PREET SINGH @ PREET KUMAR vs STATE OF HP

2026:HHC:27275
High Court of H.P.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr.M.P. No. 2693 of 2025 in
Cr. Appeal No. 120 of 2025.
Reserved on : 30.06.2026.
Date of decision: 08.07.2026
Date of upload : 08.07.2026
_____________________________________________________________________________
Preet Singh @ Preet Kumar ...Applicant.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh …Respondent.
____________________________________________________________________________

Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge.
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge.

1
Whether approved for reporting? Yes
_____________________________________________________________________________
For the Applicant. Mr. Ajay Kochhar, Senior Advocate with Ms.
Swati Sharma, Advocate.
For the Respondent: Mr. Gautam Sood, Deputy Advocate General.
__________________________________________________________
Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge
Applicant-appellant has preferred this application for
suspension of sentence awarded to him, vide judgment and order dated
17.02.2025, by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Tract Special Court
(Rape/Pocso), Shimla, H.P. in case No. 134-S/7 of 21/2019, titled State of
Himachal Pradesh vs. Preet Singh @ Preet Kumar, arising from FIR No.
1
Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
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2 2026:HHC:27275
Cr.M.P. No. 2693 of 2025
High Court of H.P.
68 of 2006, dated 23.03.2006, registered at Police Station Rohru, District
Shimla, H.P., whereby he has been sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of ten years and to pay fine of Rs. 20,000/- and
in default to pay fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for three
months for commission of offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC.
Further, he has been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a
period of two years and to pay fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to pay
fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month for
commission of offence punishable under Section 506 of IPC.
2. Learned counsel for the applicant-appellant has submitted
that there is a fair chance of acquittal, as the version of the prosecutrix is
highly unbelievable. According to him, it is not possible for a person to
commit rape upon a woman carrying a six months old infant child,
particularly when the alleged incident is stated to have occurred near her
residence, where her husband was also present.
3. It has further been submitted that if the applicant-appellant
was holding child in one hand and gagging the mouth of the prosecutrix
with the other, it would not have been possible for him to remove her
salwar and commit rape. Therefore, the allegations levelled against the
applicant-appellant are highly unbelievable.
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Cr.M.P. No. 2693 of 2025
High Court of H.P.
4. It has also been submitted that there are material
discrepancies and improvements in the statements of the prosecutrix
recorded under Section 154/164 Cr.P.C. and her deposition before the
Court, which indicate that the true version of the incident has not been
brought on record.
5. In response by respondent-State, the prayer for suspension
of sentence has been opposed. It has been submitted that the incident
occurred in March, 2006 and the applicant-appellant was arrested in
connection with the said FIR. However, he absconded while in police
custody and could be apprehended only after about twelve years.
Therefore, there is every likelihood that, if enlarged on bail, he may again
abscond.
6. Learned Deputy Advocate General has submitted that the
applicant-appellant was arrested on 24.03.2006, but when he was being
taken to the Police Station/Hospital, he escaped from police custody and
remained untraceable till 27.02.2018, when he was apprehended by the
police and produced before the Court.
7. It has further been submitted that the applicant-appellant
could be traced only after great difficulty and the trial could be concluded
after about twelve years. Therefore, if he is enlarged on bail, it may not be
possible to secure his presence again.
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Cr.M.P. No. 2693 of 2025
High Court of H.P.
8. Learned counsel for the applicant-appellant has submitted
that the applicant-appellant was not aware of the registration of FIR
against him and that no one had come to his house to arrest him.
Therefore, according to him, this circumstance goes against the
prosecution and supports the case of the applicant-appellant.
9. As per the custody certificate, the applicant-appellant has
undergone imprisonment for approximate period of one year and seven
months.
10. Learned Deputy Advocate General has submitted that
considering the conduct of the applicant-appellant, who remained
absconding for about twelve years, there is every likelihood that, if
applicant is enlarged on bail again, he would not be available.
11. Although the applicant-appellant has been acquitted of the
charge of escaping from police custody, a perusal of the judgment passed
in the said case placed on record by appellant/applicant, indicates that in
the said case the prosecution failed to lead sufficient and reliable
evidence, and the acquittal was mainly on account of failure to prove the
charge. Therefore, such acquittal cannot be made a ground for allowing
the present application.
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Cr.M.P. No. 2693 of 2025
High Court of H.P.
12. As the applicant-appellant remained absconding during
pendency of the trial and could be apprehended only after about twelve
years, it is difficult to accept his plea that he was not absconding. It has
also come on record that the prosecutrix had approached the Police
Station immediately after the incident, named the applicant-appellant as
the assailant, whereafter he was arrested and subsequently escaped
while being taken by the police.
13. If the applicant-appellant was innocent, he ought to have
approached the police thereafter. It is difficult to believe that he remained
unaware of the registration of the case against him for more than twelve
years. Learned Deputy Advocate General has rightly submitted that, if
enlarged on bail, there is every possibility of the applicant-appellant
absconding again.
14. The Supreme Court in Shivani Tyagi vs. State of U.P. &
Anr. , reported in AIR 2024 SC 4594 : AIROnline 2024 SC 346 , has
observed as under:-
“4. We will briefly refer to some of the relevant decisions
dealing with Section 389, Cr. PC. In the case of short-term
imprisonment for conviction of an offence, suspension of sentence is
the normal rule and its rejection is the exception. [See the decision in
Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai & Ors. v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 4 SCC
421]. However, we are of the considered view that the position should
be vice-versa in the case of conviction for serious offences when
invocation of power under Section 389 is invited….”
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Cr.M.P. No. 2693 of 2025
High Court of H.P.
15. The Apex Court in Kishori Lal vs. Rupa & Ors. , reported in
(2004) 7 SCC 638 , has observed as under:-
“4. Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution
of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail.
There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of
the essential ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for the
appellate Court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of
execution of the sentence or order appealed. If he is in confinement,
the said court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond.
The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that
there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects and the
order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be
passed as a matter of routine.
5. The appellate Court is duty bound to objectively assess the
matter and to record reasons for the conclusion that the case warrants
suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail. In the instant
case, the only factor which seems to have weighed with the High Court
for directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail is the absence of
allegation of misuse of liberty during the earlier period when the
accused-respondents were on bail.”
16. Without going into the rival contentions of the parties
regarding the chances of acquittal, the present application deserves to be
dismissed, particularly keeping in view the nature of the offence, the
period of detention undergone after conviction, and the fact that the
applicant-appellant had remained absconding for about twelve years and
had avoided the trial. The Trial Court has convicted the applicant-
appellant after due appreciation of the evidence on record and after
affording him full opportunity to contest the case.
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7 2026:HHC:27275
Cr.M.P. No. 2693 of 2025
High Court of H.P.
17. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of
the considered opinion that, at this stage, the applicant-appellant is not
entitled to suspension of sentence.
Accordingly, the application is dismissed and disposed of.
(Vivek Singh Thakur),
Judge.
(Ranjan Sharma),
Judge.
th
8 July, 2026
(Susheel)

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