subsequent
acknowledgement of the municipal lease by the original lessee and
the historical records and provisions of vesting as well as
the settled legal position through various judgements. Therefore,
there is a heavy burden placed upon the petitioner to prove the
same by leading contrary evidence and therefore, the same cannot
be adjudicated in a writ petition. The said burden can be
discharged by the Petitioner only by filing a regular civil suit and
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
17 WP-23838-2022
not on the basis of affidavits.

D. Title over the subject land vests in the Indore Municipal Corporation
by operation of law. Burden to prove otherwise lies on the Petitioner.
Recitals of the lease deed.
The lease deed specifically records that the lease of the subject
land was executed by the Superintendent of the Indore
Municipality who has been described as the "lessor" which
includes "his successor in office", the "land is vested in the lessor"
"by virtue of his office" and he has "such full and unqualified right
to grant the same in perpetual lease". It is clear that at the time of
grant of lease, the land was vested in the Indore Municipality
through its Superintendent.
Position of Superintendent under the 1909 Act
At the relevant point of time, the municipality was headed by
the Superintendent as the executive head who was appointed by
the Government similar to the present provisions of the 1956 Act.
The Superintendent was competent to enter into contracts on
behalf of the Municipality and for disposal of the lands vested in
it. [Annexure R/3 page no. 500-502 of Madhya Pradesh District
Gazetteer: Indore] Under Section 36 of the 1909 Act, all the
properties within the limits of the Municipality were vested in the
Superintendent on behalf of the Government and he had the right
of management and control of such properties. Section 36 at the
relevant point of time in the 1909 Act is as follows:
"36. Municipal property
(1) Subject to any special reservation which may be made by the
Government, all property of the nature hereinafter in this section
specified and situated within the limits of the Municipality shall be
Municipal property vested in the Superintendent on behalf of the
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
18 WP-23838-2022
Government and shall, with all other property which may become so
rested, or under his direction, management and control and shall be held
and applied by him for the purposes of this Act, that is to say....."

Municipality Map of 1910 and corresponding Khasra Abadi entries of 1910
At the time of enactment of Indore Municipality Act, 1909,
pursuant to the Holkar State Land Settlement, Municipal map
were prepared in the year 1910 [Annexure R/5] which records
subject land as Khasra No. 17931 and its corresponding entry in
the Municipal record/Khasra Abadi of the year 1910 [Annexure
R/6) reflects the subject land as 'Kabristan'. Notably, the
Municipal record of 1910 specifically mentions possession of the
State wherever such possession existed. No such entry appears
against the subject land. Therefore, the subject land was (1) open
land within the municipal limits (ii) not a private property and (ii)
not in the possession of the State.
Huzur Shankar Order No. 214 dated 19.05.1917 issued by the Maharaja and
Section 36(h) of the 1909 Act
Vide notification dated 18.06.1917 [Annexure R/1], the Holkar
State transferred all the lands and open sites within the municipal
limits which were not the private property and not in possession of
any department of the State to the Indore Municipality. The
subject land continued to be municipal property vested in the
Superintendent, Indore Municipality, who then executed the lease
deed dated 15.08.1919. Relying on this notification in similar
matters where lease was executed by Prime Minister of Holkar
State, the Court has held that IMC to be the owner/lessor of the
said land as on date. (para 22-29 of State of M.P. Hukumchand
Mills Ltd. Ors., (2018) 4 MP LJ 467]
Similar provisions are also present under Section 36(h) of the
Indore Municipality Act, 1909 [Page 167-168 of Compilation]
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
19 WP-23838-2022
which specifically states that all lands and open sites which are
neither private property nor are in the possession of any
department of the State vested in the Commissioner (the
Superintendent at the elevant time) on behalf of the 'Government'.
The 'Government' included His Highness the Maharaja Holkar, as
per the Notification No. 18/Mpl. dated 18.10.1918 [Annexure
R/2]. Therefore, the Superintendent executed the lease deed dated
15.08.1919 in respect of property vested in Indore Municipality on
behalf of the Government, but such execution by itself did not
mean that it was Maharaja's private property or property reserved
by the State.

Since the subject land vested in the Municipality and no
reservations were made against it by the State Government, the
subject land continued to vest in the Indore Municipality even
after Independence, under the Madhya Bharat Municipalities Act,
1954 (Section 48) and MP Municipalities Act (Section 100). It
finally vested in the Indore Municipal Corporation under the
proviso to Section 2(1) and Section 82 of the M.P. Municipal
Corporation Act, 1956. The Respondent Corporation therefore
continues to hold title as the successor of the erstwhile Indore
Municipality. [para 6,7 of Municipal Corporation, Indore v. State
of M.P. Ors., 1972 JLJ 614; para 22-29 of State of M.P. v.
Hukumchand Mills Ltd. Ors., (2018) 4 MP LJ 467]
E. Lessor-lessee relationship is admitted by Petitioner's Predecessor-in-
title,
Petitioner's predecessor-in-title has, ride sale deed dated
09.05.1941, expressly acknowledged that the subject land
admeasuring 30,084 sq. ft. was held on perpetual lease from the
Indore City Municipality. Petitioner's plea disputing Respondent's
title is contradictory to this admitted stand of his predecessor-in-
title from whom the Petitioner purchased the subject plot ride sale
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
20 WP-23838-2022
deed dated 24.03.1988. Therefore, once landlord-tenant
relationship is admitted by the predecessor of Petitioner, the
estoppel operates against him.

Any transfer of the admitted leasehold property of the
predecessor in-title could only transfer the leasehold rights and not
ownership, in terms of Section 1080 of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882. The Petitioner cannot claim ownership on the basis of
the sale deed dated 24.03.1988, which neither acknowledges the
admitted leasehold character of the property in the hands of the
predecessor-in-title nor records any conversion of the property into
freehold.
F In matters of eviction or cancellation of lease, proof of ownership is
not as strict as in a suit for declaration of title.
In para 40 of Apollo Zipper India Ltd. v. W. Newman & Co. Ltd.,
(2018) 6 SCC 744, it has been held that :
"It is a settled principle of law... that in an eviction suit... when the issue of
title over the tenanted premises is raised, the landlord is not expected to prove
his title like what he is required to prove in a title suit. In other words, the
burden of proving the ownership in an eviction suit is not the same like a title
suit."
In para 9 of Jyoti Sharma v. Vishnu Goyal, 2025 INSC 1099, it has
been held:
"It is trite that in a suit for eviction, the proof of ownership of the tenanted

premises it not to he strictly looked at as in a suit for declaration of title."
G. Petitioner is barred by Estoppel from contesting Respondent's title
Under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(corresponding to Section 122 of the BSA, 2023), a tenant or a
person claiming through the tenant is estopped from disputing the
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
21 WP-23838-2022
lessor's title at the commencement of the tenancy during its
continuance and such estoppel continues to operate so long as the
tenancy continues and unless the tenant has surrendered
possession to the landlord. The Petitioner cannot, therefore,
continue to enjoy possession derived through the lease while
disputing the Respondent's title as lessor, particularly when the
predecessor-in-title has acknowledged the Respondents as lessor.

The rule of estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act
applies against the lessee, any assignee of the term and any sub
lessee or licensee and all such persons are precluded from denying
that the lessor had a title at the date of the lease and there is no
exception even for the case where the lease itself discloses the
defect of title. The estoppel continues so long as the tenant has not
openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord. (para 6 of
Vashu Deo Vs. Balkishan, 2002(2) SCC 50, pg 206 of Kumar
Krishna Prosad Lal Singha Deo Vs. Baraboni Coal Concern, Ltd.
Ors., AIR 1937 PC 251)
H. Covenants of the lease deed are clear and binding on the parties and
the same cannot be re-written under Article 226.
On a literal interpretation, the covenants of the lease deed are
clear. It is unnecessary to impose any purposive construction
through ex-post facto circumstances or hardship when the literal
meaning of the terms is clear. (para 21 of Vivekananda Kendra
Vs. Pradeep Kumar Agarwalla, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 316]
The lease deed does not confine its conditions to any particular
portion of the subject land. The entire subject land is recorded as a
kabristan in the Municipal Map and Record of 1910 and continues
to be governed by the restrictions contained in the lease.
Clause 3 of the lease imposes two independent restrictions: (1)
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
22 WP-23838-2022
no building shall be erected on the land; and (1) the existing
graves or their contents shall not be removed or disturbed. Clause
6 permits the land to be used for "gardening or such like
purposes". A plain reading of these clauses leaves no scope for
construction or commercial use of the subject land. The plea that
the said restrictions were only to protect the burial grounds is
contrary to the express terms of the lease.

The Petitioner cannot restrict or interpret the covenant in a
manner that defeats the plain meaning of Clauses 3 and 6.
Permitting commercial use and construction contrary to the
express terms of the lease would amount to rewriting the lease,
which is impermissible in proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution. [ Para 18-20 of Gwalior Development Authority Vs.
Bhanu Pratap Singh, 2023 INSC 393]
1. Petitioner remains bound by the original lease terms and has
breached them by commercial use.
The Petitioner purchased the subject plot from his predecessor-
in-title, who had admitted that the property was held on lease from
the Indore Municipality Transfer of a leasehold property under
Section 1080) of the Transfer of Property Act conveys only
leasehold rights and not ownership. The Petitioner, therefore,
remains bound by the original terms and conditions of the lease,
including the restriction on use of the land for "gardening or such
like purposes".
The subject property, forming part of the original leased land
measuring 30,084 sq-ft, is admittedly being used for running a
commercial café, contrary to the permitted use under the lease. It
has not been asserted that any permission was granted by the
Corporation for running such a cafe. The Respondents, therefore,
rightly cancelled the lease for breach of its conditions by invoking
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
23 WP-23838-2022
Clause 8 of the lease deed dated 15.08.1919.

J. Waiver/Acquiescence of one breach does not automatically amount
to waiver of the Covenant in perpetuity.
Permissions obtained by fraud and suppression of the material
lease restrictions and the true leasehold character of the property
cannot be relied upon to claim an unrestricted right to use or
develop the leased land.
The previous building permissions were obtained on the basis
of the sale deed dated 09.05.1941, which suppressed the restrictive
conditions of the original lease dated 15.08.19119. Similarly, the
development permission dated 12.11.2012 was obtained on the
basis of the sale deed dated 24.03.1988, which does not even
disclose the leasehold nature of the property. Even assuming that
any earlier breach was permitted or waived by the Respondent
Corporation, the same would neither extinguish nor modify the
original lease covenants, nor preclude action against subsequent or
continuing breaches.
It is a clear position of law that waiver of past breaches does not
preclude the lessor from enforcing a forfeiture when the same or
another condition is subsequently broken. When the breach is of a
continuing nature, the same rule applies, and the continuance of
the breach after the waiver will justify a forfeiture. [page 1030 of
The Transfer of Property Act by Sir Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla, 13th
Ed., para 2, 3 of Muhammad Hassan & Ors. Vs. Baidya Nath
Sahay, AIR 1940 Pat 140, para 20,21 of Talbot & Co. Vs.
Haricharan Halwasiya, AIR 1952 Cal 47
Commercial use of the property as a café and making any fresh
construction constitutes an independent and continuous breach of
the lease. In the absence of any lawful modification of the lease
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
24 WP-23838-2022
conditions, previous permissions cannot justify such breach,
override the lease covenants or operate as a waiver of subsequent
or continuing breaches.

