CHATURGUN RAI vs GEETA RAI

2026:JHHC:32641-DB


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
F.A. No. 166 of 2024
Chaturgun Rai, aged about 57 years, son of Late Ram Naresh Rai,
resident of Adarsh Nagar, Road No.3, P.O. and P.S. Pulwarisharif,
District Patna, Bihar ... Petitioner/Appellant
Versus
Geeta Rai, wife of Chaturgun Rai, resident of Dhanbad Public
School Road, Bhuiphore, P.O. K.G. Ashram, P.S. Govindpur,
District Dhanbad … Respondent/Respondent
---------
CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ PRASAD
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For the Appellant: Mr Arvind Kumar Choudhary, Advocate
For the Respondent: Mr Prince Kumar, Advocate
---------
Reserved on: 08.10.2026 Pronounced on: 05/11/2026
Per Manoj Prasad, J.
1. Heard Mr Arvind Kumar Choudhary, learned counsel for the
appellant and Mr Prince Kumar, learned counsel for the

respondent.
2. The present First Appeal is under Section 19 (1) of the Family
Courts Act, 1984, filed by the petitioner/appellant, Chaturgun
Rai, husband, aged about 57 years, against his wife, opposite
party/respondent herein, namely, Geeta Rai.
3. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 30.04.2024
and the decree sealed and signed on 10.05.2024 by the Court of
the learned Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court
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No. II, Dhanbad, in Original Suit No. 537 of 2018, whereby the
learned Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court No.
II, Dhanbad, dismissed the suit of the
plaintiff/petitioner/appellant, registered on the basis of an
application filed under Section 13(1)(i-a) and (i-b) of the Hindu
Marriage Act for dissolution of marriage by decree of divorce on
the grounds of cruelty and desertion.
Factual Matrix
4. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the Suit was
instituted in 2018 by the present petitioner/appellant, Chaturgun
Rai, under Section 13(1)(i-a) and (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage
Act, stating that the respondent/opposite party treated the
petitioner with cruelty and deprived him of the enjoyment of
conjugal rights for more than two years immediately preceding
the application for dissolution of marriage, and that the
respondent is living separately, having no relationship with her
husband-appellant as a wife. It is also stated that the respondent
deserted the appellant for a continuous period of 18 years,
despite her undertaking in the compromise petition filed in the
Matrimonial Suit No. 60 of 1998 before the Family Court, Patna,
where she had given an undertaking to live with the petitioner.
This undertaking was given on 30.09.2000, but she never
complied with it. On these grounds, a prayer for dissolution of
marriage was made by a decree of divorce.
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5. The respondent appeared and filed a written statement denying
the allegations made by the present appellant.
6. The respondent stated that it is not in dispute the marriage
between the parties was solemnized as per the Hindu rituals in
the year 1988 at Village Samharia, District Arwal, Bihar. Out of
their wedlock, the parties have a daughter, namely, Richa Rai,
who was born in the year 1994 who on the date of filing of the
written statement sometimes in the year 2022 was aged about 28
years. It is stated that immediately after the marriage, as the
nature of the appellant was not good, he meted out cruelty on the
present respondent. Resultantly, an FIR was lodged which was
subsequently compromised at Hazaribagh, where the brother of
the appellant admitted the guilt and gave an undertaking not to
repeat such conduct in the future. After compromise between the
parties, the parties again lived together for some times, but the
behavior of the appellant again changed. It is stated that the
petitioner/appellant was an employee of B.M.P.V. where the
respondent was nominee. It is further stated that the
petitioner/appellant constructed a three storied building at
Adarsh Nagar, Fulwarisharif, Patna where he resided alone over
there and part of the building was given on rent of Rs. 20,000/- a
month. The appellant had also landed properties and annual
earning of Rs.5,00,000/- from agriculture. Despite having
sufficient earnings, the appellant was neglecting the respondent-
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wife and his daughter in maintaining them. The entire
belongings of the present respondent was retained by the
appellant and the respondent was ousted from her matrimonial
home in the year 1992 and she came to live with her father at
Hazaribagh who was then in service at Hazaribagh. After
retirement of her father, the respondent along with her father
returned to their paternal home at Aurangabad. A complaint was
filed by the present respondent to the Commandant of B.M.P. on
10.03.2013, where a compromise was made but all this was done
just to avoid the liabilities of the complaint. It is also stated that
the parties had consummated their matrimonial life and the
appellant even threatened that if consummation of marriage is
opposed, maintenance would not be provided to the present
respondent. It is also stated that the appellant had solemnized the
second marriage and hence it is not possible for the parties to
live together.
7. Based on the pleadings, the following issues were formulated by
the learned trial Court.

(i) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form?

(ii) Whether the petitioner has got valid cause of action for
the suit?

(iii) Whether the marriage of petitioner and respondent is fit
to be dissolved on the ground of cruelty U/s 13 (1) (i-a)
of Hindu Marriage Act?
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(iv) Whether the marriage of petitioner and respondent is fit
to be dissolved on the ground of desertion U/s 13 (i-b)
of Hindu Marriage Act?
(v) Whether the petitioner is entitled for the relief as
claimed for?
8. Thereafter, on behalf of the present appellant, three witnesses
have been examined, namely, Mofil Rai, Umesh Rai and
Chaturgun Rai, present appellant. On behalf of the respondent,
four witnesses have been examined, namely, Ashok Rai,
Janardan Rai, Vishwanath Rai and Gita Devi @ Geeta Rai,
present respondent.
Findings of the learned Trial Court
9. The learned trial court, after considering the oral and
documentary evidence, took up the two dominant issues, i. e.,
issues nos. 3 and 4, which relate to the question of cruelty and
desertion sufficient to grant a decree of divorce to dissolve the
marriage between the parties. The learned trial court observed
that the appellant, who was examined as P. W.- 3, admitted that
the marriage was solemnised in 1988 and that, after marriage,
they resided together for a sufficiently long time. However, on
account of the respondent' s frequent visits to her parents’ house
and the protests raised by the present appellant, quarrels
between the parties began, and in 1990 the respondent' s father
brought his daughter back to his house. It is stated that a suit for
dissolution of marriage was filed by the present appellant, being
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Matrimonial Suit No. 60 of 1998, but the said suit ended in
settlement, as the respondent agreed to join the company of the
appellant, and on 30. 09. 30.09.2000 the said case was disposed
of with a direction to the respondent that she would reside with
her husband. However, despite such directions of the Family
Court, Patna, resumption of conjugal life between the parties
did not take place, and it is stated that for the last 30 years there
has been no marital relationship between the parties as husband
and wife. It is also stated that, as per the directions of the
Family Court, he provides monthly maintenance of Rs. 15,
000/-.The respondent admits having a daughter, who, she says,
was born out of wedlock and is presently residing with her, i. e.,
the present respondent. In the evidence of the
appellant/petitioner, he has stated that he is not ready to bring
back his wife and daughter, as his wife has ruined his life, and it
also appears in the evidence that the appellant/petitioner has
solemnised a second marriage. P. W. 1, the brother of the
present appellant, has also supported the case of the appellant
but has denied the allegation that the present appellant has
solemnised a second marriage and is living with another lady,
and that there is a child from the second marriage. P. W.- 2, the
nephew of the present appellant, has also supported the case of
the appellant, but there is nothing very significant in his
evidence.
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10. The respondent, D.W.-4, was examined and admitted that she
has a daughter out of wedlock with the appellant, who was born
in 1994, and further stated that she was subjected to physical
and mental cruelty as her husband had an illicit relationship
with another lady, namely, Sandhya Devi. She also alleges that
the appellant has a house at Fulwarisharif which has been
purchased in the name of Sandhya Devi. She states that she has
filed a complaint against her husband where her husband had
executed a bond not to torture his wife in the future and has
stated that the present application for divorce has been filed for
the solitary purpose of removing the name of the present
respondent, who is a nominee in the service book of the present
appellant. She expresses her desire to live with her husband.
The other witnesses examined on behalf of the respondent
supports the case of the respondent.
11. The learned Trial Court, while discussing the elements of
cruelty, stated that, in order to obtain a decree of divorce on the
ground of cruelty, the petitioner-appellant was bound to prove
that the respondent's cruelty was of such a nature as to render
conjugal life impossible. The continuation of the matrimonial
relationship between the parties, if it becomes impossible on
account of physical or mental cruelty inflicted by the other
spouse, is sufficient cause for dissolving the marriage on the
ground of cruelty. The learned Trial Court held that the
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respondent had taken a specific plea of a second marriage and
stated that, for this reason, it was not possible for her to reside
with the present appellant along with the alleged second, though
not legal, married wife. The Court held that the allegation of
cruelty was unsubstantiated and that there was nothing on
record to suggest that the respondent had meted out any cruelty.
Rather, the respondent was the victim of the acts of the present
appellant, who, as per the evidence, had already solemnised a
second marriage, though prohibited under law. The appellant
also has a child from the second marriage. Similarly, living
separately for any valid reason cannot be considered a sufficient
cause for separation and will not amount to desertion for the
purpose of obtaining a decree of divorce on that ground.
Unjustified separation, with no intention to restore conjugal life,
is desertion. In the present case, as held by the learned Trial
Court, the respondent was living separately for just cause, and
nothing on record suggested that the appellant ever made any
sincere effort to restore conjugal life.
12.
Considering the entire facts, the learned trial court dismissed the
suit of the petitioner/appellant, deciding the two issues against
the petitioner/appellant and in favour of the respondent.
Consequently, the other issues were also decided against the
present appellant, and the suit was dismissed on contest.
Submission on behalf of the appellant (husband )
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13. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contended
that the fact that the appellant has contracted a second marriage
is not disputed, though the same was not admitted by the present
appellant before the trial court. It is also stated that the appellant
has a child from the second marriage. Learned counsel submits
that all efforts of settlement have failed. The respondent's
proposal to settle the dispute on one-time alimony has also
failed. Despite the appellant agreeing on every such proposal the
respondent has declined to abide by her own proposals. Learned
counsel submits that unjustified separation for a sufficiently long
period is cruelty. The parties have been living separately for
more than 30 years, and despite orders by the court to restore
conjugal life, an application for divorce had ended up by way of
settlement on terms that the party would restore conjugal life.
Failure to honour the terms of settlement, and non-restitution of
conjugal rights, amounts to mental cruelty. Learned counsel also
submits that, while the Hindu Marriage Act does not define
cruelty, every case must be examined in its own peculiar facts
and circumstances. In this case, it is not in dispute that the
parties were living separately for a sufficiently long time, and it
can be assumed that there has been an irretrievable breakdown
of the marriage, which, though it is not a ground for dissolution
of marriage, such long separation in itself amounts to mental
cruelty. Arguing that these aspects of the case were not
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considered by the learned trial court who even failed to consider
that the judgment passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family
Court, Patna on 30.09.2000 was not honoured by the respondent,
which amounted to mental cruelty on the appellant and also
amounted to desertion. It is stated that the respondent is
interested in the retiral benefits and other proceeds of the present
appellant. The respondent has no interest in restoring the
conjugal life. Considering these entire facts and circumstances
of the case, prayer is made to set aside the impugned judgment
and decree and allow the present appeal.
Submission on behalf of the respondent (wife)
14. Per contra, Mr Prince Kumar, learned Advocate appearing on
behalf of the respondent, argued that it is true that efforts at
settlement were made to settle the dispute over a certain
maintenance/alimony amount, which could not be finalised.
However, learned counsel submits that, on the merits of the case,
the appellant has no basis to stand on. It is now not in dispute,
though this fact has been concealed by the present appellant, that
the appellant has solemnised a second marriage, which is
prohibited under law, more so when the appellant is also a
government servant. Appropriate departmental proceedings
could have been initiated against him for solemnising a second
marriage prohibited under the law. Learned counsel also submits
that the allegations of the present respondent that the appellant
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had an illicit relationship with some other lady now stand
substantiated by the admitted position that the appellant has
contracted a second marriage. The respondent, living separately
along with her daughter born out of their wedlock, as the
appellant has contracted a second marriage, is for a just cause,
and the same cannot amount to desertion. No wife would like to
continue in the company of her husband who has an illicit
relationship or extra-marital affairs, or subsequently has
contracted a second marriage with some other lady. Thus, living
separately is fully justified.
15. Learned counsel also submits that, so far as the allegations of
cruelty are concerned, and with the admitted facts in the
background that the appellant has contracted a second marriage,
the charges of cruelty against the appellant fail. Rather, the
respondent was a victim of cruelty by the appellant for having
begotten a daughter (and not a son) out of their wedlock.
Considering these aspects, a prayer is made to dismiss the
present appeal.

Findings
16. Heard the parties and perused the records. On the rival
contentions raised by the parties, the following point falls for
determination before us.
“Whether the appellant was entitled for dissolution of
marriage by a decree of divorce on the grounds of cruelty and
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desertion as provided under Section 13 (1) (i-a) and (i-b) of
the Hindu Marriage Act?”
17. Before deciding the point for determination formulated by this
Court, we refer to certain proceedings in this case before a Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court. Order dated 20.02.2026 reflects
that it is admitted that the husband, i.e. the present appellant, has
already solemnised a second marriage during the lifetime of the
first wife and has a son from the wedlock with the second wife,
and the respondent wife also has a daughter from the marriage
with the present appellant. It was also observed that the parties
agreed that there was no chance of reunion, and the respondent
was ready for settlement in terms of alimony. It was stated that
the appellant was likely to superannuate sometime in the year
2027. Order dated 21.08.2026 reflects that, under the
instructions of the respondent, her learned Advocate had come
up with a proposal to deposit a sum of Rs.30,00,000/- in the
name of the respondent and Rs.10,00,000/- for the purpose of
th
solemnization of the marriage of the daughter. Order dated 11
September, 2026 shows that as per the proposal made by the
present respondent, an affidavit has been filed by the appellant,
but on the said date, the respondent was present in person before
the Court and stated that she was not ready to settle the dispute,
but rather wanted an adjudication of the lis on merit.
Subsequently, efforts at settlement were made, which failed, and
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the case was finally heard on its merits; today, it is pending
adjudication.
18. An affidavit dated 10.03.2026 was filed on behalf of the
respondent, in which she disclosed her income and assets, which
comes @ Rs. 15,000/- per month, which is being received by her
as maintenance, and further, she disclosed her assets as jewellery
with an approximate value of Rs.23,500/-.
19. The supplementary affidavit dated 16.03.2026, filed on behalf of
the appellant, stated that he was working in the post of Sub-
Inspector, Commandant Office, BMP-5, Patna, and that he had
filed his pay slip and a photocopy of the GPF balance slip, etc.
The pay slip shows his basic pay to be around Rs.64,000/-, with
a gross pay of Rs.1,22,838/-, and the GPF balance slip,
st
computed till 31 March 2025, showed an amount of
Rs.16,18,827/-.
20. Supplementary affidavit dated 01.09.2026 showed that the
appellant was ready to pay permanent alimony by transferring
Rs. 10,00,000/- in the account of the respondent and remaining
Rs. 30,00,000/- was assured to be transferred in the month of
February 2027 after receiving the retiral benefits as the appellant
was scheduled to retire on 31.01.2027, subject to the dis-
continuance that the monthly maintenance of Rs.15,000/-. These
entire efforts have already been failed and as efforts of
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settlement have failed they become insignificant in the facts of
the present case.
21. Now, coming on the merits of the case it is iterated that the
application for dissolution of marriage was instituted on the
grounds of cruelty and desertion. The respondent is admittedly
st
the 1 wife of the appellant, and they have a daughter of their
wedlock, who is aged about 30 years but is still unmarried. The
appellant has solemnized second marriage with another lady and
has a son from their wedlock. In the absence of a decree of
divorce, marriage between the parties is still subsisting.
22. The appellant claims that the respondent meted out cruelty
sufficient to obtain a decree of divorce. The suit was instituted
by the present appellant in the year 2018. The appellant alleges
that earlier in the year 1998, a suit for dissolution of marriage
was instituted, which ended by way of settlement between the
parties before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Patna and the
settlement was for restitution of conjugal rights between the
parties. However, despite the settlement, restoration of conjugal
life was not done, and thus it is alleged that despite such orders
passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court in the year 2000
still no restoration of conjugal life has been done, and after a
lapse of about 18 years, the present suit for dissolution of
marriage was instituted.
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23. This Court has considered the oral and documentary evidence on
record. In the facts of the present case, it is not in dispute that
the present appellant has solemnised a second marriage,
contravening the mandate of law which prohibits a second
marriage during the lifetime of the spouse or during the
st
subsistence of the 1 marriage.
24. In the written statement, the respondent has specifically pleaded
an extra-marital relationship of the present appellant with some
other lady, which is now substantiated by the admitted fact that
the appellant has, though wrongly, solemnised a second
marriage.
25. Under such circumstances, the respondent's defence is justified.
Under such circumstances, the plea of cruelty or desertion by the
respondent against the appellant, ex facie, fails, as the defence
taken by the respondent qua cruelty and desertion is fully
justified. Even in the written statement filed by the respondent,
she had expressed her desire to restore conjugal life, which, on
the admission made by the appellant with regard to a second

marriage, has probably become not possible.
26. We therefore are of the considered view that the appellant failed
to establish a case of cruelty on the respondent sufficient for the
purpose of granting a decree of divorce.
27. The other part of the allegation relates to desertion. Living
separately for valid cause cannot be said to be desertion. No
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woman can be compelled to stay with her husband knowing full
well that her husband has contracted a second marriage or is
having an illicit relationship with a lady who is residing with
him. The respondent's separate living is therefore justified and
cannot amount to desertion. Efforts of reconciliation even in the
previous matrimonial suit before the Principal Judge, Family
Court, Patna, appear only to be an eyewash, considering the fact
that admittedly the appellant had extra-marital affairs which
culminated in the second marriage not recognised to be lawful
under law.
28. Further, despite the alleged settlement before the Family Court,
Patna, nothing is on record to show that the present Appellant
took any step to restore conjugal rights. No evidence shows that
the appellant was eager to comply with the settlement arrived at
before the Family Judge, Patna.
29. We therefore are of the considered view that the appellant also
failed to establish his case of desertion sufficient to dissolve the
marriage by a decree of divorce under Section 13(1)(i) (b) of the

Hindu Marriage Act.
30. The Point for determination as formulated by us, is decided
against the appellant and in favour of the Respondent. As a
consequence, the appeal fails and it is dismissed.
31. On a perusal of the orders passed by the Coordinate Bench of
this Court, it appears that the parties were called upon to file
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affidavits in terms of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Rajnesh vs. Neha & Another (2021) 2
SCC 324, with regard to the assets and liabilities of the parties,
which were filed.
32. Though a decree for dissolution of marriage is not yet being
passed, interim maintenance, which is presently paid @
Rs.15,000/- is enhanced to Rs.30,000/- per month to be paid by
the appellant to the respondent.
33. This enhancement is by taking into account the financial status
of the appellant as reflected in the affidavit filed. The daughter
requires additional finances to meet her educational and other
needs. The Appellant must therefore pay this enhanced amount
effective from November 2026. All arrears of maintenance, if
any, must also be paid on or before 31.12.2026.
34. This amount shall be paid to the respondent and her daughter.
However, this order in no circumstances limits the right of the
respondent or her daughter to file an appropriate application
before the Court of competent jurisdiction for maintenance and

other allowances to which they may be entitled under the law.
35. The enhancement of the maintenance amount from Rs.15,000/-
to Rs.30,000/- under no circumstances decides the said question
in its finality, which is left open for adjudication in accordance
with law by a court of competent jurisdiction, subject to the
appropriate application filed by the respondent or her daughter.
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36. With the above observations, the present appeal is dismissed
with costs of Rs.25,000/- to be paid by the appellant to the
respondent. Pending I.As, if any, do not survive and are
disposed of.


(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)



(Manoj Prasad, J.)
th
November 5 , 2026
A.F.R.
Pramanik/ Cp.2
Uploaded on 06.11.2026


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