Achche Lal vs Central Bureau Of Investigation Thru. Cbi/Acb Lko.

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
APPLICATION U/S 528 BNSS No. - 1346 of 2026

Achche Lal
.....Applicant(s)
Versus
Central Bureau Of Investigation Thru. Cbi/Acb Lko.
.....Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Applicant(s) : Jai Prakash Awasthi
Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : Aakash Prasad
ALONG WITH
APPLICATION U/S 528 BNSS No. - 1352 of 2026

Brikesh Pandey
.....Applicant(s)
Versus
Central Bureau Of Investigation Thru. Cbi/Acb Lko.
.....Opposite Party(s)
[A.F.R.]
Court No. - 14
HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.
1. Heard Ms. Ayushi Upadhyaya, the learned counsel for the applicants and
Shri Aakash Prasad, the learned counsel for the respondent-CBI.
2. Both the aforesaid applications have been filed challenging validity of two
separate orders dated 30.01.2026 passed by the learned Special Judge, Anti
Corruption, CBI, Court No.2, Lucknow in Session Trial No.1604 of 2025
arising out of RC No.00620025A0001 under Section 61 (2) to Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) read with Section 7 Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988, Police Station- CBI/ACB, Lucknow, whereby the applications filed by
the applicants seeking their discharge, have been rejected. The applicants
have also sought quashing of separate orders dated 21.02.2026 passed by the
trial Court framing charges against them and they have challenged validity
of the prosecution sanction orders dated 30.07.2025 passed by the Senior
Superintendent of Post Offices, Azamgarh Division. They have prayed to
discharge them of the alleged offences.
3. Briefly stated, facts of the case are that on 03.02.2025, one Rohan Gupta
gave a complaint to the Superintendent of Police, C.B.I., Lucknow stating
that he had been selected on the post of ABPM (Assistant Branch Post

NA528 No. 1346 of 2026
2
Master) under GDS (Grameen Dak Sewa) and he had completed three days'
training. Ramesh Kumar and Brikesh Pandey (the applicant in Application
No. 1352 of 2026) had demanded Rs.25,000/- for permitting him to join the
post. After discreet verification, CBI registered FIR bearing No.
RC0062025A0001 under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 and 61(2) of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) against
Ramesh Kumar and Brikesh Pandey.
4. A trap was laid on 04.02.2025 during which on the instructions of the
named accused Ramesh Kumar, Achche Lal (the applicant in Application
No. 1346 of 2026) demanded bribe from the complainant through gesture
and he received the amount from the complainant. The other named accused
Brikesh Pandey (the applicant in Application No. 1346 of 2026) was also
present there alongwith them. All the three persons were caught on the spot.
5. A charge-sheet was submitted on 29.03.2025 against (1) Ramesh Kumar
Tudu, (2) Brikesh Pandey and (3) Achche Lal for offences under Section
61(2) BNS and Section 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 stating that
the investigation has revealed that for allowing the complainant to join the
post, Ramesh Kumar Tudu demanded and accepted undue advantage from
the complainant in connivance with Brikesh Pandey and Achche Lal.
6. On 30.07.2025, the competent authority issued separate orders granting
sanction for prosecution of the applicants. The prosecution orders are
detailed orders containing narration of the facts of the case. The sanctioning
authority states that after carefully examining the material placed on record
including copy of complaint, FIR, verification memo, pre trap memo, post
trap memo, transcription of recorded conversation made between the
complainant and the accused persons Ramesh Kumar Tudu and Brikesh
Pandey during verification and trap proceeding, statement of witnesses,
other relevant materials placed before the authority regarding the allegations,
circumstances of the case and after being fully satisfied after applying his
mind, the authority considered that the applicants have committed the
offences 61(2) BNS and Section 7 PC Act, and they should be prosecuted for
the said offences.
7. The applicants filed applications before the trial Court seeking their
discharge. Achche Lal sought his discharge mainly on the ground that he had
received the bribe amount on the instructions of Ramesh Kumar Tudu.
Brikesh Pandey sought his discharge on the ground that there was no
evidence of his involvement in demanding and receiving the bribe.
8. The applications seeking discharge have been rejected by means of an
order dated 20.01.2026. The trial court held that the call records, trap

