DELHI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LTD vs AIRPORT ECONOMIC REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA AND ANR
- Court
- Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal
TELECOM DISPUTES SETTLEMENT AND APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 31.07.2026
Pronounced on: 18.09.2026
AERA APPEAL NO. 1 OF 2025
Delhi International Airport Limited …Appellant
Versus
1. Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India;
2. Federation of Indian Airlines …Respondents
BEFORE:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DHIRUBHAI NARANBHAI PATEL (CHAIRPERSON)
HON’BLE DR. SANJEEV BANZAL (MEMBER)
FOR APPELLANT FOR RESPONDENT(S)
In AERA Appeal No.1/2025
In AERA Appeal No. 1/2025
For DIAL
For AERA (R-1)
Mr Ramji Srinivasan, Senior Advocate
Mr Ritesh Kumar
Ms Naina Dubey
Mr Dheerendra Singh Bisht
Mr Ravneet Singh
Ms Yashasvini Chandra
Ms Shefali Munde
Ms Shalini Prasad
Mr Arjun Bhatia
For FIA(R-2)
Ms Nishtha Kumar
Mr Prantar Basu Choudhury
Mr Shrom Sethi
Page 1 of 175
INDEX
S. No.
CONTENT Page No.s
1. SUMMARIUM 4-5
2. ABBREVIATIONS INVOLVED 6 to 9
3. FACTUAL MATRIX 10 to 13
4. ARGUMENTS OF THE APPELLANT 14 to 26
5. ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENTS 27 to 32
6. REASONS & ANALYSIS 33 to 175
7. Issue No. I: Refusal to implement the Judgment
dated 21.07.2023 in Delhi International Airport
Limited Vs. Airports Economic Regulatory
Authority of India, AERA Appeal No. 1 of 2021.
36 to 52
8. Issue No. II: Non-consideration of Actual Cost of
Debt incurred by the appellant in the true-up for
the Third Control Period.
53 to 65
9. Issue No. III: Non-consideration of actual cost of
debt incurred by DIAL in fourth control period, if
the same exceeds SBI's MCLR +150 bps.
66 to 78
10 Issue No. IV: Setting off interest during
construction cost, interest income accrued to DIAL.
79 to 86
11. Issue No. V: Non-consideration of interest during
construction on equipment procured through lease
finance by DIAL.
87 to 92
12. Issue No. VI: Determination of minimum revenue
from revenue share assets for the fourth control
period.
93 to 104
Page 2 of 175
13. Issue No. VII: Non-consideration of Corporate
Social Responsibility expenditure incurred by the
appellant as Operation and Maintenance Cost.
105 to 111
14 Issue No. VIII: Re-classification of dividend
income from DIAL’S Fuel Farm Subsidiary as
revenue from Aeronautical Services.
112 to 121
15. Issue No. IX: Non-consideration of costs relating
to Civil, Electrical and associated work for Apron
stands between taxiways L-1 and M-1, including
AGL system upgrade.
122 to 134
16. Issue No. X: Deviation from Asset-Based
allocation to Revenue Based apportionment of
legal costs.
135 to 141
17. Issue No. XI: Double counting of deleted asset
while computing true-up of RAB for the third
control period.
142 to 151
18. Issue No. XII: Reduction of 1% of un-capitalized
project cost from the target revenue in case any
particular capital project is not completed or is not
capitalized as per approved capitalization schedule
in the next control period.
152 to 160
19. Issue No. XIII: Non-consideration of expenditure
pertaining to beautification of airport gateways &
other areas as an Operation and Maintenance Cost
Pertaining to Aeronautical Services.
161 to 167
20. Issue No. XIV: Consideration of refundable
security deposit (RSD) at the rate of Cost of Debt
(CoD) instead of Cost of Equity (CoE).
168 to 175
Page 3 of 175
JUDGEMENT
Per Justice D.N. PATEL, Chairperson
SUMMARIUM
The present appeal has been preferred by the Appellant namely,
Delhi International Airport Limited (“DIAL”) , the operator
of the Indira Gandhi International Airport, New Delhi
(“IGIA”) , under Section 18 (2) of the Airports Economic
Regulatory Authority of India Act, 2008 (“AERA Act”), assailing
Order No. 20/2024-25 dated 28.03.2025 passed by the
Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India (“AERA”).
By the Impugned Tariff Order, AERA has undertaken the true-
up of the Third Control Period and determined the
aeronautical tariff for IGIA for the Fourth Control Period
commencing on 01.04.2024 and ending on 31.03.2029 .
The appeal raises several issues concerning the regulatory
treatment of capital expenditure, Regulatory Asset Base,
depreciation, Interest During Construction, Cost of Debt,
Refundable Security Deposits, Operation and Maintenance
expenditure and revenue accruing from Revenue Share Assets inter
alia.
DIAL contends that various determinations made in the Impugned
Tariff Order are contrary to the provisions of the AERA Act, the
Page 4 of 175
Operation, Management and Development Agreement, the State
Support Agreement and the tariff principles governing IGIA. It is
further contended that AERA has, in several instances, substituted
actual and audited expenditure with notional assumptions, adopted
allocation methodologies lacking a demonstrable nexus with the
relevant cost or revenue, and declined to give effect to issues
already concluded by binding judicial pronouncements.
The Respondent No.1/AERA, conversely, supports the Impugned
Tariff Order by asserting that the determinations have been made
in discharge of its statutory functions under Section 13 of the AERA
Act. AERA contends that, as the sectoral regulator entrusted with
safeguarding economic viability, efficiency and public interest, it is
empowered to scrutinise the necessity, prudence and
reasonableness of expenditure, adopt appropriate allocation
methodologies and ensure that airport users are not burdened with
inefficient or inadmissible costs.
This Tribunal is, therefore, called upon to examine the competing
submissions of the parties and determine whether the impugned
regulatory treatment of the respective tariff building blocks is legal,
proper and correct. The issues are required to be adjudicated within
the framework of the AERA Act, the governing concession
documents, the established principles of tariff regulation and the
binding precedents of this Tribunal and the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
Page 5 of 175
ABBREVIATIONS INVOLVED
Abbreviations Expansion
AAI Airports Authority of India
AERA Act,2008 Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act,
2008
AERA Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India
AF Annual Fee
AO Airport Operator
AGL Airfield Ground Lighting
ARR Aggregate Revenue Requirement
BAC Base Airport Charges
BIAL Bangalore International Airport Limited
CAPM Capital Asset Pricing Model
CMP Cash Management Process
Page 6 of 175
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
CoD Cost of Debt
CoE Cost of Equity
DAFFPL Delhi Aviation Fuel Facility Private Limited
DF Development Fee
DGCA Directorate General of Civil Aviation
DIAL Delhi International Airport Limited
ECB External Commercial Borrowing
EPC Engineering, Procurement and Construction
FDR Fixed Deposit Receipts
FIA Federation of Indian Airlines
F&B Food & Beverage
FRoR Fair Rate of Return
FY Financial Year
GST Goods and Services Tax
Page 7 of 175
HIAL/GHIAL Hyderabad International Airport Limited/
GMR Hyderabad International Airport Limited
H-RAB Hypothetical Regulatory Asset Base
IDC Interest During Construction
IGIA Indira Gandhi International Airport
JVC Joint Venture Company
MCLR Marginal Cost of Funds based Lending Rate
MIAL Mumbai International Airport Limited
MoCA Ministry of Civil Aviation
MYTP Multi Year Tariff Proposal
NAR Non-Aeronautical Revenue
NCD Non-Convertible Debenture
O&M Operation and Maintenance Expenses
OMDA Operation, Management and Development Agreement
PPP Public Private Partnership
PV Present Value
Page 8 of 175
RAB Regulatory Asset Base
RoI Return on Investment
RBI Reserve Bank of India
RSA Revenue Share Assets
RSD Refundable Security Deposit
RTL Rupee Term Loan
SBI State Bank of India
SCP Second Control Period
SPV Special Purpose Vehicle
SSA State Support Agreement
TAMP Tariff Authority for Major Ports
TCP Third Control Period
TDSAT Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal
TR Target Revenue
WACC Weighted Average Cost of Capital
Page 9 of 175
AERA APPEAL NO. 1 OF 2025
1. The present appeal has been preferred under Section 18(2)
of the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India
Act, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ AERA Act, 2008’
for the sake of brevity), by the Appellant, Delhi International
Airport Ltd, (hereinafter referred to as DIAL), challenging the
order passed by Respondent No.1 - Airports Economic
Regulatory Authority of India , (hereinafter referred to as
‘AERA’ for the sake of brevity) dated 28.03.2025, being Order
No. 20/2024-25, whereby, the Respondent has determined
Aeronautical Tariff for the Fourth Control Period i.e.
from 01.04.2024 to 31.03.2029 .
2. The impugned order has been passed by Respondent No.1, in
exercise of its powers under Section 13 (1) (a) of the AERA
Act, 2008 for Indira Gandhi International Airport, Delhi
(hereinafter referred to as ‘IGIA’ for the sake of brevity) the said
order is at Annexure A-1 to the Memo of this AERA Appeal.
Page 10 of 175
FACTUAL MATRIX
i. For the IGIA, a consortium led by the GMR Group was
awarded the contract for operating, maintaining, developing,
designing, constructing, upgrading, modernizing, financing
and managing the IGIA.
ii. Post selection of the GMR consortium based on the highest
technical rating and highest revenue share offered, a special
purpose vehicle, namely Delhi International Airport Limited
(‘DIAL’), the Appellant herein, was incorporated on
01.03.2006 with Airports Authority of India (‘AAI’) holding
26% equity stake and the balance 74% of equity capital
being acquired by members of the GMR consortium.
iii. Airports Authority of India executed Operation, Management
and Development Agreement (OMDA) with the Appellant on
04.04.2006 (Annexure A2 of the memo of AERA Appeal).
The term of OMDA is 30 years which is further extendable
for a period of 30 years.
iv. The Government of India has entered into a State Support
Agreement (SSA) with the appellant on 26.04.2006
(Annexure A-3). By virtue of this SSA, the principles of tariff
fixation have been enumerated.
Page 11 of 175
v. Under OMDA, AAI granted the Appellant, the exclusive right
and authority during the Term to undertake some of the
functions of AAI being the functions of operations,
maintenance, development, design, construction,
upgradation, modernizing, finance and management of the
IGIA and to perform services and activities constituting
aeronautical services and non-aeronautical services (but
excluding Reserved activities) at IGIA.
vi. Besides other rights, the Appellant has been granted the
exclusive right under Article 2.1.2 (iii) of OMDA to determine,
demand, collect, retain and appropriate charges from the
users of the IGIA subject to the provisions of Article 12 of
the OMDA. Further, Article 12.1.2 under Chapter XII dealing
with Tariff and Regulation specifically provides that the
charges to be levied for the provision of Aeronautical
Services (Aeronautical Charges) shall be determined as per
the provisions of the SSA.
vii. The OMDA under Article 12.2 also recognizes the exclusive
liberty of the Appellant to determine the charges for Non-
Aeronautical Services and accordingly the regulation thereof
has been specifically kept out of the regulatory domain of
the Respondent.
Page 12 of 175
viii. On 29.05.2024, DIAL submitted its Multi-Year Tariff
Proposal (“MYTP”) to AERA for determination of the
aeronautical tariff for IGIA for the Fourth Control Period
(01.04.2024 to 31.03.2029). This document is on record
as Annexure A-6 to the memo of AERA Appeal.
ix. The consultation paper No. 07/2024-25, was issued by
AERA for determination of Aeronautical Tariff for IGIA on
31.01.2025. This Consultation Paper is at Annexure A-7
to the memo of AERA Appeal. By virtue of this Consultation
Paper, AERA invited written comments on the Consultation
Paper. DIAL has also submitted its response on
03.03.2025 and its response to the comments of the
stakeholders was also submitted by DIAL on 13.03.2025.
x. Thereafter, on 28.03.2025, AERA issued the impugned
order which is at Annexure A-1. This tariff determination
order passed by AERA under Section 13(1)(a) of the AERA
Act, 2008.
xi. The Appellant-DIAL has challenged this order passed by
AERA dated 28.03.2025 under Section 18(2) of the AERA
Act on the ground that the principles of OMDA, SSA read
with AERA Act, 2008 have been disregarded.
Page 13 of 175
ARGUMENTS CANVASSED BY APPELLANT- DIAL
3. Mr. Ramji Srinivasan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on
behalf of the Appellant–DIAL, submitted that the following
determinations made by AERA in the Impugned Tariff Order
have been challenged in the present appeal:
I. Refusal to implement the Judgment of this Tribunal dated
21.07.2023 in Delhi International Airport Limited Vs. Airports
Economic Regulatory Authority of India, AERA Appeal No. 1
of 2021.
II. Non-consideration of the actual Cost of Debt incurred by the
Appellant while undertaking true-up for the Third Control
Period.
III. Non-Consideration of Actual Cost of Debt to be Incurred by
Appellant if the same exceeds SBI’s MCLR + 150 bps in the
Fourth Control Period.
IV. Setting off Interest During Construction against Interest
Income accrued to the Appellant.
V. Non-Consideration of IDC on Equipment Procured Through
Lease Finance by the Appellant.
VI. Determination of Rs.21,899 Crores as the Minimum Revenue
from Revenue Share Assets for the Fourth Control Period.
Page 14 of 175
VII. Non-Consideration of Corporate Social Responsibility
Expenditure incurred by the Appellant as Operation and
Maintenance Cost.
VIII. Re-Classification of Dividend Income from the Appellant's
Fuel Farm Subsidiary as revenues from Aeronautical Services.
IX. Non-Consideration of Costs Relating to Civil, Electrical &
associated work for Apron stands between L1 & M1 including
AGL system upgrade.
X. Deviation from Asset-Based Allocation to Revenue-Based
Apportionment of Legal Costs.
XI. Double Counting of the Deleted Asset while computing True-
up of RAB for the Third Control Period.
XII. Reduction of 1% of uncapitalized project cost from the Target
Revenue in case any particular capital project is not
completed/capitalized as per approved capitalization schedule
in the next Control Period.
XIII. Non-consideration of expenditure pertaining to beautification
of airport gateways and other areas as an Operation and
Maintenance Cost pertaining to Aeronautical Services.
XIV. Consideration of Refundable Security Deposits ('RSD') at the
rate of Cost of Debt instead of Cost of Equity.
Page 15 of 175
4. It is submitted by the Learned Senior Advocate appearing on
behalf of the appellant that several issues have already been
decided by this Tribunal in AERA Appeal No.1 of 2021 judgment
dated 21.07.2023 as well as by the decision of Hon'ble the
Supreme Court of India reported in (2024) 1 SCC 716.
5. This aspect of the matter was already highlighted by DIAL in
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their MYTP for the 4 Control Period but AERA has decided not
to implement the judgment delivered by this Tribunal in AERA
Appeal No.1 of 2021 judgment dated 21.07.2023 in case of
DIAL Vs. AERA and, therefore, several issues have to be argued
again before this Tribunal.
6. Learned Senior Advocate for the appellant has submitted that
except issue V, issue X and issue XI, all other issues which are
raised in the present appeal have already been decided by this
Tribunal in AERA Appeal No.01 of 2021 judgment dated
21.07.2023 and other AERA appeals being AERA Appeal No. 2
of 2021 judgment dated 06.10.2023, in case of MIAL Vs. AERA.
Several issues have been decided by this Tribunal in AERA
Appeal No. 4 of 2021 judgment dated 14.02.2024 in the case
of GMR Hyderabad International Airport Ltd. Vs. AERA.
Page 16 of 175
7. Likewise, these issues have been crystalized and decided by
this Tribunal in AERA Appeal No.1 of 2023 judgment dated
11.09.2025 in the case of Mangaluru International Airport
Limited Vs. AERA, AERA has not followed judgments delivered
by this Tribunal in the case of DIAL Vs. AERA for the previous
Control Periods.
8. It is submitted that AERA’s decision to not implement the
judgments of this Tribunal without obtaining a stay of the
Judgement of this tribunal and merely on the basis that an
appeal has been preferred and is pending before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India is arbitrary and contrary to law. In the
absence of any stay on the judgement of this Tribunal, AERA
ought to have given effect to the same.
9. It is submitted that AERA has overlooked the actual cost of
debt and AERA has decided to consider an arbitrary debt rate
at 10.37% whereas the actual cost of debt which is incurred
by DIAL was 10.55%, which should have been allowed by
AERA. AERA has ignored the judgment delivered by this
Tribunal in AERA Appeal No.2 of 2021 judgement dated
06.10.2023 in case of MIAL Vs. AERA whereby AERA was
directed to consider actual cost of debt , incurred by the
Page 17 of 175
Airport Operator as per Section 13(1)(a)(i) of the AERA
Act which mandates AERA to consider the “ capital
expenditure incurred ”.
10. It is submitted that this principle has been reiterated by this
Tribunal in the decisions and judgments of this Tribunal in
AERA Appeal No.4 of 2021 judgment dated 14.02.2024, in case
of GMR Hyderabad International Airport Limited Vs. AERA; as
well as in AERA Appeal No.1 of 2023 in case of Mangaluru
International Airport Limited Vs. AERA. This principle was also
laid down by this Tribunal in case of GMR Goa International
Airport Limited Vs. AERA in AERA Appeal No.1 of 2024. All these
decisions have been ignored by AERA while passing the
impugned order at Annexure A-1 and hence, the impugned
order deserves to be quashed and set aside.
11. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has taken this
Tribunal through the various facts and tables for the actual cost
of debt incurred by the appellant for the true-up of tariff
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determined in 3 Control Period to consider the cost of debt at
10.55% based on actual cost of debt incurred by DIAL during
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3 Control Period.
Page 18 of 175
12. It is also submitted that AERA’s decision to impose an arbitrary
ceiling on cost of debt is illegal because Section 13(1)(a)(i)
of the AERA Act , mandates AERA to consider “ capital
expenditure incurred….… ”. In fact this issue has been
covered by this Tribunal in various AERA Appeals. DIAL has
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projected a Weighted Average Cost of Debt of 10.24% for 4
Control Period based on its existing and proposed loan
portfolio. AERA has failed to appreciate this aspect of the
matter while passing the impugned order.
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13. It is submitted that DIAL, during 3 Control Period has incurred
interest during construction at Rs.2,122 Crores as against its
initial estimated IDC of Rs.650 Crores due to various reasons.
However, AERA has decided to set off actual IDC incurred by
DIAL against interest income accrued to DIAL. Thus, DIAL was
allowed to recover only notional IDC, in fact revenue generated
through interest cannot be set off for IDC incurred by the
appellant, this issue has also been decided by this Tribunal in
AERA Appeal No.1 of 2021 dated 21.07.2023 in case of DIAL
Vs. AERA. This issue has also been decided in AERA Appeal
No.4 of 2021 dated 14.02.2024 in case of GMR Hyderabad
International Airport Limited Vs. AERA. In fact, interest income
Page 19 of 175
constitutes “other income” and, is outside AERA’s regulatory
jurisdiction and therefore, it cannot be set off against IDC
incurred by the appellant.
14. It is submitted that DIAL had opted to procure certain
equipment through a finance lease arrangement whereby the
equipment was leased from a Lease Equipment Financier with
an option to purchase at the end of the lease term.
15. It is submitted that AERA’s decision not to consider interest
during construction on leased equipment is absolutely contrary
to the principles of tariff as pointed out under Section 13 of the
AERA Act, 2008. IDC on a finance-leased equipment is not
“notional”. In fact, it represents genuine financing cost within
the lease payments. DIAL has incurred total borrowing cost
at Rs.1,710 crores which includes Rs.17.45 Crores towards
Leased Electrical Installations and Equipment and the
borrowing cost of Rs.19.83 Crores towards Leased Plant and
Machinery.
16. Thus, total IDC will be Rs.37.28 Crores, this makes this
explicitly clear that DIAL has incurred borrowing costs towards
Leased Equipment and, therefore, this appellant is entitled to
recover IDC towards leased equipment. In fact, finance lease
Page 20 of 175
arrangement is more capital-efficient method that ultimately
lowered the tariff burden on the passengers as, by leasing
equipment, the asset was not made part of DIAL’s RAB. Thus,
meaning thereby to, the cost of such equipment was not
recovered from the users at the rate of Weighted Average Cost
of Capital (WACC) on this asset over its entire life.
17. It is submitted by Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that
AERA has no power, jurisdiction and authority to decide
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minimum revenue from Revenue Share Asset for 4 Control
Period. AERA has determined Rs.21,899.23 Crores as a
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minimum revenue from Revenue Share Asset for 4 Control
Period which is absolutely illegal and dehors the provisions of
AERA Act, 2008.
18. This issue has also been decided by this Tribunal in AERA
Appeal No.1 of 2023 in Mangaluru Vs. AERA as well as in AERA
Appeal No.1 of 2024 in GMR Goa International Airport Limited
Vs. AERA. There cannot be a presumption of minimum
revenue from Revenue Share Assets. There are no such
provisions under the AERA Act nor there are any provisions
under OMDA and SSA (Annexure A-2 and Annexure A-3
respectively).
Page 21 of 175
19. It is submitted that AERA has failed to appreciate Corporate
Social Responsibility expenditure incurred by DIAL for true-up
as Aeronautical Operation and Maintenance Expenses. This
issue has also been decided by this Tribunal in AERA Appeal
No.1 of 2021 dated 21.07.2023 in DIAL Vs. AERA. CSR
expenses incurred by the appellant are statutory expense
which ought to have been considered by AERA as per TR
formula in Schedule-I of the SSA (Annexure A-3).
20. It is also submitted by Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant
that the revenues from the dividend income cannot be
considered as revenue from the aeronautical services. This
issue has also been decided by this Tribunal in AERA Appeal
No.2 of 2021 dated 06.10.2023 in case of MIAL Vs. AERA and
in AERA Appeal No.4 of 2021 dated 14.02.2024 in case of GMR
Hyderabad International Airport Limited Vs. AERA.
21. The dividend income is because of the cash management
process. This income has not been generated from
employment of any Revenue Share Assets. Similarly, this fuel
farm services as performed by distinct and legal entities, this
income is because of investment done by Airport Operator.
This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by
Page 22 of 175
AERA while passing the impugned order. For the earlier Control
Periods, AERA had not included dividend income as
aeronautical income. Thus, there is no consistency in the
decision-making process by AERA.
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22. It is further submitted that during the 3 Control Period, DIAL
had incurred capital expenditure of Rs.96.80 Crores towards
construction of apron stands between taxiways L1 and M1,
including AGL (Airfield Ground Lighting) system upgrade.
AERA has not properly appreciated this aspect of the matter
and has not appreciated the contemporaneous evidence
submitted by DIAL for the expenditure and amount of GST for
the aforesaid work. AERA has allowed only part of expenditure
at Rs.84.34 Crores as against actual expenditure of Rs.96.80
Crores. As such, AERA should have considered the actual
expenditure incurred by DIAL towards construction of L1 & M1,
including AGL system upgrade.
23. It is submitted that AERA has wrongly excluded Legal Expenses
from professional and consultancy expenses incurred by DIAL
and decided to allocate legal expenses between aeronautical
and non-aeronautical based upon proportion of aeronautical
revenue to the total income of DIAL. This decision of AERA is
Page 23 of 175
contrary to the provisions of the AERA Act, 2008 as well as
contrary to the principles of determination of tariff. This
approach of AERA is in zig-zag manner, because, in previous
Control Periods, AERA had allowed the Legal Expenses.
24. It is stated that this type of regulatory uncertainty cannot be
allowed especially looking to the Principle of Consistency as
mentioned in Schedule-I of SSA (Annexure A-3) which requires
AERA to have “....a consistent approach in terms of underlying
principles.” Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has given
an example that because of the sound & diligent advocacy before
Delhi Cantonment Board the property tax amount was reduced
from Rs.800 Crores p.a. to Rs.9-10 Crores p.a., the benefit of
lower property tax was passed by DIAL to the users, enhancing
the efficiency of operation at the airport. Thus, Legal expenses
are necessary and it reduces the burden upon the users of the
Delhi International Airport (IGIA).
25. It is further submitted that DIAL in accordance with Statutory
Auditor’s certificate had pointed out to AERA that one of the
assets in the capitalization of Phase 3A projected being deleted
and after deletion of aeronautical asset valued at Rs.33.61
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Crores, the total capitalized amount in the 3 Control Period
under Phase 3A expansion was Rs.11,864.09 Crores, but , looking
Page 24 of 175
to AERA’s decision (Annexure A-1) in the impugned order,
AERA has deleted the value of the asset, twice, while
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computing true -up of RAB for 3 Control Period.
26. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has taken this
Tribunal to the financial statements which are annexed with
RA-5 as well as to the table 80 of the impugned order to be
read with tables 78 and 71 of the impugned order.
27. It is submitted that reduction of 1% of uncapitalized project
cost from the Target Revenue in case of any particular capital
project is not completed/capitalized, as per approved
capitalization schedule in the next Control Period. This decision
is contrary to the provisions of AERA Act, AERA has no power,
jurisdiction and authority to impose a penalty of 1% neither
under AERA act nor under OMDA (Annexure A-2) nor under
SSA (Annexure A-3), if the delayed execution of the capital
works is due to several reasons which are beyond the control
of the Airport Operator. There is no provision of penalty under
the law and no penalty can be imposed except expressed
provision of law. AERA has also not followed the decision
rendered by this Tribunal in AERA Appeal No.2 of 2021 dated
06.10.2023 in case of MIAL Vs. AERA.
Page 25 of 175
28. It is submitted that AERA has wrongly disallowed the
expenditure pertaining to beautification of airport gateway and
other areas as an Operation and Maintenance cost pertaining
to aeronautical services. AERA ought to have followed the
decision rendered by this Tribunal in AERA Appeal No.4 of 2021
dated 14.02.2024 in case of GMR Hyderabad International
Airport Limited Vs. AERA.
29. AERA has failed to appreciate that despite the decision
rendered by this Tribunal in AERA Appeal No.2 of 2021 dated
06.10.2023 in case of MIAL Vs. AERA, AERA has decided to
consider Refundable Security Deposit (RSD) at the rate of cost
of debt instead of cost of equity for the determination of
WACC.
30. In view of the aforesaid submissions, it is pointed out by the
learned senior counsel for the appellant that the impugned
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decision of AERA dated 28.03.2025 for the 4 Control Period
(01.04.2024 to 31.03.2029) deserves to be quashed and set
aside and the said order deserves to be modified in pursuance
of the earlier decisions and in pursuance of the provisions of
the AERA Act, 2008 to be read with the provisions of OMDA
(Annexure A-2) and in view of SSA (Annexure A-3).
Page 26 of 175
ARGUMENTS CANVASSED BY R.1 – AERA
31. Ld. Counsel appearing for AERA Mr. Ritesh Kumar submitted that
no error has been committed by AERA while passing the tariff
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order for 4 Control Period (Annexure A-1) especially for deciding
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the cost of debt for true-up for 3 Control Period. AERA has
allowed cost of debt at 10.37% by applying a 50-basis point
premium (0.50%) to the determined rate 9.87% vide AERA’s
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tariff determination order dated 30.12.2020 for 3 Control
Period.
32. It is further submitted that cost of debt as determined by AERA
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in the impugned order for the 4 Control Period is absolutely in
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accordance with law. The projected cost of debt for 4 Control
Period is at 10.24% which is much higher and, therefore, keeping
in mind the achievement of the efficient cost of borrowings, AERA
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has allowed 10.15% of cost of debt for 4 Control Period.
33. It is submitted that SSA does not expressly provide for inclusion
of any financing allowance (commonly referred to as ‘interest
during construction’) in tariff determination and, therefore, no
error has been committed by AERA while passing the impugned
tariff order. Accordingly, it is rightly observed by AERA in the
Page 27 of 175
impugned order that IDC on leased equipment is a notional cost
and it being hypothetical and does not represent actual cash
outlays or real financial obligations and, therefore, IDC does not
qualify for capitalization and, therefore, no error has been
committed by AERA in disallowing IDC on leased equipment.
th
34. It is submitted that for the 4 Control Period AERA has decided
that projected revenue from Revenue Share Assets should be
Rs.21,899.23 Crores and true-up of the Revenue from the
Revenue Share Assets shall be done in the next Control Period
th
only if the Revenue from Revenue Share Assets for 4 Control
Period is higher than Rs.21,899.23 Crores meaning thereby to
that AERA has assessed minimum Revenue to be generated by
the Airport Operator from Revenue Share Assets at Rs.21,899.23
Crores.
35. It is submitted that AERA has to keep in mind the efficient
management of the airport resources and, therefore, no error
has been committed by AERA while fixing the minimum Revenue
from Revenue Share Assets.
36. AERA has decided not to consider Corporate Social Responsibility
expenses as aeronautical Operation and Management expenses.
The previous decision rendered by this Tribunal in AERA Appeal
Page 28 of 175
No.8 of 2018 judgment dated 16.12.2020 as well as judgment in
AERA Appeal No.1 of 2021 judgment dated 21.07.2023 is under
challenge before Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and, therefore,
effect to those decisions have not been given by AERA.
37. It is submitted that the dividend income from DIAL’s Fuel Farm
Subsidiary has been treated as aeronautical revenue because
Fuel Farm Subsidiary is rendering aeronautical services. On this
issue also, AERA has not followed the judgment rendered by
this Tribunal in AERA Appeal No.1 of 2021 judgment dated
21.07.2023 and other similar judgments as these are under
challenge in Hon’ble the Supreme Court of India.
38. It is submitted that on the basis of purchase orders submitted
by DIAL for the costs relating to civil, electrical and associated
work for apron stands between L1 and M1 including AGL
system was only for Rs.84.34 Crores and, therefore, this
amount was allowed by AERA towards cost, the demand of
DIAL for this cost is at Rs.96.80 Crores but the purchase orders
were submitted only for Rs.84.34 Crores and hence, no error
has been committed by AERA in allowing this cost in Rs.84.34
Crores.
Page 29 of 175
rd
39. It is submitted that for the true-up of the 3 Control Period,
AERA excluded legal expenses from professional and
consultancy expenses incurred by DIAL and decided to allocate
legal expenses between aeronautical and non-aeronautical
based on the proportion of aeronautical revenue to the total
income of DIAL. DIAL has not provided the break-up of legal
expenses for the cases pertaining to aeronautical and non-
aeronautical matters.
40. It is further submitted that there is no double counting of the
rd
deleted asset while computing true-up of RAB for 3 Control
Period moreover, DIAL did not raise any issue with respect to
calculation of RAB at the consultation stage. Counsel has
placed reliance upon table 78, 80 and 71 of the impugned
order (Annexure A-1). On the basis of the aforesaid tables, it
is submitted that no error has been committed by AERA while
rd
computing the true-up of RAB for the 3 Control Period.
41. It is submitted that AERA has decided under Section 13 (1)
(a) & (f) to be read with section 14 (4) of AERA Act,
2008 AERA is duly empowered to carry out such
rationalization in tariff in case of delayed execution of capital
Page 30 of 175
works and, therefore, looking to the facts of the present case,
no error has been committed by AERA in reduction of 1% of
uncapitalised project cost from the Target Revenue in case any
particular capital project is not completed or capitalised.
42. It is further submitted that AERA has rightly decided not to
consider the expenditure pertaining to beautification of airport
gateways and other areas as an Operation and Management
cost as this beautification does not add any tangible benefit to
the users.
43. It is further submitted that Refundable Security Deposit has
been considered at the rate of cost of debt instead of cost of
equity for the determination of Weighted Average Cost of
Capital (WACC). The decision rendered by this Tribunal in
AERA Appeal No.2 of 2021 judgment dated 06.10.2023 in case
of MIAL Vs. AERA is under challenge before the Hon’ble the
Supreme Court of India and hence, effect has not been given
by AERA to this judgment.
44. In view of the aforesaid submissions, it is submitted that there
is no substance in the present AERA Appeal and the same
ought to be dismissed by this Tribunal.
Page 31 of 175
ARGUMENTS CANVASSED BY FEDERATION OF INDIAN
AIRLINES (FIA) – RESPONDENT NO.2
45. Mr. Prantar Basu Choudhury, Learned Counsel appearing on
behalf of Respondent No. 2–Federation of Indian Airlines
(“FIA”), adopted the submissions advanced on behalf of
Respondent No. 1–AERA and supported the determinations
contained in the Impugned Order.
46. Learned Counsel submitted that AERA had committed no
error in passing Order No. 20/2024-25 dated 28.03.2025 for
determination of the aeronautical tariff for IGIA for the
Fourth Control Period.
47. In addition, it was submitted that aeronautical charges
ultimately constitute a cost borne by airlines and passengers
and, therefore, only efficient, prudent and duly substantiated
expenditure ought to be passed through in tariff. According
to FIA, the actual expenditure or borrowing cost incurred by
the airport operator cannot automatically be treated as an
efficient cost recoverable from airport users.
48. It is submitted that they are supporting the case of
Respondent No.1-AERA.
Page 32 of 175
REASONS & ANALYSIS
49. In the present AERA appeal; as many as 14 issues have been
raised, most of them have already been decided by earlier
decisions rendered by this Tribunal in different AERA Appeals.
Despite the decisions rendered by this Tribunal, the same has
not been implemented at all by AERA, for the reasons that
AERA has preferred appeal against the decisions rendered by
this Tribunal in the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.
50. Upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties and considering
the pleadings and material on record, the following issues
arise for determination:
I. Whether the refusal of Respondent No. 1/AERA to implement
the judgment dated 21.07.2023 of this Tribunal in Delhi
International Airport Limited Vs. Airports Economic Regulatory
Authority of India, AERA Appeal No. 1 of 2021, while passing
the impugned order, is sustainable in law and facts?
II. Whether the Respondent No.1/AERA erred in law and facts in
not considering the actual cost of debt incurred by the
Appellant for the purposes of true-up of tariff for the Third
Control Period?
III. Whether the Respondent No.1/AERA erred in not considering
the actual cost of debt to be incurred by the Appellant for the
Page 33 of 175
Fourth Control Period, where the same exceeds SBI's Marginal
Cost of Funds based Lending Rate (MCLR) plus 150 basis
points?
IV. Whether the Respondent No.1/AERA was justified in setting
off Interest During Construction incurred by the Appellant
against interest income accrued to the Appellant?
V. Whether the Respondent No.1/AERA erred in not considering
Interest During Construction on equipment procured by the
Appellant through finance lease?
VI. Whether the determination by the Respondent No.1/AERA of
Rs. 21,899.23 Crores as the minimum revenue from Revenue
Share Assets for the Fourth Control Period is sustainable in
law?
VII. Whether the Respondent No.1 AERA erred in not considering
Corporate Social Responsibility expenditure incurred by the
Appellant as Operation and Maintenance expenditure
pertaining to aeronautical services?
VIII. Whether the Respondent No.1/AERA was justified in re-
classifying dividend income received by the Appellant from its
Fuel Farm Subsidiary as revenue from aeronautical services?
IX. Whether the Respondent No.1/AERA erred in not considering
the costs incurred by the Appellant relating to civil, electrical
and associated work for apron stands between taxiways L1
Page 34 of 175
and M1, including the Airfield Ground Lighting system
upgrade?
X. Whether the Respondent No.1/AERA erred in departing from
asset-based allocation to revenue-based apportionment of
legal costs incurred by the Appellant?
XI. Whether the Respondent No.1/AERA erred in law and facts in
double-counting the value of the deleted asset while
computing the true-up of the Regulatory Asset Base for the
Third Control Period?
XII. Whether the Respondent No.1/AERA has the power,
jurisdiction and authority to reduce 1% of uncapitalised
project cost from the Target Revenue, where a particular
capital project is not completed or capitalised as per the
approved capitalisation schedule, in the next Control Period?
XIII. Whether the Respondent No.1/AERA erred in law in not
considering the expenditure incurred by the Appellant towards
beautification of airport gateways and other areas as an
Operation and Maintenance cost pertaining to aeronautical
services?
XIV. Whether the Respondent No.1/AERA erred in considering the
Refundable Security Deposit at the rate of cost of debt instead
of cost of equity for the determination of the Weighted
Average Cost of Capital?
Page 35 of 175
ISSUE NO.I: Refusal to implement the Judgment of this Tribunal
dated 21.07.2023 in Delhi International Airport Limited Vs.
Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India, AERA Appeal No.
1 of 2021
51. That AERA, being subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this
Tribunal as per Section 17 (b) R/w. 18 (2) & (7) of the
AERA Act,2008, is bound to follow the judgments and
operative directions of this Tribunal unless their operation has
been stayed or they have been modified or set aside by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court. The principle applies inter partes and,
as precedent, to materially similar issues arising in relation to
other airports, subject to any relevant factual or contractual
distinction.
52. It ought to be kept in mind by AERA that when no stay has
been granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, the
judgment delivered by this Tribunal ought to have been
followed in the similar issues which are raised for the very
same airport and for different airports also.
53. In the facts of the present case, the impugned tariff order of
AERA, which is under challenge, is dated 28.03.2025 for the
Fourth Control Period (01.04.2024 to 31.03.2029) .
Page 36 of 175
54. The ‘Multi-Year Tariff Proposal’ (MYTP) for Fourth Control
Period was submitted by DIAL on 29.05.2024 (which is at
Annexure A-6 to the memo of this AERA appeal) and it was
pointed out by the appellant DIAL, that judgment delivered by
Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in DIAL Vs. AERA, reported
in (2024) 1 SCC 716, which was on the issue of corporate tax
pertaining to earnings from aeronautical services, and the
judgment delivered by this Tribunal dated 21.07.2023 in case
of DIAL Vs. AERA in AERA Appeal No.1 of 2021, be
implemented.
55. But looking to the impugned tariff order passed by AERA,
which is at Annexure A-1 to the memo of this appeal. It
appears that AERA has not followed the decisions
rendered by this Tribunal dated 21.07.2023 in case of
DIAL Vs. AERA in AERA Appeal No.1 of 2021 , stating that
several appeals have been preferred by AERA before Hon’ble
Supreme Court.
56. AERA has not appreciated the fact that no stay has been
granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and, therefore,
judgment delivered by this Tribunal ought to have been
followed while deciding tariff for the next control period.
Page 37 of 175
57. Previously, an error was committed by AERA, and therefore,
the judgment was delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
of India in the DIAL Vs. AERA, reported in (2024)1 SCC 716
and the matter was remanded for the re-calculation as per
the directions.
58. The decision of AERA was challenged again in AERA Appeal
No.1 of 2021. This Tribunal has decided that the said appeal
preferred by DIAL and delivered a judgment on 21.07.2023.
However, the same has not been implemented for the
Fourth Control Period by AERA. Primarily, on the excuse that
appeal has been preferred by AERA before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India, wherein, no stay has been granted
by Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India against the judgment
delivered by this Tribunal on 21.07.2023 in AERA Appeal
No.1 of 2021, hence making the excuse is legally untenable.
59. The legal position has since been reiterated by this Tribunal
in AERA Appeal No.1 of 2024 in GMR Goa International
Airport Limited Vs. AERA in paragraph numbers 186
Page 38 of 175
to 193 , and in paragraph numbers 268 to 270 , which
reads as under: -
“ 186. It is trite to state that it is elementary principle of law
that the determinations of this Tribunal binds AERA
unless and until stayed or set aside by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court. The mere pendency of an appeal
does not dilute the ratio decidendi. Where no
interim stay is in force, the Tribunal’s
pronouncement operates proprio vigore and must
be implemented inter partes in the very matter
decided and, on parity, in cognate cases
presenting the same point .
187. That non-adherence to a binding precedent
constitutes a jurisdictional error and a breach of
judicial discipline in the statutory hierarchy. The
emerging practice of deferring obedience on the footing
of a pending but unstayed appeal is deprecated. If the
Authority considers a prior ratio inapplicable, it must
identify the material distinctions, record reasons, and,
where necessary, seek clarification; it may not simply
ignore the ruling.
188. The AERA tariff framework already contains a safety-
valve in the form of true-up. Should the Hon’ble
Supreme Court subsequently vary the governing law,
symmetrical adjustments can be effected at the next
determination without unsettling settled accounts. The
availability of true-up removes any rationale for holding
back compliance with binding Tribunal law in the
interim.
189. In the present case, the binding pronouncements
dated 21.07.2023 and 06.10.2023 were in the
Authority’s knowledge when it framed the
impugned order. In the absence of a stay, AERA is
obliged to align its determinations with those
rulings both for this appellant and for other
similarly situated airports .
Page 39 of 175
190. Persistent non-compliance breeds multiplicity of
proceedings compels the Tribunal to revisit
identical questions and undermines the rule of
law and regulatory certainty values that are
foundational in a capital-intensive sector
operating under long-term PPP concessions
.
191. Delay also inflicts irremediable economic prejudice as
airlines and passengers are inherently transient; non-
aeronautical users (F&B, retail) are diffuse; and over a
span of four- or five-years retrospective recovery
becomes, in practice, illusory. Deferral of compliance
therefore distorts competitive dynamics and burdens
the very users whom the statute seeks to protect.
192. Accordingly, AERA shall give immediate effect to the
controlling decisions of this Tribunal specifically the
judgments dated 21.07.2023, 06.10.2023 and
14.02.2024 in this matter and in all like cases, subject
only to any express order to the contrary passed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court. If the law is later modified,
AERA shall apply the true-up mechanism to reconcile
accounts in the succeeding control period.
193. For future guidance, the Authority shall ensure internal
compliance protocols so that field-level tariff teams
apply binding Tribunal ratios uniformly. Wilful non-
compliance may invite consequences in law. We forbear
further observation in the present appeal in the
expectation of strict adherence hereafter.
268. Judicial hierarchy is not a mere formality. AERA,
as the first instance decision-maker within a
statutory scheme that expressly provides for
appellate oversight, is obligated to internalize the
ratio of the Tribunal’s decisions while exercising
its quasi-judicial and regulatory functions.
Departure from binding authority, without
articulating legally sustainable reasons or
Page 40 of 175
identifying distinguishing features, amounts to
jurisdictional error as it offends the rule of law,
undermines regulatory certainty and destabilizes
settled expectations in a capital-intensive sector .
269. That the Legislative Intent as expressed through the
17(b) 18 (2)
Parliament’s design in Sections R/w. is
deliberate. The Parliament recognized that tariff orders
have a blend regulatory policy with adjudicative
determination, and thus the legislature created an
efficacious appellate mechanism to ensure uniformity
of principle and correction of error.
270. An approach by which the Authority ignores or sidelines
binding pronouncements despite knowledge and in the
absence of a stay would reduce this Tribunal to a mere
stepping stone, which frustrates the legislative intent,
and stultify the very certainty for which the appellate
layer was crafted to secure. ”
60. It has, regrettably, become a recurring feature of proceedings
before this Tribunal that a direction to AERA to comply with
and give effect to this Tribunal's judgments must be repeated,
appeal after appeal, before the same issues can be said to be
settled in practice and not merely in law. The present case is
no exception.
61. The invariable counter offered by AERA to such directions is
that Civil Appeals against the judgments in question are
pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Section 31
of the AERA Act, and that AERA proposes to await the
outcome of those appeals before giving effect to this
Page 41 of 175
Tribunal's rulings. AERA has advanced precisely this position
in the present case, both in its Counter Affidavit and in its
submissions before us, in respect of the judgment in AERA
Appeal No. 01 of 2021 dated 21.07.2023 of this Tribunal.
62. This stance, repeated as it has been across successive
appeals, sits uneasily with the rule of law, and this Tribunal is
constrained to deprecate it. It is not disputed that AERA is
entitled to pursue its Civil Appeals; that entitlement was itself
upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Airports Economic
Regulatory Authority of India Vs. Delhi International
Airports Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2923 , judgment dated
18.10.2024 , which held AERA's appeals under Section 31 of
the AERA Act to be maintainable.
63. However, with caution one must note that maintainability of
an appeal and suspension of the binding effect of the
judgment appealed against are two distinct questions,
governed by two distinct bodies of law, and the Hon'ble
Supreme Court's ruling on the former, in our humble opinion,
cannot be read, as AERA appears to read it, as having any
bearing on the latter.
Page 42 of 175
64. We must further caution that AERA's position, if
accepted even in principle, would allow a maintainable
appeal, without anything more, to operate as a self-
granted stay or De Facto stay, which is a proposition this
Tribunal is unable to countenance in law and facts .
65. While alluding to the statutory scheme, it can be seen that
the said scheme itself points firmly against AERA’s present
position. From bare perusal of Section 31 of the AERA Act it
can be seen that the same confines a further appeal to the
Hon'ble Supreme Court to grounds specified in Section 100 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 that is to say, to a
substantial question of law.
66. The implication of the above is that the Parliament
has, in other words, constituted this Tribunal as the
primary and comprehensive forum for adjudication on
the merits of tariff determinations, including
questions of fact, technical methodology, accounting
treatment and contractual application, and has
deliberately confined the Hon’ble Supreme Court's
appellate role to the correction of substantial legal
error .
Page 43 of 175
67. Thus, to permit AERA to treat the mere existence of that
narrow appellate window as a licence to disregard this
Tribunal's determinations in the interim would be to invert the
statutory hierarchy as the Parliament has constructed.
68. In the absence of any order of stay passed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court against the judgment of this tribunal dated
21.07.2023; as none has been placed on record and only on
the issuance of notice, the conduct of AERA; in declining to
give effect to that judgment cannot be countenanced. This
Tribunal deprecates the conduct of AERA in this regard.
69. It bears emphasis that Section 32 of the AERA Act,2008
provides that an order passed by this Tribunal is executable
as a decree of a civil court, for which purpose this Tribunal
has all the powers of a civil court, and may transmit its order
to a civil court of local jurisdiction for execution as if it were
that court's own decree.
70. The existence of Section 32 is not without consequence,
as it demonstrates that the orders and judgments of
this Tribunal are not advisory or precatory in character
but are intended by Parliament to carry the same
finality and enforceability as a civil decree.
Page 44 of 175
71. It is incumbent upon AERA to implement and give effect to
the judgments and orders of this Tribunal on the specific
issues already decided, including while undertaking the true-
up exercise for subsequent Control Periods.
72. Further, on a conjoint reading of Section 32 together with
the limited appellate window under Section 31, and in the
continued absence of any order of stay from the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, this Tribunal finds no justification
whatsoever for AERA's failure to implement the judgments
of this Tribunal, in the present case or otherwise.
73. We do not consider it necessary, at this stage, to invoke the
coercive machinery contemplated under Section 32.
Nevertheless, the existence of such machinery reinforces the
conclusion that AERA is legally bound to implement the
operative directions of this Tribunal unless their operation has
been stayed or they have been varied by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court.
74. It must also be borne in mind that tariff determination
contains an in-built mechanism of true-up. If the Hon’ble
Supreme Court subsequently modifies or reverses the legal
position declared by this Tribunal, the resulting financial
Page 45 of 175
consequences can be appropriately and symmetrically
adjusted in the succeeding Control Period. The existence of
such a mechanism substantially answers AERA’s apprehension
regarding possible over-recovery or under-recovery.
75. In the absence of any order of stay passed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, and having regard to the statutory scheme
embodied in Sections 18, 31 and 32 of the AERA Act, there
was no justification for AERA to refuse implementation of the
judgments of this Tribunal on issues already decided.
76. We, therefore, reject the contention that the pendency of an
appeal under Section 31 entitled AERA to await the final
outcome of the proceedings before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court. AERA is directed to give effect to the judgments and
orders of this Tribunal on the issues specifically concluded
therein while undertaking the true-up exercise and while
determining tariff for subsequent Control Periods, subject
always to any express order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court.
77. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in a
consistent line of authority, that the mere filing of an appeal,
without an order of stay actually operating, does not suspend
Page 46 of 175
the operation or binding force of the judgment appealed
against as has been held in Collector of Customs Vs.
Krishna Sales (P) Ltd., 1994 Supp (3) SCC 73 , at
paragraph 6 , which reads as under:
“6. According to the said para 4, the goods will not be
released even where the party succeeds in cases where
the Customs authorities decide to go in appeal before the
Tribunal or the Supreme Court. They will consider the
issuance of such certificate only after the decision of the
Tribunal or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. The
learned counsel for the respondent characterises the
said direction as arbitrary and contrary to law. We see
the force in his submission. If the authorities are of
the opinion that the goods ought not to be released
pending the appeal, the straightforward course for
them is to obtain an order of stay or other
appropriate direction from the Tribunal or the
Supreme Court, as the case may be. Without
obtaining such an order they cannot refuse to
implement the order under appeal. As is well-
known, mere filing of an appeal does not operate
as a stay or suspension of the order appealed
against. Moreover, such detention is likely to create
several complications relating to the demurrage charges
besides the possible deterioration of the machinery and
goods. We hope and trust that the Collector of Customs,
Bombay shall appropriately revise the said public notice
in the light of the observations made herein. If he does
not do so, there is a likelihood of the Customs authorities
being themselves made liable for demurrage charges in
appropriate cases .”
78. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Kunhayammed Vs. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 ,
under paragraph 12 has observed as follows:
Page 47 of 175
“ 12. The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there
cannot be more than one decree or operative orders
governing the same subject-matter at a given point of
time. When a decree or order passed by an inferior
court, tribunal or authority was subjected to a
remedy available under the law before a superior
forum then, though the decree or order under
challenge continues to be effective and binding,
nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy . Once the
superior court has disposed of the lis before it either way
— whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside
or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order
of the superior court, tribunal or authority which is the
final, binding and operative decree or order wherein
merges the decree or order passed by the court, tribunal
or the authority below. However, the doctrine is not of
universal or unlimited application. The nature of
jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the
content or subject-matter of challenge laid or which could
have been laid shall have to be kept in view .”
79. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Madan Kumar
Singh Vs. District Magistrate, Sultanpur, (2009) 9 SCC
79 , held that the mere filing of a petition, appeal or suit does
not operate as a stay unless a specific prayer is made and an
order granting such relief is passed under Paragraph 14 ,
which reads under:
“14. It is trite to say that mere filing of a petition,
appeal or suit, would by itself not operate as
stay until specific prayer in this regard is
made and orders thereon are passed … ”
80. AERA has relied upon Union of India Vs. West Coast Paper
Mills Ltd., (2004) 2 SCC 747, particularly the observation that
Page 48 of 175
once an appeal has been entertained, the judgment under
appeal is placed in jeopardy and the lis cannot be regarded as
having attained ultimate finality until its determination by the
last court.
81. We note that the observation in West Coast Paper Mills Supra,
must be understood in the context of the doctrine of merger,
continuation of proceedings in appeal and the computation of
limitation for a subsequent claim. It does not declare that a
judgment under appeal ceases to operate or becomes
incapable of implementation in the absence of stay.
82. A judgment may be in jeopardy in the sense that its continued
existence is subject to the result of the appeal. That is
materially different from saying that the judgment stands
suspended while the appeal remains pending.
83. If the expression “in jeopardy” were construed as creating an
automatic suspension, the provisions governing grant of stay,
including Order XLI Rule 5 , would become redundant.
There would be no occasion for an appellate court to examine
prima facie case, balance of convenience or
irreparable injury because every appeal would itself
operate as a stay.
Page 49 of 175
84. We observe with due circumspection that AERA’s submissions
also fail to distinguish between res judicata and precedent.
The Appellant’s case does not depend exclusively upon the
application of res judicata across successive Control Periods.
85. It must be noted that each tariff determination may involve
fresh figures, projections and circumstances. Nevertheless,
the legal principles settled by this Tribunal concerning
the interpretation of the AERA Act, OMDA, SSA and the
tariff methodology remain binding unless the facts or
contractual provisions are materially distinguishable .
86. AERA has further contended that DIAL did not initiate
proceedings under Section 32 of the AERA Act for execution
of the judgment dated 21.07.2023 and that such omission
demonstrates that DIAL itself regarded the judgment as
unenforceable. It is made clear that Section 32 provides a
machinery for execution of the orders of this Tribunal. It is an
enabling remedy available to the successful party. It does not
make institution of execution proceedings a condition
precedent to the legal obligation of AERA to follow the
applicable judgment in a subsequent tariff determination.
Page 50 of 175
87. A statutory authority cannot decline to apply a binding judgment
and thereafter rely upon the affected party’s failure to commence
coercive execution proceedings as justification for its own non-
compliance. The obligation to act according to law rests
independently upon AERA. It does not arise only after the
successful party invokes the execution machinery.
88. AERA was bound to give effect to the legal findings and operative
directions contained in that judgment while undertaking true-up of
the earlier Control Periods and determining tariff for the Fourth
Control Period. Where AERA considered any particular finding
inapplicable because of a material difference in facts, contractual
provisions or statutory framework, it was required to identify that
distinction and furnish reasons. A general reference to the
pendency of an appeal is legally insufficient.
89. AERA submits that the airport operators themselves delayed the
adjudication of its appeals by raising objections to maintainability,
and ought not now be heard to insist on implementation. The
submission is misconceived. A party is entitled to raise legal
objections available to it. More fundamentally, whatever the cause
of pendency, the legal consequence of pendency-without-stay
remains the same. It may also be noticed that after 18.10.2024,
when the preliminary objection was decided, it was open to AERA
Page 51 of 175
to press its stay applications with urgency; nothing on record
indicates that it did so in the more than five months before it
passed the impugned order on 28.03.2025.
90. In view of the aforesaid decisions rendered by Hon'ble the
Supreme Court of India and also looking to the decisions rendered
by this Tribunal in Mangaluru International Airport Ltd. Vs. AERA,
AERA Appeal No. 1 of 2023, to be read with the decision rendered
by this Tribunal in case of GMR Goa International Airport Limited
Vs. AERA in AERA Appeal No.1 of 2024, AERA ought to have been
given effect to the legal issues which are already decided by this
Tribunal.
91. Every time the same issues have to be decided by this Tribunal
again and again because AERA is not implementing the judgments
of this Tribunal and every time the Airport Operator has to raise
the same issues in MYTP before AERA. This could have been
avoided by AERA in view of the decisions rendered by this Tribunal,
when no stay has been granted by Hon'ble the Supreme Court of
India.
92. We, therefore, direct AERA to implement the decisions of this
Tribunal for the issues already decided to avoid
multifariousness of AERA Appeals before this Tribunal .
Hence, Issue No. I is accordingly answered in favour of the
Appellant.
Page 52 of 175
Issue No. II. Non-consideration of Actual Cost of Debt
incurred by the appellant in the true-up for the Third
Control Period.
93. The actual Cost of Debt incurred by the Appellant ought to have
been considered by AERA while undertaking the true-up for the
Third Control Period, keeping in view the provisions of Section
13 (1) (a) (i) of the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of
India Act, 2008. The issue concerning imposition of a normative
ceiling upon the Cost of Debt, despite the availability of the actual
borrowing cost, has already been considered by this Tribunal in
the following judgments:
Judgment dated 06.10.2023 in Mumbai International
(i)
Airport Limited Vs. Airports Economic Regulatory
Authority of India, AERA Appeal No. 2 of 2021 along
with AERA Appeal No. 9 of 2016.
(ii) Judgment dated 14.02.2024 in GMR Hyderabad
International Airport Limited Vs. Airports Economic
Regulatory Authority of India, AERA Appeal No. 4 of
2021.
(iii) Judgment dated 11.09.2025 in Mangaluru International
Airport Limited Vs. Airports Economic Regulatory
Authority of India, AERA Appeal No. 1 of 2023.
Page 53 of 175
(iv) Judgment dated 11.09.2025 in GMR Goa International
Airport Limited Vs. Airports Economic Regulatory
Authority of India, AERA Appeal No. 1 of 2024.
94. For the true-up of the tariff determined for the Third Control
Period, DIAL requested AERA to consider the actual Cost of Debt
at 10.55% incurred during the Third Control Period, as recorded
in paragraph 4.5.3 of the impugned tariff order, which is at
Annexure A-1. For the ready reference, paragraph 4.5.3 of the
impugned tariff order reads as under:
“ 4.5.3. DIAL has considered effective cost of debt i.e. 10.55%
for the Third Control Period computed based on the debt
outstanding in each of the years of the Control Period. The
basis for the cost of debt towards True Up for the Third
Control Period is as shown in the table below:
Table 81: Cost of Debt Calculation submitted by DIAL
towards True Up for the Third Control Period
FY
ending
March
31, (Rs.
Cr)
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Average
Principal
8,773.92 12,031.02 12,031.02 11,252.25 13,252.25
Cost of
Debt
10.06% 10.24% 10.83% 10.84% 10.68%
Effective
Cost of
Debt
10.55%
Page 54 of 175
4.5.5 DIAL considered the same methodology for calculation
of WACC as adopted by the Authority in the Tariff Order for
the Third Control Period and the WACC as calculated by DIAL
stands at 13.08% with notional debt and equity at 48% and
52% respectively. The calculation of WACC is shown in the
table below:
Table 82: WACC submitted by DIAL for the Third
Control Period as per MYTP for the Fourth Control
Period
Particulars Cost of Funds Gearing Effective Rate
Equity 15.41 % 52.00% 8.02%
Debt 10.55% 48.00% 5.06%
WACC 13.08%
95. In view of the aforesaid facts, the actual cost of debt comes to
10.55%. AERA, while passing the Third Control Period tariff
order had proposed to consider the cost of debt at 9.87%, based
on assessments of effective rupee term loan and bonds, subject
to a ceiling of additional 50 bps. Accordingly, AERA has decided
to consider effective cost of debt at 10.37% (9.87% plus 0.5%).
This issue has also been decided by this Tribunal, as stated
herein above.
96. DIAL has contended that AERA ought to have been considered
actual cost of debt incurred by the appellant during third control
period and true-up has to be given for the third control period on
actual cost of debt at 10.55%.
Page 55 of 175
97. We are in agreement with the aforesaid contention as there
cannot be an artificial ceiling set by AERA upon cost of
debt, as per Section 13(1)(a)(i) of the AERA Act, 2008 .
The actual cost of debt incurred by the Airport Operator has to
be considered by AERA as Section 13(1)(a)(i) of the AERA Act
does not authorise AERA to disregard an actual and verified
financing cost by mechanically applying a predetermined ceiling.
98. It ought to be kept in mind by AERA that the final weighted-
average Cost of Debt for the entire Third Control Period could be
conclusively ascertained only after completion of the Third
Control Period on 31.03.2024, when the complete borrowing
profile and corresponding financing costs for the five-year period
had become available.
99. Upon completion of the Third Control Period, DIAL raised the
claim for consideration of its actual weighted-average Cost of
Debt of 10.55% in the MYTP submitted on 29.05.2024 for the
Fourth Control Period. The claim was therefore raised at the first
regulatory opportunity at which the complete actual borrowing
profile could be examined.
100. During third control period, there was COVID-19 and thereafter
DIAL's operation was materially and severely affected, and both
Page 56 of 175
international and domestic credit rating agencies downgraded
the credit rating of DIAL, citing project execution risk, liquidity
risk, and refinancing risk.
101. The material relied upon by DIAL shows that certain domestic
credit rating agencies had also downgraded DIAL's credit
rating from AA- (stable) to AA- (negative) in March, 2020
which was further deteriorated to A + (negative).
102. Each credit rating has a sufficient effect on the cost of debt. All
these facts have not been properly appreciated by AERA and,
therefore, contention of AERA that cost of debt incurred by DIAL
is inefficient, is not accepted by this Tribunal.
103. There were further reasons with this appellant to raise the debt
because the DIAL bonds were due for payment in February,
2022. For Phase 3A project, the debt was to be incurred so as to
complete Phase 3A expansion project. There were varieties of
reasons for which the cost of debt was incurred and, therefore,
it cannot be said that the actual cost of debt incurred by DIAL
was inefficient.
104. In fact, the contention of Respondent No.1 of assessing efficiency
as required under SSA (Annexure A-3) and permitting only
efficient cost of debt to be recovered through pricing is raised by
Page 57 of 175
AERA in its counter affidavit, but, the same is afterthought to
improve upon the reasoning in the impugned tariff order, which
is not permissible as per the decision rendered by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India in Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief
Election Commissioner, reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405.
Paragraph 8 of the said decision reads as under:
“8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a
statutory functionary makes an order based on
certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the
reasons so mentioned and cannot be
supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of
affidavit or otherwise . Otherwise, an order bad in the
beginning may, by the time it comes to court on
account of a challenge, get validated by additional
grounds later brought out. We may here draw
attention to the observations of Bose, J.
in Gordhandas Bhanji [ Commr. of Police,
Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji , 1951 SCC 1088 : AIR
1952 SC 16] :
“ Public orders, publicly made, in
exercise of a statutory authority
cannot be construed in the light of
explanations subsequently given by
the officer making the order of what
he meant, or of what was in his
mind, or what he intended to do .
Public orders made by public
authorities are meant to have public
effect and are intended to affect the
actings and conduct of those to whom
they are addressed and must be
construed objectively with reference to
the language used in the order itself.”
Orders are not like old wine becoming better as
they grow older.”
Page 58 of 175
105. In Mumbai International Airport Limited Vs. AERA, AERA
APPEAL No. 2 of 2021 decided on 06.10.2023 , this Tribunal
held that there cannot be a fixed Cost of Debt for an entire
Control Period of five years because the Cost of Debt varies with
market conditions, MCLR, inflation, repayment tenure and the
credit profile of the borrowing entity. It was held in paragraph
313 as under:
“ 313. This contention of Respondent No. 1 is not accepted
by this Tribunal mainly for the reason that there
cannot be a fixed Cost of Debt for the entire Third
Control Period of five years, which is from 2019–
2024. The Cost of Debt which is actually
incurred by the Appellant should have been
considered by AERA. The Cost of Debt depends
upon marginal cost of funds-based lending rate
and the time period within which the loan is to
be repaid. Inflation is one of the most important
factors for determination of market forces for
further determination of MCLR rates. Moreover,
the spread for the time within which loan is to
be repaid depends upon the credit profile of the
entity.”
106. It must be noted that the Cost of Debt is required to be
considered in light of Section 13(1)(a)(i) of the AERA Act
and that imposition of an artificial cap is uncalled for where the
debt had been contracted from reputed lenders.
Page 59 of 175
107. This principle was reiterated by this Tribunal in GMR Hyderabad
International Airport Limited Vs. AERA, AERA APPEAL No. 04 of
2021, decided on 14.02.2024. Wherein, AERA was directed to
consider the Cost of Debt actually incurred by the airport operator
instead of the lower normative rate adopted in the tariff order.
108. The subsequent judgments dated 11.09.2025 concerning
Mangaluru International Airport Vs. AERA, AERA APPEAL No. 01
OF 2023, and GMR Goa International Airport Vs. AERA, being AERA
APPEAL No. 01 of 2024, reinforced the same principle.
109. However, in the GMR Goa Judgment, this Tribunal clarified that
AERA may require an airport operator to pursue efficient financing
and may disallow a cost demonstrated to be imprudent. What is
impermissible is a predetermined ceiling detached from the
airport operator’s own credit profile, security package,
traffic risk, maturity profile and actual market conditions.
110. It is clarified that the judgments in the cases of Mangaluru
International Airport and GMR Goa International Airport were
delivered subsequent to the Impugned Order dated 28.03.2025.
AERA cannot, therefore, be faulted for not having applied those
judgments while passing the Impugned Order. Nevertheless, the
said judgments are relevant for the present adjudication since
Page 60 of 175
they reiterate and explain the principle already declared in the
earlier judgments dated 06.10.2023 and 14.02.2024, both of
which preceded the Impugned Order.
111. From the perusal of the above pronouncement the true legal
position at emerges, therefore, is not that every financing cost
entered in the books of an airport operator must mechanically be
passed through to airport users.
112. It is without doubt that AERA retains the jurisdiction and duty to
subject the actual borrowing cost to a prudence review. It may
disallow a cost shown to be unnecessary, collusive, related-party
driven, commercially unreasonable or avoidable through a
demonstrably available alternative.
113. However, a prudence review must be founded upon
evidence and recorded reasons. The actual Cost of Debt
is the starting point of the inquiry. AERA cannot replace
it with a normative ceiling merely because the ceiling had
been forecast in an earlier tariff order .
114. AERA must identify the particular borrowing said to be
imprudent, the contemporaneously available lower-cost
alternative, the terms upon which such alternative finance was
Page 61 of 175
available, and the financial consequence of the alleged
imprudence.
115. In the present case, AERA made no transaction-specific
finding that the borrowing was unnecessary, that the
proceeds were diverted, that the transaction was not at
arm’s length, that the lender was a related party, or that
the contractual rate was inconsistent with DIAL’s then
prevailing credit profile and market conditions.
116. Further, AERA did not identify any domestic or other financing
facility which was actually available to DIAL on or about
30.03.2021 at a materially lower all-in cost and on terms capable
of addressing the imminent refinancing obligation and the
funding requirements of Phase 3A.
117. We say this with great care, that a general observation that
subsequent borrowings were raised below 10% does not
establish that an equivalent borrowing was available on the
same terms during the peak of the COVID-19 crisis. The Third
Control Period commenced on 01.04.2019 and ended on 31.03.2024,
therefore, the actual weighted-average Cost of Debt for the entire
Control Period could be finally ascertained only after the complete
borrowing profile for the five-year period became available.
Page 62 of 175
118. The Third Control Period Tariff Order was passed on 30.12.2020
on the basis of estimated and projected financing parameters.
The true-up undertaken in the Impugned Order was a
subsequent and distinct regulatory exercise intended to replace
projections with verified actuals. A true-up cannot remain a true-
up merely in name while retaining a normative ceiling in
substance, irrespective of the actual cost subsequently
established.
119. During the Third Control Period, the aviation sector was severely
affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. DIAL’s traffic and operating
revenues were materially impaired. Its internal accruals, which
had earlier been proposed as a significant source of financing for
Phase 3A, became necessary for maintaining airport operations,
upkeep of airport equipment and payment of employee salaries.
120. The material placed on record further shows that domestic credit-
rating agencies downgraded DIAL from AA–(Stable) to AA–
(Negative) in March 2020, followed by a further downgrade to
A+(Negative). The rating was restored to AA–(Stable) only in
March 2024.
121. Each change in rating or outlook may have a corresponding effect
upon the availability, tenor, security requirements and pricing of
Page 63 of 175
debt. AERA was therefore required to examine the financial effect
of the downgrade and the then prevailing condition of the
aviation credit market. It could not reject the relevance of the
downgrade merely because the rating remained above a chosen
alphabetical threshold.
122. The weighted-average rate of 10.55% itself incorporates the
impact of the subsequent lower-cost borrowings. AERA could not
again rely upon the existence of those lower-rate instruments to
impose an additional normative reduction without identifying the
date from which further refinancing was commercially feasible,
the amount capable of being refinanced, the prepayment or
transaction costs involved, and the net saving that could
reasonably have been achieved.
123. AERA’s reliance upon Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of
India Vs. Delhi International Airport Limited, 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 2923, is also misplaced for the present purpose. In the
aforesaid case the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering
whether AERA was entitled to maintain an appeal under Section
31 of the AERA Act and, in that context, explained the regulatory
character of AERA’s functions.
Page 64 of 175
124. With great deference to the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, we
observe, that the said judgment does not hold that AERA may
disregard any of the statutory factors contained in Section
13(1)(a), ignore binding judgments of this Tribunal or impose a
predetermined ceiling without examining the actual financial
record. Regulatory discretion is not equivalent to unstructured
discretion; it must be exercised upon relevant material and for
reasons capable of withstanding judicial scrutiny.
125. In view of the materials on record and especially in view of the
decisions of this Tribunal referred to above, AERA cannot brush
aside the actual Cost of Debt incurred by the Appellant during
the Third Control Period as the burden of substantiating the
actual cost initially lies upon the Airport Operator; once it is duly
audited and verified, any regulatory disallowance must rest upon
specific reasons and supporting material.
126. We, therefore, quash and set aside the decision of AERA
to consider the Cost of Debt at 10.37%. We hereby direct
AERA to consider the actual Cost of Debt incurred by the
Appellant at 10.55% and to give true-up of the Third
Control Period on that basis . Issue No. II is accordingly
answered in favour of the Appellant.
Page 65 of 175
Issue No. III: Non-consideration of Actual Cost of Debt
to be incurred by DIAL in fourth control period, if the
same exceeds SBI's MCLR +150 bps
127. It appears that AERA has put a cap upon the cost of debt, which
is not permissible. AERA cannot presume the cost of debt .
AERA ought to have appreciated actual cost of debt incurred by
DIAL based upon projected outflows of existing loans, projected
cost of debt at 10.24% for the fourth control period, (01.04.2024
to 31.03.2029).
128. For ready reference, the cost of debt narrated in the impugned
tariff order as demanded by this appellant in paragraph 7.1.3 to
7.1.5 in the impugned tariff order at Annexure A-1 which reads
as under:
7.1.3 DIAL has projected the cost of debt based on the
outflows of the existing loans as on March 31, 2024
at the original drawdown foreign currency rate.
7.1.4 In addition to the existing loans, DIAL proposes to
avail fresh loan to meet capital projects i.e.
Construction of Pier E and Construction of Code E
and C stands proposed to be carried out in the
Fourth Control Period. The projects are proposed to
be funded by way of debt and equity in the ratio
70:30. Cost of Debt has been considered as 10%.
Page 66 of 175
7.1.5 The details of the debt outstanding along with the
cost of debt as submitted by DIAL is as shown in
the table below:
Table 257: Details of Debt Outstanding along with
Cost of Debt submitted by DIAL for the Fourth
Control Period as per MYTP
FY ending
March 31 (Rs.
Cr)
2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Long Term Debt
O/s at the end of
the FY
13,252.20 13,601.32 11,308.57 8,345.19 7,724.02
Interest cost
including hedge
premium/discount
1,397.33 1,286.22 987.66 750.96 766.12
Weighted
Average Cost of
Debt
10.54% 10.42% 10.10% 9.92% 9.92%
Effective Cost
of Debt for 4th
CP
10.24%
129. In view of the aforesaid calculation of cost of debt, DIAL
requested AERA to consider Weighted Average Cost of Capital as
12.93% for the fourth control period. For ready reference Table
258 of the impugned tariff order reads as under.
Page 67 of 175
Table 258: WACC submitted by DIAL for the
Fourth Control Period as per MYTP
FY ending
2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
March 31
Cost of funds
Cost of Equity 15.41% 15.41% 15.41% 15.41% 15.41%
Weighted Average
Cost of Debt for
the Year
10.54% 10.42% 10.10% 9.92% 9.92%
Weighted Average
Cost of Debt for
the Control Period
10.24% 10.24% 10.24% 10.24% 10.24%
Gearing
Equity 52.00% 52.00% 52.00% 52.00% 52.00%
Debt 48.00% 48.00% 48.00% 48.00% 48.00%
WACC for the
Year
12.93% 12.93% 12.93% 12.93% 12.93%
130. AERA has decided to consider cost of debt at 10.15% for
computation of WACC and true-up, the cost of debt for the Fourth
Control Period based upon actual or SBI average one-year
Marginal Cost of Funds based Lending Rate (MCLR) +150 bps,
whichever is lower at the time of tariff determination for the Fifth
Control Period.
131. From careful analysis of record, we are of the opinion that
decision of AERA is based upon presumptions. There cannot
be any presumption of cost of debt in tariff determination
process . Looking to the provisions of Section 13(1)(a) of the
Page 68 of 175
AERA Act, 2008, the actual cost of debt incurred by the Airport
Operator should be considered by AERA. This actual cost of debt
can neither be increased nor reduced by AERA without
transaction specific finding which are supported by materials to
that effect.
132. We reiterate that AERA is entitled to undertake a reasonable
forecasting exercise and a forecast or benchmark may also serve
as an initial prudence indicator. It cannot, however, be
converted into an irrebuttable ceiling that excludes a
higher actual cost subsequently shown to have been
prudently and efficiently incurred.
133. It is to be noted that imposition of arbitrary ceiling on cost of debt
is illegal. It has been held by the Tribunal in MIAL Vs. AERA in
AERA Appeal No.2 of 2021, in judgment dated 06.10.2023
under paragraph number 313, 320 to 321, which reads as under:
“313. This contention of Respondent No. 1 is not accepted by
this Tribunal mainly for the reason that there cannot be a
fixed Cost of Debt for the entire Third Control Period of five
years, which is from 2019–2024. The Cost of Debt which
is actually incurred by the Appellant should have been
considered by AERA. The Cost of Debt depends upon
marginal cost of funds-based lending rate and the
time period within which the loan is to be repaid.
Inflation is one of the most important factors for
determination of market forces for further
determination of MCLR rates. Moreover, the spread
for the time within which loan is to be repaid
depends upon the credit profile of the entity .
Page 69 of 175
320. In view of this, actual cost of debt shall be allowed
by AERA for 3rd Control Period especially looking to
the provisions of Section 13(1)(a)(i) of the AERA Act,
2008 . For the ready reference, Section 13(1) of AERA Act,
2008 reads as under: -
“POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE AUTHORITY
13. Functions of Authority. - (1) The Authority shall
perform the following functions in respect of
major airports, namely: -
(a) to determine the tariff for the
aeronautical services taking into
consideration —
(i) the capital expenditure incurred and
timely investment in improvement of
airport facilities ;
(ii) the service provided, its quality and other
relevant factors;
(iii) the cost for improving efficiency;
(iv) economic and viable operation of major
airports;
(v) revenue received from services other
than the aeronautical services;
(vi) the concession offered by the Central
Government in any agreement or
memorandum of understanding or
otherwise;
(vii) any other factor which may be relevant
for the purposes of this Act:
Provided that different tariff structures may
be determined for different airports having
regard to all or any of the above
considerations specified at sub-clauses (i) to
(vii);
Page 70 of 175
(b) to determine the amount of the
development fees in respect of major
airports;
(c) to determine the amount of the
passengers service fee levied under rule
88 of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 made
under the Aircraft Act, 1934 (22 of
1934);
(d) to monitor the set performance
standards relating to quality, continuity
and reliability of service as may be
specified by the Central Government or
any authority authorised by it in this
behalf;
(e) to call for such information as may be
necessary to determine the tariff under
clause (a);
(f) to perform such other functions relating to
tariff, as may be entrusted to it by the
Central Government or as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of
this Act.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
321. In view of the aforesaid provision, AERA ought to
have allowed actual cost of debt incurred by the
appellant especially looking to the fact that debt
availed by this appellant is from reputed lenders.
Putting a cap upon cost of debt is uncalled for, as
AERA has in fact, allowed actual interest rate for
First Control Period and Second Control Period
and therefore the same methodology should be
applied for Third Control Period as well.
We therefore direct AERA to consider actual cost of debt
and necessary true up shall be done accordingly.
Further, this action of AERA is also in violation of
provisions of AERA Act, 2008 especially Sec. 13 thereof
because the expenditure incurred ought to be allowed
to be recovered as per formula of Target Revenue given
in SSA .”
Page 71 of 175
134. Similarly, it has been decided by this Tribunal in a judgment
dated 11.09.2025 in case of Mangaluru International
Airport Limited Vs. AERA in AERA Appeal No.1 of 2023 , in
paragraph number 130, which reads as under:
“130. In view of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial
pronouncements, we hereby quash and set aside the
decision of AERA whereby AERA has considered CoD
at 9% p.a. for computation of Fair Rate of Return (FroR).
We hereby hold that, looking to the facts of the present
case, simply because the appellant has availed debt
from its one of the shareholders, the same cannot by
itself disallow the appellant to claim actual Cost of
Debt. This is more so when the entity from which the
appellant has availed debt has in turn, availed debt
from reputed lenders. Thus, AERA ought to have
allowed actual Cost of Debt incurred by the
appellant. Putting a cap upon Cost of Debt is
uncalled for and unwarranted. We therefore direct
AERA to allow actual Cost of Debt incurred by the
appellant and necessary True Up shall be given for
previous Control Periods accordingly. ”
135. It has been decided by this Tribunal in judgment dated
11.09.2025 , in case of GMR Goa International Airport
Limited Vs. AERA, AERA Appeal No.1 of 2024 , paragraph
number 133 and paragraph 134 and 135, which reads as under:
“ 133. AERA’s subsequent insistence on a 9% cap for MI Airport
without identifying a material distinction or any
supervening legal change disregards the binding
precedent.
134. The Section 13(1)(a)(iv) obliges the regulator to secure the
“economic and viable operation of major airports.” A
Page 72 of 175
CoD below actual market incidence achieved by
transplanting a parent’s credit or by cherry-picked
comparators does not serve viability; it suppresses
legitimate financing costs, strains debt covenants, and
can destabilise the regulated enterprise, particularly in
the ramp-up years of a greenfield asset. That outcome is
antithetical to the statutory object.
135. The Authority may expect the concessionaire to pursue
efficient financing. But efficiency cannot be conflated with
an imputed group rate or a flat cap detached from the
SPV’s own credit curve, security package, traffic risk, and
dual-airport competitive context. ”
136. In view of the aforesaid decision, AERA cannot impose arbitrary
ceiling on cost of debt. The capping of the Cost of Debt by
AERA amounts to a violation of Section 13(1)(a)(i) of the
AERA Act, 2008. The Cost of Debt of 10.24% for the Fourth
Control Period is based upon DIAL's existing and proposed
loan portfolio, as recorded in paragraph 7.1.3 and 7.1.5 , as
stated hereinabove and such data cannot be ignored and
hypothetical figure of cost of debt cannot be imposed as a ceiling
by AERA.
137. The observations in the impugned tariff order, Annexure A-1, in
paragraph 7.2.11, for the cost of debt, fixed by AERA which reads
as under:
“7.2.11 DIAL should over the next few years be able to optimize
the cost of debt given the expected decline in benchmark
rates of borrowing and shall take effective steps to raise
debt at efficient costs to retire the high cost debt already
raised in the past control period so that the interest costs
of DIAL gets optimized and the benefits are shared with
the airport users. ”
Page 73 of 175
138. Aforesaid reasoning given by AERA to put a hypothetical fixing
upon cost of debt is based upon the reasons given in paragraph
7.2.11 of the impugned order. These reasons are absolutely
arbitrary in nature . There may be a gap between expectation
of AERA about the cost of debt and actual cost of debt incurred
by DIAL. AERA should have appreciated that actual cost of debt
depends upon varieties of reasons of several factors prevailing in
the fiscal market.
139. As, for example, ongoing war situation and due to it, there may
be no recovery of expected ARR due to cancellation of flights,
both domestic as well as international. There may be substantial
reduction of footfall at the airport and there will be substantial
reduction in the number of passengers at the airport. There may
be such other type of circumstances which may result into a gap
between expectation of AERA about the cost of debt and actual
cost of debt incurred by the appellant, and therefore, as per
Section 13(1)(a)(i) of AERA Act 2008, actual cost of debt incurred
by the appellant should be considered at the time of true-up
process in the fifth control period.
140. The binding decisions of this Tribunal on the cost of debt
especially the ratio decidendi in MIAL Vs. AERA, GHIAL Vs.
Page 74 of 175
AERA, Mangaluru International Airport Ltd. Vs.
AERA and GMR Goa International Airport Ltd. Vs. AERA are
founded on the plain language of Section 13 (1)(a)(i) of the
AERA Act, which mandates AERA to consider the "capital
expenditure incurred".
141. The statutory mandate is to take into account the cost
actually incurred, not a notional or deemed cost that the
regulator considers efficient . Whether the debt is raised
through term loans from PSU banks, NCDs, or external
commercial borrowings is immaterial to the statutory principle;
the common thread is that the actual financing cost, contracted
at arm's length and certified by statutory auditors, must naturally
unless displaced by cogent
form the basis of tariff determination,
material demonstrating imprudence.
142. A distinction must be drawn between the provisional estimation
of Cost of Debt for a future Control Period and the treatment of
the cost actually incurred when the Control Period is
subsequently trued up. At the commencement of the Fourth
Control Period, the complete actual Cost of Debt for the ensuing
five years is necessarily unknown. AERA was, therefore, entitled
to undertake a reasonable forecasting exercise.
Page 75 of 175
143. However, such forecasting discretion, does not authorise AERA
to disregard the airport operator’s existing contractual
debt obligations, maturity profile, hedge costs, proposed
capital expenditure and project-specific borrowing
requirements . Nor does it permit AERA to prescribe in advance
that, even if a higher Cost of Debt is subsequently incurred
prudently and at arm’s length, the amount recoverable through
tariff shall remain confined to a predetermined ceiling.
144. The decision of AERA is founded upon the SBI one-year MCLR of
8.65% prevailing at the commencement of the Control Period, to
which AERA added a spread of 150 basis points. This resulted in
a Cost of Debt of 10.15%.
145. The mere fact that SBI is a large and systemically important bank
does not establish that SBI, or any other lender, would
necessarily sanction funds to DIAL at that spread. Each lender
remains entitled to undertake its own assessment of the
borrower, the project, the security package and the prevailing
market conditions.
146. AERA was entitled to examine whether any portion of such debt
could be prudently refinanced and whether the financial benefit
of refinancing ought to be passed on to airport users. However,
Page 76 of 175
such an inquiry required relevant consideration of the maturity
dates, prepayment restrictions, break costs, refinancing fees,
hedge-unwinding costs, lender approvals and the net economic
benefit likely to arise from refinancing.
147. From bare perusal of Paragraph 7.2.11 of the Impugned Order, it
is evident that AERA merely expresses an expectation that rates
would decline and that DIAL should be able to retire higher-cost
debt. AERA does not analyse whether, when and to what extent
such refinancing was legally and commercially feasible.
148. A forecast of declining rates remains subject to monetary-policy
movements, inflation expectations, liquidity conditions, sovereign
yields, credit-rating changes, currency movements and other
macroeconomic or geopolitical disruptions.
149. Where AERA establishes, on the basis of cogent material, that a
portion of the borrowing cost was imprudent or that a reasonably
available refinancing opportunity was unjustifiably ignored, it may
make a corresponding adjustment and such disallowance must,
however, be transaction-specific and supported by recorded
reasons.
150. For purposes of the prospective tariff determination, DIAL’s
projected Cost of Debt of 10.24% was based upon the airport-
specific existing and proposed loan portfolio and the corresponding
Page 77 of 175
year-wise interest outflows. AERA’s rate of 10.15%, by contrast,
was derived from a general banking benchmark and a uniform
spread, without demonstrating that the resulting rate better
represented DIAL’s all-in financing obligations for the Fourth
Control Period.
151. We, therefore, hold that AERA could not impose SBI average one-
year MCLR plus 150 basis points as an absolute ceiling upon the
Cost of Debt to be recognised at the stage of true-up for the Fourth
Control Period. There cannot be an artificial ceiling or capping upon
the cost of debt by the AERA.
152. We accordingly quash and set aside the decision contained in
paragraphs 7.2.12 and 7.6.2 of the Impugned Order to the
extent that it directs DIAL to true up the Cost of Debt on the
basis of actuals or SBI average one-year MCLR plus 150 basis
points, whichever is lower.
153. We, therefore, direct AERA to consider cost of debt at
10.24%, which will be subject to true-up on actual cost of
debt incurred by this appellant during this fourth control
period. Thus, actual cost of debt incurred by the appellant
during fourth control period shall be true-up at the time of
fifth control period for the tariff determination process. Issue
No. III is accordingly answered in favour of the Appellant.
Page 78 of 175
ISSUE IV: Setting off interest during construction cost,
interest income accrued to DIAL.
154. During the Third Control Period commencing on 01.04.2019 and
ending on 31.03.2024, DIAL incurred IDC of ₹2,121.54 crore in
relation to the Phase 3A expansion works. AERA deducted
interest income of ₹399.11 crore earned upon temporarily
unutilised funds from the said IDC, thereby reducing it to
₹1,722.43 crore. AERA thereafter made a proportionate
adjustment by applying the Cost of Debt of 10.37% instead of
10.55%, and ultimately considered IDC of ₹1,692.30 crore.
155. The AERA’s relevant determination in paragraph 4.4.170 of the
Impugned Tariff Order reads as under:
“ …
…
The IDC incurred by DIAL for Phase 3A Expansion capex (net
₹
of interest income earned on surplus funds) was 1,722.43 Cr
(i.e. ₹ 2,121.54 Cr less ₹ 399.11 Cr of interest income).
However, the Authority also notes that the actual Cost of Debt
of DIAL for the Third Control Period worked out to 10.55% as
against the Efficient Cost of Debt of 10.37% decided to be
considered by the Authority for the Third Control Period.
Accordingly, the Authority decides to carry out proportionate
adjustment in the IDC incurred by DIAL (net of interest income
earned on surplus funds) based on the Efficient Cost of Debt.
Accordingly, the IDC decided to be considered by the Authority
for Phase 3A Expansion works out to ₹ 1,692.30 Cr [i.e.
₹ 1,722.43 Cr × (10.37%/10.55%)] as against the notional IDC
of ₹ 1,396.77 Cr considered by the Authority at the Consultation
Stage. ”
Page 79 of 175
156. DIAL has reiterated the arguments canvassed on behalf of HIAL in
GMR Hyderabad International Airport Limited Vs. Airports
Economic Regulatory Authority of India, AERA Appeal No.
4 of 2021, decided on 14.02.2024 , as recorded in paragraphs
106 and 107 of the said judgment. It was contended therein that
project funding cannot ordinarily be procured in a piecemeal
manner and must be secured sufficiently in advance of the planned
expenditure, and that interest income accruing upon temporarily
unutilised debt could not be deducted from IDC.
157. The aforesaid submissions were considered by this Tribunal in
paragraphs 493 to 500 of the said judgment. In paragraphs 498
& 499, the Tribunal held that project finance cannot ordinarily be
secured intermittently or in a piecemeal manner and that IDC
must be calculated by taking into consideration the cost of the
entire debt facility & deduction of interest calculated at 6.5% per
annum upon unutilised debt from IDC was impermissible, inter
alia, because such interest did not arise from Aeronautical
Services, the formula contained in paragraph 5.2.7 (a) of the
Tariff Guidelines did not contemplate netting of interest income.
Page 80 of 175
For ready reference, paragraph 498 and 499 of the aforesaid
decision reads as under:
“ 498. In view of the aforesaid formula, lower FRoR is highly
appreciable because it is to be multiplied by RAB for the
calculation of ARR and, therefore, IDC should be calculated on
the total project funding. AERA has to calculate IDC taking
into consideration the costs of the entire debt facility.
This aspect of the matter has not been properly
appreciated by AERA while passing the impugned order
dated 31.08.2021 mainly for the reason that project
funding cannot be procured intermittently or in a
piecemeal manner. On the contrary, it should be
procured well in advance for the planned expenditure .
499. AERA has deducted interest at the rate of 6.5% per annum for
the unutilised debt and has reduced IDC to that extent. This is
not permissible in the eyes of law and this deduction is beyond
the regulatory ambit of AERA because interest does not accrue
from any services rendered by the Airport Operator. Much has
been argued out by the counsel for AERA that interest earned
upon the unutilised debt has to be deducted from the
calculation of IDC. This contention of the counsel for
Respondent No.1 - AERA is not accepted by this Tribunal
mainly for the reason that-
a. The earning of interest is not arising out of
aeronautical services;
b. Consideration of interest income is beyond the
regulatory ambit of AERA because it does not accrue
from any services rendered by the Airport Operator;
c. The formula for calculation of Financing Allowance
which is set out in paragraph number 5.2.7(a) of the
Tariff Guidelines, 2011 is unequivocal and
unambiguous. Thus, it is explicitly clear that
calculation of financing allowance given in para
5.2.7(a) does not require netting-off interest;
d. The rate of interest fixed by AERA at 6.5% is without
any basis and no reasons have been given by AERA
for the same and, therefore, it is arbitrary in nature
and excessive .”
Page 81 of 175
158. It has also been held by this Tribunal in AERA Appeal No.1 of
2021 in case of DIAL Vs. AERA, judgment dated 21.07.2023
that interest income constitutes other income and is outside the
AERA's regulatory jurisdiction because interest income is not
arising out of aeronautical services nor from non-aeronautical
services. For ready reference, paragraph 89 reads as under:
“89. Moreover, it has also been contended by counsels for
respondents that interest income is derived by investing
surplus funds which is primarily from aeronautical services
and, therefore, interest income is a part of revenue from
revenue share assets. This contention is also not
accepted by this Tribunal mainly for the reason that
“bank interest”, “interest on Fixed Deposit Receipts”
(FDRs) are not included in Schedule-6 of OMDA,
because, they are not arising out of Revenue Share
Assets. Such type of income is to the appellant
because of Cash Management Process (CMP). In fact,
there is no legal base to treat “other income” as a part of
revenue, from “Revenue Share Assets” for calculation of
cross-subsidization (for calculation of “S” factor).”
159. It has been contended by the counsel for AERA that AERA has
kept in mind the economic efficiency, which must have been
followed by the Airport Operator, and therefore, keeping in mind
the economic efficiency, the interest income has been deducted,
the actual amount of IDC incurred by the appellant.
160. This argument is not accepted by this Tribunal as the same has
been pointed out for the first time in the counter affidavit.
Page 82 of 175
Affidavit cannot be used to supplement the reasoning of the
impugned tariff order, as has been held by the Hon'ble the
Supreme Court of India in Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief Election
Commissioner, Supra, reference ought to made to paragraph 8
of the aforesaid judgement.
161. The principal question arising for consideration is whether AERA
was entitled to reduce the actual IDC incurred upon the debt
facility by setting off the interest income earned during the
temporary non-deployment of a part of the borrowed funds. This
issue has already been considered by this Tribunal in GMR
Hyderabad International Airport Limited Vs. Airports Economic
Regulatory Authority of India, AERA Appeal No. 4 of 2021,
decided on 14.02.2024. The operative findings of this Tribunal
are contained in paragraphs 498 to 500 of the said judgment as
discussed above.
162. It must be noted that Schedule 1 of the SSA undoubtedly requires
AERA to consider efficient capital expenditure, encourage
economic efficiency and permit recovery only of efficient costs.
These principles empower AERA to examine whether project debt
was raised prudently, whether the amount and timing of the
Page 83 of 175
borrowing were commercially reasonable, and whether delays or
excess drawdowns were attributable to the airport operator.
163. The power to conduct a prudence review, however,
cannot be equated with a power to alter the constituent
elements of the tariff formula by an ad hoc netting
exercise . Efficiency must be assessed by examining the
necessity and prudence of the financing decision. More
importantly, AERA’s own findings in paragraph 4.4.170 negate
any inference of imprudence on the part of DIAL. Wherein AERA
has expressly recorded that:
I. The Refundable Security Deposits expected from Bharti
Realty were delayed, resulting in a funding deficit;
II. Phase 3A works were severely affected by the COVID-19
pandemic;
III. Unlike Rupee Term Loans, bonds and debentures could not
be drawn in instalments according to the periodic progress
of the project;
IV. The entire debt of ₹7,850 crore was raised through bonds
and debentures;
V. Such funds could not have been availed in multiple tranches
merely to save interest cost; and
VI. Excess drawdown and lower expenditure were attributable
to the nature of the financing instruments and the COVID-
19 force majeure event and could not be attributed to DIAL.
Page 84 of 175
164. Having recorded the aforesaid findings, AERA could not
simultaneously proceed upon an implicit assumption that DIAL
inefficiently or deliberately retained borrowed funds for the
purpose of earning interest.
165. The allegation advanced in the counter affidavit by AERA that
acceptance of DIAL’s contention would create a “perverse
incentive” to divert borrowed funds is not supported by any
finding in the Impugned Order. On the contrary, the Impugned
Order accepts that the temporary non-deployment resulted
from circumstances beyond DIAL’s control.
166. There is no finding that DIAL borrowed an excessive amount
for the purpose of treasury investment; deliberately postponed
execution of the project; diverted the funds for an unrelated
purpose; or structured the transaction to earn an impermissible
regulatory return.
167. We state that as the contractual tariff framework does not treat
interest income as aeronautical or non-aeronautical revenue
for tariff purposes, the same income cannot indirectly be
brought within the regulatory computation by describing it as
negative IDC.
Page 85 of 175
168. AERA ought to be reminded that what cannot be
included directly as regulated service revenue cannot
ordinarily be introduced indirectly as a deduction from
a recognised financing cost , unless the applicable
agreement or tariff methodology expressly so provides.
169. AERA’s refusal to apply the judgment dated 14.02.2024 merely
because a civil appeal is pending before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court is also unsustainable for the reasons already recorded by
us while deciding Issue No. I. In the absence of any order of
stay, the judgment remained binding upon AERA.
170. In view of the aforesaid decision, we hereby quash and set
aside the decision of AERA of setting off interest during
construction against the interest income accrued to
DIAL. We, therefore, quash and set aside reasons
recorded in paragraph 4.4.170 of the Impugned Tariff
Order (Annexure A-1) are also set aside to that extent.
Consequently, we hereby, direct AERA to consider IDC actually
incurred by DIAL during Third Control Period without any set-
off against interest income accrued to DIAL. Issue No. IV is
accordingly answered in favour of the Appellant.
Page 86 of 175
ISSUE V: Non-Consideration of Interest During
Construction on Equipment Procured Through Lease
Finance by AERA.
171. Looking to the facts of the present case, it appears that the
present appellant has procured certain technical equipment
through lease agreement, whereby the equipment was leased
from lease equipment financer with an option to purchase at
the end of lease term. For the ready reference, Clause 4.4 of
the lease agreement executed between lease equipment
financer and DIAL reads as under:
“ 4.4 Payment of Interest by DIAL during Construction
Phase
DIAL shall during the Construction Phase pay an interest
of 10.20% p.a. to the Financier on the amount of the
Equipment Supplied from time to time, commencing from
61st day from the date on which the invoice is raised by
the EPC Contractor to the Financier for the Equipment
supplied by him or from date of payment made by
Financier to EPC Contractor, whichever is earlier and the
interest to be paid by DIAL during the Construction Phase
shall be payable monthly to the Financier in such manner
as specified by the Financier from time to time. ”
172. We have carefully considered AERA's submissions in defence
of the impugned disallowance. AERA's principal contention is
that the IDC on leased equipment is "notional" and
Page 87 of 175
"hypothetical", that it does not represent actual cash outlays or
real financial obligations, and that DIAL has failed to
substantiate the claim with credible evidence. AERA further
contends that there is no provision in Schedule 1 of the SSA or
the AERA Act that entitles DIAL to recover IDC on leased
equipment. We find these contentions to be wholly untenable.
173. The primary fallacy in AERA's approach is that it characterises
a contractual payment obligation as "notional". Clause 4.4 of
the lease agreement, extracted herein above, imposes
an express and unequivocal obligation upon DIAL to
pay interest at 10.20% per annum to the financier
during the construction phase, on the amount of
equipment supplied from time to time. The interest is
payable monthly and the obligation commences from the 61st
day from the date of invoice or the date of payment by the
financier to the EPC contractor, whichever is earlier.
174. This is a contractual liability that DIAL is bound to discharge. It
is a real financial obligation, not a hypothetical or deemed cost.
AERA's characterisation of such a payment obligation as
"notional" is, with respect, a fundamental misapprehension of
the nature of the transaction.
Page 88 of 175
175. In view of the aforesaid lease agreement, the present appellant
was obliged to pay interest on equipment supplied during
construction phase. This agreement has to be given due regard
and consideration by AERA while determining the tariff.
176. On the face of the lease agreement, therefore, the obligation to
pay interest during construction was contractual and not merely
a book entry. The Tribunal cannot accept the proposition that
AERA was entitled to disregard that arrangement by
characterising the IDC as notional, especially when the lease
structure itself was placed before AERA during the tariff process.
177. AERA cannot rewrite the terms of agreement. AERA
cannot shift or omit any obligation under the contract. It
is not the contention of AERA that finance lease agreement was
entered into under coercion, fraud, or any mistake caused by
undue influence, nor is there any allegations about illegality in
the process of entering into this agreement and, therefore, also
AERA cannot ignore the payment of interest on equipment
supplied during the construction phase.
178. It has been contended by learned counsel appearing for AERA
that interest during construction on leased equipment is notional
and there is no IDC required to be incurred by DIAL in lease
financing. This contention of AERA is not accepted by this
Page 89 of 175
Tribunal mainly for the reason that IDC on financed leased
equipment is not “notional”.
179. On the contrary, it represents “genuine financing cost” within
the leased payments. Moreover, a perusal of Annexure RA-3
annexed to the Rejoinder Affidavit, being DIAL's audited financial
statements for the financial year 2023-24, reveals that IDC has
actually been incurred by DIAL on leased equipment.
180. It ought to be kept in mind by AERA that finance lease agreement
is a more capital efficient method which ultimately lowers the
tariff burden on passengers because by leasing the equipment
the cost of whole asset does not form part of RAB, meaning
thereby to, that the cost of equipment is not to be recovered from
the users at the rate of WACC, of this asset over its entire life.
181. The transaction structure under the finance lease is
straightforward as the EPC contractor supplies the equipment;
the financier funds the equipment by making payment to the EPC
contractor; and DIAL bears the financing cost during the
construction phase in the form of interest at 10.20% per annum.
The equipment itself is not capitalised in DIAL's Regulatory Asset
Base, and consequently, the cost of the asset is not recovered
from users at the WACC rate over its economic life.
Page 90 of 175
182. The cost that DIAL seeks to recover is the actual financing cost
incurred during the construction phase, which is a far smaller
burden on users than the alternative of capitalising the asset
and recovering a return on it over its entire life. AERA has failed
to appreciate this fundamental distinction.
183. AERA's reliance on the absence of an express provision in the
SSA or the AERA Act for IDC on leased equipment is also
misplaced. The statutory mandate under Section 13(1)(a)(i) of
the AERA Act is to consider the "capital expenditure incurred".
The financing cost of equipment procured for the airport
project, whether through direct debt or through a finance
lease, is a component of the capital expenditure incurred.
184. At this point, it is important to note that merely the form of
financing cannot determine the allowability of the cost. If
AERA routinely allows IDC on debt-funded procurement,
there is no principled basis to deny IDC on lease-funded
procurement , particularly when the lease agreement itself
imposes an express obligation to pay interest during the
construction phase. Such an artificial distinction would penalise
the airport operator for adopting a more capital-efficient
Page 91 of 175
financing structure, which is contrary to the objective of
economic regulation.
185. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by
AERA at all. In fact, it appears that AERA has not properly
understood the whole mechanism of finance lease agreement
(Annexure RA-3) annexed with the rejoinder affidavit. AERA
cannot replace the terms of the lease agreement. Further,
AERA cannot alter any of the terms of lease agreement for any
reason whatsoever.
186. As narrated hereinabove, by virtue of the finance lease
arrangement, the cost of the equipment will not be added to
the RAB, which is an advantageous position for the passengers.
This complexity has not been appreciated at all by AERA. We,
therefore, quash and set aside the decision of AERA not
to consider the Interest During Construction on
equipment procured through lease finance.
187. We, hereby direct AERA to consider the interest
actually paid by the Appellant- DIAL during
construction on equipment procured through lease
finance . Issue No. V is accordingly answered in favour
of the Appellant.
Page 92 of 175
ISSUE VI: Determination of minimum revenue from
revenue share assets for the fourth control period.
188. Looking to Annexure A-6 to the memo of this appeal which is
Multi-Year Tariff Proposal (MYTP) filed by the present
appellant before AERA for Fourth Control Period. DIAL projected
revenue from revenue share assets at Rs. 8076 Crores and based
upon this estimate, DIAL further computed the amount of cross
subsidy for determination of Aeronautical Tariff as 2422.85
Crores.
189. According to the impugned tariff order which is at Annexure A-1,
AERA determined minimum revenue from revenue share assets
as Rs.21,899.23 Crores and it has been observed in paragraph
10.6.2 of the impugned tariff order, which reads as under:
“ 10.6.2 To true up Revenue from Revenue Share
Assets at the time of the tariff
determination for the next Control Period if
the Revenue from Revenue Share Assets for
the Fourth Control Period are higher than
that decided to be considered by the
Authority in Table 341. ”
(emphasis supplied)
Page 93 of 175
190. This issue has already been decided by this Tribunal by its
judgment dated 11.09.2025 in case of Mangaluru
International Airport Limited Vs. AERA in AERA Appeal
No.1 of 2023 and it has been held that AERA has no power,
jurisdiction and authority to determine minimum amount of non-
aeronautical revenue. It has also been held that in that judgment
AERA has to determine actual amount of non-aeronautical
revenue received for the tariff determination as per Section
13(1)(a)(v) of AERA Act, 2008.
191. For the ready reference paragraph 186 of the judgment dated
11.09.2025 in AERA Appeal No.1 of 2023 in case of
Mangaluru International Airport Limited Vs. AERA which
reads as under:
“186. AERA cannot presume that the Airport Operator
must earn a particular amount of non-aeronautical
revenue. On the contrary, once the bidding process is
just, proper and equitable and there are no allegation of
arbitrariness, illegality and unfairness, non-
aeronautical revenue received by airport operator
neither can be increased nor can be decreased by AERA.
In the present case, AERA has presumed
nonaeronautical revenue at Rs.17.36 Crores for FY
2022-23. AERA has further presumed that there
must be a 5% increase in non-aeronautical revenue
every year. Instead of these presumptions, AERA
should have looked at the actual non-aeronautical
revenue received by the Airport Operator through a
Master Service Provider .”
Page 94 of 175
192. From statutory scheme it appears that, AERA, has not been
assigned the power to fix the minimum amount of revenue from
Revenue Share Assets as per the provisions of AERA Act, 2008
especially Section 13(1)(a)(v ) thereof. AERA has to consider
the actual revenue received from Revenue Share Assets and set
off has to be given on the basis of the revenue received from
Revenue Share Assets. In fact, nobody can presume anybody's
income, much less minimum income. Always, such type of
revenues are in fact actual revenue received and not the revenue
presumed by the Authority. There cannot be any presumption for
the revenue to be received from the Revenue Share Assets.
193. Looking to paragraph 10.6.2 of the impugned order, it appears
that AERA has exceeded its jurisdiction conferred under Section
13 of AERA Act, 2008. For determination of the tariff, too
much over-enthusiastic approach is not required unless
the law permits. Court of law is the court of evidence.
Income or revenue cannot be presumed for the tariff
determination. There is nothing like minimum revenue to be
recovered by the Airport Operator. This type of concept is a
novice concept developed by AERA, which runs counter to the
Provisions of AERA Act, 2008. It also runs counter to the
Page 95 of 175
provisions of OMDA and SSA. This concept of minimum revenue
to be received from Revenue Share Assets is unknown to AERA
Act, 2008, SSA (Annexure A-3) and OMDA (Annexure A-2).
194. Looking to the Provisions of AERA Act, 2008, AERA must consider
the Gross Revenue generated by Joint Venture Company (JVC).
AERA cannot consider the revenue received by other entities in
the tariff determination process.
195. AERA has failed to appreciate that looking to the Provisions of
OMDA, Annexure A-2 to the memo of this appeal, especially
looking to the Clause 8.5.7, the present appellant is entitled
to sub-contract any activity . It appears from the facts of the
present case that DIAL has entered into sub-contracts in respect
of some of the non-aeronautical services through bonafide
contractual agreements. This is explicitly permitted under the
Provisions of OMDA (Annexure A-2).
196. It has been held by this Tribunal by judgment dated 11.09.2025
in GMR Goa International Airport Limited Vs. AERA in
AERA Appeal No.1 of 2024 in paragraph 210, 212 to 216 ,
which reads as under:
“ 210. While AERA may forecast revenues from services other
than Aeronautical Services through scrutiny of bottom-up
projections of such revenues prepared by the Appellant,
benchmarking of revenue levels, commissioning experts to
Page 96 of 175
consider where opportunities for such revenues are under
exploited, etc. as provided for in clause 5.6.1 of the Tarif
Guidelines, however, it must ultimately consider the
revenues “received” in accordance with Section 13(1)(a)(v)
of the AERA Act, 2008. In any case, the benchmarking
referred to in the Tariff Guidelines, refers to benchmarking
for the purpose of projections and not set a threshold or
benchmark of non-aeronautical revenue that the
appellant must achieve. AERA has acted in excess of its
statutory mandate by prescribing Rs.509.47 Crores as
the minimum threshold of NAR for the First Control Period
and deciding that it shall take True Up only, if actual NAR
exceeds, such minimum threshold.
212. There cannot be a minimum threshold of non- aeronautical
revenue. It has been observed by AERA in impugned order
that true-up will be given in Second Control Period only if
revenue exceeds minimum threshold, this is also beyond
the power, jurisdiction and authority of AERA under the
AERA Act, 2008 to be read with AERA Guidelines, 2011
to be read with provisions of the Concession Agreement.
213. The minimum threshold of non- aeronautical revenue could
not have been determined by AERA. Even as per the
Concession Agreement, AERA should have determined
only aeronautical charges for the use of aeronautical
services. Fixing the minimum non-aeronautical revenue,
tantamount to assuming more powers than what is given
under Section 13(1) of the AERA Act. AERA can decide
aeronautical charges but it cannot decide the minimum
aero revenue under the provisions of AERA Act, 2008.
214. For the ready reference, Section 13 (1) (a) of the AERA Act,
2008 reads as under:
“13. Functions of Authority. - (1) The Authority shall
perform the following functions in respect of major
airports, namely: -
(a) to determine the tariff for the aeronautical services
taking into consideration-
Page 97 of 175
(i) the capital expenditure incurred and timely
investment in improvement of airport
facilities;
(ii) the service provided, its quality and other
relevant factors;
(iii) the cost for improving efficiency;
(iv) economic and viable operation of major
airports;
(v) revenue received from services other than the
aeronautical services;
(vi) the concession offered by the Central
Government in any agreement or
memorandum of understanding or otherwise;
(vii) any other factor which may be relevant for the
purposes of this Act:
Provided that different tariff structures may be
determined for different airports having regard to all or
any of the above considerations specified at sub-
clauses (i) to (vii);”
215. In view of the aforesaid provision of Section 13(1)(a)(v) of
the AERA Act, 2008, AERA has to appreciate “revenue
received” from services other than aeronautical services,
meaning thereby to, AERA has to accept the figures of
revenue from services other than aeronautical services, as
it is. AERA cannot fix minimum non-aeronautical revenue,
it is beyond the powers conferred upon AERA under
Section 13 of the AERA Act, 2008.
216. Nowhere, neither in AERA Act, 2008 nor in AERA
Guidelines, 2011 nor under the Concession Agreement,
AERA has been conferred with a power to
decide/determine minimum non-aeronautical revenue
and nowhere power has been given to AERA for truing up
of non-aeronautical revenue only if such revenue exceeds
the minimum threshold at the time of determination of
tariff for Second Control Period. ”
197. We have carefully examined AERA's submissions in defence of
the impugned determination of a minimum threshold of revenue
Page 98 of 175
from Revenue Share Assets. AERA's principal contentions are that
under the SSA, 30% of the gross revenue generated by the JVC
from Revenue Share Assets is to be taken for the 'S' factor, and
the gross revenue generated from users is the relevant figure,
not the amount received by DIAL from its contractors after
deduction of costs and margins; that DIAL has outsourced non-
aeronautical services through contractors and has projected only
the net amount received under those contractual arrangements,
thereby artificially depressing the non-aeronautical revenue base
and defeating the hybrid till mechanism; that AERA has not
imposed a notional floor but has only adopted a true-up provision
to account for higher gross revenues should they materialise; and
that DIAL has not specifically challenged the inclusion of revenue
from existing assets/demised premises (Rs. 2,971.85 Crores) and
Annual Fee (Rs. 6,876.93 Crores) for the Fourth Control Period,
and therefore cannot seek to indirectly alter the computation of
Revenue Share Assets. We find these contentions to be without
force especially considering the central question.
198. The central question in this issue is whether AERA has the power
to prescribe a minimum threshold of non-aeronautical revenue
and to confine the true-up exercise only to instances where the
Page 99 of 175
actual revenue exceeds that threshold. This question has been
conclusively answered by this Tribunal in Judgements dated
11.09.2025 in Mangaluru International Airport Limited Vs.
AERA and GMR Goa International Airport Limited Vs. AERA.
199. In both judgments, this Tribunal held in unambiguous terms that
AERA has no power, jurisdiction or authority to determine a
minimum amount of non-aeronautical revenue and that AERA
must consider the actual revenue "received" for the purpose
of tariff determination under Section 13(1)(a)(v) of the AERA
Act. The ratio decidendi of these judgments is that the statutory
mandate is to take into account the revenue actually received
and not a threshold fixed by the regulator.
200. The true-up mechanism, which is an integral part of the
regulatory design, exists to reconcile projections with actuals. An
asymmetric true-up that operates only when actuals exceed the
projection, but ignores a shortfall, is fundamentally inconsistent
with the purpose of a true-up mechanism.
201. The effect of paragraph 10.6.2 of the impugned order is to
prescribe a minimum threshold of Rs. 21,899.23 Crores. AERA's
submission that it has not imposed a notional floor is contradicted
by the plain language of the impugned order itself. Once AERA
Page 100 of 175
decides that true-up will be undertaken only if the actual revenue
from Revenue Share Assets exceeds Rs. 21,899.23 Crores, it
necessarily treats that figure as a minimum. If the actual revenue
is lower, DIAL is denied a true-up and the shortfall is, in effect,
borne by DIAL. This is precisely the kind of minimum threshold that
this Tribunal has held to be beyond AERA's jurisdiction.
202. AERA's argument based on the alleged outsourcing of non-
aeronautical services through contractors and the consequent
depression of the non-aeronautical revenue base is, in our
considered view, an afterthought. The impugned order does not
contain any finding that DIAL has misused the sub-contracting
provisions of the OMDA, or that the revenue projected by DIAL is
artificially depressed on account of contractual arrangements with
third parties. The reasoning in the impugned order for determining
the minimum revenue from Revenue Share Assets at Rs. 21,899.23
Crores is based on AERA's own assessment and projections, not on
any finding of impropriety on the part of DIAL. AERA cannot,
through its counter affidavit or written submissions, introduce an
entirely new factual and legal basis to justify the impugned
determination.
203. Even if we were to consider AERA's argument on merits, the
definition of 'S' in the SSA refers to "30% of the gross revenue
Page 101 of 175
generated by the JVC from the Revenue Share Assets." The
expression "gross revenue generated by the JVC" is significant. It
refers to the revenue that the JVC itself generates from the
Revenue Share Assets. Where the JVC, in exercise of its contractual
right under Clause 8.5.7 of the OMDA, sub-contracts certain non-
aeronautical services to third parties on arm's length terms, the
revenue generated by the JVC from such arrangements is the
consideration it receives under the sub-contract.
204. It must be noted that the revenue generated by the sub-contractor
from the end-users is the revenue of the sub-contractor, not of the
JVC. The SSA does not require AERA to pierce the corporate veil or
to disregard the contractual structure adopted by the JVC within
the framework of the OMDA. AERA cannot, under the guise of
determining the 'S' factor, recharacterize the revenue of a sub-
contractor as the revenue of the JVC.
205. If AERA is of the view that the sub-contracting arrangement is a
device to defeat the hybrid till mechanism, it must record a specific
finding to that effect, after affording DIAL an opportunity of being
heard and in the present case no such finding has been recorded
in the impugned order.
206. We observe that AERA’s desire to protect airport users and
maximise the cross-subsidy available under the shared or hybrid till
Page 102 of 175
framework is legitimate as the shared till mechanism requires a
prescribed percentage of Revenue from Revenue Share Assets to
be employed in reducing the aeronautical revenue requirement.
207. However, this legitimate objective does not authorise AERA to
impute revenue which was never actually earned or legally
attributable to the airport operator as the protection of airport users
is achieved by ensuring that the full amount of actual gross revenue
legally attributable to the JVC is disclosed, audited and brought into
the computation of the S-factor.
208. Further, the economic and viable operation of a major airport,
which is itself a statutory factor under Section 13(1)(a)(iv) , would
be impaired if the airport operator is permanently denied
recognition of a genuine revenue shortfall arising from market
conditions, traffic variation, security restrictions, competing airports
or changes in passenger behaviour.
209. AERA has contended that Revenue from Revenue Share Assets is
less capital-intensive and more profitable and that maximisation of
such revenue is necessary for effective operation of the shared till
and these considerations may justify close scrutiny of DIAL’s
projections and actual performance. However, they do not justify
practice of adopting an asymmetric true-up model.
Page 103 of 175
210. If AERA seeks to introduce an incentive-based regime under which
an airport operator is rewarded for exceeding a revenue target but
bears the risk of falling below it, such a regime must possess an
identifiable statutory or contractual foundation and must be
formulated through a transparent and reasoned methodology.
211. However, no provision in the AERA Act, the SSA or the OMDA has
been shown to us which converts the Revenue from Revenue Share
Assets forecast into a guaranteed minimum performance obligation
of DIAL.
212. In view of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial
pronouncements to the provision of AERA Act, 2008
especially, w.r.t., Section 13(1)(a), we hereby quash and
set aside paragraph 10.6.2 of the impugned tariff order
(Annexure A-1) dated 28.03.2025.
213. We hereby direct AERA that true-up exercise for the fourth
control period during the determination in the next control
period (fifth control period), shall be based upon actual
revenue from Revenue Share assets earned by DIAL;
irrespective of fact that whether it exceeds or not the
minimum threshold of Rs. 21,899.23 Crores has fixed by
AERA . Therefore, Issue No. VI is accordingly answered in
favor of the Appellant.
Page 104 of 175
ISSUE VII. Non-consideration of Corporate Social
Responsibility expenditure incurred by the appellant as
Operation and Maintenance Cost.
214. As per Provisions of Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013, CSR
expenses have to be borne by DIAL. DIAL proposed in MYTP
(Annexure A-6) to consider CSR expenses incurred by DIAL as an
Operation and Maintenance cost. For the ready reference,
paragraph 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 of the impugned tariff order reads
as under:
“3.3.1 DIAL in the MYTP submitted for the Fourth Control Period
considered expenses pertaining to CSR as part of
Operation & Maintenance Costs. The submission from
st
DIAL is based on Hon'ble TDSAT order dated 21 July
2023 in the case of DIAL for the Second and Third Control
Period.
3.3.2 The Aeronautical Operation and Maintenance expenses
submitted by DIAL for the Second Control Period
considering the above mentioned submission is shown in
the table below:
Table 17: Aeronautical Operation and Maintenance
Expenses submitted by DIAL for True-up for the Second
Control Period as per MYTP for the Fourth Control Period
FY ending
March 31
(Rs. Cr)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Total
Manpower cost 117.48 111.45 116.11 146.26 166.53 657.83
Page 105 of 175
Admin &
General
expenses
253.27 143.21 234.30 203.63 210.77 1,045.18
Operating
expenses
248.15 250.77 261.42 313.76 332.68 1,406.79
Utility costs 112.32 121.66 106.54 113.20 103.35 557.07
Payment to AAI
for
VRS
16.65 16.24 15.66 15.18 14.70 78.43
Forex Losses 242.51 6.38 37.56 (0.21) 10.12 296.36
Airport Operator
Fee
84.19 88.53 102.23 117.95 51.16 444.06
Property tax 20.09 5.18 28.36 6.35 6.93 66.91
CSR Expenditure - 4.21 7.51 11.14 9.92 32.78
Total 1,094.66 747.64 909.69 927.25 906.16 4,585.40
215. In view of the aforesaid table 17 of the impugned tariff order, in
paragraph 3.3.2, it appears that CSR expenditure during second
control period was at Rs.32.78 Crores. DIAL demanded this
amount to be calculated as an Operation and Maintenance
expenses and True up was demanded for the fourth control
period. Looking to the impugned order, it appears that AERA has
committed similar error in third control period, and it had already
been decided by this Tribunal in judgment dated 16.12.2020 in
case of Bangalore International Airport Limited Vs. AERA
Appeal No. 8 of 2018, in paragraph number 81 , which
reads as under:
“81. Learned counsel for AERA has, on the other hand placed
reliance upon Section 37(1) of the Income Tax Act which
has already been noted by the Authority because this
Page 106 of 175
provision clarifies that expenditure on CSR will not be
accepted as an expenditure for business. However, the
other argument that in a regulated environment the
fair return of equity determined and allowed must be
real as determined by the Regulator, has not been
answered effectively. There is no difference between
expenditure towards CSR once it is mandated by law
vis-àvis an expenditure in the nature of income tax
which is allowed as a cost passthrough. Not allowing
such cost amounts to indirectly lowering the percentage
fixed as a fair return on equity, because if the impugned
decision of the Authority is accepted, the expenditure
towards CSR has to come out from such return allowed for
the equity holders. In view of the above discussions, the
grievance of BIAL in respect of expenditure on CSR is found
to have merits. The impugned decision on this issue is,
therefore, set aside. The Authority shall pass consequential
orders so that no loss due to reduction in determined fair
return is caused to the equity holders on account of
expenditure on CSR. Necessary truingup exercise shall be
done by the Authority accordingly.”
(emphasis supplied)
216. In view of the aforesaid decisions, it has been held by this Tribunal
that CSR expense is a statutory expense arising out of performance
of aeronautical services at the Indira Gandhi International Airport.
CSR expenses are akin to a tax on aeronautical service, which is
considered as an expense as per TR formula in Schedule-1 of SSA.
217. AERA has declined to include the aforesaid amounts in Aeronautical
O&M Costs. In paragraphs 4.6.97 to 4.6.100 of the Impugned
Order, AERA reasoned that CSR expenditure is required to be
incurred by a company out of its profits, that it is not allowable as
business expenditure under Section 37(1) of the Income Tax Act,
Page 107 of 175
1961, and that permitting tariff recovery would defeat the purpose
of the social responsibility imposed upon the company.
218. In relation to the Second Control Period, paragraph 3.3.9 of the
Impugned Tariff Order further records that AERA would not
implement the judgment of this Tribunal because the CSR issue was
pending in a civil appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
219. Moreover, in relation to the Third Control Period, AERA adopted the
same approach in paragraph 4.6.193 . Significantly, AERA
expressly acknowledged that:
I. CSR expenditure had previously been considered as part of
Aeronautical O&M expenditure in the cases of BIAL and
GHIAL; and
II. this Tribunal had already rendered a judgment directing
inclusion of CSR expenditure in DIAL’s case.
220. Notwithstanding this acknowledgement, AERA declined to apply the
binding judgment on the ground that the issue was sub judice
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The legality of treating statutory
CSR expenditure as a regulatory cost is no longer res integra. The
issue was considered by this Tribunal in Bangalore International
Airport Limited Vs. Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India,
AERA Appeal No. 8 of 2018, decided on 16.12.2020.
Page 108 of 175
221. The BIAL judgment thus considered and rejected the very reliance
upon Section 37(1) of the Income Tax Act which has again been
adopted by AERA in the present Impugned Order. The issue was
thereafter directly considered in DIAL’s own case in Delhi International
Airport Limited Vs. Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India,
AERA Appeal No. 1 of 2021, decided on 21.07.2023 as contained
under Paragraphs 167-168 of the aforesaid judgement.
222. The aforesaid judgment was rendered between the same parties and
in relation to DIAL’s tariff determination. The determination that actual
CSR expenditure incurred by DIAL must be included in operating
expenses was, therefore, directly binding upon AERA.
223. The filing or pendency of a civil appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court did not suspend the operation of the judgment. In the absence
of an express order of stay, AERA was required to comply with
paragraphs 167 and 168 of the judgment dated 21.07.2023.
224. For the reasons already recorded by us under Issue No. I, a statutory
authority cannot treat the mere filing of an appeal as a self-operative
stay. Nor can it reserve to itself the power to decide whether and
when a binding judgment of the Appellate Tribunal will be
implemented.
225. AERA’s reliance upon Section 37(1) of the Income Tax Act is, even
otherwise, misconceived. The determination whether expenditure is
Page 109 of 175
deductible while computing taxable business income is conceptually
distinct from the determination whether a statutory expenditure is to
be recognised in the regulated tariff framework.
226. Tax deductibility and regulatory pass-through operate in different
fields. An expenditure may be non-deductible for computation of
taxable income and yet constitute a relevant cost in the determination
of regulated tariff. Conversely, tax deductibility does not by itself
confer an automatic tariff entitlement.
227. The applicable tariff treatment must be determined under the AERA
Act, the SSA, the OMDA and the binding judgments of this Tribunal,
and not solely by reference to the manner in which the expenditure is
treated under the Income Tax Act.
228. The inconsistent regulatory treatment adopted by AERA also remains
unexplained. AERA itself acknowledges that CSR expenditure had
been allowed as Aeronautical O&M expenditure in the cases of BIAL
and GHIAL. In the facts of the present case, no material distinction
arising from the AERA Act, DIAL’s concession documents or the
character of the expenditure has been identified which would justify
denial of the same treatment to DIAL, particularly after the specific
judgment dated 21.07.2023 in DIAL’s own case.
229. The contention that there is no clarity whether the CSR expenditure
sought to be included is limited to 2% of the net profit derived from
Page 110 of 175
aeronautical services is an afterthought. The impugned order, at
paragraphs 3.3.9 and 4.6.97 to 4.6.100, does not reject DIAL's
claim on this ground. AERA simply decided not to treat CSR
expenses as allowable Operation and Maintenance Cost, citing the
pendency of its appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
230. The argument regarding apportionment between aeronautical and
non-aeronautical profits is raised for the first time in the counter
affidavit and cannot be relied upon to supplement the reasoning in
the impugned order, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1
SCC 405. Thus in conspectus of the above, AERA's decision not to
consider CSR expenditure as Operation and Maintenance Cost is,
therefore, contrary to the binding decisions of this Tribunal and to
the statutory framework governing tariff determination.
231. We, accordingly, quash and set aside the decision of AERA
in paragraphs 3.3.9 and 4.6.97 to 4.6.100 of the impugned
tariff order. We direct AERA to treat the CSR expenditure
actually incurred by DIAL as an allowable Operation and
Maintenance Cost and to carry out all consequential true-
up adjustments in accordance with the regulatory
framework . Issue No. VII is accordingly answered in favour
of the Appellant.
Page 111 of 175
ISSUE VIII. Re-classification of dividend income from
DIAL’S Fuel Farm Subsidiary as revenue from
Aeronautical Services.
232. AERA has considered Rs.12.77 Crores of dividend income from
the DIAL’s investment in Delhi Aviation Fuel Facility Private
Limited, DAFFPL, as Aeronautical Revenue.
233. It ought to be kept in mind by AERA that dividend income is
not arising out of aeronautical services or non-aeronautical
services. Therefore, Interest or Dividend Income has been
treated as “other income”. Under the Provisions of Section
13 of AERA Act, 2008, AERA has no power, jurisdiction, and
authority to consider dividend income received by the appellant
from fuel farm subsidiary as revenue from aeronautical
services. Dividend income, in fact, is a return on capital and
not on from Aeronautical Services provided by DIAL.
234. It has been held by this Tribunal vide judgment dated
21.07.2021 in DIAL Vs. AERA in AERA Appeal No.1 of
2023, in paragraph number 85 and 88, which reads as
under:
“85. Thus, upon conjoint reading of aforesaid definition of “S”,
definition of “Revenue Share Assets”, definition of “Non-
Page 112 of 175
aeronautical assets” and definition of “Non-Aeronautical
Services” as defined in Schedule-6 of OMDA and both part
-I and part – II thereof, “Other income” is not an income or
revenue obtained by this appellant by performing any
non-aeronautical services, therefore, “other income”
cannot be treated as part of Revenue from Revenue Share
Assets. Moreover, DIAL generates revenue by performing
Non-Aeronautical Services. Once the revenue is
generated, it is upon DIAL to collect and manage the same
and in the process, DIAL may earn some income in the
nature of interest and dividend. Hence, once the revenue
generated by performing Non-Aeronautical Services is
taken as a part of “S” for the cross subsidy as per SSA,
further income if any, arising out of management of the
said revenue cannot be taken into consideration as part
of “S”.
88. The contention raised for the counsel for Respondent No.1
to the effect that the income of “dividend” and “interest”
are in fact from the income derived by the respondent by
performing aeronautical and nonaeronautical services
and, therefore, “other income” has rightly been treated as
part of revenue, from “Revenue Share Assets”. It is also
contended by the counsels for respondents that the
“dividend income” as a part of other income is a part of
3rd Control Period because dividend income is earned by
DIAL through joint ventures set up with other group
entities of DIAL who are carrying non-aeronautical related
services and other non-aeronautical services provided in
OMDA which if carried out by DIAL itself, would have
earned surplus non-aeronautical income. These
contentions are not accepted by this Tribunal mainly for
the reason that “other income” is not relatable to and
generated from the provision of any service by this
Appellant and, therefore, it cannot be considered for cross
subsidization of aeronautical charges (i.e. as a part of
revenue from Revenue Share Assets). ”
235. This principle has also been reiterated in another judgment
delivered on 06.10.2023 in MIAL Vs. AERA in AERA
Page 113 of 175
Appeal No.2 of 2021, especially in paragraph numbers
209, 224, and 225 , which reads as under:
“ 209. Respondent No.1 has raised the contention that the
income of “dividend” and “interest” are in fact from the
income derived by the respondent by performing
aeronautical and non-aeronautical services and,
therefore, “other income” has rightly been treated as part
of revenue, from “Revenue Share Assets”. It is also
contended by the counsels for respondents that the
“dividend income” as a part of other income is a part of
3rd Control Period because dividend income is earned by
MIAL through joint ventures set up with other group
entities of MIAL who are carrying non-aeronautical
related services and other nonaeronautical services
provided in OMDA which if carried out by MIAL itself,
would have earned surplus non-aeronautical income.
These contentions are not accepted by this Tribunal
mainly for the reason that “other income” is not
relatable to and generated from the provision of any
service by this Appellant and, therefore, it cannot be
considered for cross-subsidization of aeronautical
charges (i.e. as a part of revenue from Revenue Share
Assets).
224. In light of the aforementioned decision of Hon’ble the
Supreme Court of India, once the definition of “Revenue
Share Assets” states “shall mean” meaning thereby to
that, it is an exhaustive definition. This definition is
not extensive. It would cover only those assets which
are defined as Revenue Share Assets. Thus, addition
is not permissible. This aspect has not been properly
appreciated by AERA while treating “other income” as
part of revenue generated from Revenue Share Assets .
We, therefore, quash and set aside the impugned orders
in both the aforesaid AERA Appeals which are for 2nd
and 3rd Control Periods so far as they are affecting “other
income” as a part of revenue, from revenue share assets
and consequently, true-up has to be given for the earlier
Control Periods also. We, therefore, direct AERA to give
true-up for 2nd and 3rd Control Periods for “Other Income”
as stated hereinabove.
Page 114 of 175
225. Learned senior counsel for the respondent has further
argued that “other income” is a function of cash
management earned through airport operations and,
therefore, other income must be included in the revenue
as it is generated from revenue share assets and has
placed reliance upon paragraph number 57 of this
Tribunal’s judgment dated 23rd April, 2018 in AERA
Appeal No. 06 of 2012 and contended that dividend
income needs to be included as part of “S” factor even if
services are provided through its servants and agents.
This contention is not accepted by this Tribunal mainly for
the reason that because in the case of Bangalore
International Airport Ltd. (BIAL), the concession does not
provide for a specific tariff calculation methodology which
is mentioned in case of MIAL-the present Appellant in
Schedule 1 of SSA where “S” factor is limited to the
revenue from Revenue Share Assets. Moreover, looking to
the definition of Revenue Share Assets, given in Schedule-
1 of SSA (ANNEXURE A-3(Colly)), the said term is a
predefined terminology and it does not encompass within
its sphere, the interest income and dividend income. ”
236. Similarly, it has been held by this Tribunal in a judgment dated
14.02.2024 in GMR Hyderabad International Airport
Limited versus AERA, in AERA Appeal Number 4 of
2021, in paragraph number 346 and 347 , which reads as
under.
“346. The impugned decision of AERA treating income of dividend
and interest income from Cargo Subsidiary as aeronautical
revenue and from duty free subsidiary as non-aeronautical
revenue is not tenable in law mainly for the reason that the
interest income and interest from treasury (e.g.
income from fixed deposit/mutual fund etc.) in
general, accruing to HIAL is not relatable to and
generated from the provision of any service being
provided by HIAL . This aspect of the matter has not been
appreciated by AERA while passing the impugned order and
hence, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside for
the aforesaid point.
Page 115 of 175
347. In the present case, AERA’s decision to treat dividend and
interest income received by HIAL from investments made
in HMACPL (providing cargo service) as aeronautical
revenue is based on a misconceived premise that because
AERA has decided to treat cargo services as
aeronautical in nature any income incidental
therefrom is also to be treated as aeronautical.
Similarly, for investment made by HIAL in other entity
which provides duty free services, AERA has
proceeded to treat such income as non-aeronautical in
nature and consider it for cross subsidization. HIAL
itself does not provide these services and the interest
income received by HIAL does not correspond to any
services rendered by HIAL and as such, it is beyond
the regulatory ambit of AERA .”
237. AERA has placed principal reliance upon paragraph 7.6.12 of
its Tariff Order for the Third Control Period, wherein it had
recorded a decision "to include dividend income for cross-
subsidy at the time of true up during the Fourth Control
Period." AERA contends that, in reclassifying the dividend
income in the Impugned Order, it has done no more than give
effect to a determination already made. This contention cannot
be accepted.
238. The Tariff Order for the Third Control Period, insofar as it
treated dividend income and "other income" as available for
cross-subsidisation, was the very subject-matter of the appeal
decided by this Tribunal on 21.07.2023, and was set aside on
Page 116 of 175
precisely that point at paragraphs 85 and 88 extracted
hereinabove.
239. A regulator cannot base a fresh determination upon a
paragraph of an earlier order whose foundation this
Tribunal has already removed . As held by us under Issue
No. I, AERA remains bound by the judgment dated 21.07.2023
in the continued absence of any stay. Paragraph 7.6.12 does
not survive that judgment and cannot be resurrected to sustain
the Impugned Order.
240. In view of the above decision, the dividend income forms a part
of “other income” of DIAL and the dividend income is not
generated from employment of any revenue share assets or
relatable to and generated from a provision of any services
rendered by DIAL and thus, AERA cannot reclassify the
dividend income from DAFFPL, which undertakes Fuel Farm
Services at IGI Airport as revenue from Aeronautical Services.
241. AERA, in its tariff orders for the First Control Period and the
Second Control Period, had itself taken the view that dividend
income realised by DIAL from its investments in joint ventures
should not be considered for cross-subsidisation, as the assets
of such joint ventures were not reckoned for the determination
Page 117 of 175
of DIAL's Regulatory Asset Base. AERA has now departed from
that settled position without any cogent or material
justification, resulting in an inconsistency in its approach across
Control Periods. This conduct of AERA, is manifestly arbitrary
and has resulted in uncertainty, which is antithetical to the
fundamental tenets of the rule of law & regulatory consistency.
242. Moreover, looking to Schedule-5 of OMDA, Annexure A-2,
which exhaustively defines aeronautical services, but it does
not refer to dividend income or investment activities. Thus,
treatment given to dividend income as Aeronautical Services
revenue by AERA is running counter to Schedule 5 of OMDA
and is also contrary to Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA Act,
2008.
243. Furthermore, DAFFPL is a legal entity separate and distinct
from DIAL. The aeronautical service of operating the Fuel Farm
facility is performed by DAFFPL. The consideration received for
such service is earned by DAFFPL in its own legal capacity and
DIAL does not receive the dividend as consideration for
supplying fuel, operating the Fuel Farm, granting access to the
facility or rendering any other service mentioned in Schedule 5
of the OMDA.
Page 118 of 175
244. The dividend is received by DIAL in its capacity as a shareholder.
It represents a return declared upon the equity investment held
by DIAL in DAFFPL. Its legal character does not change merely
because the profits out of which it is declared may have arisen
from an aeronautical business carried on by DAFFPL.
245. DIAL has contended, further, that the reclassification produces
double counting, DAFFPL being itself a regulated entity whose
fuel farm revenue is separately accounted for at the DAFFPL level.
AERA has denied this contention, submitting that the regulation
of DAFFPL's tariff "has no bearing" on the categorisation of the
dividend in DIAL's hands. We are unable to accept AERA's
submission, for the reason that, where the fuel farm revenue is
capable of being captured in the regulatory computation at the
level of DAFFPL, to treat the dividend distributed out of that same
revenue as DIAL's own aeronautical revenue is to bring the same
underlying commercial activity within the regulatory net twice
once as DAFFPL's revenue and again as DIAL's dividend receipt.
246. AERA has also relied upon the scope-of-grant and business-
restriction provisions of the OMDA to contend that DIAL may
undertake only airport-related activities and that, consequently,
every receipt accruing to DIAL must necessarily be classified
either as aeronautical or non-aeronautical revenue.
Page 119 of 175
247. With all sincerity, we observe that the aforesaid contention
proceeds upon a false equivalence between the activity which an
entity is permitted to undertake and the juridical character of
every receipt appearing in its accounts. The provisions defining
the permissible business and functions of DIAL do not state that
every receipt of DIAL shall be deemed to arise from the provision
of an Aeronautical Service or a Non-Aeronautical Service.
248. It is pertinent to note that Section 13(1)(a)(vi) of the AERA
Act requires AERA, while determining tariff, to take into
consideration the concession offered by the Central Government
through the governing agreements. The contractual delineation
between Aeronautical Services, Non-Aeronautical Services,
Revenue Share Assets and other receipts cannot therefore be
disregarded.
249. Regulatory classification must depend upon the nature of
the receipt in the hands of the airport operator and
whether that receipt corresponds to a service rendered
by the airport operator, not merely upon the business
undertaken by the entity declaring the dividend .
250. AERA has not recorded any finding that DAFFPL is a sham or
colourable entity; that its separate corporate personality is being
misused; that DIAL itself rendered the Fuel Farm services; or that
Page 120 of 175
the dividend was, in substance, disguised consideration for a service
provided by DIAL. In the absence of such a finding, the distinct
corporate identity of DAFFPL and the distinct juridical character of
the dividend cannot be disregarded.
251. In view of the facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, we
hereby quash and set aside the decisions of AERA to treat
dividend income from the DIAL’s Fuel Farm Subsidiary as
revenue from Aeronautical Services. We, hereby hold that
dividend income from the DIAL’s Fuel Farm Subsidiary as
“other income”, and AERA cannot consider “other
income” at the time of tariff determination process under
Section 13 of the AERA Act, 2008 .
252. For the foregoing reasons, paragraphs 4.8.4 and 4.8.5 of
the Impugned Tariff Order, read with Table 181 and
paragraph 4.8.8, are set aside to the extent that they add
dividend income of ₹12.77 crore received by DIAL from
DAFFPL to Aeronautical Revenue for the Third Control
Period. The consequential determination under
paragraph 4.11.6 shall stand modified accordingly. Issue
No. VIII is answered accordingly in favour of the
Appellant.
Page 121 of 175
ISSUE IX. Non-consideration of cost relating to Civil,
Electrical and associated work for Apron stands
between taxiways L-1 and M-1, including AGL system
upgrade.
253. From the perusal of the tariff order at Annexure A-1 dated
28.03.2025 for fourth control period (01.04.2024 to
31.03.2029), AERA has reduced capital expenditure from
Rs.96.80 Crores to Rs.84.34 Crores. AERA has reduced this
capital expenditure on the basis of an independent
consultant's report.
254. Looking to the counter affidavit filed by AERA, especially
looking to paragraph 40 (ii) & (iii). It is submitted by AERA
that cost relating to civil, electrical and associated works for
apron stands between Taxiway L1 and M1 including Airfield
Ground Lighting (AGL system) AERA has considered
Rs.84.34 Crores as a capital expenditure based upon
purchase order submitted by DIAL for the same.
255. It appears that the work orders amounting to the tune of
Rs. 82,08,77,837/- Crores, as submitted by DIAL, is
excluding GST. If the same is added, then the cost of
Page 122 of 175
Rs.96.80 Crores is obtained for works related to civil,
electrical, and associated works for apron stands between L1
and M1, including Airfield Ground Lighting (AGL system)
upgradation. For ready reference, Annexure RA-4, which is
annexed with the rejoinder affidavit, are the four different
work orders and looking to these annexures, the total works
at Rs.82,08,77,837/- excluding GST. To understand this
point, summary table for all the work orders, Annexure RA-
4, to the rejoinder affidavit in tabular format, is mentioned
as under:
“The Work Orders [ @ pg. 1915-1942 of Rejoinder
Affidavit ] would show, DIAL had issued the following 4
Work Orders to the contractor:
Work Order No. Amount (Excluding GST) Reference
DIAL/P&C/2018-19/1164 Rs.71,47,10,231/- Pg 1916
DIAL/P&C/2018-19/1217 Rs. 2,79,09,309/- Pg 1936
DIAL/P&C/2018-19/1253 Rs. 7,53,240/- Pg 1940
DIAL/P&C/2018-19/1323 Rs. 7,75,05,057/- Pg 1942
The Sum total of the Work Orders issued by DIAL is
Rs. 82,08,77,837/- (Excluding GST) and the total amount
paid by DIAL, after inclusion of GST towards the subject
works was Rs. 96.80 crores. As such, DIAL is entitled to
recover such amounts. “
Page 123 of 175
256. The quoted amount is excluding GST. This aspect of the
matter has not been properly appreciated by AERA. The total
amount has been paid by DIAL after inclusion of GST
towards subject work at Rs.96.80 Crores and therefore,
AERA cannot reduce cost relating to civil, electrical and
associated works for apron stands between taxiways L1 and
M1, including AGL system upgrading. AERA has to
appreciate actual expenditure incurred by the
appellant. As per Section 13 (1) (a) (i) of AERA Act,
2008, this principle been affirmed & reiterated by this
Tribunal in several decisions , as set out below.
257. This tribunal in the case of Delhi International Airport
Ltd. Vs. AERA, AERA Appeal No. 1 of 2021 , judgment
dated 21.07.2023 under Paras 159, Para 165(f), has held as
follows:
“159. Moreover, as per the provisions of Section 13(1), the AERA
has to keep in mind that capital expenditure incurred for
determination of tariff for the aeronautical services. For the
ready reference, Section 13(1) of AERA Act, 2008 reads as
under:
“Sec.13 Functions of Authority- (1) The Authority shall
perform the following functions in respect of major airports,
namely: -
(a) to determine the tariff for the aeronautical services taking
into consideration-
Page 124 of 175
(i) the capital expenditure incurred and timely investment in
improvement of airport facilities;
(ii) the service provided, its quality and other relevant
factors;
(iii) the cost for improving efficiency;
(iv) economic and viable operation of major airports;
(v) revenue received from services other than the
aeronautical services;
(vi) the concession offered by the Central Government in any
agreement or memorandum of understanding or otherwise;
(vii) any other factor which may be relevant for the purposes
of this Act:
Provided that different tariff structures may be determined
for different airports having regard to all or any of the above
considerations specified at sub-clauses (i) to (vii) ;
(b) to determine the amount of the development fees in
respect of major airports;
(c) to determine the amount of the passengers service fee
levied under rule 88 of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 made under
the Aircraft Act, 1934 (22 of 1934);
(d) to monitor the set performance standards relating to
quality, continuity and reliability of service as may be
specified by the Central Government or any authority
authorised by it in this behalf;
(e) to call for such information as may be necessary to
determine the tariff under clause (a) ;
(f) to perform such other functions relating to tariff, as may
be entrusted to it by the Central Government or as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
165. …. (f) As per Section 13 (1)(a)(i) of the AERA Act, 2008, it was
a power coupled with a duty vested in AERA to determine
the tariff for the aeronautical services taking into
Page 125 of 175
consideration, “the capital expenditure incurred and
timely investment in the improvement of airport
facilities” which is on “actual basis” meaning thereby, if
the actual capital expenditure is incurred by the appellant,
the same has to be considered by AERA as per aforesaid
provision of AERA Act and it cannot be so easily brushed
and set aside by AERA under the guise of “the efficient
cost”;
258. Further, this tribunal in the case of GMR Hyderabad
International Airport Ltd. Vs. AERA, AERA Appeal No. 4 of
2021, judgment dated 14.02.2024 under Paras 372–373,
which reads as under:
“ 372. Thereafter, global tenders are being invited. Then the lowest
no.1 will be chosen, and this is how the “Market Discovered
Price” is being found out by the competitive bidding process
and this “Market Discovered Price” for the construction in
question cannot be so easily brushed aside or given go by
on just an opinion given by or just an estimated price of
construction is given by another body/committee. As per
Section 13 (1) (a) (i) of AERA Act,2008, AERA has to
keep in mind capital expenditure incurred . For ready
reference Section 13 (1) (a) (i) reads as under:
“Chapter III
Powers & Functions of the Authority
13. (1) The Authority Shall perform the following functions
in respect of major airports namely: -
(a) to determine the tariff for the aeronautical
services taking into consideration-
(i) the capital expenditure incurred and timely
investment in improvement of airport
facilities;”
(Emphasis Supplied)
Page 126 of 175
373. In view of the aforesaid provision of Section 13(1), AERA has to
appreciate actual capital expenditure incurred by the
appellant. As per Respondent No.1, the cost which is arrived at
by the global bidding process is not an efficient cost and,
therefore, AERA had arrived at its own efficient cost seeking
consultant’s report from RITES. ”
259. Subsequently, this tribunal in the case of Mangaluru International
Airport Ltd. Vs. AERA, AERA Appeal No. 1 of 2023, judgment
dated 11.09.2025 under Para 260, which reads as under:
“ 260. Looking to the provision of Section 13(1)(a) of AERA Act, 2008,
while deciding tariff, AERA has to appreciate
“expenditure incurred”. Whenever actual expenditure
incurred is available from audited books of accounts of
airport, AERA cannot rely upon notional expenditure .
Hence, the impugned order at Annexure A-1 for repair and
maintenance expenses whereby the cap of 6% of Opening RAB
has been applied deserves to be quashed and set aside. ”
260. Lastly, this Tribunal in the case of GMR Goa International Airport
Ltd. Vs. AERA, AERA Appeal No. 1 of 2024, judgment dated
11.09.2025 under Paras 91 & 95, which reads as under:
“ 91. Under Section 13(1)(a)(i) of the AERA Act, 2008, there is a
mandate for AERA to consider capital expenditure
incurred . For the ready reference, Section 13(1)(a)(i) of the AERA
Act, 2008 reads as under:
“13. Functions of Authority. - (1) The Authority shall
perform the following functions in respect of major
airports, namely:-
(a) to determine the tariff for the
aeronautical services taking into
consideration-
(i) the capital expenditure incurred
and timely investment in
improvement of airport
facilities;…”
95. In view of the aforesaid decision, under the AERA Act, 2008,
AERA has to verify the capital expenditure incurred and
it has no power, jurisdiction and authority to review the
capital expenditure to be incurred or suggest its own
cost of capital expenditure.”
Page 127 of 175
261. AERA, on the other hand, submits that the principal purchase
order placed before its independent consultant reflected a
value of Rs. 71.47 crore excluding GST and Rs. 84.34 crore
including GST. According to AERA, the remaining variation
orders were not furnished during tariff determination and
were relied upon for the first time with DIAL’s rejoinder
before this Tribunal.
262. DIAL disputes this assertion and states that, by email dated
11.10.2024, it supplied several work orders relating to
General Capital Expenditure, including the original work
order and the three variation orders pertaining to the present
works.
263. The rejoinder specifically states that the email dated
11.10.2024 contained the four relevant contractual
documents and that AERA arrived at ₹84.34 crore by
considering only one of them. The email dated 11.10.2024
was also annexed to the memorandum of appeal as
Annexure A-10.
264. We must note that an independent consultant’s
recommendation may constitute relevant expert material. It
cannot, however, substitute a reasoned regulatory
Page 128 of 175
determination. AERA was required to identify the documents
considered, disclose the reconciliation undertaken and state
the precise reason for excluding the balance contractual
value.
265. We now allude to Section 13(1)(a)(i) of the AERA Act which
requires AERA, while determining tariff for Aeronautical
Services, to take into consideration “ (i) the capital expenditure
incurred and timely investment in improvement of airport
facilities;”
266. The expression “capital expenditure incurred” herein
requires consideration of actual and established expenditure.
It does not compel AERA to accept every amount entered in
the books without scrutiny, but it does preclude substitution
of verified actual expenditure by an unsupported notional
figure.
267. We reiterate and make it clear that the judgments in
Mangaluru and GMR Goa were delivered after the Impugned
Order. AERA cannot therefore be criticised for not having
applied those judgments in March 2025. They nevertheless
reaffirm the principle already declared in the DIAL and GHIAL
judgments and govern the present adjudication.
Page 129 of 175
268. Moreover, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Delhi
International Airport Limited Vs. Airports Economic
Regulatory Authority of India, reported in (2024) 1 SCC
716, also recognised the distinction between Section
13(1)(a)(i), dealing with capital expenditure incurred, and
Section 13(1)(a)(iii), dealing with the cost of improving
efficiency, for ready reference Para 148 to 151 reads as
under:
“148. Different aspects towards determination of project cost
have been examined by AERA, and AERA has carried
out its responsibility while granting a little leeway for the
pioneering effort in an untested field in the country. The
auditors too had not been able to quantify or identify the
losses due to increased project cost in monetary terms.
How can one expect AERA to take on such a task in light
of the functions ascribed to it under the said Act.
149. There is also substance in the contention that the whole
project was running against strict timelines on account
of litigations relating to projects, a common phenomenon
in our country. This was more so in the context of the
Commonwealth Games being around the corner.
Additionally, there is also some substance in what is
contended by the airport operators that the terminology
in Sections 13(1)(a)(i) and 13(1)(a)(iii) of the said Act
cannot be read into each other. The manner of reading
of the provision by FIA is to combine sub-clause (iii) with
sub-clause (i) while determining tariff.
150. In our view, the provisions have been separately made
because the concept of Section 13(1)(a)(i) requires
AERA to determine the tariff by including capital
expenditure incurred and timely investment in
improvement of airport facilities. One of the other
Page 130 of 175
distinct factors to be considered is the cost of improving
efficiency as under Section 13(1)(a)(iii). These aspects
have no doubt been examined by the authority
concerned, although not necessarily in the manner FIA
seeks them to. Does it really lie with us to superimpose
a view which has not been found feasible in the given
conspectus of the large number of reports and
documents before AERA as well as Tdsat. We thus reject
the contention.
151. In the end, we do believe that the matter having
traversed from AERA to the appellate authority to
this Court, the parties and the counsel may have
become fully aware of the nitty-gritties of the
various matters and thus sought to embark on
canvassing the case almost as we are some kind of
first authority on these aspects. We are unwilling
to do so. We have analysed all the contentions in a
broad perspective, keeping in mind that the Authority
has performed its task and so has the appellate
authority. Despite the course of action followed by the
counsel, we have still analysed the matter in such depth
as was required to be done by this Court in rejecting all
aspects in these appeals and cross-appeals except one
aspect which arose from terminology and its definition .”
269. It must be noted that in aforesaid paragraphs 148 and 149,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court rejected an attempt to merge the
two statutory considerations and observed that the
provisions had been separately enacted. The “cost for
improving efficiency” under clause (iii) cannot therefore be
employed mechanically to erase the requirement under
clause (i) to consider capital expenditure incurred.
270. Equally, AERA’s submission that DIAL is completely
precluded from questioning the adjustment because it did
Page 131 of 175
not submit a specific response to paragraph 4.4.143 of the
Consultation Paper cannot be accepted. The claim of ₹96.80
crore formed part of DIAL’s MYTP. AERA itself recorded that
claim in paragraph 4.4.143 (i) of the tariff Order. The dispute
is therefore not a claim invented for the first time in appellate
proceedings, for ready reference Para 4.4.143 (i) of the tariff
order reads as under:
“4.4.143 The Authority after analysis of the major items of the
general capex through the independent consultant
proposed to make the following adjustment:
i. The cost towards Civil, Electrical & associated work
for Apron stands between L1 & M1 including AGL
system upgrade as submitted by DIAL is
Rs. 96.80 Cr. However, the Authority based on
assessment through the independent consultant
proposed to consider an amount of Rs. 84.34 Cr
against the same based on the purchase order
submitted by DIAL for the same.”
271.
Even assuming that only the principal purchase order was
available before AERA, that circumstance would not, by
itself, justify restricting the claim to the value reflected
therein. Pertinently, Section 13 (1) (e ) of the AERA Act
expressly empowers the Authority " to call for such
information as may be necessary to determine the
tariff under clause (a) ".
Page 132 of 175
272. Wherever the claim of ₹96.80 crore had been disclosed in DIAL’s
MYTP but the supporting material was considered incomplete,
AERA was required either to seek the necessary documents or to
identify the evidentiary deficiency and afford DIAL an opportunity
to cure it.
273. AERA could not, without recording such deficiency or seeking
clarification, confine the claim to the value of the single document
available and thereafter defend the reduction solely on the
ground that the remaining documents were not before it, despite
the record showing the contrary, because such a course would
be inconsistent with the transparent and reasoned decision-
making contemplated by Section 13 (4) of the AERA Act, 2008.
274. We also find it significant that AERA has not disputed that the
works in question were actually executed by DIAL. The nature of
the works such as pavement upgrades, dismantling of old
pavements, comprehensive civil and electrical works, and DGCA-
mandated Airfield Ground Lighting upgrades is not contested.
275. The dispute is confined solely to the quantum of expenditure
allowable. In such circumstances, where the fact of execution is
admitted and the necessity of the works is unchallenged, AERA’s
role under Section 13(1)(a)(i) of the AERA Act is to ascertain the
Page 133 of 175
actual capital expenditure incurred, not to substitute a notional
figure based on an incomplete reading of the contractual record.
276. We accordingly quash and set aside paragraph 4.4.143(i)
of the impugned order to the extent that the expenditure
relating to the apron stands between taxiways L1 and M1
and the AGL System upgrade has been conclusively
restricted to Rs. 84.34 crore without examination of the
complete contractual and accounting record .
277. We hereby direct, AERA, to consider the actual capital
expenditure of Rs. 96.80 Crores incurred by the Appellant
towards the said works being the amount supported by
the four Work Orders at Annexure RA-4 to the Rejoinder
Affidavit and to include the said expenditure in General
Capex and in the Regulatory Asset Base for the Third
Control Period.
278. The determination so made shall remain subject to true-up
upon the actual expenditure as reflected in the Appellant's
audited financial statements, in the ordinary course.
Consequential adjustments shall be carried out in
depreciation, return on the Regulatory Asset Base, Target
Revenue and tariff through the applicable true-up
mechanism . Issue No. IX is accordingly answered in favour
of the Appellant.
Page 134 of 175
ISSUE X. Deviation from Asset-Based allocation to
Revenue Based apportionment of legal cost
279. Looking to the impugned tariff order passed by AERA, and
Annexure A-1 for the Fourth control period, AERA excluded legal
expenses from professional and consultancy expenses incurred
by DIAL and decided to allocate legal expenses between
aeronautical and non-aeronautical based upon proportion of
aeronautical revenue to the total income of DIAL.
280. Legal expenses are common expenses essential for entire
operation of airport including regulatory compliances,
protection of concession rights and statutory requirements
under OMDA and SSA, all of which are essential for airport
operation integrity . In several matters, DIAL is a party to the
litigation for the activities arising on the airport premises.
281. The decision of AERA to consider legal expenses to the extent of
proportion of aeronautical revenue to the total revenue of DIAL
is fundamentally flawed. Legal expenses are not incurred based
on their connection to revenue generation. Legal expenses
incurred are based upon the nature, volume, and complexity of
the litigation and compliance need. This aspect of the matter is
not properly appreciated at all by AERA.
Page 135 of 175
282. AERA has given different treatments to legal expenses across
different control periods, which has resulted in the regulatory
uncertainty, which is fundamental to a stable investment
environment and contrary to a principle of consistency enshrined
in Schedule-1 of SSA (Annexure A-3) which requires AERA to
have “……a consistent approach in terms of underlying
principles”.
283. AERA has identified no material change of circumstance, and has
recorded no reasons in the impugned order, explaining the
departure. Furthermore, AERA continues to allocate other
professional and consultancy expenses on the basis of objective
parameters such as the Gross Fixed Assets Ratio or the Terminal
Building Ratio, which reflect the physical usage of resources. The
selection of a different, revenue-based metric for legal expenses
alone, without any discernible rationale, is the very antithesis of
a consistent regulatory approach.
284. Much has been argued out by learned counsel for AERA that legal
expenses do not have any value addition to the services offered
to the users. The base which is taken by AERA in this argument
is arbitrary in nature and it is irrelevant also because legal
expenses and charges are essential for the operation of the
Page 136 of 175
airports. There are tangible and intangible benefits to the users
for the legal expenses incurred by Airport Operator.
285. An example was given by this appellant that in arbitration against
Delhi Cantonment Board towards property tax demand, after
arguments by the advocates, the demand of property tax was
reduced from Rs.800 Crores p.a. to Rs.9 to 10 Crores p.a. The
benefit of reduced amount of property tax has been passed on
by DIAL to the users and thereby enhancing efficient operation
at the airport. Thus, legal expenses actually incurred ought to
have been true-up without any bifurcation between aeronautical
and non-aeronautical basis.
286. The assets can be bifurcated on the basis of aeronautical and
non-aeronautical ratio, but, legal expenses cannot be bifurcated
on the basis of aeronautical and non-aeronautical asset ratio.
Thus, this aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated
by AERA.
287. We have further considered AERA's submissions in opposition.
AERA contended before us, that in the impugned order, DIAL did
not provide a break-up of legal expenses between matters
pertaining to aeronautical and non-aeronautical services, and
that legal expenses, being of a general nature, could not be
Page 137 of 175
allowed in their entirety as aeronautical Operation and
Maintenance costs. AERA's apportionment based on the ratio of
aeronautical revenue to total income was, in its submission, a
reasonable method of allocating these common costs.
288. We find this approach to be legally unsustainable. The absence
of a case-wise break-up may have entitled AERA to call for
further particulars under Section 13(1)(e) of the AERA Act,
it did not entitle AERA to adopt a proxy that bears no causal
relationship to the cost being apportioned .
289. The regulatory framework itself does not prescribe a revenue-
based allocation for common costs. The OMDA and the SSA
contemplate that the airport operator will incur costs
necessary for the efficient operation of the airport. Legal
expenses are a necessary incident of operating a major
international airport within a heavily regulated environment.
290. AERA has defended the revenue-proportion method on the
footing that it is "a more accurate indicator" of the aeronautical
and non-aeronautical components of legal expense than an
asset-based ratio, since legal cost is said to track revenue
potential rather than asset value. We are unable to agree to this
submission as, Legal expenditure is, in its nature, a function
Page 138 of 175
of the incidence, subject-matter and complexity of
litigation and of regulatory compliance obligations; it does
not vary in proportion to the revenue earned by the
segment to which the dispute relates.
291. There is a further and independent infirmity. It is not in dispute that
legal expenses form part of the broader category of Professional
and Consultancy Expenses, and that AERA has allocated
Professional and Consultancy Expenses generally by reference to
the Gross Fixed Assets ratio or the Terminal Building ratio,
according to whether the expense was incurred outside or within
the terminal building. AERA has singled out legal expenses alone
from within that category and subjected them to a wholly different
basis of allocation, namely revenue-proportion.
292. When called upon to justify treating the subset differently from the
set of which it forms part, AERA has offered only that the separate
treatment was "a matter of regulatory prudence" intended to guard
against cross-subsidisation. That itself explains why AERA might
examine legal expenses with particular care; it does not explain
why, having examined them, it apportioned them by a method it
applies to no other species of Professional and Consultancy
Expense.
Page 139 of 175
293. An unexplained departure of this kind, treating like categories
unalike, is the antithesis of the reasoned and documented decision-
making required by Section 13(4) of the AERA Act, and offends the
Principle of Consistency in Schedule 1 of the SSA. The arbitrariness
is compounded by the fact that AERA has itself, in previous Control
Periods, allowed legal expenses without adopting the revenue-
proportion methodology now applied and in the Fourth Control
Period tariff order has identified no material change of
circumstance.
294. AERA has further contended that DIAL is precluded, by the principle
of constructive res judicata embodied in Explanation IV to Section
11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, from agitating the
treatment of legal costs, in as much as the determination in the
Third Control Period Tariff Order was not carried in appeal and has
attained finality.
295. This objection is answered by the reasons already recorded by this
Tribunal in respect of Issue No. II, which apply with equal force
here. It is pertinent to note that the true-up exercise is not
an occasion for re-litigating a concluded determination; it
is the statutorily contemplated stage at which projections
are reconciled against actuals.
Page 140 of 175
296. The quantum of legal expenditure actually incurred across the Third
Control Period could not have been known, and therefore could not
have been challenged, before that Control Period concluded on
31.03.2024. A party is not to be visited with the bar of constructive
res judicata for failing to raise a challenge to figures that did not
then exist. Further, as this Tribunal has already observed, AERA has
itself contended elsewhere in this very Appeal that a challenge is
premature until the true-up stage is reached; it cannot
simultaneously maintain that a challenge is barred for not having
been brought before that stage.
297. We, therefore, quash and set aside the decision of AERA to exclude
the legal expenses from professional and consultancy expenses
incurred by DIAL.
298. We, hereby also quash and set aside the decision of AERA
to allocate the legal expenses between aeronautical and
non-aeronautical based upon proportion of aeronautical
revenue to the total income of DIAL.
299. We direct AERA to treat the entire actual legal expenses
incurred by DIAL as allowable Operation and Maintenance
costs, without any such apportionment. Consequential
true-up adjustments shall be carried out accordingly . Issue
No. X is accordingly answered in favour of the Appellant.
Page 141 of 175
ISSUE XI Double accounting of deleted asset while
computing true-up of RAB for the third control period.
300. Looking to the impugned tariff order which is at Annexure A-1,
AERA has deleted value of one of the assets in the capitalization
of Phase 3A project.
301. The Table 78 of the impugned tariff order from paragraph
4.4.182, which is the calculation of RAB decided by AERA for true-
up for the third control period which reads as under:
Table 78: Additions to RAB to be considered by the Authority
for True up for the Third Control Period
FY Ending March 31, (Rs. Cr) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total
Aeronautical Asset Additions as per the Authority's analysis on
Reclassification of Assets [Refer Table 68] (A)
215.03 160.28 926.08 992.49 9,841.51 12,135.39
Disallowances/Adjustments in Phase 3A Expansion Capex in the
Third Control Period as per the Authority's analysis [Refer Table 77]
Additions knocked off with deletions (B) 33.61* 33.61
Reductions in IDC (C) - - 1.89 1.87 26.37 30.13
Reductions in Enabling and Miscellaneous Works (D) 0.01 0.01 0.90 0.92 11.12 12.96
Reductions in EPC Claims (E) 24.44 24.44
Total Adjustments in Phase 3A Expansion Capex (F=B+C+D+E) 0.01 0.01 2.78 36.40 61.94 101.14
Adjustments in General Capex in 3rd CP as per the Authority's
analysis [Refer Table 66] (G)
2.97 2.49 2.18 1.92 2.90 12.46
Total Disallowances/Adjustments in Capex (H=F+G) 2.98 2.50 4.96 38.32 64.83 113.60
Aeronautical Portion of Asset Addition proposed to be considered by
the Authority % [Refer Table 68] (I)
93.52% 83.15% 94.04% 97.11% 94.63%
Aeronautical portion of Adjustments in Capex (J=H×I) 2.79 2.08 4.67 37.17 61.33 108.04
Aeronautical Asset Additions as per the Authority's analysis (A-J) 212.24 158.20 921.41 955.32 9,780.18 12,027.35
Asset additions amounting to Rs. 33.61 Cr knocked-off with deletions have been adjusted in the above computation in line with *
clarifications provided by DIAL. DIAL as part of clarifications submitted that total amount capitalised in the Third Control Period under
Phase 3A Expansion was Rs. 11,864.09 Cr after deducting Rs. 33.61 Cr.
Page 142 of 175
302. It is submitted by learned counsel appearing for respondent no.1-
AERA, that there is no double accounting of the deleted assets
while computing true-up of RAB for the third control period and
it is also submitted by learned counsel appearing for respondent
no.1 that DIAL did not raise any issue with respect to calculation
of RAB at the time of consultation stage.
303. In view of the aforesaid calculation, there is already a deduction
of Rs.33.61 Crores, and after deduction of the aforesaid amount,
aeronautical asset additions as per AERA has been arrived at
Rs.955.32 Crores for the financial year 2023.
304. Looking to Table 70, 71, to be read with 79 and 80 of the
impugned tariff order, AERA has not appreciated the fact that
total capitalized amount in the third control period under Phase
3A expansion was Rs.11,864.09 Crores, and this figure has been
arrived at after deletion of aeronautical asset valued at Rs.33.61
Crores. To understand this, Table 70, 71, 79 and 80 reads as
under:
Table 70: Adjustments in Additions to RAB proposed to be considered by
the Authority for the Third Control Period at the Consultation Stage
Page 143 of 175
Page 144 of 175
Table 80: Aeronautical Depreciation and RAB decided to be considered by the Authority for
the Third Control Period
FY ending March 31 (Rs. Cr) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total
Opening Aero RAB (A) 4,771.83* 4,514.24 4,250.83 4,005.62 4,627.00
Addition considered on Pro-Rata
97.98 88.15 148.92 397.13 3,938.76 4,670.94
basis# [Refer Table 78] (B)
Adjustments from Previous Year on
393.32^ 114.26 70.05 772.49 558.20 1,908.31
Pro-Rata basis [Refer Table 78] (C)
Deletions [Refer Table 71] (D) 15.65 0.29 0.07 6.46 46.15 68.62
DF Adjustment (E) 232.05 - - - - 232.05
Depreciation [Refer Table 79] (F) 501.19 465.53 464.11 541.77 669.70 2,642.31
Pro Rata Aero RAB (based on Pro
4,514.24 4,250.83 4,005.62 4,627.00 8,408.10
Rata Additions) (G=A+B+C-D-E-F)
Opening HRAB (H) 218.84* 193.15 169.72 147.64 123.93
Depreciation [Refer Table 79] (I) 25.69 23.43 22.08 23.71 19.60 114.52
Closing HRAB (J=H-I) 193.15 169.72 147.64 123.93 104.33
Average HRAB (K=(H+J)/2) 206.00 181.44 158.68 135.78 114.13
Average RAB for FRoR (G+K) 4,720.24 4,432.27 4,164.30 4,762.78 8,522.23
Closing Aero RAB and HRAB respectively as on March 31, 2019 as per the Tariff Order for the *
Third Control Period
#Pro-rata adjustment in additions in each year has been considered with the balance carried forward
to subsequent year. For Eg: Of total aeronautical asset addition of Rs. 212.24 Cr in FY 2020 as per
Table 78, Rs. 97.98 Cr is considered in FY 2020 on pro-rata basis while the balance Rs. 114.26 Cr
is shifted to FY 2021 as mentioned above. Similarly, of the total aeronautical asset addition of Rs.
9,780.18 Cr as per Table 78, asset addition of Rs. 3,938.76 Cr is considered in FY 2024 on pro-rata
basis, while the balance amount of Rs. 5,841.42 Cr is considered in the Opening Aero RAB for FY
2025.
^Carried forward from FY 2019
Note: Regulatory Asset Base considered for the purpose of estimating return was based on actual
date of capitalization for a year and was arrived at by incorporating addition/deletions/adjustments
to the aeronautical asset base of DIAL on a pro-rata basis on the opening balance of RAB in that
year.
Page 145 of 175
305. In View of the aforesaid tables, it is explicitly clear that AERA has
arrived at a calculation after double deduction of the deleted assets.
Moreover, the contention of AERA that this issue was never raised
by this appellant at the consultation stage is factually wrong. The
present appellant has given calculation and informed AERA that the
phase 3A capitalization amount of Rs.11,864.09 Crores was arrived
at after deduction of Rs.33.61 Crores on account of deletion of
assets.
306. While computing additions to RAB in the financial year 2023, the
amount of Rs.955.32 Crores had been computed after deduction of
Rs.33.61 Crores on account of deletion of assets as stated in Table
number 78.
307. As per Table number 80, as stated hereinabove for computing
aeronautical depreciation and RAB, the additions of RAB of
Rs.955.32 Crores (as per Table number 78) split into two
components, viz. Rs.397.13 Crores (recognized as pro-rata
additions in financial year 2023) and the balance of Rs.558.20
Crores carried forward as an “Adjustment from Previous
Years” in financial year 2024, (Rs.397.13 Crores +Rs. 558.20
Crores is Rs.955.33 Crores). Which is corresponding to the
Rs. 955.32 Crores reflected in Table 78, the marginal difference of
Rs. 0.01 Crore being attributable to rounding.
Page 146 of 175
308. In Table number 80 for the financial year 2024, AERA has
considered deletions for Rs.46.15 Crores by giving reference to
Table number 71 and deducted the said amount while
computing RAB, but, AERA has failed to consider or appreciate
the fact that this amount of Rs.46.15 Crores includes the
deletion of Rs.33.61 Crores.
309. This is an Error Apparent on the Face of the Record as
committed by AERA . The deleted amount has been again
deleted. Thus, there is a double deletion of Rs.33.61 Crores as
Table 71 to be read with Table 80 of the impugned order. This
amount of Rs.33.61 Crores has been deducted twice. Firstly,
as mentioned in Table 78 while computing additions to RAB,
and thereafter again the same amount has been deducted as
per calculation again in Table 80 while computing aeronautical
depreciation of RAB.
310. The sum of Rs.46.15 Crores as referred in Table number 80
under the heading deletions (by reference to Table 71)
includes the value of deleted asset of Rs.33.61 Crores
proposed by DIAL, audited financial statement for the financial
year 2022-23, are at Annexure RA-5 to the memo of rejoinder
Page 147 of 175
affidavit. Note number 13 to the financial statement makes it
explicitly clear that the value of net block comes to Rs.46.50
Crores. This figure has been arrived at after deduction of total
disposal value at Rs.165.06 Crores, accumulated depreciation
of Rs.118.56 Crores.
311. The aforesaid net block of Rs. 46.50 Crores has been
considered as Rs. 46.15 Crores in Table 71 by AERA, AERA
having, on a pro-rata basis, considered that the majority of its
impact pertains to the financial year 2024. Thus, the sum of
Rs. 33.61 Crores, being the value of the deleted asset, has
been considered twice by AERA.
312. AERA's contention in opposition to above is that there has been
no double counting, and that DIAL did not raise any issue
regarding the computation of RAB at the consultation stage.
We, must admit that neither contention survives contact with
AERA's own order.
313. As to the above, the premise of DIAL's complaint is not merely
established but expressly admitted by AERA, in this regard
reference may be drawn to the footnote to Table 78 of the
impugned order, recorded by AERA itself, states that "DIAL as
Page 148 of 175
part of clarifications submitted that total amount capitalised in
the Third Control Period under Phase 3A Expansion was Rs.
11,864.09 Cr after deducting Rs. 33.61 Cr," and that the said
sum has "been adjusted in the above computation in line with
clarifications provided by DIAL." AERA reiterates this at
paragraph 42 (iv) of its Counter Affidavit.
314. Once AERA accepts, on the face of its own order, that the
capitalisation figure from which it proceeded was already net
of the Rs. 33.61 Crore deletion and that it further adjusted its
computation to give effect to that deletion, any subsequent
deduction of the same asset in the course of the same true-up
necessarily counts it twice. The vice in the facts of present case
is not one of judgment or methodology, upon which minds
might differ; it is an arithmetical consequence of AERA's own
admitted starting point.
315. The mechanism by which the second deduction occurred is not
in serious dispute. Having given effect to the Rs. 33.61 Crore
deletion in Table 78, AERA proceeded, in Table 80, to deduct
a further sum of Rs. 46.15 Crores under the head "Deletions"
by reference to Table 71. That figure of Rs. 46.15 Crores is
Page 149 of 175
itself derived from DIAL's audited financial statements for FY
2022-23, where Note 13 records disposals of Rs. 165.06
Crores, a sum which sub-note (c) which is annexed to as
Annexure RA-5 to the rejoinder affidavit thereto identifies as
including the Terminal Arrival Building decapitalisation of
Rs. 33.60 Crores against accumulated depreciation on
disposals of Rs. 118.56 Crores, yielding a net block of
approximately Rs. 46.50 Crores.
316. It is clear to us that Rs. 33.61 Crores is therefore embedded
within the Rs. 46.15 Crores, and its deduction in Table 80
repeats the deduction already effected in Table 78. AERA has
offered no explanation whatsoever, either in the impugned
order or before us, as to why a further deduction of Rs. 46.15
Crores was warranted once the Rs. 33.61 Crore adjustment
had already been made.
317. We also note that AERA’s objection that DIAL did not raise this
issue at the consultation stage is of no legal consequence. A
computational error that results in a double deduction is not a
mere procedural objection that can be waived by failure to
respond to a consultation paper.
Page 150 of 175
318. AERA exercises statutory functions in determining tariff, and
its order must be correct in fact and in law. The consultation
process under Section 13(4) of the AERA Act is designed to
elicit stakeholder views; it does not operate as a limitation on
the appellate power of this Tribunal or on the right of an
aggrieved party to point out an error in the final order.
319. An error that is patent on the face of the record is
amenable to correction regardless of whether it was
flagged in the consultation stage . To hold otherwise would
allow AERA to immunise its errors from judicial scrutiny by relying
upon the silence of a stakeholder during consultation, a result
not countenanced by the statutory scheme.
320. We, therefore, direct AERA that, while computing the true-
up of RAB for the Third Control Period, the sum of Rs. 33.61
Crores shall not be deducted a second time, that is to say,
by excluding from the Rs. 46.15 Crores deletion carried into
Table 80 the component of Rs. 33.61 Crores already given
effect to in Table No. 78 and the computation shall be
revised accordingly. The necessary true-up shall be given
by AERA in the next Control Period . Issue No. XI is
accordingly answered in favour of the Appellant.
Page 151 of 175
ISSUE XII. Reduction of 1% of un-capitalized project
cost from the target revenue in case any particular
capital project is not completed or is not capitalized
as per approved capitalization schedule in the next
control period.
321. AERA has decided as per paragraph 6.7.3 of the impugned
tariff order, Annexure A-1, to reduce 1% un-capitalized
project cost from the target revenue in case of any particular
capital project is not completed as per the approved
capitalization schedule in the next control period. For the
ready reference, paragraph 6.7.3 of the impugned tariff
order, Annexure A-1 reads as under:
Para 6.7.3:
To reduce (adjust) 1 % of uncapitalized project cost from
the Target Revenue in case any particular capital project
is not completed/capitalized as per approved
capitalization schedule, as mentioned in Table 251. The
same will be examined at the time of tariff determination
for the next Control Period.
322. It has been contended by the learned counsel for
Respondent No. 1–AERA that, having regard to paragraph
6.7.3 of the impugned tariff order, no final decision has yet
been taken by AERA to impose a penalty of one per cent of
the uncapitalised project cost, and that this issue cannot,
Page 152 of 175
therefore, be decided at this stage. This contention is not
accepted by this Tribunal, mainly for the reason that AERA
has no power, jurisdiction or authority to impose such a
penalty upon the Airport Operator for an uncapitalised
project and such an observation in the impugned tariff order
is an unwarranted threat to the Airport Operator. There is no
provision for a penalty for delayed capitalisation, either
under the AERA Act, 2008, or under the OMDA (Annexure A-
2), or under the SSA (Annexure A-3).
323. If such powers were to be recognised, then in future, instead
of a 1% penalty, there could be a 1.5% penalty, a 2%
penalty, and thereafter a 2.5% penalty. It ought to have
been appreciated by AERA that uncapitalized project have
several reasons, sometimes beyond the control of Airport
Operator like pandemic situations arising out of COVID-19,
sometimes war between two mighty countries in the world,
sometimes footfall is being reduced for varieties of reasons.
324. The project may be incomplete for all these reasons, and
therefore, no penalty can be imposed on Airport Operator
without any penalty Clause in the OMDA and SSA or in AERA
Act, 2008. Moreover, even if there is a Penalty Clause in
Page 153 of 175
existence, a show-cause notice ought to have been given for
imposing penalty. Even if such notice is given, then also the
quantum of punishment thereafter also amount of penalty
should be proportionate. Over enthusiastic approach of AERA
is being reflected in paragraph 6.7.3 of the impugned tariff
order.
325. AERA should have appreciated the fact that, as per Clause
11.1.2 of OMDA (Annexure A-2), the Airports Authority
of India is getting an Annual Fee equivalent to
45.99% of projected Revenue for each Year during the
Term of the Agreement . Moreover, the Airport Operator is a
bidder chosen by the Central Government on PPP mode to
run IGIA. The Airport Operator has to take work from few
dozen of agencies. Moreover, Airport Operator is also facing
sometimes circumstances beyond its control.
326. The capitalisation of any project depends upon several
factors and, therefore, even if some delay has been caused,
AERA should have enquired into the reasons for the delay
and should have issued appropriate guidelines. A direct
allegation of a 'negligent approach' cannot be assigned
to the Airport Operator alone . The observation contained
Page 154 of 175
in paragraph 6.7.3 of the impugned tariff order demoralises
the concessionaire chosen by the Central Government (the
present Appellant). For every delay in the capitalisation of a
project, the Airport Operator may not be liable. These
aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by
AERA. AERA should have adopted a soft touch approach
instead of didactic approach.
327. We state that the AERA’s objection concerning prematurity
cannot be accepted, as Paragraph 6.7.3 does not state that
AERA may consider whether a one per cent adjustment
should be introduced in the future. It contains a definitive
determination, which reads as “To reduce (adjust) 1 % of
uncapitalized project cost from the Target Revenue in case
any particular capital project is not completed/capitalized as
per approved capitalization schedule, as mentioned in Table
251.”
328. Upon holistic reading of the above it appears that the
subsequent sentence stating that the matter will be
examined during the next tariff determination postpones the
application of the measure; however, it does not postpone
the decision to impose the measure.
Page 155 of 175
329. Thus, the triggering event and the rate of deduction have,
therefore, already been prescribed. What remains is only the
identification of projects which have not met their approved
capitalisation schedules and the computation of the
corresponding amount. In our view, DIAL is not precluded to
wait until the deduction is actually made before questioning
whether AERA possesses the jurisdiction to prescribe it.
330. AERA has sought to describe the measure as a regulatory
adjustment or balancing mechanism rather than a penalty.
The legal character of a measure depends upon its substance
and effect and not merely upon the description assigned to
it by the regulator as the bare reading of Paragraph 6.7.3
states that, apart from the ordinary consequences arising
from non-capitalisation of an asset, an additional amount
equal to one per cent of the uncapitalised project cost shall
be deducted from Target Revenue.
331. Its quantum bears no demonstrated relationship with the
duration of delay, the reason for delay, the extent of project
completion, the amount actually recovered through tariff or
the financial consequence suffered by airport users and such
a ‘predetermined monetary deduction’ possesses the
Page 156 of 175
essential attributes of a penalty, irrespective of whether
AERA describes it as a rationalisation, readjustment,
balancing measure or efficiency incentive.
332. AERA has relied upon Sections 13(1)(a)(i), 13(1)(a)(ii),
13(1)(a)(vii), 13(1)(f) and 14(4) of the AERA Act. These
provisions empower AERA to take into consideration timely
investment, quality of service and other relevant factors, to
perform functions necessary for tariff determination and to
issue directions for monitoring performance.
333. They do not, however, expressly or by necessary
implication confer an unrestricted power to impose a
fixed monetary exaction unrelated to the actual
regulatory consequence of the delay. We must clarify
that a general power to determine tariff and monitor
performance cannot be employed to create a penal
consequence for which the statute and governing
agreements provide no standard, limit or methodology.
334. AERA has relied upon Bangalore International Airport Limited
Vs. Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India, AERA
Appeal No. 8 of 2018, decided on 16.12.2020. In the facts of
the aforesaid judgement on this issue, it is relevant to point
Page 157 of 175
out that in BIAL’s case the project was accorded
capitalisation during the relevant Control Period upon a
specific assurance by BIAL that Terminal II–Phase 1 would
be commissioned within the stipulated period. The deduction
was treated as a limitation upon the benefit obtained through
such advance recognition. More importantly, paragraph 54
of the judgement expressly relied upon Clause 9.2.9 of
BIAL’s Concession Agreement, which recognised the
regulator’s authority concerning performance standards and
penalties.
335. However, no corresponding provision in DIAL’s OMDA or SSA
has been identified before us. Nor has AERA demonstrated
that DIAL has been granted an equivalent advance
capitalisation benefit upon a specific assurance which would
otherwise permit recovery of return or depreciation despite
the asset remaining unavailable for use. The contractual and
factual foundation upon which the BIAL judgment proceeded
on this issue is therefore absent in the present case.
336. It has been held by this Tribunal in its judgment dated
06.10.2023 in Mumbai International Airport Limited Vs.
Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India, AERA
Page 158 of 175
Appeal No. 2 of 2021, at paragraph 303 & 308, which reads
as under:
“303. Learned senior advocate for the respondent has placed
heavy reliance upon the decision rendered by this
Tribunal in AERA Appeal No.8 of 2018 dated 16.12.2020
in case of Bangalore International Airports Ltd. Looking
to the facts and circumstances of the case, the
Clause of penalty was prevailing in Article 9.2.9 of
Concession Agreement of BIAL dated 05.07.2004
whereas there is no such provision of penalty in
OMDA entered into between this appellant and AAI.
308. Moreover, in absence of any provision for penalty
under OMDA or SSA or AERA Act, 2008, no such
penalty can be imposed, otherwise highly
discriminatory position will prevail because today
1% of project cost penalty is imposed and
subsequently it may be increased to 1.5%. If 1%
penalty is allowed then 1.5% penalty would also
have to be allowed then in forth coming years, as
there are unguided powers, the penalty might be
3% also and, thereafter it can be 5% or more also.
There will be no end to penalty in absence of any
provision under OMDA, SSA and AERA Act, 2008 .
It ought to be kept in mind that unguided and
uncontrolled power always leads to discrimination. In
case of one airport operator penalty imposed will be 1%
and in case of another airport operator it can be 2%
because there is no law, there is no contract, there is no
provision and there are no guidelines. The balance has
already been created under OMDA and SSA in the
methodology of true up in next control period and as
stated hereinabove, as per the said methodology, excess
amount recovered shall be trued up with carrying cost in
next control period. Therefore, in the aforesaid example,
if Rs.83 Crores has been recovered, the true up amount
in the next control period, if the project is not commenced
or completed within the time bound schedule, would be
at Rs.121 Crores which is in fact more than sufficient
revenue clawed back from the airport operator and
Page 159 of 175
perhaps for this very reason no powers have been given
to AERA for imposing penalty. Hence, we hereby quash
and set aside the decision of AERA of carrying out 1% of
readjustment to project cost and applicable carrying cost
in the target revenue at the time of determination of tariff
for next control period. ”
337. The same principle has been reiterated by this Tribunal in its
judgment dated 14.02.2024 in GMR Hyderabad
International Airport Limited Vs. Airports Economic
Regulatory Authority of India, AERA Appeal No. 4 of
2021 , at paragraph 510, which reads under:
“ 510. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the present
case and also keeping in mind the AERA Act, 2008 and
Concession Agreement under dated 20.12.2024
(Annexure-A3 to the memo of this appeal) there is no
provision under the AERA Act, 2008 nor in there is
any provision in the Concession Agreement which
contemplates the levy of penalty much less levy of
penalty 1% on delayed execution and hence,
deduction of 1% of the total value of the project
cost from ARR is beyond the power, jurisdiction
and authority of AERA . ”
338. In view of the aforesaid decisions, AERA has no power,
jurisdiction and authority to reduce 1% of any uncapitalized
project cost from the target revenue in case any particular
project is not capitalized as per the approved capitalization
schedule in the next control period and, therefore, we hereby
quash and set aside the observations in paragraph 6.7.3 of the
impugned tariff order. Issue No. XII is accordingly
answered in the favour of the Appellant.
Page 160 of 175
ISSUE XIII. Non-consideration of expenditure
pertaining to beautification of airport gateway and
other areas as an Operation and Maintenance Cost
Pertaining to Aeronautical Services.
339. As per paragraph 6.6.11 at Annexure A-1, AERA has
decided not to consider the expenditure pertaining to
beautification of airport gateway and other areas as an
operation and maintenance cost because, in the opinion of
AERA, this expenditure does not add any tangible benefit to
the users. AERA has allowed expenditure towards
landscaping as an operation and maintenance cost for the
Bangalore International Airport Limited, however, a different
treatment has been meted out to the present appellant.
Moreover, this issue has also been decided in a judgment
delivered by this Tribunal dated 14.02.2024 in GMR
Hyderabad International Airport Limited Vs. AERA, in
AERA Appeal No.4 of 2021, at paragraph 449 , which
reads as under:
“ 449. Landscaping is an integral part of customer experience at
the airport campus, as submitted by the counsel for the
appellant and it is an integral part of airport operations as it
enables the airport operator to attract more passengers at
Page 161 of 175
the airport. Looking to the facts of the case and keeping
in mind the purpose of landscaping at the airport, it
is meant for the passengers at the airport. The
landscaping at the airport is always facilitating to
attract more passengers at the airport. Landscaping
is an integral part of the airport. This aspect of the
matter has not been properly appreciated by AERA
and has therefore wrongly treated landscaping as
common i.e. aeronautical and non-aeronautical.”
340. It thus emerges from the above that this Tribunal has
already recognised that expenditure pertaining to
beautification of airport, gateway, and other areas through
landscaping adds tangible benefit to the users. It enhances
environmental mitigation, reduces dust and noise pollution,
which directly support aeronautical usage and traffic
attraction.
341. AERA contends that the treatment accorded to Delhi must
differ from that accorded to Bangalore and Hyderabad "on
account of the concessions granted to each of these
airports". However, AERA does not identify any provision of
the SSA or the OMDA that excludes landscaping from
Operation and Maintenance cost, nor any provision in the
Bangalore or Hyderabad concessions that expressly includes
it.
Page 162 of 175
342. On the contrary, it is not in dispute that in the case of
Bangalore International Airport Limited, AERA itself treated
landscaping as an operation and maintenance cost
pertaining to Aeronautical Services, and that in the case of
GMR Hyderabad International Airport Limited, this Tribunal
directed the same treatment.
343. For future guidance it is made clear that where a regulator
such as AERA, accords materially different treatment to the
same category of expenditure at different airports, the
burden lies upon it to identify the material distinction. AERA
has not discharged that burden conclusively. An unexplained
divergence of this kind offends the Principle of Consistency
in Schedule 1 of the SSA, which obliges AERA to maintain "a
consistent approach in terms of underlying principles."
344. Further contention that landscaping "has not added any
efficiency to the airport operations," and is therefore not an
efficient cost within Schedule 1 of the SSA, is an
afterthought. Paragraph 6.6.11 of the impugned order
rejects the expenditure on the single ground that it "does not
add any tangible benefit to the users." It records no
examination whatsoever of the efficiency of the expenditure,
Page 163 of 175
no comparison against any benchmark, and no finding that
the cost was excessive or imprudently incurred. For ready
reference Paragraph 6.6.11 reads as under:
“6.6.11 The Authority has noted DIAL’s submission to allow the
expenditure pertaining to beautification of airport
gateways as submitted in the MYTP. During the
Consultation Stage, the Authority proposed not to
consider this expenditure as it did not add any
tangible benefit for the users. The Authority decides
to retain the same stand as taken during the
Consultation Stage.”
345. It appears that AERA has disallowed the expenditure in its
entirety, which is not an efficiency assessment at all but a
rejection in principle.
346. As to the substance, AERA's premise that beautification
confers no tangible benefit upon users cannot be accepted.
Landscaping at an airport is not ornamental indulgence. It
performs identifiable operational functions such as mitigation
of dust and noise, the improvement of ambient air quality,
and the maintenance of the environment in which
passengers arrive at, move through, and depart from the
airport.
347. This Tribunal has already so held in GMR Hyderabad
International Airport Limited Vs. AERA, judgment dated
14.02.2024, at paragraph 449, observing that landscaping
Page 164 of 175
"is an integral part of customer experience at the airport
campus," that it "is an integral part of airport operations as
it enables the airport operator to attract more passengers at
the airport," and that "landscaping at the airport is always
facilitating to attract more passengers at the airport."
348. We must also observe that these points are not without
foundation in the concession documents themselves, as
upon analysis of Entry 4 & 16 of Schedule 5 of the
OMDA at Annexure A-2, it identifies, among Aeronautical
Services, and reads as under:
“4. general maintenance and upkeep of the Airport;
…
…
16. Airside and landside access roads and forecourts
including writing, traffic signals, signage and
monitoring .”
349. From the perusal of the record it appears that the gateway
and forecourt of the Airport are precisely the areas to which
the disputed expenditure relates. It may also be observed,
that the Indira Gandhi International Airport remains a State
asset operated under concession, and is for a great many
international travellers the first and last point of contact with
this country.
Page 165 of 175
350. Landscaping of an airport gateway cannot be regarded as
wholly ornamental or unrelated to airport operations merely
because it does not directly increase runway, terminal or
passenger-handling capacity. Airport operations include the
maintenance of the physical environment through which
passengers enter, leave and move within the airport campus.
351. AERA has further not identified any provision in DIAL’s OMDA
or SSA which requires landscaping within airport gateways,
landside access areas or forecourts to be treated differently
from similar landscaping at Hyderabad Airport. We observe,
that merely making general assertion in the Counter Affidavit
that the concession agreements are different, cannot by
itself become a substitute for identification of the particular
contractual provision which corroborates the alleged
distinction.
352. It is worth keeping in mind that purely decorative
expenditure undertaken exclusively for corporate branding
or for enhancement of a non-aeronautical commercial
development need not be passed through to aeronautical
users, as these are not covered as per the clauses of OMDA.
Page 166 of 175
353. But, landscaping undertaken at airport gateways, access roads,
forecourts, boundary areas and other parts of the operational
airport campus for passenger experience, environmental
mitigation and maintenance of airport ambience is, however,
aeronautical in character.
354. It is entirely reasonable that the Airport Operator should maintain
its gateway and approaches to a standard befitting the
international stature of IGIA, which is adjudged as the best
airport in the India & South Asia for 8 successive years under the
relevant category and same should not in principle considered as
extravagance without any corroborating material; rather it ought
to be presumed as an ordinary incident of operating a major
international airport.
355. In view of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial
pronouncements, we hereby quash and set aside the
decision of AERA in paragraph 6.6.11 of the impugned tariff
order. We, hereby hold that the expenditure pertaining to
beautification of the airport gateway and other areas shall
be considered as an operation and maintenance cost
pertaining to Aeronautical Services and necessary true-up,
shall be given for this expenditure in the next control
period . Issue No. XIII is accordingly answered in the favour
of the Appellant.
Page 167 of 175
ISSUE XIV. Consideration of refundable security
deposit at the rate of Cost of Debt (CoD) instead of
Cost of Equity (CoE).
356. The Appellant has received interest-free Refundable
Security Deposits (“RSDs”) from lessees in connection with
concessions granted to third parties for the development
of Non-Transfer Assets. The deposits are contractually
refundable to the concerned lessees upon expiry or
termination of the respective concession arrangements.
357. However, where this RSD has been utilised by DIAL for
meeting the project cost of the IGI Airport, the amount so
deployed assumes the character of funds placed at the risk
of the project, and hence should be considered at the rate
of cost of equity, and not at the rate of cost of debt, for
the determination of WACC.
358. It has been held by this Tribunal in judgment dated
06.10.2023 in AERA Appeal No.2 of 2021 in case of
MIAL Vs. AERA in paragraphs 172 to 175 , which
reads as under:
Page 168 of 175
“172. Thus, even while getting the debt from the financial
companies, this appellant had mentioned RSD as equity.
Moreover, this amount has been utilised to fund the
capex, which is expected to have risk, inherent to
that associated with equity, hence opportunity cost
equivalent to cost of equity should be considered for
this appellant .
173. It is submitted by Learned Senior Advocate appearing on
behalf of the appellant that other infrastructure sector
regulators such as Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory
Board (PNGRB) and Tariff Authority for Major Ports
(TAMP) where the tariff is regulated have allowed return
on capital employed. These regulators do not provide
return on the basis of source and associated cost of funds.
Hence, we are of the considered opinion that once
RSD has been utilised for meeting the capital
expenditure, it should be treated as a part of Equity
Share Capital invested by the appellant in the
business and, therefore, this appellant is entitled to
reasonable rate of return treating RSD as equity.
174. Moreover, RSD raised by the appellant has been deployed
for meeting the project cost of the Chhatrapati Shivaji
Maharaj International Airport, Mumbai. If this fund is not
available with this appellant, they would have been
compelled to infuse same amount of equity for the project
of Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj International Airport,
Mumbai.
175. It is presumed by AERA that if the amount of RSD
would not have been available, the appellant would
have incurred a debt and, therefore, AERA has given
return on debt on an amount equal to RSD. This is
an error on the part of AERA, in fact, if the amount
of RSD would not have been available with this
appellant, this amount equal to RSD would have
been brought by this appellant through equity
infusion . ”
359. In view of the aforesaid decision, it appears that DIAL has used
the RSD as a means of finance for the IGI Airport, and its
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lenders have treated this amount as equity for the purpose of
computing the debt-equity ratio for lending purposes. The
aforesaid decision is equally applicable to the facts of the
present case, and therefore, the amount of RSD, having been
utilised by DIAL for meeting the project cost of the IGI Airport,
should be considered as equity, and should accordingly be
considered at the rate of cost of equity instead of cost of debt.
360. It ought to have been appreciated by AERA that, had this
amount of RSD not been received from the lessees , which
amount was ultimately used by DIAL for meeting the project
cost of the IGI Airport, an equivalent amount would have had
to be brought in by DIAL to meet the project cost. AERA has
presumed that such amount would have been necessarily
borrowed, and has accordingly applied the cost of debt. That
presumption is erroneous.
361. It is material to note that the Refundable Security Deposits
were funds which the Appellant was under no obligation to
deploy towards the Indira Gandhi International Airport at all.
As DIAL has asserted, and AERA has not disputed, the
deposits, generated from lease arrangements in respect of
Non-Transfer Assets, were available to the Appellant for
Page 170 of 175
application to any purpose, with no contractual compulsion to
invest them in the airport project.
362. The Appellant nonetheless elected to deploy them towards the
creation of aeronautical assets, thereby reducing to that extent
the equity it would otherwise have been required to infuse.
Funds were voluntarily committed to the project, and exposed
to the project's risk, in place of equity that would otherwise
have had to be raised.
363. As had the RSD not been available, the Airport Operator would
have been compelled to infuse an equivalent amount by way
of equity. It is immaterial by which methodology the Airport
Operator brings in the funds required for the project; what
matters is the risk to which those funds are exposed once
deployed. The cost of equity should therefore have been
applied for the determination of WACC.
364. The fallacy in AERA's approach lies in its presumption that, had
the Refundable Security Deposits not been available, DIAL
would have raised an equivalent sum by way of debt, and this
presumption is contradicted by the very treatment the funds
received through market, as it is not disputed that DIAL's own
lenders, in computing the debt-equity ratio for lending
purposes, treated the RSD as equity. In view of the above, a
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regulator cannot assign to a fund a character that the
commercial parties dealing with that fund at arm's length have
declined to assign to it.
365. Even, in the face of the above, the determinative question for
us is not the source of the fund but the risk to which it has
been exposed. Money deployed into the construction of
aeronautical assets is money placed at the risk of the project
it is subject to the hazards of execution, of traffic, and of
regulatory outcome, in precisely the manner that equity is, and
in a manner that a lender's advance, secured and contractually
serviced, is not.
366. Once the RSD was deployed to meet the project cost of the
Indira Gandhi International Airport, it assumed the risk profile
of equity, and the opportunity cost of that deployment is the
cost of equity. It is reinforced by the Paragraph 2 of
Commercial Principle in Schedule 1 of the SSA , which obliges
AERA to have regard to the need for the Joint Venture
Company to “achieve a reasonable return on investment
commensurate with the risk involved.”
367. To the above AERA's contention is, in substance, two fold, and
neither limb avails it. AERA reliance upon the pendency of its
Civil Appeal against the MIAL judgment has already been dealt
Page 172 of 175
with by this Tribunal under Issue No. I, and requires no further
elaboration and in the absence of any stay, that judgment
binds and guides AERA.
368. Its further contended, that Schedule 1 of the SSA confines it to
“efficient capital expenditure” and the “efficient cost of
debt/equity,”. AERA has not suggested that the deployment of
the RSD towards the project cost of the Airport was itself
inefficient, nor could it sensibly do so as the deployment
reduced DIAL's recourse to external borrowing and thereby
reduced the financing cost ultimately borne by users.
369. We have observed that time and again, AERA has invoked
efficiency principle not to identify any inefficiency, but as
a general licence to depart from a binding determination
of this Tribunal. It does not serve that purpose. Beyond
these, AERA has identified no provision of the OMDA, the SSA,
or the AERA Act that requires the RSD to be treated at the cost
of debt, and has recorded no reasoning in the impugned order
engaging with the risk character of the deployed funds.
370. AERA has further submitted that treating the Refundable
Security Deposits as equity would confer an unjustified return
upon the Appellant and impose an additional burden on airport
users. This submission misapprehends the nature of the
Page 173 of 175
exercise. The purpose of WACC is to reflect the appropriate
regulatory return on the capital actually deployed in the
regulated business, having regard to the economic function
and risk characteristics of each component of that capital.
371. Where funds bearing the risk of equity are remunerated only
at the cost of debt, the operator is under-compensated for a
risk genuinely borne, and the Weighted Average Cost of Capital
is thereby understated. The higher return associated with
equity is not, by itself, a windfall; it represents compensation
for the greater risk borne by such capital.
372. AERA’s submission therefore assumes the very issue requiring
determination, whether the RSD, as deployed, functioned as
debt or as equity-side capital. Once the latter character is
established on the facts, allowing the corresponding regulatory
return cannot be described as unjustified, subject always to
verification of the quantum and period of actual eligible
deployment and the exclusion of any duplication.
373. In view of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial
pronouncements, we hereby quash and set aside the
decision of AERA at paragraph 2.2.7 of the impugned
tariff order (Annexure A-1) , whereby AERA has decided to
consider RSD at the rate of cost of debt. We hereby hold that
Page 174 of 175
AERA shall consider RSD at the rate of cost of equity for the
determination of WACC. Issue No. XIV is accordingly
answered in favour of the Appellant, and this Appeal is
allowed to the aforesaid extent.
374. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, arguments,
findings and applicable legal principles discussed
hereinabove, this AERA Appeal No. 1 of 2025 is hereby
allowed to the aforesaid extent and accordingly stands
disposed of. Consequently, AERA Order No. 20/2024-25
dated 28.03.2025 (Annexure A-1) passed by Respondent
No. 1 – AERA stands modified to the extent of the issues
allowed in the present Appeal. AERA is directed to give
effect to the same within a period of three months from
the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. All pending
miscellaneous applications connected with this Appeal
are also disposed of.
_____________________
(JUSTICE D.N. PATEL)
CHAIRPERSON
/NS/
___________________
(DR. SANJEEV BANZAL)
MEMBER
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