Sterlite Power Transmission Limited & Ors. vs Union Of India & Ors.

Court
Delhi High Court

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 27.10.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 17.11.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 17.11.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010095132024
+ W.P.(C) 2966/2024, CM APPL. 12196/2024
STERLITE POWER TRANSMISSION LIMITED & ORS.
.....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Balbir Singh, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Kumar Visalaksh, Mr.
Rahul Khurana, Mr. Udit Jain,
Mr. Arihant Tater, Mr. Ajitesh
Dayal Singh, Mr. Pranav
Bansal, Mr. Vibhor Sharma,
Ms. Disha Jham, Mr. Vedant
Kohli and Mr. Karan Sachdev,
Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Ms. Tanvi Nigam, SPC for
UOI.
Mr. Shashank Dixit, CGSC
along with Mr. Kunal Raj, Adv.
Mr. Shagun Shahi Chugh and
Ms. Rimpy Rohilla, Advs.
Mr. N. Venkatraman, ASG with
Mr. Atul Tripathi, SSC with
Mr. Akshay Sagar, Mr.
Shubham Mishra and Mr.
Gaurav Mani Tripathi, Advs.
# CNR No. DLHC010482292024
+ W.P.(C) 10924/2024, CM APPL. 45008/2024
M/S RENEW PRIVATE LIMITED .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sujit Ghosh, Senior
Advocate with Ms. Mannat
Waraich, Ms. Anshika
Agarwal, Mr. Chirag Motwani
and Ms. Vidhi Chhabra, Advs.
versus
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
Signing Date:17.11.2026
16:34:07
W.P.(C) 2966/2024 and connected matter Page 1 of 119

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Ms. Manisha Agrawal Narain,
CGSC with Mr. Ayush
Srivastava, Adv. for UOI.
Mr. Sumit K. Batra and Ms.
Priyanka Jindal, Advs. for
GNCTD.
Mr. N. Venkatraman, ASG with
Mr. Atul Tripathi, SSC with
Mr. Akshay Sagar, Mr.
Shubham Mishra and Mr.
Gaurav Mani Tripathi, Advs.
Mr. Farman Ali, CGSC along
with Ms. Usha Jamnal, Adv.
# CNR No. DLHC010710362024
+ W.P.(C) 14622/2024, CM APPL. 61385/2024
JINDAL STAINLESS HISAR LIMITED NOW MERGED
WITH JINDAL STAINLESS LIMITED .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Harsh Makhija, Adv.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Ms. Monica Benjamin, SSC
along with Ms. Laiba Arif and
Ms. Prerika Narang, Advs. for
R-1 to 3.
Mr. Ruchesh Sinha, SSC along
with Ms. Upasna Vashistha,
Adv. for R-1 & 3.
Mr. Vedansh Anand, SPC with
Mr. Shivam Kumar, GP for
UOI.
Ms. Manisha Agrawal Narain,
CGSC with Mr. Ayush
Srivastava, Adv. for UOI.
# CNR No. DLHC010792312024
+ W.P.(C) 15738/2024, CM APPL. 66100/2024
MS AZURE POWER INDIA PVT LTD .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sujit Ghosh, Senior
Advocate with Ms. Mannat
Waraich, Ms. Anshika
Agarwal, Mr. Chirag Motwani
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
Signing Date:17.11.2026
16:34:07
W.P.(C) 2966/2024 and connected matter Page 2 of 119

and Ms. Vidhi Chhabra, Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Bhagvan Swarup Shukla,
CGSC along with Mr. Sawan
Kumar Shukla, Mr. Mukesh
Kumar Pandey, Mr. Praveen
Gupta, Ms. Shreya Mishra and
Mr. Anupam Pandey, Advs. for
UOI.
Mr. N. Venkataraman, ASG
with Mr. Chandrashekar
Bharathi, Mr. Shivshankar,
Advs. with Mr. Anurag Ojha,
SSC with Mr. Dipak Raj, Mr.
Aditya Chaudhary, Mr. Garima
Kumar, Mr. Aayushman Bhatt,
Mr. Deep Raj, Advs.
Ms. Vaishali Gupta, PC with
Ms. Rashi Aggarwal, Adv. for
R-2.
# CNR No. DLHC010953282024
+ W.P.(C) 17559/2024, CM APPL. 74775/2024
NAMBI BUILDWELL LIMITED .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Kavita Jha, Sr. Adv. along
with Mr. Shammi Kapoor, Ms.
Swati Agarwal, Mr. Sandeep
Gupta and Ms. Kanika Sethi,
Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. N. Venkataraman, ASG
with Mr. Chandrashekar
Bharathi, Mr. Shivshankar,
Advs. with Mr. Anurag Ojha,
SSC with Mr. Dipak Raj, Mr.
Aditya Chaudhary, Mr. Garima
Kumar, Mr. Aayushman Bhatt,
Mr. Deep Raj, Advs.
Ms. Iram Majid, CGSC along
with Mr. Mohd Suboor, Mr.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
Signing Date:17.11.2026
16:34:07
W.P.(C) 2966/2024 and connected matter Page 3 of 119

Mohd Saad Khan, Mr. Amaan
Siddiqui and Mr. Goutham M
S, Advs.
# CNR No. DLHC010615032025
+ W.P.(C) 12955/2025, CM APPL. 52912/2025
JITF URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES LTD
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Jay Savla, Sr. Adv. along
with Mr. Prabhat Chaurasia and
Mr. Rajpal Singh, Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Theepa Murugesan, SPC
along with Mr. Yogesh Dubey,
Adv. for UOI.
Mr. N. Venkatraman, ASG with
Mr. Atul Tripathi, SSC with
Mr. Akshay Sagar, Mr.
Shubham Mishra and Mr.
Gaurav Mani Tripathi, Advs.
# CNR No. DLHC010632072025
+ W.P.(C) 13341/2025, CM APPL. 54668/2025
ESSAR POWER LIMITED .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Rishi Agrawala, Mr. Alok
Yadav, Mr. Daksh Arora and
Mr. Abhishek Anand, Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. P. S. Singh, CGSC along
with Ms. Shivangi Sharma, Mr.
Ankit Bansal and Ms. Natasha
Goel, Advs.
Mr. N. Venkataraman, ASG
with Mr. Chandrashekar
Bharathi, Mr. Shivshankar,
Advs. with Mr. Anurag Ojha,
SSC with Mr. Dipak Raj, Mr.
Aditya Chaudhary, Mr. Garima
Kumar, Mr. Aayushman Bhatt,
Mr. Deep Raj, Advs.
# CNR No. DLHC010632252025
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
Signing Date:17.11.2026
16:34:07
W.P.(C) 2966/2024 and connected matter Page 4 of 119

+ W.P.(C) 13358/2025, CM APPL. 54715/2025, CM APPL.
3848/2026
MS GAIL INDIA LIMITED .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Mannat Waraich, Ms.
Anshika Agarwal, Mr. Chirag
Motwani and Ms. Vidhi
Chhabra, Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Jagdish Chandra, CGSC
with Ms. Maanya Saxena, Adv.
for UOI.
Mr. N. Venkatraman, ASG with
Mr. Aditya Singla, SSC along
with Ms. Arya Suresh Nair, Mr.
Akhil Sharma, Mr. Dhananjay
Gautham, Adv and Ms. Nehaol
Shri L. V., Advs.
# CNR No. DLHC011048252025
+ W.P.(C) 19506/2025, CM APPL. 81421/2025
ESSAR SHIPPING LIMITED .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Rishi Agrawala, Mr. Alok
Yadav, Mr. Daksh Arora and
Mr. Abhishek Anand, Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Ravindra Vikram Singh
(SPC) with Mr. V.K Singh, Mr.
Ajay Rathore and Mr. Kunal
Pal, Advs. for R-1/UOI.
Mr. Satish Aggarwal, Sr.
Standing Counsel with Mr.
Gagan Vaswani, Adv. for R-4.
# CNR No. DLHC010003182025
+ W.P.(C) 214/2025, CM APPL. 970/2025, CM APPL.
53742/2026
AVAADA ENERGY PVT LTD & ORS. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Ankur Sood, Ms. Romila
Mandal, Mr. Prajwal Suman
and Mr. Dhaman Trivedi, Advs.
versus
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
Signing Date:17.11.2026
16:34:07
W.P.(C) 2966/2024 and connected matter Page 5 of 119

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Dr. Abhishek Khanna, SPC for
R-1/UOI.
Ms. Arunima Dwivedi, SSC
along with Ms. Himanshi
Singh, Ms. Monalisha Pradhan
and Mr. Suman Ghosh, Advs.
for R-1 and R-3.
Mr. Satish Kumar Aneja, Adv.
# CNR No. DLHC010232082025
+ W.P.(C) 5238/2025, CM APPL. 23838/2025
SAEL LIMITED & ANR. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Kumar Visalaksh, Mr.
Rahul Khurana, Mr. Udit Jain,
Mr. Arihant Tater, Mr. Ajitesh
Dayal Singh, Mr. Pranav
Bansal and Mr. Vibhor Sharma,
Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Devvrat Yadav, Mr. Kartik
Sharma, Mr. Manhan Chawla,
Ms. M Shuaib Zahoor,
Ms.Pearl Sharma and Ms.Geeta
Thareja, Advs.
# CNR No. DLHC010301612025
+ W.P.(C) 6436/2025
FUTURE BRANDS LIMITED .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Kumar Visalaksh, Mr.
Rahul Khurana, Mr. Udit Jain,
Mr. Arihant Tater, Mr. Ajitesh
Dayal Singh, Mr. Pranav
Bansal and Mr. Vibhor Sharma,
Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. N. Venkatraman, ASG with
Mr. Aditya Singla, SSC along
with Ms. Arya Suresh Nair, Mr.
Akhil Sharma, Mr. Dhananjay
Gautham, Adv and Ms. Nehaol
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
Signing Date:17.11.2026
16:34:07
W.P.(C) 2966/2024 and connected matter Page 6 of 119

Shri L. V., Advs.
# CNR No. DLHC010350682025
+ W.P.(C) 7639/2025
ISP TECHNOLOGIES PRIVATE LIMITED .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Pradeep Singh Rawat, Mr.
Lalit Mohan Pant and Mr.
Abhinav Kalra, Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Ms. Shagun Shahi Chugh, Mr.
Varun Chugh, Ms. Rimpy
Rohilla and Ms. Barkha, Advs.
# CNR No. DLHC010397372025
+ W.P.(C) 8990/2025
LOGIX REALTORS PRIVATE LIMITED .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Pradeep Singh Rawat, Mr.
Lalit Mohan Pant and Mr.
Abhinav Kalra, Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Sahaj Garg, SPC with Mr.
Sanjay Pal, GP and Mr. Prakhar
Negi, Advs. for UOI.
Mr. Arun Khatri, SSC with Mr.
Pranavjeet Singh, Adv. for
CGST.
# CNR No. DLHC011083812025
+ W.P.(C) 280/2026, CM APPL. 1254/2026, CM APPL.
3918/2026, CM APPL. 5523/2026, CM APPL. 9779/2026, CM
APPL. 9784/2026, CM APPL. 11199/2026
HERO FUTURE ENERGIES PVT LTD .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. J. Salva, Sr. Adv. along
with Mr. Yash Srivastava, Ms.
Satakshi Sood and Ms.
Naimishi Verma, Advs.

versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Ms. Tanvi Nigam (SPC) with
Mr. Divyansh Nigam, Adv. for
R-1.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
Signing Date:17.11.2026
16:34:07
W.P.(C) 2966/2024 and connected matter Page 7 of 119

Mr. N. Venkataraman, ASG
with Mr. Chandrashekar
Bharathi, Mr. Shivshankar,
Advs. with Mr. Anurag Ojha,
SSC with Mr. Dipak Raj, Mr.
Aditya Chaudhary, Mr. Garima
Kumar, Mr. Aayushman Bhatt,
Mr. Deep Raj, Advs.
# CNR No. DLHC011083102025
+ W.P.(C) 281/2026, CM APPL. 1255/2026, CM APPL.
3981/2026, CM APPL. 5521/2026, CM APPL. 11198/2026,
CM APPL. 29377/2026, CM APPL. 29379/2026, CM APPL.
29664/2026
HERO SOLAR ENERGY PRIVATE LIMITED .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. J. Salva, Sr. Adv. along
with Mr. Yash Srivastava, Ms.
Satakshi Sood and Ms.
Naimishi Verma, Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Abhishek Mahajan, SPC
for R-1.
Mr. Piyush Beriwal and Ms.
Rucita Srivastava, Advs. for R-
2 to R-4.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BHARAT PARASHAR
J U D G M E N T
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.:
A. FOREWORD:
1. The present batch of Petitions invites this Court to venture upon
a substantial and rather interesting question of law as to whether the
issuance of a corporate guarantee by a holding/parent company in
favour of a financial institution, in respect of the financial obligations
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
Signing Date:17.11.2026
16:34:07
W.P.(C) 2966/2024 and connected matter Page 8 of 119

of its subsidiary/group company, constitutes a ‗ supply and/or supply
of service ‘ under Sections 7 and 9 of the Central Goods and Services
1
Tax Act, 2017 , consequently making it a taxable event attracting the
imposition of Goods and Services Tax (GST) at the rate of 1% under
2
Rule 28(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 .
2. While raising the aforestated issue, the Petitioners herein also
call upon this Court to read down Notification No.52/2023-Central
3
Tax dated 26.10.2023 and the Circular No.204/16/2023-GST dated
4
27.10.2023 , vide which sub-rule 2 was inserted into Rule 28,
prescribing deemed value of 1% for the supply of services by way of
providing corporate guarantee to any banking company or financial
institution on behalf of a related person. The applicability and
interpretation of the said provision came to be clarified further vide
the IC-2023.
3. In addition, the Petitioners also calls this Court to read down
5
Notification No.12/2024 dated 10.07.2024 , vide which the IN-2023
came to be amended, by incorporating the following expressions,
‗ located in India ‘ and ‗ per annum ‘, into sub-rule 2 along with the
proviso thereto. A challenge also stands raised towards the Circular
No.225/19/2024-GST dated 11.07.2024, vide which the applicability
of Rule 28(2) was clarified.
4. At the outset, we must also highlight that the Petitioners in
W.P.(C) 15738/2024 and W.P.(C) 12955/2025, have raised certain

1
hereinafter referred to as ‗Act of 2017‘
2
hereinafter referred to as ‗Rules of 2017‘
3
hereinafter referred to as ‗Impugned Notification/IN-2023‘
4
hereinafter referred to as ‗Impugned Circular/IC-2023‘
5
hereinafter referred to as ‗Impugned Notification/IN-2024‘
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
Signing Date:17.11.2026
16:34:07
W.P.(C) 2966/2024 and connected matter Page 9 of 119