K. Revenue entries/Khasra panchshala are irrelevant in respect of lands
included within the Municipal limits.
It is a settled position of law that revenue entries/khasra
panchshala do not by themselves confer or raise any presumption
of title. And, khasra entries maintained in respect of land falling
within the municipal limits of Indore cannot be relied upon as
proof of ownership.
The Petitioner has not specified exactly which khasra is
pertaining to the subject property. Although upon examination,
majority of the Khasra entries prescribe the land use as 'Abadi',
which under Section 2(a) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959
(MPLRC), refers to land reserved for residence of inhabitants of a
village. A 'Village' under Section 2(2-5) refers to any tract of land
in a non-urban area. whereas an area within municipal limits is an
"Urban area' under Section 2(2-4). Further, Sections 243 to 246 of
the MPLRC deals with the right to manage Abadi lands by gram
panchayat and the manner of disposal, which have no application
once the land is included within the Municipality by virtue of
Section 405 of the MP Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 and the
Khasra entries maintained for a non-urban area does not have any
relevance. Mere mention of the word "Abadi" in the relevant
column does not confer or prove ownership in favour of the State
In para 18,19 of Garvit Khandelwal Vs. State of M.P., W.A.
No. 200/2021, the Hon'ble Division Bench has held that once a
village area is included within a Municipality or Municipal
Corporation, it ceases to retain the status of a village and there is
no requirement for the Revenue Authorities to maintain Khasra
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
25 WP-23838-2022
Panchshala or other land records in respect of such area under the
M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. Therefore, even if revenue
records continue to be maintained for areas falling within the
municipal limits of Indore, the entries therein are not a reliable
reflection or proof of title.

The Khasra entries (Annexure P/31) have recorded almost the
entire Survey No 403 as Government land. If these entries
accepted as conclusive, every property within the said area,
including the High Court, advocates offices and private residential
and commercial buildings, would become Government property
merely by virtue of a revenue entry
Subject land has never been recorded as Nazul land or as
belonging to any department of the State Government at the time
of vesting, nor has the State ever asserted any claim over it.
1. Land use as per the Master Plan does not dilute the conditions of the
Lease.
The Master Plan cannot override the terms of a lease executed
prior to its coming into force. The land must be used in
accordance with the agreement between the parties, and the user
cannot be changed contrary to such agreement merely because the
Master Plan permits such use. A change of use in the Master Plan
is only enabling in nature. A change in user would require the
consent of the lessor and cannot be made unilaterally by the
occupant. It is therefore incorrect to contend that no permission of
the landlord was required for change of user. [para 17 of Union of
India & Ors. Vs. Dev Raj Gupta Ors., (1991) 1 SCC 63]
M. Pending SLP (C) No. 23769/2017 does not preclude Respondent's
right as lessor.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
26 WP-23838-2022
SLP (C) No. 23769/2017 concerns the grant of building
permission and is entirely distinct from the present proceedings
concerning cancellation of the lease. The pendency of those
proceedings does not affect the Respondents' independent right as
lessors to terminate the lease.

N. No reliance can be placed on stayed Judgements
The Petitioner's reliance on observations made in the earlier
proceedings, which are under challenge in SLP (C) No.
23769/2017, is misconceived, as the order dated 10.11.2016
passed in WP. No. 1502/2015, and affirmed nide Order dated
02.03.2017 in W.A. 20/2017, is presently stayed ride Order dated
25.08.2017 of the Hon'ble Apex Court.
The observations regarding the covenants of the lease deed in
the previous proceedings were merely assumption without any
effective argument or reasoning or perusal of the relevant
material. Therefore the same cannot be held to be binding in
subsequent proceedings relating specifically to the question of
cancellation of lease.
The nature of earlier proceedings were confined to the rejection
of building permission applications. The Court interpreted the
restrictive clause for limited purposes. It has not declared that
continued and commercial usage was lawful nor did it restrain the
Corporation from exercising its rights for future and continued
breaches
Since the issue involved in the present case is the specific
violation of the covenants of lease deed, the material that has been
produced by IMC was not there before the writ court. Moreover,
the issue of dispute as to the IMC's title is not involved in the
previous proceedings. There is no stay by the Supreme Court of
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
27 WP-23838-2022
any interim order preventing the IMC from exercising its further
rights as a lessor.

Further, the findings on which the Petitioner relies are contrary
to the evidence on record in Annexure R/5 and R/6 and also the
main and clear recitals of the lease deed. The present case is to be
decided on these facts and not merely on the basis of some
observations in the previous proceedings.
It is submitted that the Order passed in WP 1502/2015 contains
observation on the scope of 1919 lease covenants without detailed
examination of the actual wordings of the lease deed or any proper
and legal factual analysis primarily on the basis of subsequent
permissions and layouts. Such observations can be characterized
as sub silentio on the precise legal question of the scope of the
covenants and would not operate as a bar in the present
proceedings. [para 20 of Arnit Das Vs State of Bihar (2000) 5
SCC 488]
"20. A decision not expressed, not accompanied by reasons and not
proceeding on a conscious consideration of an issue cannot be deemed to
be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article
141. That which has escaped in the judgment is not the ratio decidendi.
This is the rule of sub silentio, in the technical sense when a particular
point of law was not consciously determined. (See - State of U.P. Vs.
Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139, para 41.)"
O. Due opportunity of hearing given to the Petitioner.
The Petitioner was afforded due opportunity of hearing, whereby the
Respondent submitted reply dated 20.08.2022 and application dated
22.09.2022 and it was only after due consideration of the same, the
impugned order dated 13.10.2022 was passed for cancellation of the
lease.
18/ I have considered the rival submissions made by the parties at bar
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
28 WP-23838-2022
and also considered the fact that the respondent/ Corporation is contesting the

proceeding on various grounds as discussed above.
19/ By referring to the list of events, which broadly indicate the issue
involved in the present petition and relevant dates for development occurred
in the present petition, it is relevant to note after considering the rival
submissions that it is an undisputed fact that lease agreement dated
15/08/1919 was executed by then ruler of the Holkar State at relevant time
through the then Superintendent of Municipality and the said deed cannot
and could not be executed by the Indore Municipal Corporation, who is
contesting respondent. It also transpires that though it is claimed that by
virtue of the subsequent notification and by virtue of further development on
enactment of the State of Madhya Pradesh in view of further provision of the
Municipal Corporation Act, the Indore Municipal Corporation is constituted
and by virtue of the notification, which is relied on by the respondent, such
lands are deemed to be vested in the Corporation. Considering this
submission, however, from the entire record available with this Court, there
is no such lease or document, which shows that such property is vested with
the Municipal Corporation. As such, the genesis of the dispute between the
parties are also laying there. In nutshell, considering the fact that whether the
Indore Municipal Corporation can be considered established owner of the
property/ lands in question ? or it can be considered that the Indore
Municipal Corporation has assumed the title in itself and thereafter issue
notice of termination to the petitioner ?. It is also relevant to note that it is
first and foremost fact, which is required to be noted that the property being
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
29 WP-23838-2022
plot no. 11/7 has been sold to the petitioner's father through registered sale

deed dated 24/03/1988 and it seems that there is substance in the claim of
the petitioner that by virtue of legal representative of the erstwhile owner, the
petitioner became the owner of the property. The purpose of considering this
aspect, it is relevant to note to refer to relevant portion of lease deed, which
is reproduced as under :
"This indenture made this 15th day of August 1919 between the
superintendent, Indore Municipality on behalf of High Highness the Maharaja
Holkar (herein called the lessor which expression shall be deemed to include
his successor in office) of the one part and Dr. Prabhakar Ramkrishna
Bhandarkar of Indore (hereinafter called the lessee which term shall include his
heirs, executors, administrators and assigns) of the other part witnessed that
whereas the piece of land hereinafter mentioned is vested in lessor by virtue of
his office and whereas he has such full and unqualified right to grant the same
in perpetual lease and whereas the lessee as agreed to receive the same in
perpetual lease according to the stipulation hereinafter mentioned, the lessor
and the lessee by this present mutually agree as follows."
20/ Considering the same, it transpires that the lease deed has been
executed by the then Superintendent, Indore Municipality on authority given
by His Highness, Maharaja Holkar. That fact also seems not controverted by
respondent no. 1 as the impugned order itself refers to this factum, therefore,
there is also substance in the contention raised by the petitioner that it can be
considered as an admission on the part of respondent no. 1 that the lease
agreement has been executed on the authority of His Highness, Maharaja
Holkar. The order dated 09/02/2015 passed by the Building Officer also
indicate that the lease has been executed by His Highness, Maharaja Holkar
and in that view, it cannot be said that the respondent has absolute right to
initiate the proceeding for cancellation of the lease deed as a owner of the
property in question. From the record, it also transpires that the lease was
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
30 WP-23838-2022
valid as reservation was made by the Government [ Holkar State] granted the

land/s through the then Superintendent as its agent. After scrutinizing the
document, I am of the opinion that there is also substance in the contention
raised by the petitioner that such document can be considered as Darbar
Sanad and not Municipal Lease under section 36 of the Indore Municipality
Act, 1909. Though this Court has the limited jurisdiction to interpret such
document, but prima-facie, it appears so and therefore, such perpetual lease
is valid, heritable and transferable and creates permanent interest of the
parties, who entered into further transaction. It cannot be said that such lease
is not binding upon the Indore Municipal Corporation. Though the
contention raised by respondent in his reply to the rejoinder that as per the
copy of the extract i.e. notification dated 18.06.1917, the Holkar State had
transferred all the lands and open sites within the municipal limits which
were not the private property and not in possession of any department of the
State to the Indore Municipality, however, no notification number or
notification or Hazur Shri Shankar Order no. 214 dated 19.05.1917, more
particularly, to establish that such transfer has been made, as on the contrary,
the petitioner has filed the notification no. 25, dated 14/09/1927 issued by
the State government for closing of the burial ground. It seems that if such
transfer was made on 18/06/1917, then there was no occasion for the High
Highness to issue notification no. 25 for closing of the burial ground. It also
requires to be noted that the aforementioned notification dated 18/06/1917 is
also not referred in the impugned order 13/10/2022 and the title was claimed
on the ground that all lands of graveyards, cemetery and burial grounds
under the municipal limit will be vested in the Corporation. Therefore, the
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
31 WP-23838-2022
contention raised by the respondent / Corporation are per se not acceptable

