Fahimuddin Ansari vs State Of U.P. Thru. Secy. Home Lko. And Another

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 964 of 2026
Fahimuddin Ansari
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
State Of U.P. Thru. Secy. Home Lko. And Another
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Narendra Gupta
Counsel for Respondent(s) : G.A.
AFR
Court No. - 27
HON'BLE RAM MANOHAR NARAYAN MISHRA, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant, learned AGA for the State,
responded no.1 and perused the record.
2. Instant criminal appeal, under Section 14-A(1) of the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, has been
preferred against the order dated 26/03/2026 passed by Special Judge,
SC/ST Act, Sitapur in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No.75 of 2026, CIS
No.127 of 2026, Smt. Sushila versus Fahimuddin Ansari, on application
under Section 173(4) BNSS filed by defacto complainant respondent
no.2, whereby the learned Special Judge, SC/ST Act has directed the
SHO, Tambour, District, Sitapur, to register FIR under the appropriate
sections and investigate the case according to the law. Compliance to be
ensured within 10 days.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there are various
discrepancies in the impugned order passed by learned Special Judge on
the application under section 173(4) BNSS. The complainant has stated in

CRLA No. 964 of 2026
2
said application under Section 173(4) BNSS that she had gone to get
photocopies of her Aadhar card on 14.12.26 at the shop of the opposite
party (appellant), where he tried to get her proximity and asked her
address and on pretext of showing his second shop, he took her to his
shop of fertilizer and seeds and brought her back to the photocopying
shop. He asked her to sit there and engaged in obscene conversation with
her and molested her. She anyhow rescued herself from his clutches. On
reaching at her home, she narrated the incident to her family members. On
the next day i.e. 15/02/2026, she moved an application at police station
concerned and also made a complaint through the IGRS portal, but no
action was taken. She also filed a complaint against the appellant by
registered post to the Superintendent of Police, Sitapur and other higher
officers, but no action was taken. Therefore, she was compelled to move
the application before the court.
4. He next submitted that there is a distance of 90 kilometers between the
"Jan Seva Kendra" operated by the appellant and the residence of the
complainant. It is quite unnatural that she would have come to get
Photocopies at his Graahak Seva Kendra. The procedural requirements of
Section 173(4) BNSS, were not complied with by the complainant. She
hatched a conspiracy to falsely implicate the appellant with ulterior
motive to get compensation from the government due to her caste factor.
She did not visit the police station on asking of higher authority regarding
her complaint on the IGRS portal, the learned court below, while passing
the impugned order, did not consider the submissions of the police
station, wherein, it is stated that no such incident as alleged by the
complainant had occurred. It is also stated therein that the appellant had
come for her treatment at Kasba, Tambaur, and visited the Jan Seva

CRLA No. 964 of 2026
3
Kendra operated by the opposite party where some hot talk occurred
between them on the question of charges of photocopying. None of the
neighbouring shop owners corroborated the incident on interrogation. The
learned court below has made wrong observation that on the basis of the
averments in the application filed by the applicant and from the report of
the police station, it appears that the opposite party had misbehaved and
molested the applicant. He also submitted that the applicant had also
lodged another FIR vide Case Crime No.141 of 2025 on 13/06/2025
against Deepak Shukla and Sushil Shukla in which she made allegation of
molestation, use of criminal force, marpit and criminal intimidation.
During the police investigation, the case was found false and final report
was submitted.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant prayed for interim relief to stay the
operation of the impugned order and submitted that on lodging of the FIR
pursuant to the impugned order, the purpose of filing the present revision
shall frustrate.
6. Per contra, learned AGA has submitted that the appeal is not
maintainable against impugned order which is interlocutory as such in
terms of Full Bench judgment of this Court in
Father Thomas versus
, reported in , and
State of UP and Others 2011 (72) ACC 564 Jagannath
, reported in
Verma and Others versus State of UP and Another 2014
. The prospective accused in an order passed on application
(8) ADJ 439
u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. (173(4), BNSS. can not prefer an appeal or Revision
against an order directing registration of FIR and investigation by police.
7. Learned AGA has also placed reliance on a recent judgment of single
bench of this Court in
Kamlesh Meena and Others versus State of UP

