DR RAMDAS @ RAMDAS PATIL vs STATE OF KARNATAKA

1
R
Reserved on :16.07.2026
Pronounced on :16.10.2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

TH
DATED THIS THE 16 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

CRIMINAL PETITION No.10701 OF 2025

BETWEEN:

DR.RAMDAS @ RAMDAS PATIL
S/O GOVINDARAO PATIL
AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS,
RESIDING AT:
NO.76-4, MEHKAR
NEAR GOVERNMENT BUS STAND
BHALKI TALUK
BIDAR DISTRICT
KARNATAKA – 585 416.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI G.L.VISHWANATH, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
MS.MANASA M.B., ADVOCATE)

AND:

1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY WOMEN POLICE STATION
MANGALURU
REPRESENTED BY
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT BUILDING
BENGALURU – 560 001.

2 . XXXXX











Digitally
signed by
CHAYA S A
Location:
High Court of
Karnataka

2
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI K.NAGESHWARAPPA, HCGP FOR R-1;
SRI SHANTKUMAR N., ADVOCATE FOR R-2)

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 528 OF
B.N.S.S., PRAYING TO QUASH OR SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED
04.06.2025 PASSED IN SPL.C.NO.88/2025 BY THE II ADDL.
DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, MANGALURU TAKING
COGNIZANCE FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 69 AND 115(2) OF BNS
2023 AND U/S.3(1)(w)(i)(ii) AND SEC.3(2)(va) OF SC & ST (POA)
ACT ON THE FILE OF THE II ADDL. DISTRICT AND SESSIONS
JUDGE, MANGALURU VIDE ANNEXURE- A AND THE CHARGE SHEET
BEARING NO.45/2025 DATED 13.05.2025 FILED BY THE
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, MANGALURU CENTRAL
SUB-DIVISION IN CRIME NO.27/2025, WHICH IS NOW
REGISTERED AS SPL.C.NO.88/2025 FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 69
AND 115(2) OF BNS 2023 AND U/S.3(1)(w)(i)(ii) AND SEC.3(2)(va)
OF SC & ST (POA) ACT BEFORE THE II ADDL. DISTRICT AND
SESSIONS JUDGE, MANGALURU VIDE ANNEXURE B.

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 16.07.2026, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

3
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

CAV ORDER


The petitioner is before the Court calling in question
proceedings in Special Case No.88 of 2025 registered for offences
punishable under Sections 69 and 115(2) of the BNS and Sections
3(1)(w)(i)(ii) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to
as ‘the Act’ for short).

2. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: -

nd
The 2 respondent is the complainant and petitioner, the
accused. Both are doctors by profession. It is the case of the
prosecution that the complainant meets the accused in 2017 in
Bidar through a common friend and later developed friendship;
friendship blossomed into relationship and the relationship
continued with the accused in 2019 at Mangalore and further
continued till the date of registration of the complaint. In this entire
period between 2017 to 2023 it is the allegation that the petitioner
has had physical relationship with the complainant on the promise

4
of marriage and has breached the said promise on the score that
the petitioner belongs to Marata community and the complainant
belonging to Scheduled Caste. The complainant then comes to
know that the petitioner is getting married to another girl in Bidar
and is said to have come to the petitioner to speak about their
marriage and denial of such marriage, the complainant walks to the
jurisdictional Police Station to register a complaint for the aforesaid
offences. The complaint becomes a crime in Crime No.27 of 2025.
The police conduct investigation, file a charge sheet against the
petitioner for the afore-quoted offences and filing of the charge
sheet is what has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject
petition.

3. Heard Sri. G. L. Vishwanath, learned senior counsel
appearing for the petitioner, Sri K Nageshwarappa, learned High
Court Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1 and
Sri Shanth Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent
No.2.

4. The learned senior counsel Sri G.L. Vishwanath appearing
for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the petitioner who

5
is the medical practitioner comes in contact with the complainant
when they were pursuing their respective medical courses;
presently, petitioner is said to be pursing his M.D. in Anesthesia and
the respondent/complainant MDS in Prosthodontics. Initially
between 2019 and 2023, the complainant and the petitioner have
had relationship which was physical as well, but never on the
promise of marriage or never had relationship on deceitful means.
The alleged physical act was at the first instance during the year
2019 and it continued after a gap of almost a year till the date of
registration of complaint. The learned senior counsel would submit
that it cannot be said that the petitioner promised marriage and
then began relationship which lasted for 7 long years and that
permitting further trial for offence punishable under Section 69 of
the BNS would become an abuse of the process of law. Merely
because the complainant belongs to Scheduled Caste, it cannot be
that the petitioner must face trial.

nd
5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the 2
respondent/complainant would vehemently refute the submissions
nd
in contending that the petitioner and the 2 respondent were

6
initially friends between 2017 and 2019. The relationship began in
the year 2019 and lasted for about 4 years. This was only on the
promise of marriage. The marriage does not take place on account
of caste equation. By then, the petitioner had indulged in sexual
relationship on promise of marriage. The learned counsel submits
that the Police after investigation have filed a charge sheet and
have also sought permission to file additional charge sheet in the
event of additional evidence springing in further investigation. He
would seek dismissal of the present petition.

6. The learned High Court Government Pleader would also toe
the lines of the learned counsel for the complainant in contending
that the Police after investigation have filed the charge sheet. In
the light of the charge sheet having been filed, this Court must not
interfere at this stage. The Court should either relegate the
petitioner to file a revision or direct the petitioner to come out clean
in a full-blown trial. He would seek dismissal of the petition.

7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.

7
8. The afore-narrated facts though a matter of record would
nd
require skeletal iteration. The meeting of the petitioner and the 2
respondent/complainant happens during the period when the
petitioner was pursuing his final year medical degree in Bidar
Institute of Medical Sciences and he is presently said to be pursuing
M.D. in Anesthesia at A.J. Institute of Medical Sciences and
nd
Research Centre, Mangalore. The 2 respondent/complainant was
studying BDS in Srinivasa Institute of Dental Sciences, Mukka,
Mangalore at the relevant point in time and is presently pursuing
her postgraduate MDS in Prosthodontics at KVG Dental College and
nd
Hospital, Sullia in Dakshina Kannada. The petitioner and the 2
respondent/complainant come to know each other in 2017 and
developed friendship since 2019. The friendship appears to have
turned into consensual sexual relationship. The said relationship
then lasted between June, 2019 and November, 2023 for five long
years. The allegation is for five long years the petitioner has had
sexual intercourse with the complainant on the promise of marriage
and has breached the said promise owing to certain caste equation.

8
9. It is the allegation that the marriage between the petitioner
and the complainant did not take place. It is then a complaint
comes to be registered against the petitioner on 15-03-2025. Since
the entire issue is now triggered from registration of the complaint,
I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. It reads as follows:

“ From

Xxxxx
xxxxx

To,

Station House Office,
Women's Police Station
Mangalore City

Respected Sir,

Subject - Gave False Hope for Marriage & cheated
sexually & mentally tortured.

I xxxxxxx, wants to file a complaint against Dr. Ramdas
Patil.
I met Ramdas in 2017 in Bidar through my Best friend
contact.

Later we both fell in love and had a relationship of 7 years
till 2023 (Nov)

I had physical relation with Ramdas in 2019 (Mangalore)
& it continued till today.

Ramdas gave me promise to marry & convinced me for
my physical relation even his parents against caste.