NA528 No. 1346 of 2026
3
memorandum, involvement of Achche Lal in the conversation and recovery
of tainted money from the Achche Lal do not warrant his discharge.
Regarding Brikesh Pandey, the trial Court held that the material indicates
that he was involved in demanding money from the complainant to permit
him to join the duties of the post on which he has been appointed. Brikesh
Pandey was an integral part of the entire process. Whether he was in fact
involved or not, would be determined after scrutiny of evidence during the
trial.
9. The trial Court has framed charges against the applicants by means of an
order dated 21.02.2026.
10. The validity of the prosecution sanction order has been challenged on the
ground that in the verbatim similar prosecution sanction orders, the
sanctioning authority has stated that he accords sanction under Section 19 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for the prosecution of the applicants
for the offences punishable under Section 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita (BNS) 2023, and Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 (as amended in 2018) and for any other offences made out from the
aforesaid facts and circumstances for taking cognizance of the said offences
against the said accused by the Court of competent jurisdiction.
11. The learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that Section 19 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act prohibits taking cognizance of the offences
punishable under Sections 7, 11, 13, and 15 of the Act. Section 19 of the
aforesaid Act does not provide for a grant of sanction for prosecution of the
offence under Section 61(2) of BNS. The mention of Section 61(2) of BNS
indicates that the sanction order has been passed in a mechanical manner,
without application of mind.
12. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the applicant has
placed reliance on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
State of Mohammed Iqbal Ahmed versus State of Andhra Pradesh;
(1979) 4 SCC 172, wherein the Honorable Supreme Court held that it is
incumbent on the prosecution to prove that a valid sanction had been granted
by the sanctioning authority after it was satisfied that a case for sanction had
been made out constituting the offence. The Court has to see whether or not
the sanctioning authority at the time of giving sanction, was aware of the
facts constituting the offence and applied its mind to the same.
13. The learned counsel for the applicant has also placed reliance on a
decision of this Court rendered in the case of Sushant Gupta v. CBI , 2025
SCC OnLine All 3138, wherein this Court had set-aside a similarly worded
prosecution sanction order.

NA528 No. 1346 of 2026
4
14. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent-CBI has submitted that
what is required in Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is that no
court shall take cognizance of any offence under section 7, 11, 13 and 15 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 without previous sanction by the
competent authority. It does not prohibit grant of sanction for any other
offence and the mere mention of the offence of criminal conspiracy along
with the offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, would
not invalidate the sanction for prosecution for the offence under Section 7 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act.
15. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for respondent CBI has
placed reliance on the decision rendered by a Full Bench of this Court in the
case of Neera Yadav v. C.B.I. (Bharat Sangh) : 2005 SCC OnLine All
1217. He has also placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in
Surendar Singh v. CBI : 2026 SCC OnLine All 2049 and Ashok Kumar
Choudhary versus Central Bureau of Investigation: 2026:AHC-LKO:22051.
16. In : (1979) 4 SCC 172, the
Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P.
appellant was said to have been caught red handed while receiving Rs.125/-
as bribe. The resolution of the Standing Committee read as follows: -
" As per note of the Commissioner, M.C.H., the Standing
Committee unanimously accords sanction for prosecution of Shri
Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed (in the scale of 110—180) Section Officer of
town Planning Section (under suspension) in a competent Court
for the offence mentioned in the note of the Commissioner M.C.H.,
dated January 18, 1969 so as to enable the Commissionor to sign
the prosecution order and send it to the Director, Anti-Corruption
Bureau for taking further action at the earliest."
The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: -
"
3. A perusal of the resolution of the Sanctioning Authority clearly
shows that no facts on the basis of which the prosecution was to be
sanctioned against the appellant are mentioned in the sanction nor
does this document contain any ground on which the satisfaction
of the Sanctioning Authority was based and its mind applied. This
document merely mentions that the sanction has been given on the
basis of a note of the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation which
appears to have been placed before the Committee. It is obvious,
therefore, that this note, if any, must have come into existence
either on March 31, 1969 or at any date prior to this.
The
prosecution could have proved the facts constituting the offence
which were placed before the Sanctioning Authority by
producing the note at the trial. But no such thing has been done.
What the prosecution did was merely to examine two witnesses
PWs 2 and 7. PW 2 has produced the order implementing the
Resolution of the Sanctioning Authority which is Ex. P10 and is
dated April 21, 1969, that is to say after the sanction was given.
This document no doubt contains the facts constituting the offence

NA528 No. 1346 of 2026
5
but that does not solve the legal issues that arise in this case. It is
incumbent on the prosecution to prove that a valid sanction has
been granted by the Sanctioning Authority after it was satisfied
that a case for sanction has been made out constituting the
offence. This should be done in two ways; either (1) by
producing the original sanction which itself contains the facts
constituting the offence and the grounds of satisfaction and (2)
by adducing evidence aliunde to show that the facts placed
before the Sanctioning Authority and the satisfaction arrived at
by it . It is well settled that any case instituted without a proper
sanction must fail because this being a manifest difficulty in the
prosecution, the entire proceedings are rendered void ab initio…."
(Emphasis added)
17. The aforesaid judgment was given while examining the validity of a
judgment passed by the High Court allowing an appeal against a judgment of
acquittal passed by the trial Court where the prosecution had failed to adduce
evidence to show the facts placed before the sanctioning authority and the
satisfaction arrived by it. In the present case, this stage has not yet arrived
and the petitioner has challenged the validity of the prosecution sanction
order before commencement of the trial. Therefore, the ratio laid down in
Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P. (supra) would not apply to the present
case.
18. In : 2006 SCC OnLine All 141,
Neera Yadav v. C.B.I. (Bharat Sangh)
the following questions had been referred to the Full Bench: -
" 1. Whether in the case of public servant which can be removed
only by the Central Government and sanction under section 19 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is also given, further
sanction under section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code is also
required because at the relevant time the said public servant was
also employed in connection with the affairs of the State
Government.
2. Whether public servant who is charged under section 13 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act as also under section 120-B IPC and
the sanction u/s 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is already
given by the Central Government, yet the sanction by the State
Government under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
is necessary since he is being charged under section 120-B IPC
also.
3. If the answer to the above two questions is in affirmative, then,
whether the alleged act or omission for which the petitioner are
being charged had reasonable connection to the discharge of their
official duty calling for applicability of section 197 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure."
The Full Bench gave the following answers to the aforesaid questions: -
" (I) For prosecution under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,

NA528 No. 1346 of 2026
6
once sanction under Section 19 of the said Act is granted, there is
no necessity for obtaining further sanction under Section 197 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(II)
Where a public servant is sought to be prosecuted under the
provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section
120-B, I.P.C. and sanction under Section 19 of Act of 1988 has
been granted, it is not at all required to obtain sanction under
Section 197 Cr.P.C. from the State Government or any other
authority merely because the public servant is also charged
under Section 120-B, I.P.C.
(III) The offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
as well as charge of criminal conspiracy, cannot be said to
constitute "acts in discharge of official duty ."
(Emphasis added)
19. In Surendar Singh v. CBI , 2026 SCC OnLine All 2049, the petitioner
had challenged the validity of a prosecution sanction order, a charge-sheet
for offences under Section 120-B read with Sections 409, 420, 468, 471, 460
, 477, 201 IPC, Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)( d ) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988 and Sections 65 and 66 of Information Technology
Act. This Court referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of : (2007) 1 SCC 1,
Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab
wherein it has been held that: -
" The sanction in the instant case related to the offences
48.
relatable to the Act. There is a distinction between the absence of
sanction and the alleged invalidity on account of non-application
of mind. The former question can be agitated at the threshold but
the latter is a question which has to be raised during trial."
20. This Court also relied upon the judgment in the case of Dinesh
: (2012) 1 SCC 532, in which the
Kumar v. Airport Authority of India
Hon'ble Supreme Court followed the aforesaid law laid down in Parkash
Singh Badal (supra) and held that: -
" While drawing a distinction between the absence of sanction
9.
and invalidity of the sanction, this Court in Parkash Singh Badal
expressed in no uncertain terms that the question of absence of
sanction could be raised at the inception and threshold by an
aggrieved person. However, where sanction order exists, but its
legality and validity is put in question, such issue has to be raised
in the course of trial. Of course, in Parkash Singh Badal, this
Court referred to invalidity of sanction on account of non-
application of mind.
10. In our view, invalidity of sanction where sanction order
exists, can be raised on diverse grounds like non-availability of

NA528 No. 1346 of 2026
7
material before the sanctioning authority or bias of the
sanctioning authority or the order of sanction having been
passed by an authority not authorised or competent to grant such
sanction. The above grounds are only illustrative and not
exhaustive. All such grounds of invalidity or illegality of
sanction would fall in the same category like the ground of
invalidity of sanction on account of non-application of mind—a
category carved out by this Court in Parkash Singh Badal, the
challenge to which can always be raised in the course of trial .
13. In our view, having regard to the facts of the present case, now
since cognizance has already been taken against the appellant by
the trial Judge, the High Court cannot be said to have erred in
leaving the question of validity of sanction open for consideration
by the trial court and giving liberty to the appellant to raise the
issue concerning validity of sanction order in the course of trial.
Parkash
Such course is in accord with the decision of this Court in
Singh Badal and not unjustified."
21. Both the aforesaid judgments have been followed in
CBI v. Ashok
Kumar Aggarwal : (2014) 14 SCC 295, in which it was held that: -
"
59. Undoubtedly, the stage of examining the validity of sanction
is during the trial and we do not propose to say that the validity
should be examined during the stage of inquiry or at pre-trial
stage."
22. This Court also took into consideration the judgment in the case of State
(Inspector of Police) v. Surya Sankaram Karri : (2006) 7 SCC 172,
wherein the Hon'ble the Supreme Court relied upon the judgment in State of
Karnataka v. C. Nagrajswami : (2005) 8 SCC 370wherein it was held that:
-
" Ordinarily, the question as to whether a proper sanction has
14.
been accorded for prosecution of the accused persons or not is a
matter which should be dealt with at the stage of taking
cognizance. But in a case of this nature where a question is raised
as to whether the authority granting the sanction was competent
therefor or not, at the stage of final arguments after trial, the same
may have to be considered having regard to the terms and
conditions of service of the accused for the purpose of
determination as to who could remove him from service.
15. Grant of proper sanction by a competent authority is a sine
qua non for taking cognizance of the offence. It is desirable that
the question as regards sanction may be determined at an early
stage. (See Ashok Sahu v. Gokul Saikia [1990 Supp SCC 41] and
Birendra K. Singh v. State of Bihar [(2000) 8 SCC 498].)"
23. This Court noted in (supra) that the judgment in
Surendar Singh State
of Karnataka v. C. Nagrajswami (supra) does not take into consideration
the precedents in the cases of Parkash Singh Badal, Dinesh Kumar and
Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (supra) and it does not mandate that in all cases, it
is mandatory to examine the validity of the prosecution sanction order at the

NA528 No. 1346 of 2026
8
inception of trial. In view of the aforesaid legal position, this Court declined
to examine the validity of the prosecution sanction order at the stage when
examination of prosecution witnesses was already in progress. This Court
had also weighed the factor that the petition had been filed after a delay of
10 years from the date of the prosecution sanction order. This Court left it
open for the petitioner to raise the plea of validity of the prosecution
sanction order before the trial court at the appropriate stage.
24. In , 2025 SCC OnLine All 313, the prosecution
Sushant Gupta v. CBI
sanction order stated that after fully and carefully examining the documents,
copies of the statements of witnesses under Section 161 CrPC and other
materials placed before him and having applied his mind properly in regard
to the said allegations and circumstances of the case, the sanctioning
authority considered that offences under Section 120-B read with Sections
409, 418, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477(A) IPC and Section 13(2) read with
Section 13(1)( d ) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and substantive
offences thereof are made out against the applicants and other persons and
therefore the authority accorded sanction under Section 19 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for prosecution of the applicants and
other persons for the said offences and for any other offence(s) punishable
under any other provisions of law in respect of the said acts and for taking
cognizance of the said offences by a court of competent jurisdiction. The
applicants filed an application for discharge on the ground that no sanction
of prosecution had been granted under Section 197 CrPC and it was granted
only under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. This Court
held that: -
" 41. The applicants were working in Axis Bank, which is not even
a nationalised bank, and it is not disputed that the applicants were
not holding a post where they could not be removed from service
except by or with the sanction of the government. In this view of
the matter the provisions of Section 197 are not attracted to the
case of the applicants. The prosecution sanction order dated 2-2-
2022 issued by the President and Head Corporate Affairs of Axis
Bank, Mumbai, states that the allegations levelled against 20
persons, including the applicants, have been corroborated by the
statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC and the documents
collected during investigation of the case. After careful
examination and perusal of the documents and statements of the
witnesses it has been found that offences under Section 120-B read
with Section 409, 418, 419, 420, 468, 471 and 477-A IPC and
Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act and
substantive offence thereof are made out against 20 persons,
including the applicants. The sanctioning authority proceeded to
state that after fully and carefully examining the documents, copies
of the statements of witnesses under Section 161 CrPC and other
materials placed before him and having applied his mind properly

NA528 No. 1346 of 2026
9
in regard to the said allegations and circumstances of the case,
considered that offences under Section 120-B read with Section
409, 418, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 477-A IPC and Section
13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1998 and substantive offence thereof are made out against the
applicants and other persons and therefore the authority has
accorded sanction under Section 19 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for prosecution of the
applicants and other persons "for the said offences and for any
other offence(s) punishable under any other provisions of law in
respect of the said acts and for taking cognizance of the said
offences by a court of competent jurisdiction".
*
43. … The sanction of prosecution "for the said offences and for
any other offence(s) punishable under any other provisions of law
in respect of the said Acts" for which no sanction was obtained,
indicates a total non-application of mind to the facts of the case
and the law applicable. It indicates that the sanctioning authority
has acted as a mere rubber stamp. Non-application of mind by the
sanctioning authority vitiates the sanction order dated 2-2-2023 as
also the order dated 28-7-2023 passed by the trial court rejecting
the discharge application.
The order of sanction after a proper application of mind to the
44.
relevant facts and circumstances of the case and the material-on-
record is a prerequisite for prosecution of a public servant, as it is
intended to provide a safeguard to a public servant against
frivolous and vexatious litigants. This safeguard cannot be dealt
with in a casual and mechanical manner."
25. The learned Counsel for the respondent CBI informed that a challenge
made to the aforesaid order by filing S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 15225 of 2025,
which is pending consideration of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
26. In the present case, the only charges are of commission of offence under
Section 61(2) BNS and Section 7 of the PC Act. There is no allegation of
commission of the offences under Sections 409, 418, 419, 420, 467, 468,
471 and 477-A IPC.
27. In Neera Yadav v. C.B.I. (supra), the Full Bench has held that sanction
granted under Section 19 would be sufficient for prosecution for the offence
under Section 120-B IPC also, which is equivalent to Section 61(2) BNS.
Further, the offences under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 and Section 61(2) BNS cannot be said to constitute "acts in discharge
of official duty" and, therefore, no sanction is required for those acts.
28. As per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Parkash
,
Singh Badal v. State of Punjab Dinesh Kumar v. Airport Authority of
India and CBI v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal
the validity of sanction order has to be examinedduring the trial and not at

