Satya Narayan Soni vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK KUMAR SINGH
th
ON THE 25 OF AUGUST, 2026
WRIT PETITION No.10161 of 2009
Satya Narayan Soni
Versus
State of M.P. and Others
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Appearance:
Shri D. K. Tripathi- Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Hitendra Singh- Government Advocate for the respondents.
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Reserved on : 05.08.2026
Delivered on : 25.08.2026
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ORDER
The petitioner has filed the instant petition challenging the legality, validity
and propriety of the punishment order dated 10.4.2006 passed by the
Divisional Forest Officer (DFO), Burhanpur (respondent No. 3). By the said
order, the major penalty of removal from service was imposed upon the
petitioner. The petitioner further assails the appellate order dated 21.9.2006
passed by the Chief Conservator of Forest, Khandwa (respondent No. 2),

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whereby, the appeal preferred by petitioner was partially allowed, modifying
the penalty of removal to a reduction to the minimum of the pay scale for a
period of five years.
2. The factual matrix of the present case is that the petitioner was engaged
as a Forest Guard and at the relevant time was posted at the Bori Beat, Asir
Range, under the Burhanpur Forest Division from 23.9.1994 to 30.12.2002.
He was placed under suspension on 30.12.2002 and a charge sheet was issued
to him on 10.2.2003 outlining two primary charges:-
(i) Charge No. 1: During his posting, an encroachment spanning 1047
hectares took place in compartments 138, 139, and 140 of the Bori Beat.
It was alleged that the petitioner made no solid effort to prevent this
encroachment and failed to inform his superior officers, thereby showing
negligence toward his duties.
(ii) Charge No. 2: During the same tenure, nationalized forest produce
(‘Salai Goand’ or gum) was illegally collected and stored in Bori village.
It was alleged that the petitioner failed to seize the contraband, register a
case or inform his superiors, violating the M.P. Civil Services (Conduct)
Rules, 1965 .
3. A departmental enquiry was instituted. The Enquiry Officer after
recording the statements of prosecution witnesses and examining the record,

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submitted a report explicitly concluding that both Charge No. 1 and Charge
No. 2 were not proved against the petitioner.
4. Disagreeing with the Enquiry Officer’s findings, the Disciplinary
Authority issued a show-cause notice dated 23.8.2005 (Annexure P-8)
proposing the penalty of removal. The petitioner submitted a detailed
representation (Annexure P-9), appending a list of over 40 Preliminary
Offence Reports (PORs) he had registered. Disregarding this defense, the
Disciplinary Authority passed the impugned order dated 10.4.2006, holding
the petitioner guilty.
5. On appeal, the Appellate Authority while upholding the finding of guilt,
observed that the punishment of removal was excessively harsh considering
the petitioner’s 23 years of service, his “Very Good” Annual Confidential
Reports (ACRs) and a commendation letter awarded in 2005-06.
Consequently, the punishment was modified to a reduction in pay scale for
five years.
6. Ld. counsel for the petitioner submitted that the present case is a case of
no evidence and it is perverse based on non-application of mind. It was argued
that the Disciplinary Authority completely ignored voluminous documentary
evidence specifically the PORs and Panchnamas filed by the petitioner
between 1996 and 2002 which conclusively proved that he had actively
reported the encroachments to the Range Officer and the Police. It was further

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submitted that the area was surrounded by organized mobs making it
physically impossible for a lone guard to halt the mass encroachment, a fact
admitted by the prosecution witnesses.
7. Per contra , the Ld. government advocate appearing for the
respondent/State strongly relied upon the Return and argued that the
Disciplinary Authority was well within its jurisdiction to disagree with the
Enquiry Officer. It was contended that the petitioner’s failure to prevent the
encroachment of 1047 hectares and his failure to detect the illegal storage of
50 kg of gum amounted to grave dereliction of duty. The State urged that the
High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, cannot act as an
appellate authority to re-appreciate evidence and since procedural propriety
was maintained, the petition ought to be dismissed.
8. Heard the respective counsel and perused the record.
9. This Court is aware of the settled legal position regarding judicial review
in disciplinary matters. The jurisdiction under Article 226 is supervisory, not
appellate. The Court shall not re-weigh evidence or substitute its own
conclusion for that of the Disciplinary Authority. However, this restraint is
subject to a well-recognized exception, i.e., the doctrine of perversity . If the
findings of the Disciplinary Authority are based on no evidence or if the
authority actively ignores material documentary evidence available on record

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that runs contrary to the charge, such findings are rendered perverse, arbitrary
and legally unsustainable.
10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. H.C.
Goel , AIR 1964 SC 364, observed that where a public servant is punished for
misconduct after a departmental enquiry is conducted, a clear case where
interference under Article 226 of the Constitution is warranted is when there
is no evidence to establish the official’s guilt:
“22. We are not prepared to accept this contention. Mala fide
exercise of power can be attacked independently on the ground
that it is malafide. Such an exercise of power is always liable to
be quashed on the main ground that it is not a bona fide exercise
of power. But we are not prepared to hold that if mala fide are
not alleged and bona fides are assumed in favour of the
appellant, its conclusion on a question of fact cannot be
successfully challenged even if it is manifest that there is no
evidence to support it. The two infirmities are separate and
distinct though, conceivably, in some cases both may be
present. There may be cases of no evidence even where the
Government is acting bona fide; the said infirmity may also
exist where the Government is acting mala fide and in that case,
the conclusion of the Government not supported by any
evidence may be the result of mala fides but that does not mean
that if it is proved that there is no evidence to support the
conclusion of the Government, a writ of certiorari will not issue
without further proof of mala fides. That is why we are prepared
to accept the learned Attorney-General's argument that since
no mala fides are alleged against the appellant in the present
case, no writ of certiorari can be issued in favour of the
respondent.
23. That takes us to the merits of the respondent's contention that
the conclusion of the appellant that the third charge framed
against the respondent had been proved, is based on no
evidence. The learned Attorney-General has stressed before us
that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the

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fact that the appellant is acting with the determination to root
out corruption, and so, if it is shown that the view taken by the
appellant is a reasonably possible view this Court should not
sit in appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this
Court would have taken the same view or not. This contention
is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which we can
legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondent's
case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made
against the respondent that Charge No. 3 was proved against
him? In exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 on such a
plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the
sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular
conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of
the authority which deals with the question; but the High Court
can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in
support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the
whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true,
does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved
against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the
evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine
whether on that evidence illegally the impugned conclusion
follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that
the respondent's grievance in well founded, because, in our
opinion, the finding which is implicit is the appellant's order
dismissing the respondent that charge number 3 is proved
against him is based on no evidence.”
[Emphasis supplied]
11. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India , (1995) 6 SCC 749 , the Hon’ble
Supreme Court indicated the scope of judicial review. It was ruled that judicial
review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the
decision is made. It is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment
and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily
correct in the eyes of the court. The court/tribunal in its power of judicial review
does not act as an appellate authority; it does not reappreciate the evidence.

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“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review
of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial
review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair
treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the
authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court.
When an enquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a
public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine
whether the enquiry was held by a competent officer or whether
rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings
or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority
entrusted with the power to hold enquiry has jurisdiction, power
and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that
finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical
rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as
defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the
authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support
therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in
its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to
reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent
findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere
where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent
officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice
or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry
or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary
authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be
such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the
Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding,
and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of
each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where
appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co extensive
power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment.
In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and
findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence
or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed
before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C.
Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 16 :
(1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364] , this Court held at p. 728
that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence
reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from

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patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at
all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
12. Reiterating these principles in United Bank of India v. Biswanath
Bhattacharjee , (2022) 13 SCC 329 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed an
employer’s appeal because the termination was based on no evidence. The
Court emphasized that while Article 226 does not confer appellate powers to
re-appreciate evidence, a basic scrutiny of the disciplinary materials is strictly
necessary to ascertain if findings are perverse, ignore material facts or rely on
extraneous factors. Thus, the Court’s margin of appreciation allows for this
fundamental review while maintaining its non-appellate character.
“21. The Bank is correct, when it contends that an appellate review
of the materials and findings cannot ordinarily be undertaken,
in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Yet,
from H.C. Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, 1963 SCC OnLine
SC 16 : (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364] onwards, this
Court has consistently ruled that where the findings of the
disciplinary authority are not based on evidence, or based on a
consideration of irrelevant material, or ignoring relevant
material, are mala fide, or where the findings are perverse or
such that they could not have been rendered by any reasonable
person placed in like circumstances, the remedies under Article
226 of the Constitution are available, and intervention,
warranted. For any court to ascertain if any findings were
beyond the record (i.e. no evidence) or based on any irrelevant
or extraneous factors, or by ignoring material evidence,
necessarily some amount of scrutiny is necessary. A finding of
“no evidence” or perversity, cannot be rendered sans such
basic scrutiny of the materials, and the findings of the
disciplinary authority. However, the margin of appreciation of

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the court under Article 226 of the Constitution would be
different; it is not the appellate in character.
……
……
30. In view of the foregoing discussion, and having regard to the
record, the impugned judgment [Biswanath
Bhattacharjee v. United Bank of India, 2008 SCC OnLine Cal
766] cannot be faulted with. The appeal is unmerited. The
appellant Bank is directed to ensure that the respondent's
services are deemed to be reinstated, and calculate all his
benefits, including arrears of salary, pay increase (as
applicable), increments, and all consequential benefits, and
calculate his terminal benefits, and fix his pension, if admissible
to him under the Bank's regulations. The determination of these
benefits shall be undertaken, and the payment of all amounts be
made, within three months from date of this judgment. The
appeal is dismissed without order on costs.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
13. When charge no. 1 is analysed, the core of the Disciplinary Authority’s
reasoning to overturn the Enquiry Officer’s exoneration was the assumption
that the petitioner did not disclose the issue with respect to the encroachment
to his superiors and only began filing POR cases in the year 2001. This finding
is fundamentally flawed and contradicted by the official record. A perusal of
Annexure P-9 reveals a detailed tabular chart of over 40 PORs registered by
the petitioner dating back to 1996, 1997, 1998 and 2000. Furthermore, the
panchnamas and police complaints placed on record (Annexure P-12)
demonstrate that as early as 1996 and 1998, the petitioner actively patrolled
the beat, documented the presence of mobs comprising 50 to 150 individuals
armed with plows, and continuously dispatched reports to the Range Officer

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and the local Station House Officer (SHO). The legal maxim lex non cogit ad
impossibilia (the law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot
possibly perform) is highly relevant here. A Class-IV Forest Guard cannot be
expected to single handedly physically resist an organized mob of over 100
people. His statutory duty was to report the crime, register the offence and
inform his superiors. The documentary evidence establishes that the petitioner
discharged this duty. The Disciplinary Authority’s conclusion that the
petitioner took no action and did not disclose the information regarding
encroachment is not just an error of judgment; it is a perverse finding arrived
at by turning a blind eye to the very records maintained by the department.
14. Regarding the illegal storage of 50 kg of Salai gum, the Enquiry Officer
correctly noted that there was no evidence linking the petitioner to this act, as
the seizure was conducted directly by the Range Officer on a specific tip-off.
The Disciplinary Authority, however, held the petitioner guilty purely on the
presumption that since the gum was found in October/November (outside the
collection season), it was suspicious that the Beat Guard did not know about
it. In service jurisprudence, suspicion, no matter how strong, cannot take the
place of legal proof. There was absolutely no witness statement or
documentary evidence produced during the enquiry to prove that the petitioner
had knowledge of this stored gum or was complicit with the agent. Punishing

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an employee based on an assumption of constructive knowledge amounts to a
finding based on no evidence.
15. At this juncture, it is imperative to examine the statutory framework
governing the Disciplinary Authority’s power to disagree with the Enquiry
Officer’s report as exercised in the present case. This power is specifically
drawn from Rule 15 of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 . Sub-rule (2) of Rule 15 explicitly stipulates
that:
“ 15. Action on the inquiry report:
……
(2) The disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the
findings of the inquiring authority on any article of charge,
record its reasons for such disagreement and record its
own finding on such charge, if the evidence on record is
sufficient for the purpose.”
16. The legislative intent behind the qualifying phrase “if the evidence on
record is sufficient for the purpose” is unambiguous. While it is a settled
proposition of service jurisprudence that the Disciplinary Authority is not
strictly bound by the findings of the Enquiry Officer and may arrive at its own
conclusion, this statutory power is conditional. The Disciplinary Authority
cannot act on mere surmises, conjectures or suspicions. Its independent
finding of guilt upon disagreement must necessarily be sustained by sufficient,
cogent and legally acceptable evidence already existing on the record of the
enquiry. If the evidence on record points to the innocence of the delinquent or

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if there is a lack of evidence supporting the charge, the Disciplinary Authority
lacks the jurisdiction under Rule 15(2) to arbitrarily manufacture a finding of
guilt.
17. In the present case, the Disciplinary Authority’s exercise of power
under Rule 15(2) to overturn the Enquiry Officer’s exoneration fails to meet
this statutory threshold. When the Disciplinary Authority chose to differ, it
was mandated by law to base its disagreement on sufficient evidence from the
record. However, the record contained over 40 registered PORs and
contemporaneous panchnamas proving the petitioner’s active reporting of the
encroachments, which the Disciplinary Authority actively ignored. Similarly,
regarding the illegal storage of gum, the disagreement was based entirely on
suspicion regarding the collection season rather than any evidentiary proof of
the petitioner’s complicity. By recording findings of guilt where the evidence
on record was absolutely insufficient, the Disciplinary Authority violated the
explicit statutory mandate of Rule 15(2) of the Rules of 1966, rendering its
order legally unsustainable. The Disciplinary Authority’s findings are vitiated
by a total non-application of mind to the PORs and Panchnamas that
conclusively disproved the charges. The Disciplinary Authority did not base
any disagreement on a logical appreciation of the evidence on record. The
findings are perverse, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

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18. The Appellate Authority recognized the petitioner’s unblemished
service record of 23 years and modified the punishment on sympathetic
grounds. However, it failed to adjudicate the core illegality which is the
perversity of the Disciplinary Authority’s factual findings. A reduced
punishment based on a fundamentally flawed and unproven charge cannot be
sustained in the eyes of the law.
19. Resultantly, the impugned punishment order dated 10.4.2006 passed
by respondent No. 3 and the appellate order dated 21.9.2006 passed by
respondent No. 2 are hereby quashed and set aside. The respondents are
directed to restore the pay scale of the petitioner as he was drawing prior to
the imposition of the impugned penalty. The petitioner shall be entitled to all
consequential benefits, including arrears of salary resulting from the
restoration of his pay scale, pay increase (as applicable) and increments. The
respondents are directed to calculate and release these arrears within a period
of 90 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
20. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed .
21. There shall be no order as to costs.

(VIVEK KUMAR SINGH)
JUDGE
Digitally signed by ASHISH
KUMAR LILHARE
Date: 2026.08.31 12:13:06 +05'30'