9
st
For 1 time, we had physical contact in my Flat (Mukka)
th
(103), in my room in June 26 2019. Later, it continued the
th
same thing till 2023 (7 Nov) at the time I was studying in
Srinivas Dental College & Later after 2 years, I was suffering
mental depression (Because of the mental stress of rejection of
Marriage). As I belong to Schedule Caste (Holeya) & Ramdas
belong to Maratha (General Category) his family rejected
marriage because of caste discrimination & I fell into depression
in Dec 2023 & still suffering mentally to move on from mental
trauma.

In Sept. 2024, I joined my post graduate (MDS) (KVG
Dental College, Sullia), Prosthodent for my further studies.

th
In Sept. 5 2024, Ramdas again contacted me & stay in
touch for physical at Hotel Poonja International and again gave
me hopes for marriage.

th
Now, after 5 months, in March 12 he denied for marriage
th
& this family getting him married to another girl in Bidar on 20
March 2025.

th
On 13 March 2025, I came to Mangalore to talk to
Ramdas. For 3 days we stayed in Hotel International Poonja,
th
Mangalore. On Saturday, 15 March 2025 Morning at 11:am we
had arguments regarding the Marriage, decision, where he
assaulted me & forced me to commit suicide & gave mental
trauma. He threatened me to commit suicide & leave him. He
doesn't get affected & wants to leave me suffering mentally &
physically.

Ramdas has many physical affairs with other girls in
around A.J. College & other places where he played with
women's emotion.

So, I request you to kindly provide me to justice to get
married to Ramdas (Caste discrimination basis) & strict against
must be taken against his family to do the caste discrimination
& giving trauma (mentally) to me.

Place Mangalore Yours faithfully
th
Date:15 /03/25 Sd/-“

10
It is the case of the complainant that she meets the petitioner in
2017 in Bidar. Later they fell in love and have had relationship for 7
years from 2017 to 2023. The physical relationship between the
petitioner and the complainant, even according to the complainant,
begins in 2019 and continues till the date of registration of the
complaint i.e., 15-03-2025. The complainant narrates that for the
first time they had physical relationship on 26-06-2019, at the time
when the complainant was pursuing her bachelor degree. The
relationship had a gap between 2023 and 2024. In September,
2024, the narration in the complaint is that the complainant was
pursuing post-graduation. On 05-09-2024 the complainant is said
to have been contacted by the petitioner again and have had sexual
relationship thereafter, up to the date of registration of the
complaint. All this is now shrouded with the allegation that it has
happened on account of promise of marriage. This becomes a crime
in Crime No.27 of 2025 for the afore-quoted offences. The Police
conduct investigation and file a charge sheet against the petitioner.
The summary of the charge sheet as obtaining in Column No.17
reads as follows:

11
12
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12
As observed hereinabove, filing of the charge sheet is what has
driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition.

10. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner has taken
this Court through the statements recorded of the complainant to
demonstrate that all the years i.e., 7 or 8 years the petitioner and
the complainant knew each other, they have had sexual
relationship. 7 or 8 years of sexual relationship cannot mean that it
was on promise of marriage. A man cannot by deceitful means have
relationship with a woman for 7 to 8 long years. In the case at
hand, the relationship initially was for about 4 years when they
were pursuing their respective studies and after gap of a year, the
two again began the second bout of relationship. If the sexual acts
between the complainant and the petitioner is on promise of
marriage and the petitioner has breached it, the complainant had
no warrant to go back to the petitioner after gap of a year and
begin the relationship all over again. It is, therefore, a clear case
nd
where the petitioner and the 2 respondent/complainant have had
sexual relationship, but not on the promise of marriage. It is the
case of the complainant herself that for 7 to 8 years they know

13
each other and were in love. The relationship between the two
turning sore or it breaking cannot mean that the petitioner would
stand guilty of the offence under Section 69 of the BNS. Section 69
of the BNS reads as follows:

“ 69. Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful
means, etc .—Whoever, by deceitful means or by making
promise to marry to a woman without any intention of fulfilling
the same, has sexual intercourse with her, such sexual
intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation .—“deceitful means” shall include inducement
for, or false promise of employment or promotion, or marrying
by suppressing identity.

OTES ►
N In the Penal Code 1860, prior to repeal, having
sexual intercourse on false promise of marriage, employment,
promotion or by supressing identity was not recognised as an
offence.”

Section 69 punishes a person who by deceitful means or making
promise of marriage to a woman without any intention of fulfilling
the same has had sexual intercourse and becomes open for
punishment under Section 69 which is 10 years imprisonment. The
soul of the provision is deceitful means. It cannot be said that the
petitioner has had sexual relationship with the complainant by
deceitful means for over 8 years. The deceitful means under Section

14
69 has for the first time sprung on 01-07-2024 by introduction of a
new provision in BNS. By then, the two have had 6 years of sexual
relationship. It cannot be that the new provision springs in new
allegations between the two. Section 69 is akin to what was being
alleged throughout of Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC coupled with
Section 420, where breach of promise of marriage was the fulcrum
of the allegation in every case. This is now being made use of to
become the fulcrum of Section 69. Whether the offence has
happened today or offence has happened 10 years ago, Section 69
is what is being pulled in by the complainant.

11. The Apex Court in interpreting Section 376(2)(n) and
Section 420 of the IPC where sexual intercourse had happened
between the accused and the victim for years which is alleged that
it was on the promise of marriage and its breach had become the
reason for registration of the complaint or the crime, held that such
allegations of sexual relationship between the two can never
become the allegation of rape. I, therefore, deem it appropriate to
notice the judicial landscape.

15
11.1. The Apex Court in the case of DR. DHRUVARAM
1
MURLIDHAR SONAR v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA has
held as follows:
“…. …. ….

11. In State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa [State of
Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89 : 2002 SCC
(Cri) 539] , it was held that while exercising powers under
Section 482 CrPC, the court does not function as a court of
appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section
though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with
caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests
specifically laid down in the section itself. It was further held as
under : (SCC p. 94, para 6)

“ 6. … It would be an abuse of process of the
court to allow any action which would result in injustice
and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the
powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding
if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to
abuse of the process of court or quashing of these
proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court
may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is
sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the
materials to assess what the complainant has alleged
and whether any offence is made out even if the
allegations are accepted in toto.”
… … …
23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape
and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very
carefully examine whether the complainant had actually
wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and
had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his
lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or
deception. There is also a distinction between mere
breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If
the accused has not made the promise with the sole

1
(2019) 18 SCC 191

16
intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual
acts, such an act would not amount to rape. There may be
a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for the
accused and not solely on account of the misconception
created by accused, or where an accused, on account of
circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which
were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite
having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated
differently. If the complainant had any mala fide
intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear
case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical
relationship between the parties would not constitute an
offence under Section 376 IPC.

24. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the
appellant was serving as a Medical Officer in the Primary Health
Centre and the complainant was working as an Assistant Nurse
in the same health centre and that she is a widow. It was
alleged by her that the appellant informed her that he is a
married man and that he has differences with his wife.
Admittedly, they belong to different communities. It is also
alleged that the accused/appellant needed a month's time to get
their marriage registered. The complainant further states that
she had fallen in love with the appellant and that she needed a
companion as she was a widow. She has specifically stated that
“as I was also a widow and I was also in need of a companion, I
agreed to his proposal and since then we were having love affair
and accordingly we started residing together. We used to reside
sometimes at my home whereas sometimes at his home”. Thus,
they were living together, sometimes at her house and
sometimes at the residence of the appellant. They were in a
relationship with each other for quite some time and
enjoyed each other's company. It is also clear that they
had been living as such for quite some time together.
When she came to know that the appellant had married
some other woman, she lodged the complaint. It is not
her case that the complainant has forcibly raped her. She
had taken a conscious decision after active application of
mind to the things that had happened. It is not a case of
a passive submission in the face of any psychological
pressure exerted and there was a tacit consent and the
tacit consent given by her was not the result of a

17
misconception created in her mind. We are of the view
that, even if the allegations made in the complaint are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety,
they do not make out a case against the appellant. We
are also of the view that since the complainant has failed
to prima facie show the commission of rape, the
complaint registered under Section 376(2)( b ) cannot be
sustained.”

11.2. Later, the Apex Court in the case of SHAMBHU
2
KHARWAR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH has held as follows:
“…. …. ….

9. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of
Maharashtra [Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra,
(2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] a two-Judge Bench
of this Court of which one of us was a part (D.Y. Chandrachud,
J.), held in Sonu v. State of U.P. [Sonu v. State of U.P., (2021)
18 SCC 517] observed that: (Pramod Suryabhan Pawar
case [Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019)
9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] , SCC pp. 616-18 & 620,
paras 12, 14, 16 & 18)

“ 12 . This Court has repeatedly held that consent
with respect to Section 375IPC involves an active
understanding of the circumstances, actions and
consequences of the proposed act. An individual who
makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various
alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various
possible consequences flowing from such action or
inaction, consents to such action. …

*

14 . … Specifically in the context of a
promise to marry, this Court has observed that
there is a distinction between a false promise
given on the understanding by the maker that it
will be broken, and the breach of a promise which

2
(2022) SCC OnLine SC 1032

18
is made in good faith but subsequently not
fulfilled. …
*
16 . Where the promise to marry is false and
the intention of the maker at the time of making
the promise itself was not to abide by it but to
deceive the woman to convince her to engage in
sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact”
that vitiates the woman's “consent”. On the other
hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a
false promise. To establish a false promise, the
maker of the promise should have had no intention
of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The
“consent” of a woman under Section 375 is
vitiated on the ground of a “misconception of fact”
where such misconception was the basis for her
choosing to engage in the said act . …

*
18 . To summarise the legal position that emerges
from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with
respect to Section 375 must involve an active and
reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To
establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a
“misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to
marry, two propositions must be established. The
promise of marriage must have been a false promise,
given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered
to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must
be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the
woman's decision to engage in the sexual act .”

(emphasis supplied)
… … …

11. In this backdrop and taking the allegations in
the complaint as they stand, it is impossible to find in the
FIR or in the charge-sheet, the essential ingredients of an
offence under Section 376IPC. The crucial issue which is
to be considered is whether the allegations indicate that
the appellant had given a promise to the second
respondent to marry which at the inception was false and
on the basis of which the second respondent was induced
into a sexual relationship. Taking the allegations in the
FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial

19
ingredients of the offence under Section 375IPC are
absent. The relationship between the parties was purely
of a consensual nature. The relationship, as noted above,
was in existence prior to the marriage of the second
respondent and continued to subsist during the term of
the marriage and after the second respondent was
granted a divorce by mutual consent.


12. The High Court, in the course of its judgment, has
merely observed that the dispute raises a question of fact which
cannot be considered in an application under Section 482CrPC.
As demonstrated in the above analysis, the facts as they stand,
which are not in dispute, would indicate that the ingredients of
the offence under Section 376IPC were not established. The
High Court has, therefore, proceeded to dismiss the application
under Section 482CrPC on a completely misconceived basis.”



3
11.3. In XXXX v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH the Apex
Court holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
9. While getting her statement recorded under Section
164CrPC, she admitted that she knew the appellant since 2017.
On account of dispute with her husband, she was living with her
parents. As she got acquainted with the appellant, they fell in
love. In 2018, the appellant went to Maharashtra for job.
However, he used to visit her home and take care of the
complainant as well as her daughter. In 2019, the appellant
assured the complainant that he will marry her in case she takes
divorce from her husband who used to harass and beat her. For
this reason, she divorced her husband and solemnised marriage
with the appellant in a temple in January 2019. Thereafter, they
started living together with her daughter born from the previous
marriage. Despite assurance, the appellant did not solemnise
court marriage. After marriage was solemnised in temple,
treating the appellant as her husband, they both started leading
a married life having physical relations from January 2019 till

3
(2024) 3 SCC 496

20
June 2020. The appellant treated the complainant as his wife.
Thereafter, the appellant refused to respond to her calls and
even marry her.
… … …
11. Further, in the FIR the complainant stated that she
got divorce from her earlier husband on 10-12-2018. In the
statement under Section 164CrPC, she stated that marriage
between the appellant and the complainant was solemnised in a
temple in January 2019. However, the date of divorce as
claimed by the complainant is belied from the copy of the
decree annexed with the appeal as Annexure P-9, where divorce
by mutual consent was granted to the complainant and her
husband vide judgment dated 13-1-2021. The aforesaid fact
could not be disputed. Meaning thereby, the complainant
besides the facts in the FIR and also in the statement under
Section 164CrPC regarding her divorce from the earlier
marriage, sought to claim that she had remarried with the
appellant during subsistence of her earlier marriage.

12. From the contents of the complaint, on the basis
of which FIR was got registered and the statement got
recorded by the complainant, it is evident that there was
no promise to marry initially when the relations between
the parties started in the year 2017. In any case, even on
the dates when the complainant alleges that the parties
had physical relations, she was already married. She
falsely claimed that divorce from her earlier marriage
took place on 10-12-2018. However, the fact remains
that decree of divorce was passed only on 13-1-2021. It
is not a case where the complainant was of an immature
age who could not foresee her welfare and take right
decision. She was a grown up lady about ten years elder
to the appellant. She was matured and intelligent enough
to understand the consequences of the moral and
immoral acts for which she consented during subsistence
of her earlier marriage. In fact, it was a case of betraying
her husband. It is the admitted case of the prosecutrix
that even after the appellant shifted to Maharashtra for
his job, he used to come and stay with the family and
they were living as husband and wife. It was also the
stand taken by the appellant that he had advanced loan

21
of Rs 1,00,000 to the prosecutrix through banking
channel which was not returned back.”




11.4. In JASPAL SINGH KAURAL v. STATE OF NCT OF
4
DELHI the Apex Court has held as follows:
“…. …. ….

13. At the outset, we refer to the ratio in Naim
Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi) [ Naim Ahamed v. State
(NCT of Delhi) , (2023) 15 SCC 385] whereby this Hon'ble
Court had decided a similar matter, wherein allegedly,
the prosecutrix had also given her consent for a sexual
relationship with the appellant-accused, upon an
assurance to marry. The prosecutrix, who was herself a
married woman having three children, had continued to
have such relationship with the appellant-accused, at
least for about five years till she gave the complaint. In
the conspectus of such facts and circumstances, this Court had
observed as under : (SCC pp. 398-99, paras 21-22)

“ 21 . The bone of contention raised on behalf of
the respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her
consent for sexual relationship under the misconception
of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to
marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and
therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of the
law and the case fell under Clause Secondly of Section
375IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there
is a difference between giving a false promise and
committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of
false promise, the accused right from the beginning
would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix
and would have cheated or deceived the prosecutrix by
giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to
satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise,
one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might
have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her,
and subsequently might have encountered certain
circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances

4
(2025) 5 SCC 756

22
beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his
promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of
promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a
person for the offence under Section 376. As stated
earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts
before the court.

22 . In the instant case, the prosecutrix who
herself was a married woman having three
children, could not be said to have acted under the
alleged false promise given by the appellant or
under the misconception of fact while giving the
consent to have sexual relationship with the
appellant. Undisputedly, she continued to have
such relationship with him at least for about five
years till she gave complaint in the year 2015.
Even if the allegations made by her in her
deposition before the court, are taken on their face
value, then also to construe such allegations as
“rape” by the appellant, would be stretching the
case too far. The prosecutrix being a married
woman and the mother of three children was
mature and intelligent enough to understand the
significance and the consequences of the moral or
immoral quality of act she was consenting to . Even
otherwise, if her entire conduct during the course
of such relationship with the accused, is closely
seen, it appears that she had betrayed her
husband and three children by having relationship
with the accused, for whom she had developed
liking for him. She had gone to stay with him
during the subsistence of her marriage with her
husband, to live a better life with the accused. Till
the time she was impregnated by the accused in
the year 2011, and she gave birth to a male child
through the loin of the accused, she did not have
any complaint against the accused of he having
given false promise to marry her or having
cheated her. She also visited the native place of
the accused in the year 2012 and came to know
that he was a married man having children also,
still she continued to live with the accused at
another premises without any grievance. She even
obtained divorce from her husband by mutual
consent in 2014, leaving her three children with
her husband. It was only in the year 2015 when
some disputes must have taken place between

23
them, that she filed the present complaint . The
accused in his further statement recorded under
Section 313CrPC had stated that she had filed the
complaint as he refused to fulfil her demand to pay
her huge amount. Thus, having regard to the facts
and circumstances of the case, it could not be said
by any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix
had given her consent for the sexual relationship
with the appellant under the misconception of
fact, so as to hold the appellant guilty of having
committed rape within the meaning of Section
375IPC.”
(emphasis supplied)

14. The decision in Naim Ahamed [ Naim
Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi) , (2023) 15 SCC 385] is
squarely applicable to the conspectus of present case. It
has been time and again settled by this Hon'ble Court,
that the mere fact that physical relations were
established pursuant to a promise to marry will not
amount to a rape in every case. An offence under Section
375IPC could only be made out, if promise of marriage
was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain
consent for sexual relations without having any intent of
fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that
such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on
the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations.
[ Mahesh DamuKhare v. State of Maharashtra , (2024) 11
SCC 398 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471]


15. Upon a bare perusal of the FIR and the charge-sheet,
the following facts are clearly established:


15.1. The physical relationship between the appellant and
Respondent 2 was consensual from the very beginning and
cannot be said to be against the will or without the consent of
the prosecutrix. Even if the case of the prosecutrix is accepted,
there is no material on record to show that there was any
dishonest inducement, or incitement on part of the appellant.”
15.2. There is also no material on record, to establish an
offence of criminal intimidation under Section 506IPC against

24
the appellant. In fact, it is apparent from the conduct of the
appellant, that he was acting in furtherance of the promise to
marry. It is the own observation of the High Court, that the
appellant had made a promise to marry Respondent 2 and was
acting accordingly. The mangalsutra being prepared with the
initials of the name of Respondent 2 complainant does reflect his
intention and promise to marry. However, in the eventuality of a
fall out or split between the parties, it cannot be said that the
promise to marry was false, and the corresponding conduct
dishonest.
15.3. There is also no element of criminality that
can be accrued to the appellant, insofar as it is the own
case of the prosecutrix, that she was in a relationship
with the appellant, while being in a subsisting marriage.
It is also hard to believe that the prosecutrix could have
sustained a physical relationship for a prolonged period
of five years [ Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi) , (2025) 5
SCC 764] , while being in a subsisting marriage, and even
subsequently obtaining divorce to sustain the
relationship. The prolonged period of the relationship,
during which the sexual relations continued between the
parties, is sufficient to conclude that there was never an
element of force or deceit in the relationship. [ Mahesh
Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra , (2024) 11 SCC 398 :
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471] The prosecutrix was thus,
conscious and cognizant of the consequences of her
actions, and had given her consent after an active and
reasoned deliberation. [ Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v.
State of Maharashtra , (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC
(Cri) 903]”
5
11.5. In SAMADHAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA the
Apex Court has held as follows:
“…. …. ….

28. We find that the present case is not a case
where the appellant lured respondent No. 2 solely for

5
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528

25
physical pleasures and then vanished. The relationship
continued for a period of three long years, which is a
considerable period of time. They remained close and
emotionally involved. In such cases, physical intimacy
that occurred during the course of a functioning
relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as
instances of offence of rape merely because the
relationship failed to culminate in marriage.

29. This Court has, on numerous occasions, taken
note of the disquieting tendency wherein failed or broken
relationships are given the colour of criminality. The
offence of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be
invoked only in cases where there exists genuine sexual
violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To convert
every sour relationship into an offence of rape not only
trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts
upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice.
Such instances transcend the realm of mere personal
discord. The misuse of the criminal justice machinery in
this regard is a matter of profound concern and calls for
condemnation.

30. In Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi , (2025) 5 SCC
764, this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna, J.)
observed that a mere break-up of a relationship between a
consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal
proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the
parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of
criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a
marriage. The relevant portion is extracted as under:

“20. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR
and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial
ingredients of the offence under Section 376(2)(n)IPC
are absent. A review of the FIR and the complainant's
statement under Section 164CrPC discloses no indication
that any promise of marriage was extended at the
outset of their relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if
the prosecution's case is accepted at its face value, it
cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged in a
sexual relationship with the appellant solely on account
of any assurance of marriage from the appellant. The
relationship between the parties was cordial and also

26
consensual in nature. A mere break up of a relationship
between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation
of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual
relationship between the parties at the initial stages
cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said
relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship.
Further, both parties are now married to someone else
and have moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our
view, the continuation of the prosecution in the present
case would amount to a gross abuse of the process of
law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by
continuing the prosecution.”
(underlining by us)

31. This Court is conscious of the societal context in
which, in a country such as ours, the institution of marriage
holds deep social and cultural significance. It is, therefore, not
uncommon for a woman to repose complete faith in her partner
and to consent to physical intimacy on the assurance that such
a relationship would culminate in a lawful and socially
recognised marriage. In such circumstances, the promise of
marriage becomes the very foundation of her consent, rendering
it conditional rather than absolute. It is, thus, conceivable that
such consent may stand vitiated where it is established that the
promise of marriage was illusory, made in bad faith, and with no
genuine intention of fulfilment, solely to exploit the woman. The
law must remain sensitive to such genuine cases where trust
has been breached and dignity violated, lest the protective
scope of Section 376 of the IPC be reduced to a mere formality
for those truly aggrieved. At the same time, the invocation of
this principle must rest upon credible evidence and concrete
facts, and not on unsubstantiated allegations or moral
conjecture.
… …. …

33. The appellant has unequivocally asserted that, during
the subsistence of the relationship, no grievance or allegation
was ever raised by respondent No. 2 regarding the absence of
consent in their physical relations. It was only upon the
appellant's refusal to fulfil her demand for payment of the sum
of Rs. 1,50,000/- that the present criminal proceedings came to
be instituted. Furthermore, the alleged incidents are stated to
have occurred between 12.03.2022 and 20.05.2024; however,

27
the FIR was lodged only on 31.08.2024, i.e. nearly three
months after the last alleged act of sexual intimacy.

34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific
allegation that the appellant had either forcibly taken or
compelled respondent No. 2 to accompany him to the hotel, nor
does it disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or
inducement on the part of the appellant to procure her presence
there. Therefore, the only logical inference that emerges is that
respondent No. 2, of her own volition, visited and met the
appellant on each occasion. It is also borne out from the record
that whenever the appellant brought up the subject of marriage,
respondent No. 2 herself opposed the proposal. In such
circumstances, the contention of respondent No. 2 that the
physical relationship between the parties was premised upon
any assurance of marriage by the appellant is devoid of merit
and stands unsustainable.

35. We deem it appropriate to refer to the decision of this
Court in Rajnish Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh , (2025) 4 SCC
197, whereby it was held that when a woman who willingly
engages in a long-term sexual relationship with a man, fully
aware of its nature and without any cogent evidence to show
that such relationship was induced by misconception of fact or
false promise of marriage made in bad faith from the inception,
the man cannot be held guilty of rape under Section 376 of
the IPC. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted as
under:

“33. There is no dispute that from the year 2006
onwards, the complainant and the appellant were
residing in different towns. The complainant is an
educated woman and there was no pressure whatsoever
upon her which could have prevented her from filing a
police complaint against the accused if she felt that the
sexual relations were under duress or were being
established under a false assurance of marriage. On
many occasions, she even portrayed herself to be the
wife of the appellant thereby, dispelling the allegation
that the intention of the appellant was to cheat her right
from the inception of the relationship.

34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact that it
was mostly the complainant who used to travel to meet

28
the appellant at his place of posting. Therefore, we are
convinced that the relationship between the complainant
and the appellant was consensual without the existence
of any element of deceit or misconception.

35. Further, the application filed by the
complainant at One Stop Centre, Lalitpur on 23-3-2022,
makes it abundantly clear that she was in a consensual
relationship with the appellant since 2006. It is alleged
in the complaint that when she had proposed that they
should marry and live together, the appellant physically
abused her and beat her up. If at all there was an iota of
truth in this allegation then the FIR should have been
registered immediately after this incident. However, it is
only when it came to the knowledge of the complainant
that the appellant was getting married to another
woman, in an attempt to stop his marriage, she filed
aforesaid complaint at the One Stop Centre wherein she
also admitted that she was equally guilty as the
appellant and therefore, his marriage must be stopped.
xxx

39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not
liable for the offence of rape if the victim has wilfully
agreed to maintain sexual relations. The Court has also
recognised that a prosecutrix can agree to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for the
accused.”
(underlining by us)

36. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High
Court observed that although it was contended on behalf of the
appellant that the relationship between him and respondent No.
2 was consensual in nature, no such categorical statement was
made by him in the memo of application and that the plea of
consent was merely inferred. In this regard, reliance was placed
by the High Court on the case of Ganga Singh v. State of
Madhya Pradesh , (2013) 7 SCC 278 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ)
505 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 314, wherein this Court had stated
that unless there was a specific defence of a consensual
relationship, such a defence cannot be inferred.

37. The said finding of the High Court, however,
fails to appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in
question itself reveals that the relationship between the

29
parties was, in fact, consensual, inasmuch as respondent
No. 2 met the appellant whenever he expressed a desire
to meet her. Furthermore, respondent No. 2, being a
major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated
with the appellant and entered into physical intimacy on
her own volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the
relevant time, the marriage of respondent No. 2 was
subsisting. In light of the foregoing circumstances, even
upon a bare reading of the material on record, it is
manifest that the relationship between the parties was
consensual, and therefore, the absence of an express
statement to that effect in the memo of application, as
emphasised in the impugned order, cannot be held
against the appellant when the same can be otherwise
clearly discerned.

38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of
this Court in Mahesh Damu , wherein the following observations
were made:

“29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be
a false promise to amount to misconception of fact
within the meaning of Section 90IPC, it must have been
made from the very beginning with an intention to
deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical
relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such
consent was given under a misconception of fact, the
said consent is vitiated and not a valid consent. In this
regard we may refer to Deepak Gulati v. State of
Haryana [ Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana , (2013) 7
SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660], in which it was held
as follows : (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24)

“21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced
or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit.
Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by
deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the
good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction
between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this,
the court must very carefully examine whether the
accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had
mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this
effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the
ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction
between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling

30
a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether
there was made, at an early stage a false promise of
marriage by the accused; and whether the consent
involved was given after wholly understanding the
nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There
may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have
sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion
for the accused, and not solely on account of
misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where
an accused on account of circumstances which he could
not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control,
was unable to marry her, despite having every intention
to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An
accused can be convicted for rape only if the court
reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused
was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.

xxx

24. Hence, it is evident that there must be
adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e.
at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention
whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim.
There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person
having the best of intentions is unable to marry the
victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The
‘failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future
uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear
from the evidence available, does not always amount to
misconception of fact. In order to come within the
meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact
must have an immediate relevance’.
Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a
situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and
fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is
assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the
accused had never really intended to marry her.”

(underlining by us)”

31

11.6. In BATLANKI KESHAV (KESAVA) KUMAR ANURAG
6
v. STATE OF TELANGANA the Apex Court has held as follows:
“…. …. ….

25. In the chats which have been placed on record along
with the additional documents, the de-facto complainant, who is
referred to by the name ‘Muffin’, has admitted that she was
manipulative and was trying to “get a green card holder”. At one
point of time, she also stated that it would not be difficult for
her to trap the next one. In the very same breath, she mentions
that she would not waste time with the accused appellant and
needs to “invest on the next victim”. She also mentions that she
would irritate her victims to the extent that they dump her, and
she could happily start with the next one. She also stated that
she was using the accused appellant.

26. These chats depict the stark reality about the
behavioral pattern of the de-facto complainant who
appears to be having manipulative and vindictive
tendency.

27. Thus, in our opinion, the accused appellant was
absolutely justified in panicking and backing out from the
proposed marriage upon coming to know of the
aggressive sexual behaviour and the obsessive nature of
the de-facto complainant.

28. Hence, even assuming that the accused
appellant retracted from his promise to marry the
complainant, it cannot be said that he indulged in sexual
intercourse with the de-facto complainant under a false
promise of marriage or that the offence was committed
by him with the de-facto complainant on the ground that
she belonged to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes
community.

29. It is also relevant to mention here that in FIR No. 751
of 2021, the de-facto complainant has not even made a whisper

6
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1258

32
about the accused appellant dumping her on the ground of her
caste. Thus, apparently this allegation which has been set out in
the subsequent FIR No. 103 of 2022 lodged almost after seven
months is nothing but a sheer exaggeration which must be
discarded.

30. Having considered the entirety of facts and
circumstances as available on record, we are of the firm
opinion that allowing prosecution of the accused
appellant to continue in the impugned FIR No. 103 of
2022 would be nothing short of a travesty of justice in
addition to being a gross abuse of the process of Court.
The impugned FIR No. 103 of 2022 is nothing but a
bundle of lies full of fabricated and malicious
unsubstantiated allegations levelled by the complainant.
The facts on record clearly establish the vindictive and
manipulative tendencies of the complainant and these
aspects have a great bearing on the controversy.”


11.7. Again, in the case of AMOL BHAGWAN NEHUL v.
7
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA the Apex Court has held as follows:
“…. …. ….

8. Having heard both sides in this case and after carefully
considering the material on record, the following attributes
come to the fore:

(a) Even if the allegations in the FIR are taken as a true and
correct depiction of circumstances, it does not appear
from the record that the consent of the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 was obtained against her
will and merely on an assurance to marry. The Appellant
and the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 were acquainted
since 08.06.2022, and she herself admits that they
interacted frequently and fell in love. The
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 engaged in a physical
relationship alleging that the Appellant had done so

7
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1230

33
without her consent, however she not only sustained her
relationship for over 12 months, but continued to visit
him in lodges on two separate occasions. The narrative of
the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 does not corroborate
with her conduct.

(b) The consent of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2
as defined under section 90 IPC also cannot be said
to have been obtained under a misconception of
fact. There is no material to substantiate
“inducement or misrepresentation” on the part of
the Appellant to secure consent for sexual relations
without having any intention of fulfilling said
promise. Investigation has also revealed that
the Khulanama , was executed on 29.12.2022 which
the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 had obtained
from her ex-husband. During this time, the parties
were already in a relationship and the alleged
incident had already taken place. It is inconceivable
that the Complainant had engaged in a physical
relationship with the Appellant, on the assurance of
marriage, while she was already married to
someone else. Even otherwise, such promise to
begin with was illegal and unenforceable qua the
Appellant.

(c) There is no evidence of coercion or threat of injury
to the Complainant/Respondent no. 2, to attract an
offence under section 506 IPC. It is improbable that
there was any threat caused to the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 by the Appellant
when all along the relationship was cordial, and it
was only when the Appellant graduated and left for
his hometown to Ahmednagar, the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 became agitated.
We also cannot ignore the conduct of the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 in visiting the
native village of the Appellant without any
intimation, which is also unacceptable and reflects
the agitated and unnerved state of mind of the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2. For the same
reason, the criminal prosecution against the

34
Appellant herein is probably with an underlying
motive and disgruntled state of mind.

(d) There is also no reasonable possibility that the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 or any woman being
married before and having a child of four years,
would continue to be deceived by the Appellant or
maintain a prolonged association or physical
relationship with an individual who has sexually
assaulted and exploited her.

9. In our considered view, this is also not a case
where there was a false promise to marry to begin with.
A consensual relationship turning sour or partners
becoming distant cannot be a ground for invoking
criminal machinery of the State. Such conduct not only
burdens the Courts, but blots the identity of an individual
accused of such a heinous offence. This Court has time
and again warned against the misuse of the provisions,
3
and has termed it a folly to treat each breach of promise
to marry as a false promise and prosecute a person for an
offence under section 376 IPC.”


11.8. The Apex Court in the case of PRAMOD KUMAR
8
NAVRATNA v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH , holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
16. Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC provides for enhanced
punishment in cases where rape is committed repeatedly on the
same woman. It mandates rigorous imprisonment for a term of
not less than ten years which may extend to life imprisonment
for the remainder of the person's natural life. The object of this
provision is to address aggravated instances of sexual assault
where the offence is not a single incident but has occurred
repeatedly on the same victim. The expression “repeatedly”
employed in the provision is of significance. It contemplates

8

2026 SCC OnLine SC 154

35
more than one act of sexual assault, committed at different
points in time on the same victim. Courts have consistently
interpreted this phrase to mean a series of acts that are
separate in nature and not a continuation of a single
transaction. In genuine cases under Section 376(2)(n) of
the IPC, the pattern is usually unmistakable; it is an
initial act of sexual assault, followed by multiple acts
under fear, pressure, captivity, or continued deceit, often
when the woman is rendered vulnerable and unable to
escape the situation.

17. At the outset, we refer to the ratio in the case
of Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi) , (2023) 15 SCC
385 whereby this Court had decided a similar matter,
wherein allegedly, the prosecutrix had also given her
consent for a sexual relationship with the accused-
appellant therein, upon an assurance to marry. The
prosecutrix, who was herself a married woman having
three children, had continued to have such a relationship
with the accused-appellant, at least for about five years
till she gave the complaint. In the conspectus of such facts
and circumstances, this Court had observed as under:

“21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of
the respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her
consent for sexual relationship under the misconception
of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to
marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and
therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of the
law and the case fell under Clause Secondly of
Section 375 IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note
that there is a difference between giving a false promise
and committing breach of promise by the accused. In
case of false promise, the accused right from the
beginning would not have any intention to marry the
prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceived the
prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only
with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach
of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the
accused might have given a promise with all seriousness
to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered
certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the
circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him
to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each
breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to

36
prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376.
As stated earlier, each case would depend upon its
proved facts before the court.”

18. It has been time and again settled by this Court,
that the mere fact that the parties indulged in physical
relations pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount
to a rape in every case. An offence under Section 375 of
the IPC could only be made out, if promise of marriage
was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain
consent for sexual relations without having any intent of
fulfilling said promise from the very beginning and that
such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on
the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations.
The issue for consideration is whether, given the facts and
circumstances of the case and after examining the FIR, the High
Court was correct in refusing to quash the ongoing criminal
proceedings against the accused-appellant arising out of FIR No.
213/2025 dated 06.02.2025 and the Chargesheet No.
269/2025.
…. …. ….

22. The Courts have to be extremely careful and
cautious in identifying the genuine cases filed under
Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC by identifying the essential
ingredients to constitute the said offence i.e. there should
be a promise of marriage made by the accused solely
with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations and
without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from
the very beginning, and that such false promise of
marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving
her consent for sexual relations. Such genuine cases that
deserve prosecution of the accused must be clearly
demarcated from the litigation that arises from the cases
of consensual relationships between consenting adults
going acrimonious on account of dispute and
disagreement or a future change of mind. In view of the
aforesaid settled position of law, the respondent No. 1-
State and the complainant-respondent No. 3 has failed to
place any material on record to show how the accused-
appellant on the subsequent meetings managed to
repeatedly coax and dupe the complainant-respondent
No. 3 into having physical relations with him on the false

37
pretext of marriage considering the fact that within initial
meetings, both parties were aware about the marital
status of the victim and therefore it cannot be, by any
stretch imagination said that the consent of the
complainant-respondent No. 3 has been vitiated or
obtained on fraud and misrepresentation made by the
accused-appellant.

23. At this stage, it is material to refer to the decision of
this Court in Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of
Maharashtra , (2024) 11 SCC 398, wherein the following
observations were made:

“29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be
a false promise to amount to misconception of fact
within the meaning of Section 90 IPC, it must have been
made from the very beginning with an intention to
deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical
relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such
consent was given under a misconception of fact, the
said consent is vitiated and not a valid consent. …”

24. On a perusal of the allegations made in the
present case, it is an admitted fact that the complainant-
respondent No. 3, within the first initial meetings told the
accused-appellant that she was a married woman with
divorce proceedings pending before the Family Court.
Therefore, in the same breath, she cannot be allowed to
claim and allege that she was also coaxed by the
accused-appellant into having a physical relationship
with him on the false pretext of marriage as the two facts
cannot stand together on the same plane and
simultaneously as both are antagonistic and antithetical
to each other. In our opinion, the facts of the present
case clearly indicate a consensual relationship gone sour
whereas both the parties should have exercised restraint
and should have refrained from involving the State into
their personal relationship turning rancour.
25. At this juncture, it is important to place reliance
upon the observations in Prashant v. State of NCT of
Delhi , (2025) 5 SCC 764, wherein this Court speaking
through one of us (Nagarathna, J.) observed that a mere
break-up of a relationship between a consenting couple

38
cannot result in the initiation of criminal proceedings.
What was a consensual relationship between the parties
at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of
criminality when the said relationship does not fructify
into a marriage. Furthermore, this Court
in Samadhan v. State of Maharashtra , 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 2528 through one of us (Nagarathna, J.) observed that
this Court has, on numerous occasions, taken note of the
disquieting tendency wherein failed or broken
relationships are given the colour of criminality. The
offence of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be
invoked only in cases where there exists genuine sexual
violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To convert
every soured relationship into an offence of rape not only
trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts
upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice.
Such instances transcend the realm of mere personal
discord. The misuse of the criminal justice machinery in
this regard is a matter of profound concern for the
judiciary already facing a heavy load and calls for
condemnation.

26. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the
judgment in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , 1992
Supp (1) SCC 335 (“ Bhajan Lal ”) with particular reference to
paragraph 102 therein, where this Court observed thus:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court
in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power Under Article 226 or the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we have given the
following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay
down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae
and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases
wherein such power should be exercised.

39
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety
do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the Accused.
xxx

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the commission of
any offence and make out a case against the Accused.
xxx

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted
in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the Accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

27. On a careful consideration of the
aforementioned judicial dictum, we find that the offence
alleged against the accused-appellant herein is not made
out at all. In fact, we find that the allegation of rape on
false pretext of marriage even when taken on its face
value, does not amount to an offence of rape and hence
not liable for punishment under Section 376(2)(n) of
the IPC in the instant case and therefore, the judgment of
this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal squarely apply to the
facts of these cases. Therefore, it is neither expedient nor
in the interest of justice to permit the present
prosecution emanating from the FIR and consequent
Sessions Case No. 89/2025 to continue .”

40
11.9. The Apex Court in the case of SHAILESHBHAI
9
GOVINDBHAI MAKWANA v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA , has
held as follows:
“…. …. ….
18. A careful perusal of the records indicates that:-

(i) Both parties were aware that they were earlier married
to different spouses;

(ii) The complainant at a point when her divorce was not
finalized put up a matrimonial advertisement;

(iii) Admittedly, for over a period of 04 years, the parties
travelled together and established a physical relationship;

(iv) The physical relationship which the complainant
states to have been forceful was on 17.10.2017;

(v) Admittedly, even after 17.10.2017 parties travelled
together and had a physical relationship;

(vi) No complaint of the incident of 17.10.2017, about the
forcible sexual intercourse and the unnatural sex was lodged till
09.02.2021.

19. In the above background, the question is
whether the appellant under a promise of marriage
deceived the respondent? In the light of the admitted
facts, parties had knowledge that they were married to
some other spouse earlier and the admitted fact is that
before obtaining a divorce the respondent-complainant
gave a matrimonial advertisement and before finalization
of divorce had sexual relationship and never complained
of any force by the appellant for 04 years.


9

SLP (Crl.) No.2260/2026, disposed on 20.04.2026

41
20. We are of the opinion that this was not a case
where a promise of marriage resulted in appellant
deceiving the complainant. Parties have happily
cohabited together between 2017 and 2020 and,
thereafter, the relationship soured.

21. In Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra
and Anr. (2024) 11 SCC 398) this Court held as under: -

“26. The complainant had taken the plea
that the appellant had physical relationship with
her against her consent by making a false promise
that he would marry her. In this regard, it has to
be considered whether making a false promise to
marry amounts to an offence. If a false promise of
marriage is made to a woman by a man, thus
deceiving the woman leading her to engage in
sexual relations, it may amount to misconception
of fact, in which case the consent given by the
woman may be vitiated. In this regard one may refer
to the decision of this Court in Naim Ahamed v. State
(NCT of Delhi) [Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2023) 15 SCC 385] : (SCC p. 398, para 21)

“21. The bone of contention raised on
behalf of the respondents is that the
prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual
relationship under the misconception of fact, as
the accused had given a false promise to
marry her and subsequently he did not marry,
and therefore such consent was no consent in
the eye of law and the case fell under the
Clause — Secondly of Section 375IPC. In this
regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a
difference between giving a false promise and
committing breach of promise by the accused.
In case of false promise, the accused right
from the beginning would not have any
intention to marry the prosecutrix and would
have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by
giving a false promise to marry her only with a
view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of
breach of promise, one cannot deny a
possibility that the accused might have given a
promise with all seriousness to marry her, and
subsequently might have encountered certain
circumstances unforeseen by him or the
circumstances beyond his control, which
prevented him to fulfil his promise. So, it

42
would be a folly to treat each breach of
promise to marry as a false promise and to
prosecute a person for the offence under
Section 376.”

27. In our view, if a man is accused of having
sexual relationship by making a false promise of
marriage and if he is to be held criminally liable, any
such physical relationship must be traceable directly to
the false promise made and not qualified by other
circumstances or consideration. A woman may have
reasons to have physical relationship other than the
promise of marriage made by the man, such as personal
liking for the male partner without insisting upon formal
marital ties.

28. Thus, in a situation where physical
relationship is maintained for a prolonged period
knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with
certainty that the said physical relationship was
purely because of the alleged promise made by the
appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be
shown that the physical relationship was purely
because of the promise of marriage, thereby
having a direct nexus with the physical
relationship without being influenced by any other
consideration, it cannot be said that there was
vitiation of consent under misconception of fact .”

22. We are also not convinced with the reasoning of the
High Court that the quash petition was not maintainable,
especially, because in the present case the earlier petition was
withdrawn without any discussion on the merits. Further when
we have examined the facts and found that the offence alleged
is not made out, we feel it will not be just to throw out the
petition on maintainability. We say so on the special facts of this
case.”

11.10. The Apex Court in its latest judgment rendered in the
case of KUNAL RAMESHBHAI KALYANI v. STATE OF

43
10
GUJARAT , considers what would become an offence under
Section 69 of the BNS and holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
2. The appellant is an accused under Section 69 of the
Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). The appellant is aggrieved with
the impugned judgment, which refused quashing of the FIR
registered with Sayajiganh Police Station, Vadodara City,
Gujarat dated 20.05.2025 bearing No. 11196030250292. The
second respondent is the complainant, who alleged that under
the pretext of the promise to marry, the appellant entered into
physical relations with the second respondent and later resiled
from his promise on the allegation that his mother was not
favourable to such a marriage with the second respondent.

3. The High Court while declining the prayer for quashing
specifically referred to the judgment of this Court in Deepak
Gulati v. State of Haryana 1 of which paragraph 24 is extracted
hereunder:

“24. Hence, it is evident that there must be
adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e.
at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention
whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim.
There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person
having the best of intentions is unable to marry the
victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The
“failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future
uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear
from the evidence available, does not always amount to
misconception of fact. In order to come within the
meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact
must have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC
cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon
the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability
on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that
from the very beginning, the accused had never really
intended to marry her.”


10

2026 SCC OnLine SC 1818

44
4. Under the IPC, the false promise of marriage was
prosecuted under Section 375 read with Section 90. Therein the
requirement was to find that the consent, if at all coming out
from the facts, was tainted insofar as the victim having been led
to believe a promise of marriage and physical relations having
been permitted only on the belief that the promise will be
complied with; which the promisor even at the time of giving
such promise had no intention to comply with. It was held in the
aforesaid decision that misconception of fact cannot be alleged if
the promise is made with good intention and later for
unavoidable circumstances, the person is forced to resile from
the aforesaid promise. The BNS by incorporating Section 69
brought in a separate offence carving out the fraudulent
and deceitful conduct as spoken of therein from the grave
offence of rape, while at the same time providing a
penalty for the deceptive conduct alleged therein. The
word employed “deceitful means or by making a promise
to marry to a woman without any intention of fulfilling
the same” brings in the same rigor of the promise having
been given with an intention of never being fulfilled,
which is the deceitful conduct sought to be punished.

5. In the present case, the FIR has been extracted by the
High Court and it clearly indicates that the appellant and the
complainant came into contact through a digital platform and a
friendship developed between them, which later became a love
affair. It is also stated in the complaint that the appellant
communicated his desire to marry the complainant on the first
physical meeting. The complainant is said to have succumbed to
his entreaties and allowed sexual intercourse. This was on
12.02.2024 and again in April 2024, the victim is said to have
stayed in a hotel for two days with the appellant. The
statements made in the complaint clearly indicate a
consensual relationship and we do not find anything to
find a deceitful conduct, of, the appellant having induced
the complainant into sexual intercourse, which she
succumbed to only on the promise to marry. Here we
reiterate that on the first occasion when they met, the
complainant succumbed to the appellant's entreaties, is the
specific statement made without even stating that it was on the
promise to marry that physical relationship was permitted.

45
6. On the mere communication of the desire of the
appellant to marry her, we are unable to find the
appellant having used any deceitful means. In any event,
the very complaint is that the appellant refused to marry
her later, because his mother did not permit it, which
indicates that the promise was made with all good
intention, if at all it was made.”


(Emphasis supplied at each instance)


12.1. The Apex Court, in the case of Dr. DHRUVARAM
MURLIDHAR SONAR supra , draws with unmistakable clarity, the
doctrinal line that separates rape from consensual intimacy,
where two adults of their own volition, engage in consensual
sexual relation over a sustained period, the subsequent
refusal of the man to marry the woman, howsoever
regrettable, does not, ipso facto, transmute such intimacy
into the offence of rape as punishable under Section 376 of
the IPC.

12.2. The principle is reaffirmed in SHAMBHU KHARWAR
supra where the Apex Court interdicted the criminal process at
the threshold holding that the relationship between the

46
parties was purely consensual and accordingly quashed the
crime as well as the charge sheet.

12.3. Likewise, in NAIM AHAMED v. STATE (NCT OF
DELHI) [ (2023) 15 SCC 385 ], the Apex Court addressed an
identical factual complexion, where the complainant had
even become pregnant on account of the relationship, and
yet held that such circumstance, by itself cannot clothe the
relationship with criminality, for pregnancy arising out of
consensual intimacy.

12.4. In SAMADHAN supra the Apex Court sounded a note
of stern caution against the disquieting tendency of coloring
failed relationships, with the hue of heinous crimes. The
Apex Court holds that mere breakdown of a relationship
between the consenting adults, cannot constitute rape nor
can the criminal law be set into motion as a retaliatory
instrument, merely because the relationship did not
ultimately culminate in marriage.

47
12.5. Further, in AMOL BHAGWAN NEHUL, the Apex Court
observes that where the complainant is already married, the
allegation of physical intimacy induced by promise of
marriage stands on infirm grounds, for a promise which is
ex-facie unenforceable, cannot in those circumstances, be
elevated into a foundation of imputing criminality.


12.6. In BATLANKI KESHAV (KESAVA) KUMAR ANURAG
supra the Apex Court goes even further, on a perusal of
contemporaneous chats, it found that the complainant had
exhibited manipulative and vindictive tendencies and held
that man backing out of marriage, even assuming such
promise existed, cannot automatically attract the offence of
rape. Holding the prosecution to be malicious and
fabricated, the Apex Court obliterates the proceedings
against the accused.

12.7. In the light of the overwhelming majority of such
decisions, the Apex Court has exercised its Constitutional and
inherent jurisdiction to arrest the criminal process, even at

48
the stage of registration of the crime, where the allegation
taken to their highest, disclose nothing beyond a consensual
relationship subsequently turning sore.


12.8. The Apex Court in PRAMOD KUMAR NAVRATNA supra
observes that the essential ingredient to constitute the offence
under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC for the promise of marriage is
that the promise must be made with the intention of not fulfilling it
at the very outset. It is reiterated that a consensual relationship,
which turns sour would not amount to a false promise of marriage.

12.9. In the case of SHAILESHBHAI GOVINDBHAI
MAKWANA , the Apex Court, while following its earlier judgment in
the case of MAHESH DAMU KHARE v. STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA reported in (2024) 11 SCC 398, holds that there
can be no false promise of marriage when the parties have had a
prolonged relationship knowing that they are married to other
spouses.

49
12.10. The Apex Court in KUNAL RAMESHBHAI KALYANI
interprets the ingredients of the offence under Section 69 of the
BNS and observes that the promise to marry made with the
intention of not being fulfilled would become a deceitful conduct
punishable under this provision. The Apex Court further holds that
mere communication of the desire of the accused to marry the
complainant would not amount to using deceitful means.
Thus, the offence under Section 69 of the BNS is loosely laid
against the petitioner.

13. What remains is offence under Section 115 of the BNS.
Section 115 is Section 323 of the earlier regime, the IPC. It
punishes a person who indulges in voluntarily causing hurt of the
other. In the entire complaint or the summary of the charge sheet,
not a single word of the petitioner causing hurt upon the
complainant is found. The allegation is that the complainant was
driven to committing suicide. That would not fall within the
ingredients of Section 323 of the IPC. Therefore, the said offence
also is loosely laid, more so in the light of wound certificate or the

50
medico Legal Examination Report of the complainant showing no
injuries on the body.

14. What remains to be considered is the offence under the
Act. What is alleged is under Section 3(1)(w), it reads as follows:

“ 3. Punishments for offences of atrocities . - (1)
Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe,—
… … …
( w )( i ) intentionally touches a woman belonging to a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, knowing that she belongs to
a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, when such act of
touching is of a sexual nature and is without the
recipient's consent;

( ii ) uses words, acts or gestures of a sexual nature towards a
woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe, knowing that she belongs to a Scheduled Caste or
a Scheduled Tribe.

Explanation .—For the purposes of sub-clause ( i ), the
expression “consent” means an unequivocal voluntary
agreement when the person by words, gestures, or any form
of non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to
participate in the specific act:

Provided that a woman belonging to a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe who does not offer physical
resistance to any act of a sexual nature is not by reason only
of that fact, is to be regarded as consenting to the sexual
activity:

Provided further that a woman's sexual history,
including with the offender shall not imply consent or
mitigate the offence;”

51
Section 3(1)(w) would punish a person who intentionally touches a
woman knowing that she belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe and the touch is of a sexual nature without
consent. Here lies the crux. Consensual acts for 7 years cannot
mean that it was done without consent. The other offence is
Section 3(2)(va) of the Act. It reads as follows:

“(2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe,—
… … …
( v-a ) commits any offence specified in the
Schedule, against a person or property, knowing that
such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such
member, shall be punishable with such punishment as
specified under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) for
such offences and shall also be liable to fine.”

Any person commits an offence specified in the schedule against
the person or property who is a member belonging to Scheduled
Caste or Scheduled Tribe becomes open for punishment.

15. The only allegation in the complaint is that the marriage
did not take place because of caste discrimination. This cannot be
laid against the petitioner, as all of which have sprung from
consensual acts between the two for seven years. Therefore, it is a

52
case where the admitted allegation even would not amount to an
offence under the BNS or under the Act. It is the case of the
complainant herself that they met in 2017 and continued their
relationship up to November, 2023. Again, after a gap, met in the
year 2024 and continued the relationship up to the date of
registration of the complaint. Therefore, these acts would not mean
that the petitioner should be permitted to be tried.

16. In the light of the aforesaid reasons, the subject case
becomes a classic illustration of abuse and misuse of Section 69 of
the BNS which are now mushrooming in Courts. All consensual acts
between the accused and the victim for years together are now
projected to become ingredients of Section 69. I, therefore, deem
it appropriate to exercise my jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
CrPC/528 of the BNSS and obliterate the proceedings to save it
from becoming an abuse of the process of law and result in
miscarriage of justice.

53
17. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

O R D E R

(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.

(ii) Proceedings in Special Case No.88 of 2025 pending
before the II Additional District and Sessions Judge,
Mangalore, arising out Crime No.27 of 2025 stand
quashed.


Consequently, I.A.No.2 of 2025 stands disposed.





Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE




BKP
CT:MJ