CRLA No. 964 of 2026
4
in support of his contentions.
and Others, reported in 2025 (5) ALJ 578
He submitted that in the impugned order, learned Special Judge has issued
a direction to the Station House Officer concerned to register an FIR and
investigate the case under appropriate sections in the light of applications
under Section 173(4) BNSS. This is an interlocutory order and revision is
not maintainable against such order.
8. Per contra, learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on an
interim order passed by this by Single Bench in Matters Under Article
227 No.1268 of 2026, dated 10/2/2026, wherein, an interim stay was
granted against the impugned order passed by the learned CJM,
Chandausi, District Sambhal on an application under Section 173(4) of
BNSS, whereby learned CJM has issued direction to lodge an FIR and
register the case against the petitioners who happen to be Additional
Superintendent of Police, North, District Sambhal; being a public servant,
before issuing directions under Section 174(3) BNSS, it was incumbent
on learned CJM to comply with the provisions of Section 175(4) BNSS
before issuing such an order. He also submitted that this is statutory
appeal u/s 14(A)(1) of the Act and this Court has ample power to examine
the impugned order and set it aside in an appropriate case.
9. I have gone through the judgments cited by learned counsel for the
parties, as well as a recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Criminal Appeal No.352 of 2020, Om Prakash Ambadkar versus
in light of facts and circumstances of
State of Maharashtra and Others
the case.
10. Ordinarily, provisions of Section 156(3) CrPC, which is replaced by
Section 173(4) BNSS, are invoked by the complainant when the police

CRLA No. 964 of 2026
5
authorities decline to register an FIR. In such circumstances, a private
complaint may be made in the court of the magistrate or Special Judge, as
the case may be, and the complainant may pray that police investigation
be ordered under Section 156(3) of the CrPC or Section 173(4) of BNSS,
as the case may be.
11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed both the provisions, which are
essentially pari materia in
Om Prakash Ambadkar vs. The State of
and observed in paragraphs 29, 30, 31, 32, 33,
Maharashtra and others
and 34, which are extracted as under:
"29. Section 175 of the BNSS corresponds to Section 156 of
the Cr.P.C. Sub-section (1) of Section 175 of the BNSS is in
pari materia with sub-section 156(1) of the Cr.P.C. except for
the proviso which empowers the Superintendent of Police to
direct the Deputy Superintendent of Police to investigate a case
if the nature or gravity of the case so requires. Sub-section (2)
of Section 175 the BNSS is identical to Section 156(2) of the
Cr.P.C. Section 175(3) of the BNSS empowers any Magistrate
who is empowered to take cognizance under Section 210 to
order investigation in accordance with Section 175(1) and to
this extent is in pari materia with Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C.
However, unlike Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., any Magistrate,
before ordering investigation under Section 175(3) of the
BNSS, is required to :
a. Consider the application, supported by an
affidavit, made by the complainant to the
Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4) of the
BNSS;
b. Conduct such inquiry as he thinks necessary; and
c. Consider the submissions made by the police
officer.
30. Sub-section (4) of Section 175 of the BNSS is a new
addition to the scheme of investigation of cognizable cases
when compared with the scheme previously existing in Section
156 of the Cr.P.C. It provides an additional safeguard to a
public servant against whom an accusation of committing a
cognizable offence arising in the course of discharge of his

