KISHORE KUMAR NINAWE vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
- Court
- Chhattisgarh High Court
- Case type
- WRIT PETITON SERVICE MATTER
- Decided on
- 28-02-2026
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NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 8211 of 2023
Order Reserved On 06.02.2026
Order Delivered On 28.02.2026
1 - Kishore Kumar Ninawe S/o Shri Ramesh Ninawe Aged About 45
Years R/o Ward No. 19, P.S. Lalbagh, District Rajnandgaon
(Chhattisgarh)
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Revenue And Disaster
Management, Department, Mantralay, Mahanadi Bhavan, Nava Raipur,
Atal Nagar, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
2 - General Administration Department Through Secretary, G.A.D.
Mahanandi Bhawan, Mantralay, Naya Raipur, District Raipur,
Chhattisgarh.
3 - Director/commissioner Land Record Indravati Bhawan, 1st Floor,
Block-2, Naya Raipur, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
4 - High Level Caste Scrutiny Committee Tribal And Schedule Caste
Development Office Of Commissioner, Schedule Tribe And Schedule
Caste Development, Block-4d, Ground Floor, Indravati Bhawan, Atal
Nagar, Naya Raipur, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
5 - Collector Rajnandgaon, Dist. Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh.
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from the Case Information System)
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For Petitioner :- Mrs. Surya Kawalkar Dangi, Advocate
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For State :- Mr. D.R. Minj, Dy. A.G.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SB- Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
CAV Order
1. The instant petition has been preferred challenging the
termination order dated 14.09.2023 passed by respondent No. 3,
despite the fact that the services of the petitioner had already been
protected by this Hon’ble Court vide order dated 01.07.2016 passed in
WPS No. 616/2016, which order stands affirmed up to the Hon’ble Apex
Court.
2. The sole issue involved in the present writ petition is whether the
respondent authorities are legally justified in terminating the services of
the petitioner on the ground that his caste certificate is of Halba-Koshti
and not Halba, despite the fact that this very issue has already attained
finality up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Earlier, pursuant to complaints
regarding caste status, the petitioner’s case was examined and this
Hon’ble Court in WPS No. 616/2016 by order dated 01.07.2016 granted
protection to the petitioner’s service while directing that he be treated as
a general category employee, which order was affirmed by the Hon’ble
Division Bench in WA No. 542/2016 on 14.02.2017, and further upheld
by dismissal of the State’s SLP by the Hon’ble Apex Court. Acting upon
the said final adjudication, the petitioner continued in service and was
even promoted in the general category; however, the respondents have
now reopened the settled issue and terminated the petitioner’s services
vide order dated 14.09.2023, solely on the same ground of caste status,
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without affording due opportunity of hearing. Such action is ex facie
illegal, arbitrary, and without jurisdiction, being hit by the principles of
finality of litigation and res judicata, and is squarely covered by the law
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gajanan Marotrao Nimje v.
RBI (2019) 12 SCC 639, which prohibits collateral disturbance of
service protections already granted by final judicial orders.
3. The petitioner in the present writ petition has prayed for following
reliefs:-
“10.1 That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased
to set aside aside the termination order dated dated
14.09.2023 (Annexure P/1), being as illegal and
bad in law.
10.2 That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased
to direct the respondent authorities to comply with
the directions issued in WPS no. 616/2016
(Annexure P/2) in its true letter and spirit.
10.3 That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased
to direct the respondent authorities to permit the
petitioner to discharge his services as a general
category employee, without raising any further
dispute with regard to his caste.
10.4 Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court
deems, fit in the facts and circumstances may also
be granted in favour of the petitioner.”
4. Facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed on the post
of Patwari on 29.04.1998 in the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh
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under the Scheduled Tribe category on the basis of a caste certificate of
“Halba” issued on 01.07.1995 by the competent authority, at a time
when persons belonging to Halba-Koshti were bona fide treated as
Halba due to a prevailing misconception. After the Constitution Bench
judgment in State of Maharashtra v. Milind (2001), which clarified that
Halba-Koshti is not a Scheduled Tribe but protected appointments that
had attained finality prior to 28.11.2000, the petitioner’s case, along with
similarly situated employees, was examined by this Hon’ble Court in
WPS No. 616/2016, wherein, by order dated 01.07.2016, the circular
withdrawing service protection was quashed and the petitioner was
granted service protection while being treated as a general category
employee. The said order was affirmed by the Hon’ble Division Bench in
WA No. 542/2016 vide order dated 14.02.2017 and further attained
finality upon dismissal of the State’s SLP by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
on 06.08.2018. Acting upon the said final adjudication, the petitioner
continued in service and was promoted to the post of Revenue
Inspector in the year 2018 in the general category. However, despite the
issue of the petitioner’s caste status having been conclusively settled,
the caste scrutiny committee again invalidated the petitioner’s caste
certificate by order dated 04.05.2019 while expressly leaving the issue
of service protection to the department. Thereafter, without issuing any
proper show-cause notice, without issuing any charge-sheet, without
conducting any disciplinary enquiry, and without affording any
opportunity of hearing, and despite repeated representations made by
the petitioner, the respondent authorities abruptly terminated the
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services of the petitioner by the impugned order dated 14.09.2023 on
the very same ground of Halba-Koshti caste. The impugned action
amounts to reopening of a concluded issue in clear violation of the
principles of natural justice, finality of litigation, and binding judicial
orders passed by this Hon’ble Court, the Hon’ble Division Bench, and
the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the present case
does not call for any fresh adjudication on the caste status of the
petitioner. The issue sought to be raised by the respondent authorities
has already attained finality up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The
petitioner’s service stands expressly protected by binding judicial orders
passed by this Hon’ble Court, affirmed by the Hon’ble Division Bench,
and thereafter upheld by dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by the
Hon’ble Apex Court. The impugned termination order, therefore,
amounts to a clear violation of binding directions issued inter partes.
Learned counsel submits that earlier, in the States of Madhya Pradesh
and Maharashtra, Halba and Koshti/Halba-Koshti were treated as Halba
due to a prevailing misconception. It was only after the Constitution
Bench judgment in State of Maharashtra v. Milind [(2001) 1 SCC 4] that
it was clarified that Koshti or Halba-Koshti are not Halba. However, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court expressly protected admissions and
appointments that had attained finality prior to 28.11.2000. Pursuant
thereto, the Central Government issued a circular dated 10.08.2010
granting service protection to affected employees, and similarly, the
State of Chhattisgarh also extended service protection to such
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employees appointed prior to 28.11.2000. It is further submitted that
when the State Government withdrew such protection by circular dated
11.01.2016, the petitioner challenged the same by filing WPS No.
616/2016. This Hon’ble Court, vide order dated 01.07.2016, quashed
the withdrawal and granted service protection to the petitioner. The said
order was affirmed by the Hon’ble Division Bench in WA No. 542/2016
by order dated 14.02.2017, wherein the operative findings are contained
in paragraph 39. The Special Leave Petition preferred by the State was
dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 06.08.2018, thereby
rendering the protection absolute and final. Learned counsel submits
that despite such final adjudication, the High Level Caste Scrutiny
Committee, vide order dated 04.05.2019, reiterated that the petitioner
belongs to Halba-Koshti and not Halba, which was already the admitted
and accepted factual position even at the time of granting judicial
protection. Importantly, even the Committee left the question of service
protection to the administrative department in light of government
circulars and judicial directions. It is stated that the respondents have
selectively relied upon a general observation to defeat a specific and
binding relief granted inter partes, which is impermissible in law. It is
also submitted that once the Division Bench judgment was carried to
the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Special Leave Petition was
dismissed, the doctrine of res judicata squarely applies and the order of
the Caste Scrutiny Committee dated 04.05.2019 does not and cannot
override binding judicial orders and, in fact, acknowledges that service
protection is to be governed by judicial and governmental directions.
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Learned counsel further points out that pursuant to the earlier judicial
orders, the petitioner continued in service and was promoted to the post
of Revenue Inspector as a General Category employee, without
claiming any benefit of Scheduled Tribe status. In view of the above
submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
impugned termination order is contrary to binding judicial directions,
suffers from gross illegality, is hit by the doctrine of res judicata and
finality of litigation, and is based on a patent misinterpretation of the
Division Bench judgment. It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that
this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to quash the impugned termination
order and direct reinstatement of the petitioner in service as a General
Category employee in terms of the binding judgments already passed.
She has placed reliance upon the judgments of Ganjanan Marotrao
Nimje vs. RBI [(2019) 12 SCC 639] and R.Unnikrishnan vs. V.K.
Mahanudevan [(2014) 4 SCC 434] .
6. Learned State Counsel submits that the present writ petition is
devoid of merits and deserves to be dismissed. It is contended that the
petitioner’s Scheduled Tribe caste certificate of “Halba” has been
cancelled by the High Level Caste Scrutiny Committee vide order dated
04.05.2019 (Annexure P/6), wherein a categorical finding has been
recorded that the petitioner belongs to the Halba-Koshti community from
the State of Maharashtra. Once the caste certificate itself stands
invalidated and has not been challenged by the petitioner, the said order
has attained finality and all consequential actions flowing therefrom are
legally sustainable. It is further submitted that the Hon’ble Division
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Bench, while deciding WA No. 542/2016 by judgment dated 14.02.2017,
has clearly observed that the protection granted by earlier circulars
cannot be extended to all and sundry. The Hon’ble Court specifically
clarified that persons belonging to Halba-Koshti from the State of
Maharashtra, who had shifted to the State of Madhya Pradesh, would
not be treated as Halba-Koshti of Madhya Pradesh and that their caste
certificates would be totally false, rendering them ineligible for any
service protection. According to learned State Counsel, the petitioner
squarely falls within the said excluded category and, therefore, cannot
claim any benefit of service protection. The respondents, therefore,
were justified in acting upon the observations made by the Hon’ble
Division Bench. It is further argued that the petitioner chose not to
challenge the Division Bench judgment before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court. Consequently, the said observations have attained finality and
the petitioner cannot now question the inevitable consequences flowing
therefrom. It is also contended that the order passed by the High Level
Caste Scrutiny Committee dated 04.05.2019 was passed strictly in light
of the observations made by this Hon’ble Court and that the petitioner,
having failed to assail the said order, is estopped from questioning the
consequential termination. Learned State Counsel further submits that
the representations submitted by the petitioner were duly considered in
the context of the order dated 04.05.2019 and the binding judgment of
the Division Bench in WA No. 542/2016. Only thereafter, and after
proper appreciation of the relevant judicial directions, the impugned
termination order dated 14.09.2023 was passed. The impugned order is
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thus neither arbitrary nor illegal and does not suffer from any procedural
infirmity. In view of the above submissions, learned State Counsel
submits that no ground has been made out for interference under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is misconceived,
devoid of merit, and is liable to be dismissed with costs.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
8. From the perusal of the record, it is evident that on 01.07.1995 the
Sub-Divisional Officer, Rajnandgaon issued a caste certificate in favour
of the petitioner certifying that he belongs to the Halba community, a
Scheduled Tribe. Thereafter, vide order dated 29.04.1998, the petitioner
was appointed to the post of Patwari under the Scheduled Tribe
category in the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh and has
continuously served since then.
9. The Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
State of Maharashtra v. Milind (2001) 1 SCC 4 , decided on
28.11.2000, clarified that “Halba Koshti” is not included within the
Scheduled Tribe “Halba”. However, while rendering the said decision,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court specifically protected appointments that had
already been made prior to 28.11.2000, even where the candidates had
availed Scheduled Tribe benefits as Halba Koshti. In furtherance of the
said judgment, the Government of India issued an Office Memorandum
extending service protection to employees appointed prior to
28.11.2000 whose caste was recorded as Halba, though they in fact
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belonged to Koshti/Halba Koshti. Pursuant thereto, the State of
Chhattisgarh also issued a circular granting identical protection to
similarly situated employees affected by the Milind (Supra) decision.
The State circular explicitly protected the services of persons appointed
prior to 28.11.2000 on the strength of caste certificates describing them
as Halba or Halba Koshti. Since the petitioner was appointed prior to
the cut-off date of 28.11.2000, he squarely falls within the protected
category. Therefore, the benefit of service protection flows in his favour
by virtue of the Supreme Court judgment, the Government of India
Office Memorandum dated 10.08.2010, and the State Government
circular. Consequently, a complaint raised after a prolonged lapse of
time in the year 2015 and the subsequent circular dated 11.01.2016
withdrawing earlier protection cannot override the binding protection
granted by the Supreme Court. When the petitioner and other similarly
situated employees challenged the withdrawal circular in WPS No.
616/2016, this Court quashed the circular dated 11.01.2016 and
directed the respondents to extend service protection. The writ appeal
preferred against the said order was dismissed by the Division Bench
vide order dated 01.07.2016, affirming that the petitioners were entitled
to continue in service, though to be treated as General Category
employees from 28.11.2000 onwards.
10. In consequence of the aforesaid judicial pronouncements, the
petitioner was promoted to the post of Revenue Inspector while being
treated as a General Category employee for promotional purposes. The
Special Leave Petition preferred against the Division Bench judgment
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dated 01.07.2016 was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on
06.08.2018, thereby giving finality to the issue.
11. In the matter of Milind (supra) , the Hon’ble Suprme Court ruled
that “Halba-Koshti” is not a Scheduled Tribe, invalidating claims made
under that category. However, it protected past appointments and
educational admissions already finalized to prevent undue hardship.
The decision has since guided policies on caste and tribe verification
and is often cited in cases concerning the limits of judicial review in
matters of constitutional lists.
12. Also, in the matter of Gajanan Marotrao Nimje and others vs.
Reserve Bank of India and others reported in (2019) 12 SCC 639
wherein despite being given service protection to employees affected
with the dispute of Halba and Halba/Koshti, their services were
terminated, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:-
"8. We are afraid, in the peculiar background of
the appellants and the history of the previous
litigation of the same issue, the High Court is
not justified in passing such an omnibus order.
There is no case for anybody, leave alone the
writ petitioners that at the time of entry in
service, the appellants played any fraud. There
was no case that the petitioners therein had
played any fraud in obtaining the certificate or
employment. In any case the appellants, it is
pointed out that, even assuming that they do
not belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled
Tribe, fall either under the Most Backward or
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under the Backward Category, who were also
entitled to some reservation at the time of
recruitment. In order to avoid any litigation on
this aspect only, the High Court in its wisdom
passed the judgment dated 1-11-2012, that all
the petitioners therein will be put in the general
category.
9. It will be relevant to note that the common
judgment dated 1-11-2012 was challenged
before this Court and the special leave
petition(s) and the review petition(s) were also
dismissed.
10. Having regard to the background, as above,
we are of the view that the appellants are
entitled to the protection granted by the same
High Court in the judgment dated 1-11-
2012. ....."
13. Further, an identical situation has arisen in the matter of R.
Unnikrishnan vs,. V.K. Mahanudevan reported in 2014 4 SCC 434 ,
wherein once the employee was granted service protection, his caste
status was reopened, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:-
“12. Two distinct questions fall for
determination in these appeals. The first is
whether the appellants could have reopened
for examination the caste status of the
respondent V.K. Mahanudevan no matter that
judgment of the High Court in OP No. 9216 of
1986 had declared him to be a "Thandan"
belonging to a Scheduled Caste community.
The High Court has, as seen above, taken the
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view that its judgment and order in OP No.
9216 of 1986 effectively settled the question
regarding the caste status of the respondent
which could not be reopened as the said
judgment had attained finality. The second and
the only other question that would arise for
determination is whether the respondent V.K.
Mahanudevan can claim protection against
ouster from service and, if so, what is the effect
of the change in law relevant to the caste
status of the respondent. We propose to deal
with the two questions ad seriatim.19. It is trite
that law favours finality to binding judicial
decisions pronounced by courts that are
competent to deal with the subject matter.
Public interest is against individuals being
vexed twice over with the same kind of
litigation. The binding character of the
judgments pronounced by the courts of
competent jurisdiction has always been treated
as an essential part of the rule of law which is
the basis of the administration of justice in this
country. We may gainfully refer to the decision
of the Constitution Bench of this Court in
Daryao v. State of U.P. (AIR 1961 SC 1457]
where the Court succinctly summed up the law
in the following words: (AIR p. 1462, paras 9 &
11)
"9.... It is in the interest of the public at
large that a finality should attach to the
binding decisions pronounced by courts
of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in
the public interest that individuals should
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not be vexed twice over with the same
kind of litigation.
*
11. The binding character of judgments
pronounced by courts of competent
jurisdiction is itself an essential part of
the rule of law, and the rule of law
obviously is the basis of the
administration of justice on which the
Constitution lays so much emphasis."
26. It is only because the Full Bench of the
Kerala High Court held that anthropological
study conducted by KIRTADS may not provide
a sound basis for holding Thandans, like the
respondent, as those belonging to the
Scheduled Caste category that the issue
regarding the correctness of the certificate and
a fresh investigation into the matter surfaced
for consideration. Even if one were to assume
that the conclusion drawn by KIRTADS was not
for any reason completely accurate and
reliable, the same would not have in the
absence of any other material to show that
such conclusion and enquiry was a complete
farce based on wholly irrelevant or
inadmissible material and motivated by
extraneous considerations by itself provided a
basis for unsettling what stood settled by the
order passed by the High Court. Suffice it to
say that the contention urged on behalf of the
appellants that the order passed by the High
Court in OP No. 9216 of 1986 was a nullity on
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the ground of fraud has not impressed us in
the facts and circumstances of the case.
27. The upshot of the above discussion,
therefore, is that the order passed by the High
Court in OP No. 9216 of 1986 which had
attained finality did not permit a fresh enquiry
into the caste status of the writ petitioner.
Inasmuch as the High Court quashed the said
proceedings and the order passed by the State
Government pursuant thereto, it committed no
error to warrant interference."
14. From the above legal position and the law laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Milind , along with
the memorandum issued by the Government of India and the State
circular dated 01.10.2011, it is clear that employees appointed prior to
28.11.2000 on the basis of Halba/Halba Koshti caste certificates are
entitled to protection of their services. This protection is based on
binding judicial directions and cannot be taken away by later
administrative action. Therefore, even though the Caste Scrutiny
Committee later held that the petitioner belongs to Halba Koshti and
invalidated the caste certificate, such a finding cannot affect the
petitioner’s service. At most, it can affect future benefits under the
reserved category, but it cannot cancel the protection already granted
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and implemented by the Government.
The petitioner’s service is therefore legally protected.
15. In view of this settled position of law, the impugned order dated
14.09.2023 (Annexure P/1), by which the petitioner’s services were
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terminated, is not sustainable. The termination order goes against
binding court judgments and reopens an issue that has already been
finally decided. Once the courts have granted protection and the matter
has attained finality, the authorities cannot pass an order in violation of
those directions. The impugned action is based on an incorrect
understanding of the earlier Division Bench judgment and ignores the
protection granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Therefore, the
termination order deserves to be quashed.
16. As a result, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in service
with continuity. However, in accordance with earlier Court directions, the
petitioner shall be treated as a General Category employee from
28.11.2000 onwards for future service purposes. He shall not be entitled
to take benefit of Halba tribe. The respondents are directed to restore
the petitioner to service and grant all consequential benefits in
accordance with law, preferably within a period eight weeks from the
date of production of copy of this order.
17. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated
hereinabove.
18. No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Vishakha