ASHOK NARAYAN PIPRAIYA vs LILIBAI NARAYAN PIPRAIYA

2026:BHC-AS:10859
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.15615 OF 2025
1. Ashok Narayan Pipraiya
Age 43 years, Occ – Business,
2. Asha Ashok Pipraiya
age 38 yrs. Occu – Housewife,
Residing at Flat No.209, Siddhiki
Co-op. Hsg. Society Ltd., MHADA
Colony, Navghar Road,
Mulund (E), Mumbai – 400 081 ... Petitioners
versus
1. Lilabai Narayan Pipraiya,
Age 71 years, Occu – Housewife,
Residing at – C/o Kishor Narayan
Pipraiya, Flat No.702, Mount Classic – 2,
Yogi Hill, D Wing, Mulund (W),
Mumbai – 400 080.
2. The Appellate Tribunal and
Additional Collector, Mumbai
Suburban District, Mumbai,
th
Administrative Building, 9 Floor,
Government Colony, Bandra (E),
Mumbai – 400 051.
3. The Presiding Officer, Senior Citizen
Welafe Tribunal & Sub-Divisional
Officer, Eastern Suburban,
Mumbai Suburban District,
Having office at Nilkant Business Park,
A Building, Ground Floor, Kirol Road,
Vidyavihar (W), Mumbai – 400 086 … Respondents
Mr. R.S.Dubey, for Petitioners.
Mr. Aashutosh Kulkarni with Mr. Vipul Raut, appointed Advocate for
Respondent No.1.
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Ms. Leena Patil, B Panel Counsel for Respondent Nos.2 and 3.
CORAM: N.J.JAMADAR, J.
RESERVED ON : 11 FEBRUARY 2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 5 MARCH 2026
JUDGMENT :
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith, and, with the consent of the
learned Counsel for the parties, heard finally.
2. By this Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the
Petitioners take exception to a judgment and order dated 29 October 2025
passed by the Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No.80 of 2025, whereby the said
appeal, preferred by the Petitioners, against the order dated 26 August 2025
passed by the Maintenance Tribunal under the Maintenance and Welfare of
Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (the Senior Citizens Act, 2007), thereby
directing the Petitioners to vacate the premises i.e. House No.C-209, Siddhi
Co-op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd., Mhada Colony, Navghar Road, Mulund (the subject
flat) came to be dismissed by affirming the order passed by the Maintenance
Tribunal.
3. The background facts necessary for the determination of this Petition
can be stated, as under :
3.1 The Respondent No.1 is the mother of Petitioner No.1. Petitioner No.2
is the wife of Petitioner No.1. The Petitioners are residing in the said flat.
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Respondent No.1 – senior citizen, filed a complaint being Case No.41 of
2025, before the Maintenance Tribunal, asserting that the Petitioners were
harassing, abusing and assaulting her. Few incidents of the alleged
harassment and torture at the hands of the Petitioners were narrated in the
said complaint. It was, inter alia , alleged that the Petitioners subjected the
Respondent No.1 to physical assault, abused and coerced her to execute the
documents to transfer the subject flat in favour of Petitioner No.1. The
Petitioners eventually drove the Respondent No.1 out of the subject flat.
Respondent No.1, thus, prayed that the Petitioners be evicted from the
subject flat, so that she can live a normal life in her own premises.
3.2 The Petitioners resisted the application. It was refuted that the
Respondent No.1 is the sole and absolute owner of the subject flat. According
to the Petitioners, the Petitioner No.1 and Respondent No.1 had purchased
the subject flat for the residence of the family for a total consideration of
Rs.6,18,000/-. Although, the subject flat was purchased in the name of
Respondent No.1, substantial part of the consideration was contributed by the
Petitioner No.1. To finance the said acquisition, the Petitioner No.1 had
allegedly paid a sum of Rs.2,18,000/- to the Respondent No.1, in cash.
3.3 The Petitioner No.1 and Respondent No.1 had also jointly purchased
another flat being Flat No.405, C Wing, Mulund Shree Sawant Co-op. Hsg.
Soc. For the said acquisition, the Petitioner No.1 had contributed a sum of
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Rs.2,60,000/-. In the year 2013, the Petitioners alleged, Respondent No.1
had illegally and without the consent of the Petitioner No.1, sold the said Flat
No.405 for a total consideration of Rs.76,00,000/- and the entire sale
proceeds were handed over by Respondent No.1 to Kishor, the elder brother
of the Petitioner No.1. Kishor and his wife Seema had executed documents
acknowledging receipt of the said amount and the liability to maintain
Respondent No.1 for her lifetime.
3.4 It was alleged that the Respondent No.1 has been suffering from
mental ailments. The Petitioners have been taking care of Respondent No.1,
including her personal, medical and daily needs. Respondent No.1 had left
the subject flat on her own volition and started to reside with Kishor. The
complaint was lodged before the Maintenance Tribunal by the Respondent
No.1 at the instigation of Kishor and another self-styled called social worker.
3.5 The Maintenance Tribunal, after appraisal of the rival contentions and
the material on record, found that the subject flat stood in the name of
Respondent No.1. The provision for residence fell within the ambit of the
definition of maintenance under Section 2(b) of the Act, 2007. Respondent
No.1 had a right to live a peaceful and normal life in her own premises. Thus,
the Maintenance Tribunal directed the Petitioners to deliver possession of the
subject flat to the Respondent No.1, without prejudice to the rights of the
parties to succeed to the property under the provisions of the Hindu
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Succession Act, 1956.
3.6 Being aggrieved, the Petitioners preferred an appeal before the
Appellate Authority. By the impugned order, the Appellate Authority declined
to interfere with the impugned order, finding no infirmity therein. It was
reiterated that the Respondent No.1 had a right to live a peaceful, undisturbed
and normal life in her own house.
3.7 Being further aggrieved, the Petitioners have invoked the writ
jurisdiction.
4. I have heard Mr. R.S.Dubey, learned Counsel for the Petitioners, Mr.
Kulkarni, learned Counsel who was appointed to espouse the cause of
Respondent No.1 and Ms. Leena Patil, learned Counsel for Respondent
Nos.2 and 3, at some length. Learned Counsel for the parties took the Court
through the pleadings and material before the authorities under the Act, 2007.
5. Mr. Dubey, learned Counsel for the Petitioners, took a slew of
exceptions to the impugned order as well as the order passed by the
Maintenance Tribunal. First and foremost, according to Mr. Dubey, an
application for eviction of the children simplicitor without a prayer for award of
maintenance under the Act, 2007 is not legally tenable. In the order passed
by the Maintenance Tribunal, it has been categorically recorded that the
Respondent No.1 was not seeking any maintenance from the Petitioner No.1.
Therefore, in the absence of a prayer for maintenance, towards the
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enforcement of which only an order for eviction can be lawfully passed,
authorities under the Act, 2007 committed grave jurisdictional error in passing
the impugned orders.
6. Secondly, Mr. Dubey would urge that, the provisions contained in the
Act, 2007, cannot be the basis to order the eviction of the children or relatives
of the senior citizen in a summary manner, when they assert an independent
right in the premises. Amplifying the aforesaid submission, Mr. Dubey would
urge, in the facts of the case at hand, there is material to indicate that the
Respondent No.1 has been earning sumptuous amount by way of licence
fee/rent of the shop premises. In fact, the Respondent No.1 does not require
any financial assistance and she cannot be said to be unable to maintain
herself from her own earning out of the property owned by her. Resultantly,
the very jurisdictional fact to entertain a prayer to evict the Petitioners cannot
be said to have been fulfilled.
7. To lend support to this submission, Mr. Dubey placed a very strong
reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Jitendra
1
Gorakh Megh V/s. Additional Collector & Appellate Authority and Anr. ,
wherein it was, inter alia, enunciated that, though the Senior Citizens Act, is a
beneficial statute it cannot be (mis)used by the Senior Citizens as a tool for
summary eviction without fulfillment of the statutory requirements.
1 OOCJ WP(L) No.31614 of 2025 dated 8 Dec. 2025
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8. Mr. Dubey also placed reliance on a three-Judge Bench judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. S. Vanitha V/s. The Deputy
2
Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District and Ors. , wherein the Supreme
Court emphasised that the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, are required to be harmoniously
considered. Mr. Dubey also banked upon the judgment of the Supreme Court
3
in the case of Samtola Devi V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. , wherein
it was, inter alia, observed that the Senior Citizens are simply entitled to
maintenance rather than eviction of their son/relatives.
9. Mr. Dubey would submit that, in the instant case, a complaint was made
before the Maintenance Tribunal with an oblique motive to evict the
Petitioners, though Respondent No.1 does not require any maintenance, nor
she has been subjected to any harassment, as alleged. Thus, the impugned
orders deserve to be quashed and set aside.
10. In opposition to this, Mr. Kulkarni, learned Counsel for Respondent
No.1, supported the impugned order. Mr. Kulkarni would urge that the instant
case is a typical illustration of the neglect, harassment and torture, to which a
senior citizen is subjected to, and for whom the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 has
been enacted.
11. Mr. Kulkarni laid emphasis on the fact that the things have come to
2 Civil Appeal No.3822 of 2020 dated 15 Dec. 2020
3 2025 INSC 404
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such a pass that the Respondent No.1 is made to take shelter in an old age
home i.e. Banyan Tree Geriatric Care LLP Centre. Respondent No.1 is left in
a state of destitution and helpless situation. Attention of the Court was
invited to the invoice raised by Banyan Tree Geriatric Care LLP for the
payment of the accommodation charges which have accumulated to
Rs.1,05,000/-.
12. The substratum of the defence of the Petitioners that the Respondent
No.1 has filed a complaint before the Maintenance Tribunal at the instance of
her elder son, is belied by the fact that the Respondent No.1 is forced to
reside in an old-age home. If the protection under the Citizens Act, 2007 is
not granted to the senior citizen, like Respondent No.1, there can be hardly
any better case for grant of reliefs under the said Act, urged Mr. Kulkarni.
13. Mr. Kulkarni assiduously submitted that, incontrovertibly the subject flat
stands in the name of Respondent No.1. The Petitioner No.1 is laying false
claim over the subject flat by contending that, he had contributed to the
consideration at the time of acquisition of the subject flat. The said contention
cannot be countenanced in a proceeding before the Maintenance Tribunal.
The Petitioner No.1 may work out his remedies before the appropriate Civil
Court.
14. In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts, Mr. Kulkarni would urge, the
challenge to the jurisdiction of the Maintenance Tribunal to pass an order of
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eviction when no maintenance is claimed by the senior citizen, is unworthy of
countenance. A provision for maintenance clearly falls within the ambit of
“maintenance”, as defined under Section 2(b) of the Act, 2007.
15. Mr. Kulkarni submitted that, the reliance placed by Mr. Dubey on a
Division Bench judgment in the case of Jitendra Gorakh Megh (supra) , to
urge that the application for eviction of the children / relatives without seeking
maintenance is not tenable, is wholly unfounded. On the one hand, Mr.
Kulkarni would urge, the fact-situation in the case of Jitendra Gorakh Megh
(supra) , was completely different. On the other hand, the import of the
definition of maintenance under Section 2(b) of the Act, 2007, was not
examined in its fullest amplitude in the case of Jitendra Gorakh Megh (supra) .
16. Mr. Kulkarni would urge that, there are two prior Division Bench
judgments of this Court, wherein a prayer for eviction simplicitor of the
children / relatives without a prayer for maintenance, has been upheld by this
Court. Reliance was placed by Mr. Kulkarni on the Division Bench judgments
4
in the cases of Shweta Shetty V/s. State of Maharashtra and Ors. and
5
Dinesh Bhanudas Chandanshive v/s. State of Maharashtra and Ors. .
17. Mr. Kulkarni further submitted that, in the case of Smt. S. Vanitha
(supra) , as well, the Supreme Court has enunciated that the Tribunal under
the Senior Citizens Act, may have the authority to order eviction if it is
4 2021 SCC Online Bom 4575
5 2024 SCC Online Bom 336
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necessary and expedient to ensure the maintenance and protection of the
senior citizen or parents. Therefore, the submissions on behalf of the
Petitioners that, sans the prayer for maintenance, an application for eviction is
not maintainable, cannot be sustained.
18. I have given anxious consideration to the aforesaid submissions
canvassed across the bar. The broad factual backdrop, in which the question
of law sought to be urged on behalf of the Petitioner arises, is not much in
contest. The relationship between the Petitioners and Respondent No.1 is
not in dispute. Nor the fact that the subject flat stands in the name of the
Respondent No.1. It has been allotted to the Respondent No.1 under a letter
of allotment dated 12 February 2001 issued by the Mulund Siddhi CHS Ltd.
The share certificate stands in the name of Respondent No.1.
19. By and large, there is not much controversy over the fact that the
Respondent No.1 has been currently residing in a facility meant for the senior
citizens i.e. Banyan Tree Geriatric Care LLP. It is also not in dispute that the
Respondent No.1 did not claim any maintenance from the Petitioners and
sought their eviction from the subject flat. The parties are at issue over the
treatment meted out to the Respondent No.1 by the Petitioners. However,
the fact remains that the things came to such a pass that the Respondent
No.1 was constrained to take shelter in a facility for the senior citizens.
20. In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts, the moot question that
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wrenches to the fore is : whether the application for eviction of the children /
relative simplicitor sans a prayer for award of maintenance from the premises
belonging to the senior citizen is maintainable under the provisions of the Act,
2007 ?
21. In the quest of exploring an answer, reference to few provisions of the
Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and the legislative object behind its enactment
would be indispensable. Under Section 2(h), “senior citizen” means any
person being a citizen of India, who has attained the age of sixty years or
above; under clause 2(a), “children” includes son, daughter, grandson and
grand-daughter but does not include a minor; under clause (d), “parent”
means father or mother whether biological, adoptive or step father or step
mother, as the case may be, whether or not the father or the mother is a
senior citizen; and under clause 2(g), ‘relative’ means any legal heir of the
childless senior citizen who is not a minor and is in possession of or would
inherit his property after his death.
22. The Senior Citizens Act, 2007, primarily and predominantly deals with
the maintenance and welfare of the parents and senior citizens. ‘Maintenance’
is defined under clause (b), as under :
“(b) “maintenance” includes provision for food, clothing,
residence and medical attendance and treatment;”

“Welfare” is defined under clause (k), as under :
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“(k) “welfare” means provision for food, health care,
recretion centres and other amenities necessary for the
senior citizens;”
23. Chapter II of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 subsumes provisions under
the caption “Maintenance of Parents and Senior Citizens”. Under Section 4, a
senior citizen, including parent, who is unable to maintain himself from his
own earning or out of the property owned by him, is entitled to make an
application under section 5, in case of (i) parent or grand-parent, against one
or more of his children not being a minor; (ii) a childless senior citizen, against
such of his relative referred to in clause (g) of section 2. Sub-sections (2) and
(3) of Section 4 describes the nature of the obligation of the children or
relative to maintain a senior citizen or parent by emphasising that the
obligation extends to the needs of such senior citizen / parent, so that he can
lead a normal life.
24. Section 5 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 contains provisions in regard
to the application for maintenance. Section 6 provides for jurisdiction and
procedure to determine such application. Constitution of Maintenance
Tribunal is provided for under Section 7. Under Section 8, the Tribunal,
subject to the rules that may be prescribed by the State Government, may
follow such summary procedure as it may deem fit. Under Section 9, the
Tribunal is empowered to award maintenance at such monthly rate, as the
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Tribunal may deem fit, subject to the maximum maintenance allowance as
may be prescribed by the State Government, which shall not exceed
Rs.10,000/- per month. Under Section 12, an option is given to the senior
citizen to seek maintenance under the Act, 2007 or Chapter IX of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. The senior citizen may claim such maintenance
under either the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 or Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, but not under both. Section 15 provides for constitution of Appellate
Tribunal. Appeals are provided under Section 16 before the Appellate
Tribunal.
25. Chapter III deals with establishment of old age homes. Provisions for
medical care of senior citizens are envisaged in Chapter IV. Chapter V is
dedicated towards the protection of life and property of senior citizens.
Section 23, in particular, empowers the Tribunal to declare the transfer of
property by way of gift deed or otherwise, made by the senior citizen, subject
to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic
physical needs to the transferor, void if such transferee refuses or fails to
provide such amenities and physical needs. Section 27 of the Act, 2007 bars
the jurisdiction of civil court in respect of any matters to which any provisions
of the said Act applies. Section 3 gives overriding effect to the provisions of
Act, 2007 over the provisions of any other enactment or instrument.
26. At this juncture, ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’ of the Senior
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Citizens Act, 2007, deserves to be noted. It reads as under :
“Statement of Objects and Reasons”
Traditional norms and values of the Indian society laid stress
on providing care for the elderly. However, due to withering
of the joint family system, a large number of elderly are not
being looked after by their family. Consequently, many older
persons, particularly widowed women are now forced to
spend their twilight years all alone and are exposed to
emotional neglect and to lack of physical and financial
support. This clearly reveals that ageing has become a major
social challenge and there is a need to give more attention to
the care and protection fo the older persons. Though the
parents can claim maintenance under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, the procedure is both time-consuming as
well as expensive. Hence, there is need to have simple,
inexpensive and speedy provisions to claim maintenance for
parents.”
27. A conjoint reading of the provisions contained in the Act, 2007 as a
whole, in the light of the Statement of Objects and Reasons, makes the intent
of the legislature explicitly clear. The Parliament intended to address alarming
situation caused by the neglect and harassment of the parents and senior
citizens in the evening of their life. Senior Citizens were found to be deserted
and deprived of the basic physical necessities, medical care and amenities
which are required the most in the advanced age. Many elderly persons,
particularly widowed women, were found to have been forced to spend their
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twilight years all alone, and were exposed to emotional neglect and want of
physical and financial support. This mischief was sought to be addressed by
the Parliament by providing a simple, inexpensive and speedy mechanism to
claim maintenance and also by making provisions for the institutionalized care
of the senior citizens in old age homes, medical support and, most
importantly, protection of life and property of the senior citizens. The
Statement of Objects and Reasons specifically records that, though under the
provisions of the Code, 1973, parents can claim maintenance, the procedure
was both time consuming as well as expensive.
28. The capacious breadth of the provisions of the Act, 2007 leaves no
manner of doubt that it is a beneficial legislation, enacted to advance the
object of care and protection of the senior citizens. Thus, while interpreting
the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, it is imperative to adopt tools
of interpretation which are required to be applied when interpreting the
beneficial piece of legislation. The cardinal principle is that the beneficial
legislation must receive liberal construction in consonance with the objectives
such legislation seeks to achieve. Interpretative process must be attuned to
the purposive construction informed by the legislative object. In a given case,
if two views are plausible, the Court must lean in favour of an interpretation
which favours the beneficiaries rather than one which stultifies object of the
beneficial legislation.
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29. A profitable reference, in this context, can be made to the decision of
6
the Supreme Court in the case of K.H.Nazar V/s. Mathew K. Jacob , wherein
the Supreme Court exposited the approach to interpretation of a beneficial
legislation, as under :
“11. Provisions of a beneficial legislation have to be
construed with a purpose-oriented approach. The act
should receive a liberal construction to promote its objects.
Also, literal construction of the provisions of a beneficial
legislation has to be avoided. It is the court’s duty to discern
the intention of the legislature in making the law. Once such
an intention is ascertained, the statute should receive a
purposeful or functional interpretation.
……
13. While interpreting a statute, the problem or mischief
that the statute was designed to remedy should first be
identified, and then a construction that suppresses the
problem and advances the remedy should be adopted. It is
settled law that exemption clauses in beneficial or social
welfare legislations should be given strict construction. It
was observed in Shivram A. Shiroor V. Radhabai
7
Shantaram Kowshik that the exclusionary provisions in a
beneficial legislation should be construed strictly so as to
give a wide amplitude to the principal object of the
legislation and to prevent its evasion on deceptive grounds.
Similarly, in Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act
8
V/s. NSW Abaroginal Land Council , Kirby, J. held that the
6 (2020) 14 SCC 126
7 (1984) 1 SCC 588
8 (2008) 237 CLR 285
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principle of providing purposive construction to beneficial
legislations mandates that exceptions in such legislations
should be construed narrowly.” (emphasis supplied)
30. Keeping in mind the aforesaid beneficial intent of the statute, some of
the key provisions of the Act, 2007, adverted to above, deserve to be
revisited.
30.1 Firstly, the definition of maintenance under Section 2(b) is inclusive.
Maintenance includes provision for food, clothing, residence, medical
attendance and treatment. Evidently, the definition of maintenance is of wide
amplitude. The Parliament has designedly not given restrictive meaning to
the term ‘maintenance’.
30.2 Secondly, the term ‘property’ under section 2(f) of the Senior Citizens
Act, 2007, has also been defined in expansive terms. Property means,
property of any kind, whether movable or immovable, ancestral or self-
acquired, tangible or intangible and includes rights or interests in such
property.
30.3 Thirdly, the obligation of the children or relative to maintain the senior
citizen or parent under Section 4(2) and (3), as the case may be, extends to
the needs of such senior citizen or parent so that he may lead a normal life.
This statutory obligation, in contradistinction to the moral or pious obligation, if
read in juxtaposition with the definition of maintenance under Section 2(b),
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further expands the protective umbrella of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. So
construed, the obligation to maintain a senior citizen in such manner as to the
facilitate the senior citizen to lead a normal life transcends the monetary
connotations.
30.4 The obligation of the children or relative under Section 4(2) and (3)
impliedly gives statutory recognition to the right of the senior citizen to live a
life free from neglect, harassment, exploitation, physical and emotional
disturbance. The expression ‘normal life’ connotes a safe, dignified, peaceful
and physical and emotional stress free life. A senior citizen is entitled to
safeguard his physical and mental health. All the facets which make life a
normal life, given the situation in life of the senior citizen, are subsumed within
the expression ‘normal life’.
31. The thrust of the submission of Mr. Dubey was that the provisions
contained in the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 cannot be used as a tool to evict
the children or relative from the premises in which a senior citizen has some
interest. What Senior Citizen Act, 2007 envisages is a provision for
maintenance of the senior citizen by the children or relative. Eviction of a
child or relative cannot be the sole purpose for which the senior citizen can
approach the Maintenance Tribunal. At the highest, eviction may be a
consequence of the enforcement of the right to be maintained by the senior
citizen. Thus, in the absence of a prayer for maintenance, an application for
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eviction simplicitor would be beyond the jurisdictional competence of the
authorities under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007.
32. In the case of Jitendra Gorakh Megh (supra), which constituted the
anchor-sheet of the submission of Mr. Dubey, the Division Bench of this Court
considered the following question :
“Whether an eviction order can be passed under the
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens
Act, 2007 without any claim towards maintenance being
made by the senior citizen ?
33. After adverting to the facts of the case, the Statement of Objects and
Reasons, key provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and the judicial
precedents, including the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt.
S. Vanitha (supra) and judgments of this Court in the cases of Ranjana
9
Rajkumar Makharia V/s. Mayadevi Subhkaran Makharia , Ritika Prashant
10
Jasani V/s. Anjana Niranjan Jasani and Shweta Shetty (supra) , the
Division Bench enunciated, inter alia, as under :
“20. Section 4 of the Act contains provisions dealing with
the maintenance of parents and senior citizens. It prescribes
that a senior citizen who is unable to maintain himself from
his own earnings or from property owned by him, is entitled to
make an application for maintenance under Section 5 of the
Act. The said section further prescribes that the obligation of
9 2020(3) Mh.L.J. 587
10 2021 SCC Online Bom 1802
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children to maintain the senior citizen extends to the needs of
such senior citizen so that he may lead a normal life. Section
5 contains provisions relating to the application which the
senior citizen can make for maintenance. Sub-section (2)
enables the Tribunal to order monthly allowance to be paid to
the senior citizen towards interim maintenance. In these
circumstances, when the senior citizen has made no claim for
maintenance, we fail to see how the said application which
has been filed by the senior citizen under section 5(2) of the
Act, is maintainable, in the first place. This position appears
to have been completely overlooked, both in the eviction
order and also in the appellate order.
……
24. The Act is a beneficial statute intended to safeguard
the vulnerable (senior citizen), but it cannot be (mis) used by
the senior citizen as a tool for summary eviction without the
fulfilment of statutory requirements. In the present case, we
find that the said application does not satisfy the
requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act and is therefore
not maintainable. Accordingly, the eviction order could not
have been passed by the Tribunal and upheld by the
Appellate Tribunal, vide the appellate order. The senior
citizen has not claimed any maintenance from the Petitioner
and the order of eviction is not in furtherance thereof.
Eviction, as also held in S. Vanitha (supra) would be an
incident of the enforcement of the right to maintenance and
protection which should be granted only after adverting to the
competing claims of both parties in dispute. This has
admittedly not been done in the appellate order or in eviction
order (which it confirms).
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25. In fact, the senior citizen is financially well-to-do and
owns several other immovable properties, both residential
and commercial and instead, the record reveals that the
Petitioner (if evicted from the subject premises) would not
have any other roof over his head. This is not disputed by
the senior citizen in the said application who in-fact asserts
that the Petitioner has been unemployed for several years. In
such circumstances, it was incumbent on the Tribunal and
the Appellate Tribunal to have considered these material
factors before passing the eviction and appellate orders. This
has admittedly not been done. Instead, the eviction order
accepts all the averments made in the said application and
proceeds to hold that since the subject premises belong to
the senior citizen and he needs to reside therein since he
travels frequently for medical treatment, the Petitioner is
required to be evicted therefrom.
26. The eviction order is thus clearly contrary to the
scheme of the Act. In fact, the Tribunal and the Appellate
Tribunal have both also lost sight of the fact that the said
application is bereft of any allegations of harassment and/or
cruelty by the Petitioner, which has not been considered
whilst passing the eviction order and the appellate order.
There is no finding, let alone any discussion in terms of
Section 9 of the Act, that the senior citizen had suffered
neglect at the hands of the Petitioner, which was required as
per the decision in Ritika Prashant Jasani (supra). Hence,
both the appellate order as also the eviction order, cannot be
sustained.
27. The decision in Shweta Shetty (supra) is of no
assistance to the senior citizen and is easily distinguishable
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on its facts. In that case, the daughter who was initially
residing in Germany, returned to India and began residing
with the senior citizen and refused to vacate his premises,
unless she was given ‘her share’. Nasir V/s. Govt. of NCT of
11
Delhi and Ors. was a case where the Tribunal permitted the
senior citizen, who was admittedly the owner of the property,
to occupy one floor and give out the other two floors on rent
and recover the income therefrom. This is also
distinguishable on facts. Hence, neither decision is of any
assistance to the senior citizen.”
34. Mr. Kulkarni, learned Counsel for Respondent No.1, joined the issue by
canvassing a submission that the aforesaid Division Bench judgment cannot
be read torn out of context and the peculiar facts, in which it was rendered.
Attention of the Court was invited to the relevant facts noted by the Division
Bench in the said case in paragraph No.18 of the said judgment, including
that the senior citizen had never resided in the subject premises; the senior
citizen resided in a separate residential flat in another society with his wife,
which was not claimed to be unsuitable for the senior citizen; there was a
declaration by the senior citizen expressly permitting the Petitioner therein to
reside in the subject premises and to conduct business therefrom, for as long
as the Petitioner therein desired, without any charges for the occupation;
there was no allegation of harassment and/or cruelty made by the senior
citizen and the senior citizen appeared to be financially sound and owned
11 2015 SCC Online Del 13060
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several other immovable properties, both residential and commercial, and, in
contrast, the Petitioner therein, if evicted from the subject premises, would not
have any other roof over his head.
35. Mr. Kulkarni would urge, these hard facts weighed with the Division
Bench in answering the question framed in the negative. An earnest
endeavour was made by Mr. Kulkarni to drive home the point that the Division
Bench cannot be said to have laid down an absolute proposition of law that
the application for eviction of the children or relative without seeking
maintenance is not maintainable under any circumstances whatsoever.
36. At this stage, as noted above, the expansive and wide definition of
maintenance, and, obligation of the children and relative, assume critical
salience. If a senior citizen is turned out of her home and made to take
shelter in the premises of another child / relative, or in an old age home, like
the case in hand, can it be said that the obligation of the child / relative who is
alleged to have driven the senior citizen out of her home, to maintain the
senior citizen is discharged ? Would it still be incumbent upon the senior
citizen to first seek maintenance from such child/relative who has allegedly
driven her out of her property ?
37. A purposive interpretation of the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act,
2007 would provide a legitimate answer. In a situation of the present nature,
the senior citizen can be said to be enforcing her right to lead a normal life,
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which obligation is correspondingly and statutorily cast on the child/relative.
Definition of maintenance, which includes residence; has both positive and
negative connotations. In the positive form, there is an obligation on the child
/ relative to provide residence to the parent/senior citizen in case the
parent/senior citizen does not hold the property as defined under section 2(f)
of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. In the negative sense, there is an obligation
on the child/relative not to dispossess a senior citizen of her own residence
and when a senior citizen approaches the Tribunal seeking eviction of the
child / relative, who has allegedly dispossessed the senior citizen forcibly or
by making the life of the senior citizen miserable by acts of omission or
commission, the prayer still partakes the character of enforcing the obligation
of the child / relative to allow the senior citizen to lead a normal life.
38. Mr. Kulkarni was justified in advancing a submission that the issue has
been dealt with by the two Division Bench judgments of this Court in the
cases of Shweta Shetty (supra) and Dinesh Bhanudas Chanddanshive
(supra) .
39. In the case of Shweta Shetty (supra) , a Division Bench of this Court
repelled an identical challenge to the order of the Maintenance Tribunal. In
that case, senior citizen was seeking to evict from his flat, one of the
daughters, who had forced herself upon the senior citizen. A submission was
canvassed on behalf of the daughter that, it was impermissible under the
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scheme of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to seek eviction of a person for,
under Section 5, only an application for maintenance could be entertained by
the Tribunal, and, thus, the Tribunal had acted without jurisdiction in directing
eviction of the daughter.
40. The Division Bench negatived the challenge, after adverting to the
Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Ritika Prashant Jasani
(supra), in the following terms :
“9. As to the jurisdictional question we do not believe the
point is well taken. The definition of maintenance in clause
2(b) reads thus :
“(b) “maintenance” includes provision for food,
clothing, residence and medical attendance and treatment;”

10. Clearly it includes residence; and this means residence
of the senior citizen.
12. In Jasani, therefore, the claim of the appellant was that
the house was a ‘shared household’, i.e. that she had a
legally definable right in the property itself. That is not the
case before us at all, where Shweta accepts that she has no
right in the flat in question. The mere use of the word ‘eviction’
is not by itself determinative. To constitute eviction, or to
invoke any prohibition against eviction, it must be shown that
some legally enforceable civil right of the appellant in the
property itself has been determined and that the appellant has
been denied that right. Removal of a person with no right in
the premises is not eviction so as to attract any such
prohibition. After all, as Jasani notes, the statutory intent is to
protect senior citizens. It is not to foist on senior citizens an
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imaginary claim over their own property where the claimant
has no such right to begin with. The statutory intent is not to
limit the rights of senior citizens, but exactly the reverse.”
(emphasis supplied)
41. The Division Bench in the case of Shweta Shetty (supra) , also
adverted to other judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case
12
of Dattatrey Shivaji Mane V/s. Lilabai Shivaji Mane , wherein it was
enunciated that Section 4 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 cannot be read in
isolation but has to be read with Section 23 and also Sections 2(b), (d) and (f)
of the said Act, 2007 and the mother cannot be restrained from recovering
exclusive possession from her son or other family members for the purpose of
generating income from the said premises or to lead a normal life.
13
42. In the case of Sunny Paul V/s. State of NCT of Delhi , a Division
Bench of the Delhi High Court has enunciated that, the Senior Citizens Act,
2007 being a social legislation and the same requires to be given liberal
interpretation to achieve the mandate of the Act of 2007 i.e. for the welfare of
the parents and senior citizens and for the protection of their life and property,
there is no doubt that the Tribunal does have the jurisdiction to direct vacation
by the children of any property in which the senior citizen has a right of
residence/possession.
43. In Shweta Shetty (supra) , the Division Bench also followed the
12 (2018) 6 Mah LJ 681
13 2018 scc Online Del 11640
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Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Sunny Paul
(supra) , and observed with reference to the enunciation of law in Dattatrey
Shivaji Mane (supra) and Sunny Paul (supra) , as under :
“We entirely endorse the views of the learned Single Judge
and accept them as our own. We are also fully in agreement
with the views of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court
in the case of Sunny Paul (supra), a most careful and
elaborate judgment that includes what appears to us to be a
comprehensive overview of the jurisprudence.”
44. In the case of Dinesh Bhanudas Chandanshive (supra) , which again
arose out of the struggle of a mother, who was illegally ousted from her own
abode, to take back the same from her son, the Division Bench after following
the decision in the case of Shweta Shetty (supra) , rejected the challenge to
the order passed by the Maintenance Tribunal on the ground that the Tribunal
had no jurisdiction to order eviction. It was, inter alia, exposited that, during
the lifetime of the parents, children cannot assert any legal right whatsoever in
respect of the property of their parents claiming exclusive ownership or
possession of the parents property. The mother certainly deserves to be
maintained from her own tenement. The Petitioner has no legal right
whatsoever to oust the mother from her tenement so as to make her roofless
and/or deprive maintenance from her tenement.
45. At this stage, the decision in the case of Smt. S. Vanitha (supra),
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deserves to be consulted. The Supreme Court in the said case has
illuminatingly postulated the path to be traversed where two enactments,
namely, the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, both having non-obstante clauses compete for
operation. It was enunciated that the Tribunal must adopt a harmonious
construction. In paragraph No.17 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court
postulated that the Tribunal may have the authority to order an eviction, if it is
necessary and expedient to ensure the maintenance and protection of the
senior citizen or parent. Eviction, in other words, would be an incident of the
enforcement of the right to maintenance and protection. However, this remedy
can be granted only after adverting to the competing claims in the dispute.
46. It is in the aforesaid context, in the case of Samtola Devi (supra) , on
which reliance was placed by Mr. Dubey, it was enunciated that the provisions
of the Act, nowhere specifically provides for drawing proceedings for eviction
of persons from any premises owned or belonging to such a senior citizen. It
is only on account of the observations made by the Supreme Court in S.
Vanitha (supra) , that the Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act, may also
order eviction if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the protection of the
senior citizens. It must be noted that the decision in Samtola Devi (supra),
also turned on the peculiar facts of the said case.
47. The matter can be looked at from the two other perspectives, especially
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where the allegation is that the senior citizen has been driven out of her own
home/property. First, under the provisions of Section 23 of the Act, 2007, the
Tribunal is conferred with the authority to declare a transfer, made by the
senior citizen in favour of the transferee, void if the transferee refuses or fails
to provide basic amenities and physical needs to the transferor, post transfer.
In a sense, the power is drastic in nature. The Tribunal is empowered to
declare a registered instrument inter vivos void, and, resultantly, put the
transferor – senior citizen in possession of the property for failure of the
condition subsequent; express or implied.
48. Indeed, the said measure falls under the Chapter of Protection of life
and property of senior citizen. However, if the provisions of the Act, are read
as a whole, chapter by chapter, section by section; and word by word; which
is the standard rule of interpretation ( Reserve Bank of India V/s. Peerless
14
General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and Ors.) , then if the Tribunal
is empowered to declare a transfer, which has already been effected by
instruments inter vivos void, a fortiori , the Tribunal in exercise of its power to
enforce the right of maintenance of the senior citizen and the corresponding
obligation of the child / relative, would have the authority to order eviction of
the child / relative who has unlawfully dispossessed the senior citizen or
created an atmosphere which forces the senior citizen to take shelter
14 (1987) 1 SCC 424
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elsewhere than her own home.
49. Second, under the provisions of the Act, the Tribunal can award
maintenance not exceeding Rs.10,000/- per month. In a metropolis like
Mumbai, where the property commands premium, for a senior citizen, who is
dispossessed of her own premises, an award of maintenance of the maximum
amount of Rs.10,000/- per month can hardly be a solace. The said amount
would hardly be sufficient to have a roof over the head of the senior citizen.
50. Thus, the submission premised on the impression that the maintenance
under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 can be measured only in monetary terms,
is fallacious and does not merit countenance.
51. In the light of the aforesaid consideration, this Court must revert to the
decision in the case of Jitendra Gorakh Megh (supra) . From the perusal of
the said judgment, in its entirety, it becomes abundantly clear that the peculiar
facts of the said case, highlighted above, were taken into account by the
Division Bench. In the respectful understanding of this Court, in the backdrop
of those facts, especially the sound financial position of the senior citizen who
was found to have a number of properties, no allegation of cruelty and/or
harassment at the hands of the Petitioner therein, and the said application
having been filed as a counter-blast to the suit instituted by the Petitioner
therein, the Division Bench ruled that, such an application without seeking
maintenance was not maintainable.
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52. I am, thus, of the considered view that it cannot be laid down as an
immutable and absolute rule of law that the application for eviction simplicitor
sans the prayer for monetary maintenance is not maintainable, even when the
senior citizen claims that she has been dispossessed of her property or she
requires the property to generate income out of the said property to lead a
normal life. To hold otherwise, would amount to defeating the very objective of
the Act, 2007.
53. In the light of the aforesaid legal position, reverting to the facts of the
case, it is distressing to note that the Respondent No.1 has been forced to
take shelter in a facility meant for the senior citizen. The submission on behalf
of the Petitioner that the Petitioner No.1 has contributed some part of the
consideration, in cash, when the Respondent No.1 had acquired the subject
flat, is required to be stated to be repelled. In the circumstances of the case,
the said assertion appears to be self-serving one. On the basis of the
material on record, an inference becomes inescapable that the subject flat is
the property of the senior citizen within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act,
2007.
54. Conversely, there is no competing claim of the Petitioner. It must be
noted that, after the order of eviction came to be passed, the Petitioner No.2
who is the wife of Petitioner No.1 and daughter in law of the Respondent No.1
– senior citizen, has instituted a proceeding under the Protection of Women
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from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The said proceeding is instituted by way
of a desparate attempt to obviate the inevitable consequences.
55. In the application before the Maintenance Tribunal, the Respondent
No.1 has given a vivid account of the manner in which the Petitioners had
harassed her and subjected her to illtreatment. A positive case of neglect and
refusal on the part of the Petitioner No.1 to maintain Respondent No.1 was
pleaded. Various acts of harassment with reference to the incidents were
highlighted. Even an apprehension of safety of the life of Respondent No.1 at
the hands of the Petitioners was expressed.
56. Before this Court as well, an endeavour was made on behalf of the
Petitioners that, since the Respondent No.1 was suffering from depression,
there were quarrels between the Petitioners and Respondent No.1. Reliance
was sought to be placed on certain prescriptions and medical record. If that
was the case, then the need of the senior citizen to be cared for her physical
and mental health increases substantially and correspondingly, the obligation
on the Petitioner No.1 to provide adequate care and treatment for her mother
becomes even more pronounced. Certainly, that could not have been ruse as
oust the Respondent No.1 from her abode.
57. Lastly, the case at hand is that of a widowed woman, which the
Parliament has recognized in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, as most
vulnerable class of senior citizens, who required the protection of the
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provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. In the view of this Court, the
provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 find that the practical application in
a case of the present nature.
58. In the totality of the circumstances, in the considered view of this court,
the application filed by Respondent No.1 before the Maintenance Tribunal
was towards the enforcement of her right of maintenance and the obligation of
the Petitioners to allow the Respondent No.1 to lead a normal life. If at all the
Petitioners claim any semblance of right, title and interest in the subject flat, it
would be for the Petitioners to work out their remedies and not for the senior
citizen to run from pillar to post to retrieve her property.
59. For the foregoing reasons, the Writ Petition deserves to be dismissed.
60. Before parting, the Court appreciates the able assistance rendered by
Mr. Kulkarni, who was appointed to espouse the cause of Respondent No.1.
61. Hence, the following order :
ORDER
(i) The Writ Petition stands dismissed with costs.
(ii) Rule discharged.
( N.J.JAMADAR, J. )
61. At this stage, learned Counsel for the Petitioners seeks continuation of
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the ad-interim relief.
62. As the order is of eviction, the ad-interim relief shall continue to operate
for a period of three weeks subject to the Petitioners filing an undertaking, not
to create any third party rights and part with possession of the subject flat,
within a period of one week from today.
( N.J.JAMADAR, J. )
SSP 34/34
Signed by: S.S.Phadke
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 05/03/2026 21:36:47