additional issues and challenges beyond those identified hereinabove.
However, the scope of the present judgment is confined to the
taxability of corporate guarantees and the issues pertaining to Rule
28(2) of the Rules of 2017, IN-2023, IN-2024, IC-2023 and IC-2024,
while leaving open the additional issues raised, in the aforementioned
Petitions, for consideration in appropriate proceedings.
5. Before turning towards examination of the rival arguments
advanced by learned counsels representing the parties, we deem it
appropriate to reproduce the relevant constitutional and statutory
provisions relied upon by the learned counsels during the course of
their respective submissions, as the same shall also form the basis of
our analysis thereafter. The relevant provisions are reproduced
hereinbelow-
Constitution of India
12. Definition. —In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires,
―the State‖ includes the Government and Parliament of India and the
Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or
other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of
the Government of India.
14. Equality before law. —The State shall not deny to any person
equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the
territory of India.
19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech,
etc. —(1) All citizens shall have the right—
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade
or business.
246A. Special provision with respect to goods and services tax. —
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in articles 246 and 254,
Parliament, and, subject to clause (2), the Legislature of every State,
have power to make laws with respect to goods and services tax
imposed by the Union or by such State.
(2) Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to
goods and services tax where the supply of goods, or of services, or
both takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
Signing Date:17.11.2026
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Explanation.—The provisions of this article, shall, in respect of goods
and services tax referred to in clause (5) of article 279A, take effect
from the date recommended by the Goods and Services Tax Council.
265. Taxes not to be imposed save by authority of law. —No tax
shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.
292. Borrowing by the Government of India. —The executive
power of the Union extends to borrowing upon the security of the
Consolidated Fund of India within such limits, if any, as may from
time to time be fixed by Parliament by law and to the giving of
guarantees within such limits, if any, as may be so fixed.
293. Borrowing by States. —(1) Subject to the provisions of this
article, the executive power of a State extends to borrowing within the
territory of India upon the security of the Consolidated Fund of the
State within such limits, if any, as may from time to time be fixed by
the Legislature of such State by law and to the giving of guarantees
within such limits, if any, as may be so fixed.
(2) The Government of India may, subject to such conditions as
may be laid down by or under any law made by Parliament, make
loans to any State or, so long as any limits fixed under article 292
are not exceeded, give guarantees in respect of loans raised by any
State, and any sums required for the purpose of making such loans
shall be charged on the Consolidated Fund of India.
(3) A State may not without the consent of the Government of India
raise any loan if there is still outstanding any part of a loan which
has been made to the State by the Government of India or by its
predecessor Government, or in respect of which a guarantee has
been given by the Government of India or by its predecessor
Government.
(4) A consent under clause (3) may be granted subject to such
conditions, if any, as the Government of India may think fit to
impose.
366. Definitions. —In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise
requires, the following expressions have the meanings hereby
respectively assigned to them, that is to say—
(11) ―Federal Court‖ means the Federal Court constituted under the
Government of India Act, 1935;
(12) ―goods‖ includes all materials, commodities, and articles;
(12A) ―goods and services tax‖ means any tax on supply of goods,
or services or both except taxes on the supply of the alcoholic liquor
for human consumption;
(26A) ―Services‖ means anything other than goods;
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
Signing Date:17.11.2026
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ACT OF 2017
Section 2. Definitions.-
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(1) "actionable claim" shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in
section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882);
(17) "business" includes –
(a) any trade, commerce, manufacture, profession, vocation,
adventure, wager or any other similar activity, whether or not it is
for a pecuniary benefit;
(b) any activity or transaction in connection with or incidental or
ancillary to sub-clause (a);
(c) any activity or transaction in the nature of sub-clause (a),
whether or not there is volume, frequency, continuity or regularity
of such transaction;
(31) "consideration" in relation to the supply of goods or services or
both includes-
(a) any payment made or to be made, whether in money or
otherwise, in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of,
the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the recipient or
by any other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the
Central Government or a State Government;
(b) the monetary value of any act or forbearance, in respect of, in
response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or
services or both, whether by the recipient or by any other person
but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central Government
or a State Government:
Provided that a deposit given in respect of the supply of goods or
services or both shall not be considered as payment made for such
supply unless the supplier applies such deposit as consideration for the
said supply;
(32) "continuous supply of goods" means a supply of goods which is
provided, or agreed to be provided, continuously or on recurrent basis,
under a contract, whether or not by means of a wire, cable, pipeline or
other conduit, and for which the supplier invoices the recipient on a
regular or periodic basis and includes supply of such goods as the
Government may, subject to such conditions, as it may, by
notification, specify;
(33) "continuous supply of services" means a supply of services which
is provided, or agreed to be provided, continuously or on recurrent
basis, under a contract, for a period exceeding three months with
periodic payment obligations and includes supply of such services as
the Government may, subject to such conditions, as it may, by
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
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notification, specify;
(93) "recipient" of supply of goods or services or both, means-
(a) where a consideration is payable for the supply of goods or
services or both, the person who is liable to pay that consideration;
(b) where no consideration is payable for the supply of goods, the
person to whom the goods are delivered or made available, or to
whom possession or use of the goods is given or made available;
and
(c) where no consideration is payable for the supply of a service,
the person to whom the service is rendered,
and any reference to a person to whom a supply is made shall be
construed as a reference to the recipient of the supply and shall
include an agent acting as such on behalf of the recipient in relation to
the goods or services or both supplied;
(101) ―securities‖ shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in
clause (h) of section 2 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act,
1956;
(102) "services" means anything other than goods, money and
securities but includes activities relating to the use of money or its
conversion by cash or by any other mode, from one form, currency or
denomination, to another form, currency or denomination for which a
separate consideration is charged;
Explanation.- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the
expression "services" includes facilitating or arranging transactions in
securities;
Section 7. Scope of supply.-
(1) For the purposes of this Act, the expression - "supply" includes-
(a) all forms of supply of goods or services or both such as sale,
transfer, barter, exchange, licence, rental, lease or disposal made or
agreed to be made for a consideration by a person in the course or
furtherance of business;
(aa) the activities or transactions, by a person, other than an
individual, to its members or constituents or vice-versa, for cash,
deferred payment or other valuable consideration.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this clause, it is hereby clarified
that, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the
time being in force or any judgment, decree or order of any Court,
tribunal or authority, the person and its members or constituents
shall be deemed to be two separate persons and the supply of
activities or transactions inter se shall be deemed to take place from
one such person to another;]
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
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(b) import of services for a consideration whether or not in the
course or furtherance of business; [and]
(c) the activities specified in Schedule I, made or agreed to be
made without a consideration;
(1A) where certain activities or transactions constitute a supply in
accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1), they shall be
treated either as supply of goods or supply of services as referred to
in Schedule II.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),-
(a) activities or transactions specified in Schedule III; or
(b) such activities or transactions undertaken by the Central
Government, a State Government or any local authority in which
they are engaged as public authorities, as may be notified by the
Government on the recommendations of the Council,
shall be treated neither as a supply of goods nor a supply of services.
(3) Subject to the provisions of [sub-sections (1), (1A) and (2)], the
Government may, on the recommendations of the Council, specify,
by notification, the transactions that are to be treated as-
(a) a supply of goods and not as a supply of services; or
(b) a supply of services and not as a supply of goods.
Section 8. Tax liability on composite and mixed supplies.-
The tax liability on a composite or a mixed supply shall be determined
in the following manner, namely:-
(a) a composite supply comprising two or more supplies, one of
which is a principal supply, shall be treated as a supply of such
principal supply; and
(b) a mixed supply comprising two or more supplies shall be
treated as a supply of that particular supply which attracts the
highest rate of tax.
Section 9. Levy and collection.-
(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), there shall be levied a
tax called the central goods and services tax on all intra-State supplies
of goods or services or both, except on the supply of alcoholic liquor
for human consumption [and un-denatured extra neutral alcohol or
rectified spirit used for manufacture of alcoholic liquor, for human
consumption] on the value determined under section 15 and at such
rates, not exceeding twenty per cent., as may be notified by the
Government on the recommendations of the Council and collected in
such manner as may be prescribed and shall be paid by the taxable
person.
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(2) The central tax on the supply of petroleum crude, high speed
diesel, motor spirit (commonly known as petrol), natural gas and
aviation turbine fuel shall be levied with effect from such date as may
be notified by the Government on the recommendations of the
Council.
(3) The Government may, on the recommendations of the Council, by
notification, specify categories of supply of goods or services or both,
the tax on which shall be paid on reverse charge basis by the recipient
of such goods or services or both and all the provisions of this Act
shall apply to such recipient as if he is the person liable for paying the
tax in relation to the supply of such goods or services or both.
(4) The Government may, on the recommendations of the Council, by
notification, specify a class of registered persons who shall, in respect
of supply of specified categories of goods or services or both received
from an unregistered supplier, pay the tax on reverse charge basis as
the recipient of such supply of goods or services or both, and all the
provisions of this Act shall apply to such recipient as if he is the
person liable for paying the tax in relation to such supply of goods or
services or both.
(5) The Government may, on the recommendations of the Council, by
notification, specify categories of services the tax on intra-State
supplies of which shall be paid by the electronic commerce operator if
such services are supplied through it, and all the provisions of this Act
shall apply to such electronic commerce operator as if he is the
supplier liable for paying the tax in relation to the supply of such
services:
Provided that where an electronic commerce operator does not have a
physical presence in the taxable territory, any person representing
such electronic commerce operator for any purpose in the taxable
territory shall be liable to pay tax:
Provided further that where an electronic commerce operator does not
have a physical presence in the taxable territory and also he does not
have a representative in the said territory, such electronic commerce
operator shall appoint a person in the taxable territory for the purpose
of paying tax and such person shall be liable to pay tax.
Section 13. Time of Supply of Services.-
(2) The time of supply of services shall be the earliest of the following
dates, namely:-
(a) the date of issue of invoice by the supplier, if the invoice is issued
within the period prescribed under section 31 or the date of receipt of
payment, whichever is earlier; or
(b) the date of provision of service, if the invoice is not issued within
the period prescribed under section 31 or the date of receipt of
payment, whichever is earlier; or
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(c) the date on which the recipient shows the receipt of services in his
books of account, in a case where the provisions of clause (a) or
clause (b) do not apply.
Provided that where the supplier of taxable service receives an
amount up to one thousand rupees in excess of the amount indicated in
the tax invoice, the time of supply to the extent of such excess amount
shall, at the option of the said supplier, be the date of issue of invoice
relating to such excess amount.
Explanation .- For the purposes of clauses (a) and (b)-
(i) the supply shall be deemed to have been made to the extent it is
covered by the invoice or, as the case may be, the payment;
(ii) "the date of receipt of payment" shall be the date on which the
payment is entered in the books of account of the supplier or the
date on which the payment is credited to his bank account,
whichever is earlier.
Section 15. Value of Taxable Supply.-
(1) The value of a supply of goods or services or both shall be the
transaction value, which is the price actually paid or payable for the
said supply of goods or services or both where the supplier and the
recipient of the supply are not related and the price is the sole
consideration for the supply.
(4) where the value of the supply of goods or services or both cannot
be determined under subsection (1), the same shall be determined in
such manner as may be prescribed.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-
section (4), the value of such supplies as may be notified by the
Government on the recommendations of the Council shall be
determined in such manner as may be prescribed.
Section 164. Power of Government to make rules.-
(1) The Government may, on the recommendations of the Council, by
notification, make rules for carrying out the provisions of this Act.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section
(1), the Government may make rules for all or any of the matters
which by this Act are required to be, or may be, prescribed or in
respect of which provisions are to be or may be made by rules.
(3) The power to make rules conferred by this section shall include the
power to give retrospective effect to the rules or any of them from a
date not earlier than the date on which the provisions of this Act come
into force.
(4) Any rules made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) may
provide that a contravention thereof shall be liable to a penalty not
exceeding ten thousand rupees.
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Section 168. Power to issue instructions or directions.-
(1) The Board may, if it considers it necessary or expedient so to do
for the purpose of uniformity in the implementation of this Act, issue
such orders, instructions or directions to the central tax officers as it
may deem fit, and thereupon all such officers and all other persons
employed in the implementation of this Act shall observe and follow
such orders, instructions or directions.
(2) The Commissioner specified in clause (91) of section 2, sub-
section ( 3 ) of section 5, clause (b) of sub-section (9) of section 25,
sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 35, sub-section (1) of section 37,
sub-section (6) of section 39, [section 44] , sub-sections (4) and (5) of
section 52], [sub-section (1) of section 143, except the second proviso
thereof], clause (l) of sub-section (3) of section 158 and section 167
shall mean a Commissioner or Joint Secretary posted in the Board and
such Commissioner or Joint Secretary shall exercise the powers
specified in the said sections with the approval of the Board.
SCHEDULE I
[See section 7 ]
ACTIVITIES TO BE TREATED AS SUPPLY EVEN IF MADE
WITHOUT CONSIDERATION
(1) Permanent transfer or disposal of business assets where input tax
credit has been availed on such assets.
(2) Supply of goods or services or both between related persons or
between distinct persons as specified in section 25, when made in the
course or furtherance of business:
Provided that gifts not exceeding fifty thousand rupees in value in a
financial year by an employer to an employee shall not be treated as
supply of goods or services or both.
(3) Supply of goods-
(a) by a principal to his agent where the agent undertakes to supply
such goods on behalf of the principal; or
(b) by an agent to his principal where the agent undertakes to
receive such goods on behalf of the principal.
(4) Import of services by a 1[person] from a related person or from
any of his other establishments outside India, in the course or
furtherance of business.
SCHEDULE III
[See section 7 ]
ACTIVITIES OR TRANSACTIONS WHICH SHALL BE
TREATED NEITHER AS A SUPPLY OF GOODS NOR A
SUPPLY OF SERVICES
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1. Services by an employee to the employer in the course of or in
relation to his employment.
2. Services by any court or Tribunal established under any law for the
time being in force.
3. (a) the functions performed by the Members of Parliament,
Members of State Legislature, Members of Panchayats, Members of
Municipalities and Members of other local authorities;
(b) the duties performed by any person who holds any post in
pursuance of the provisions of the Constitution in that capacity; or
(c) the duties performed by any person as a Chairperson or a
Member or a Director in a body established by the Central
Government or a State Government or local authority and who is
not deemed as an employee before the commencement of this
clause.
4. Services of funeral, burial, crematorium or mortuary including
transportation of the deceased.
5. Sale of land and, subject to clause (b) of paragraph 5 of Schedule II,
sale of building.
6. Actionable claims, other than [specified actionable claims].
7. Supply of goods from a place in the non-taxable territory to another
place in the nontaxable territory without such goods entering into
India.
8. (a) Supply of warehoused goods to any person before clearance for
home consumption;
[(aa) Supply of goods warehoused in a Special Economic Zone or
in a Free Trade Warehousing Zone to any person before clearance
for exports or to the Domestic Tariff Area]
(b) Supply of goods by the consignee to any other person, by
endorsement of documents of title to the goods, after the goods
have been dispatched from the port of origin located outside India
but before clearance for home consumption.]]
9. Activity of apportionment of co-insurance premium by the lead
insurer to the co-insurer for the insurance services jointly supplied by
the lead insurer and the co-insurer to the insured in coinsurance
agreements, subject to the condition that the lead insurer pays the
central tax, the State tax, the Union territory tax and the integrated tax
on the entire amount of premium paid by the insured.
10. Services by insurer to the reinsurer for which ceding commission
or the reinsurance commission is deducted from reinsurance premium
paid by the insurer to the reinsurer, subject to the condition that the
central tax, the State tax, the Union territory tax and the integrated tax
is paid by the reinsurer on the gross reinsurance premium payable by
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the insurer to the reinsurer, inclusive of the said ceding commission or
the reinsurance commission.]
Explanation [1].- For the purposes of paragraph 2, the term "court"
includes District Court, High Court and Supreme Court.
[Explanation 2.- For the purposes of [clause (a) of] paragraph 8, the
expression "warehoused goods" shall have the same meaning as
assigned to it in the Customs Act, 1962 (50 of 1962).]
[Explanation 3.- For the purposes of clause (aa) of paragraph 8, the
expressions ―Special Economic Zone‖, ―Free Trade Warehousing
Zone‖ and ―Domestic Tariff Area‖ shall have the same meanings
respectively as assigned to them in section 2 of the Special Economic
Zones Act, 2005.]
RULES OF 2017
Rule 28. Value of supply of goods or services or both between
distinct or related persons, other than through an agent. –
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), the value of
supply of services by a supplier to a recipient who is a related person
[located in India], by way of providing corporate guarantee to any
banking company or financial institution on behalf of the said
recipient, shall be deemed to be one per cent of the amount of such
guarantee offered [per annum], or the actual consideration, whichever
is higher.]
[Provided that where the recipient is eligible for full input tax credit,
the value declared in the invoice shall be deemed to be the value of
said supply of services.]
INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, 1872
126. ―Contract of guarantee‖, ―surety‖, ―principal debtor‖ and
―creditor‖.— A ―contract of guarantee‖ is a contract to perform the
promise, or discharge the liability, of a third person in case of his
default. The person who gives the guarantee is called the ―surety‖; the
person in respect of whose default the guarantee is given is called the
―principal debtor‖, and the person to whom the guarantee is given is
called the ―creditor‖. A guarantee may be either oral or written.
127. Consideration for guarantee.— Anything done, or any promise
made, for the benefit of the principal debtor, may be a sufficient
consideration to the surety for giving the guarantee.
140. Rights of surety on payment or performance.— Where a
guaranteed debt has become due, or default of the principal debtor to
perform a guaranteed duty has taken place, the surety upon payment
or performance of all that he is liable for, is invested with all the rights
which the creditor had against the principal debtor.
145. Implied promise to indemnify surety.— In every contract of
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guarantee there is an implied promise by the principal debtor to
indemnify the surety, and the surety is entitled to recover from the
principal debtor whatever sum he has rightfully paid under the
guarantee, but, no sums which he has paid wrongfully.
TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882
3. In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or
context,-
―actionable claim‖ means a claim to any debt, other than a debt
secured by mortgage of immoveable property or by hypothecation or
pledge of moveable property, or to any beneficial interest in moveable
property not in the possession, either actual or constructive, of the
claimant, which the Civil Courts recognise as affording grounds for
relief, whether such debt or beneficial interest be existent, accruing,
conditional or contingent;
INCOME TAX ACT, 1961
Meaning of international transaction.
92B. (1) For the purposes of this section and sections 92, 92C, 92D
and 92E, ―international transaction‖ means a transaction between two
or more associated enterprises, either or both of whom are non-
residents, in the nature of purchase, sale or lease of tangible or
intangible property, or provision of services, or lending or borrowing
money, or any other transaction having a bearing on the profits,
income, losses or assets of such enterprises, and shall include a mutual
agreement or arrangement between two or more associated enterprises
for the allocation or apportionment of, or any contribution to, any cost
or expense incurred or to be incurred in connection with a benefit,
service or facility provided or to be provided to any one or more of
such enterprises.
INCOME TAX ACT, 2025
163. (1) For the purposes of this Chapter, the expression ―international
transaction‖ means a transaction between two or more associated
enterprises, one of which is necessarily a non-resident, and includes—
(c) capital financing, lending or borrowing of money, including,—
(i) any type of long-term or short-term borrowing, lending or
guarantee; or
(ii) purchase or sale of marketable securities; or
(iii) any type of advance, payments or deferred payment or
receivable or any other debt arising during the course of business;
(d) provision of services, including provision of market research,
market development, marketing management, administration,
technical service, repairs, design, consultation, agency, scientific
research, legal or accounting service;
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INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY CODE, 2016
3. In this Code, unless the context otherwise requires,—
(11) "debt" means a liability or obligation in respect of a claim which
is due from any person and includes a financial debt and operational
debt;
5. In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires,—
(8) "financial debt" means a debt alongwith interest, if any, which is
disbursed against the consideration for the time value of money and
includes—
(i) the amount of any liability in respect of any of the guarantee or
indemnity for any of the items referred to in sub-clauses (a) to (h) of
this clause;
SECURITY CONTRACT REGULATIONS ACT, 1956
2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—
(h) ―securities‖ include—
(i) shares, scrips, stocks, bonds, debentures, debenture stock or other
marketable securities of a like nature in or of any incorporated
company or other body corporate;
[(ia) derivative;
(ib) units or any other instrument issued by any collective investment
scheme to the investors in such schemes;]
[(ic)security receipt as defined in clause (zg) of section 2 of the
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002;]
[(id) units or any other such instrument issued to the investors under
any mutual fund scheme;]
(ii) Government securities;
(iia) such other instruments as may be declared by the Central
Government to be securities; and
(iii) rights or interest in securities;
[(i) ―spot delivery contract‖ means a contract which provides for,—
(a) actual delivery of securities and the payment of a price therefore
either on the same day as the date of the contract or on the next
day, the actual period taken for the despatch of the securities or the
remittance of money therefore through the post being excluded
from the computation of the period aforesaid if the parties to the
contract do not reside in the same town or locality;
(b) transfer of the securities by the depository from the account of a
beneficial owner to the account of another beneficial owner when
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such securities are dealt with by a depository;]
[(j) ―stock exchange‖ means—
(a) any body of individuals, whether incorporated or not,
constituted before corporatisation and demutualisation under
sections 4A and 4B, or
(b) a body corporate incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956
(1 of 1956) whether under a scheme of corporatisation and
demutualisation or otherwise,
for the purpose of assisting, regulating or controlling the business of
buying, selling or dealing in securities.]
B. CONTENTION OF THE PARTIES:
6. The Petitioners in this batch have been represented by different
learned counsel. Their submissions overlap substantially, though
certain counsel have also advanced additional submissions peculiar to
the Petitions represented by them. We have heard learned senior
counsel and counsel for the parties at length and have perused the
paperbook, the written submissions and the judgments relied upon, all
of which have been duly considered.
7. To avoid repetition, the submissions are recorded under the
following heads:
I. Submissions on behalf of the Petitioners – (i) common
arguments raised by the Petitioners; and (ii) additional submissions on
behalf of the respective Petitioners; and
II. Submissions on behalf of the Respondents – (i) independent
submissions; and (ii) reply submissions, recorded under the same
heads as the Petitioners‘ grounds.
III. Rejoinder submissions on behalf of the Petitioners.
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I. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
i. Common arguments raised by the Petitioners
8. The Petitioners have, with varying degrees of emphasis, made
the following common submissions:
8.1. The furnishing of a corporate guarantee by a holding company
for its subsidiary does not constitute a ‗supply‘ of ‗services‘ under
Section 7 of the Act of 2017, when read in light of Section 7(1),
Section 7(1A), Schedule I and Schedule II thereof;
8.2. A corporate guarantee is merely a shareholder activity,
undertaken to protect the investment of the holding company, and is
not an activity in the course or furtherance of ‗business‘;
8.3. In the absence of ‗consideration‘ as defined under Section 2(31)
of the Act of 2017, a corporate guarantee cannot be taxed, in light of
Commissioner of CGST & Central Excise v Edelweiss Financial
6
Services Ltd. and M/s D.P. Jain & Co. Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v.
7
Union of India & Ors. ;
8.4. The subsidiary cannot be treated as the ‗recipient‘ under Section
2(93) of the Act of 2017, in light of Sections 126, 127, 140 and 145 of
8
the Indian Contract Act, 1872 ;
8.5. A corporate guarantee is an ‗actionable claim‘, falling within
Entry 6 of Schedule III read with Section 7(2)(a) of the Act of 2017;

6
MANU/SC/0648/2023

7
, W.P. No. 2087/2025, decided on 06.05.2026 by the High Court of Bombay

8
hereinafter referred to as ‗Act of 1872‘
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8.6. Rule 28(2) of the Rules of 2017 is ultra vires the Act of 2017,
arbitrary, and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 246A and 265 of the
Constitution;
8.7. Rule 28(2), as inserted by IN-2023 and amended by IN-2024,
cannot be applied retrospectively, and guarantees executed prior to
26.10.2023, and those executed prior to 01.07.2017, are not exigible to
tax;
8.8. A corporate guarantee is a one-time undertaking and not a
‗continuous supply of services‘ under Section 2(33) of the Act of
2017, and its ‗time of supply‘ under Section 13 thereof is to be
determined accordingly; and
8.9. The IC-2023 and IC-2024 are ultra vires Section 168 of the Act
of 2017 and are otherwise arbitrary.
9. Mr. Balbir Singh, Mr. Sujit Ghosh, learned senior counsels
alongside learned counsels representing the Petitioners, under Ground
A have made the following submissions:
9.1 At the outset, it is contended that a charging provision must be
strictly construed, and no tax can be imposed by inference, intendment
or purposive interpretation. As the Act of 2017 does not separately
define ‗supply‘, the expressions ‗supply‘ and ‗supply of services‘ in
Section 7 must bear their ordinary meaning, namely, an activity done
by one person to another. A taxable supply must be established within
the four corners of Section 7 and cannot be presumed merely because
the transaction confers an economic or commercial benefit on the
subsidiary. Reliance is placed on Sales Tax Commissioner v Modi
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9 10
Sugar Mills ; J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v Commercial Taxes Officer ;
11
A.V. Fernandez v State of Kerala ; and Bimal Chandra Banerjee v
12
State of Madhya Pradesh .
9.2 It is further argued that a supply under Section 7 read with
Schedule I requires, firstly , an identifiable supply of goods or services
and, secondly , that it be made in the course or furtherance of business.
Section 7(1)(c) read with Entry 2 of Schedule I dispenses only with
consideration in specified related-person transactions, and not with the
underlying supply or its connection with the supplier‘s business.
Neither Schedule I nor the relationship under the Explanation to
Section 15 converts every corporate or shareholder activity into a
taxable supply. It is argued that unless a legally recognisable supply is
first established, GST cannot be levied on the basis of an executive
circular or the valuation mechanism in Rule 28(2) of the Rules of
2017.
9.3 Learned senior counsel representing the Petitioner in W.P.(C)
15738/2024, submitted that supply means ‗giving and taking‘, and a
corporate guarantee supplies nothing; it is merely a promise to pay in
a future contingency which may never arise. Unlike Entry 1, the
deeming fiction in Section 7(1)(c) read with Entry 2 of Schedule I
does not dispense with an actual supply, and Schedule I cannot mean
that GST is payable irrespective of supply.

