Navraj vs Registrar General High Court Of Delhi

Court
Delhi High Court

$~36
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision : 24.08.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010397682026
+ W.P.(C) 12343/2026 & CM APPL. 57257/2026
NAVRAJ .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Charu Sharma, Advocate
versus
REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF DELHI .....Respondent
Through: Dr. Amit George, Mr. Arnav Bhansali
and Mr. Vaibhav Gandhi, Advocates
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA

V. KAMESWAR RAO , J. (ORAL)

1. This petition has been filed with the following prayers:
“(a) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction declaring the
decision of the Respondent, as recorded in the Notice dated
12.08.2026, to retain the existing answer-key entries in respect
of Question Nos. 65, 73 and 81 of Booklet Series ‘B’ to be
legally unsustainable, and consequently direct the Respondent
to correct the said answer-key entries and/or delete the
defective question(s), as the case may be, in accordance with
the findings of this Hon’ble Court;
(b) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and
setting aside, to the extent of the Petitioner’s challenge, the
Notice dated 12.08.2026 recording the decision on objections
to the Model Answer Keys, the result of the Delhi Higher
Judicial Service Preliminary Examination–2026, and the
Notice dated 14.08.2026 shortlisting candidates for provisional
admission to the Mains Examination (Written)–2026, insofar as
they give effect to the retention of the impugned answer-key
entries and consequently exclude the Petitioner from the


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Signed By:PRADEEP
SHARMA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
15:31:14

shortlist;
(c) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction directing the
Respondent to treat Option (4) as the correct answer to
Question No. 65 of Booklet Series ‘B’, and to make the
corresponding consequential correction in the answer key
applicable to the other Booklet Series, wherever the
corresponding question and options are identical in substance;
(d) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction directing the
Respondent to delete Question No. 73 of Booklet Series ‘B’, on
the ground that the question, as framed, is incapable of yielding
a single objectively correct answer, and to make the
corresponding consequential correction in the answer key
applicable to the other Booklet Series, wherever applicable;
(e) In the alternative to prayer (d), issue an appropriate writ,
order or direction directing the Respondent to treat Option (3)
as the correct answer to Question No. 73 of Booklet Series ‘B’,
and to make the corresponding consequential correction in the
answer key applicable to the other Booklet Series, wherever
applicable;
(f) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction directing the
Respondent to treat Option (3) as the correct answer to
Question No. 81 of Booklet Series ‘B’, and to make the
corresponding consequential correction in the answer key
applicable to the other Booklet Series, wherever applicable;
(g) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction directing the
Respondent to re-compute the Petitioner’s marks in the
Preliminary Examination on the basis of the corrections and/or
deletion(s) directed by this Hon’ble Court, and thereafter
redraw the Preliminary Examination result and the shortlist for
the Mains Examination (Written)–2026 accordingly; and, if
upon such re-computation the Petitioner meets the applicable
qualifying cut-off, include the Petitioner in the shortlist for
provisional admission to the Mains Examination (Written)-
2026;
(h) Pending the hearing and final disposal of the present
petition, issue an appropriate interim order directing the
Respondent to permit the Petitioner to participate provisionally
in the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Mains Examination


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Signed By:PRADEEP
SHARMA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
15:31:14

(Written)-2026 scheduled to be held on 12th and 13th
September, 2026, subject to the outcome of the present petition;
(i) Award costs of the present petition to the Petitioner; and
(j) Pass such other and further order(s) as this Hon’ble Court
may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the
present case and in the interest of justice.”

2. In effect, the petitioner is challenging the notice dated 12.08.2026
whereby the respondent, High Court of Delhi, pursuant to objections
received to the Model Answer Keys, has decided to delete 11 questions of
the Delhi Higher Judicial Services Preliminary Examination, 2026 held on
26.07.2026. The answer key to all other questions were held to be correct.
Pursuant thereto, the marks of the petitioner were declared as 70.50, which
falls short of the cut off mark for enabling a candidate to sit in the Mains
examination.
3. The challenge laid is primarily to question nos.65, 73 and 81 and the
answers thereto. The same are reproduced here as under:
“65. Section 343 of the BNSS deals with tender of pardon to an
accomplice. Which out of following is correct category of
offences for which such pardon can be tendered?
(1) To all offences
(2) To any offence triable exclusively by Sessions Court.
(3) To any offence punishable with maximum sentence of three
years.
(4) None of the above

73. When an offence under the Protection of Children from
Sexual Offences Act, 2012 is committed by a child, which is the
court competent to try the case?
(1) Special Court under the POCSO Act
(2) The Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) -
(3) The Children's Court
(4) The Magistrate Court


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Signed By:PRADEEP
SHARMA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
15:31:14

81. B was robbed on a highway by two unknown offenders. The
accused persons were arrested three days after the incident. B
is called at the police station to identify the accused persons. B
identifies the accused persons at the police station and later in
the court during trial. What is the evidentiary value of such
identification?
(1) The identification of accused persons in police station by B
corroborates the evidence of identification in court, and is
therefore, substantive evidence
(2) Such identification has no value in the eyes of law without
prior Test Identification Parade
(3) Identification of accused persons in court by B on oath can
be relied upon, even though there was no Test Identification
Parade.
(4) None of the above”
4. The submission of Ms. Charu Sharma, the learned counsel for the
petitioner on question no.65 is that the said question is contrary to the
statutory text of Section 343(2)(a) of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 (BNSS). The provision expressly refers to offences triable exclusively
by a Court of Session and also by a Special Judge appointed under any other
law for the time being in force. According to her, option no.2 to the
question, which is adopted as correct by the respondent refers only to
offences triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions and omits the latter
statutory category i.e., the Special Judge.
5. According to her, the petitioner specifically brought this error to the
respondent’s notice and identified ‘none of the above’ as the correct
response. She submits therefore, the dispute concerns the application of
pleading statutory language and not a question on which competing legal
interpretation reasonably arises.
6. Dr. Amit George, the learned counsel for the respondent would


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Signed By:PRADEEP
SHARMA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
15:31:14

contest the submission of Ms. Sharma. He states that though the provision of
Section 343(2)(a) of BNSS also refers to a Special Judge, the word Special
Judge was specifically omitted from the question. The provision reads as
under:-
“(2) This section applies to-
(a) any offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session or by
the Court of a Special Judge appointed under any other law for
the time being in force;”

7. According to him, the question refers to offences triable exclusively
by a Court of Session, which finds mention in the said section. Hence, the
answer necessarily has to be option no.2 and not ‘none of the above’ as
answered by the petitioner. In fact, choosing the option ‘none of the above’
would render option no.2 incorrect, which cannot be the case as Section
343(2)(a) of BNSS specifically refers to offences triable exclusively by the
Court of Session.
8. We agree with the submission of Dr. George as in the available four
options, the answer or for that matter, the closest correct answer is option
no.2. Hence, the challenge of the petitioner qua question no.65 is rejected.
9. Insofar as question no.73 is concerned, according to Ms. Sharma, the
same is incomplete and incapable of yielding a correct answer. She submits
that the question merely posits that when an offence under the Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) has been committed
by a child, which Court would be competent to try the case. She submits it
does not identify the particular POCSO offence, the category of the offence,
the age of the child, the punishment prescribed for that offence or its
classification by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,


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Signed By:PRADEEP
SHARMA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
15:31:14

2015 (JJ Act). She submits those particulars are legally determinative
inasmuch as the statutory scheme distinguishes between offences according
to the punishment prescribed. The JJ Act separately classifies offences as
petty, serious and heinous and prescribes different consequences upon their
adjudication.
10. She also submits that an offence committed by a child follows the
statutory preliminary assessment proceedings by the Children’s Court
whereas other offences may remain triable with the Juvenile Justice Board.
She states that the petitioner specifically raised this defect in his objection,
pointing out that the question contains both Juvenile Justice Board and
Children’s Court as options despite failing to furnish the facts necessary to
determine which forum is competent. The submission of Dr. George is
primarily that the submission of Ms. Sharma is on a misreading of the
provisions of the JJ Act. According to him, the competent forum to decide
the issue relatable to offences committed by a child less than sixteen years of
age is the Juvenile Justice Board. It is only in certain eventualities like under
Section 15 and Section 18 of the JJ Act that the matter is referred to the
Children’s Court. If the question is seen in that perspective, the right answer
to the question no.73 would be Children’s Court.
11. We agree with the said submission made by Dr. George as the offence
is stated to be under the POCSO Act, the Court competent to decide the
issue shall be the Children’s Court. Hence, the objection to this question is
rejected.
12. Insofar as question no.81 is concerned, the submission of the
Ms.Sharma is primarily that the same is contrary to law declared by the


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Signed By:PRADEEP
SHARMA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
15:31:14

Supreme Court. She submits that the respondent has treated the proposition
that identification of an accused in Court has no value in the eyes of law in
the absence of prior Test Identification Parade (TIP) as the correct answer.
She states that the question, however, expressly states that the witness
identified the accused person in a police station and subsequently identified
the accused in the Court during trial. The petitioner objected to the answer
key stating option no.2 as the right answer, as according to him, the same
runs contrary to the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of
Harjindra Singh Etc. v. State of UP 2026 SCC OnLine SC 966 and
Malkhansingh and Ors. v. State of MP. (2003) 5 SCC 746. Paragraph 26 of
Harjindra Singh (supra) reads as under:
“26. This argument is legally untenable given the specific facts
of this case. A TIP is not a substantive piece of evidence; it is
merely corroborative. As correctly pointed out by the
respondent-State, this Court in Ronny @ Ronald James Alwaris
Etc (supra) clearly laid down that “where the witness had a
chance to interact with the accused or that in a case where the
witness had an opportunity to notice the distinctive features of
the accused which lends assurance to his testimony in court, the
evidence of identification in court for the first time by such a
witness cannot be thrown away merely because no test
identification parade was held.” Furthermore, in Rajesh
Govind Jagesha (supra), we held that the absence of a TIP is
not fatal if the accused is sufficiently described or arrested
immediately after the occurrence.”

13. We are not in agreement with the submission made by the learned
counsel for the petitioner for the simple reason that question no.81 states that
the person accused of the offence were unknown offenders, unlike in the
judgments supra , on which reliance has been placed by the petitioner where


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Signed By:PRADEEP
SHARMA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
15:31:14

the accused persons were in acquaintance with the victim and it was in that
context that the Court held that failure to hold a TIP would not make
evidence of identification in Court inadmissible. In this regard, we may refer
to paragraph 10 of Malkhansingh and Ors. (supra) , which reads as under:
“10. It is no doubt true that much evidentiary value cannot be
attached to the identification of the accused in court where
identifying witness is a total stranger who had just a fleeting
glimpse of the person identified or who had no particular
reason to remember the person concerned, if the identification
is made for the first time in court.”

14. We find that Dr. George is correct in relying upon the judgment in the
case of V. C. Shukla v. State (Delhi Administration), (1980) 2 SCC 665
wherein the Supreme Court in paragraph 24 has held as under:
“24. In order to show that A-1 took a somewhat unusual
interest in the dispatch of the negatives and other material of
the film from Bombay to Delhi it is further the case of the
prosecution that Tripathi who was Special Assistant to A-1 was
sent expressly to receive the materials at New Delhi Railway
station and make arrangements for their transport But Tripathi
categorically stated that he never went to the Railway Station
for the purpose of receiving the film material, etc. On the other
hand, PW2 states that on 9-11-1975 PW4, Khandpur informed
him on telephone from Bombay that the film material was being
sent from Bombay to Delhi by Western Express and would be
reaching Delhi on the next day and that two officers, one of
them being Kane, PW 5, were accompanying the material. PW
2 adds that he then, rang up Ghose and asked him to get in
touch with Tripathi for making the necessary arrangements for
transport and delivery of the material. The witness goes on to
th
state that on the 10 November 1975, PW 39 Ghose came to
him and reported that the film material had arrived and had
been brought in tempos arranged by A-l. Ghose, however, has
not supported this witness on this aspect of the matter. Reliance


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Signed By:PRADEEP
SHARMA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
15:31:14

was therefore, placed on the evidence of PW 5, Kane to show
that when he reached Delhi along with the film material,
Tripathi was there to receive the same. It is not disputed that
Tripathi was not known to PW S, Kane, before the 10th and
that by the time the witness saw him at the New Delhi Railway
Station he had seen him only once in Bombay. The witness
doles state that his pointed attention was drawn to Tripathi
because he had asked him to settle the payment of charges to
the coolies and that but for this his attention would not have
been drawn to Tripathi. He, however, admits that he his
statement before the Central Bureau of Investigation, he did not
mention the fact that Tripathi had asked him to settle the matter
of the payment of charges to the coolies. Thus, the existence of
the only circumstance on the basis of which the witness could
have identified Tripathi becomes doubtful and in view of the
categorical statement of Tripathi that he never went to New
Delhi Railway Station on the 10th of November to receive the
film, it is difficult to accept the evidence of PW 5 that Tripathi
was the person present at the station. The possibility that the
witness committed some mistake in identifying cannot be ruled
out. Moreover, the identification of Tripathi by the witness for
the first time in the court without being tested by a prior test
identification parade was valueless. Besides, the witness admits
that in the note Ext. PW4/E-2 he did not mention Tripathi or
any other person along with Ghose to have been present at the
New Delhi Railway Station. Thus, even on the question of the
arrival of the material of the film at New Delhi no direct
connection with A-1 has been established by the prosecution. In
time, it is not proved by the prosecution that Tripathi was
present at the Railway Station to receive the film and hence it
cannot be said that A-1 took an unusual interest in seeing that
the film is properly brought from Bombay to Delhi and placed
in his custody.”

15. As such, the submission of Ms. Sharma with respect to question no.81
is liable to be rejected.


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Signed By:PRADEEP
SHARMA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
15:31:14

16. In view of our above discussion, the pleas raised by the learned
counsel for the petitioner are unsustainable. We do not see any merit in the
petition. The same is liable to be dismissed along with the pending
application. We order so.

V. KAMESWAR RAO, J



MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J
AUGUST 24, 2026/ rt


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Signed By:PRADEEP
SHARMA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
15:31:14