Karamjit Kaur Sekhon And Others vs State Of Punjab And Otherxs

CRM-M-62478-2026 - 1-
130 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-62478-2026
Date of Decision: 03.11.2026
Karamjit Kaur Sekhon and others …Petitioners
vs.
State of Punjab and others …Respondents
Coram : Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.S.Shekhawat
Present : Mr. Pardhuman Garg, Advocate, for the petitioners.
Mr.M.S.Bajwa, Deputy Advocate General, Punjab.
*
N.S.Shekhawat J. (Oral)
1. The petitioners have filed the present petition under Section 528 of
B.N.S.S (Section 482 Cr. P.C) with a prayer to issue appropriate directions to
the Court of Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Nihal Singh Wala, District
Moga to decide a case titled as “State Vs. Mangat Rai and others”, arising out
of FIR No.138 dated 02.12.2010 registered under Sections 186, 353 and 506 of
IPC (Corresponding to Sections 221, 132, 351 of BNS, 2023) at Police Station
Nihal Singh Wala, District Moga (Annexure P-1) in a time bound manner.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that one FIR No.138
dated 02.12.2010 under Sections 186, 353, 506 of IPC, Police Station Nihal
Singh Wala, District Moga (Annexure P-1) was ordered to be registered against
the petitioners. After conducting the investigation, the police had prepared a
cancellation report and presented the same before the Court of Sub-Divisional
Judicial Magistrate, Nihal Singh Wala, District Moga. However, vide order
dated 26.11.2021 (Annexure P-2), the cancellation report was returned to the
concerned Police Station and the police was directed to conduct further
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investigation in the present case. Thereafter, again another cancellation report
was prepared and was submitted to the Court of Sub-Divisional Judicial
Magistrate, Nihal Singh Wala, District Moga on 15.09.2024. He further
submits that no decision has been taken by the Court of Sub-Divisional Judicial
Magistrate, Nihal Singh Wala, District Moga on the said cancellation report for
the last more than 02 years.
3. On the other hand, learned State counsel submits that he has no
serious objection to the prayer made by learned counsel for the petitioner.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record
carefully.
5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the scope of
speedy trial and emphasizing that the speedy trial is one of the most important
facets of the fundamental rights to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21, held
in the matter of Kartar Singh Vs. State of Punjab and connect case, 1994(2)
RCR 169 as follows:-
Speedy Trial
89. The right to a speedy trial is a derivation from a provision of
Magna Carta. This principle has also been incorporated into the
Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 and from there into the
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of United States of America
which reads, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial......
90. It may be pointed out, in this connection, that there is a Federal
Act of 1974 called 'Speedy Trial Act' establishing a set of time-
limits for carrying out the major events, e.g., information,
indictment, arraignment, in the prosecution of criminal cases. See
Black's Law Dictionary, (Sixth Edition) p. 1400.
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91. The right to a speedy trial is not only an important safeguard
to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration, to minimise anxiety
and concern accompanying the accusation and to limit the
possibility of impairing the ability of an accused to defend himself
but also there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial. This
right has been actuated in the recent past and the courts have laid
down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental
rights. In fact, lot of cases are coming before the courts for
quashing of proceedings on the ground of inordinate and undue
delay stating that the invocation of this right even need not await
formal indictment or charge.
92. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an
essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty
guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to
speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and
consequent incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the
stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that
any possible prejudice that may result from impermissible and
avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the offence till
it consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it
may be noted that the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial is
properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
93. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. Home Secretary, State
of Bihar, 1980 (1) SCC 81 at P. 89 while dealing with Article 21 of
the Constitution of India has observed thus:
"No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can
be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of
Article 2 1. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and
by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral
and essential part of th e fundamental right to life and liberty
enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise
is as to what would be the consequent if a person accused of an
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offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his
liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in
violation of his fundamental right under Article 21. Would he be
entitled to be released unconditionally freed from the charge
leveled against him on the ground that trying him after an unduly
long period of time and convicting him after such trial would
constitute violation of his fundamental right under Article 21."
94. See also (1) Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, 1979 (1) SCR
392; (2) Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar,
1979 (3) SCR 169; (3) Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary,
State of Bihar, Patna, 1979 (3) SCR 532; (4) Hussainara Khatoon
and others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Govt. of Bihar, Patna
1979 (3) SCR 1276; (5) Kadra Pahadia v. State of Bihar, 1983 (2)
SCC 104;, (6) T. V. Vatheeswaran v. State of T.N., 1983(2) SCR
348; and (7) Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R. S. Nayak, 1992 (1) SCC
225.
6. Again, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down certain propositions,
which govern the basic human right to a speedy trial in a criminal prosecution
in the matter of Abdul Rehman Antulay and others Vs. R.S. Nayak and
another 1992(2) RCR 634 as follows:-
54. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions
emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these
propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all
situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules.
These propositions are :
1. Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the
Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily.
Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a
speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the societal
interest also, does not make it any-the-less the right of the accused.
It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of
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the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the
circumstances.
2. Right to Speedy Trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all
the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal,
revision and retrial. That is how, this Court has understood this
right and there is no reason to take a restricted view.
3. The concerns underlying the Right to speedy trial from the point
of view of the accused are :
(a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as
short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be
subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his
conviction; (b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his
vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged
investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and
(c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the
accused to defend himself, whether on account of death,
disappearance or non- availability of witnesses or otherwise.
4. At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it is usually the
accused who is interested in delaying the proceedings. As is often
pointed out, "delay is a known defence tactic". Since the burden of
proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay
ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-availability of
witnesses, disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work
against the interest of the prosecution. Of course, there may be
cases where the prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the
proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the Right to speedy
trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put
and answered is who is responsible for the delay? Proceedings
taken by either party in good faith, to vindicate their rights and
interest, as perceived by them, cannot be treated as delaying tactics
nor can the time taken in pursuing such proceedings be counted
towards delay. It goes without saying that frivolous proceedings or
proceedings taken merely for delaying the day of reckoning cannot
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be treated as proceedings taken in good faith. The mere fact that an
application/petition is admitted and an order of stay granted by a
superior court is by itself no proof that the proceeding is not a
frivolous. Very often these stays obtained on ex-parte
representation.
5. While determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting
in violation of Right to Speedy Trial) one must have regard to all
the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of
accused and witnesses, the work-load of the court concerned,
prevailing local conditions and so on-what is called, the systemic
delays. It is true that it is the obligation of the State to ensure a
speedy trial and State includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and
practical approach should be adopted in such matters instead of a
pedantic one.
6. Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the
accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. As has
been observed by Powell, J. in Barker "it cannot be said how long
a delay is loo long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift
J. in U.S.
but deliberate". The same ideal has been stated by White,
v. Ewell, 15 Law Edn. 2nd 627,
in the following words :
“the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative,
is consistent with delays, and has orderly expedition, rather than
more speed, as its essential ingredients; and whether delay in
completing a prosecution amounts to an un-constitutional
deprivation of rights depends upon all the circumstances.
However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive
proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of
accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be
allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution
become prosecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case.
7. We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called the
'demand' rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the
court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accussed's plea of
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denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused
did at no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case, he did
make such a demand and yet he was not tried speedily, it would be
a plus point in his favour, but the mere non- asking for a speedy
trial cannot be put against the accused. Even in U.S.A., the
relevance of demand rule has been substantially watered down in
Barker and other succeeding cases.
8. Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the several
relevant factors-'balancing test' or 'balancing process'-and
determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been
denied in a given case.
9. Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion
that Right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the
charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed.
But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and
other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of
proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it
is open to the court to make such other appropriate order-including
an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is
not concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has
concluded-as may be deemed just and equitable in the
circumstances of the case.
10. It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for
trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such
rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving
justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution. In every case of
complaint of denial of Right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the
prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is
the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case
before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of
U.S.A. too as repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time limit
inspite of the Sixth Amendment. Nor do we think that not fixing any
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such outer limit in effectuates the guarantee of Right to speedy
trial.
11. An objection based on denial of Right to speedy trial and for
relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court.
Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should
not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional
nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed
of on a priority basis”.
7. In the present case also, it is apparent that the cancellation report
has already been presented before the trial Court on 15.09.2024 and apparently,
the matter is being adjourned repeatedly since last two years. In fact, after the
cancellation report was submitted, the Court of Sub-Divisional Judicial
Magistrate, Nihal Singh Wala, District Moga should have considered and
decided the cancellation report expeditiously by passing a speaking and well-
reasoned order.
8. However, in the considered opinion of the Court, the matter has
been adjourned for the last two years without any justification. Consequently,
the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Nihal Singh Wala, District Moga is
directed to take a decision on the cancellation report within a period of two
months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. It is expected that
the Court of Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Nihal Singh Wala, District
Moga shall pass a speaking and well-reasoned order in accordance with law.
9. The present petition stands disposed of.
(N.S.SHEKHAWAT)
03.11.2026 JUDGE
hemlata
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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