NA528 No. 1346 of 2026
10
pre-trial stage.
29. It is also relevant to note that Section 17-A(1) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 provides as follows: -
" 17-A. Enquiry or Inquiry or investigation of offences relatable to
recommendations made or decisions taken by public servant in
discharge of official functions or duties. -
No police officer shall conduct any enquiry or inquiry or
investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed by a
public servant under this Act, where the alleged offence is
relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by such
public servant in discharge of his official functions or duties,
without the previous approval—
(a) in the case of a person who is or was employed, at the time
when the offence was alleged to have been committed, in
connection with the affairs of the Union, of that Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is or was employed, at the time
when the offence was alleged to have been committed, in
connection with the affairs of a State, of that Government;
(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to
remove him from his office, at the time when the offence was
alleged to have been committed:
Provided that no such approval shall be necessary for cases
involving arrest of a person on the spot on the charge of
accepting or attempting to accept any undue advantage for
himself or for any other person :
Provided further that the concerned authority shall convey its
decision under this section within a period of three months, which
may, for reasons to be recorded in writing by such authority, be
extended by a further period of one month."
30. In CBI v. Santosh Karnani : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 427, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that: -
" 33… Section 17A merely contemplates that police officers shall
not conduct any enquiry, inquiry or investigation into any offence
alleged to have been committed by a public servant where the
alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or
decision taken in discharge of official functions or duties, without
the previous approval of the competent authority. The first proviso
to the section states that such approval is not necessary in cases
involving arrest of the person on the spot on the charges of
accepting undue advantage.
34. As may be seen, the first proviso to Section 17A refers to cases
wherein a public servant is charged with acceptance of an undue
advantage or attempt thereof. A prior approval or sanction to
investigate such an officer in a trap case is likely to defeat the very
purpose of trap and the investigation, which is not the underlying
intention of the legislature. The investigation against Respondent
No. 1, being an accused of demanding a bribe, did not require any
previous approval of the Central Government. That apart, the
accusation against Respondent No. 1 does not revolve around any

NA528 No. 1346 of 2026
11
recommendations made or decisions taken by him in his quasi-
judicial or administrative capacity."
31. In CBI v. Santosh Karnani (supra), the accused could not be arrested at
the spot during the trap and he had absconded, yet the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that the investigation against a person accused of demanding a
bribe does not require any previous approval of the Central Government.
32. CBI v. Santosh Karnani (supra) has been followed in the case of
Surendra Dhariwal Vs. State of Rajasthana and another : Crl. Appeal
Nos.3717-3718 of 2025, decided on 25.08.2025.
33. In
Ashok Kumar Choudhary v. Central Bureau Of Investigation
/Anti Corruption Bureau Lko , Neutral Citation: 2026:AHC-LKO:22051,
this Court after relying on Hon'ble Supreme Court's precedents on this aspect
has held that under Section 17-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988,
grant of prosecution sanction is not required in case an accused is arrested
during the trap proceedings.
34. In the present case also, as per the prosecution case, the applicant
Achche Lal was caught red handed while accepting bribe money and the
other applicant Brikesh Pandey was also arrested during the trap
proceedings. In view of the provision contained in the first proviso appended
to Section 17-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and the law laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CBI v. Santosh Karnani
(supra), it appears that no previous sanction for prosecution of the applicants
was required and the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner
that the entire proceedings stand vitiated for the defect in prosecution
sanction order, has no force and the same is rejected.
35. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the considered view that
there is no error or illegality in the orders dated 30.01.2026 passed by the
learned Special Judge, Anti Corruption, CBI, Court No.2, Lucknow in
Session Trial No.1604 of 2025 arising out of RC No.00620025A0001 under
Section 61 (2) to Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) read with Section 7
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Police Station- CBI/ACB, Lucknow,
whereby the applications filed by the applicants seeking their discharge,
have been rejected and in the orders dated 21.02.2026 passed by the trial
Court framing charges against them. The petitions lack merits and are
dismissed .
April 23, 2026
-Amit K-
(Subhash Vidyarthi,J.)
Digitally signed by :-
AMIT KUMAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench