District Magistrate And District Election Officer And Collector vs National Insurance Company Limited

Court
Supreme Court
<div> 2026 INSC 279<br /> <b>REPORTABLE </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA </b><br /> <b>CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026 </b><br /> (@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.22910 of 2025) <br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <br /> DISTRICT MAGISTRATE AND <br /> DISTRICT ELECTION OFFICER AND <br /> COLLECTOR, GWALIOR, M.P. … APPELLANT(S) <br /> <br /> VERSUS <br /> <br /> <br /> NATIONAL INSURANCE <br /> COMPANY LIMITED &amp; ORS. … RESPONDENT(S) <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <b>J U D G M E N T </b><br /> <b>SANJAY KAROL J. </b><br /> Leave Granted. <br /> <b>2.</b> This appeal presents a question of determination of liability <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Digitally signed by<br /> NAVEEN D<br /> Date: 2026.03.23<br /> 19:20:29 IST<br /> Reason:<br /> rd<br /> in connection with the accident that took place on 23 January 2010 <br /> C.A.No../2026 @ SLP©No.22910 of 2025 Page <b>1</b> of <b>10</b> <br /> <br /><br /> 1<br /> between a bus bearing registration number MP-07-MG-9897 and a <br /> motorcycle bearing number MP-07-TC-0514, killing the rider of the <br /> latter. The bus, although under the ownership of Kidzee Corner <br /> School, Gwalior, had been, undisputedly, requisitioned under the <br /> orders of the appellant for the purposes of Gram Panchayat <br /> Elections. It had, while being under the orders and command of the <br /> relevant election authorities, dashed into the motor-cycle of the <br /> deceased. The Fifth Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, <br /> 2 3<br /> Gwalior allowed the claim that had been filed by the legal <br /> representatives of the deceased, namely Rajesh Mandil and awarded <br /> compensation to the tune of Rs 5,13,500 along with 6% interest from <br /> the date of filing of the petition. The award also provided for a <br /> distribution of the amount so awarded as per the discussion in issue <br /> No. 6. Aggrieved by such determination, two Miscellaneous <br /> Appeals came to be filed before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh <br /> - one by the Insurance Company (respondent no.1 herein) being MA <br /> No.703 of 2012 and one by the legal representatives of the deceased <br /> - respondent nos. 2 to 5, before this Court who instead took objection <br /> to the conservative estimation of the deceased’s income and as such, <br /> prayed for the enhancement of the compensation so awarded. In <br /> <br /> 1<br /> Offending vehicle <br /> 2<br /> Tribunal <br /> 3<br /> Claim No. 25/2010 <br /> C.A.No../2026 @ SLP©No.22910 of 2025 Page <b>2</b> of <b>10</b> <br /> <br /><br /> th<br /> terms of the impugned judgment dated 8 January 2024, both the <br /> miscellaneous appeals were allowed. The Insurance Company’s <br /> appeal was allowed insofar as liability originally fastened upon them <br /> was instead shifted to the appellant herein. The Appeal by <br /> Respondent Nos. 2-5 was allowed by enhancing the compensation <br /> to Rs. 27,01,556/-. <br /> <b>3.</b> The appellant by way of this appeal takes exception to the <br /> shifting of liability upon him. It is urged that the High Court’s <br /> determination was erroneous since at the relevant point in time the <br /> offending vehicle was under the coverage of an insurance policy, <br /> and so liability to be fastened otherwise would be wrong. Further, it <br /> is submitted that when the bus was being used for a public purpose <br /> and in course thereof, if the liability is fastened upon public <br /> authorities it would send a wrong message since the authorities do <br /> not have either ownership of the vehicle or any insurable interest <br /> therein. <br /> <b>4.</b> The short question to be determined by us is whether the High <br /> Court’s finding that the appellant, a functionary of the State would <br /> be liable to meet the award and not the Respondent - Insurance <br /> Company, was in accordance with law or not. We have heard the <br /> learned counsel for the parties, Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, learned <br /> senior counsel, appointed as <i>amicus curiae</i> and also perused the <br /> C.A.No../2026 @ SLP©No.22910 of 2025 Page <b>3</b> of <b>10</b> <br /> <br /><br /> written submissions filed by them. <br /></div><table><thead><tr><th>5. As already noted above, it is undisputed that the bus in</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>question was requisitioned by the appellant for the Gram Panchayat</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>elections. The word requisition is defined by the Cambridge</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Dictionary4 as follows: “to officially request or take something”.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Merriam Webster5 defines it as “ the act of formally requiring or</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>calling upon someone to perform an action; a formal demand made</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>by one nation upon another for the surrender or extradition of a</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>fugitive from justice; the act of requiring something to be</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>furnished; a demand or application made usually with authority:</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>such as - a demand made by military authorities upon civilians for</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>supplies or other needs; a written request for something authorized</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>but not made available automatically; the state of being in demand</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>or use”.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>6.</td><td>The judgment of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v.</td></tr></tbody></table><div><br /> <i>6</i><br /> <b><i>Deepa Dev</i></b> <i>i</i> , appears to squarely cover the situation presented in <br /> this case, as follows: <br /> <b>“10.</b> Parliament either under the 1939 Act or the 1988 Act did <br /> not take into consideration a situation of this nature. No doubt, <br /> Respondents 3 and 4 continued to be the registered owners of <br /> the vehicle despite the fact that the same was requisitioned <br /> by the District Magistrate in exercise of the power conferred <br /> <br /> 4<br /> https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/requisition <br /> 5<br /> https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/requisition <br /> 6<br /> (2008) 1 SCC 414 <br /> C.A.No../2026 @ SLP©No.22910 of 2025 Page <b>4</b> of <b>10</b> <br /> <br /><br /></div><table><thead><tr><th>upon him under the Representation of the People Act. A vehicle</th><th></th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>is requisitioned by a statutory authority, pursuant to the</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>provisions contained in a statute. The owner of the vehicle</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>cannot refuse to abide by the order of requisition of the vehicle</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>by the Deputy Commissioner. While the vehicle remains under</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>requisition, the owner does not exercise any control thereover.</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>The driver may still be the employee of the owner of the vehicle</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>but he has to drive it as per the direction of the officer of the</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>State, who is put in charge thereof. Save and except for legal</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>ownership, for all intent and purport, the registered owner of the</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>vehicle loses entire control thereover. He has no say as to</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>whether the vehicle should be driven at a given point of time or</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>not. He cannot ask the driver not to drive a vehicle on a bad road.</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>He or the driver could not possibly say that the vehicle would</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>not be driven in the night. The purpose of requisition is to use</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>the vehicle. For the period the vehicle remains under the control</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>of the State and/or its officers, the owner is only entitled to</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>payment of compensation therefor in terms of the Act but he</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>cannot not (sic) exercise any control thereupon. In a situation of</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>this nature, this Court must proceed on the presumption that</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Parliament while enacting the 1988 Act did not envisage such a</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>situation. If in a given situation, the statutory definitions</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>contained in the 1988 Act cannot be given effect to in letter and</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>spirit, the same should be understood from the common sense</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>point of view.”</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>(emphasis supplied)</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>urther, a bench of three judges in</td><td>Purnya Kala Devi v. State</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table><div><br /> <b><i>7</i></b><br /> <b><i>of Assam</i></b> <b>, </b> dealt with a case in which the State of Assam had <br /> requisitioned the vehicle in question. It was held: <br /> <b>“16.</b> Though the above point was pressed into service, the High <br /> Court, without adverting to Section 5 of the Assam Act, merely <br /> on the basis of the definition of “owner” as contained in Section <br /> 2(30) of the 1988 Act, mulcted the award payable by the owner <br /> <br /> 7<br /> (2014) 14 SCC 142 <br /> C.A.No../2026 @ SLP©No.22910 of 2025 Page <b>5</b> of <b>10</b> <br /> <br /><br /> of the vehicle. The High Court failed to appreciate that at the <br /> relevant time the offending vehicle was under the requisition of <br /> Respondent 1 State of Assam under the provisions of the Assam <br /> Act. Therefore, Respondent 1 was squarely covered under the <br /> definition of “owner” as contained in Section 2(30) of the 1988 <br /> Act. The High Court failed to appreciate the underlying <br /> legislative intention in including in the definition of “owner” a <br /> person in possession of a vehicle either under an agreement of <br /> lease or agreement of hypothecation or under a hire-purchase <br /> agreement to the effect that a person in control and possession <br /> of the vehicle should be construed as the “owner” and not alone <br /> the registered owner. The High Court further failed to appreciate <br /> the legislative intention that the registered owner of the vehicle <br /> should not be held liable if the vehicle was not in his possession <br /> and control. … The Tribunal also erred in accepting the <br /> allegation of Respondent 2 that the vehicle was released on the <br /> date of the accident at 10.30 a.m. and the accident occurred at <br /> 10.30 a.m. without any evidence even though in the claim <br /> petition, it was stated that the accident had occurred at 10.15 <br /> a.m.” <br /> <i>(emphasis supplied) </i><br /> <b>7.</b> That being the position of law, we are of the considered view <br /> that no error can be found in the impugned judgment. As such, the <br /> appeal is bereft of merit. <br /> <b>8.</b> Before parting with the matter, however, we deem it <br /> appropriate to deal with one of the contentions raised by the <br /> appellant to the effect that it will send a bad message to civic <br /> authorities who are requisitioning such vehicles for public purposes. <br /> C.A.No../2026 @ SLP©No.22910 of 2025 Page <b>6</b> of <b>10</b> <br /> <br /><br /> <b>9.</b> When a public authority requisitions a privately owned <br /> vehicle for public purposes, the nature of possession and control <br /> changes entirely. The owner is divested of custody and decision-<br /> making power, and the vehicle is placed at the disposal of the State <br /> for governmental functions. During this period, the owner neither <br /> directs its use nor derives any benefit from it. It only stands to reason <br /> that in such circumstances, if an untoward incident occurs, <br /> responsibility would properly to rest with the requisitioning <br /> authority and not with the insurer engaged by the owner for <br /> ordinary, private or commercial use, as the case may be. Once <br /> requisitioned, the vehicle is operated under official directions. The <br /> authority determines the manner of deployment, the purpose for <br /> which it is used, and the conditions under which it is operated. The <br /> owner has no say in these matters. Where control is assumed by the <br /> State, the legal consequences arising from that control cannot, in <br /> fairness, be shifted back to a private insurer whose contractual <br /> engagement was premised on a wholly different footing. It is equally <br /> important to recognize that a requisition is not a voluntary <br /> arrangement, instead it is a command issued under statutory <br /> authority, as stated by the judgments referred to <i>supra</i> . The owner <br /> does not consent to part with possession; he is compelled to do so. <br /> The insurance policy obtained by him envisions and accounts for the <br /> C.A.No../2026 @ SLP©No.22910 of 2025 Page <b>7</b> of <b>10</b> <br /> <br /><br /> vehicle’s regular and lawful use in the ordinary course. Compelled <br /> deployment for public functions cannot reasonably be characterised <br /> as “ <i>regular use</i> ” within the ‘usual’ contemplation. To fasten liability <br /> upon the insurer in these circumstances would be to extend the <br /> contract beyond the risk that was agreed to be covered. Requiring <br /> the insurer to answer for consequences arising from a use neither <br /> authorised nor controlled by the insured would be unfair. The <br /> insurer assesses and underwrites risk based on the insured’s ordinary <br /> operations. When the State steps in, assumes control, and deploys <br /> the vehicle for its own purposes, it assumes with that control the <br /> corresponding responsibility. Further, when statutory power is <br /> exercised to requisition private property in the public interest, that <br /> power carries with it an obligation to answer for the consequences <br /> flowing from such compelled use. To hold otherwise would impose <br /> upon private parties and their insurers the burden of risks generated <br /> exclusively by governmental action. <br /> <b>10.</b> Here itself, it be observed, that the learned Amicus Curiae, in <br /> her note, submitted to the Court that in view of <b><i>U.P. SRTC v. </i></b><br /> 8<br /> <b><i>National Insurance Co. Ltd.</i></b> , which in turn relied on <b><i>U.P. SRTC </i></b><br /> 9<br /> <b><i>v. Kulsum</i></b> , the insurer would continue to be liable despite it being <br /> <br /> 8<br /> 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3278 <br /> 9<br /> (2011) 8 SCC 142 <br /> C.A.No../2026 @ SLP©No.22910 of 2025 Page <b>8</b> of <b>10</b> <br /> <br /><br /> operated by the authority. We cannot accept this view since the <br /> crucial distinction in the above two cases <i>vis-a-vis</i> the present one is <br /> that in the former the vehicles operated under an agreement for such <br /> purpose. Here, as is abundantly clear, it was a requisition by the <br /> authority under a special statute. Accordingly, it is held that where <br /> a vehicle is requisitioned for public functions and an incident occurs <br /> during the period of such requisition, liability ought properly to be <br /> borne by the requisitioning authority, and not by the insurer engaged <br /> by the owner for the vehicle’s regular and voluntary use. <br /> <b>11.</b> There is yet another point that needs consideration. Section <br /> 160 of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1950 grants power to <br /> the State to requisition premises and vehicles. The provision, <br /> however, does not expressly authorize the requisition of manpower <br /> such as driver. In practice, however, vehicles are often placed at the <br /> disposal of the authorities along with their drivers. In practice, <br /> however, vehicles are often placed at the disposal of the Authorities <br /> along with their drivers in view of operational convenience. Once <br /> the vehicle is requisitioned and deployed for election duty, its <br /> control and use effectively passes to the State authorities for the <br /> duration of that period, as already observed <i>supra</i> . In such <br /> circumstances, it is a reasonable conclusion that by accepting and <br /> utilizing the services of the driver, the Authorities implicitly <br /> C.A.No../2026 @ SLP©No.22910 of 2025 Page <b>9</b> of <b>10</b> <br /> <br /><br /> recognized such a driver’s competence, capacity and ability to <br /> operate the vehicle. It is also to be noted that the authority in this <br /> case made a conscious decision to requisition the vehicle with the <br /> driver instead of exercising its power to request staff for the purpose <br /> of carrying out duties in connection with the election. In other <br /> words while the vehicle could have been requisitioned from the <br /> School, the driver could have been a staff member of the <br /> authorities/institutions listed under Section 159(2) of the Act. <br /> However, that was not the case. Viewed thus too, the liability would <br /> rest with the requisitioning authority, and thereby with the State. <br /> <b>12.</b> With these observations, the appeal is dismissed along with <br /> any pending applications being disposed of. <br /> <br /> <br /> <b>………………………….…………………..J. </b><br /> <b>(SANJAY KAROL) </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>………………………………………………J. </b><br /> <b>(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH) </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>March 23, 2026 </b><br /> <b>New Delhi </b> <br /> C.A.No../2026 @ SLP©No.22910 of 2025 Page <b>10</b> of <b>10</b> <br /> </div>