9
1960 (10) TMI 65

10
(1994) 4 SCC 276
11
(1957) 1 SCC 582
12
(1970) 2 SCC 467
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9.4 It is argued that Schedule II only classifies transactions which
already constitute a ‗supply‘ under Section 7(1). Section 7(1A) is
subservient to Section 7(1), and Entry 5(e) of Schedule II, agreeing to
the obligation to refrain from an act, or to tolerate an act or a situation,
or to do an act, is a classification provision which cannot
independently determine taxability or cure the absence of a supply.
9.5 Relying on the CBIC Circular dated 03.08.2022 and on the
judgment of the Bombay High Court in Tata Sons Private Limited v.
13
Union of India & Ors. , it is contended that Entry 5(e) requires an
examination of the underlying contractual obligation and its nexus
with the alleged supply. Under Paragraph Nos.4 to 6.1 of the Circular,
the entry requires an independent agreement either express or implied
to refrain from an act, tolerate an act or situation, or do an act, coupled
with a flow of consideration from the other party. These elements are
absent in a corporate guarantee furnished by a holding company.
9.6 It is the case of the Petitioners that taxing an activity which is
not a supply of services exceeds the legislative competence under
Article 246A read with Article 366(12A) of the Constitution, and,
absent an underlying supply, the levy cannot be sustained by resort to
Rule 28(2) or the impugned Circulars.
9.7 The Petitioners in W.P.(C) 10924/2024, 15738/2024 and
13358/2025 submit that, notwithstanding the wide amplitude of
‗services‘ under Article 366(26A) of the Constitution and Section
2(102) of the Act of 2017, every activity cannot be taxed merely
because it is not goods, money or securities, as that would confer

13
BHC-OS:11242-DB
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unbridled power on the Respondents to tax any arrangement. Relying
on Directorate General of Goods and Services Tax Intelligence
14
(HQS) Vs. Gameskraft Technologies (P.) Ltd. , it is contended that a
taxable supply must be both a legally recognised form of supply and
an economic supply of services, and neither the Act of 2017 nor any
other law, including the Act of 1872, recognises the arrangement as an
independent supply of service by the holding company to its
subsidiary.
10. Learned senior counsels and counsels representing the
Petitioners, under Ground B, have made the following submissions-
10.1 It is contended that a corporate guarantee securing the
obligations of a subsidiary is a shareholder activity, undertaken to
protect the holding company‘s investment and to facilitate its business
operations. To elaborate the aforestated, it is contended that an activity
performed primarily for the holding company‘s own benefit is not a
supply of services merely because the subsidiary derives an incidental
benefit by way of access to finance or better borrowing terms. The
legal obligation between the holding company and its subsidiary only
reinforces that the guarantee serves the holding company‘s own
interests. The holding company is neither in the business of providing
guarantees nor furnishes them as a regular commercial activity for
profit.
10.2 The Petitioners, while distinguishing the bank guarantee, have
argued that a bank issues guarantees as a financial product in its
regulated business, ordinarily for consideration and against margin

14
2026 INSC 595
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money or counter-security. A holding company furnishes a guarantee
by reason of its investment and shareholder relationship, without
carrying on any business of guarantees or necessarily charging a fee.
Therefore, a corporate guarantee is, ‗quasi-capital‘ or a shareholder
contribution, and has not been recognised as a provision of services in
certain decisions under the transfer pricing provisions of the Income
15
Tax Act, 1961 .
10.3 Reliance is placed on Sterlite Industries India Ltd. v
16
Commissioner of GST & Central Excise and Micro Ink Limited v
17
ACIT , which acknowledge corporate guarantees as shareholder
contribution or quasi-capital; and Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v
18
DCIT , which is stated to hold that a parent company‘s guarantee,
absent any cost, outflow or economic sacrifice, cannot be equated with
a bank guarantee or warrant imputation of guarantee commission on
assumptions. The Petitioners in W.P.(C) 10924/2024, 15738/2024 and
13358/2025 also rely on Centel Communications Co. v
19
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (United States Court of
Appeals, 7th Circuit), which holds that shareholders guaranteeing an
investee company‘s borrowings assume additional financial risk to
protect their investment and do not render services.
10.4 Further, reliance is also placed on Australian GST Ruling
GSTR 2006/1 to argue that even if the Subsidiary Company

15
hereinafter referred to as ‗Act of 1961‘
16
2019 (25) G.S.T.L. 277 (Tri.-Chennai)

17
[2015] 63 taxmann.com 353
18
2026 (5) TMI 1062
19
920 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir., decided on 17.12.1990)
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compensates the Holding Company for providing the corporate
guarantee, such payment may be additional consideration for the same
guarantee supplied to the Bank/Lender, rather than consideration for
an independent service to the Subsidiary.
10.5 The same Petitioners also submitted that, since the Act of 2017
neither defines ‗economic supply‘ nor prescribes a test for it,
accordingly recourse must be had to international commercial and
taxation jurisprudence, particularly the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Transfer Pricing Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, January,
20
2022 , as under:
(a) in order to substantiate the applicability of the OECD
Guidelines, it has been contended that the Respondents
nd
themselves, in the Agenda for the 52 GST Council Meeting,
21
referred to Rule 10TD of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 ,
pertaining to Safe Harbour, which is said to be the basis of the
1% valuation, resting upon the arm‘s length principle in Chapter
IV of the OECD Guidelines;
(b) under Paragraph No.7.6 of Chapter VII, an intra-group
service exists only if a service is actually rendered, judged by the
‗ Benefits Test ‘, i.e., whether an independent enterprise in
comparable circumstances would pay a third party for the activity
or perform it in-house; a parent-subsidiary relationship or an
incidental economic benefit is insufficient;

20
hereinafter referred to as ‗OECD Guidelines‘
21
hereinafter referred to as ‗Safe Harbour Rules‘
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(c) a corporate guarantee cannot ordinarily be procured from an
unrelated party, as no independent enterprise not engaged in the
business of guarantees would expose its balance sheet and
creditworthiness for an unrelated entity; and
(d) under Paragraph No.7.9, activities of a holding company
undertaken solely by virtue of its ownership interest, to protect its
investment, are not intra-group services even if the subsidiary
incidentally benefits. Thus, corporate guarantee arises from the
ownership interest, fails the Benefits Test and is a shareholder
activity, not an independent economic supply. It is also
contended that the Respondents have adopted a selective
approach to the OECD Guidelines and the OECD Commentary,
under which corporate guarantees are stated to be not taxable.
10.6 Reference is made to Section 7(1)(a) and Entry 2 of Schedule I,
which require the supply to be in the course or furtherance of
business. It is contended that the inclusive definition in Section 2(17)
cannot extend to every activity having an indirect benefit to the
holding company. ‗Incidental or ancillary‘ presupposes an identifiable
principal business, and the subsidiary‘s business cannot be substituted
for that of the alleged supplier. Reliance is placed on State of Tamil
22
Nadu & Anr. v Board of Trustees of the Port of Madras and
Paragraph No.52 of D.P. Jain (Supra) .
10.7 The Petitioners in W.P.(C) 19506/2025 and 13341/2025 add
that the wide definition of ‗business‘ does not dispense with
identifying an actual supply to an identifiable recipient, and a board

22
1999 4 SCC 630
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resolution authorising a guarantee merely evidences corporate
approval, not rendition of a taxable service. The Petitioners in W.P.(C)
15738/2024, rely on Aerocom Cushions Private Limited Vs.
23
Assistant Commissioner (Anti Evasion) to contend that ‗business‘
does not cover corporate guarantees.
11. The Petitioners under Ground C, have made the following
submissions:
11.1 It is argued that since no consideration is charged, the guarantee
is not a supply. The Deeds of Guarantee of Petitioner Nos.2 and 3 in
W.P.(C) 2966/2024 expressly bar any fee or commission while the
guaranteed obligations subsist, and Clause 12 of the guarantees in
W.P.(C) 5238/2025 and 6436/2025 provides that none is payable. The
guarantees are furnished at the instance of the lender, without any fee,
commission, security or other consideration from the subsidiary.
11.2 It had been submitted that under Section 2(31), consideration
must be a payment, or the monetary value of an act or forbearance,
having a direct nexus with the supply. However, nothing flows to the
holding company here. The loan to the subsidiary under a separate
financing arrangement is not consideration to the holding company;
the guarantee cannot be consideration for itself; and the subsidiary‘s
benefit is not consideration, since the holding company acts as a
shareholder and its enforceable undertaking runs in favour of the
lender.

23
BHC-NAG-348-DB
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11.3 Reference has been made to Section 127 of the Act of 1872,
which treats anything done or promised for the principal debtor‘s
benefit as sufficient consideration for a guarantee, cannot be imported
into Section 2(31). Since it merely validates a guarantee where no
consideration flows from the debtor to the surety; the two enactments
operate in distinct fields and are not pari materia . Reliance is placed
24
on State of Gujarat v Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah . The
Petitioners in W.P.(C) 19506/2025 and 13341/2025 added that Section
145 of the Act of 1872 neither creates an implied obligation to pay
guarantee commission nor establishes consideration under Section
2(31).
11.4 Reference has been made to the judgment in Edelweiss (Supra) ,
wherein the Supreme Court held that a corporate guarantee furnished
to group companies without consideration was not a taxable service
under the service tax regime. It is argued that even as per the ratio in
Gameskraft (Supra) a direct nexus between consideration and supply
is required, which is absent.
11.5 A reference is also made to the judgment of Bombay High
Court in D.P. Jain (Supra) , wherein the Court while following
Edelweiss (Supra) , held that corporate guarantees furnished without
fee, commission or other consideration do not attract GST. The
Petitioners in W.P.(C) 19506/2025 and 13341/2025 submit that D.P.
Jain (Supra) granted relief against departmental action on guarantees
issued before Rule 28(2), without striking down the Rule, and must be
applied according to its precise ratio.

24
(2020) 20 SCC 360
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12. The Petitioners under Ground D have made the following
submissions:
12.1 Reference has been made to Section 126 of the Act of 1872, to
argue that a contract of guarantee involves the surety/holding
company, the principal debtor/subsidiary and the creditor/lender. It is
argued that the guarantee runs in favour of the creditor, who obtains
additional security and direct recourse against the holding company on
default, whereas the subsidiary merely obtains finance under an
independent lending arrangement and acquires no contractual right
under the guarantee.
12.2 While substantiating the term Recipient under Section 2(93)(c),
it is contended that a recipient is a person to whom the service is
actually rendered. Absent any contract with, or service rendered to,
the subsidiary, it cannot be the recipient merely as the ultimate or
indirect economic beneficiary; hence, the lender, being the promisee
and beneficiary of the guarantee, is the recipient. It is their case that
the statutory requirement of rendition to the recipient cannot be
replaced by the concept of an indirect beneficiary, and the impugned
Circulars cannot deem a recipient contrary to Section 2(93).
Additionally, it is also contended that the subsidiary is also not privy
to the contract of guarantee.
12.3 Further reference has also been made to Sections 140 and 145
of the Act of 1872. It is argued that Section 140 confers rights on the
surety against the debtor on payment of the guaranteed debt, whereas
Section 145 creates an implied obligation on the debtor to indemnify
the surety for sums rightfully paid. Accordingly, that obligation flows
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from the subsidiary to the holding company and arises only on
discharge of the debtor‘s liability, thereby establishing no reciprocal
supply by the holding company; since an obligation to indemnify is
not a contract for the supply of services. The Petitioners in W.P.(C)
2966/2024 and 214/2025 submit that the reliance on Sections 140 and
25
145 in Torrent Power Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. is misplaced.
13. The Petitioners under Ground E have made the following
submissions:
13.1 Without prejudice to the primary plea that no supply exists, a
corporate guarantee is argued to be an ‗actionable claim‘ under
Section 2(1) of the Act of 2017, which adopts Section 3 of the
26
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and includes a claim to a debt,
whether existing, accruing, conditional or contingent. It is argued that
a corporate guarantee is a contingent claim to a debt, crystallising on
the subsidiary‘s default thereby enabling the lender to recover from
the guarantor. Referring to Entry 6 of Schedule III read with Section
7(2)(a), it is argued that the aforesaid provisions treat actionable
claims, other than specified actionable claims such as lottery, betting
and gambling, as neither goods nor services, hence, the transaction
cannot be indirectly taxed as a supply of services. The aforesaid
exclusion is stated to be applicable to the entire transaction and cannot
be circumvented by artificially segregating its components.
13.2 The Petitioners in W.P.(C) 12955/2025 rely on Paragraph
nos.21 and 24 of the Constitution Bench decision in Sunrise

25
R/SCA No. 12175/2024 and connected matters, decided on 14.08.2026 by the High Court of
Gujarat
26
hereinafter referred to as ‗Act of 1882‘
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27
Associates v Government of NCT of Delhi , explaining an actionable
claim as an incorporeal right encompassing claims to debts and
beneficial interests, including contingent claims. The Petitioners in
W.P.(C) 10924/2024, 15738/2024 and 13358/2025 rely on
Gameskraft (Supra) , which recognised a creditor‘s right to recover
money advanced under a private transaction as an actionable claim.
13.3 The Petitioners in W.P.(C) 2966/2024 submit that
transferability is not essential under Section 3 of the Act of 1882, as
otherwise even specified actionable claims, such as those relating to
gambling and online gaming, would not qualify for tax.
13.4 The Petitioners in W.P.(C) Nos.10924/2024, 15738/2024 and
13358/2025 submit that, ‗debt‘ being undefined in the Act of 1882, its
meaning must be drawn from other sources. Reference in furtherance
thereof, has been made to Article 366(8) of the Constitution, which is
argued to include guarantee liabilities within ‗debt‘, and Sections
28
3(11) and 5(8)(i) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
recognise them as ‗debt‘ and ‗financial debt‘, respectively. Reliance is
29
placed on Hotel & Restaurant Association v Star India Pvt. Ltd.
and Ahmedabad Private Primary Teachers’ Association v
30
Administrative Officer .
13.5 It is contended that though the principal debtor and the
guarantor are distinct persons, the underlying debt is the same, and the
guarantor becomes liable to discharge it on default. Relying on Laxmi

27
(2006) 5 SCC 603

28
hereinafter referred to as ‗IBC‘
29
2006 (11) TMI 540
30
(2004) 1 SCC 755
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31
Pat Surana v Union Bank of India and Anr. , it is contended that
the guarantor‘s liability is co-extensive and co-terminous with that of
the borrower under Section 128 of the Act of 1872, and the lender
may proceed against both. As Section 3 of the Act of 1882 includes
contingent debts, enforceability only upon default does not take the
guarantee outside actionable claims.
13.6 Alternatively, the Petitioners in W.P.(C) 19506/2025 and
13341/2025 submit that the guarantee instrument, the lender‘s debt
claim and the surety‘s rights upon payment are distinct legal concepts,
and the exclusion must be applied with reference to the precise rights
involved, not presumed merely because the guarantee creates a
contingent obligation.
14. The Petitioners under Ground F have made the following
submissions:
14.1 It is argued that Section 15 and Rule 28 operate only after a
taxable supply is established. Sections 7 and 9 govern the existence
and levy of a supply, Section 15 the valuation framework, and Section
164 the rule-making power. Rule 28(2) cannot create the taxable
event, determine the recipient, assume every related-party guarantee to
be taxable while prescribing its value, or enlarge Sections 7 and 9.
14.2 On the aforesaid strength, it had been contended that a
delegated legislation cannot travel beyond the parent enactment or
create an artificial taxable value unsupported by the transaction, and a
deeming fiction in delegated legislation cannot enlarge constitutional

31
2021 8 SCC 481
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competence. The parent Act lays down no discernible policy or
standard supporting the 1% valuation, and delegating the measure of
tax without guidance is an abdication of an essential legislative
function, amounting to excessive delegation. Deeming the value at 1%
per annum irrespective of the actual facts is impermissible.
14.3 It is argued that a tax enactment, shall take into consideration
four components of a levy, namely, the taxable event, the person
liable, the rate and the measure of tax, which must be ascertainable
from the taxing statute itself and bear a rational nexus with one
another. Reliance in this regard is placed on Govind Saran Ganga
32
Saran v Commissioner of Sales Tax ; State of Rajasthan v
33
Rajasthan Chemists Association ; A.V. Fernandez (Supra); and
Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v Steel Authority of
34
India Ltd. & Anr. . It is argued that the 1% valuation ignores
relevant factors, such as the economic value of the service, the
guarantor‘s risk, the subsidiary‘s creditworthiness, the risk of default,
the likelihood of invocation, the actual duration of the guarantee and
the amount, if any, invoked. It thus lacks a rational nexus between the
object and the measure of tax and travels beyond Articles 246A and
265 of the Constitution.
14.4 The Petitioners in W.P.(C) 2966/2024, 5238/2025 and
6436/2025 submit that, absent a nexus between the measure and the
alleged service, Rule 28(2) taxes the guaranteed amount itself, which
is a direct tax on money beyond Article 246A. The burden, equivalent

32
1985 SCC OnLine SC 326
33
(2006) 6 SCC 773
34
2024 INSC 554
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to 0.18% of the guaranteed amount per annum, arises irrespective of
whether consideration is received, a service is independently rendered
or the guarantee is invoked. Reliance in this regard is placed on
35
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v Union of India and State of Madras
36
v Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. .
14.5 It is contended that the deemed value of 1% tax is borrowed
from the Safe Harbour Rules and from commission charged by banks
on bank guarantees, without any independent assessment of corporate
guarantees. It is argued that while Safe Harbour is optional and
permits taxpayers to establish the actual arm‘s length price, Rule 28(2)
makes the benchmark a compulsory fiction, with no opportunity to
establish the actual value or its inapplicability. With respect to the
Income Tax benchmarks, it is argued that the same operate under a
distinct framework and cannot be mechanically imported, as
determining an arm‘s length price differs from establishing and
valuing a supply under Sections 7 and 15 of the Act of 2017. Bank
and corporate guarantees being commercially and legally distinct,
bank commission is no rational benchmark for a guarantee furnished
as a shareholder measure.
14.6 The Petitioners in W.P.(C) 15738/2024, pointed out that the
GST Council itself accepted that banks charge between 0.5% and 3%,
and sometimes nothing. Where a guarantee can be furnished at no
cost, the fiction cannot assume a fixed 1% irrespective of the facts. In
this regard, reliance is placed on Union of India and Another v. A

35
(2006) 3 SCC 1
36
1968 SCC OnLine SC 177
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37
Sanyasi Rao and Others ; Wipro Ltd. v Assistant Collectors of
38 39
Customs ; and Munjaal Manishbhai Bhatt v Union of India . On
this Court‘s query as to why open market value under Rule 28(1)
could not be extended to corporate guarantees, it was argued that the
actual consideration could well be lower than 1%, rendering the Rule
arbitrary.
14.7 Further, it has also been contended that the ‗whichever is
higher‘ formula under Rule 28(2) is illusory in gratuitous transactions,
where actual consideration is nil, making 1% the sole basis of
valuation. They submit that the reading down in Torrent Power
(Supra) does not cure the independent arbitrariness of mandating a
presumptive 1% valuation irrespective of the transaction‘s nature or
ascertainable commercial value. Such a rigid mechanism, which
excludes alternative valuation methods, is arbitrary. Reliance is placed
on Munjaal Manishbhai Bhatt (Supra) , Wipro Ltd. (Supra) and
Federation of Hotels & Restaurant Associations of India v. Union of
40
India .
14.8 It is their case that Rule 28(2) singles out related-party
corporate guarantees for a mandatory deemed valuation of 1% per
annum, while other related-party transactions are valued under the
general framework of Rule 28, including open market value. There is
no intelligible differentia or rational nexus with the object of the Act
of 2017 for such onerous treatment, reliance in this regard has been

37
(1996) 3 SCC 465

38
2015 14 SCC 161
39
2022 (5) TMI 397
40
2016 (44) S.T.R. 3 (Del.)
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41
placed upon State of Madhya Pradesh v Gopal D. Tirthani and
42
Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India .
14.9 The Petitioners in W.P.(C) 10924/2024, 15738/2024,
13358/2025 and 214/2025 contend that the proviso creates unequal tax
burdens: while recipients eligible for full ITC are taxed on invoice
value, those ineligible for ITC, such as power generators supplying
exempt output, bear the deemed 1% as an actual cost, resulting in
cascading. This differential treatment of similarly situated guarantees
is challenged as arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and
265 of the Constitution.
14.10 In conclusion, it is their case that Rule 28(2), insofar as it
mandates a uniform deemed value of 1% per annum of the guaranteed
amount irrespective of the actual consideration, nature and
commercial value of the transaction, is ultra vires the parent
enactment, arbitrary, confiscatory and violative of Articles 14,
19(1)(g), 246A and 265 of the Constitution.
15. The Petitioners under Ground G have made the following
submissions:
15.1 It is contended that Rule 28(2) introduced by IN-2023 with
effect from 26.10.2023, is neither retrospective nor clarificatory. The
Petitioners contend that guarantees executed between 01.07.2017 and
26.10.2023 cannot be taxed by applying a subsequently introduced
valuation mechanism. Accordingly, the 2019-2023 demand in
W.P.(C) 12955/2025 is argued to be unsustainable. It is their case that

41
AIR 2003 SC 2952
42
AIR 2018 SC 4321
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for the pre-amendment period, the then-operative Rule 28 and, where
applicable, Rules 30 and 31 must be considered, without presuming a
supply or eligibility under the provisos. IC-2024 itself distinguishes
guarantees issued or renewed before and after 26.10.2023.
15.2 With respect to IN-2024, which amended Rule 28(2)
retrospectively from 26.10.2023, it is argued that the same is
independently arbitrary and unconstitutional, inasmuch as the said
notification instead of curing a procedural defect or clarifying an
existing mechanism, imposes substantive liabilities on concluded
transactions.
15.3 It is argued that the taxable event, if any, crystallises on
execution of the guarantee, and guarantees executed before
01.07.2017 cannot be taxed. Accordingly, the seven guarantee deeds
in W.P.(C) Nos. 19506/2025 and 13341/2025, having been executed
and delivered between 31.12.2009 and 30.12.2015, constitute
completed pre-GST transactions and cannot be taxed merely because
they remain enforceable after 01.07.2017. In the absence of any
established post-GST issuance, renewal, extension, amendment or
novation, continued enforceability or the lender‘s subsisting right of
invocation cannot constitute a fresh supply. They have impressed
upon the Court that the Respondents must identify the specific post-
GST taxable event, if any, on a deed-wise basis and any distinct post-
GST supply so established must be taxed and valued strictly under the
provisions applicable to that period.
16. The Petitioners, under Ground H, have made the following
submissions:
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16.1 It is contended that a corporate guarantee is a one-time
contingent undertaking with a continuing obligation, and not a
‗continuous supply of services‘ under Section 2(33) of the Act of
2017, which contemplates a continuous or recurrent supply under a
contract for a period exceeding three months with periodic payment
obligations. A notional value under Rule 28 cannot create periodic
payment obligations or convert a single undertaking into a recurring
supply. Torrent Power (Supra) is stated to have recognised the same
and declined to treat a fee-free guarantee as a continuous supply.
16.2 It is further contended that the continued subsistence of a
guarantee gives rise to no fresh or recurring liability. Execution,
extension, renewal, amendment and invocation are distinct legal
events, and neither the passage of time, nor continued enforceability,
nor the disclosure of a contingent liability in the books or financial
statements of the subsidiary, creates a fresh supply every year. The
Petitioner in W.P.(C) 15738/2024, added that the subsidiary does not
reflect the guarantee in its books of account at all.
16.3 Without prejudice, the Petitioners in W.P.(C) 214/2025 submit
that, if taxable at all, the time of supply is governed by Section
13(2)(b), and not the residuary Section 13(2)(c). Where no invoice is
issued within the prescribed period, clause (b) fixes the time of supply
as the date of provision of service, which is the date of execution of
the guarantee, and the absence of an invoice or payment does not
render the said clause inapplicable. The Petitioners in W.P.(C)
19506/2025 and 13341/2025 add that Section 13 presupposes a
taxable supply and cannot independently create one.
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16.4 It is also their case that the levy for future years under the
impugned Circulars, where the guarantee extends beyond one year, is
illegal. The guaranteed obligation reduces each year, and the
guarantee may not run its full tenure, therefore, the deemed value, if
any, must be spread across the tenure, and cannot be levied and
collected upfront in the first year.
17. The Petitioners, under Ground I, have made the following
submissions:
17.1 It is contended that IC-2023 and IC-2024 are ultra vires Section
168 of the Act of 2017, which empowers the CBIC only to issue
instructions for uniformity in implementation, and not to create a
taxable event, legislate administratively or pre-empt issues falling
within the domain of the adjudicating authorities. By declaring a
taxable supply, identifying the supplier and recipient, characterising
the service, fixing the time of supply and prescribing the valuation, the
impugned Circulars are stated to expand the levy by executive
instruction. It is argued that a circular can neither enlarge Sections 7
and 9, nor deem a recipient contrary to Section 2(93), nor create a
taxable event by implication; nor can the rule-making powers under
Sections 15 and 164 create a charging event absent under Section 7.
43
Reliance is placed on Union of India v Karvy Stock Broking Ltd. ;
44
Faridabad Iron & Steel Traders Association v Union of India ; and
45
Harivansh Lal Mehra v State of Maharashtra .

43
(2019) 11 SCC 631
44
2004 (178) E.L.T. 1099 (Del.)
45
(1971) 2 SCC 54
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17.2 Further, IC-2024 is assailed on the ground that it declares
guarantees taxable even prior to the introduction of Rule 28(2), on the
premise that the Rule merely provides a valuation mechanism,
whereas a circular cannot retrospectively establish a taxable event
without a clear statutory basis. It is also argued that having
characterised the service as the assumption of the risk of default, IC-
2024 directs valuation on the entire guaranteed amount, irrespective of
whether the loan is fully, partly or not at all disbursed, though the
value ought to bear a reasonable nexus with the risk actually
undertaken.
17.3 It is their case that IC-2023 arbitrarily assigns a nil value to
personal guarantees furnished by directors, owing to RBI restrictions
on the payment of consideration, while subjecting corporate
guarantees to Rule 28(2), even though lenders may equally prohibit
commission on corporate guarantees. It is argued that the source of a
restriction cannot alter the character or value of a transaction, and the
distinction so drawn is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
17.4 It is further contended that, under IC-2024, the taxability of a
takeover of a loan by another bank depends upon the formal issuance
of a fresh guarantee or renewal of the existing one, rather than upon
the alleged benefit or risk. A guarantee already taxed may thus be
taxed again merely upon a change of lender, without any mechanism
to adjust the tax already paid.
17.5 The Petitioners in W.P.(C) 10924/2024, 15738/2024 and
13358/2025 submit that, by Paragraph No.122(F) of Torrent Power
(Supra) , the Gujarat High Court had set aside the impugned Circulars
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to the extent contrary to its observations and directions, and, relying
46
on Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v Union of India & Anr. , that such
invalidation is not confined to its territorial jurisdiction.
ii. Additional submissions on behalf of the respective Petitioners
18. The additional submissions of the respective Petitioners, not
covered by the common grounds, are recorded counsel-wise
hereinbelow. The Petitioners in W.P.(C) 5238/2025 and 6436/2025
have adopted the common grounds and have not advanced any
additional submissions.
Additional submissions on behalf of the Petitioners in W.P.(C)
2966/2024
18.1 Learned senior counsel contends that Torrent Power (Supra) is
distinguishable, inasmuch as the Gujarat High Court framed, but did
not decide, the question whether a corporate guarantee, being a
shareholder activity, constitutes a supply of service; and relied upon
Section 127 of the Act of 1872 without considering the definition of
‗consideration‘ under Section 2(31) of the Act of 2017. The remaining
grounds on which Torrent Power (Supra) is sought to be
distinguished, namely, its reliance on Sections 140 and 145 of the Act
of 1872 and on Entry 5(e) of Schedule II, and its rejection of the plea
of actionable claim, stand recorded under Grounds A, D and E.

46
(2004) 6 SCC 254
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Additional submissions on behalf of the Petitioners in W.P.(C)
10924/2024, 15738/2024 and 13358/2025
18.2 It is contended that Section 126 of the Act of 1872 recognises a
single tripartite agreement between the surety, the principal debtor and
the creditor. The request of the subsidiary to the holding company to
furnish a guarantee cannot be dissected into a separate agreement for
supply of service, there being no distinct offer, acceptance or
consensus between them. It is argued that, in the absence of any
provision permitting vivisection of a composite transaction, and
Sections 2(30) and 8 of the Act of 2017 taxing composite supplies
according to the principal supply, the Respondents cannot artificially
segregate alleged inter se services between the holding company and
its subsidiary.
18.3 Reliance in this regard is placed on Levob Verzekeringen BV v
47
Staatssecretaris van Financiën , wherein the Court of Justice of the
European Communities held that a single economic supply should not
be artificially divided, and that its nature and essential features
determine the tax liability.
Additional submissions on behalf of the Petitioners in W.P.(C)
214/2025
18.4 It is contended that the Department, having accepted D.P. Jain
(Supra) without challenge, cannot take inconsistent stands against
similarly situated assessees, contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution
and the principles of consistency and judicial discipline. Reliance is

47
Case C-41/04, Court of Justice of the European Communities (First Chamber)
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placed on Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v Collector of Central
48 49
Excise ; Union of India v Kaumudini Narayan Dalal ; CCE v Tata
50 51
Engineering & Locomotives Co. Ltd. ; Birla Corporation v CCE ;
52
and Jayaswals Neco Ltd. v CCE .
Additional submissions on behalf of the Petitioners in W.P.(C)
19506/2025 and 13341/2025
18.5 It is contended that the levy conflates the shareholder
relationship, the contingent obligation owed to the lender and a
taxable supply, and that neither the related-party relationship, nor the
commercial benefit to the subsidiary, nor the continued enforceability
of the guarantees, nor a notional valuation mechanism independently
establishes a supply. They pray that the levy and proceedings be set
aside insofar as they tax the continued subsistence of the seven pre-
GST deeds, absent any post-GST issuance, renewal or other taxable
event, and that IC-2023, IC-2024 and Rule 28(2) be confined to the
limits of the parent enactment.
Additional submissions on behalf of the Petitioners in W.P.(C)
12955/2025
18.6 Without prejudice to Ground E, it is contended that a corporate
guarantee is a ‗security‘, excluded from ‗services‘ under Section
2(102) of the Act of 2017. Section 2(101) adopts the definition under

48
(2007) 13 SCC 803

49
(2000) 124 ELT 323 (Tri.)

50
(2003) 11 SCC 193
51
(2005) 6 SCC 95
52
(2007) 13 SCC 807
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53
Section 2(h) of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 ,
which is inclusive and not confined to the instruments enumerated
therein. Reliance is placed on Naresh Agarwala & Co. v Canbank
54
Financial Services Ltd. and Sahara India Real Estate Corporation
55
Ltd. v SEBI . It is argued that a guarantee, being security furnished to
the creditor and enforceable upon the default of the debtor under
Sections 126 to 128 of the Act of 1872, cannot be a taxable service.
18.7 It is further contended that a pledge of shares cannot attract
GST, securities being excluded from ‗services‘, and the show cause
notices are, therefore, without jurisdiction. One of the Petitioners
submits that its case involves no contract of guarantee, but only a
pledge of shares, which is distinct from a guarantee, and hence no
supply arises.
18.8 These Petitioners also assail the invocation of the extended
period of limitation under Section 74 of the Act of 2017, which can be
invoked only in cases of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of
facts with intent to evade tax, none of which is established. It is
submitted that all the show cause notices invoke Section 74, though
the issue is purely interpretative and involves no fraud or suppression.
The Petitioners in W.P.(C) 19506/2025 and 13341/2025 point out that
Torrent Power (Supra) granted partial relief with respect to the
proceedings under Section 74.

53
hereinafter referred to as ‗Act of 1956‘
54
(2010) 6 SCC 178
55
(2013) 1 SCC 1
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II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
19. Mr. N. Venkataraman, learned ASG, advanced his submissions
on behalf of the Respondents under two categories, namely, (A)
independent submissions, constituting the affirmative case of the
Respondents for the levy and the valuation under Rule 28(2),
including the answer to the query of this Court as to how and why the
value was fixed at 1%; and (B) reply submissions, answering the
grounds of the Petitioners under the same heads as Grounds A to I.
i. Independent submissions on behalf of the Respondents
20. On the nature of a corporate guarantee and the undisputed facts,
the learned ASG has made the following submissions:
20.1 It is argued that a corporate guarantee substitutes a traditional
bank guarantee as collateral, enabling the borrower to avail a loan
without blocking its funds or furnishing collateral. It is extended by
the holding company and accepted by the lender on the strength of the
valuation and creditworthiness of the holding company, as an
assurance that the holding company will repay the loan to the extent of
the default of the subsidiary.
20.2 It is further contended that a corporate guarantee involves three
parties, namely, the lender, the borrower/subsidiary and the
guarantor/holding company. The loan transaction is only between the
lender and the borrower, and the guarantor becomes relevant only
upon default, and to the extent thereof. According to the Respondents,
the lender cannot recover directly from the guarantor. It is argued to
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be undisputed that all the corporate guarantees in the present batch
were extended without consideration.
21. On the scheme of the Act of 2017 vis-à-vis the erstwhile
indirect tax regimes, the learned ASG has made the following
submissions:
21.1 It is argued that, under the erstwhile regime, sales tax and
service tax required the passing of consideration to trigger the charge,
whereas customs and central excise duties were triggered upon import
or manufacture, consideration not being a sine qua non . Service tax, in
particular, was consideration-based and not contract-based, requiring a
provider, a recipient, rendition of service and payment of
consideration.
21.2 It is further submitted that GST subsumed these levies into a
single tax on supply under Sections 7 and 9 of the Act of 2017, and
departs from service tax inasmuch as, while taxing supplies for
consideration under Section 7(1)(a), it also taxes the activities
specified in Schedule I under Section 7(1)(c), even without
consideration. Therefore, the mandate of Parliament is, that Section 7
covers supplies with or without consideration. Further, it is argued that
the Petitioners herein have not challenged the vires of Section 7(1)(c).
22. On the taxability of a corporate guarantee between related
persons under Section 7(1)(c) read with Entry 2 of Schedule I, the
learned ASG has made the following submissions:
22.1 It is submitted that Entry 2 of Schedule I covers supplies
between related persons, or between distinct persons under Section 25,
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made in the course or furtherance of business. Explanation (a) to
Section 15 deems persons to be related, inter alia , where any person
directly or indirectly owns, controls or holds 25% or more of the
outstanding voting stock or shares of both, where one directly or
indirectly controls the other, and where both are directly or indirectly
controlled by a third person. It is his case that the Petitioners admit
that a holding company and its subsidiary are related persons; such a
supply, therefore, falls within Entry 2 and is taxable even without
consideration.
22.2 It is further argued that Parliament brought related-person
transactions within Schedule I as they are predominantly not at arm‘s
length and any consideration therein is unrealistic. Market guarantors,
who enable borrowers to avail loans without collateral, always charge
an arm‘s length consideration from the borrower, whereas the same
transaction between a holding company and its subsidiary will almost
never be at arm‘s length. Hence, with or without consideration, a
guarantee by a holding company for its subsidiary is a taxable supply
under Section 7(1)(c) read with Entry 2 of Schedule I.
23. On the classification of the supply under Section 7(1A) read
with Schedule II, the learned ASG has made the following
submissions:
23.1 It is submitted that Section 7(1A) does not define supply de
hors Section 7(1), but operates harmoniously with it; once a
transaction is a supply under Section 7(1), Schedule II classifies it as a
supply of goods or of services, and operates only qua the transactions
listed therein. In the Additional Written Submissions, the Respondents
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fully agree that Section 7(1A) is subservient to Section 7(1) and that,
unless a case falls under Section 7(1), Section 7(1A) read with
Schedule II cannot be invoked. Therefore, Entry 5(e) of Schedule II is
not relied upon to establish the supply, which is traced to Section
7(1)(c) read with Entry 2 of Schedule I, but only to classify it as a
supply of service.
23.2 It is further submitted that Entry 5(e) treats ‗agreeing to the
obligation to refrain from an act, or to tolerate an act or a situation, or
to do an act‘ as a supply of service. The Petitioners aver that holding
companies do not generally provide corporate guarantees and did so
only because their subsidiaries were involved; though irrelevant, the
admitted fact that they did so constitutes ‗agreeing to do an act‘. A
corporate guarantee, being an agreement to pay the defaulted amount
if the subsidiary fails to repay, is thus classifiable as a supply of
service.
24. On the valuation framework under Section 15 of the Act of
2017 and Rule 28(2) of the Rules of 2017, the learned ASG has made
the following submissions:
24.1 It is submitted that Section 9(1) levies tax on the value
determined under Section 15. Under Section 15(1), the value is the
transaction value only where the supplier and the recipient are not
related and the price is the sole consideration. Thus, related-party
supplies are excluded from Section 15(1), and their value is to be
determined under Sections 15(4) and 15(5).
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24.2 It is further argued that Section 15(4) invokes the general
valuation principles under the Rules for all supplies whose value
cannot be determined under Section 15(1), including related-party
supplies; whereas Section 15(5), which operates notwithstanding
Sections 15(1) and 15(4), empowers the Government to notify
specified supplies and prescribe their value in the Rules themselves, in
which case the general principles do not apply.
24.3 It is submitted that Rule 28(1), which deals with supplies
between distinct and related persons, is not in issue. It is his case that
Rule 28(2), inserted by IN-2023 under Section 164, identifies the
supply of service by way of a corporate guarantee to a banking
company or financial institution on behalf of the recipient, and
prescribes its value as 1% of the amount of guarantee per annum or
the actual consideration, whichever is higher, thereby satisfying the
twin requirements of Section 15(5).
24.4 It is also submitted that, whether the power is traced to Section
15(5) or to Section 164, both originate in the recommendation of the
GST Council, and the source is, therefore, immaterial. The issue is
stated to be no longer res integra in view of Paragraph No.58.2 of
Gameskraft (Supra) , which reads as under:
― 58.2 A conjoint reading of Sections 15(4), 15(5), 164 and
Section 2(87) reveals a common statutory thread, namely the
requirement of recommendation of the GST Council.
Consequently, whether Rule 31A traces its source to Section
15(4), Section 15(5), or the general rule-making power under
Section 164, the foundational statutory requirement remains
identical and intact. Once it is established that Rule 31A was
introduced pursuant to recommendations of the GST Council, the
controversy regarding the precise source of delegated authority
loses much of its significance. ‖
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25. In answer to the query of this Court as to why the value was
fixed at 1%, the learned ASG has made the following submissions:
25.1 It is submitted that, since the power under Sections 15(4), 15(5)
or 164 can be exercised only on the recommendation of the GST
Council, the answer lies in the minutes and deliberations of the
Council.
25.2 It is submitted that Rule 28(2) originates in Agenda Item 3(ii) of
nd
the 52 GST Council Meeting, concerning corporate guarantees
between related persons, including by a holding company to its
subsidiary. Paragraph Nos.4.1 to 5 of the Agenda, is argued to have
placed the following before the Council:
(a) a corporate guarantee between related companies,
including by a holding company to its subsidiary, is taxable
under Schedule I as a supply in the course or furtherance of
business, even without monetary consideration (Paragraph
Nos.4.1 and 4.2);
(b) its value would otherwise be determined under Rule 28,
mainly on open market value or the value of like services, or
under Rules 30 or 31; however, corporate guarantees, unlike
bank guarantees, are peculiar to a corporate group, third-party
comparisons may be unavailable or not relatable, and the
commission depends on factors such as the creditworthiness of
the company, the amount guaranteed, borrowing history,
soundness of financial statements, current cash flows and income
of the company guaranteed, and its relationship with the lender,
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owing to which field formations and taxpayers found it difficult
to arrive at the open market value (Paragraph No.4.3);
(c) where the recipient is eligible for full input tax credit, the
invoice value, if any, is deemed to be the open market value
under the second proviso to Rule 28, but difficulties arose where
it is not; banks charge between 0.5% and 3% for bank
guarantees, and sometimes nothing, depending on the client
relationship; and, as Rule 10TD of the Safe Harbour Rules fixes
1% of the amount guaranteed as the minimum acceptable fee for
corporate guarantees in eligible international transactions, the
same was proposed for valuation under GST (Paragraph No.4.4);
and
(d) the Law Committee recommended that the applicability
of the proposed Rule 28(2) be clarified by a circular, placed at
Annexure-A (Paragraph Nos. 4.6 and 5).
25.3 On the strength of the aforestated, it is his case that the Agenda
thus explained the difficulty caused by the non-availability of open
market values, owing to the peculiar relationship between holding and
subsidiary companies, and adopted the minimum fee under the Income
Tax Rules, 1962. He argued that by Paragraph Nos.4.16 to 4.18 of the
nd
minutes of the 52 Meeting held on 07.10.2023, the Council accepted
the recommendations of the Law Committee along with the circular,
and Rule 28(2) was accordingly inserted under Section 164.
25.4 It is further submitted that, by way of the IN-2024, Rule 28(2)
was amended with effect from 26.10.2023 to deem the value at 1% of
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the amount of guarantee per annum, and to confine the Rule to
recipients located in India, thereby removing exports from its scope.
These amendments are argued to have arisen from Paragraph Nos.3 to
rd
5 of the Agenda for the 53 Meeting, approved by Paragraph
Nos.4.138 to 4.141 of the minutes of the meeting held on 22.06.2024.
Thus, it is his case that Rule 28(2), its amendments, IC-2023 and IC-
2024 were all issued on the recommendations of the GST Council.
25.5 It is contended that the said recommendations, having been
adopted by a unanimous vote of all the voting States and the Union,
are binding on the delegated legislature, and the wisdom of the GST
Council must prevail.
26. In response to the submissions of the Petitioners on the levy for
future years and the nature of the supply, the learned ASG has,
without prejudice to one another, made the following alternative
submissions, the answer to which is stated to lie in Section 13 of the
Act of 2017:
26.1 It is his case that Section 13(2)(a) and (b) turn on the date of
invoice under Section 31, which does not assist in the present case,
and hence do not apply. Section 13(2)(c) operates independently and
fixes the time of supply as the date on which the recipient shows the
receipt of services in its books of account. Clause 18(b)(ii) of Indian
56
Accounting Standards 24 requires the subsidiary to disclose every
guarantee given or received, and Clause 18(b) the outstanding balance
of commitments, including guarantees, in every reporting period while
the liability subsists. Thus, the time of supply can be determined each

56
hereinafter referred to as ‗Ind AS‘
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year, and a taxable supply arises in each year in which receipt is so
recorded.
26.2 It is argued that, in such a case, the expression ‗1% of the
amount of such guarantee offered per annum‘ may be judicially
interpreted to mean the amount subsisting in each year. For a ten-year
guarantee of Rs.100 crores, instead of 10% of Rs.100 crores, the value
would be 1% of the subsisting amount each year after setting off
repayments; on pre-closure in the seventh year, there would be no
supply for the remaining three years; and an increase in the guaranteed
amount would be valued accordingly. It is submitted that, on the
aforesaid reading, a pre-GST guarantee would be taxable only for its
surviving years from 01.07.2017.
26.3 Alternatively, it is submitted that, under Section 13(5)(a), which
applies where Sections 13(2) to 13(4) do not assist, the time of supply
is the due date of the periodical return to be filed by the subsidiary, so
that the supply would arise every year on the return due date traceable
to the anniversary of the guarantee, with the same consequences.
However, if Section 13(5) is triggered only once, Rule 28(2) would
apply fully in the first year, i.e., 10% of Rs.100 crores for a ten-year
guarantee, without set-off for repayments, and guarantees entered into
before 01.07.2017 would not be taxed. It is urged that this Court may,
nonetheless, harmoniously construe Rule 28(2) to extend year-wise
valuation, which would only defer the tax without diluting the Rule;
either way, the Revenue would collect the same tax, save in the rarest
of rare cases.
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26.4 On the question of continuous supply, the learned ASG stated
that, on a literal reading, a multi-year guarantee would not be a
‗continuous supply of services‘ under Section 2(33), since ‗periodic
payment obligations‘ are absent in a Schedule I transaction without
consideration, the other elements being satisfied. However, it is his
contention that if periodic payment were insisted upon, no Schedule I
supply could ever be a continuous supply, which could not have been
intended. Rule 28(2) supplies, by legal fiction, the element of
consideration absent in Schedule I transactions, and the deemed value
must, therefore, be treated as deemed consideration establishing
periodic payment obligations, a deeming fiction being required to be
carried to its logical end. Reliance in this regard is placed upon Ashok
57
Leyland Ltd. v State of Tamil Nadu .
26.5 It is further contended that, if a taxable supply arises every year,
guarantees subsisting in the GST regime are taxable for the surviving
years; and if it arises only once, guarantees whose supply concluded
before 01.07.2017 are not taxable. For the period before 26.10.2023,
Rule 28(2) being only a valuation mechanism, the transaction was
taxable from 01.07.2017 and valued under Rule 31 read with Rule
28(c), and under Rule 28(2) thereafter.
26.6 It is his case that Rule 28(2) is beneficial, as it brings certainty
of value, is confined to recipients in India and extends the benefit of
input tax credit. Hence, this Court may, on a harmonious construction
of Rules 28(2) and 31, extend the same to the period before
26.10.2023, or give it effect from 01.07.2017. Then, supplies to

57
(2004) 3 SCC 1
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recipients located outside India would be outside the levy from
01.07.2017 and, Rule 28(2) being the specific mechanism, Rule 31
cannot be used to value them, the intention of the GST Council being
that exports must not bear GST.
ii. Reply submissions on behalf of the Respondents
27. The learned ASG has controverted the submissions of the
Petitioners, under the same heads as Grounds A to I, as recorded
hereinbelow.
28. In reply to Ground A, the learned ASG has made the following
submissions:
28.1 Against the contention that the charge must be strictly construed
and established within the four corners of Section 7, it is submitted
that once a guarantee by a holding company for its subsidiary is a
taxable supply under Section 7(1)(c) read with Entry 2 of Schedule I,
classified as a supply of service under Section 7(1A) read with
Schedule II, the charge under Section 9 is triggered on a plain reading,
and tax is payable on the value under Rule 28(2) read with Section
15(5). A charge so triggered cannot be assailed on any other ground.
28.2 Against the contention that every activity cannot be taxed
merely because it is not goods, money or securities, and that the
arrangement is not a legally recognised supply, it is argued that the
same runs contrary to Paragraph Nos.51.6 to 51.9 of Gameskraft
(Supra) , wherein it was held that Section 7(1) employs expressions of
the widest amplitude, namely, ‗includes‘, ‗all forms of supply‘ and
‗such as‘; that the forms of supply in Section 7(1)(a) are illustrative
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and not exhaustive; that Article 366(12A) deliberately adopts
‗supply‘, in contradistinction to ‗transfer‘ in Article 366(29A); and
that GST taxes supplies, and not merely transfers of title or
conventional sales. It is contended that Paragraph No.85 thereof also
58
reiterates Union of India v Mohit Minerals Pvt. Ltd. , which held
that Section 7 defines supply with a broad brush, GST is supply-
centric, and fiscal legislation must adapt to emerging commercial
realities.
28.3 Against the contention that a corporate guarantee supplies
nothing and is merely a promise to pay in a future contingency, it is
submitted that there is, in fact, both value addition and giving and
taking. The subsidiary could not procure the loan without the
guarantee and would otherwise have to park funds in bank guarantees
or part with assets as collateral. The lender extends the loan on the
strength of the creditworthiness and credibility of the holding
company.
28.4 Against the contention based on the Circular dated 03.08.2022,
it is submitted that the conditions of a contract coupled with
consideration referred to therein are relevant only where consideration
exists. For Schedule I transactions, consideration is dispensed with
and only a contract to do an act need exist, which, under Section 126
of the Act of 1872, exists in every contract of guarantee. Read closely,
the Circular reflects the correct position and favours the Revenue.
28.5 It is further submitted that Tata Sons (Supra) arose from an
arbitral award against Tata Sons, which was settled and recorded in a

58
(2022) 10 SCC 700
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court order, and the Revenue sought to tax it as an import of services,
treating Docomo as having agreed to tolerate the breach and withdraw
all enforcement actions. The Bombay High Court quashed the show
cause notice, holding that there was no contract between the parties
for that purpose and the settlement amount was not consideration
therefor. The said decision turned on its own facts, whereas, in the
present case, every Petitioner has admittedly contracted to pay the
defaulted amount if its subsidiary fails to discharge its obligations.
29. In reply to Ground B, the learned ASG has made the following
submissions:
29.1 Against the contention that the holding company is not in the
business of guarantees, it is submitted that Section 2(17) inclusively
covers any trade, commerce, manufacture, profession, vocation,
adventure, wager or similar activity, whether or not for pecuniary
benefit; any activity or transaction connected therewith, or incidental
or ancillary thereto; and any activity or transaction in the nature
thereof, irrespective of volume, frequency, continuity or regularity. It
is his case that the definition being transaction-centric and indifferent
to purpose, quantity and frequency, guarantees, even if not the main
activity of the holding company, yielding no pecuniary benefit and not
offered to others in the market, are incidental and ancillary to its trade
and commerce, and hence constitute business.
29.2 Against the contention that a board resolution merely evidences
corporate approval, it is submitted that the expression ‗in the course or
furtherance of business‘ in Entry 2 of Schedule I covers transactions
in the course of business, even if they do not further it. He contended
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that the Petitioners admittedly convened board meetings and approved
the guarantees, which shows that the same were in the course of
business. In one Writ Petition, the contract of guarantee itself states
that it is entered into for the benefit of the guarantor and its business,
which is an admission that it is a business endeavour.
29.3 With respect to the reliance placed upon Aerocom Cushions
(Supra) , it is contended that the said decision concerns the assignment
of leasehold rights arising from a transfer of immovable property, and
is irrelevant to whether a corporate guarantee is furnished in the
course or furtherance of business.
29.4 It is further submitted that Centel Communications (Supra)
does not deal with corporate guarantees and concerns the taxation of
ESOPs provided by an employer to its employees, and that the
Australian Ruling GSTR 2006/1 reflects a sovereign policy decision
not to tax corporate guarantees, which has no application in
interpreting the Act of 2017.
29.5 Against the contention that the Respondents have selectively
relied upon the OECD Guidelines, it is submitted that the Act of 2017
does not define ‗supply‘ with reference to the OECD Commentaries.
It is a standalone statute, and a supply taxable thereunder remains
uninfluenced by any conflicting material, including the said
Commentaries.
30. In reply to Ground C, the learned ASG has made the following
submissions:
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30.1 It is submitted that, though the guarantees were admittedly
extended without consideration, the same is not fatal, since Section
7(1)(c) read with Entry 2 of Schedule I taxes related-person supplies
even without consideration, Parliament having deliberately so
provided as such transactions are not at arm‘s length. Without
prejudice, Section 127 of the Act of 1872 treats anything done or any
promise made for the benefit of the principal debtor as sufficient
consideration for the guarantee.
30.2 Against the contention that the issue is covered by D.P. Jain
(Supra) , it is argued that the said judgment traced its reasoning
entirely to Edelweiss (Supra) , which, though concerning the same
transaction, was rendered under the service tax regime, where
consideration was ingrained in the definition of ‗service‘ under
59
Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 , and there was no
equivalent of Section 7(1)(c). It is argued that D.P. Jain (Supra) does
not discuss Section 7(1)(c) read with Schedule I and, having ignored a
provision of law, is per incuriam , and the Bombay High Court erred
in importing findings rendered under a regime which mandated
consideration.
31. In reply to Ground D, the learned ASG has made the following
submissions:
31.1 It is submitted that, no consideration being payable, clause (c)
of Section 2(93) applies, and the recipient is the person to whom the
service is rendered. The service is rendered only to the subsidiary,
which alone gains from the guarantee, and is therefore the recipient.

59
hereinafter referred to as ‗Act of 1994‘
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31.2 Against the contention that the subsidiary is not privy to the
guarantee, it is submitted that Section 145 of the Act of 1872 implies,
in every contract of guarantee, a promise by the principal debtor to
indemnify the surety for whatever sum the surety has rightfully paid.
Though not a party to the guarantee, the subsidiary is thus in an
implied contract with the holding company and is the ultimate
beneficiary to whom the service is rendered.
31.3 It is further argued that the recipient is to be identified by
asking at whose instance the service was triggered. Lenders are
unconcerned with who gives the guarantee and do not search the
market for guarantors; it is the subsidiary which approaches the
holding company and requests the guarantee. Moreover, as Entry 2 of
Schedule I refers to a supply between related persons, and any
reference to a person to whom a supply is made is a reference to the
recipient under Section 2(93), hence, the subsidiary automatically
qualifies as the recipient.
32. In reply to Ground E, the learned ASG has made the following
submissions:
32.1 It is his case that, under Section 2(1) of the Act of 2017 read
with Section 3 of the Act of 1882, an actionable claim is a claim to a
debt, other than a secured debt, or to a beneficial interest in movable
property not in the possession of the claimant. A guarantee cannot be
a beneficial interest in movable property, there being no movable
property at all, and is merely a promise to repay the creditor to the
extent of the default of the subsidiary.
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32.2 It is further submitted that the loan may give rise to a debt with
the subsidiary as the debtor, but the guarantor, who merely promises
to repay on default, is not a debtor. The traditional meaning of ‗debt‘
does not factor in the guarantor, and where the law intends otherwise,
it says so expressly. Under Sections 3(8), 3(10), 3(11), 3(12), 5(5A)
and 5(8) of the IBC, a corporate guarantor is treated as distinct from a
debtor and is treated as a corporate debtor only because ‗financial
debt‘ expressly includes guarantee liability. The definition adopted in
the Act of 2017 is drawn from the Act of 1882, and not the IBC, and
vis-à-vis the guarantor there is no debt until the debtor defaults.
32.3 Against the reliance on Section 128 of the Act of 1872, it is
submitted that the guarantor only discharges the liability of a third
person on default, and the principal and primary liability is always that
of the debtor. Section 128 presupposes two parties, namely, the debtor
and the guarantor, and treating guarantors as debtors would render it
otiose. Thus, there is no actionable claim, and Section 7(2)(a) read
with Schedule III does not apply.
32.4 To the reliance placed on Article 366(8) of the Constitution, it
is argued that Article 366 defines expressions ‗in this Constitution,
unless the context otherwise requires‘, and ‗debt‘ thereunder cannot be
imported into the Act of 1882. The inclusion of guarantees within
‗debt‘ is explained by Articles 112(3)(c) and 202(3)(c), which require
‗debt charges‘, including charges on guarantees issued by
Governments, to be reflected in the annual financial statements of the
Union and the States.
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33. In reply to Ground F, the learned ASG has made the following
submissions:
33.1 Against the contention of excessive delegation, it is submitted
that delegation is excessive only where the delegate acts on its own
authority without tracing its power to the parent statute. However, in
the present case the power stands traced to Sections 15(4), 15(5) and
164, as submitted in Paragraph Nos.24.1 to 24.4 hereinabove.
Reliance is placed on All India Bank Officers’ Association v
60
Regional Manager, Central Bank of India & Ors. , wherein the
Supreme Court, following Municipal Corporation of Delhi v Birla
61
Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills and Banarsi Das Bhanot v
62
State of Madhya Pradesh , held that leaving to the executive the
details of taxation, such as the persons to be taxed and the rates, is not
unconstitutional, where the Act delineates the policy and standards.
33.2 Against the contention that deeming the value at 1% is
impermissible, it is submitted that Rule 28(2) does not deem one value
for all guarantees, but adopts 1% per annum or the actual
consideration, whichever is higher, so that a higher agreed
consideration prevails. He argued that, whether value can be deemed
is no longer res integra , in view of Ashok Leyland (Supra) , which,
63
relying on State of Bombay v Pandurang Vinayak and East End
64
Dwellings Co. Ltd. v Finsbury Borough Council , held that a
statutory fiction must be given full effect. The deliberations of the

60
(2024) 9 SCC 664

61
AIR 1968 SC 1232

62
AIR 1958 SC 909
63
(1953) 1 SCC 425
64
[1951 2 All ER 587 (HL)
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GST Council show that the fiction was introduced to remove the
ambiguity faced by field formations and to fix a reliable value.
33.3 As to the reliance on the bank rates of 0.5% to 3%, similar
arguments as those recorded in Paragraph Nos.24.1, 25.2 and 25.3
hereinabove, were made and it was submitted that bank rates are no
reliable basis for valuing related-party supplies. Though the GST
Council noted the said range, it found the same not comparable and
unreliable for valuing related-party supplies, and the Petitioners
cannot rely on data which the Council rejected; since the Council
instead adopted the 1% minimum fee already prescribed under the
Safe Harbour Rules.
33.4 In answer to the query of this Court, and to the argument that
the actual consideration may be below 1%, it had been argued that
Section 15(1) presumes that transaction value cannot be the value
between related parties, and that considering a lower actual
consideration would defeat that mandate. Open market values for
related-party guarantees could not be ascertained for want of data and
comparables, and prescribing open market value would invite a
challenge to every assessment. The learned ASG has also sought to
distinguish A. Sanyasi Rao (Supra) , Wipro Ltd. (Supra) and Munjaal
Manishbhai Bhatt (Supra), inasmuch as they concern a related-party
transaction or mandate the adoption of actual value therein; while
Rule 28(2) allows the assessee to show actuals, actuals below 1% in a
related-party transaction must be ignored under Section 15(1).
34. In reply to Ground G, the learned ASG has made the following
submissions:
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34.1 To the challenge to the retrospective operation of IN-2024, it is
submitted that Rule 28(2) is only a valuation mechanism, the
transaction being taxable from 01.07.2017. As introduced on
26.10.2023, the Rule applied to all recipients, and IN-2024 restricted
it, with effect from 26.10.2023, to recipients located in India,
reflecting the intention of the GST Council that exports must not bear
GST. The amendment being beneficial, the challenge fails.
34.2 As regards pre-GST guarantees and the period before
26.10.2023, the Respondents rely on their alternative submissions
recorded in Paragraph Nos.26.2 to 26.4 and 26.6 hereinabove.
35. In reply to Ground H, the learned ASG has made the following
submissions:
35.1 Against the plea of the Petitioners in W.P.(C) 214/2025, it is
submitted that Section 13(2)(b) does not apply, as Section 31 does not
assist in the present matters, and Section 13(2)(c) operates
independently where clauses (a) and (b) do not apply.
35.2 Against the submission that the subsidiary does not reflect the
guarantee in its books, it is argued that the same runs contrary to law,
since Ind AS 24 mandates the disclosure of the guarantee and of the
outstanding commitment in every reporting period, which binds the
subsidiary irrespective of whether it chooses to comply.
35.3 Against the contentions that GST cannot be levied upfront for
future years and that the guarantee is not a continuous supply, the
Respondents rely on their alternative submissions recorded in
Paragraph Nos.26.2, 26.4 and 26.5 hereinabove.
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36. In reply to Ground I, the learned ASG has made the following
submissions:
36.1 It is submitted that, as held in Commissioner of Central Excise,
65
Bolpur v Ratan Melting & Wire Industries , circulars bind the
authorities under the statute but not the Court, which must declare
what the statute says, and a circular contrary to the statute has no
existence in law.
36.2 It is further submitted that the Respondents rely on the
impugned Circulars only in aid, having independently shown from the
statute that the transaction is taxable. The impugned Circulars reflect
the law, are consistent with the statute, and help field formations apply
it without uncertainty; they are collateral to Rule 28(2) and its
amendments, and not standalone circulars without an underlying
provision. Therefore, the case law on circulars creating a levy or
exceeding the statute is stated to be irrelevant.
37. In reply to the additional submissions of the respective
Petitioners, the learned ASG has made the following submissions:
37.1 On the criticism of Torrent Power (Supra) by the Petitioners in
W.P.(C) 2966/2024, and the reliance on D.P. Jain (Supra) by the
Petitioners in W.P.(C) 214/2025, the Respondents rely on their replies
under Grounds A, C and D hereinabove.
37.2 Against the contention that a guarantee or pledge is a ‗security‘,
it is submitted that, though ‗services‘ excludes securities as defined
under the Act of 1956, a guarantee is not a security thereunder, and an

65
(2008) 13 SCC 1
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admitted contract of guarantee cannot be elevated to one. What is
taxed is the act of agreeing to be a guarantor by executing a contract
under Section 126 of the Act of 1872. A pledge, defined under Section
172 of the Act of 1872 as the bailment of goods as security for
payment of a debt or performance of a promise, is an independent
transaction with which the levy is unconcerned, and the supply arising
on execution of the guarantee cannot be combined with a pledge
merely because both are contained in the same contract.
37.3 Against the contention of the Petitioner claiming to have only
pledged shares, it is submitted that its deed of corporate guarantee
(Annexure E) is itself a contract of guarantee under Section 126 and,
though Annexure M dated 20.03.2019 is titled ‗agreement for pledge
of shares‘, Recital E and Clause Nos.2.1.1 and 2.5.1 thereof show it to
be a contract of guarantee, inasmuch as the eligibility of the borrower
is conditioned on the Petitioner pledging its shares in the subsidiary,
the pledge secures the obligations of the borrower, and the shares may
be appropriated on default, satisfying both Sections 126 and 172 of the
Act of 1872.
37.4 It is further submitted that a pledge may either secure one‘s own
debt, taking the colour of a security, or secure the promise of a
guarantor for the debt of another. Paragraph No.25 of Phoenix ARC
(Supra) concerned the securing of one‘s own debt, and Paragraph
Nos.32 and 33 of Maitreya Doshi (Supra) a borrower pledging shares
for his own debt under a loan-cum-pledge agreement, whereas the
pledge of the Petitioner secures the debt of a third party.
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37.5 As regards the extended period of limitation, it is contended that
limitation is a mixed question of law and fact, no facts in that regard
are pleaded, and the issue before this Court is purely one of law.
Therefore, the same may be left to the adjudicating authority, who
would appreciate the facts while deciding the show cause notices.
38. In light of the aforesaid, the learned ASG has prayed that the
present batch of Writ Petitions be dismissed.
III. REJOINDER SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE
PETITIONERS
39. In rejoinder, learned senior counsel for the Petitioners in
W.P.(C) 2966/2024 and W.P.(C) 13358/2025 have, in large part,
reiterated the submissions already recorded hereinabove. To avoid
repetition, only such submissions as were additionally urged in
rejoinder are recorded hereinbelow.
Rejoinder submissions on behalf of the Petitioners in W.P.(C)
2966/2024
39.1 It is submitted that the Respondents have not addressed the
structure of the power transmission sector, wherein projects are
implemented through Project Owning Companies or Special Purpose
Vehicles (‗SPVs‘), incorporated at the instance of the Government and
thereafter acquired by the successful bidder. Such SPVs ordinarily
have no independent financial standing to raise project finance, and
the corporate guarantee of the parent is a necessity flowing from the
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regulatory framework itself, which, it is argued, reinforces the
submission recorded in Paragraph No.10.1 hereinabove.
39.2 Referring to the response of the Revenue to a query of this
Court, it is submitted that the reach of a charging provision is fixed by
its text under Article 265 of the Constitution, and not by the revenue
expectations of the Department.
39.3 In furtherance of the submissions recorded in Paragraph
Nos.14.2, 14.3 and 14.6 hereinabove, reliance is additionally placed
66
on Sanjeev Sharma v Union of India and on Paragraph Nos.105 to
108 of Torrent Power (Supra) , wherein, following Munjaal
Manishbhai Bhatt (Supra) and Wipro Ltd. (Supra) , the expression
‗whichever is higher‘ in Rule 28(2) was held to be violative of
Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. By way of illustration, it
is pointed out that a guarantee for thirty years would carry a deemed
value of 30% of the guaranteed amount. Reliance is also placed on
67
Union of India v Bombay Tyre International Ltd. ; CIT v Prem
68 69
Bhai Parekh ; and CIT v B.C. Srinivasa Setty , to contend that the
charging and computation provisions form one integrated code.
39.4 In response to the submissions recorded in Paragraph No.32.2
hereinabove, it is clarified that the plea that a guarantee liability is a
‗debt‘ rests independently on Article 366(8) of the Constitution, the
IBC having been referred to only as a supplementary aid.

66
W.P.(C) No. 5055/2018

67
(1984) 1 SCC 467
68
(1970) 1 SCC 784
69
(1981) 2 SCC 460
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Rejoinder submissions on behalf of the Petitioner in W.P.(C)
13358/2025
39.5 In furtherance of the submission recorded in Paragraph No.9.2
hereinabove, it is submitted that Section 7(1)(c) refers to ‗the activities
specified in Schedule I‘, whereas Entry 2 refers to a ‗supply of goods
or services or both‘. Section 3(1)(c) of the Model GST Law published
in November 2016 employed the expression ‗a supply specified in
Schedule I‘, and the change in the enacted text must be presumed to
be deliberate. Reliance is placed on Corporation of Calcutta v Liberty
70 71
Cinema and Arthur Paul Benthall v CIT .
39.6 Relying on Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co. v Bharat Coking
72
Coal Ltd. , it is urged that no one may speak for Parliament, and the
Respondents cannot enlarge the charge by their own view of
legislative intent. Where Parliament intended to deem a transaction to
be a supply, it did so expressly, as in Section 7(1)(aa), inserted with
retrospective effect from 01.07.2017, and no analogous provision
exists for corporate guarantees. It is further contended that, having
invoked transfer pricing principles to justify the value, the
Respondents cannot object to the same principles being applied to
determine the character of the transaction.
39.7 It is contended that clauses (b) and (c) of Section 2(17) take
colour from clause (a), and clause (c) only relaxes the requirement of

70
AIR 1965 SC 1107
71
AIR 1956 SC 35
72
(1983) 1 SCC 147
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volume, frequency, continuity or regularity, and cannot convert an
activity lacking the character of business into one. Reliance is placed
on Central Electricity Regulatory Commission v Directorate General
73
of GST Intelligence , to contend that an activity is not a taxable
supply merely because it falls within the residuary definition of
74
‗services‘; and on Anuj Jain v Axis Bank Ltd. , for the proposition
that an activity in the ordinary course of business must form part of
the usual flow of commercial dealings.
39.8 It is further submitted that Section 186 of the Companies Act,
75
2013 separately regulates guarantees given by companies, and
Section 186(11)(a) excludes guarantees given by specified entities in
the ordinary course of their business, which shows that furnishing
guarantees is not the business of every holding company. The enquiry
under Entry 2 must be with reference to the business of the guarantor,
and the Respondents cannot treat the holding company and the
subsidiary as one economic unit to establish furtherance of business,
while treating them as separate persons to identify a supplier and a
recipient.
39.9 Relying on Chief Commissioner of CGST v Safari Retreats
76
Pvt. Ltd. ; Ambuja Cements Ltd. v Chief Controlling Revenue
77 78
Authority ; and Ramnath & Co. v CIT , it is submitted that where
two views are reasonably possible, the one favouring the assessee

73
W.P.(C) 10680/2024, decided by the Delhi High Court
74
(2020) 8 SCC 401

75
hereinafter referred to as ‗Act of 2013‘

76
Civil Appeal No. 2948/2023, decided on 03.10.2024 by the Supreme Court
77
Stamp Reference Nos. 1 to 7 of 2020
78
(2021) 12 SCC 217
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must be adopted, that a levy cannot rest on presumption, and that
undefined expressions, including ‗services‘, must bear their
commercial meaning.
39.10 It is contended that the rights of subrogation and indemnity
under Sections 140 and 145 of the Act of 1872 arise only upon future
contingencies. Relying on Rajasthan Chemists Association (Supra) , it
is argued that a present levy must bear a nexus with the taxable event
as it exists in praesenti , and rights which may arise in futuro cannot be
used to characterise the furnishing of a guarantee as a service.
39.11 It is further contended that Section 3 of the Act of 1882
expressly includes a claim to an unsecured debt which is ‗existent,
accruing, conditional or contingent‘, and the fact that the liability of
the guarantor arises only on default does not take it outside the ambit
of an ‗actionable claim‘. Reliance is placed on Shanti Prasad Jain v
79
Director of Enforcement and Kesoram Industries & Cotton Mills
80
Ltd. v CWT on the meaning of contingent debts; on Paragraph
No.52.2 of Gameskraft (Supra) ; and on Ram Bahadur Thakur & Co.
81
v Sabu Jain Ltd. and Mauritius Commercial Bank Ltd. v Sujana
82
Universal Industries Ltd. , which recognise guarantees as contingent
liabilities. The observations in Torrent Power (Supra) on
assignability, and on the distinction between a direct debt and a
secondary liability, are argued to run contrary to the words ‗any debt‘
in Section 3.

79
1962 SCC OnLine SC 167

80
1965 SCC OnLine SC 11
81
1979 SCC OnLine Del 114
82
2015 SCC OnLine Hyd 281
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39.12 It is also submitted that Rule 28(1) prescribes a sequential
method of valuation, namely, open market value, followed by the
value of supplies of like kind and quality, and thereafter Rules 30 and
31; by its non-obstante clause, Rule 28(2) bypasses that hierarchy and
renders the other methods redundant for corporate guarantees,
contrary to Wipro Ltd. (Supra) . Relying on Paragraph Nos.64, 67, 69,
114 and 122(B) of Torrent Power (Supra) , it is further submitted that,
there being no specific machinery for valuing non-monetary corporate
guarantees before 26.10.2023, the attempt of the Respondents to apply
the 1% benchmark to the earlier period, on the footing that the Rule
only standardised valuation, is contrary to those findings.
C. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:
40. Having heard the rival submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the parties at length and upon perusal of the record, this
Bench has identified the following five issues for determination:
a. Whether a corporate guarantee furnished by a holding or
group company to a banking company or financial
institution, for the borrowings of a related person and
without consideration, constitutes a ‗supply‘ of
‗services‘, under Section 7(1)(c) read with Entry 2 of
Schedule I of the Act of 2017 and if so, who is its
recipient?
b. Whether such a corporate guarantee stands excluded from
the levy either as an ‗actionable claim‘ or as a ‗security‘
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as per Section 7(2)(a) read with Entry 6 of Schedule III
and Section 2(102) of the Act of 2017?
c. Whether the deemed valuation under Rule 28(2) of the
Rules of 2017, as inserted by IN-2023 and amended by
IN-2024, is intra vires the Act of 2017 and consistent
with Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 246A and 265 of the
Constitution?
d. When does the supply take place, and what follows
therefrom for guarantees executed before 01.07.2017,
guarantees executed between 01.07.2017 and 25.10.2023,
and the retrospective operation of IN-2024?
e. Whether IC-2023 and IC-2024 are ultra vires Section 168
of the Act of 2017 or otherwise unsustainable?
41. At this stage, it is deemed appropriate to clarify that the
invocation of the extended period of limitation under Section 74 of the
Act of 2017, the plea relating to the pledge of shares, and such other
questions as depend upon the facts of individual cases, are not being
examined in the present judgment, for the reasons noted in Paragraph
Nos.4 and 37.5 hereinabove. The same are left open for adjudication
by the competent authorities in accordance with law.
Constitutional design of GST and the objectives behind its
introduction
42. Before adverting to the issues so identified, it is deemed
imperative by this Court to notice the constitutional design of GST
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and the objectives with which it came to be introduced. Several of the
questions raised in the present batch, namely, the amplitude of the
expression ‗supply‘, the purpose underlying Schedule I and the
justification for the valuation fiction, cannot be answered in isolation
from that design.
43. Notably, GST came to be introduced by the Constitution (One
83
Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016 , which inserted Articles
246A and 279A, alongside Clauses (12A) and (26A) in Article 366 of
the Constitution. Prior to the Amendment of 2016, the taxing fields
stood divided by the nature of the taxable event; manufacture, sale and
rendition of services were each taxed by a different authority, and the
tax paid at one stage often became a cost at the next. The Statement of
Objects and Reasons of the Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-
Second Amendment) Bill, 2014, which culminated in the Amendment
of 2016, reveals the legislative intent behind its introduction, namely,
to subsume a multiplicity of indirect taxes into a single levy on
‗supply‘, to remove the cascading effect of tax on tax, and to create a
common national market for goods and services. The objects and
reasons thereto are reproduced hereunder for ready reference:
―Statement of Objects and Reasons .— The Constitution is proposed
to be amended to introduce the goods and services tax for conferring
concurrent taxing powers on the Union as well as the States including
Union territory with Legislature to make laws for levying goods and
services tax on every transaction of supply of goods or services or
both. The goods and services tax shall replace a number of indirect
taxes being levied by the Union and the State Governments and is
intended to remove cascading effect of taxes and provide for a
common national market for goods and services. The proposed
Central and State goods and services tax will be levied on all

83
hereinafter referred to as ‗Amendment of 2016‘
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transactions involving supply of goods and services, except those
which are kept out of the purview of the goods and services tax.
2. The proposed Bill, which seeks further to amend the Constitution,
inter alia, provides for—
(a) subsuming of various Central indirect taxes and levies such as
Central Excise Duty, Additional Excise Duties, Excise Duty levied
under the Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Act,
1955, Service Tax, Additional Customs Duty commonly known as
Countervailing Duty, Special Additional Duty of Customs, and
Central Surcharges and Cesses so far as they relate to the supply of
goods and services;
(b) subsuming of State Value Added Tax/Sales Tax, Entertainment
Tax (other than the tax levied by the local bodies), Central Sales Tax
(levied by the Centre and collected by the States), Octroi and Entry
tax, Purchase Tax, Luxury tax, Taxes on lottery, betting and gambling;
and State cesses and surcharges in so far as they relate to supply of
goods and services;
(c) dispensing with the concept of ‗declared goods of special
importance‘ under the Constitution;
(d) levy of Integrated Goods and Services Tax on inter-State
transactions of goods and services;
(e) levy of an additional tax on supply of goods, not exceeding one per
cent in the course of inter-State trade or commerce to be collected by
the Government of India for a period of two years, and assigned to the
States from where the supply originates;
(f) conferring concurrent power upon Parliament and the State
Legislatures to make laws governing goods and services tax;
(g) coverage of all goods and services, except alcoholic liquor for
human consumption, for the levy of goods and services tax. In case of
petroleum and petroleum products, it has been provided that these
goods shall not be subject to the levy of Goods and Services Tax till a
date notified on the recommendation of the Goods and Services Tax
Council;
(h) compensation to the States for loss of revenue arising on account
of implementation of the Goods and Services Tax for a period which
may extend to five years;
(i) creation of Goods and Services Tax Council to examine issues
relating to goods and services tax and make recommendations to the
Union and the States on parameters like rates, exemption list and
threshold limits. The Council shall function under the Chairmanship
of the Union Finance Minister and will have the Union Minister of
State in charge of Revenue or Finance as member, along with the
Minister in-charge of Finance or Taxation or any other Minister
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nominated by each State Government. It is further provided that every
decision of the Council shall be taken by a majority of not less than
three-fourths of the weighted votes of the members present and voting
in accordance with the following principles:—
(A) the vote of the Central Government shall have a weightage of one-
third of the total votes cast, and
(B) the votes of all the State Governments taken together shall have a
weightage of two-thirds of the total votes cast in that meeting.‖
44. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid leads us to infer that three
features of the design so introduced bear directly upon the present
controversy. Firstly , the taxable event under GST is no longer sale,
manufacture or the rendition of an enumerated service, but ‗supply‘.
The Supreme Court in Mohit Minerals Pvt. Ltd. (Supra) , and
thereafter in Gameskraft (Supra) , has described the said concept as
one of wide amplitude. Correspondingly, ‗services‘ under Article
366(26A) of the Constitution means anything other than goods, and
Section 2(102) of the Act of 2017 excludes therefrom only money and
securities.
45. Secondly , GST is a destination-based tax on consumption,
collected in stages, with input tax credit ensuring that the tax is borne
only on the value added at each stage. Meaning thereby, where the
recipient of a supply is entitled to full credit, the tax charged on that
supply is, in substance, revenue neutral. However, where the recipient
is not so entitled, owing to its own outward supplies being exempt or
non-taxable, the tax becomes a final cost, and the value which escapes
tax at that stage escapes it altogether.
46. Lastly , since price is the measure of value under Section 15(1)
of the Act of 2017, the design stands exposed where the parties are
related and are in a position to fix the price or to dispense with it
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altogether. Entry 2 of Schedule I, and the exclusion of related-person
transaction value from Section 15(1), answer that exposure. To put it
succinctly, these are provisions designed to protect the value chain
from erosion; they are not provisions which create a supply out of
something which is not one.
47. In the opinion of this Court, two consequences follow from the
aforestated, which inform the analysis hereinafter. Firstly , Entry 2 of
Schedule I presupposes a supply and dispenses only with the
requirement of consideration. On this aspect, there remains no real
dispute, the Respondents having fairly accepted that Section 7(1A)
read with Schedule II cannot independently establish a supply.
Secondly , GST being a tax measured by value, a fiction which departs
from value must find its justification in the protection of the credit
chain, or in a genuine difficulty of valuation, and must yield where the
value can otherwise be established; the administrative convenience of

a uniform figure is not, by itself, sufficient.
In re: Issue a
48. At the very outset, this Court is in agreement with the
submission of the Petitioners that a charging provision must be strictly
construed, and no tax can be imposed by inference or intendment.
However, strict construction does not mean a narrow construction of
plain words. The benefit of doubt arises only where a real ambiguity
survives after the ordinary tools of interpretation have been applied
[Ref: Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v Dilip Kumar &
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84
Co. ]. Applying the aforesaid standard, this Court proceeds to
examine four questions, namely, whether anything is supplied, i.e.,
whether there exists a ‗service‘; who supplies it and to whom; whether
it is supplied in the course or furtherance of business; and whether the
absence of consideration is fatal to such levy.
49. A contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Act of 1872 is
a contract to perform the promise, or discharge the liability, of a third
person in case of his default. In the group financing transactions
forming the subject matter of the present batch, three distinct
relationships exist side by side, namely, the loan, between the
lender/financial institution and the subsidiary; the guarantee, between
the holding company and the lender/financial institution; and the
relationship between the holding company and the subsidiary, under
which the holding company, at the instance or with the concurrence of
the subsidiary, undertakes to bear the risk of the subsidiary‘s default.
50. Against this backdrop, the real question is not whether the
guarantor/holding company promises something to the lender, which
it plainly does, but whether, in doing so, it provides something to the
subsidiary. In the opinion of this Court, what the guarantor/holding
company provides is its own creditworthiness. It places its balance
sheet behind the borrowings of the subsidiary and, from the very
moment the guarantee is executed, assumes the risk of the subsidiary‘s
default. The aforesaid is in consonance with the submission of the
learned ASG that the lender extends the loan on the strength of the
creditworthiness of the holding company, without which the
subsidiary would have to park funds or furnish collateral.

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(2018) 9 SCC 1
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51. Such assumption of risk is real and present, inasmuch as it
consumes the guarantor‘s own capacity to borrow and to furnish
further guarantees; it is an exposure for which the guarantor must
provide; and it is precisely what enables the subsidiary to obtain a loan
which it could not otherwise obtain, or to obtain it on better terms.
Thus, something of value passes from the holding company/guarantor
to the subsidiary, and that something is neither goods, nor money, nor
securities. Therefore, it is a ‗service‘ within the meaning of Section
2(102) of the Act of 2017.
52. The aforestated conclusion does not rest on inference alone and
is fortified by four independent indicators. Firstly , the assumption of
another‘s credit risk for a fee is a recognised commercial service.
Banks charge commission for issuing guarantees; ‗providing bank
guarantee‘ was an enumerated taxable service under Section 65(12)(a)
of the Act of 1994; and guarantee commission continues to be taxed
under the Act of 2017 as a financial service. What distinguishes a
corporate guarantee from a bank guarantee is the identity of the
guarantor and the absence of a fee, and not the nature of the act. The
absence of a fee is exactly what Entry 2 of Schedule I neutralises,
whereas the identity of the guarantor does not alter what is done. To
that extent, this Court finds merit in the submission of the
Respondents that a corporate guarantee substitutes a traditional bank
guarantee as collateral and is unable to accept the distinction sought to
be drawn by the Petitioners between the two.
53. Secondly , various statutory provisions referred to hereinafter
recognise a guarantee as an assumption of a substantive financial
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commitment. Section 186(2) of the Act of 2013 places guarantees,
alongside loans and investments, within the limits of a company‘s
permissible financial exposure. Section 5(8)(i) of the IBC expressly
includes liability in respect of a guarantee within the ambit of a
‗financial debt‘. Similarly, the Explanation to Section 92B of the Act
of 1961, and Section 163(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 2025,
recognise guarantees as transactions pertaining to capital financing.
Read together, these provisions reflect a consistent legislative
understanding that the furnishing of a guarantee is not a mere formal
assurance or an act devoid of economic substance; it entails the
assumption of a legally enforceable financial obligation and, therefore,
constitutes a commitment of value on the part of the guarantor.
54. Thirdly , Ind AS 109, which governs the recognition and
measurement of financial instruments, defines a ‗financial guarantee
contract‘ as a contract that requires the issuer to make specified
payments to reimburse the holder for a loss it incurs because a
specified debtor fails to make payment when due in accordance with
85
the original or modified terms of a debt instrument . A corporate
guarantee furnished by a holding company to a lender, for the
borrowings of its subsidiary, squarely falls within the said definition,
the holding company being the issuer, the lender the holder, and the
subsidiary the specified debtor.
55. Paragraph No.5.1.1 of Ind AS 109 requires the issuer to
measure such a contract, at initial recognition, at its fair value,

85
Appendix A to Ind AS 109 (Financial Instruments), notified under the Companies (Indian
Accounting Standards) Rules, 2015. Paragraph No.2.1(e) thereof brings financial guarantee
contracts within the scope of Ind AS 109 insofar as the issuer is concerned

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whereas Paragraph No.4.2.1(c) requires it to be carried thereafter at
the higher of the loss allowance and the amount initially recognised.
Meaning thereby, the accounting standards do not regard an intra-
group guarantee as valueless merely because no fee is charged. It is,
however, pertinent to clarify that this Court does not derive the
liability to tax from an accounting standard. It is trite law that the
entries in the books of account, or the accounting treatment of a
transaction, are not determinative of its character under a taxing
86
statute [Ref: Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v CIT ]. The
accounting treatment is noticed only as an indicator corroborating the
conclusion already drawn from the statute, namely, that something of
value passes from the guarantor to the subsidiary at the stage of
execution itself.
56. Lastly , the Petitioners in W.P.(C) 2966/2024 themselves state
that their SPVs have no independent financial standing to raise funds,
and that the parent‘s guarantee is a necessity for the project. The
aforestated, in the opinion of this Court, is the clearest description of a
service rendered to the SPV; the SPV lacks creditworthiness, and the
parent supplies it.
57. One of the principal contentions of the Petitioners is that the
guarantee is furnished qua shareholder, to protect the holding
company‘s investment, and thus qualifies as a shareholder activity.
This Court is unable to accept that the motive with which an act is
done alters its character and finds force in the submission of the
learned ASG that the definition of ‗business‘ under Section 2(17) is

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transaction-centric and indifferent to purpose. The levy of GST is
attracted by reference to the nature and legal character of the
transaction, and not merely by the subjective considerations that may
have prompted the parties to enter into it. Indeed, transactions between
a holding company and its subsidiary would, in the ordinary course,
have some bearing on the protection or preservation of the holding
company‘s investment. If the mere fact that a transaction is
undertaken to protect such investment were sufficient to exclude it
from the ambit of ‗supply‘, Entry 2 of Schedule I would be
substantially deprived of its intended operation in precisely the class
of transactions for which it is most relevant. This is particularly so
because a holding company and its subsidiary fall within the ambit of
‗related persons‘ under Explanation (a) to Section 15 of the Act of
2017.
58. Moreover, while this Court agrees with the Respondents that
the Act of 2017 is a standalone statute, not to be construed with
reference to the OECD Commentaries, even otherwise, the reliance
upon the OECD material does not come to the aid of the Petitioners.
Paragraph No.7.9 of Chapter VII of the OECD Guidelines concerns
activities which a parent performs for itself as an owner, such as its
own governance, consolidated reporting or the raising of its own
capital, from which the subsidiary benefits only incidentally. Chapter
X of the same Guidelines, which deals specifically with financial
guarantees, distinguishes the ‗implicit support‘ that a subsidiary
enjoys merely by being a member of the group, which is not a service,
from an explicit guarantee which enhances the borrower‘s credit
beyond that position, for which an independent party would expect to
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be paid. The guarantees in the present batch are explicit and legally
enforceable undertakings. Therefore, read as a whole, the OECD
material supports, rather than undermines, the conclusion reached
hereinabove.
59. Additionally, even if a guarantee is regarded as quasi-capital, or
as a transaction of capital financing, it does not on that account cease
to be a ‗service‘ under the Act of 2017, which excludes only goods,
money and securities. The scheme of the Act of 2017 itself
demonstrates that financing is not outside the fold of services.
Lending is a service, which is precisely why services by way of
extending deposits, loans or advances, in so far as the consideration is
represented by way of interest or discount, had to be expressly
exempted under Entry 27 of Notification No.12/2017-Central Tax
(Rate) dated 28.06.2017. To put it simply, the legislative scheme does
not treat financing transactions as falling outside ‗services‘; rather, it
exempts specific financing services by name, and no such exemption
exists for guarantees.
60. The submission recorded in Paragraph No.39.5 proceeds on a
premise which this Court has accepted, in agreement with the
Petitioners and as also conceded by the Respondents, namely, that
Entry 2 requires a supply. The change in the enacted text, from ‗a
supply specified in Schedule I‘ to ‗the activities specified in Schedule
I‘, does not, however, add any further requirement. Schedule I is itself
titled ‗Activities to be treated as supply even if made without
consideration‘, and the enacted text simply describes its entries as
activities which are to be treated as supply notwithstanding the
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absence of consideration. The principle laid down in Liberty Cinema
(Supra) and Arthur Paul Benthall (Supra) , that a change of words
ordinarily signifies a change of meaning, is well settled; however, the
change in the present case does not carry the consequence sought to be
attributed to it.
61. Similarly, the reliance upon Section 7(1)(aa) of the Act of 2017
is misplaced. The Explanation thereto, as reproduced in Paragraph
No.5 hereinabove, deems a person and its members or constituents to
be two separate persons, and the supply of activities or transactions
inter se to take place from one such person to another. In other words,
a deeming provision was needed there to treat as two persons what
would otherwise be regarded as one. No such deeming is required in
the present case. A holding company and its subsidiary are distinct
legal persons [Ref: Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v Union of
87
India ], and the Act of 2017 treats them as related persons under
Explanation (a) to Section 15. Everything that a specific deeming
provision would have supplied, namely, two separate persons and
dispensation with consideration, already stands supplied by the Act of
2017. Therefore, the absence of a guarantee-specific deeming
provision is of no consequence.
62. Insofar as Entry 5(e) of Schedule II is concerned, this Court is
in agreement with the submission of the Petitioners, which stands
accepted by the Respondents, that Schedule II only classifies a supply
as one of goods or of services, and cannot independently determine
taxability. It is pertinent to add that, once a supply exists and its

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subject is not goods, Section 2(102) itself makes it a supply of
services, so that Entry 5(e) adds nothing to the outcome. Therefore,
this Court does not rest its conclusion on Entry 5(e), nor on the
reading of ‗obligation‘ as a vinculum juris adopted in Torrent Power
(Supra) . For the same reason, the Circular dated 03.08.2022 and Tata
Sons (Supra) , which turn on whether an amount constitutes
consideration for tolerating an act, do not require further examination.
63. The submission of the Petitioners recorded in Paragraph
No.39.2 finds favour with this Court. The scope of a levy is fixed by
Article 265 of the Constitution and the text of the statute, and no one
may speak for Parliament. The conclusion reached by this Court rests
on the text of Sections 2(102) and 7(1)(c) and Entry 2 of Schedule I,
and not on any view of the Revenue as to what ought to be taxed.
64. Turning to the second question, namely, the identity of the
recipient, Section 2(93)(c) of the Act of 2017 provides that, where no
consideration is payable for a service, the recipient is ‗the person to
whom the service is rendered‘. The definition looks to rendition, and
not to privity of contract. The person to whom credit support is
rendered is the subsidiary, and to that extent, this Court is in
agreement with the submission of the learned ASG that it is its
borrowing that is secured, its default that is underwritten, and its
access to finance that is enabled. The lender is the promisee under the
contract of guarantee, but the guarantee does not exist for the lender‘s
benefit in the relevant sense, since, without it, the lender would simply
have declined the loan or required other security. The Act of 1872
itself recognises the aforesaid, inasmuch as, under Section 127
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thereof, what supports the surety‘s promise is anything done for the
benefit of the principal debtor. It is clarified that Section 127 is
referred to only to identify the person for whose benefit the guarantee
is given, and not to treat such benefit as ‗consideration‘ under Section
2(31) of the Act of 2017. In any event, nothing turns on consideration,
since Schedule I dispenses with it.
65. This Court agrees with the Petitioners that the rights of
subrogation and indemnity under Sections 140 and 145 of the Act of
1872 arise only when the guarantee is invoked and the guarantor
makes payment. Such rights, therefore, cannot form the basis of a
supply which, if it exists, must exist at the time the guarantee is
executed. Accordingly, this Court does not accept the reliance placed
by the Respondents on Section 145 and does not rest the identification
of the recipient on these provisions. To that extent, this Court
respectfully differs from the reasoning in Torrent Power (Supra) . In
the view of this Court, the supply is complete when the guarantor
assumes the risk, which occurs at the time of execution itself. Thus,
the requirement laid down in Rajasthan Chemists Association
(Supra) , that a levy must bear a nexus with the taxable event as it
exists in praesenti , stands satisfied.
66. The contention of the Petitioners that the transaction is a single
tripartite arrangement incapable of vivisection also falls short of merit.
Section 8 of the Act of 2017 deals with two or more supplies made by
a taxable person to a recipient, which are naturally bundled. In the
present case, the loan is supplied by the lender/financial institution
and the guarantee by the holding company, and supplies by different
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suppliers cannot form a single composite supply. Therefore,
recognising the guarantee as a distinct supply is not a vivisection of
one transaction; it is the identification of the supply made by each
person. The principle laid down in Levob Verzekeringen (Supra) ,
relied upon by the Petitioners, is accepted; however, the same only
forbids the artificial splitting of what one supplier supplies to one
customer, and does not, therefore, assist the Petitioners. The
Australian Ruling GSTR 2006/1 reflects the treatment of financial
supplies under the Australian statute and cannot control the
identification of the recipient under Section 2(93)(c) of the Act of
2017.
67. Adverting to the third question, this Court accepts the reading
of the Petitioners that clauses (b) and (c) of Section 2(17) of the Act of
2017 take colour from clause (a), and where the main activity is not
business, an activity incidental thereto will not be business either.
However, the said principle stands satisfied in the present case. The
Petitioners are commercial enterprises, and their subsidiaries are the
vehicles through which they carry on their own business. It is the
Petitioners‘ own case that the guarantees were furnished to protect and
advance their investment in the projects of their subsidiaries.
Accordingly, an act done to secure finance for a project which the
guarantor has bid for, acquired and stands to profit from, is an activity
‗in connection with or incidental or ancillary to‘ its trade or commerce
under Section 2(17)(b). The board resolutions approving the
guarantees, and in one case the recital that the guarantee is executed
for the guarantor‘s own benefit and business, further corroborate the
aforesaid. To that extent, this Court is in agreement with the
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submission of the learned ASG that the guarantees are incidental and
ancillary to the trade and commerce of the guarantor and are furnished
in the course of business. The same principle underlies Central
Electricity Regulatory Commission (Supra) , which concerned the fee
of a statutory regulator whose main function was not business, and
which, therefore, does not assist the Petitioners.
68. It is equally pertinent to note that Entry 2 employs the
expression ‗in the course or furtherance of business‘, and not ‗in the
ordinary course of business‘. Anuj Jain (Supra) construed the latter
expression under Section 43(3)(a) of the IBC, in the context of
preferential transactions, where the narrower phrase was deliberately
employed. However, the Act of 2017 does not import the element of
ordinariness; on the contrary, as rightly submitted by the learned ASG,
Section 2(17)(c) dispenses with volume, frequency, continuity or
regularity.
69. Further, the reliance upon Section 186 of the Act of 2013 is also
misplaced. Section 186 is a provision of corporate governance. It
limits the financial exposure a company may take on, in order to
protect its shareholders and creditors, and has no bearing on whether a
guarantee is a supply for the purposes of GST. In any event, Section
186(11)(a) exempts from these limits not only banking, insurance and
housing finance companies, but also companies engaged in providing
infrastructural facilities, which, under Schedule VI to the Act of 2013,
include the transmission of power and natural gas. Thus, rather than
treating guarantees given by such companies as unrelated to their
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business, the Act of 2013 recognises them as part of the ordinary
manner in which infrastructure is financed.
70. The submission of one of the Petitioners that the Respondents
treat the two entities as one unit for one purpose, and as two separate
persons for another, proceeds on a misreading of the enquiry. Whether
a supply is made in the course or furtherance of business is to be
tested at the level of the guarantor, i.e., whether the guarantor, in
furnishing the guarantee, acts in connection with its own business. The
fact that such business is carried on through subsidiaries does not
make the two entities one person; it only explains why the guarantor
furnishes the guarantee. Thus, the supplier and the recipient remain
distinct persons throughout. Having said the aforestated, this Court
does not rule out a case where the act of the guarantor bears no nexus
with any business carried on by it. However, that would be a question
of fact for the adjudicating authority and is not the case pleaded before
this Court.
71. As regards the fourth question, under Section 65B(44) of the
Act of 1994, a ‗service‘ meant any activity carried out by a person for
another for consideration. Thus, consideration was a part of the very
definition of a service. Accordingly, Edelweiss (Supra) , wherein the
Supreme Court declined to interfere with the view that a corporate
guarantee given without consideration did not attract service tax,
rightly turned on that definition. However, the Act of 2017
consciously departs from that position, inasmuch as Section 7(1)(c)
read with Entry 2 of Schedule I treats a supply between related
persons as a supply even without consideration. Therefore, the
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submission of the learned ASG that Edelweiss (Supra) does not
govern the levy under the Act of 2017 finds favour with this Court.
Consequently, the admitted absence of consideration, and the clauses
in the Deeds of Guarantee prohibiting any fee or commission are not
fatal to the levy, and bear only upon valuation, which is examined
under Issue c hereinbelow.
72. In view of the aforestated, this Court is of the considered view
that a corporate guarantee furnished by a holding or group company to
a banking company or financial institution, for the borrowings of a
related person, constitutes a supply of services under Section 7(1)(c)
read with Entry 2 of Schedule I of the Act of 2017, even if no
consideration is charged. The service consists in the assumption of the
risk of the related person‘s default and the consequent extension of the
guarantor‘s creditworthiness to it. The recipient of the said service is
the related person on whose behalf the guarantee is furnished, under
Section 2(93)(c) of the Act of 2017.
In re: Issue b
73. Section 7(2)(a) read with Entry 6 of Schedule III of the Act of
2017 provides that ‗actionable claims, other than specified actionable
claims‘ shall be treated neither as a supply of goods nor as a supply of
services. This exclusion applies to the subject matter of the supply,
i.e., where the thing supplied is itself an actionable claim, as in the
case of its sale, assignment or transfer. Meaning thereby, the question
is not whether an actionable claim arises somewhere in the
transaction, but whether what the supplier supplies to the recipient is
an actionable claim.
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74. Applying the aforesaid test, what the subsidiary receives from
the holding company is credit support, and not a claim. The subsidiary
acquires no right against the guarantor under the guarantee. On the
contrary, if the guarantor makes payment, the subsidiary becomes its
debtor, and not its creditor, a consequence which, as noted in
Paragraph No.65 hereinabove, arises only upon payment and has no
bearing on the supply made at execution. The claim, if any, arises in
favour of the lender, who is not the recipient of the supply taxed under
Entry 2 of Schedule I read with Rule 28(2).
75. Therefore, it is unnecessary for this Court to decide whether the
right of the lender against the guarantor is a claim to a contingent debt
under Section 3 of the Act of 1882. The textual argument of the
Petitioners, that Section 3 expressly covers contingent debts, is not
without force. Accordingly, this Court neither rests upon the
submission of the Respondents that a guarantor can never be a debtor,
nor upon the distinction between a direct debt and a secondary
liability drawn in Torrent Power (Supra) . The authorities relied upon
in support, namely, Shanti Prasad Jain (Supra) , Kesoram (Supra) ,
Ram Bahadur Thakur (Supra) , Mauritius Commercial Bank (Supra)
and Laxmi Pat Surana (Supra) , as well as Article 366(8) of the
Constitution and Sections 3(11) and 5(8)(i) of the IBC, all relate to the
nature of the creditor‘s right against the guarantor. Even if these are
read in favour of the Petitioners, they have no bearing on the supply
made by the guarantor to the subsidiary.
76. Moreover, if the exclusion were applied in the manner urged by
the Petitioners, it would equally apply to every bank guarantee, since
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the beneficiary of a bank guarantee also holds a contingent claim
against the bank. However, the commission charged by banks for
guarantees has consistently been treated as consideration for a taxable
service, both under the Act of 1994 and under the Act of 2017, and the
Petitioners have not pointed to any principled distinction. Therefore, a
reading which would take every guarantee outside the levy cannot be
correct.
77. Insofar as the plea of the Petitioners that a corporate guarantee
is a ‗security‘, excluded from ‗services‘ under Section 2(102) of the
Act of 2017 is concerned, it is noted that Section 2(101) adopts the
definition under Section 2(h) of the Act of 1956. Though the said
definition is inclusive, it is confined to marketable instruments and to
rights or interests in securities. A guarantee is a ‗security‘ only in the
sense that it is collateral for a debt, and the two meanings cannot be
treated as the same. To that extent, the submission of the learned
ASG, that an admitted contract of guarantee cannot be elevated to a
security under the Act of 1956, is well founded. In view of the
aforestated, this Court is of the considered view that a corporate
guarantee furnished for a related person is not excluded from the levy
either as an actionable claim under Entry 6 of Schedule III, or as a
security under Section 2(102) of the Act of 2017.
In re: Issue c
78. Section 9(1) of the Act of 2017 levies tax on the value
determined under Section 15. Section 15(1) excludes the transaction
value where the parties are related, while Sections 15(4) and 15(5)
permit the value to be prescribed, and Section 164 confers the general
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rule-making power. Once the Rule is made on the recommendation of
the GST Council, the precise source of power is immaterial, as held in
Paragraph No.58.2 of Gameskraft (Supra) , reproduced in Paragraph
No.24.4 hereinabove. The four components of a tax, as laid down in
Govind Saran Ganga Saran (Supra) and Mineral Area Development
Authority (Supra) , on which the Petitioners have relied, are found in
the statute itself. Sections 7 and 9 provide for the taxable event;
Section 9 identifies the person liable and the rate; and Section 15,
along with the Rules made thereunder, provides the measure. Leaving
the method of valuation to delegated legislation, within the policy laid
down in Section 15, is a permissible delegation of detail. Therefore,
this Court is in agreement with the submission of the learned ASG and
the plea of excessive delegation stands rejected.
79. However, this Court is unable to accept the submission of the
learned ASG that the wisdom of the GST Council must prevail, so as
to place the Rule beyond scrutiny. The Supreme Court in Mohit
Minerals (Supra) held that the recommendations of the GST Council
are the product of collaborative federalism and carry persuasive value
but are not binding on Parliament and the State Legislatures.
Therefore, a recommendation, however unanimous, does not protect a
Rule made upon it from the tests applicable to all subordinate
legislation. To put it succinctly, the recommendation deserves
deference on matters of fiscal policy but does not exclude judicial
review on the ground of vires or arbitrariness.
80. It is trite law that a presumptive measure of value is not, by
itself, objectionable in a taxing statute [Ref: Ashok Leyland (Supra) ;
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Avinder Singh (Supra) ]. The deliberations of the GST Council record
a genuine difficulty in finding comparables for intra-group guarantees.
Moreover, the Rules of 2017 already provide presumptive values for
other services whose value is difficult to determine, such as money
changing, air travel agency and life insurance under Rule 32.
Therefore, the adoption of 1% from the Safe Harbour Rules, which
reflect the Union‘s own considered view of an acceptable fee for such
guarantees, is a rational starting point, and to that extent, the
submission of the learned ASG merits acceptance.
81. The argument of the Petitioners that the Rule taxes the
guaranteed amount itself and thereby falls outside Article 246A of the
Constitution, cannot be accepted. The subject of the tax is the supply
of the service, whereas the guaranteed amount is only the yardstick by
which its value is measured. Such yardstick is clearly related to the
risk assumed, which increases with the amount guaranteed. Thus, the
measure adopted does not alter the nature of the tax [Ref: Bombay
Tyre International (Supra) ].
82. Therefore, the real question is whether the deemed value may
operate as a fixed minimum, even where it is shown that the open
market value is lower. In the opinion of this Court, it cannot, for four
nd
reasons stated hereinafter. Firstly , the agenda for the 52 Meeting of
the GST Council records that banks charge between 0.5% and 3% for
guarantees, and sometimes nothing at all. Therefore, the Council was
conscious of the fact that the true value of a guarantee could be lower
than 1%, as rightly pointed out by the Petitioners.
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83. Secondly , the figure of 1% was taken from the Safe Harbour
Rules. A safe harbour under Section 92CB of the Act of 1961 is
optional, i.e., the assessee may either accept it for the sake of certainty
or establish the arm‘s length price. The Respondents have taken a
figure meant to be an option for the taxpayer and turned it into a
compulsory minimum. Therefore, the source chosen does not support
the compulsion imposed, and the submission of the Petitioners on this
aspect is well founded.
84. Thirdly , sub-rule (2) of Rule 28, being a non obstante provision,
overrides the methods of valuation under sub-rule (1), the first of
which is the open market value. Resultantly, the deemed value of 1%
applies even where the supplier can show that the open market value
is lower. The difficulty in finding comparables, noted in Paragraph
No.80 hereinabove, may justify fixing a default value; however, it
does not justify refusing to accept the open market value where the
same can be shown.
85. Lastly , the assumption that the open market value of an intra-
group guarantee cannot be determined does not hold good in every
case. The fair value recognised under Ind AS 109, transfer pricing
benchmarks accepted in assessments, and pricing based on credit
rating differentials, are all capable of establishing such value. Where
the value can be so established, deeming a higher value would amount
to taxing a value which does not exist. Therefore, this Court is in
agreement with the submission of the Petitioners that a presumptive
valuation made mandatory, even where the actual value is
ascertainable, is arbitrary [Ref: Wipro Ltd. (Supra) ; Munjaal
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Manishbhai Bhatt (Supra) ; Federation of Hotels & Restaurant
Associations of India (Supra) ].
86. Having said the aforestated, this Court is equally in agreement
with the submission of the learned ASG that the consideration agreed
between related persons cannot, by itself, displace the deemed value.
Section 15(1) of the Act of 2017 does not accept the price agreed
between related persons as the transaction value, since such price is
not a reliable measure of value. The Rules of 2017 accept such price
only where, as under the second proviso to Rule 28(1) and the proviso
to Rule 28(2), the recipient is eligible for full input tax credit and the
value is, in substance, revenue neutral, as discussed in the succeeding
Paragraph No.89 of this judgment. It is at this juncture that this Court
respectfully differs from the reading down in Torrent Power (Supra) ,
which permits the actual consideration to be adopted where it can be
ascertained. Outside the situation covered by the said provisos, a
reading down which adopts the price agreed within the group would
reintroduce the very measure which Section 15(1) treats as unreliable.
Thus, in our opinion, the correct basis of comparison is not the price
agreed within the group, but the open market value, i.e., the value
between unrelated persons, as defined in clause (a) of the Explanation
to Rule 35 of the Rules of 2017, which applies to Chapter IV thereof.
87. It is a settled principle that efforts must be made to read down
subordinate legislation, rather than striking it down, where this can be
done without doing violence to its language [Ref: Calcutta Gujarati
88
Education Society v Calcutta Municipal Corporation ]. Applying

88
(2003) 10 SCC 533
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the aforesaid principle, Rule 28(2) is read down as follows: the
deemed value of 1% of the amount of the guarantee per annum shall
yield to a lower open market value, where the supplier establishes
such value on cogent and verifiable material. The burden lies on the
supplier, and the proper officer is entitled to test the material. Thus,
the deemed value is a rebuttable presumption, and not a fixed
minimum. Read in this manner, the words ‗ notwithstanding anything
contained in sub-rule (1) ‘ override Rule 28(1) only to the extent of a
conflict between the two, i.e., only where the supplier does not
establish a lower open market value.
88. The aforesaid reading keeps every legitimate object of the Rule
intact. Certainty is preserved, since the deemed value applies by
default unless displaced; erosion of value is prevented, since pricing
within the group cannot displace it, save where the proviso to Rule
28(2) applies; and uniformity is maintained, since the same standard
applies to all. What is removed is only the arbitrariness identified in
Paragraph Nos.82 to 85 hereinabove. This reading also mitigates the
concern arising from the illustration of a thirty-year guarantee referred
to in Paragraph No.39.3, since the deemed value applies only where
the supplier cannot establish the open market value for the tenure in
question. The other concerns arising from long-term guarantees stand
addressed in Paragraph Nos.97 to 100 hereinbelow.
89. The challenge of the Petitioners to the proviso to Rule 28(2),
which deems the invoice value to be the value where the recipient is
eligible for full input tax credit, must fail. The classification is
founded on the design of GST noticed in Paragraph No.45
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hereinabove. Where full credit is available, the tax paid on the
guarantee can be fully set off by the recipient and is, in substance,
revenue neutral; therefore, the declared value is accepted. However,
where full credit is not available, the value of the guarantee would
otherwise escape tax altogether.
90. The same logic underlies the second proviso to Rule 28(1),
which is not under challenge. That the deemed value becomes a cost
for recipients whose outward supplies are exempt is a result of the
exemption, and not of any discrimination, since tax legislation enjoys
89
a wide latitude in classification [Ref: R.K. Garg v Union of India ].
For the same reason, the separate treatment of corporate guarantees,
challenged by the Petitioners, for which the GST Council recorded the
lack of comparables, does not offend Article 14 of the Constitution.
However, this Court is in agreement with the Petitioners that whether
a recipient is in fact eligible for full credit is a question of fact and
cannot be presumed merely because the parties are related.
91. In view of the aforestated, this Court is of the considered view
that Rule 28(2) of the Rules of 2017 is intra vires Sections 15 and 164
of the Act of 2017 and is not beyond Article 246A or Article 265 of
the Constitution. However, insofar as it makes the deemed value a
fixed minimum which cannot be displaced, it is arbitrary and violative
of Article 14 of the Constitution and is accordingly read down in
terms of Paragraph No.87 hereinabove. The proviso to Rule 28(2) is
valid. Having so held under Article 14, this Court does not find it
necessary to examine the challenge under Article 19(1)(g) separately.

