Rajan Chaurasia @ Rajendra And 3 Others vs State of U.P. and Another

Court
Allahabad High Court

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 1753 of 2026
Rajan Chaurasia @ Rajendra And 3 Others
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and Another
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Prince Kumar
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Amar Nath Tiwari, G.A.
A.F.R.
Court No. - 51
HON'BLE MADAN PAL SINGH, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the appellants, learned counsel for
opposite party no.2 and learned A.G.A. for the State.
2. The present criminal appeal under Section 14-A (1) of Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 has
been preferred by the appellants to quash the order dated 15th
September, 2025 passed by the Special Judge (S.C./S.T. Act),
Deoria in Special Trial No. 132 of 2023 (Badami Devi Vs. Rajan
Chaurasia & Others) under Sections 427, 504, 506 I.P.C. and
Sections 3 (1) (da) and 3 (1) (dha) of S.C./S.T. Act, Police Station-
Khukhundu, District-Deoria, whereby the charges have been framed
against the appellants.
3. Before considering the present criminal appeal on merits, learned
counsel for opposite party no.2 and the learned A.G.A. for the State
have raised preliminary objection to the maintainability of the present
criminal appeal by submitting that since the order of framing of
charge is an interlocutory order, therefore, as per Section 14-A of
S.C./S.T. Act itself, the present criminal appeal is not maintainable.
4. Learned counsel for the appellants vehemently argues that the
order of framing the charge cannot be termed as interlocutory order
and, therefore, an appeal against framing of charge is maintainable.
He further submits that as per Section 14-A of S.C./S.T. Act, an
appeal shall lie, from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an

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interlocutory order to the High Court both on facts and law.
5. On the above premise, learned counsel for the appellant submits
that since the 'framing of charge' is not an interlocutory order, the
present criminal appeal is maintainable.
6. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel
for the appellant, the learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 and
the learned A.G.A. as well as perused the material available on
record including the impugned order.
7. The first issue is up for consideration before this Court as whether
the order of framing of charge is an interlocutory order or not?
8. The second issue is as to whether appeal under Section 14-A of
S.C./S.T. Act is maintainable against an interlocutory order or not?
Issue No.1
9. For deciding the said issue, it is necessary for this Court to refer
the law laid down by the Apex Court in various judgments from time
to time on the said issue.
10. In the case of Ratilal Bhanji Mithani Vs. State of Maharasthtra
& Others reported in (1979) 2 SCC 179 has held that an order of
discharge in a warrant case instituted on complaint or police report,
can be made only after the process has been issued and before the
charge is framed.
11. It is further opined by the Apex Court that once a charge is
framed, the Magistrate has no power under section 227 or any other
provision of the Code to cancel the charge, and reverse the
proceedings to the stage of Section 353 and discharge the accused.
The trial in a warrant case starts with the framing of charge; prior to it,
the proceedings are only an inquiry. After the framing of charges if
the accused pleads not guilty, the Magistrate is required to proceed
with the trial in the manner provided in section 254 to 258, to a logical
end. Once a charge is framed in a warrant case, instituted either on
complaint or a police report, the Magistrate has no power under the
Code to discharge the accused, and thereafter, he can either acquit
or convict the accused unless he decides to proceed under Section
349 and 562 of the Code of 1892 (which correspond to Sections 325
and 360 of the Code of 1973).

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12. It is then held that after framing charges the Magistrate
whimsically, without appraising the evidence and without permitting
the prosecution to produce all its evidence, 'discharges' the accused,
such an acquittal, without trial, even if clothed as 'discharge', will be
illegal.
13. Relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
Ratilal Bhanji Mithani (Supra), further the Apex Court in the case of
Bharat Parikh Vs. C.B.I. & Another reported in (2008) 10 SCC 109
has opined that once the charges have been framed and the accused
pleads not guilty, the Magistrate is required to proceed with the trial to
its logical end. The Magistrate has no power under the Code to
discharge the accused. He/she can, thereafter, either convict or
acquit the accused.
14. Taking note of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
Ratilal Bhanji Mithani (Supra) , the Apex Court in the case of State
T reported in (2014) 11
h. CBI New Delhi Vs. Jitendra Kumar Singh
SCC 724 has held that the trial of a warrant case starts with the
framing of charge. Prior to that the proceedings are only an inquiry.
The Apex Court has reiterated the same law as held by the Apex
Court in the case of Ratilal Bhanji Mithani (Supra).
15. A Six Judges of Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in 2014)
3 SCC 92, has also relied and followed the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India in the case of Ratilal Bhanji Mithani
(Supra).
16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Amar Nath
VS. State of Haryana reported in (1977) 4 SCC 137 has opined that
"interlocutory order" "denotes" orders of a purely interim or temporary
nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities
of the parties and that any order which substantially affects the rights
of the accused is not an interlocutory order.
17. From the aforesaid settled legal position, it is crystal clear
that once charges have been framed, the issue of discharge
becomes redundant, as Courts have no jurisdiction to allow discharge
after charges having been framed. After charges have been framed,
Court can either convict or acquit an accused. As such, the said issue
is no longer res-integra and stands concluded by the judgement of

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Supreme Court referred to above.
18. On the basis of the aforesaid legal position, this Court is of the
considered opinion that an interlocutory order or judgment is one
made or given during the progress of an action, but which does not
finally dispose of the rights of the parties. In case of an interlocutory
order, the conclusion is inescapable that an order which does not
terminate the proceedings or finally decides the rights of the parties is
only an interlocutory order. In other words, in ordinary sense of the
term, an interlocutory order is one which only decides a particular
aspect or a particular issue or matter in a proceeding, suit or trial but
which does not however conclude the trial at all. This would be the
result if the term interlocutory order is interpreted in its natural and
logical sense without having resort to Criminal Procedure Code or
any other statute.
19. It is well settled that the trial begins when the accused is charged
and called on to answer and then the question before the Court is
whether the accused is to be acquitted or convicted and not whether
the complaint is to be dismissed or the accused discharged.
Therefore, this Court has no room to doubt to hold that order of
framing of charge is an interlocutory order, as after charging an
accused, the trial begins and he is called on to answer and then the
question before the Court, whether is to be acquitted or convicted.
20. From the aforesaid settled legal position as laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in aforesaid cases, it is crystal
established that the order of framing of charges an interlocutory
order, in which the conclusion is inescapable and the same does
not terminate the proceedings or finally decides the rights of the
parties. Accordingly, while answering the issue no.1, this Court
opines that the order of framing of charge is an interlocutory order.
Now this Court comes to the second issue.
21. For appreciating the aforesaid legal issue, it would be worthwhile
to reproduce Section 14-A of S.C./S.T. Act wherein the instant
criminal appeal has been filed. Section 14-A of S.C./S.T. Act is
quoted here-under:
" 14A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure,1973, an appeal shall lie, from any judgment, sentence or
order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court or an
Exclusive Special Court, to the High Court both on facts and on law.

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(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of section 378 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, an appeal shall lie to the High Court
against an order of the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court granting
or refusing bail.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in
force, every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of
ninety days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from:
Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the
said period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient
cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of ninety days:
Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the
period of one hundred and eighty days.
(4) Every appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall, as far as possible, be
disposed of within a period of three months from the date of admission of the
appeal."
22. Perusal of the Section 14-A (1) specifically reflects that an appeal
shall lie, from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an
interlocutory order, of a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court,
to the High Court both on facts and on law. Consequently, this Court
is of the firm opinion that since the impugned order framing charge
against the appellant is an interlocutory order as the said issue has
already been answered by this Court herein above, therefore, as per
Section 14-A (1), the present criminal appeal is maintainable against
such order.
23. While deciding the aforesaid two issues, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India in the case of V.C. Shukla Vs. State through C.B.I.
reported in 1980 Supp SCC 92, has opined that applying these tests
to the order impugned we find that the order framing of the charges is
purely an interlocutory order as it does not terminate the proceedings
but the trial goes on until it culminates in acquittal or conviction. It is
true that if the Special Court would have refused to frame charges
and discharged the accused, the proceedings would have terminated
but that is only one side of the picture. The other side of the picture is
that if the Special Court refused to discharge the accused and framed
charges against him, then the order would be interlocutory because
the trial would still be alive.
24. The Apex Court has concluded that in view of the conclusion that
the order framing a charge is an interlocutory order within the
meaning of Section 11 (1) of Special Courts Act, 1979, the appeal
against such an order is incompetent in view of the provision
contained in Section 11 (2) of Special Courts Act, 1979, and therefore

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the preliminary objection must be upheld and the appeal is dismissed.
25. A learned Single Judge of Himanchal Pradesh High Court at
Shimla in the case of Lagnesh Verma Vs. State of H.P. & Others
reported in 2026 SCC OnLine HP 1038 has opined that once the
Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that framing of charge cannot be
construed as final order, the appeal is not maintainable, the
aggrieved party can avail the remedy of revisional jurisdiction or
inherent jurisdiction of this Court under the BNSS or other laws if
permissible. However, the appeal filed by the appellant is not
maintainable against the order of framing the charge. Accordingly, the
Himanchal Pradesh High Court has held that the appeal against the
order of framing of charge is not maintainable and hence is
dismissed. However, the appellant is at liberty to avail any other
remedy available under law.
26. For the sake of argument, if it is presumed that the order of
framing charge is a final order and the appeal is maintainable, then in
that circumstances also, this Court cannot direct the trial court to
terminate the proceedings or discharge the accused or to pass a
fresh order of framing of charge, as the trial court has no power to do
the same, in view of the aforementioned settled position of law.
27. Consequently, this Court holds that the present criminal appeal
preferred for quashing/setting aside the order dated 15th September,
2025 passed by the Special Judge (S.C./S.T. Act), Deoria in Special
Trial No. 132 of 2023 (Badami Devi Vs. Rajan Chaurasia & Others)
under Sections 427, 504, 506 I.P.C. and Sections 3 (1) (da) and 3 (1)
(dha) of S.C./S.T. Act, Police Station-Khukhundu, District-Deoria,
whereby the charges have been framed against the appellants, is not
maintainable and is liable dismissed, as the impugned order is an
interlocutory order and against an interlocutory order, the criminal
appeal under Section 14-A (1) of S.C./S.T. Act shall not lie, as has
been opined by this Court herein above.
28. Accordingly, the present criminal appeal being not maintainable is
dismissed.


May 14, 2026
Sushil/-
(Madan Pal Singh,J.)
Digitally signed by :-
SUSHIL KUMAR SINGH
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad