MR. VINCENT CORREA vs MS. VIYOLA PRATHVI CORREA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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CRL.RP No. 870 of 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
R
TH
DATED THIS THE 17 DAY OF JULY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P.SANDESH
CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO.870 OF 2026
BETWEEN:
1. MR. VINCENT CORREA,
S/O MR. LEO CORREA,
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS,
R/AT PADAVU MEGINA MANE,
KAIKAMBA, KULSHEKARA,
MANGALURU-575005.
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. S. BALAKRISHNAN, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. MS. VIYOLA PRATHVI CORREA,
D/O MR. VINCENT CORREA,
AGED ABOUT 23 YEARS,
R/AT 16-117-7 PADAV MEGINA MANEMANJAI,
SHETTY ROAD, KULSHEKAR POST,
MANGALURU, DAKSHINA KANNADA,
KARNATAKA-575005.
…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. AJAY PRABHU M., ADVOCATE)
THIS CRL.RP IS FILED UNDER SECTION 397 R/W 401 OF
CR.PC (FILED U/S 438 R/W 442 BNSS) PRAYING TO SET ASIDE
THE JUDGEMENT PASSED BY II ADDL. DISTRICT AND
SESSIONS JUDGE, MANGALURU IN CRIMINAL APPEAL
NO.140/2026 VIDE ORDER DATED 28.04.2026 AND TO SET
ASIDE THE ORDER CONFIRMING THE SAME BY HONBLE JMFC
(III COURT), MANGALURU, IN CRL. MISC.NO.01/2024 TO PAY A
SUM OF RS.16,00,000/- AND ORDER DATED 03.02.2026
Digitally signed
by DEVIKA M
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
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CRL.RP No. 870 of 2026
TOWARDS COLLEGE FEES FOR PURSUING POST-GRADUATION
OF THE RESPONDENT.
THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN
HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 13.07.2026, THIS
DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P.SANDESH
CAV JUDGMENT
This criminal revision petition is filed praying this Court to
set aside the judgment passed by II Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Mangalore in Crl.A.No.140/2026, vide order
dated 28.04.2026, confirming the order passed by the learned
JMFC (III Court), Mangalore in Crl.Misc.No.1/2024 dated
03.02.2026, to pay a sum of Rs.16,00,000/- to the respondent
herein towards college fee for pursuing her Post Graduation.
2. The factual matrix of the case of the respondent
herein i.e., petitioner No.2 in Crl.Misc.No.1/2024 is that,
petitioner No.2 filed an application before the Trial Court
praying to direct the respondent father to pay first year college
fee for Post Graduation of petitioner No.2 to the tune of
Rs.16,00,000/-. In support of the application, an affidavit is
attached wherein it is stated that, she has successfully written
NEET examination and secured a commendable rank. She has
secured admission through Karnataka Examination Authority
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CRL.RP No. 870 of 2026
(‘KEA’ for short) counseling at Fr. Muller’s Institute of Medical
Education and Research, Mangalore, for post-graduation (M.D.
Dermatology). She has secured the said admission for an
annual fees of Rs.13,87,994/- payable to the KEA. Otherwise
the cost of the said seat in the said institute is Rs.75,15,000/-
per year. Apart from that, she need to pay annual fee of
Rs.1,50,000/- to Fr. Muller’s Institute of Medical Education and
Research towards college/tuition fees and other miscellaneous
expenses to bear towards books, stationary and medical
equipment, etc. Hence, the total cost towards first year post
graduation course will come to the tune of Rs.16,00,000/-. It is
contended that she has no means of paying the aforesaid fees.
She has borrowed money from her grandfather to meet the fee
of Rs.13,87,994/- as there was urgency in payment of fee and
she has paid the said fees on 02.12.2025. It is also contended
that she requires to pay the college fee of Rs.1,50,000/- soon.
She needs to repay her grandfather towards the amount
borrowed from him to meet all other educational expenses. It
is contended that if the application is allowed, no prejudice will
be caused to the respondent, who is the father.
3. The respondent father filed objections stating that
the application is filed with an intention to harass him and grab
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CRL.RP No. 870 of 2026
as such money as possible. The respondent also denied that
petitioner No.2 secured rank and admission through KEA
counseling. If the petitioner had obtained very good rank, she
would have been able to secure under the general merit
category for which the annual fee would have been lesser than
Rs.7,50,000/-. The petitioner has intentionally not revealed her
rank and the category under which she has secured admission.
It is further contended that during post graduation study, the
petitioner is entitled to get a stipend of Rs.60,000/- per month
for the first year. Hence, she can maintain her other day-to-day
expenses stated in the affidavit. The grandfather of the
petitioner is more than 75 years old and he was formerly an
auto driver and at present he has no avocation to mobilize the
amount of Rs.13,87,994/- to pay the same to the petitioner
and the petitioner has not produced any scrap of paper to
substantiate the said contentions. The mother of the petitioner
had availed two gold loans for Rs.4,30,000/- and Rs.3,61,000/-
from Bank of Baroda, which were repaid in December 2025 and
the gold was released. This fact shows that the petitioner and
her mother have huge funds at their disposal by doing idly
business as stated in the written statement filed to the main
petition. Apart from that, the mother of the petitioner is
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CRL.RP No. 870 of 2026
working at M/s. Fernandes Brothers, Mangalore and she earns a
considerable amount as salary. It is also contended that on
account of mental illness of the respondent due to depression
caused by harassment by the petitioner and her mother and
lack of support from any family members, he also underwent a
loss in his business. Only with an intention to make wrongful
gain, the application is filed.
4. The Trial Court having considered the grounds
urged in the application as well as in the statement of
objections, taken note of the list of documents produced by the
petitioner before the Court in support of the claim in paragraph
No.9 and also the documents furnished by the respondent in
paragraph No.10 and so also the expenses claimed by the
respondent i.e., annual expenses to the tune of Rs.27,78,948/-.
The Trial Court taken note of the grounds urged in paragraph
No.12 and taken note of the documents as well as the
petitioner has got All India Rank 11,722 and she has got
admission in Fr. Muller’s Medical College in M.D. and also
specifically stated that the daughter and mother were not
having any other source of income. The Trial Court taken note
of amount was borrowed from the grandfather of petitioner
No.2 and also taken note of a sum of Rs.14,00,000/- was
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CRL.RP No. 870 of 2026
transferred to his granddaughter on 29.11.2025. In paragraph
No.13, taken note of capability of the respondent to pay the
amount that he is having transactions credit amount shown as
Rs.21,25,000/-. On 22.09.2025 Rs.15,56,469/- debited, on the
very same day Rs.5,65,575/- and Rs.74,974/- debited. The
Trial Court also taken note of the fact that he has annual
expenses of Rs.27,78,948/- and comes to the conclusion that
nowadays MBBS without M.D. has no significant value in the
medical field. The Trial Court having considered all these
reasons, allowed the application filed under Section 20(d) of
the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
(‘DV Act’ for short) and directed the respondent to pay an
amount of Rs.16,00,000/- to petitioner No.2.
5. Being aggrieved by the said direction to pay the
amount of Rs.16,00,000/- towards education fee, an appeal is
filed in Crl.A.No.140/2026. The Appellate Court having taken
note of the grounds urged in the appeal memo, formulated the
points whether petitioner No.2 has made out a ground to direct
the respondent to pay Rs.16,00,000/- and whether the order
passed by the Trial Court requires interference. Considering the
grounds urged and also the material available on record, the
Appellate Court, particularly in paragraph No.18, taken note of
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CRL.RP No. 870 of 2026
that the income tax returns of the respondent indicates that he
had acquired fixed assets in the year 2021. He acquired assets
to the tune of Rs.1,34,44,130/- in the year 2021. The
petitioner No.2 has produced the letter issued by the Bank of
Baroda, which indicates the respondent availed O.D. loan of
Rs.50,00,000/- on 05.08.2021, on 18.03.2022 he availed loan
of Rs.32,18,000/- as housing loan, on 13.10.2023 he availed
gold loan of Rs.4,71,000/-, he availed car loan of
Rs.40,25,000/- on 08.11.2023, again he availed gold loan of
Rs.11,00,000/- on 08.11.2023. The total outstanding balance
loan was Rs.1,27,96,529/-. The Appellate Court having taken
note of all these facts into consideration, comes to the
conclusion that even though the daughter has attained
majority, it is the duty of the father to meet the educational
expenses of his daughter, since the wife and daughter are not
having any other income and also comes to the conclusion that
the application under Section 20(d) of the DV Act is
maintainable and confirmed the order of the Trial Court.
6. Being aggrieved by the order of the Trial Court and
also the Appellate Court, the present revision petition is filed
before this Court.
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CRL.RP No. 870 of 2026
7. The main contention of the learned counsel for the
revision petitioner before this Court is that the findings
recorded by both the Courts are not based on any evidence and
both the Courts ignored the material on record and also the
provision of law. It is contended that the respondent daughter
was born on 17.08.2000 and attained the age of majority on
17.08.2018. On the date of filing the petition, she was aged
about 23 years. She completed her degree in MBBS totally
funded by the petitioner. Now, instead of taking the profession
as a doctor, she opted to pursue post graduation at the cost of
her father and the same is only with the sole intention of
subjecting him to agony, as he is already under depression.
The learned counsel also contend that now she is receiving
Rs.60,000/- as monthly stipend.
8. The other contention of the learned counsel for the
revision petitioner is that the daughter had filed an application
under Section 20(d) of the DV Act. Section 20(d) of the DV Act
says that, the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as
her children, if any, including an order under or in addition to
an order of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the
time being in force. The learned counsel would contend that the
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CRL.RP No. 870 of 2026
definition of “aggrieved person” under Section 2(a) of the DV
Act would refer to a “woman” and not a “child” as defined
under Section 2(b) of the DV Act. It is contended that the
respondent attained the age of majority on the date of filing the
petition and as such would not fall within the definition of
aggrieved person. The learned counsel also would contend that
the definition of “domestic relationship” under Section 2(f) of
DV Act means a relationship between two persons who at any
point of time lived together in a relationship of marriage in a
shared household. Therefore, the respondent-daughter who
attained the age of 24 years could not invoke the provisions of
DV Act. Section 12 of DV Act provides only for an aggrieved
person or a protection officer or any other person on behalf of
aggrieved person may present an application under DV Act.
Likewise, even Sections 20 and 22 of the DV Act provides
remedy to aggrieved person.
9. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner in
support of his arguments relies upon the judgment of this Court
in the case of G.KALASEGOWDA v. SMT. N.K.
NETHRAVATHI passed in Crl.R.P.No.795/2015 c/w
Crl.R.P.No.1031/2025, dated 23.08.2023 and brought to the
notice of this Court paragraph No.10, wherein reference was
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made with regard to Section 20(1)(d) and there is a provision
for awarding maintenance to the aggrieved person as well as
the children. The definition of the child is given in Section 2(d)
of the Act, wherein child is described as any person below the
age of 18 years and it includes adopted, step or foster child.
Hence, under the provisions of Section 20, maintenance can be
awarded only to aggrieved person and children.
10. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment
of this Court in the case of BHASKAR REDDY v. MS.
ROSHINI passed in Crl.R.P.No.528/2025 dated 29.01.2026
and brought to the notice of this Court that this Court referred
the judgment of Kalasegowda (supra) and judgment in the
case of RAJNESH v. NEHA AND ANOTHER reported in
(2021) 2 SCC 324. The learned counsel brought to the notice
of this Court paragraph No.29, wherein definition of aggrieved
person under Section 2(a) of DV Act was taken note of and
Section 2(a) of DV Act would refer to a woman and not a child,
which is defined separately under Section 2(b) as person aged
below 18 years of the age. The learned counsel referring this
judgment would contend that the respondent is not entitled for
any maintenance.
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11. The learned counsel also relies upon the judgment
of the Apex Court in the case of ABHILASHA v. PARKASH
AND OTHERS reported in (2021) 13 SCC 99, wherein it is
held that daughter is not entitled to claim maintenance under
Section 125 of Cr.P.C. However, she is entitled to claim
maintenance till her marriage under Section 20(3) of the Hindu
Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and proper forum for
claiming such maintenance by major unmarried Hindu daughter
is before the jurisdictional Family Court and not Magistrate
under Section 125 of Cr.P.C.
12. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent
would vehemently contend that both the Courts have taken
note of the capability of the revision petitioner herein to meet
the educational expenses of unmarried daughter. The learned
counsel would contend that the respondent is not earning and
still she is pursuing her education. The amount of
Rs.16,00,000/- is including tuition fee/college fee and other
expenses and earlier also the respondent approached the Trial
Court and this Court and this Court also directed the petitioner
to meet the educational expenses. The learned counsel would
contend that definition under Section 2(a) of DV Act is with
regard to “aggrieved person” and Section 2(b) is with regard to
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attaining the age of majority and the same will not disentitle
the respondent from getting the educational support from the
father. It is contended that at the time of admission to MBBS
course, both father and mother were living together and
thereafter, differences were arisen between them. It is
contended that the respondent has continued her post
graduation after getting good rank all over the India and fee is
also a nominal fee. The learned counsel would contend that the
father is staying in the ground floor and the mother and the
daughter are staying in the first floor. While doing MBBS, both
father and mother were living together. When such being the
case, being the father, he has to take care of the child as well
as to provide education to the daughter. The learned counsel
would contend that even though the respondent has attained
the age of majority, she is not earning.
13. The learned counsel for the respondent in support
of his arguments, relies upon the documents of her educational
career i.e., marks cards of the respondent pertaining to MBBS,
registration pass pertaining to PG NEET examination, final seat
allotment list, bank statement of the respondent, receipt
towards the payment of fees, latest bank account of the
petitioner, affidavit of the grandfather of the respondent for
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having helped in getting admission, I.T. returns of the
petitioner, loan details of the respondent and the order dated
15.11.2024 passed in Crl.A.No.147/2024.
14. The learned counsel also relies upon the judgment
of this Court in the case of KUM. BHAVANA N. v. SRI
NAGARAJU S passed in Crl.R.P.No.556/2025 dated
25.09.2025. The learned counsel referring this judgment would
contend that this Court in detail discussed the scope of Section
20 of the DV Act. Under Section 20 of the DV Act, while
claiming monetary reliefs, the aggrieved person is also entitled
to claim such monetary reliefs not only on her behalf, but also
on behalf of her children. The learned counsel also brought to
the notice of this Court paragraph Nos.20, 21 and 22 of the
judgment, wherein Section 20 of the DV Act is discussed. A
daughter as soon as she attains majority, fall under the
definition of women and as such may become an aggrieved
person, if she is able to establish that she is subjected to
domestic violence as defined under Section 3. A daughter on
whose behalf monetary reliefs were sought, on attaining
majority, falling under the definition of aggrieved person would
be entitled for the monetary reliefs. The learned counsel
contend that the very contention that she is a major and not
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comes within the definition of Section 2(b) of DV Act, cannot be
accepted.
15. The learned counsel also relies upon the judgment
of Allahabad High Court in the case of NAIMULLAH SHEIKH
AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS, neutral
citation No.2024:AHC:4853 and brought to the notice of this
Court the discussion made in respect to Section 20 of the DV
Act and exercising the powers of the Magistrate for providing
education.
16. The learned counsel also relies upon the judgment
of the Apex Court in the case of NEELIMA CHOURE v. VIJAY
CHOURE AND ANOTHER dated 02.01.2025 passed in Criminal
Appeal No.10/25 and brought to the notice of this Court
paragraph No.8, wherein the Apex Court taken note of that
Rs.43,00,000/- is an amount to which respondent No.2 was
entitled to in law. She, being the daughter, has an
indefeasible, legally enforceable, lawful and legitimate right to
secure educational expenses from her parents. It is observed
that the daughter has a fundamental right to pursue her
education, for which the parents could be compelled to provide
necessary funds within the limit of their financial resources.
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17. Having heard the learned counsel for the revision
petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent and also
considering the principles laid down in the judgments referred
supra, the points that would arise for the consideration of this
Court are:
(i) Whether the major daughter, who is unmarried
can invoke Section 20 of the DV Act for
monetary relief to pursue her post graduation
and whether attainment of majority of an
unmarried daughter disentitles her from
getting the compensation under Section 20 of
the DV Act?
(ii) What order?
Point No.(i):
18. Having heard the learned counsel for the revision
petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent, this
Court would like to make a mention of undisputed facts. There
is no dispute that the respondent herein is the daughter of the
petitioner herein. It is also an undisputed fact that when she
had joined the MBBS course, at that time, both the parents
were living together. But when the respondent daughter was
pursuing her medical examination, differences were arisen
between the husband and wife. The fact is that the daughter
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has pursued her MBBS and also got good rank all over India.
Though at the first stage it is disputed, but she has placed on
record the material with regard to that she has got All India
rank 11,722. It is also not in dispute that she is admitted to
Father Muller’s Medical College, Mangalore for P.G. Course.
The respondent has also produced the document for having
paid the fee to the P.G. Course to the tune of Rs.13,87,994/-
and also she has to meet the college/tuition fee and other
incidental expenses. The Trial Court granted an total amount of
Rs.16,00,000/-. With regard to borrowing of the amount from
the grandfather also, the respondent has placed on record the
copy of bank statement of the respondent to show that an
amount of Rs.14,00,000/- was transferred to her account.
Hence, there is no dispute with regard to the payment of fee as
well as other additional fees.
19. The Trial Court and the Appellate Court also comes
to the conclusion that it is the bounden duty of the father to
meet the educational expenses of the daughter. But the learned
counsel for the revision petitioner relies upon the judgment of
this Court in the case of Kalasegowda (supra) and Bhaskar
Reddy (supra). The learned counsel also relies upon the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Abhilasha (supra).
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No doubt, the Apex Court in this judgment held that, unmarried
daughter having attained majority cannot seek relief under
Section 125 of Cr.P.C. and can seek relief under the Hindu
Adoptions and Maintenance Act. Having taken note of the
principles laid down in the judgments referred supra relied
upon by both the learned counsel for the revision petitioner and
the learned counsel for the respondent, the Apex Court in its
recent judgment in the case of Neelima Choure (supra),
having taken note of the dispute between the parties, in
paragraph No.8 held that, when the daughter is pursuing her
education, she has an indefeasible, legally enforceable, lawful
and legitimate right to secure educational expenses from her
parents. Further observation is made that the daughter has a
fundamental right to pursue her education, for which the
parents could be compelled to provide necessary funds within
the limit of their financial resources. The Apex Court has
categorically held that it is the bounden duty of the parents to
meet the same. The learned counsel for the respondent also
relies upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Bhavana
(supra) and this Court also taken note of the wide meaning of
definition of Section 2(a) aggrieved person. The learned
counsel also relies upon the judgment of the Allahabad High
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Court in the case of Naimullah Sheikh (supra) and there is no
dispute with regard to the principles laid down in the said
judgments.
20. This Court would like to extract Sections 2(a), 2(b)
and 20 of the DV Act, which reads as follows:
“2.(a) “aggrieved person” means any woman
who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with
the respondent and who alleges to have been
subjected to any act of domestic violence by the
respondent;
(b) “child” means any person below the age of
eighteen years and includes any adopted, step or
foster child.
20. Monetary reliefs.– (1) While disposing of an
application under sub-section (1) of section 12, the
Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay
monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred and
losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any
child of the aggrieved person as a result of the
domestic violence and such relief may include, but
not limited to,–
(a) the loss of earnings;
(b) the medical expenses;
(c) the loss caused due to the destruction,
damage or removal of any property from
the control of the aggrieved person; and
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(d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person
as well as her children, if any, including an
order under or in addition to an order of
maintenance under section 125 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or
any other law for the time being in force.”
(2) The monetary relief granted under this section
shall be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent
with the standard of living to which the aggrieved
person is accustomed.
(3) The Magistrate shall have the power to order
an appropriate lump sum payment or monthly
payments of maintenance, as the nature and
circumstances of the case may require.
(4) The Magistrate shall send a copy of the order
for monetary relief made under sub-section (1) to
the parties to the application and to the in-charge of
the police station within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction the respondent resides.
(5) The respondent shall pay the monetary relief
granted to the aggrieved person within the period
specified in the order under sub-section (1).
(6) Upon the failure on the part of the respondent
to make payment in terms of the order under sub-
section (1), the Magistrate may direct the employer
or a debtor of the respondent, to directly pay to the
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aggrieved person or to deposit with the court a
portion of the wages or salaries or debt due to or
accrued to the credit of the respondent, which
amount may be adjusted towards the monetary relief
payable by the respondent.”
21. This Court would like to rely upon the judgment of
the Madras High Court in the case of JAGADESAN v. STATE
OF TAMIL NADU AND OTHERS reported in (2015) 1 MWN
(Cr.) 451, wherein Sections 12, 20 and 23 of the DV Act is
discussed in length. Paragraph Nos.37, 38 and 39 of the said
judgment reads as under:
“37. The Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 (Act 43 of 2005), is enacted to
provide for more effective protection of the rights of
women guaranteed under the Constitution, who are
victims of violence of any kind occurring within the
family and for matters connected therewith or
incidental thereto. As per Section 2(f), “domestic
relationship” means a relationship between two
persons, who live or have, at any point of time, lived
together in a shared household, when they are
related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a
relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or
are family members living together as a joint family.
38. Monetary relief is defined under Section 2(k),
which means, the compensation which the Magistrate
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may ‘order the respondent to pay to the aggrieved
person, at any stage during the hearing of an
application seeking any relief under this Act, to meet
the expenses incurred and the losses suffered by the
aggrieved person as a result of the domestic
violence.
39. Section 3(d)(iv) of the Act, defines,
“Economic abuse”, as follows:
“(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial
resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled
under any law or custom whether payable under an
Order of a Court or otherwise or which the aggrieved
person requires out of necessity including, but not
limited to, household necessities for the aggrieved
person and her children, if any, stridhan, property,
jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved person,
payment of rental related to the shared household
and maintenance;
(b) disposal of household effects, any alienation
of assets whether movable or immovable, valuables,
shares, securities, bonds and the like or other
property in which the aggrieved person has an
interest or is entitled to use by virtue of the domestic
relationship or which may be reasonably required by
the aggrieved person or her children or her stridhan
or any other property jointly or separately held by
the aggrieved person; and
(c) prohibition or restriction to continued access
to resources or facilities which the aggrieved person
is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic
relationship including access to the shared
household.”
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22. The Madras High Court in paragraph No.43 of the
judgment held that, as per Section 23 of the Act, the
Magistrate has got powers to grant interim ex parte orders, as
he deems just and proper, if he is satisfied that the application
prima facie discloses that the respondent is committing, or has
committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a
likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic
violence, he may grant an exparte order, on the basis of an
affidavit in such form, as may be prescribed, of the aggrieved
person under Section 18, Section 19, Section 20, Section 21 or,
as the case may be, Section 22 against the respondent. The
first contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner
that no inquiry and no evidence was recorded, cannot be
accepted and the same can be passed based on the affidavit.
23. The Madras High Court in paragraph No.48 also
taken note of the judgment in the case of RAJESH KURRE v.
SAFURABAI reported in AIR 2009 (NOC) 813 (CHH) ,
wherein it is held that under Section 20(1)(d) of the Act, the
aggrieved party is required to prove that he or she is unable to
maintain himself/herself and having no means to maintain. On
the other hand, the non-applicants therein have submitted that
maintenance under Section 20 of the Act, is in addition to, an
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order of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code and
therefore, at the time of passing of any order, under Section 20
of the Act, the Court is not required to examine the case, in
accordance with the provisions of Section 125 of the Code.
24. The Madras High Court in paragraph No.51 taken
note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
SAVITRI v. GOVIND SINGH RAWAT reported in AIR 1986
SC 984 and even extracted the paragraph with regard to scope
of Section 125 of Cr.P.C. and referring the said judgment
observed that, the Apex Court held that the Magistrate has the
power to pass an interim order, for maintenance, pending
disposal of the main application, filed under Section 125 of the
Code. In the case on hand, the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is a special enactment. It
empowers the Magistrate to pass all orders, permissible under
Sections 18 to 22, even at the interim stage. This Court would
like to extract paragraph No.63 of the judgment in respect of
discussion made with regard to Section 20 of the Act, which
reads as follows:
“63. As per Section 20 of the Act, while disposing
of an application under sub-section (1) of section 12,
the Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay
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monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred and
losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any
child of the aggrieved person as a result of the
domestic violence and such relief may include, but
not limited to, (a) the loss of earnings; (b) the
medical expenses; (c) the loss caused due to the
destruction, damage or removal of any property from
the control of the aggrieved person; and (d) the
maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her
children, if any, including an order under or in
addition to an order of maintenance under section
125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any
other law for the time being in force.”
25. This Court also would like to extract paragraph
Nos.69 and 70 of the said judgment, which reads as follows:
69. In a given case, the child may be studying in
a good school. Due to deprivation of economic or
financial assistance, wife may not be in a position to
provide the same standard of education. When the
parties lived together and when there was no
domestic violence, the child would have been
provided with all the care and assistance, either by
the husband or wife or any other near relative, and
when the same is lost, on account of domestic
violence or when there is loss of continued support
from other sources, then there would be a necessity,
to seek for appropriate interim orders, against the
respondents, under Section 23 of the Act. Necessity
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for claiming all the reliefs, cannot be visualised, at
the time of filing an application, under Section 12 of
the Act. Instances, stated supra, are only illustrative.
There can be other valid reasons also, for the
aggrieved person, to seek for any or all of the orders,
that can be granted by the Court, under Sections 18
to 23, during any stage of hearing of an application,
seeking for any relief, under the Act.
70. Seeking monetary relief, by way of an interim
order, depends upon the facts and circumstances of
each case. If the contention of the petitioner that
lumpsum payment can be awarded, only at the time
of final disposal of the main application filed under
Section 12 of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, has to be accepted,
then the aggrieved person, who is in dire necessity
to meet the medical expenses to herself or her
child/children, educational expenses to the children,
would be put to irreparable hardship.
26. The Madras High Court having taken note of the
same, held that, monitory relief granted under Section 20 of
the Act, shall be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent
with the standard of living to which the aggrieved person is
accustomed. In paragraph No.73 it is held that, in Section 20
of the Act, the Legislature has used the expression “but is not
limited to” . In other words, the inference that could be safely
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drawn, is that apart from what is specifically mentioned in
Section 20 of the Act, the Magistrate can pass appropriate
orders, for any kind of deprivation of economic loss incurred by
his wife. The expression “but is not limited to” should be
interpreted as “ means and includes” . The Madras High Court
also taken note of the judgments of the Apex Court, dealing
with the expression, “ means and includes” , in the cases of
DILWORTH v. COMMISSIONER OF STAMPS reported in
1899 AC 99, V.F. & G INSURANCE CO. v. FRASER & ROSS
reported in AIR 1960 SC 971. This Court would like to extract
paragraph Nos.74 and 75, which reads as follows:
“74. Economic abuse means deprivation of all or
any economic or financial resources to which the
aggrieved person is entitled under any law or
custom. It is customary that father is morally bound
to maintain his wife and child, by providing basic
amenities like, food, shelter and clothing. He is also
bound to provide health and education. Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, is
intended to provide for more effective protection of
the rights of women guaranteed under the
Constitution.
75. Eventualities and necessity to seek for just
and proper orders, cannot be visualised, at the time,
when Section 12 application is filed. That is why, the
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Legislature has defined the words, “economic abuse”,
as including, all the deprivation or any economic or
financial resources to which the aggrieved person is
entitled to, under any law or custom. Every word and
expression used in the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, has to be interpreted to
mean that the Legislature has carved out the same,
with a clear intent and purpose.”
27. The Madras High Court in paragraph No.76,
discussed about the role and duties of a father and education.
The good which a father can do to his son, is to prepare him,
for a prominent role in the assembly of the learned. One’s
learning alone is one’s indestructible and outstanding wealth,
nothing else possesses this special value. This Court also would
like to extract paragraph No.77, which reads as follows:
“77. Family is one of the most cherished facet of
any human being. Father has an obligation to
provide love and affection, righteousness basic
amenities and the most important among others,
health and education and the necessities of life. He
has a unique role in the family. Protection intended
in the Act is exhaustive. He is legally and morally
obligated to provide all material needs and
responsible to provide means of livelihood in all
forms. His role is not stopped on the child attaining
majority.
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28. The Madras High Court also held that monetary
relief that can be granted, under Section 20 of the Act, should
be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the
standard of living to which the aggrieved person is accustomed.
It is the duty of the father to provide education to the child and
for continuation of the child’s education, certainly there is a
necessity to seek for suitable orders under Section 23 of the
Act. Child is defined under Section 2(b) of the Act, as any
person, below the age of 18 years and includes any adopted,
step or foster child. One of the contentions raised is that soon
has attained majority and therefore, cannot be any order of
maintenance, cannot be accepted. It is the obligations of the
parents to provide basic amenities, health and education,
cannot be said to be extinguished, on the child, attaining
majority. While defining economic abuse, the Legislature has
also included deprivation of all or any economic or financial
resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any
law or custom. It is the custom and practice that everywhere in
the world that parents are morally obligated to provide basic
amenities, including health and education. If the contention of
the petitioner that the child is not entitled to maintenance or
educational expenses, on attaining majority, is accepted, then
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the expression, “in addition to”, employed in Section 20(1)(d)
would be otiose. As per Section 2(k), the compensation which
the Magistrate may order the respondent to pay to the
aggrieved person, at any stage during the hearing of an
application seeking any relief under this Act, to meet the
expenses incurred and the losses suffered by the aggrieved
person, as a result of the domestic violence.
29. Having taken note of the detailed discussion, the
Madras High Court in paragraph No.93 comes to the conclusion
that, an order under Section 20(d) is not limited to
maintenance for the aggrieved person, as well as the children
and it includes, an order under or in addition to an order of
maintenance under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. or any other law for
the time being in force. Manifest intention of the Legislature,
conferring power on the Magistrate, to direct the respondent to
pay monetary relief, to meet the expenses incurred and the
loss suffered by the aggrieved person, is abundantly clear. If
the Legislature has intended to restrict an order under Section
20(d), only for maintenance, then there is no need for the
usage of the expression, “but is not limited to”. Section 20(d)
of the Act makes it clear that in addition to the maintenance,
under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. or any other law for the time
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being in force, the Magistrate is empowered to pass an order,
granting monetary reliefs. The expressions, “but is not limited
to” in Section 20(1) of the Act and “in addition to
maintenance”, have wide connotation and amplitude and the
power of the Magistrate is not circumscribed to only (a) the loss
of earnings; (b) the medical expenses; (c) the loss caused due
to the destruction, damage or removal of any property from the
control of the aggrieved person; and (d) the maintenance for
the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, including
an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under
Section 125 of Cr.P.C. or any other law for the time being in
force.
30. The detailed discussion of the judgment of the
Madras High Court, is very clear that Section 20 of the DV Act
is for monetary relief in addition to the maintenance and the
father has to meet the educational expenses of the daughter
whether it is for under graduation or post graduation and it is
the obligation on the part of the father to pay the maintenance.
The expressions, “but is not limited to” in Section 20(1) of the
Act and “in addition to maintenance”, have wide connotation
and amplitude and the power of the Magistrate is not restricted.
Hence, the very contention of the learned counsel for the
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revision petitioner that when she attained majority, she can
pursue her education by obtaining the bank loan, cannot be a
ground to set aside the order of the Trial Court and the
Appellate Court. The Court has to take note of that the
daughter is not earning money and she is pursuing her
education and the same is a continuous education of under
graduation and post graduation. In the present case on hand, it
is very clear that at the time of admitting the child to MBBS,
both parents were living together and there were no differences
and later differences were arisen while pursuing her under
graduation.
31. The other contention is that the very daughter
disowns the father and hence, she is not entitled for payment
of fee. The Court has to take note of the fact that she was
admitted to MBBS with the consent of both the parents and the
father was also a part of admitting her to MBBS. When such
being the case, the revision petitioner now cannot say that he
cannot pay the fee towards the post graduation and it is the
obligation on the part of the father and economically he is
doing business and transaction is more than Crores and is able
to avail loan and clear the same from his business. The records
clearly disclose his income and his business and he availed the
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loan in different years i.e., 2021, 2022 and 2023, which
establishes his financial capacity and the same was taken note
of by the Appellate Court while confirming the order of the Trial
Court. When such being the case, I do not find any force in the
contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that
the father is not liable to pay any educational expenses after
she has attained the majority. Hence, I answer the point
accordingly.
Point No.(ii):
32. In view of the discussions made above, I pass the
following:
ORDER
The criminal revision petition is dismissed.
Sd/-
(H.P.SANDESH)
JUDGE
MD