CRLA No. 964 of 2026
6
official duty is made. The provision stipulates that any
Magistrate who is empowered to take cognizance under
Section 210 of the BNSS may order investigation against a
public servant upon receiving a complaint arising in course of
the discharge of his official duty, only after complying with the
following procedure:
a. Receiving a report containing facts and
circumstances of the incident from the officer
superior to the accused public servant; and
b. Considering the assertions made by the accused
public servant as regards the situation that led to the
occurrence of the alleged incident.
31. A comparison of Section 175(3) of the BNSS with Section
156(3) of the Cr.P.C. indicates three prominent changes that
have been introduced by the enactment of BNSS as follows:
a. First, the requirement of making an application to
the Superintendent of Police upon refusal by the
officer in charge of a police station to lodge the FIR
has been made mandatory, and the applicant making
an application under Section 175(3) is required to
furnish a copy of the application made to the
Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4),
supported by an affidavit, while making the
application to the Magistrate under Section 175(3).
b. Secondly, the Magistrate has been empowered to
conduct such enquiry as he deems necessary before
making an order directing registration of FIR.
c. Thirdly, the Magistrate is required to consider the
submissions of the officer in charge of the police
station as regards the refusal to register an FIR
before issuing any directions under Section 175(3).
32. The introduction of these changes by the legislature can be

CRLA No. 964 of 2026
7
attributed to the judicial evolution of Section 156 of the Cr.P.C.
undertaken by a number of decisions of this Court. In the case
of Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. reported in (2015) 6
SCC 287 , this Court held that prior to making an application to
the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., the
applicant must necessarily make applications under Sections
154(1) and 154(3). It was further observed by the Court that
applications made under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. must
necessarily be supported by an affidavit sworn by the applicant.
The reason given by the Court for introducing such a
requirement was that applications under Section 156(3) of the
Cr.P.C. were being made in a routine manner and in a number
of cases only with a view to cause harassment to the accused
by registration of FIR. It was further observed that the
requirement of supporting the complaint with an affidavit
would ensure that the person making the application is
conscious and also to see that no false affidavit is made. Once
an affidavit is found to be false, the applicant would be liable
for prosecution in accordance with law. This would deter him
from casually invoking the authority of the Magistrate under
Section 156(3). The relevant observations made by the Court
are reproduced hereinbelow:
“27. Regard being had to the aforesaid enunciation
of law, it needs to be reiterated that the learned
Magistrate has to remain vigilant with regard to the
allegations made and the nature of allegations and
not to issue directions without proper application of
mind. He has also to bear in mind that sending the
matter would be conducive to justice and then he
may pass the requisite order. The present is a case
where the accused persons are serving in high
positions in the Bank. We are absolutely conscious
that the position does not matter, for nobody is
above the law. But, the learned Magistrate should
take note of the allegations in entirety, the date of

CRLA No. 964 of 2026
8
incident and whether any cognizable case is
remotely made out. It is also to be noted that when a
borrower of the financial institution covered under
the Sarfaesi Act, invokes the jurisdiction under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and also there is a separate
procedure under the Recovery of Debts Due to
Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, an
attitude of more care, caution and circumspection
has to be adhered to.
28. Issuing a direction stating “as per the
application” to lodge an FIR creates a very
unhealthy situation in society and also reflects the
erroneous approach of the learned Magistrate. It
also encourages unscrupulous and unprincipled
litigants, like Respondent 3, namely, Prakash Kumar
Bajaj, to take adventurous steps with courts to bring
the financial institutions on their knees . As the
factual exposition would reveal, Respondent 3 had
prosecuted the earlier authorities and after the matter
is dealt with by the High Court in a writ petition
recording a settlement, he does not withdraw the
criminal case and waits for some kind of situation
where he can take vengeance as if he is the emperor
of all he surveys. It is interesting to note that during
the tenure of Appellant 1, who is presently
occupying the position of Vice- President, neither
was the loan taken, nor was the default made, nor
was any action under the SARFAESI Act taken.
However, the action under the SARFAESI Act was
taken on the second time at the instance of the
present Appellant 1. We are only stating about the
devilish design of Respondent 3 to harass the
appellants with the sole intent to avoid the payment
of loan. When a citizen avails a loan from a financial
institution, it is his obligation to pay back and not

CRLA No. 964 of 2026
9
play truant or for that matter play possum. As we
have noticed, he has been able to do such
adventurous acts as he has the embedded conviction
that he will not be taken to task because an
application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is a simple
application to the court for issue of a direction to
the investigating agency. We have been apprised
that a carbon copy of a document is filed to show the
compliance with Section 154(3), indicating it has
been sent to the Superintendent of Police concerned.
29. At this stage it is seemly to state that power
under Section 156(3) warrants application of
judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the
police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the
Code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the
authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really
grieved citizen with clean hands must have free
access to invoke the said power. It protects the
citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route
to harass their fellow citizens, efforts are to be made
to scuttle and curb the same.
30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in
this country where Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly
sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of
the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an
appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be
well advised to verify the truth and also can verify
the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can
make the applicant more responsible. We are
compelled to say so as such kind of applications are
being filed in a routine manner without taking any
responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain
persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and
alarming when one tries to pick up people who are

CRLA No. 964 of 2026
10
passing orders under a statutory provision which
can be challenged under the framework of the said
Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a
criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle
the scores.
31. We have already indicated that there has to be
prior applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3)
while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both the
aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application
and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed.
The warrant for giving a direction that an
application under Section 156(3) be supported by an
affidavit is so that the person making the application
should be conscious and also endeavour to see that
no false affidavit is made. It is because once an
affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for
prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter
him to casually invoke the authority of the
Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we
have already stated that the veracity of the same can
also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard
being had to the nature of allegations of the case.
We are compelled to say so as a number of cases
pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial
dispute/family disputes, commercial offences,
medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the
cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in
initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in
Lalita Kumari [(2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri)
524] are being filed. That apart, the learned
Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in
lodging of the FIR.”
(Emphasis supplied)

CRLA No. 964 of 2026
11
33.In a recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of Babu
Venkatesh v. The State Of Karnataka reported in (2022) 5
SCC 639 , the observations made in Priyanka Srivastava
(supra) were referred to and it was held as follows:
“24. This Court has clearly held that, a stage has
come where applications under Section
156(3)Cr.P.C. are to be supported by an affidavit
duly sworn by the complainant who seeks the
invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate.
25. This Court further held that, in an appropriate
case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised
to verify the truth and also verify the veracity of the
allegations. The Court has noted that, applications
under Section 156(3)Cr.P.C. are filed in a routine
manner without taking any responsibility only to
harass certain persons.
26. This Court has further held that, prior to the
filing of a petition under Section 156(3)Cr.P.C.,
there have to be applications under Sections 154(1)
and 154(3)Cr.P.C.. This Court emphasises the
necessity to file an affidavit so that the persons
making the application should be conscious and not
make false affidavit. With such a requirement, the
persons would be deterred from causally invoking
authority of the Magistrate, under Section
156(3)Cr.P.C.. Inasmuch as if the affidavit is found
to be false, the person would be liable for
prosecution in accordance with law.”
(Emphasis supplied)
34.In light of the judicial interpretation and evolution of
Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. by various decisions of this Court
as discussed above, it becomes clear that the changes
introduced by Section 175(3) of the BNSS to the existing

CRLA No. 964 of 2026
12
scheme of Section 156(3) merely codify the procedural
practices and safeguards which have been introduced by
judicial decisions aimed at curbing the misuse of invocation of
powers of a Magistrate by unscrupulous litigants for achieving
ulterior motives.”
12. With the above observation, the Supreme Court set aside the
impugned order passed by the Magistrate, directing police investigation
under Section 156(3) CrPC in a criminal appeal filed against the rejection
of an application filed by the accused appellant in a case under Sections
323, 294, 500, 504 and 506 IPC against the appellant, who was a
practicing advocate, and set aside the order of the High Court, passed
under Section 482 CrPC, whereby the petition of the appellant for setting
aside the impugned order passed by the trial court was dismissed.
13. This Court, in a recent judgment in Kamlesh Meena and others vs.
State of U.P. and others , placing reliance on Full Bench judgment of this
Court in Father Thomas vs. State of U.P. and Others also citing the
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Om Prakash Ambedkar versus
the State of Maharashtra and others and other leading cases on ambit
and scope of the order on application under Section 156(3) CrPC,
considered it in detail. This Court observed that in the latter part.
Paragraphs 18 and 21 are extracted of as under:-
“ 18. In the latter part of Section 173(4) of B.N.S.S., it is
provided that "failing which such aggrieved person may make
an application to the Magistrate". Aforesaid phrase used in
Section 173(4) of B.N.S.S., in my opinion, clearly denotes that
in case all the remedies as mentioned under sub-section 1, sub-
section 3 and initial part of sub-section 4 of Section 173

CRLA No. 964 of 2026
13
B.N.S.S. are exhausted, applicant/aggrieved person has a right
to move an appropriate application before the Magistrate,
who, in turn, either proceed on the aforesaid application and
issue a direction for police investigation after registering the
F.I.R., or treat it as a complaint and proceed accordingly, or
reject the same on merits. In the instant matter, learned
Magistrate came to conclusion that the cognizable offence is
made out against the opposite parties in the complaint, thus, it
would be justified to issue a direction for registration of an
F.I.R. and investigation of the matter.
21. In this conspectus, as above, I am of the considered view
that the present applicants, who are the prospective accused,
have no locus standi to assail the direction for investigation
under Section 173(4) read with 175 (3) B.N.S.S. before the
summoning/cognizance stage. There is neither any abuse of
process of court nor any ground made out to pass an order to
interfere with the complaint u/s 173(4) for securing the ends of
justice, in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court
under Section 528 B.N.S.S."
14. In , the Full Bench of
Father Thomas versus State of UP and others
this Court held that the initial order of the Magistrate under Section
156(3) CrPC peremptorily reminds the police to perform its duty and
investigate a cognizable offence. The orders for investigation under
Section 156(3) CrPC, are only ancillary step in aid of the investigation or
trial and are clearly interlocutory in nature and are not amenable to
challenge in a criminal revision in view of the bar contained in Section
397(2) of the Code. An order under Section 156(3) CrPC, issuing a

CRLA No. 964 of 2026
14
direction to police to register a case and investigate, is not amenable to
challenge in a criminal revision or an application under Section 482
CrPC. It is not necessary for this Court to go into further questions,
whether the said order is administrative in nature as urged by counsel for
the revisionist and the learned Government Advocate. The Full Bench
further held that the order of Magistrate in exercise of power under
Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure directing the police to
register and investigate is not open to revision at the instance of a person
against whom neither cognizance has been taken nor any process issued.
15. Subsequently, a full bench of this court in
Jagannath Verma and
considered the judgment of , and
Others (supra) Father Thomas (supra)
held that before the Full Bench in , the
Father Thomas (supra)
controversy was whether a direction to the police to register a first
information report in regard to a case involving a cognizable offense and
for investigation is open to revision at the instance of a person suspected
of having committed a crime, against whom neither cognizance has been
taken nor any process issued. Such an order was held to be interlocutory
in nature and, therefore, attracts the bar under subsection (2) of Section
397. An order of a Magistrate rejecting an application under Section
156(3) of the Court for the registration of the case by the police and for
investigation is not an interlocutory order. Such an order is amenable to
the remedy of a criminal revision under Section 397.
16. is a landmark
Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2185
judgement defining interlocutory orders. It has been defined in paragraph
6 as the term 'interlocutory order' in Section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code has
been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It
merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do