in absence of justifiable material available on record and there is some
contentions raised by the petitioner is required to be accepted as notification
no. 25 supports the case of the petitioner.
21/ It is also relevant to note that the Corporation has considered the
aspect of lease on the basis of claim vested by way of statutory development
or by way of notification, but it seems from the record that no document of
title in the name of Indore Municipal Corporation was, nor any document to
indicate that there was any vesting of particular land, which is subject matter
of present petition is there after independence received in the year 1947. It is
also relevant to note that the Indore Municipal Corporation was established
by virtue of the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act 1956 and the lease, which is
executed in present case is of the year 1919 i.e. much prior to that. Even
contention regarding the payment of lease rent by the petitioner or
predecessor of petitioner is not supported by any receipt issued by the
Corporation towards collecting lease rent, even no notice is found on record,
which indicates that any kind of demand made from the original lessee and
his assignees demanding arrears of lease rent. It is also found from the record
that though the respondents/ Corporation has contended that the predecessor
in title of the petitioner has admitted the ownership of the respondents in the
sale deed dated 02.05.1941, perusal of the sale deed clearly indicates the
lease deed dated 15.08.1919 and contents of the said document clearly
indicates that the lease was executed on behalf of His Highness. Therefore, it
cannot be said that in the sale deed, there is admission regarding ownership
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
32 WP-23838-2022
of the Municipal Corporation. For the purpose of consideration of the matter

further, the provisions of Sections 107, 109, 111 and 116 of the Transfer of
Property Act are required to be referred to and are reproduced as under :
107. Leases how made
A lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding
one year or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered
instrument.
All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered
instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession.
Where a lease of immovable property is made by a registered instrument,
such instrument or, where there are more instruments than one, each such
instrument shall be executed by both the lessor and the lessee:
Provided that the State Government from time to time, by notification in the
Official Gazette, direct that leases of immovable property, other than leases
from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly
rent, or any class of such leases, may be made by unregistered instrument or by
oral agreement without delivery of possession.
109. Rights of lessor’s transferee.—
If the lessor transfers the property leased, or any part thereof, or any part of
his interest therein, the transferee, in the absence of a contract to the contrary,
shall possess all the rights, and, if the lessee so elects, be subject to all the
liabilities of the lessor as to the property or part transferred so long as he is the
owner of it; but the lessor shall not, by reason only of such transfer cease to be
subject to any of the liabilities imposed upon him by the lease, unless the lessee
elects to treat the transferee as the person liable to him:
Provided that the transferee is not entitled to arrears of rent due before the
transfer, and that, if the lessee, not having reason to believe that such transfer
has been made, pays rent to the lessor, the lessee shall not be liable to pay such
rent over again to the transferee.
The lessor, the transferee and the lessee may determine what proportion of
the premium or rent reserved by the lease is payable in respect of the part so
transferred, and, in case they disagree, such determination may be made by any
Court having jurisdiction to entertain a suit for the possession of the property
leased.
111. Determination of lease.—
A lease of immoveable property determines—
(a)by efflux of the time limited thereby;
(b)where such time is limited conditionally on the happening of some event—
by the happening of such event;
(c)where the interest of the lessor in the property terminates on, or his power to
dispose of the same extends only to, the happening of any event—by the
happening of such event;
(d)in case the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property
become vested at the same time in one person in the same right;
(e)by express surrender; that is to say, in case the lessee yields up his interest
under the lease to the lessor, by mutual agreement between them;
(f)by implied surrender;
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
33 WP-23838-2022
(g)by forfeiture; that is to say, (1) in case the lessee breaks an express
condition which provides that, on breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter;
or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a
third person or by claiming title in himself; or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an
insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening
of such event; and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice
in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease;
(h) on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, or of intention
to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to the other.
116. Effect of holding over.—
If a lessee or under-lessee of property remains in possession thereof after the
determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and the lessor or his legal
representative accepts rent from the lessee or under-lessee, or otherwise assents
to his continuing in possession, the lease is, in the absence of an agreement to
the contrary, renewed from year to year, or from month to month, according to
the purpose for which the property is leased, as specified in section 106.

22/ It is also required to be considered the Sections 82 and 83 of the
M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, which read as under :
82. Property vested in Corporation.-
(1) ] Subject to any special reservation made or to any special conditions
imposed by the Government, all property of the nature hereinafter in this
section specified and situated within the city, shall vest in and be under the
control of the Corporation, and with all other property which has already
vested, or may hereinafter vest in the Corporation shall be held and applied by
it for the purposes of this Act, namely :
(a)all public gates, markets, slaughter-houses, manure and night-soil deposits
and public buildings of every description which have been constructed or
maintained out of the municipal fund;
(b)all public streams, rivers, springs, and works for the supply, storage and
distribution of water for public purposes and all bridges, buildings, engines,
materials and things connected therewith or appertaining thereto, and also any
adjacent land (not being private property) appertaining to any public tank or
well;
(c)all public sewers and drains, and all sewers, drains, culverts and
watercourses in or under any public street or constructed by or tor the
Corporation along side any public street, and all works, materials and things
appertaining thereto;
(d)all dust, dirt, dugs, ashes, refuse, animal matter, or filth or rubbish of any
kind, or dead bodies, of animals, collected by the Corporation from the streets,
houses, privies, sewers, cesspools or elsewhere or deposited in places fixed by
the Corporation;
(e)all public lands, lamp-posts and apparatus connected therewith or
appertaining thereof;
(f)all land or other property transferred to the Corporation by the Government
or acquired by gift, purchase or otherwise for local public purposes;
(g)all public streets, not being land owned by the Government and the
pavements, stone and other material thereof and also trees growing on, and
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
34 WP-23838-2022
erections, materials, implements and things provided for such streets;
(h)all open lands which are neither the property of any person nor of the
Government.
(2) [ All property such as tank, playground, park, garden and other places meant
for public utility vested in the Corporation shall neither be used for any other
purpose nor be permitted to use for any other purpose by the Corporation.]
[Inserted by M.P. Act No. 29 of 2003.]
83. Record of immovable property-
[(1) The Corporation shall maintain a register and a map of all immovable
properly of which it is the proprietor or which vests in it otherwise or which it
holds in trust for the Government.
(2) [ The Commissioner, after having demarcated every land, building,
establishment and plant etc. in the ownership of the Corporation, shall arrange
to affix therein the boards showing that the said property is in the ownership of
the Corporation.
(3) The Commissioner at each year in the budget meeting of the Corporation
shall publish the details of all immovable property of the Corporation and send
its copy along with the agenda to the members.
(4) The Commissioner shall, from time to time, in order to save from
encroachment on the property of the Corporation inspect and take action to
remove the encroachment if found.]

23/ Whereby the Corporation is possessing the list of immoveable
properties held by the Corporation, which is kept in register, but no such list
or register has been produced on record to demonstrate that the subject
property was vested in the Indore Municipal Corporation. As such, prima-
facie, there is no believable material, which clearly establish the fact that the
Indore Municipal Corporation has title or right over the subject property,
which also in turn, the Corporation is empowered to take action against the
petitioner for further proceeding of cancellation of the lease which is subject
matter of present petition. It also transpires from the record that various
contentions are tried to raise by the respondents including entertainability of
present petition in view of the alternate efficacious remedy. It is relevant to
note that the matter is admitted and is pending since 2022 and Hon'ble Apex
Court on many occasion has observed that once the matter is admitted and
heard finally, at the final stage, it is not proper for the Court to relegate the
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
35 WP-23838-2022
parties for alternative efficacious remedy, otherwise also, looking to the

subject matter of present petition, it cannot be said that no powers are
required to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, more
particularly, the judgment delivered in the case of Whirlpool Corporation Vs.
Registrar of Trade reported in (1998) 8 SCC11 where four categories are
given and the impugned action of the respondents can also be examined
from the angle, whether it is arbitrary or against the principle of natural
justice, or without authority or jurisdiction, and therefore, that contention is
not found good and required to be negative. It also transpires that the
property in question bearing plot bearing old no. 11/7 (new no. 17) M.G.
Road Indore is part of Khasra No. 403. The said Khasra no. 403 has been
recorded as Government land in the revenue record maintained under the
M.P. Land Revenue Code 1959. The entire Khasra no. 403 is divided in to
24 parts and the name of the government is standing in the entire record. In
Khasra No. 403/1665, it is mentioned as Cemetery and area is 0.045 hectare
i.e. 4400 Sq. feet., therefore, it can be inferred that the petitioner's plot cannot
be the part of the Cemetery and as has rightly been decided by this Hon'ble
Court in earlier round of litigation. It also requires to be noted that in the
Khasra No. 403/1664 and Khasra No. 403/1663, name of Municipality
Indore is standing and name of Hotel Princess Palace is mentioned in column
no. 12. The subject plot is the property situated in between the Khasra No.
403/1 to 403/33, which can be cleared from the NOC dated 03.12.2013
issued by the Sub Divisional Officer Indore. It also transpires from the record
that the petitioner has applied for demarcation of the subject property before
the Tahsildar, who vide order dated 29.03.2012 allowed the demarcation of
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
36 WP-23838-2022
the property and confirmed that the subject plot is part of Khasra No. 403. It

is thus clear from the record that it is an undisputed fact that the subject land
was leased out by His Highness Maharaja Holkar and therefore the said land
vested in the State government after independence in the year 1947 and
merger of princely state in Republic of India. Therefore, prima-facie, the
contention raised by counsel for the petitioner is required to be accepted that
the government property cannot be said to be open land vested in the Indore
Municipal Corporation Indore, in absence of any documents produced by
IMC like list of the property is maintained in the Register of the Corporation
etc or any other document which clearly indicates the vesting of the land in
question. From the record, it also clarified that the Indore Municipal
Corporation Indore has granted some permission for establishment of
petroleum outlet, shed & store/toilet on the land, which was the subject
matter of the lease in the year 1960, 1972 & 1983, even Gas Godown was
constructed over the plot bearing no. 11/6 and other properties are also there
on plot no. 11/5. Therefore, it seems that the Indore Municipal Corporation
had permitted commercial use of the property and no notice of termination
till date was given to owner of plot no. 11/5 and therefore, there is substance
found in the contention raised by the petitioner that there is hostile
discrimination has been done by the Corporation by issuing notice to the
petitioner. It also transpires that the master plan is binding on the corporation
and once a building plan is submitted for approval, it has to be considered the
permitted user under the master plan and cannot sit in appeal over the master
plan and contends that the user indicated in the master plan was erroneous
done. The user indicated in the lease gets superseded by operation of law
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
37 WP-23838-2022
under the master plan and once the user is defined in law, no reliance can be

placed on the terms of the lease deed to restrict the user as the same would
then be contrary to the master plan. Therefore, in view of the above
discussions, it is required to be appreciated the contentions raised by the
petitioner and would require to be accepted as the land in question of the
petitioner forms a part entirely separate from the land of the cemetery and the
lease conditions governing the cemetery in question not applying to the
parcel of the land of the petitioner and granting building permissions by the
corporation to other parcels of land forming part of the lease hold property;
the acts of the Indore Municipal Corporation cannot be considered in
accordance with law. It is also relevant to refer to the judgment, which is
mainly relied on by counsel for the respondent in the case of Sajni dio
Dwarkadas Bajaj Versus Indore Development Authority & others reported in
2012(1) MPLJ 53 is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of present
case as the petitioner has challenged the impugned order on the ground that
the respondent have no jurisdiction to cancel the lease agreement as the land
in question belonging to the State and it cannot be said that there is many
disputed question of fact involved in the present case. The case of the parties
are relied on the admitted documents and on that count also, writ is required
to be entertained and even in the judgment delivered in Sajni Bajaj, the
Division Bench expressly kept the validity of cancellation open for
adjudication before the competent forum. The ratio was confined to the
proposition that disputed questions concerning breach of lease covenants and
consequential civil rights could not ordinarily be adjudicated in writ
jurisdiction and independently. In the present case, the facts are much
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
38 WP-23838-2022
different. The other judgments, which are cited by counsel for the

respondents, are required to be reproduced, which are as under :
A. Sajni v. Indore Development Authority, 2011 SCC OnLine MP 1308 :
(2012) 1 MP LJ 53.
14. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and
considered their contentions.
16. In order to appreciate the controversy, it would be appropriate to extract
the relevant portion of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State
of U.P. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh (supra) on which, as stated
above, both the parties have placed strong reliance:
“10. The High Court was persuaded to the view that the proceedings
initiated and the action taken by the Government and the Vice-Chairman of the
LDA in the matter, respectively, of forfeiture of the lease and the cancellation
of the permission to build were both infirm in law and required, to be quashed.
Accordingly, writ petitions 6819 of 1985 and WP 367 of 1986 were allowed
and the order dated 19-11-1985 of the Government purporting to cancel the
lease was quashed. Likewise, WP 3463 of 1986 filed jointly by the Lessees
was allowed and the show cause notice dated 9-1-1986 as well as the order
dated 19-4-1986 of the Vice-Chairman cancelling the permission were
quashed.
11. We may first take up the appeals of the State Government and of the
LDA assailing the order of the High Court quashing the cancellation of the
lease. Sri Yogeshwar Prasad for the appellants submitted that the High Court
fell into an error in allowing a matter, which should properly have been the
subject-matter of a civil-suit, to be agitated in proceedings under Article 226 of
the Constitution. Learned counsel submitted that the relationship between the
parties was one of the Lessor and Lessee; the dispute between them pertained
to the question whether there were breaches and non-performance of the
covenants and conditions of the lease justifying the forfeiture of the lease, and
that these matters, pertained to a private law situation and were not
appropriately matters for enforcement of public law remedies. Learned Counsel
further submitted that the question whether there were breaches of covenants
on the part of the lessee involved the construction of the terms of the lease-
deed and required evidence on the matter. Disputes of this nature, learned
counsel submitted, could not be resolved on mere affidavits. Thirdly, Sri
Yogeshwar Prasad submitted that on the merits of the contentions, the High
Court should have noticed that even on the facts admitted, there were clear
violations of the covenants and conditions of the lease; Learned counsel also
submitted that the view of the High Court that a reasonable opportunity of
being heard had been denied to the respondents was erroneous and that, at all
events, no hearing could be contemplated in the context for forfeiture of a lease
of this nature.
Sri Sorabjee for the respondents contended that the State, even as a lessor,
could not act arbitrarily either in the grant or premature termination of the
leases of public property and disputes arising in such contexts cannot always be
reckoned as private law situations and that, at all events, the threatened
exercise of extra-judicial re-entry by the State, being violative both of the
limitations of the powers of the State as lessor under the law of landlord and
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
39 WP-23838-2022
tenant and of its actions as State, is a matter which requires to be mandated
against.
12. The show-cause notice preceding the cancellation of the lease and the
decision dated 19-11-1985 to cancel the lease, refer to and rely upon 10
grounds. Grounds 1 to 7 pertain to what the Government consider to be
violations and breaches of the terms and conditions of the lease. They pertain
to an alleged change of user, to subletting and subdivision of the leasehold
property. The grounds also refer to the alleged non-disclosure of the terms and
conditions of the Memorandum dated 7-7-1984 between the Lessees on the
one hand and Messrs Amar Builders Private Limited oh the other. The grounds
for forfeiture also refer to the likelihood of fraud being practiced on the
prospective purchasers of the fiats as to the nature and extent of the lessees’
subsisting interest under the lease and the limitations thereon.
We do not propose to go into the merits of these grounds and their
sufficiency in law to support the purported forfeiture as, in our view, this
exercise, having regard to the disputed questions of fact that are required to be
gone into in that behalf, are extraneous to proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
13. In regard to the merits of the grounds for forfeiture of the lease, the High
Court after an elaborate discussion of the relevance and tenability of each of
the grounds, the learned judge held:
“From the comments made by me on the above nine grounds it would be
seen that some of the grounds are irrelevant or illusory or based on irrelevant
material or on non-existent facts and some require serious consideration which
has not been given. It has also been seen that while under the lease-deed the
right of re-entry could be exercised only for a breach of the term of the lease in
presenti, the lease has been cancelled for a breach in future. In this view of the
matter the impugned order of the State Government cannot be sustained;”
Shri Yogeshwar Prasad says that this exercise was extraneous to a
proceeding under Article 226 as the question whether the construction with 39
flats would be one unit or multiplicity of units; whether if third party rights
were created by the transfer, or use, of the flat, that would amount to sub-
letting or assignment; Or would, in arty other way, violate the terms and
conditions of the lease and the like, would not be matters that admit of being
satisfactorily resolved on mere affidavits. Learned counsel submitted that even
according to the learned judges there were serious questions to be examined.
14. On a consideration of the matter, we think, in the facts and
circumstances of this case, the High Court should have abstained from the
examination of the legality or correctness of the purported cancellation of the
lease which involved resolution of disputes on questions of fact as well. In
Express News Papers v. Union of India, [1985] Supp. 3 SCR 382
Venkataxamiah, J. in a somewhat analogous situation observed:
“The rest of the questions relate truly to the civil rights of the parties flowing
from the lease deed. Those questions cannot be effectively disposed of in this
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The questions arising out of the
lease, such as, whether there has been breach of the covenants under the lease,
whether the lease can be forfeited, whether relief against forfeiture can be
granted etc. are foreign to the scope of Article 32 of the Constitution. They
cannot be decided just on affidavits. These are matters which should be tried in
a regular civil proceeding. One should remember that the property belongs to
the Union of India and the rights in it cannot be bartered away in accordance

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
40 WP-23838-2022
with the sweet will of an Officer or a Minister or a Lt. Governor but they
should be dealt with in accordance with law. At the same time a person who
has acquired rights in such property cannot also be deprived of them except in
accordance with law. The stakes in this case are very high for both the parties
and neither of them can take law into his own hands.”
Accordingly, we hold that the question whether the purported forfeiture and
cancellation of the lease were valid or not should not have been allowed to be
agitated in proceedings under Article 226.
15. Sri Sorabjee submitted that great hardship and injustice would be
occasioned to the respondents if the State Government, on the self-assumed
and self-assessed validity of its own action of cancellation of the lease,
attempts at and succeeds in, a resumption of possession extra-judicially by
physical force. Sri Sorabjee referred to the notice dated 19-11-1985 in which
the Government, according to Sri Sorabjee, had left no-one in doubt as to its
intentions of resorting to an extra-judicial resumption of possession. Sri
Sorabjee referred to paras 3.10 and 4 of the order dated 19-11-1985.
A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession extra-
judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry or earlier
termination of, the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression
‘re-entry’ in the lease-deed does not authorise extrajudicial methods to resume
possession. Under law, the possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its
earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible dispossession is
prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of
law. In, the present case, the fact that the lessor is the State does not place it, in
any higher or better position. On the contrary, it is under an additional
inhibition stemming from the requirement that all actions of Government and
Governmental authorities should have a ‘legal pedigree’. In Bishandas v. State
of Punjab, [1962] 2 SCR 69 this Court said:
“We must, therefore, repel the argument based on the contention that the
petitioners were trespassers and could be removed by an executive order. The
argument is not only specious but highly dangerous by reason of its
implications and impact on law and order.”
“Before we part with this case, we feel it our duty to say that the executive
action taken in this case by the State and its officers is destructive of the basic
principle of the rule of law,”
Therefore, there is no question in the present case of the Government
thinking of appropriating to itself an extra-judicial right of re-entry. Possession
can be resumed by Government only in a manner known to or recognised by
law. It cannot resume possession otherwise than in accordance with law.
Government is, accordingly, prohibited from taking possession otherwise than
in due, course of law.
16. In the result, the appeals of the State of Uttar Pradesh (SLPs 4761 and
4762 of 1987) and of the LDA (SLPs 13298 and 11498 of 1987) directed
against the common Judgment dated 8-12-1985 in so far as it pertains to WP
6819 of 1985 and WP 357 of 1986 are allowed and the said two writ petitions
are dismissed, leaving the question of the legality and validity of the purported
cancellation of the lease and the defence of the lessees open to be urged in
appropriate legal proceedings, whenever and wherever Government proceeds
to initiate action in accordance with law for resumption of possession on the
basis of the alleged cancellation or forfeiture of the lease. Any developmental
work that may be made by the lessees or at their instance would, of course, be

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
41 WP-23838-2022
at their own risk and shall be subject to the result of such proceedings.”
19. Having considered the aforesaid submissions of the learned counsel, for
the parties, we find that both the parties are at one on the point that this Court,
while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot
examine the correctness and validity of the impugned order of cancellation of
lease deed. We are also of the view that the questions, which are involved in
the matter, relate truly of the civil right of the parties flowing from the lease
deed. These questions cannot be effectively decided in this petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as has been held by the Supreme Court
in the case of State of U.P. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh (supra). The
questions arising out of the lease; such as, whether there has been breach of
covenant under the lease, whether there was a valid sanction for the
construction, which has been raised by the petitioner, the stand of the petitioner
that there was obstruction in raising the further construction and that the
sanction of building map by the Indore Municipal Corporation was made
known to the IDA and at no point of time, the IDA objected for raising of the
said construction, are all questions, which cannot be decided in this writ
petition. These are the questions, which require trial either in regular civil
proceedings or in a proceeding for eviction, if initiated by the IDA under the
Public Premises Eviction Act. In the circumstances, we refrain ourselves from
deciding these disputed questions of fact in this petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India

B. State of U.P. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 505 :
1989 SCC OnLine SC 63 at page 516
27. On a consideration of the matter, we think, in the facts and
circumstances of this case, the High Court should have abstained from the
examination of the legality or correctness of the purported cancellation of the
lease which involved resolution of disputes on questions of fact as well. In
Express Newspapers v. Union of India [(1986) 1 SCC 133 : 1985 Supp 3 SCR
382] Venkataramiah, J. in a somewhat analogous situation observed: (SCC p.
258, para 202)
“The rest of the questions relate truly to the civil rights of the parties flowing
from the lease deed. Those questions cannot be effectively disposed of in this
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The questions arising out of the
lease, such as, whether there has been breach of the covenants under the lease,
whether the lease can be forfeited, whether relief against forfeiture can be
granted etc. are foreign to the scope of Article 32 of the Constitution. They
cannot be decided just on affidavits. These are matters which should be tried in
a regular civil proceeding. One should remember that the property belongs to
the Union of India and the rights in it cannot be bartered away in accordance
with the sweet will of an officer or a Minister or a Lt. Governor but they should
be dealt with in accordance with law. At the same time a person who has
acquired rights in such property cannot also be deprived of them except in
accordance with law. The stakes in this case are very high for both the parties
and neither of them can take law into his own hands.”
28. Accordingly, we hold that the question whether the purported forfeiture
and cancellation of the lease were valid or not should not have been allowed to
be agitated in proceedings under Article 226.

Municipal Corporation Indore Vs. State of M;P and others reported in 1972 JLJ

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
42 WP-23838-2022
614
6. Section 36 of the Indore Municipal Act, 1909 reads thus:
"36 (1) Subject to any special reservation which may be made by the
Government, all property of the nature hereinafter in this section specified and
situated within the limits of the Municipality shall be municipal property
vested in the Commissioner on behalf of the government and shall, with all
other property which may become so vested, be under his direction,
management and control, and shall be held and applied by him for the purposes
of this Act, that is to say:-
(a) All public town-walls, gates, markets, slaughter houses, manure and night-
soil depots and public buildings of every description which have been
constructed or are maintained out of the Municipal Fund;
(b) All public streams, springs and works for the supply, storage and
distribution of water for public purposes, and all bridges, buildings engines,
materials and things connected therewith or appertaining thereto and also any
adjacent land (not being private property) appertaining to any public tank or
well;
(c) All public sewers and drains, and all sewers, drains, culverts and water-
courses in, alongside or under any street, and all works, materials and things
appertaining thereto;
(d) all dust, dirt, dung, ashes, refuse, animal matter or filth or rubbish of any
kind, or dead bodies of animals collected by the Municipal servants, from the
streets, houses, privies, sewers, elsewhere, or deposited in places fixed under
section 49
(e) all public lamps, lamp posts, and apparatus connected or appertaining
thereto;
(f) all land or other property transferred to the Municipality by purchase or
otherwise for local public purposes
(g) all streets, and the pavements, stones and the other material of, and all trees,
erections, materials, Implements and provided for such streets; and
(b) all lands and open sites which are neither private property hot in possession
of any department of the State.
(2) The Government may, by notification in the Holkar Government Gazette
direct that any property which has vested under sub-section (1) in the
Commissioner shall cease to be so vested, and thereupon the property specified
in the notification shall cease to be so so vested and the Government may pass
such orders as it think t thereupon the property specified in the notification
shall cease to be regarding the disposal and management of such property",
Government may make the properties mentioned in this section shall vest in It
is clear from this provision that subject to any reservation which the State the
municipality and shall be municipal properties. Clause (h) of sub-section (1) of
this section refers to open sites which are neither private properties nor are in
possession of any department of the State. It cannot, therefore, be doubted, and
it is also not contested, that by the constitution of the Indore Municipality
under the provisions of the Indore Municipal Act, 1909, all open lands, which
were neither private property and nor in possession of any particular
department of the State, became municipal property and vested in the
Commissioner, and in consequence all these open lands were managed, leased
out and disposed of by the Indore Municipality. In 1954 the Indore Act was
substituted by the M. P. Municipalities Act and section 2 and its proviso saved
the Municipalities constituted under the old Act and all actions taken under that

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
43 WP-23838-2022
Act. Section 48 of the M. B. Act provided for vesting of the properties in a
municipality, and it was as follows:
48. All property of the nature hereinafter in this section specified, and not being
specially reserved by the Government shall be vested in and belong to the
municipality, and shall, together with all other property, of what nature of kind
soever not being specially reserved by the Government, which may become
vested in the municipality, be under their direction, management and control,
and shall be held and applied by them as trustees, subject to the provisions and
for the purposes of this Act, that is to say-
(a) all public town-walls, gates, markets, slaughter houses, manure and night-
soil depots, and public buildings of every description;
(b) all public stream, tanks, reserviors, cisterns, wells, springs, aqueducts,
conduits, tunnels, pipes, pumps and other waterworks, and all bridges,
buildings, engines, works, materials and things "connected therewith or
appertaining thereto, and also any adjacent land (not being private property),
appertaining to any public tank or well;
(c) ail public sewers and drains, and all sewers, drains, tunnels, colverts,
gutters and water courses in, alongside and under any streets, all dust, dirt,
dung, ashes, refuse, animal matter, filth, night-soil or rubbish of any kind
collected by the municipality or by customary or private sweepers from the
streets, houses, privies, sewers, cesspools, or elsewhere;
(d) all public lamps, lamp-posts, and apparatus connected therewith, or
appertaining thereto;
(e) all lands transferred to them by the Government, or by gift or otherwise for
local public purposes;
(f) all public streets, and the pavements, stones and other materials also thereof
and also all trees, erections, materials, implements and things provided for
such streets."
This provision clearly indicates that the properties will continue to vest in the
municipality except if any reservations are made by the Government. It is also
clear from the provisions of this Act that the municipality shall apply these
properties as trustees subject to the provisions and for the purposes of this Act.
It cannot, therefore, be disputed that the properties that vested in the
municipality under the Indore Act continued to vest in it even after the M. B.
Act came into force. This Act was later substituted by the M. P. Municipalities
Act, section 100 of which is as under:
"100. (1) Subject to any special reservation made or any special conditions
imposed by the State Government, all property of the nature hereinafter in this
section specified within the limits of the Municipality, shall vest in and be
under the control of the Council and with all other property which has already
vested, or may hereafter vest in the Council, shall be held and applied by it as
trustees for the purposes of this Act, that is to say-
(a) all public town-walls, gates, markets, slaughter-houses, manure and night-
soil depots and public buildings of every description which have been
constructed or maintained out of the Municipal Fund;
(b) all public streams, tanks, reservoirs, cisterns, wells, springs, aqueducts,
conduits, tunnels, pipes, pumps and other water works, and all bridges,
buildings, engines, works, materials and things connected with "or
appertaining thereto, and also adjacent land not being private property,
appertaining to any public tank or well;
(c) all public sewers and drains and all sewers, drains, tunnels, culverts, gutters

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
44 WP-23838-2022
and water-courses in, alongside or under any streets and all works, materials
and thing things appertaining thereto;
(d) all dust, dirt, dung, ashes, refuse, animal matter, filth, night-soil or rubbish
of any kind collected by the Council or by any customary or private sweeper
from the streets, houses, privies, sewers, cesspools or elsewhere:
(e) all public lamps, lamp-posts and apparatus connected therewith, or
appertaining thereto;
(f) all public streets, not being land owned by the State Government and the
pavement, stone and other material thereof and also trees growing on and
erections, materials, implements and things provided for such street.
(g) all lands and/or other property transferred to the Council by the State
Government or acquired by gift, purchase or otherwise for public purposes.
(2) The State Government may, by notification, direct that any property which
has vested in the Council shall cease to be so vested; and thereupon the
property specified in the notification shall cease to be so
vested, and the State Government may pass such orders as it thinks regarding
the disposal and management of such property,
(3) The State Government may resume any immovable property such property
is required for a public purpose, without payment of any compensation other
than the amount paid by the counsel for such and the market value at the date
of resumption of any building or works subsequently erected or executed
thereon by the council.
Provided that before taking any such action, the State Government shall obtain
and take into consideration the view or objections of the Council:
Provided further that compensation need not be paid for buildings or works
constructed or erected in contravention of the terms of the transfer."
This section clearly indicates that all property of the nature specified therein
within the limits of the municipality shall vest in and be under the control of
the municipality of course subject to any reservation made or conditions
imposed by the State Government under the Act. It cannot be doubted that in
fact these properties vested in the municipality even before this Act came into
force and there is no case of any reservations or conditions prescribed by the
State under the Act. it is no doubt true that the restriction provided in this
section was that the properties shall be applied and held as trustees for the
purposes of the Act. Clause (g) of sub-section (1) of section 100 of this Act
clearly refers to the properties of the kind which are in dispute in this petition.
Sub-sections (2) and (3) of this section provide the manner in which the
Government can, if it so desires, take back the property which vested in the
municipality under this Act. In any event, that question is not before us and it is
not the case of the Government that they have chosen to act under these sub-
sections of section 100. There is, therefore, no need to go into the question as
to whether under sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 100 the Government could
take action pertaining to the properties which had vested in the petitioner long
before this Act came into force. As there is no dispute that the Government had
not chosen to act under these provisions, it is not necessary for us to go into
that question, and it cannot be disputed that the properties, which vested in the
Indore Municipality long before the passing of this Act, continued to vest in it.
Section 101 of this Act also indicates that even under the present Act transfer
of certain lands with the Nazul Deportment to a municipal council is
contemplated. This only indicates that where municipalities may be constituted
under the provisions of this Act for the first time, it may be possible for the

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
45 WP-23838-2022
State to transfer such open pieces of land. This clearly shows that vesting of
properties in local bodies even under the scheme of this Act is not a matter not
contemplated. In 1956, M. B. Municipal Corporation Act was brought into
force and later the same Act with slight modifications was enacted as the M. P.
Municipal Corporation Act which came into force in 1961. Section 80 of the
M. P. Municipal Corporation Act is as under:
(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1)
-a) the Commissioner may, in his discretion grant a lease of any immovable
property belonging to the Corporation, including any right of fishing or of
gathering and taking fruit, flowers and the like of which the premium or rent or
both as the case may be, does not exceed five hundred rupees for any period
not exceeding twelve months at the time:
Provided that every such lease granted by the Commissioner, other than the
lease or the class in respect of which Standing Committee has by resolution
exempted the Commissioner from compliance with the requirements of this
proviso, shall be reported by him to the Standing Committee within 15 days
after the same has been gran-ted;
(b) within the sanction of the Standing Committee, the Commissioner may by
sale or otherwise grant a lease of immovable property including any such right
as aforesaid, for any period not exceeding three years at a time of which the
premium or rent or both, as the case may be, for any of one year does not
exceed three thousand rupees;
(c) with the sanction of the Corporation the Commissioner may lease, sell,
otherwise convey any immovable property belonging to the Corporation.
(3) The Commissioner may-
(a) in his discretion dispose of by sale, letting out on hire or otherwise, any
movable property belonging to the Corporation not exceeding five hundred
rupees in value;
(b) with the sanction of Standing Committee, dispose of by sale, let ting out on
hire or otherwise any immovable property belonging to the Corporation not
exceeding five thousand rupees in value;
(c) with the sanction of the Corporation sell, let out on hire or other-wise
convey any "movable property belonging to the Corporation.
(4) The sanction of the Standing Committee or of the Corporation under sub
section (2) or sub-section (3) may be given either generally for any class of
cases or specifically in any particular case,
(5) The foregoing provisions of this section shall apply to every disposal of
property belonging to the Corporation made under or for the purpose of this
Act:
Provided that-
(1) no property vesting in the Corporation in trust shall be leased, sold or
otherwise conveyed in a manner that is likely to prejudically affect the purpose
of the trust subject to which such property is held;
(ii) no land exceeding twenty five thousand rupees in value shall be sold or
otherwise conveyed without the previous sanction of the Government and
every sale or other conveyance of property vesting in the Corporation shall be
deemed to be subject to the conditions and limitations imposed by this Act or
by any other enactment for the time being in force."
This provision clearly indicates and provides for a complete scheme for
management of properties within the limits of the Corporation. It is, therefore,
clear that this section also provides for-the-management-of-the properties that

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
46 WP-23838-2022
had already vested in the Corporation long before the Act came into force,
Section 82 of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act is as under:
"82. Subject to any special reservation.made or to say special conditions
imposed by the Government all property of the nature hereinafter in this
section specified and situated within the city, shall wear and be under the
control of the Corporation and with all other property which has already vested
or may hereafter vest in the Corporation be held and applied by it for the
purposes of this Act, namely that
(a) all public gates, markets, slaughter-houses, manure and night-oil depots and
public buildings of every description which have been constructed or
maintained out of the Municipal Fund;
(b) all public streams, rivers, springs, and works for the supply, storage and
distribution of water for public purposes and all bridges buildings, engines,
materials and things connected therewith of appertaining thereto, and also any
adjacent land (not being private property) appertaining to any public tank or
well;
(c) all public sewers and drains, and all sewers, drains, culverts and water-
courses in or under any public street or constructed by or for the Corporation
alongside any public strect, and all works, mate rials and things appertaining
thereto;
(d) all dust, dungs, ashes, refuse, animal matter, or filth or rubbish of of any
kind, or dead bodies of animals, collected by the Corpora tion from the streets,
houses, privies, sewers, cess-pools or elsewhere or deposited in places fixed by
the Corporation; appertaining thereto; (e) all public lands, lamp-posts and
apparatus connected therewith or
(f) all land or other property transferred to the Corporation by the Government
or acquired by gift, purchase or otherwise for local public purposes;
V(g) all public streets, not being land owned by the Government and the
pavements, stone and other material thereof and also trees growing on, and
erections, materials, implements and thing provided for such streets;
all open lands which are neither the property of any person nor of the
Government."
This provision makes it clear that all properties in the nature specified therein
vested in the Corporation and shall be under the control and management of the
Corporation except subject to certain reservations, and sub-clause (h) of this
section refers to all open lands which are neither the property of any person nor
of the Government, a provision more or less similar to sub clause (h) of section
36 of the Indore Municipal Act, 1909. Consequently it cannot be doubted that
under this provision all open lands, which were not private properties and are
also not the properties of any department of the Government, shall vest in the
Corporation. Apart from the fact, in the case of the petitioner these properties
had already vested in the petitioner long before this Act came into force. It
cannot, therefore, be doubted that all open lands within the limits of the
Corporation, which are not private lands, continued to vest in the petitioner,
and the petitioner had the power and authority under this Act as indicated in
section 80 to deal with these lands.

7. What is contended on behalf of the respondents is that what had vested in
the petitioner is not the absolute property rights. It is in substance contended
that the ownership rights have not been vested in the municipality or the
Corporation but only the power of management has been entrusted to il under

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
47 WP-23838-2022
the respective statutes, and as the Government happens to be the owner of the
lands, it is entitled to withdraw the power of management conferred on the
local bodies. Reliance in this respect was placed on section 57 of the M. P.
Land Revenue Code, which is as under:
57. (1) All lands belong to the State Government and it is hereby declared that
all such lands, including standing and flowing water, mines, quarries, minerals
and forests reserved or not, and all ment: sub-soil
Provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect any rights of any
person subsisting at the coming into force of this Code in any such property.
(2) Where a dispute arises between the State Government and any person in
respect of any right under sub-section (1) such dispute shall be decided by the
Sub-Divisional Officer.
(3) Any person aggrieved by any order passed under sub-section (2) may
institute a civil suit to contest the validity of the order within a period of one
year from the date of such order,
(4) Where a civil suit has been instituted under sub-section (3) against any
order, such order shall not be subject to appeal or revision."
I cannot be doubted that this provision itself saves the rights of parties in whom
rights have been vested prior to the passing of this Code. Apparently, therefore,
section 57 cannot be used to contend that by this provision the peti tioner-
Corporation has been divested of the properties which had vested in it. It is also
not contended that the Revenue Book Circulars under which the respondents
now claim to administer and manage the lands (open sites within the
Corporation limits) have any statutory sanction. It is, therefore, clear that
whatever incident of property vested in the petitioner under respective pro-
visions of the Acts referred to above could not be taken away by an adminis-
trative circular, order or instruction. In this view of the matter, it is not
necessary for us to go into the question of the extent of rights that were confer-
red under the various statutes relating to these properties on the petitioner, and
the effect of subsequent enactments on those rights. As discussed above, it
cannot be doubted that under all the statutes these properties have been pro-
tected as they have vested in the municipality or the petitioner-Corporation.
Thus whatever rights vested in the petitioner are rights under a statuie. It
cannot, therefore, be doubted that by an administrative action the petitioner
cannot be deprived of those rights which vested in it under various Acts men-
tioned above.

C. State of M.P. v. Hukumchand Mills Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine MP 1175 :
(2018) 4 MP LJ 467 at page 474
22. The record reflects that the Indore Municipal Corporation was set up by the
Indore Municipal Act, 1909. The Holkar State had transferred all the lands and
open sites within the municipal limits which was not the private property and in
possession of any department of the State to the Municipal Corporation Indore
by the notification dated 18th June, 1917 which reads as under:—
“PART I THE HOLKAR SIRKAR GAZETTE JUNE 18, 1917
Home Department.
Notification.
It is notified for general information that His Highness the Maharaja in Hazur
Shri Shankar Order No. 214 dated 19-5-17, is pleased to accord sanction to the
transfer to the District Municipalities of all lands and open sites that lie within
the Municipal limits of the towns where Municipalities have been established,

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
48 WP-23838-2022
but which are neither the private property nor are in possession of the Revenue
Department or any other departments of the State.

29. In terms of the proviso to sub-section (1) above, the right which were
existing on the date of coming into force of the Code were unaffected and
substantive provision contain in section 57(1) did not nullify such right.
Undisputely present case relates to rights existing prior to introduction of Code,
hence section 57 will have no effect on such rights.

D . Vashu Deo v. Balkishan, (2002) 2 SCC 50 : 2002 SCC OnLine SC 66 at
page 57
6. We now proceed to examine whether the appellant could have directly
attorned to the owner Trust bypassing the respondent-tenant on 1-4-1983,
relying on the event of institution of suit for eviction by the owner Trust
against the respondent-tenant on 30-3-1983 and whether the said event enables
successfully raising of the plea of respondent-tenant's eviction by paramount
title, bringing the obligation of the appellant sub-tenant to deliver possession
over the tenancy premises to the respondent and to pay rent to him till that
date. Under Section 108 clause (q) of the Transfer of Property Act, in the
absence of contract or local usage to the contrary, it is an obligation of the
tenant to put his lessor into possession of the property on the termination of the
lease. Section 116 of the Evidence Act, which codifies the common law rule of
estoppel between landlord and tenant, provides that no tenant of immovable
property or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance
of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had at the
beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property. The rule of
estoppel so enacted has three main features: (i) the tenant is estopped from
disputing the title of his landlord over the tenancy premises at the beginning of
the tenancy; (ii) such estoppel continues to operate so long as the tenancy
continues and unless the tenant has surrendered possession to the landlord; and
(iii) Section 116 of the Evidence Act is not the whole law of estoppel between
the landlord and tenant. The principles emerging from Section 116 can be
extended in their application and also suitably adapted to suit the requirement
of an individual case. Rule of estoppel which governs an owner of an
immovable property and his tenant would also mutatis mutandis govern a
tenant and his sub-tenant in their relationship inter se. As held by the Privy
Council in Currimbhoy & Co. Ltd. v. L.A. Creet [AIR 1933 PC 29 : 60 IA 297]
and Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh [AIR 1915 PC 96 : 42 IA 202] the
estoppel continues to operate so long as the tenant has not openly restored
possession by surrender to his landlord. It follows that the rule of estoppel
ceases to have applicability once the tenant has been evicted. His obligation to
restore possession to his landlord is fulfilled either by actually fulfilling the
obligation or by proving his landlord's title having been extinguished by his
landlord's eviction by a paramount title-holder. Eviction by paramount title-
holder is a good defence bringing to an end the obligation of the tenant to put
the lessor in possession of the property under Section 108(q) of the Transfer of
Property Act. The burden of proving eviction by title paramount lies on the
party who sets up such defence.

E. Kumar Krishna Prosad Lal Singha Deo v. Baraboni Coal Concern, Ltd.,
1937 SCC OnLine PC 54:(1937) 46 LW 201:(1936-37) 64 IA 311:(1937) 39
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
49 WP-23838-2022
Bom LR 1034:1937 All LJ 1389:AIR 1937 PC 251:(1937) 2 Mad LJ 286:1937
OWN 866 at page 206
The section does not deal or profess to deal with all kinds of estoppel or
occasions of estoppel which may arise between landlord and tenant. It deals
with one cardinal and simple estoppel and states it first as applicable between
landlord and tenant and then as between licensor and licensee, a distinction
which corresponds to that between the parties to an action for rent and the
parties to an action for use and occupation. Whether during the currency of a
term the tenant by attornment to A who claims to have the reversion, or the
landlord by acceptance of rent from B who claims to be entitled to the term is
estopped from disputing the claim which he has once admitted are important
questions, but they are instances of cases which are outside S. 116 altogether;
and it may well be that as in English law the estoppel in such cases proceeds
upon somewhat different grounds and is not wholly identical in character and
in completeness with the case covered by the section. The section postulates
that there is a tenancy still continuing, that it had its beginning at a given date
from a given landlord. It provides that neither a tenant nor anyone claiming
through a tenant shall be heard to deny that particular landlord had at that date
a title to the property. In the ordinary case of a lease intended as a present
demise—which is the case before the Board on this appeal—the section
applies against the lessee, any assignee of the term and any sublessee or
licensee. What all such persons are precluded from denying is that the lessor
had a title at the date of the lease and there is no exception even for the case
where the lease itself discloses the defect of title. The principle does not apply
to disentitle a tenant to dispute the derivative title of one who claims to have
since become entitled to the reversion, though in such cases there may be other
grounds of estoppel, e.g., by attornment, acceptance of rent, etc. In this sense it
is true enough that the principle only applies to the title of the landlord who
“let the tenant in” as distinct from any other person claiming to be reversioner.
Nor does the principle apply to prevent a tenant from pleading that the title of
the original lessor has since come to an end.
In the present case therefore the defendant company could not dispute that the
Raja in 1912 had title to the property demised and this merely by reason of
their position as assignees of the term. There is no ground whatever for the
notion that Radha Ballav did not get possession or never had more than what in
English law was called an interesse termini. He entered under the lease and he
and his assigns have occupied and paid rent under it for years. An inquiry
whether the defendant company when they took their assignment in 1914 were
or were not then in possession has in their Lordships' view no bearing whatever
upon the application of S. 116 or on the rights of the parties. It is quite true that
in this particular case the assignment by the lessee to the defendant company
was part of a compromise to which the Raja was a party. But the defendant
company took no new title from him: they took the title of his lessee: though
the Raja as a party to the compromise was precluded from denying that the
original term was now vested in them. “The tenancy” under S. 116 does not
begin afresh every time the interest of the tenant or of the landlord devolves
upon a new individual by succession or assignment. In India, where tenants
may have occupancy right, and permanent or unlimited tenures are well
known, the application of S. 116 may not always be clear; but the present case
raises no difficulty, and there being no dispute as to the plaintiff's derivative
title it seems profitless to inquire into the position as at 1914 when the landlord

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
50 WP-23838-2022
was not purporting to pass any title.

F. Vivekanand Kendra Vs. Pradeep Kumar Agrawal reported in 2026 SCC
Online SC 316 para 20. 20. Thus, in the case at hand, the reason for
ignoring literal construction is not convincing to us. We note that interpreting
intention through purposive construction or through ex-post facto
circumstances is unnecessary when the intention is understood from the plain
and ordinary meaning of the text. There is no doubt that the nomenclature
alone of the document is not the decisive factor of the nature of a document; it
is the text and the context that point to the obligations undertaken by the
parties to a written document. In the case at hand, the document's
nomenclature, text and context lead to only one conclusion: that Defendant No.
1 entered into a 99-year lease deed. Thus, the unilateral cancellation, in the
facts and circumstances of this case, is illegal, and it should be understood as
having interfered with the right of the Plaintiff to remain in possession of the
Plaint Schedule Property for 99 years. Therefore, the prayers, as made, are
available and are rightly granted by the Trial and First Appellate Courts.

G. Gwalior development authority v. Bhanu Pratap singh 2023INSC393
18. However, the fact is that the parties sitting across the table, got the lease
deed executed for 18262.89 sq. meters without demur on 29th March, 2006
and the transaction stood concluded after execution of the lease deed, which
was initiated pursuant to a tender floated by the appellant on 13th March, 1997
and since the lease deed was to be compulsorily registered under Section 17 of
the Registration Act, 1908, it was nowhere open to be altered or amended even
by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
20. The submission made by the respondent that the tender floated by the
appellants on 13th March, 1997 was called upon to the bidders to submit their
bid for 27887.50 sq. meters and which could not have been segregated, more so
after the bid has been finalized @Rs. 725/- per sq. meter and that alone has
been taken care of by the High Court by directing to execute the lease deed for
the remainder of the land, in our considered view, is bereft of merit for the
reason that so far as the tender floated by the Authority on 13th March, 1997 is
concerned, the transaction was concluded on execution of the lease deed
executed without demur for 18262.89 sq. meters on 29th March, 2006 and after
the transaction is concluded and the instrument being registered under the law,
it was not open to either party to question at least in the writ jurisdiction of the
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and the mandamus issued by
the High Court to execute the lease deed for the remainder of the area without
any consideration is completely contrary to the settled principles of law and
deserves to be set aside.

H. Muhammad Hassan v. Baidya Nath Sahay, 1939 SCC OnLine Pat 158 : AIR
1940 Pat 140
2. In second appeal two points have been taken by Mr. Mitter on behalf of the
defendants-appellants. First, it has been argued that the plaintiff in this case
had waived his right to claim forfeiture of the lease. It is said that as there were
previous arrears which apparently have never been paid, the plaintiff has
waived for ever his right to re-enter. In short, the argument amounts to this,
that if a landlord is a little indulgent to his tenant, he loses for ever the right to

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
51 WP-23838-2022
enforce a forfeiture clause in the lease. It is true that if after the landlord is
aware of a cause of forfeiture he by some act recognizes the lease, he waives
his right to claim forfeiture for that particular breach. For example, if there is a
right of forfeiture in the lease for non-payment of rent and after the right to
claim forfeiture has arisen, the landlord demands the rent and thus
acknowledges that the lease is subsisting, it can be said that the landlord has
waived the forfeiture. That, however, does not mean that he for ever waived his
right to claim a forfeiture. Waiver would only operate in respect of a particular
breach.
3. In the present case, it may be that the plaintiff or his predecessor waived the
right to claim forfeiture for the earlier arrears; but there is nothing whatsoever
to show that the plaintiff had ever acknowledged the lease to be subsisting after
the arrears now complained of occurred. As I have pointed out, the notice
served shows that the plaintiff no longer regards the lease as subsisting and has
claimed forfeiture of it. There is nothing whatsoever to suggest that the parties
ever agreed that future rights under this lease should be waived. In my view,
both the Courts below were right in holding that the plaintiff had not waived
his right to forfeit the lease for the arrears complained of in this suit. The
second and more substantial point taken in this appeal is that the landlord has
no right under the Bengal Tenancy Act to claim a forfeiture for non-payment of
rent. It was argued in the Court below that this lease was not a lease falling
within the Bihar Tenancy Act; but in my view this is a lease governed by that
Act. Its very terms show that it was in the nature of an agricultural lease which
would fall within the Act. On behalf of the appellants it has been argued that
there can be no ejectment for nonpayment of rent under the Bihar Tenancy Act
by reason of Ss. 10, 65 and 178(1)(c). Had there been no other provisions in
the Act, the appellants' contention would be well founded; but unfortunately
for them s an express provision dealing with this case, namely S. 179 of the
Act. That Section is in these terms:
Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prevent a proprietor or a holder of a
permanent tenure in a permanently settled area from granting a permanent
mukarrari lease on any terms agreed on between him and his tenant.

I. Talbot and Co. v. Haricharan Halwasiya, 1949 SCC OnLine Cal 130 : AIR
1952 Cal 47 at page 51
20. Waiver of past breaches in my judgment does not preclude the lessor from
enforcing a forfeiture when the same or any other condition is ‘subsequently’
broken, it being understood that the condition is such that the breach thereof
provides for re-entry. It is argued on behalf of the defendants in this case that
the plaintiffs had given their consent in writing for subletting a portion of the
said premises to Walford Transport Ltd. That does not mean in my opinion that
the lessee could go on subletting the premises to other persons or parties in
breach of the covenant. As Harries, C.J. in a decision of the Patna High Court
‘Md. Hasan v. Baidyanath’, AIR (27) 1940 Pat 140 points ??? that waiver of a
particular breach does not ??? waiver for ever. I respectfully follow that
decision.
21. It is necessary to observe in more specific detail the case of a breach of the
express condition against subletting providing for re-entry such as the one in
the present case before me. It has been argued that subletting is an act of a
continuing nature and that where the breach is of a continuing nature waiver of
a particular breach is a waiver for ever. I am unable to accept that argument. In

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
52 WP-23838-2022
my judgment where the breach is of a continuing nature the continuance of the
breach after the waiver will justify a forfeiture and it will not be open to the
lessee to say that because past breaches of the same condition have been
waived its future breaches, or continuing breaches after waiver are also to be
deemed to have been waived and condoned. The only limitation on this
principle is that in the case of the breach of a condition not to sublet the waiver
operates during the continuance of the entire period of the interest which the
particular subletting created. But when the entire period of the offending sub-
lease is over the past waiver will not protect fresh breach of the same covenant
not to sublet. Formerly express waiver for a particular breach was regarded as a
total waiver of the covenant itself. But that is usually regarded in this breach of
the law as a relic of ‘Dumpor's case’, (4 Co. Rep. 119a). It is needless for me
here to say that ‘Dumpor's case’ has never been followed in India. In other
words a waiver of the benefit of a covenant or condition in a lease only extends
to the particular breach of the covenant or condition to which it relates and is
not a general waiver of the benefit of that covenant or condition.

Garvit Khandelwal vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh reported 2022 SCC
Online MP 1344
18. Likewise, section 2 (31) of the Municipal Corporation Act,1956 also
defines 'the land' which includes benefits arising out of land, houses and things
attached to the earth. Section 7 of the Act of 1956 provides the constitution of
Municipal Corporation and there shall be constituted a Municipal Corporation
for a larger Urban area in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Section
135 of the Act of 1956 provides the imposition of Property Tax by the
Municipal Corporation. Land which has been included in the Municipalities or
the Municipal Corporation as the case may be is subjected to the imposition of
taxes as it no more remains the land of the village. There are no provisions for
charging land revenue on such land under the Act of 1956 or the Act of 1961,
as provided in Adhiniyam,1993. The land within the village area forming the
Gram Panchayat is liable to be entered in the land record maintained by the
Revenue Authorities under the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 . Once the
village has been included into the Municipalities or the Municipal Corporation
as the case may be, it ceases the status of the village, hence, there would be no
need to maintain the Khasra Panchshala or other land Records by the Revenue
Authorities for such land. All these lands are subjected to the property tax and
other tax payable under the Municipalities Act as well as Municipal
Corporation Act , therefore, the Government is directed to examine as to why
all revenue authorities are maintaining the land record of those land which are
no more in the village and are included into municipalities or Municipal
Corporation. A copy of this order be sent to the Advocate General of State of
M.P., Principal Secretary of the Department of Revenue for taking necessary
action.
19. Till than so far as the land situated in other than village area, but the land
records are being maintained by the Revenue Authorities of the respective
areas, such records are also liable to be corrected or updated by the Revenue
authorities under M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. In some urban areas where
land is within the limits of Local Bodies like Municipal Corporation or
Municipal Councils / Nagar Parishad still, the land records are being
maintained by the revenue authorities despite that no agricultural activities are
going on there hence such records are liable to be corrected or updated despite

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
53 WP-23838-2022
the nature of the land.

Union Of India And Ors vs Dev Raj Gupta And Ors reported in (1991) 1 SCC
63
The High Court is further not right in holding that there was an automatic or a
statutory conversion of the user of the land because in the Master Plan the land
in question fell in the area reserved for commercial use. The High Court failed
to appreciate that the charge of user of the land permitted by the Plan was only
enabling in nature. It lifted the restriction which was otherwise there for using
the land for commercial purpose. The land has to be used as per the agreement
between the contracting parties, and no change of the user can be made
contrary to the agreement even if the Plan permits such user. The Plan helps
the parties to change the user, if the parties mutually agree to do so. It does not
permit the occupant to change the user unilaterally. It is not, therefore, correct
to say that no permission of the landlord was reeded to change the user of the
land.

Apollo Zipper India Limited vs W. Newman And Co. Ltd reported in (2018_ 6
SCC 744
It is a settled principle of law laid down by this Court that in an eviction suit
filed by the landlord against the tenant under the Rent Laws, when the issue of
title over the tenanted premises is raised, the landlord is not expected to prove
his title like what he is required to prove in a title suit.

Jyoti Sharma Vs. Vishnu Goyal reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 1956
True, the proceedings for probate was itself initiated in the year 2015 after the
appeal was decided on remand by order dated 13.10.2009. The order in
probate was issued when the matter was pending fore the High Court. It is
pertinent, as seen from the order of the trial court that the deceased Ramji s
had left behind other legal heirs also, his wife, three daughters and the wife and
children of a ceased son. None of them had challenged the Will when the
matter was pending before the trial urt. ne of the grounds taken by the trial
court to suspect the Will was that though it is mentioned in e Will that the
daughters of the testator were married of with their shares and even the wife
and ildren of the deceased son had no interest in the property, nothing was
kept aside for the wife. The nding of the trial court that it is not natural that a
person would not keep in mind the interest of his n wife, according to us, is
not a valid ground to suspect the intentions of the testator or the probity of he
bequest made. In any event, when an order of probate was produced, which is
not mandatory, e claim of the plaintiff through a Will attains a legal sanctity
which could not have been brushed ide y the High Court. It is trite Page 6 of
10 CA @ SLP (C) No.29500 of 2024 that in a suit for iction, the proof of
ownership of the tenanted premises is not to be strictly looked at as in a suit
for claration of title

Arnit Das vs State Of Bihar reported in (2000) 5 SCC 488
A decision not expressed, not accompanied by reasons and not proceeding on
conscious consideration of an issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to
have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. That which has
escaped in the judgment is not ratio decidendi. This is the rule of sub-silentio,

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
54 WP-23838-2022
in the technical sense when a particular point of law was not consciously
determined. (See State of U.P. Vs. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. 1991 (4) SCC
138, para 41).

24/ Considering all these judgments, there is no quarrel about the
preposition of law discussed by the respective Courts, but the ratio of
judgments are required to be applied by considering facts of each case. In the
present case, it is apparently coming on record, more particularly, by
considering the revenue entries, which is still existing in the name of the
State Government and considering the fact that the action of the respondents/
Corporation, which is pursuant to taking action for cancellation of lease
deed, cannot be considered by considering the fact that the Corporation has
expressly assumed role of lessor for the subject matter, more particularly,
regarding the lease agreement of the year 1919 in favour of the predecessor
of petitioner and having any authority to take action for cancellation of lease
deed on the ground of breach of lease conditions. On these apparent facts,
the judgments, which are cited by counsel for the respondents, though are
very interesting, regarding the preposition of law, the Court is bound to
accept that preposition, but looking to the facts and circumstances of the
case, those judgments are not helpful to the case of present respondents /
Corporation, therefore, in view of the above discussions, I am of the opinion
that the impugned order passed by the respondents/ Corporation is found
without giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, therefore,
impugned action of the respondents / Corporation can be considered against
the principle of natural justice, arbitrary, illegal, without jurisdiction and also
not in consonance with law, more particularly, when the SLP is pending
before Hon'ble Apex Court, therefore also, there was no reason for the
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
55 WP-23838-2022
Corporation to issue any notice for cancellation of lease, which is subject

matter of present petition. The respondents / Corporation is trying to take law
in hand with a view to frustrate legitimate right of the petitioner to enjoy the
property in question as a perpetual lease holder and the respondents/
Corporation cannot be permitted to assume as a title holder and therefor,
issuance of the impugned notice can be considered as illegal and without
jurisdiction, therefore, warrants interference by exercising power under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For this purpose, it is relevant to
Surya
refer to the judgment to refer to the judgment delivered in the case of
Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai and others reported in 2003 (6) SCC 675 for the scope of
exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For the sake of reference,
paragraphs no.6 to 10 are reproduced as under :
"Writ of Certiorari
6. According to Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol.14, page 121) certiorari is a writ
issued from a superior court to an inferior court or tribunal commanding the
latter to send up the record of a particular case.
7. H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth define certiorari in these words :-
"Certiorari is used to bring up into the High Court the decision of some inferior
tribunal or authority in order that it may be investigated. If the decision does
not pass the test, it is quashed – that is to say, it is declared completely invalid,
so that no one need respect it.
The underlying policy is that all inferior courts and authorities have only
limited jurisdiction or powers and must be kept within their legal bounds. This
is the concern of the Crown, for the sake of orderly administration of justice,
but it is a private complaint which sets the Crown in motion."(Administrative
Law, Eighth Edition, page 591).
8. he learned authors go on to add that problem arose on exercising control
over justices of the peace, both in their judicial and their administrative
functions as also the problem of controlling the special statutory body
which was addressed to by the Court of King's Bench. "The most useful
instruments which the Court found ready to hand were the prerogative
writs. But not unnaturally the control exercised was strictly legal, and no
longer political. Certiorari would issue to call up the records of justices
of the peace and commissioners for examination in the King's Bench and
for quashing if any legal defect was found. At first there was much
quashing for defects of form on the record, i.e. for error on the face.
Later, as the doctrine of ultra vires developed, that became the dominant
principle of control" (page 592).
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
56 WP-23838-2022
9. The nature and scope of the writ of certiorari and when can it issue was
beautifully set out in a concise passage, quoted hereafter, by Lord
Chancellor Viscount Simon in Ryots of Garabandho and other villages
Vs. Zamindar of Parlakimedi and Anr. – AIR 1943 PC 164.

"The ancient writ of certiorari in England is an original writ which
1.
may issue out of a superior Court requiring that the record of the
proceedings in some cause or matter pending before an inferior
Court should be transmitted into the superior Court to be there
dealt with. The writ is so named because, in its original Latin
form, it required that the King should "be certified" of the
proceedings to be investigated, and the object is to secure by the
exercise of the authority of a superior Court, that the jurisdiction of
the inferior tribunal should be properly exercised. This writ does
not issue to correct purely executive acts, but, on the other hand,
its application is not narrowly limited to inferior "Courts" in the
strictest sense. Broadly speaking, it may be said that if the act
done by the inferior body is a judicial act, as distinguished from
being a ministerial act, certiorari will lie. The remedy, in point of
principle, is derived from the superintending authority which the
Sovereign's Superior Courts, and in particular the Court of King's
Bench, possess and exercise over inferior jurisdictions. This
principle has been transplanted to other parts of the King's
dominions, and operates, within certain limits, in British India."
10. Article 226 of the Constitution of India preserves to the High
Court power to issue writ of certiorari amongst others. The
principles on which the writ of certiorari is issued are well-settled.
It would suffice for our purpose to quote from the 7-Judge Bench
decision of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Ahmad Ishaque
and Ors. – (1955) 1 SCR 1104. The four propositions laid down
therein were summarized by the Constitution Bench in The
Custodian of Evacuee Property Bangalore Vs. Khan Saheb Abdul
Shukoor etc. – (1961) 3 SCR 855 as under :-
1. "……the High Court was not justified in looking into the
order of December 2, 1952, as an appellate court, though it
would be justified in scrutinizing that order as if it was
brought before it under Article 226 of the Constitution for
issue of a writ of certiorari. The limit of the jurisdiction of
the High Court in issuing writs of certiorari was considered
by this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Ahmad Ishaque
1955-I S 1104 : ((s) AIR 1955 SC 233) and the following
four propositions were laid down :-
"(1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of
jurisdiction;
(2) Certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal
acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as
when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties
to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice;
(3) The court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a
supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence
of this is that the court will not review findings of fact
reached by the inferior court or tribunal, even if they be
erroneous.
(4) An error in the decision or determination itself may also
be amenable to a writ of certiorari if it is a manifest error
apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g., when it is
based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:31748
57 WP-23838-2022
law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be
corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision."

25/ In view of the aforesaid discussions, present petition deserves to
be allowed by quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated
13/10/2022 [ Annexure-P/30] and by further granting relief that the
respondents / Corporation shall not interfere / disturb the possession of the
petitioner in any manner, more particularly, by considering the fact that the
proceeding of S.L.P. is also pending before the Hon'ble Apex Court and as
such, the respondents have failed to produce any document to show that the
name of the respondent / Corporation is entered into the revenue record as a
lessor.
26/ With the aforesaid direction, present petition is allowed and
disposed of.
C.C. as per rules.
(SANDEEP N. BHATT)
JUDGE
amol

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMOL
NIVRUTTIRAO MAHANAG
Signing time: 06-11-2026
13:14:25