89
(1981) 4 SCC 675
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In re: Issue d
92. The service, being the assumption of risk, is supplied when the
guarantee is executed and delivered. The continuing obligation
thereafter is only a consequence of the supply already made, and not a
repetition of it. However, each renewal, extension of tenure or
enhancement of the guaranteed amount is a fresh supply, the value of
which is to be determined with reference to the period of renewal or
extension, or the amount of enhancement, as the case may be, so that
the same risk is not taxed twice. Invocation of the guarantee is merely
the performance of the obligation already undertaken and is not a new
supply. To that extent, this Court is in agreement with the submission
of the Petitioners that a corporate guarantee is a one-time undertaking
with a continuing obligation, and its continued subsistence does not
give rise to a fresh supply.
93. Section 2(33) of the Act of 2017, as reproduced in Paragraph
No.5 hereinabove, requires ‗periodic payment obligations‘, which are
absent in a gratuitous guarantee, as has been fairly accepted by the
learned ASG on a literal reading. The argument that the deemed value
under Rule 28(2) creates a deemed periodic payment obligation
cannot be accepted. A legal fiction must be confined to the purpose
for which it is created [Ref: Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v State of
90
Bihar ], and though it is to be carried to its logical end, it can only be
so carried within that purpose [Ref: Ashok Leyland (Supra) ]. The
fiction under Rule 28(2) relates only to value and being created by a
Rule framed under Section 15, it can neither alter a definition in the

90
AIR 1955 SC 661
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Act, nor create an obligation to pay where none exists. Therefore, a
corporate guarantee is not a continuous supply of services.
94. Insofar as the time of supply is concerned, Section 31(2) of the
Act of 2017 read with Rule 47 of the Rules of 2017 requires a tax
invoice to be issued, within the prescribed period, for every taxable
supply of services, including a supply under Schedule I. If the invoice
is issued in time, Section 13(2)(a) applies. If not, as rightly submitted
by the Petitioners in W.P.(C) 214/2025, Section 13(2)(b) fixes the
time of supply as the date of provision of the service, i.e., the date of
execution of the guarantee. Section 13(2)(c) is a residuary provision,
which applies only where neither clause (a) nor clause (b) applies, and
the failure of a supplier to issue an invoice cannot shift the time of
supply to the books of the recipient.
95. Further, the disclosure of a guarantee as a related-party
commitment under Ind AS 24 does not amount to the recipient
‗showing the receipt of services in his books of account‘. Moreover,
Section 13 only fixes the time of a supply which already exists and
cannot convert one supply into a series of annual supplies. Since the
time of supply can be determined under Section 13(2), Section 13(5)
does not arise. Therefore, the alternative submissions of the
Respondents to the contrary cannot be accepted. To the extent that
Paragraph No.64 of Torrent Power (Supra) holds that the taxable
event recurs every year by reference to Section 13(2)(c), this Court
most respectfully differs; its own finding in Paragraph No.63 thereof
that the levy attaches on the date of execution, in fact, supports the
view taken by this Court.
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96. The expression ‗per annum‘, and the clarification in IC-2024

that, for a guarantee exceeding one year, the value is to be computed
for the number of years for which it is offered, are consistent with a
single supply whose value is measured by reference to its tenure, just
as an arm‘s length guarantee fee is ordinarily quoted as an annual rate.
For a guarantee co-terminous with the loan facility, or one in which no
tenure is stated, the tenure is that of the facility as it stands at the time
of execution. Since the undertaking for the entire tenure is given at the
stage of execution itself, the tax is to be computed at the time of
supply for the entire tenure of the guarantee, and the payment of tax
on a multi-year service at the time of supply is not unusual. To that
extent, the contention of the Petitioners that the levy cannot be
collected upfront cannot be accepted.
97. However, this Court is also unable to adopt the year-wise
approach offered by the Respondents in the alternative, since it
requires each year to be treated as a fresh supply, contrary to Sections
2(33) and 13 of the Act of 2017, and a concession on a question of law
does not bind the Court. Nonetheless, the concern of disproportion is
addressed in two ways, namely, by the reading down in Paragraph
No.87 hereinabove, and by Section 34 of the Act of 2017. The supply,
namely the assumption of risk, is complete on execution; its value,
however, is measured by reference to the period for which the risk is
undertaken. Where a guarantee is released or discharged before the
expiry of the period for which it was offered, the risk is in fact borne
for a shorter period, and the taxable value shown in the invoice is
found to exceed the taxable value in respect of such supply, which is a
case contemplated by Section 34(1) of the Act of 2017. In such a case,
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the supplier may reduce the same by issuing a credit note under
Section 34, subject to the conditions and time limits prescribed
therein. However, the position is different where the amount
guaranteed is not fully disbursed, since the guarantor remains exposed
to the entire amount committed for so long as the guarantee subsists.
98. Having said the aforestated, this Court is mindful of the
financial burden that upfront payment of tax for the entire tenure may
impose in cases involving long-term guarantees, as highlighted in
Paragraph No.16.4 hereinabove. The learned ASG has himself
acknowledged, in Paragraph No.26.3, that a year-wise approach would
merely defer the tax without diluting the Rule.
99. While the tax liability must be computed upon execution of the
guarantee for its entire tenure, its collection may be regulated
separately. Section 148 of the Act of 2017 empowers the Government,
on the recommendations of the GST Council, to prescribe special
procedures for specified classes of registered persons, including for
payment of tax, while Section 164 confers the general rule-making
power. Accordingly, the Respondents may consider framing an
appropriate Rule or issuing a notification under Section 148, with such
consequential clarification under Section 168 as may be necessary, to
permit collection of the tax so computed in annual instalments over
the tenure of the guarantee.
100. Such a mechanism would regulate only the collection of tax,
without altering the single supply made upon execution, its time of
supply or its value. It would neither convert the supply into a
continuous supply nor adopt the year-wise approach rejected
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hereinabove. It would also address the difficulty arising from
premature release of a guarantee, which Section 34 can otherwise
accommodate only within the prescribed time limits.
101. In the case of guarantees executed before 01.07.2017, the
supply was complete before the Act of 2017 came into force, and the
continued existence of the guarantee is not a fresh supply. Such
guarantees do not attract tax under the Act of 2017, unless they are
renewed, extended or enhanced on or after 01.07.2017. Whether any
such renewal, extension or enhancement has taken place must be
examined by the adjudicating authority for each deed, with reference
to its date of execution and any subsequent amendment, renewal or
novation. Therefore, this Court is in agreement with the submission of
the Petitioners. The same also accords with the alternative submission
of the Respondents that, if the supply arises only once, guarantees
concluded before 01.07.2017 are not taxable. The other alternative
submission of the Respondents, that the remaining years of such
guarantees are taxable, fails, since this Court has not accepted that the
taxable event recurs every year.
102. As regards guarantees executed between 01.07.2017 and
25.10.2023, in view of the findings rendered on Issue a, such
guarantees were taxable supplies from 01.07.2017. However, Rule
28(2) does not apply to them, since the said Rule was introduced only
with effect from 26.10.2023, and the Government has not exercised its
power under Section 164(3) of the Act of 2017 to give it effect from
an earlier date. The request of the Respondents to extend the Rule to
the earlier period by ‗harmonious construction‘ or on the ground that
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it is beneficial, must be declined. The Court cannot do what the
delegate has not done, and a provision affecting substantive liability is
91
presumed to be prospective [Ref: CIT v Vatika Township (P) Ltd. ].
103. Equally, the present is not a case of failure of the machinery
provisions, in the sense of B.C. Srinivasa Setty (Supra) , as contended
by the Petitioners relying upon Torrent Power (Supra) . Rules 28, 30
and 31 of the Rules of 2017 were in force throughout, and a difficulty
in valuation does not mean that there is no method of valuation.
Therefore, the value for this period must be determined under the
Rules then in force, on the basis of the material relating to the
guarantee in question, and to that extent, this Court is in agreement
with the submission of the Petitioners. Where the recipient was
eligible for full input tax credit, the second proviso to Rule 28, now
Rule 28(1), shall apply. However, Rule 31 cannot be used to apply the
figure of 1% as a uniform measure for this period, as that would
amount to applying Rule 28(2) retrospectively by indirect means. The
value must rest on material specific to the guarantee in question, and
not on a figure prescribed for the class of guarantees as a whole.
104. It follows from Paragraph Nos.92 to 95 hereinabove that a
guarantee executed before 26.10.2023 does not attract Rule 28(2)
merely because it continues to exist thereafter, unless it is renewed,
extended or enhanced on or after that date. To that extent, this Court
respectfully differs from Torrent Power (Supra) , which permits the
levy from 26.10.2023 on the outstanding amount, since that
conclusion rests on the annual recurrence of the taxable event, which

91
(2015) 1 SCC 1
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this Court has not accepted. The view taken by this Court is also
consistent with IC-2024 itself, which provides that guarantees issued
or renewed before 26.10.2023 are to be valued under Rule 28 as it
then stood.
105. IN-2024 made two changes with effect from 26.10.2023.
Firstly , the words ‗located in India‘ confine the Rule to domestic
recipients, and as rightly submitted by the learned ASG, are
beneficial. Secondly , the words ‗per annum‘ are clarificatory, since the
GST Council took the figure of 1% from the Safe Harbour Rules,
where it is expressed as an annual rate on the amount guaranteed, and
the amendment only makes explicit what was already implicit in the
source of the Rule. The period of retrospective operation is less than
nine months, and Section 164(3) of the Act of 2017 confers the power
to make Rules with retrospective effect. Retrospective fiscal
legislation is not unconstitutional for that reason alone; its validity is
to be tested on the touchstone of reasonableness, having regard, inter
alia , to the length of the retrospective period and the circumstances in
92
which it is enacted [Ref: Rai Ramkrishna v State of Bihar ;
Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax v Buckingham &
93
Carnatic Co. Ltd. ]. Judged by the aforesaid test, the retrospective
period being less than nine months, the amendment being in part
beneficial and in part clarificatory and having regard to the reading
down in Paragraph No.87 hereinabove, the challenge of the Petitioners
raised under Paragraph No.15.2 hereinabove fails, and the
retrospective operation of IN-2024 is valid.

92
AIR 1963 SC 1667
93
(1969) 2 SCC 55
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106. With effect from 26.10.2023, Rule 28(2) does not apply to
recipients located outside India. For the period prior thereto, whether,
and how, a guarantee furnished for such a recipient was taxable shall
be determined by the adjudicating authority, taking into account the
stand of the Respondents recorded in Paragraph No.26.6, namely, that
the intention of the GST Council is that exports must not bear GST.
107. In view of the aforestated, this Court is of the considered view
that a corporate guarantee is a single supply made on execution, and
again on each renewal, extension or enhancement. It is not a
continuous supply of services, and its time of supply is governed by
Section 13(2)(a) or (b), and not by Section 13(2)(c) read with Ind AS
24. The tax is to be computed at the time of supply for the entire
tenure of the guarantee, though it is open to the Respondents to
provide for its collection in annual instalments, as observed in
Paragraph Nos.98 to 100 hereinabove. Guarantees executed before
01.07.2017 are not taxable, unless they are renewed, extended or
enhanced thereafter. Guarantees executed between 01.07.2017 and
25.10.2023 are taxable but are to be valued under the Rules then in
force, without recourse to Rule 28(2) or to the figure of 1% as a
uniform measure. Rule 28(2) applies only to guarantees executed,
renewed, extended or enhanced on or after 26.10.2023, and IN-2024 is
valid.
In re: Issue e
108. It is trite law that circulars issued under Section 168 of the Act
of 2017 bind the officers of the department, but do not bind the
assessee or the Court, and a circular contrary to the statute has no
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existence in law [Ref: Ratan Melting & Wire Industries (Supra) ].
Further, a circular can neither create a levy nor widen the scope of a
charge [Ref: Karvy Stock Broking (Supra) ; Faridabad Iron & Steel
Traders Association (Supra) ]. These principles, urged by the
Petitioners, are also accepted by the Respondents. In the present case,
as rightly submitted by the learned ASG, the Respondents rely upon
the Circulars only in aid of their case, and the findings rendered
hereinabove rest on the Act of 2017 and the Rules of 2017 themselves.
109. Tested on the aforesaid touchstone, the Circulars, in substance,
reflect the law as found by this Court. Firstly , the premise of IC-2023
that a corporate guarantee to a related person is a taxable supply is in
line with the findings rendered on Issue a. Secondly , different
treatment of personal guarantees given by directors is based on a
regulatory restriction of general application on the payment of
consideration to directors for such guarantees, which has a direct
bearing on open market value. A clause against commission in a
guarantee deed agreed within a group is not comparable to such a
restriction. Therefore, the contention of the Petitioners that the
distinction offends Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be accepted.
110. Thirdly , the clarification in IC-2024 that the value is to be
computed on the amount guaranteed, irrespective of the amount
disbursed, follows the text of the Rule, which refers to ‗the amount of
such guarantee offered‘. The risk is assumed for the entire amount
committed, and any case where the open market value is lower stands
addressed by the reading down in preceeding Paragraph No.87.
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111. Fourthly , the clarifications on multi-year guarantees, and on the
issue of a fresh guarantee or the renewal of an existing one upon the
takeover of a loan, are consistent with a single supply on execution
and with each renewal being a fresh supply. Any double taxation upon
the takeover of a loan is addressed by Section 34 of the Act of 2017,
as noted in Paragraph No.97 hereinabove. Lastly , the clarification that
guarantees issued or renewed before 26.10.2023 are to be valued
under Rule 28 as it then stood is in line with preceeding Paragraph
Nos.102 to 104.
112. In view of the aforestated, this Court is of the considered view
that IC-2023 and IC-2024 are not ultra vires Section 168 of the Act of
2017. However, the same shall be read and applied in conformity with
the present judgment. Therefore, the said Circulars shall not be given
effect insofar as they may be understood to prevent a supplier from
establishing a lower open market value, or to treat the continued
existence of a guarantee executed before 26.10.2023 as a fresh supply.
In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to examine the
submission based on Kusum Ingots (Supra) regarding the territorial
effect of Torrent Power (Supra) .
JUDGMENTS RELIED UPON BY THE PARTIES
113. Before parting, this Court deems it appropriate to deal with the
principal judgments relied upon by the parties, to the extent the same
require to be distinguished in view of the conclusions reached
hereinabove.
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114. With utmost respect, and in substantial agreement with the
submission of the Respondents, this Court finds itself unable to concur
with the view taken in D.P. Jain (Supra) , on three premises. However,
this Court expresses no view on whether the said judgment is per
incuriam . Firstly , the said judgment rests on Edelweiss (Supra) , which
was rendered under a levy based on consideration, an entirely
different regime. Secondly , the effect of Section 7(1)(c) read with
Entry 2 of Schedule I, which dispenses with consideration between
related persons, does not appear to have been examined therein.
Lastly , D.P. Jain (Supra) declined to interfere with Rule 28(2); yet
Rule 28(2) applies only where a guarantee for a related person is given
free of charge or below its value, and a holding that such guarantees
are not taxable leaves the Rule with nothing to operate upon.
115. As regards the plea of parity, the principle of consistency laid
down in Indian Oil Corporation (Supra) , Birla Corporation (Supra)
and Jayaswals Neco (Supra) governs the conduct of the Revenue in
adjudication and appeal. However, it does not relieve this Court of its
duty to declare the law on a question of vires, particularly when
another High Court has taken a contrary view.
116. This Court is in agreement with Torrent Power (Supra) that a
corporate guarantee for a related person is a supply of services even in
the absence of consideration; that the subsidiary is its recipient; that
Rule 28(2) is within the rule-making power; that the deemed value,
insofar as it operates as a minimum even where the true value is
lower, is arbitrary; that a guarantee is not a continuous supply; and
that Rule 28(2) does not apply prior to 26.10.2023, albeit , in the view
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of this Court, because the Rule operates prospectively, and not
because its application to that period offends Articles 14 and 19(1)(g)
of the Constitution. However, for the reasons recorded hereinabove,
and in partial agreement with the submissions of the Petitioners under
Paragraph Nos.12.3, 18.1 and 39.11, this Court respectfully differs
therefrom on five aspects.
117. Firstly , this Court does not rest the supply or the identification
of the recipient on Sections 140 and 145 of the Act of 1872, on
Section 127 as supplying consideration, or on Entry 5(e) of Schedule
II. Secondly , this Court does not reject the plea of actionable claim on
the basis of a distinction between a direct debt and a secondary
liability. Thirdly , this Court permits the deemed value to be displaced
only by the open market value, and not by the charge agreed between
the related persons. Fourthly , this Court does not accept that the time
of supply is governed by Section 13(2)(c) and recurs every year, or its
consequence for guarantees executed before 26.10.2023. Lastly , to the
extent Torrent Power (Supra) is understood to hold that no levy could
arise before 26.10.2023 for want of a valuation mechanism, this Court
has taken a different view.
118. Reliance placed upon Edelweiss (Supra) is also distinguishable,
since it was rendered under Section 65B (44) of the Act of 1994,
which made consideration a part of the very definition of ‗service‘.
For the same reason, Sterlite Industries India Ltd. (Supra) , decided
by the CESTAT under the service tax regime, does not govern the
levy under the Act of 2017.
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119. Micro Ink (Supra) and Cadila Pharmaceuticals (Supra) dealt
with whether a guarantee is an international transaction requiring an
adjustment to income, which is a different question from whether a
supply exists. Whereas, Centel Communications (Supra) dealt with
whether warrants received by shareholders for guaranteeing the
company‘s loans were received in connection with the performance of
services under the Internal Revenue Code of the United States, which
is again a different statutory question. The Australian Ruling GSTR
2006/1 and Levob Verzekeringen (Supra) have been dealt with in
Paragraph No.66 hereinabove.
120. Similarly, Tata Sons (Supra) and Aerocom Cushions (Supra)
dealt with a settlement amount under an arbitral award and the
assignment of leasehold rights, respectively. Neither dealt with the
assumption of another‘s credit risk, and neither has any bearing on the
questions decided herein.
D. CONCLUSION:
121. In view of the aforestated, this Court is of the considered view
that a corporate guarantee furnished by a holding/group company to a
banking company or financial institution, for the borrowings of a
related person, is a supply of services under Section 7(1)(c) read with
Entry 2 of Schedule I of the Act of 2017, even where no consideration
is charged. The service lies in the assumption of the risk of the related
person‘s default, and the resulting extension of the guarantor‘s
creditworthiness to it. The recipient of the said service is the related
person/subsidiary on whose behalf the guarantee is furnished, under
Section 2(93)(c) of the Act of 2017.
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122. Further, such a corporate guarantee is not excluded from the
levy, either as an actionable claim under Entry 6 of Schedule III, or as
a security under Section 2(102) of the Act of 2017.
123. Insofar as the valuation is concerned, Rule 28(2) of the Rules of
2017, as amended by IN-2024, is intra vires Sections 15 and 164 of
the Act of 2017, and is not beyond Article 246A or Article 265 of the
Constitution. However, insofar as it makes the deemed value of 1%
per annum a fixed minimum which cannot be displaced, it is arbitrary
and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, Rule 28(2)
is read down in terms of Paragraph No.87 hereinabove.
124. Meaning thereby, the deemed value shall give way to a lower
open market value, where the supplier establishes such value on
cogent and verifiable material. However, the consideration agreed
between the related persons, or the absence of any consideration, shall
not by itself constitute such material. The proviso to Rule 28(2) is
valid.
125. Moreover, the supply of a corporate guarantee takes place when
it is executed, and again upon each renewal, extension of tenure or
enhancement of the guaranteed amount, the value of which is to be
determined with reference to the period of renewal or extension, or the
amount of enhancement, as the case may be. It is not a continuous
supply of services under Section 2(33) of the Act of 2017. Thus, its
time of supply is governed by Section 13(2)(a) or (b), and not by
Section 13(2)(c) read with Ind AS 24. Where a guarantee is released
or discharged before the expiry of the period for which it was offered,
the supplier may reduce the value attributable to the unexpired period
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by issuing a credit note under Section 34 of the Act of 2017, subject to
the conditions and time limits prescribed therein. While the tax is to
be computed on execution for the entire tenure of the guarantee, the
Respondents will be at liberty to collect the same in annual
instalments over such tenure.
126. As regards the period to which the levy extends, guarantees
executed before 01.07.2017, which have not been renewed, extended
or enhanced thereafter, are not liable to GST. Guarantees executed
between 01.07.2017 and 25.10.2023 are liable to GST; however, they
shall be valued under the Rules then in force, without recourse to Rule
28(2), and without applying the figure of 1% through Rule 31. Rule
28(2) applies only to guarantees executed, renewed, extended or
enhanced on or after 26.10.2023, and does not apply to a guarantee
executed earlier merely because it continues to exist thereafter.
Accordingly, the retrospective operation of IN-2024 is valid.
127. Lastly , IC-2023 and IC-2024 are not ultra vires Section 168 of
the Act of 2017. However, the same shall be read and applied in
conformity with the present judgment. Therefore, the said Circulars
shall not be given effect insofar as they may be understood to prevent
a supplier from establishing a lower open market value, or to treat the
continued existence of a guarantee executed before 26.10.2023 as a
fresh supply.
128. Keeping in view the above position of law, as well as the facts
and circumstances of the present case, the show cause notices, orders
and demands impugned in the respective Writ Petitions are set aside,
to the extent they proceed on a basis contrary to the findings recorded
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hereinabove. The proper officers shall determine the liability afresh, if
any, in accordance with the present judgment, after giving the
Petitioners an adequate opportunity of hearing.
129. At this stage, it is deemed appropriate to clarify that the
following questions are left open: the invocation of the extended
period of limitation under Section 74 of the Act of 2017; the plea
relating to the pledge of shares; the taxability of guarantees furnished
for recipients located outside India for the period before 26.10.2023;
the eligibility of the recipient to full input tax credit; the establishment
of open market value; and the dates of execution, renewal, extension
or enhancement of each guarantee. These shall be decided by the
competent authorities on the facts of each case, in accordance with
law.
130. Insofar as W.P.(C) 15738/2024 and W.P.(C) 12955/2025 are
concerned, the issues raised therein, to the extent they relate to the
furnishing of a corporate guarantee, shall stand disposed of in terms of
the findings and observations made hereinabove. However, for the
purpose of adjudication of the additional issues raised in the aforesaid
Petitions, as referred to in Paragraph No.4 hereinabove, the said
Petitions be listed before the roster bench on 09.12.2026, subject to
the orders of Hon‘ble the Chief Justice.
131. Accordingly, the present Writ Petitions are partly allowed in the
above terms, save and except W.P.(C) 15738/2024 and W.P.(C)
12955/2025, which shall stand disposed of to the extent indicated in
Paragraph No.130 hereinabove. Pending applications, if any, in the
Writ Petitions also stands disposed of.
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132. Notably, nothing stated hereinabove shall be construed as an
expression of opinion on the merits of the individual show cause
notices or proceedings, which shall be decided by the competent
authorities on their own facts, in accordance with law and in light of
the findings recorded in the present judgment.

ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.


BHARAT PARASHAR, J.
NOVEMBER 17, 2026
sp/hr

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