CRLA No. 964 of 2026
15
not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties.
Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides
certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so
as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that
would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of
this particular provision in S. 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance,
orders summoning witnesses. adjourning cases, passing orders for bail,
calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding,
may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision
would lie under Section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are
matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the
accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be
interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional
jurisdiction of the High Court.
17. In the order summoning the appellants in a
Amar Nath's case,
mechanical manner after the police had submitted a final report against
them leading to their release by the Judicial Magistrate, and the revision
petition against the order of the Magistrate preferred before the
Additional Sessions Judge by the complainant had also failed. Even the
subsequent complaint by the complainant had been dismissed on merits.
Against the dismissal of the latter complaint, the complainant preferred a
revision. The Sessions Judge set aside the order of the Judicial Magistrate
and remanded the case for further inquiry, whereupon the Magistrate
straightaway summoned the appellants for trial. The High Court
dismissed the revision of the complainant on premise that the judicial
Magistrate's order being an interlocutory revision to the High Court was
bared under Section 397(2). Since the Revision to the High Court was

CRLA No. 964 of 2026
16
barred by Section 397(2), the High Court could not take up the case under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. In Appeal, Hon' ble Supreme Court held that
the order which appeared to infringe substantial rights acquired by the
appellants was considered an order of moment and not a mere
interlocutory order, which would invite the bar to entertaining the revision
under S. 397(2) of the Code.
18. The scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989, Section 14A of the SC/SC Act provides as under:
" 14A. Appeals (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall
lie, from any judgment. sentence or order, not being an
interlocutory order, of a Special Court or an Exclusive Special
Court, to the High Court both on facts and on law.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of
section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974), an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order
of the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court granting or
refusing bail.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for
the time being in force, every appeal under this section shall be
preferred within a period of ninety days from the date of the
judgment, sentence or order appealed from:

Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the
expiry of the said period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the
appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal
within the period of ninety days:

Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the
expiry of the period of one hundred and eighty days.

CRLA No. 964 of 2026
17

(4) Every appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall, as far
as possible, be disposed of within a period of three months
from the date of admission of the appeal.]"
19. Thus, on a bare perusal of aforesaid statutory provision for appeals
under which present appeal has been preferred by the prospective accused
against whom an order on application under Section 173 (4) BNSS for
registration of case and investigation has been issued by learned Special
Judge. It is obvious that appeal shall not lie from any interlocutory order.
This provision corresponds to the provisions of Section 397(2) CrPC,
which provides that the powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1)
shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any
appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.
20. From perusal of judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Om Prakash
an inference may
Ambadkar vs. The State of Maharashtra and others
be drawn that High Court can quash an order passed on application under
Section 173(4) BNSS, in appropriate and exceptional cases, moved by a
person aggrieved by inaction of police officer or refusal on their part to
record the information referred in sub-section (1) of section 173, whereon,
an order for registration of FIR and investigation by police is directed by
filing a petition under Section 482 CrP.C. or 528 BNSS on ground that
the procedural requirements provided under Section 173(4) and Section
175 (3) BNSS are not complied or on averments in the application, no
cognizable offense is made out as stated in para 31 of the judgment
(supra) as said procedure, practices and safeguards are introduced in
aforesaid sections of BNSS to curb the misuse of invocation of powers of
Magistrate by unscrupulous litigants for achieving ulterior motives and
Hon'ble Court has also enjoined a duty of Magistrate to apply his mind

CRLA No. 964 of 2026
18
judicially by considering both the complaints and submissions of police
officer thereby ensuring that requirement of passing reasoned order on
application under Section 173(4) BNSS is complied with in a more
effective and comprehensive manner.
21. However, in the light of Full Bench pronouncements of this Court in

and , the
Father Thomas (supra) Jagannath Verma and others (supra)
impugned order being interlocutory in nature, the prospective accused is
debarred from challenging the said order by way of filing a criminal
revision or statutory appeal under Section 14-A(1) of the Act 1989.
Consequently, the appeal preferred against impugned order by
prospective accused/appellant is not maintainable and deserves to be
dismissed at the stage of admission.
22. Appeal is hereby dismissed.
(Ram Manohar Narayan Mishra,J.)
April 7, 2026
KR
Digitally signed by :-
RABINDRA KUMAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench