SMT. GOWRAMMA, vs STATE OF KARNATAKA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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Reserved on : 25.09.2026
Pronounced on : 04.11.2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 04 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 7300 OF 2026
BETWEEN:
1. SMT. GOWRAMMA,
W/O LATE MUNINARAYANAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 81 YEARS,
RESIDING AT
KHAJISONNENAHALLI VILLAGE,
BIDARAHALLI HOBLI,
BENGALURU EAST TALUK,
BENGALURU – 560 067.
2. SRI M.HARISH,
S/O LATE MUNINARAYANAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS,
RESIDING AT
KHAJISONNENAHALLI VILLAGE,
BIDARAHALLI HOBLI,
BENGALURU EAST TALUK,
BENGALURU – 560 067.
3.
SRI M. NATARAJA,
S/O LATE MUNINARAYANAPPA
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS,
RESIDING AT
Digitally signed by
PADMAVATHI B K
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka
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KHAJISONNENAHALLI VILLAGE,
BIDARAHALLI HOBLI,
BENGALURU EAST TALUK,
BENGALURU – 560 067.
4.
SMT. MANJULA,
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
RESIDING AT
KHAJISONNENAHALLI VILLAGE,
BIDARAHALLI HOBLI, BENGALURU EAST TALUK,
BENGALURU – 560 067.
…PETITIONERS
(BY SMT.LAKSHMY IYENGAR, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
SRI ABHINAY S., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY KADUGODI POLICE STATION,
REPRESENTED BY
THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KARNTAKA,
BENGALURU – 560 001.
2. SRI DODDAGIRIYAPPACHARI,
S/O LATE GIRIYAPPACHARI,
AGED ABOUT 82 YEARS,
RESIDING AT
KHAJISONNENAHALLI VILLAGE,
KADUGODI, BENGALURU CITY,
KARNATAKA – 560 067.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT.DEEPTHI ALVA, HCGP FOR R-1;
SRI SOMASHEKARA K.M., ADVOCATE FOR R-2)
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THIS CRL.P FILED U/S 482 CR.P.C (U/S 528 BNSS) PRAYING
TO ALLOW THIS CRL.P AND QUASH THE FIR IN CR.NO.209/2026
DATED 11.05.2025 REGISTERED BY KADUGODI P.S., BENGALURU
CITY, PENDING BEFORE THE ACJM, BANGALORE RURAL
DISTRICT, FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 329(3), 352, 351(2),
351(3) AND 190 OF BNS, 2023, INSOFAR AS THE PETITIONERS
ARE CONCERNED.
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 25.09.2026, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE
FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
Petitioners - accused Nos.2, 3, 4 and 5 are before the Court
calling in question registration of a crime in Crime No.209/2026
for the offences punishable under Sections 329(3), 351(2),
351(3), 352 and 190 of the BNS, now pending before the
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru Rural District.
2. Heard Smt. Lakshmy Iyengar, learned senior counsel for
the petitioners, Smt. Deepthi Alva, learned High Court
Government Pleader for respondent No.1 and Sri Somashekara
K.M., learned counsel for respondent No.2.
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3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows:
It would suffice if the narration commences from the
execution of a sale deed dated 21.04.2006 concerning 1 acre 36
guntas in Survey No.143 through a General Power of Attorney.
This sale deed becomes the subject matter of a writ petition
preferred by respondent No.2 before this Court in
W.P.No.14207/2025, from which the dispute between the
petitioners and respondent No.2 springs. A coordinate Bench of
this Court dismisses the writ petition in terms of the order dated
26.09.2025. Against the said order, the complainant prefers a writ
appeal in W.A.No.1657/2025, and an order of maintenance of
status quo is granted on 03.10.2025 by a Division Bench of this
Court. The writ appeal then comes to be dismissed for non-
compliance with the office objections . An application seeking recall
of the order of dismissal and restoration is filed by the
complainant, and the appeal is restored to file in terms of the
order dated 27.11.2025, but no fresh interim order is granted . In
the interregnum, the subject crime comes to be registered for the
offences punishable under Sections 329(3), 351(2), 351(3), 352
and 190 of the BNS. It is the registration of the crime that has
driven the petitioners to this Court in the subject petition.
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4. Smt. Lakshmy Iyengar, learned senior counsel appearing
for the petitioners, would vehemently contend that there are no
ingredients of the offences alleged against the petitioners, as the
entire fulcrum of the lis concerns the property or its boundaries
mentioned in the aforesaid sale deed of the year 2006. It is a
dispute between rival claimants to the land. The learned senior
counsel would submit that the criminal justice machinery should
not be permitted to be used against the petitioners, as it is a
property dispute or a dispute concerning the boundaries of the
property, which is purely civil in nature.
5. Per contra, Per contra, Sri Somashekhara K.M., learned
counsel appearing for respondent No.2, would vehemently refute
the submissions, contending that the dispute may seem to be civil
in nature but the possession of the property at the hands of
respondent No.2 is disturbed by the petitioners, and this
disturbance amounts to trespass. Therefore, the offence under
Section 329(3) of the BNS, which was Section 447 of the IPC, the
earlier regime, is alleged. Learned counsel submits that the crime
is registered for the very reason and the investigation must be
permitted to continue in the least. It is always open for the
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petitioners to knock at the doors of the appropriate fora in the
event the final report is filed and goes against the petitioners.
6. Smt. Deepthi Alva, learned High Court Government
Pleader appearing for respondent No.1 – State, would also toe the
lines of the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 –
complainant, contending that the crime is registered and must be
investigated into. Insofar as the facts that have led to registration
of the crime are concerned, the learned High Court Government
Pleader would not dispute that there is a lurking dispute between
the petitioners and respondent No.2 concerning the property or its
boundaries.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel for the parties and have
perused the material on record.
8. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. A little history
to the dispute is required to be noticed before proceeding to
consider the issue in the lis.
8.1. A land in Survey No.143 of Khajisonnenahalli Village,
Bidarahalli Hobli, Bengaluru East Taluk, measuring 6 acres 15
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guntas, is said to have been granted in the name of one T.
Poojappa on 02.04.1947. After the said grant, the son of the
original grantee initiates proceedings under Section 5 of the
Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of
Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (for short ‘the PTCL Act’),
and by an order dated 15.05.1998, the Assistant Commissioner
allows the application and orders resumption and restoration of
possession of the land to an extent of 3 acres 26 guntas out of 6
acres 15 guntas. The order is said to have been confirmed by the
Deputy Commissioner in terms of the order dated 07.02.2000.
Aggrieved by the said orders, one Smt. Basamma and her
daughters prefer a writ petition in W.P.No.31871/2000 before this
Court. The writ petition is said to have been dismissed, thereby
upholding the orders passed by the authorities, and subsequently
the land comes to be restored at the hands of the legal heirs of
the original grantee.
8.2. One Muninarayanappa and his family members, the
legal heirs of the original grantee, execute a General Power of
Attorney on 19.04.2006 in favour of one B.M. Ramesh, authorizing
him to alienate 1 acre 36 guntas of land in Survey No.143.
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Respondent No.2 purchases the land to an extent of 1 acre 36
guntas by a sale deed executed by the General Power of Attorney
holder on 21.04.2006. It transpires that thereafter the mutation is
effected in the name of respondent No.2 in M.C.No.69/2005-06.
On 20.08.2015, Muninarayanappa and the family members
execute a release deed in favour of respondent No.2, ratifying the
sale deed executed by the General Power of Attorney holder. It is
said that respondent No.2 is in possession of the said property.
After about eighteen years from the date of the sale, one M.
Harisha, one of the sons of Muninarayanappa, initiates
proceedings under Section 5 of the PTCL Act before the Assistant
Commissioner seeking resumption and restoration of possession
of the land that was the subject matter of the earlier proceedings.
By an order dated 27.08.2024, the Assistant Commissioner allows
the application and declares the sale deed executed on
21.04.2006 as null and void. The order of the Assistant
Commissioner comes to be challenged before the Special Deputy
Commissioner, who confirms the order and dismisses the appeal.
This becomes the subject matter of W.P.No.14207/2025.
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9. An interim order is said to have been initially granted,
directing the parties to maintain status quo . Subsequently, the
coordinate Bench of this Court, by an order dated 26.09.2025,
dismisses W.P.No.14207/2025 in the following terms:
“5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that
the sale could not have been annulled when admittedly prior
sanction was granted by the State Government, in terms of
Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act. Secondly, delay of more than
18 years was not explained and having regard to the law
declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi Vs. State of Karnataka And
Another (2020) 14 SCC 232 and Sri Vivek M Hinduja
And Others Vs. M.Ashwatha And Others (2020) 14 SCC
228 , although no period of limitation is prescribed in the Act
for filing a petition, nevertheless, the petition has to be filed
within reasonable period.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would also
place reliance on a recent decision of a Co-ordinate bench of
this Court in the case of Smt. Rudramma and others Vs.
State of Karnataka and others, in W.P.No.29559/2018
dated 09.04.2025, where it is held that the provision
contained in Section 4 of the Act are attracted only when the
granted lands have been transferred for the first time in
contravention of the terms of the grant and it does not
contemplate to govern the transfer made after the lands have
been resumed and restored to the grantee under the Act. It
is held that the intent of law is thus manifestly clear, that it is
designed to undo a wrong by declaring the alienation void
and restore the land to the grantee so that he can utilize the
land for the purpose that it is granted. While framing the
question, “Whether these provisions could be invoked for a
second time after the lands have been resumed and restored
to the grantee?”, the Co-ordinate bench held that the
provisions of the PTCL Act were not meant to grant a licence
to grantees to sell the lands that were resumed in their
favour and once again seek restoration. It was held that a
grantee cannot abuse a remedial statute to perpetuate an
illegality and, at the same time, secure a process which
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legitimizes his illegal act repeatedly. The Co-ordinate bench
also noticed a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the
case of Bhadre Gowda Vs. Deputy Commissioner -
(2012) 2 KCCR 1529 , where it was held, “we are satisfied
that repeated sales at the hands of the original grantee
constitutes the offence of cheating under Section 420 of the
Penal Code, 1860. A person who cheats is definitely not
entitled to seek restoration of the granted land and retain the
consideration received by him by sale thereof………….. It also
needs to be recorded here, that when a grantee repeatedly
sells the granted land, it is open to the vendee to initiate
criminal prosecution against him. Such repeated sale is
nothing but a process of cheating.” Thus, the Co-ordinate
Bench has proceeded to hold that on a plain reading of
Section 4, it cannot be in doubt that an alienation made in
contravention of the terms of the grant or under a transfer in
violation of Section 4(2) would be null and void. However, it
was also held that Section 4 only contemplated that a
transfer made for the first time alone was required to be
annulled and it did not contemplate subsequent alienations
made by a grantee after the lands were restored in his
favour.
7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further
submitted that after the impugned orders are passed by the
Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner,
respondent No.4 has entered into an agreement with
respondent No.3, agreeing to sell the lands in question. This
shows that respondents No.3 and 4, in collusion with each
other are trying to defraud the petitioner and are defrauding
the Government, while misusing the provisions of the
beneficial legislation. Respondent No.4 has further entered
into an agreement with another Multinational Company,
trying to make a windfall at the cost of the petitioner. It is
submitted that the conduct of respondents No.3 and 4 should
be taken into consideration, as held in the case of Bhadre
Gowda (supra).
8. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel Sri.Gurudas
S.Kannur, appearing for respondent No.4 submitted that the
petitioner, knowing fully well that sanction has been accorded
by the State Government on 15.11.2005, at Annexure-H
permitting Sri Muninarayanappa S/o T.Poojappa to sell the
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property in question in favour of respondent No.3-
Sri.B.M.Ramesh on certain conditions that the purchaser
should be eligible to purchase the land under the provisions
of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act; that the applicant should
sell the lands as per the prevailing market value; that the
applicant shall purchase agricultural lands from the sale
proceeds received from the transaction, nevertheless, the
petitioner proceeded to purchase the property from
respondent No.3. It is submitted that the petitioner cannot
make allegations against respondent No.4, since the
petitioner willfully purchased the lands from respondent No.3
who was not the owner of the property and he was not the
person who was permitted to sell the property. Moreover, the
permission granted by the State Government enabled sale by
respondent No.4 in favour respondent No.3 only. The
conduct of the petitioner should fall under a scanner and not
the conduct of respondent No.4.
9. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that since
respondent No.4 did not sell the property in favour of the
petitioner herein, the cause of action to invoke the provisions
of the PTCL Act did not commence from the date of the sale
deed or the registration of the same. The cause of action, at
the most, may begin to run from the date of execution of the
Deed of Confirmation dated 20.08.2015 and the second Deed
of Confirmation dated 24.08.2015. The application under
Section 5 was filed before the Assistant Commissioner on
08.02.2024, after delay of about 8 years and 05 months. It
is submitted that in the case of Satyan Vs. Deputy
Commissioner and others (2020) 14 SCC 210 the Apex
Court has held that a period of 8 years cannot be said to be
such, as to amount to such delay and laches as would make
the action void, considering that it is in respect of beneficial
legislation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
community.
10. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that this Court
in the case of A K Chikkaveerappa and Others Vs. The
Assistant Commissioner and Others reported in 2022 (3)
KCCR 2022 has held as follows:
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“8. As noticed in the beginning, this case
presents another bleak picture of the manner in which
the officials of the Revenue Department have been
ignoring the guidelines issued by the State Government
while considering an application seeking prior permission
of the State Government in terms of Section 4(2) of the
Act. This Court has been repeatedly bringing it to the
notice of the State Government that while considering an
application under Section 4(2) of the Act, persons
claiming to be holders of Powers of Attorney should not
be entertained by the State Government. The very
purpose for which provisions are made under the Act,
the Rules and the Circulars issued by the State
Government in the matter of considering of an
application under Section 4(2) of the Act is to ensure
that the persons belonging to the depressed classes are
not taken for a ride. This avowed objective of the
statute is keeping in mind the poverty, illiteracy and
innocence of such persons who have been granted with
lands so that they cultivate the lands and eke out a living
and stand shoulder to shoulder with other persons in the
Society. This Court has come across numerous such
instances where applications are made by third parties
claiming to be the holders of Powers of Attorney, while
the gullible grantees are kept in dark not only about the
restrictions placed in the statute in the matter of
transacting with such granted lands, but also provision
being made to ensure that proper market value is paid
by the purchasers to such grantees. It is in this regard
that certain conditions are imposed while granting prior
permission. One such conditions is that the grantee who
is disposing of the agricultural lands, shall purchase an
alternative agricultural land in order to maintain himself
and his family. Conditions are also imposed that the
prevailing market value shall be paid to the grantee. It
is in order to ensure that these conditions are fulfilled,
the authorities are required to find out from the original
grantee as to whether he intends to sell the property; to
whom he is selling the property and what is the sale
consideration. After ascertaining all these aspects, the
authorities are required to accord permission.
9. It is found that in many such instances,
persons claiming to be Powers of Attorney of the original
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grantee approach the State Government and the persons
manning the Department are not adhering to the
guidelines issued by the State Government. As seen in
the present case, a General Power of attorney is got
registered at the hands of the original grantee. In the
considered opinion of this Court, execution of a general
Power of Attorney granting powers to deal with the
property and sell the property is equally hit by the
provisions of the Act…”
(emphasis supplied)
And further, in paragraphs No.11 and 12 it was
held as follows:
“11. Going by the letter and spirit of the
provision, this Court does not hesitate to hold that if
such Powers of Attorney are permitted to be executed by
the grantees empowering the Attorney to deal with the
granted land, it will pave way to defraud gullible
grantees. The present case is one such example. A look
at the sale deed dated 13.04.2006 evidences the fact
that no sale consideration is passed on to the original
grantee and obviously the registered General Power of
Attorney dated 07.04.2005 is not coupled with interest.
The words ‘or enter into any other transaction’ used in
the provision would encompass Power of Attorney also.
The law prohibits the grantee from transferring and any
person from acquiring granted land, without the previous
permission of the Government. This Court has come
across several such instances where gullible grantees are
tricked into executing Powers of Attorney on the premise
that the Attorney will secure the permission from the
State Government.
12. In that view of the matter, it is trite to hold
that the Power of attorney registered by the original
th
grantee in favour of the 5 respondent is hit by the
provisions of the Act. Section 4(2) would definitely
apply even in a case of Power of attorney, since the
instrument seeks to grant power in favour of the
attorney to sell the property in favour of any other
person. In the considered opinion of this Court, such
execution of powers of attorney granting powers to
dispose of the property or to approach the State
Government seeking prior permission under Section 4(2)
of the Act, is also not permissible.”
(emphasis supplied)
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11. Consequently, it was held that when permission
was accorded by the State Government to Sri.A K
Chikkaveerappa to sell the lands in favour of
Sri.Munianjanappa, a sale deed could not have been executed
at the hands of the Power of Attorney holder in favour of
respondent No.4, contrary to permission accorded by the
State Government. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the
situation is exactly the same in the present case. This Court
held that under such circumstances, where a sale deed was
executed by a Power of Attorney holder being without
authority of law and in contravention of permission accorded
by the State Government, the same is required to be held as
null and void. It is submitted that the said judgment of this
Court in the case of A K Chikkaveerpappa has been
confirmed at the hands of the Hon’ble Division Bench in
W.A.No.1402/2021 dated 21.01.2025. The Hon’ble Division
Bench has held that the contentions raised by the appellants
therein that appellant No.1 had purchased the property for
due consideration and that he had acted on the permission
granted by the State Government cannot make a difference
to the factual situation as available in the instant case. It
was held that the permission clearly has to be specific with
regard to the person selling the property as also buying the
same. The transferee as well as the transferor have to be
specific in the order of permission. It was held that if such
permission is not granted, same would not be valid.
12. Learned Senior Counsel would also submit that the
sale deed dated 21.11.2005 under which Sri
Muninarayanappa purchased 2 Acres 27 Guntas of land in
Sy.No.29/3 of Sonnawadi village, Kasaba Hobli, Mulabagilu
Taluk, Kolar District, has nothing to do with the petitioner or
respondent No.3. The sale consideration in the said sale
deed is Rs.1,90,000/- and whereas the sale consideration in
the sale deed dated 21.04.2006 executed by respondent No.3
in favour of the petitioner herein is Rs.19,00,000/- and no
part of the sale consideration is given to respondent No.4 or
his family members. This clearly shows that the petitioner
herein, knowing fully well that permission is accorded by the
State Government to respondent No.4 to sell the property in
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favour of respondent No.3, the petitioner has ignored the
same and transacted with respondent No.3 and has paid no
part of the sale consideration to respondent No.4 or his
family members. Learned Senior Counsel therefore submits
that the petitioner cannot make allegations against
respondent No.4 or cast aspersions on respondent No.4.
13. Insofar as the judgment relied upon by the learned
Counsel petitioner in the case of Smt . Rudramma (supra),
learned Senior Counsel Sri.Gurudas S. Kannur, submitted
that a plain reading of the provisions contained in Section 5
of the PTCL Act, does not give any impression that the
provisions are attracted only in respect of one transaction or
that the provisions are not attracted in respect of a second
transaction or subsequent transactions. It is submitted that
Section 4 of the Act, does not prescribe that once granted
lands are resumed and restored in favour of the original
grantee or his/her legal heirs, there is no need to obtain
permission at the hands of the State Government. Learned
Senior Counsel submits that the said judgment is contrary to
the express provisions of the Act and the Rules.
14. Even otherwise, it is submitted that the petitioner
has proceeded to purchase the property on the strength of
the sanction accorded by the State Government. In that view
of the matter, learned Senior Counsel submits that the
petitioner is blowing hot and cold, if on the one hand, he is
contending that in terms of the judgment in the case of
Smt.Rudramma, there is no need for a grantee or his legal
heirs to obtain prior sanction of the Government for a
subsequent sale since the property has been resumed and
restored under the provisions of the PTCL Act in terms of the
previous proceedings and on the other hand, the petitioner is
contending that he has purchased the lands after obtaining
permission from the Government.
15. Heard learned Counsel Sri.Mohammed Akil, for the
petitioner, learned Counsel Sri.C.Shivashankar for respondent
No.3, learned Senior Counsel Sri.Gurudas S. Kannur for
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respondent No.4 and learned High Court Government Pleader
for respondents No.1 and 2 and perused the petition papers.
16. It remains undisputed that an application was filed
in the name of Sri.Muninarayanappa, on 15.11.2005 seeking
permission from the Government in terms of Section 4(2) of
the Act. Official Memorandum was issued on 07.12.2005
permitting Sri Muninarayanappa to sell the property in favour
of Sri B.M.Ramesh, respondent No.3 herein. However, a
General Power of Attorney dated 19.04.2006 is executed by
Sri Muninarayanappa, his wife Smt.Gowramma and their
children, minors represented by their father Sri
Muninarayanappa empowering the third respondent Sri
B.M.Ramesh to sell the property and receive sale
consideration on behalf of the executants therein. It is
noticeable that there is a mention of the Official
Memorandum dated 07.12.2005 stating that prior permission
has been obtained from the Government. No sale
consideration is shown to have been passed to the
executants. The General Power of Attorney is registered in
the office of the Sub-Registrar, K.R.Puram on 19.04.2006.
On 21.04.2006 the third respondent executes a sale deed in
favour of the petitioner herein on the strength of the
registered Power of Attorney. It is stated in the sale deed
that the entire sale consideration of Rs.19,00,000/- is paid by
the petitioner to the third respondent, by cash.
17. It is under similar such circumstances that this
Court held in the case of A.K.Chikkaveerappa (supra) that
this Court has come across numerous such instances where
applications are filed by third parties claiming to be holders of
Power of Attorney, seeking permission at the hands of the
Government, while the gullible grantees are kept in dark not
only about the restrictions placed in the statute in the matter
of transacting with such granted lands, but also provision
being made to ensure that proper market value is paid by the
purchasers to such grantees. In this case, although it is not
clear as to whether the third respondent got the permission
from the Government in the name of Sri Muninarayanappa,
however, it is clear that in violation of the terms of sanction
granted by the Government, the third respondent got a
General Power of Attorney executed in the place of a sale
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deed. No sale consideration is passed on to Sri
Muninarayanappa or his legal heirs.
18. However, learned Counsel for the petitioner sought
to place reliance on Sri A.K.Chikkaveerappa (supra) where
this Court having regard to the definition of the word
‘transfer’ in Section 3(1)(e) of the Act held that execution of
a General Power of Attorney granting powers to deal with the
property and sell the property would amount to transfer.
Even if that argument is accepted, nevertheless there is utter
violation of the conditions imposed in the sanction accorded
by the Government. One of the conditions imposed on the
purchaser viz., Sri B.M.Ramesh, respondent No.3 is that he
shall pay the market value to Sri Muninarayanappa. The
other condition is that out of the sale proceeds, Sri
Muninarayanappa is required to purchase another piece of
agricultural land, as an alternative for his livelihood.
19. Regarding the contention of the petitioner that
there is compliance of the conditions imposed in the
permission granted by the Government inasmuch as Sri
Muninarayanappa purchased alternative lands under sale
deed dated 21.11.2005, and having regard to the chronology
of events, where permission was granted by the Government
on 07.12.2005, it cannot be contended by the petitioner or
respondent No.3 that Sri Muninarayanappa purchased the
lands from out of the sale proceeds flowing from the sale
deed dated 21.04.2006 or that Sri Muninarayanappa,
purchased the lands from any advance amount paid by the
petitioner or respondent No.3. Neither the registered Power
of Attorney dated 19.04.2006 nor the registered sale deed
dated 21.04.2006 mention any such transaction or payment
made to Sri Muninarayanappa. Therefore, such a contention
raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that Sri
Muninarayanappa purchased the lands under sale deed dated
21.11.2005 from out of the sale proceeds of the lands in
question, cannot be accepted.
20. The third respondent and the petitioner herein
have violated the conditions imposed in the sanction accorded
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by the Government inasmuch as the third respondent not
purchasing the property from Sri Muninarayanappa. The
petitioner too is guilty of violating the express conditions
imposed by the Government. The learned Senior Counsel for
respondent No.4 is right, while pointing out to the decision of
the Hon’ble Division Bench in W.A.No.1402/2021, where it
was held as follows:
“9. In the above factual situation, we are of the
opinion that the contentions raised by the appellants that
appellant No.1 had purchased the property for due
consideration and that he had acted on the permission
granted by the State government cannot make a
difference to the factual situation as available in the
instant case.
10. There is a clear bar as to transfer and
acquisition of granted land without prior permission of
the State government. The prior permission clearly has
to be specific with regard to the person selling the
property as also buying the same. The transferee as well
as the transferor have to be specific in the order of
permission. If such permission is not granted, same
would not be valid.”
(emphasis supplied)
21. In the above analysis, this Court does not find any
infirmity in the impugned orders passed by the Assistant
Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy
Commissioner has placed reliance on the decision of this
Court in the case of A.K.Chikkaveerappa (supra) where it
was held that when permission was accorded by the State
Government to Sri A.K.Chikkaveerappa to sell the properties
in favour of Sri Munianjanappa, a sale deed could not have
been executed at the hands of the Power of Attorney holder
to a third party.
22. The learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.4 is
also right in his submission that since admittedly Sri
Muninarayanappa or his legal heirs did not execute the sale
deed in favour of respondent No.3 or the petitioner herein,
the cause of action for filing an application under Section 5 of
- 19 -
the PTCL Act, did not arise from the date of the sale deed. At
best, it can be said that the cause of action arose for
respondent No.4 to move the Assistant Commissioner when
he along with his family members executed the Deeds of
Confirmation i.e., on 20.08.2015 and/or 24.08.2015. It is
necessary to notice that Article 59 of the Limitation Act,
1963, prescribes three years for cancellation or setting aside
an instrument and the time from which period begins to run
is when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument
cancelled or set aside ‘first became known to him’.
23. The delay from the date of the Deeds of
Confirmation may be around 8 years 5 months or less than 8
years. The learned Senior Counsel is right while submitting
that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Satyan (supra)
has held that delay of 8 years is not so enormous, having
regard to the objective of the beneficial legislation. In fact,
the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the law of limitation
does not apply to the Act.
24. Nevertheless, since the learned Counsel for the
petitioner sought to place reliance on a decision rendered by
a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of
Smt.Rudramma (supra) to contend that if a grantee or his
legal heirs, on getting the lands resumed and restored in
their favour, once again choose to sell the lands that are
restored to them, then, they would not be entitled to invoke
the provisions of the PTCL Act, for the second time and seek
resumption and restoration, this Court is required to deal with
such contention. For that purpose, it would be relevant to
notice the provisions contained in Sections 4 and 5 of the
PTCL Act, which read as follows:
“4. Prohibition of transfer of granted lands .-
(1) Notwithstanding anything in any law, agreement,
contract or instrument, any transfer of granted land
made either before or after the commencement of this
Act, in contravention of the terms of the grant of such
land or the law providing for such grant, or sub-section
(2) shall be null and void and no right, title or interest in
- 20 -
such land shall be conveyed or be deemed ever to have
conveyed by such transfer.
(2) No person shall, after the commencement of
this Act, transfer or acquire by transfer any granted land
without the previous permission of the Government.
(3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2)
shall apply also to the sale of any land in execution of a
decree or order of a civil court or of any award or order
of any other authority.
(emphasis supplied)
5. Resumption and restitution of granted
lands.- (1) Where, on application by any interested
person or on information given in writing by any person
or suo-motu, and after such enquiry as he deems
necessary, the Assistant Commissioner is satisfied that
the transfer of any granted land is null and void under
sub-section (1) of section 4, he may,-
(a) by order take possession of such land after
evicting all persons in possession thereof in such manner
as may be prescribed:
Provided that no such order shall be made
except after giving the person affected a reasonable
opportunity of being heard;
(b) restore such land to the original grantee or
his legal heir. Where it is not reasonably practicable to
restore the land to such grantee or legal heir; such land
shall be deemed to have vested in the Government free
form all encumbrances. The Government may grant such
land to a person belonging to any of the Scheduled
Castes or Scheduled Tribes in accordance with the rules
relating to grant of land.
[(1A) After an enquiry referred to in sub-section
(1) the Assistant Commissioner may, if he is satisfied
that transfer of any granted land is not null and void
pass an order accordingly.]
(2) [Subject to the orders of the Deputy
Commissioner under section 5A, any order passed]
under [sub-section (1) and (1-A)] shall be final and shall
not be questioned in any court of law and no injunction
shall be granted by any court in respect of any
proceeding taken or about to be taken by the Assistant
- 21 -
Commissioner in pursuance of any power conferred by or
under this Act.
(3) For the purposes of this section, where any
granted land is in the possession of a person, other then
the original grantee or his legal heir, it shall be
presumed, until the contrary is proved, that such person
has acquired the land by a transfer which is null and void
under the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 4.
25. On a plain reading of the said provisions, this Court
finds no such restriction, that an application invoking the
provisions of the PTCL Act is prohibited if granted lands are
transferred after they are resumed and restored in favour of
the grantee or his legal heirs in an earlier round of litigation
under the provisions of the Act. A larger Bench of the Apex
Court, in the case of D.R.Venkatachalam and Others Vs.
Dy. Transport Commissioner and Others (1977) 2 SCC
273 held as follows:
“If we start from a theory as to what the real
purpose or need is or could be, the danger is that we
may be injecting a subjective notion or purpose of our
own into what is, after all, a legal question of
construction or interpretation, according to well
recognised principles, although it may be necessary, in
exceptional eases, to explain or fortify the interpretation
adopted in the light of so well understood and well
known a purpose or theory that we could take judicial
notice of it and refer to it. The exposition of the well
known purpose or theoretical foundation must, however,
generally, flow from and explain an interpretation
adopted, on the strength of legally acceptable and
accepted canons of construction, if we are to avoid the
danger of an a priori determination of the meaning of a
provision based on our own pre-conceived notions of an
ideological structure or scheme into which the provision
to be interpreted is somehow fitted. The path of judicial
certainty and predictability has to be paved with well
settled principles of construction and interpretation.”
(emphasis supplied )
26. In Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit And Others
Vs. State of Maharashtra And Others (2001) 4 SCC 534
the Apex Court has held that an Ordinance, if does not
infringe the constitutional safeguards, it cannot be examined
- 22 -
nor can the motive for such a promulgation be in question.
Courts cannot interfere with the legislative malice in passing
a statute. Interference is restrictive in nature and that too on
the constitutionality aspect and not beyond the same.
Legislative malice is beyond the pale of jurisdiction of the law
courts and since there is no constitutional invalidity nor the
same been contended before the Court, question of
interference does not arise. It was reiterated that,
“It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of
statute that the words of a statute must be understood
in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed
according to their grammatical meaning, unless such
construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is
something in the context or in the object of the statute
to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is that the
words of a statute must prima facie be given their
ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction
that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and
unambiguous, then the Courts are bound to give effect
to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. It is
said that the words themselves best declare the intention
of the law giver. The Courts have adhered to the
principle that efforts should be made to give meaning to
each and every word used by the legislature and it is not
a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in
a statute as being inapposite surpluses, if they can have
a proper application in circumstances conceivable within
the contemplation of the statute.”
(emphasis supplied)
27. In Sangeeta Singh Vs. Union of India and
Others (2005) 7 SCC 484 it was held as follows:
“Two principles of construction one relating to
casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the
statute as a whole appear to be well settled. Under the
first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the
Court except in the case of clear necessity and when
reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute
itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not
be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a
statute or section must be construed together and every
clause of a section should be construed with reference to
the context and other clauses thereof so that the
construction to be put on a particular provision makes a
consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be
- 23 -
more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads
to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could
not have been intended by the Legislature. A casus
omissus ought not to be created by interpretation, save
in some cases of strong necessity.”
(emphasis supplied)
28. In that view of the matter, this Court is unable to
agree with the opinion of the co-ordinate Bench. A plain
reading of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act, do not in any way
suggest that a grantee or his legal heirs are barred from
invoking the provisions of the Act alleging violation of the
conditions of grant or violation of Section 4(2) of the Act
which mandates prior permission of the Government for sale
of granted lands in favour of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled
Tribe persons, after the commencement of the Act i.e.,
01.01.1979. Such an opinion will also have a bearing on the
express provisions contained in Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act,
which mandates prior permission for sale.
29. For the reasons stated above, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the writ petition lacks merit. The writ
petition is accordingly dismissed .”
9.1. The afore-quoted order comes to be challenged before
the Division Bench in W.A.No.1657/2025. The Division Bench
directs the parties to maintain status quo on 03.10.2025. The
order reads as follows:
“Sri Mohammed Akhil, the learned counsel for the
petitioner, Sri Milind Dange, the learned Additional
Government Advocate for the first and the second
respondents, and Sri Vikram A. Huilgol, the learned Senior
Counsel for the fourth respondent, are heard on the grant of
ad interim order on perusal of the impugned order dated
26.09.2025.
Sri Vikram A. Huilgol submits that his instructions are
that the fourth respondent, who has the benefit of the
concluded proceedings including the orders of the writ Court,
- 24 -
cannot create third party interest without prior permission
under Section 4 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands)
Act, 1978 and that this respondent has not even made an
application for permission.
At this stage, Sri Mohammed Akhil submits that the
appellant has had the advantage of an order of status quo
which enjoins all the concerned not to change the nature of
the property, an assertion which is not contested.
This Court is of the prima facie view that the question
answered by the impugned order, in the light of another
order by a Co-ordinate Bench, will have to be examined for
an authoritative decision and until then, not only should
there be no third party interest in the subject property it
must also be preserved in its nature without any disturbance
in possession or use. Hence, interim order is granted
directing the parties to maintain status quo on the title and
nature/ use of the subject property as well.
There shall be emergent notice returnable by
30.10.2025 to the third respondent.”
9.2. The parties were thus directed to maintain status quo.
It transpires that, pursuant to the afore-quoted order, the
Assistant Commissioner passes an order of eviction, or a direction
to take possession of the property, in proceedings bearing
No.LRF(E)KS 87/1979-80. This is called in question before this
Court in another writ petition in W.P.No.18848/2025. A coordinate
Bench, by its order dated 26.02.2026, passes the following order:
“.... .... ....
8. In that view of the matter, the writ petition is
partly allowed. The impugned order passed by the Land
Tribunal is accordingly quashed and set aside. However, it
- 25 -
is clarified that the lands belonging to T.Pujappa and his
legal heirs including respondent No.7 to an extent of 6
acres 15 guntas in Survey No.143, shall not be disturbed,
having regard to the recent mutation order passed by the
revenue authorities. Nevertheless, a direction is hereby
issued to the revenue authorities namely the Deputy
Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District and the concerned
Assistant Director of Land Records to assign a separate
number to 2 acres of land in survey No.143, which is the
land which was purchased by Sri Akbar Basha and in whose
favour a sale deed was executed by the court. A separate
number shall be assigned to the said lands and the RTC
now standing in the name of the private respondents herein
in Survey No.143 to the extent of 6 acres 15 guntas is
hereby confirmed. The entire exercise of assigning a new
survey number to the lands belonging to Sri N.Krishna
Reddy and the petitioners herein shall be concluded as
expeditiously as possible and at any rate within a period of
two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this
order.”
9.3. An application is then filed for modification of the order.
The order on the application is as follows:
“ ORDER ON I.A.NO.1/2026
Though this matter was disposed of on 26.02.2026, an
application has been filed at the hands of respondent No.7 in
I.A.No.1/2026 seeking modification of the order.
2. Sri. Vikram A. Huilgol, learned Senior counsel
appearing for respondent No.7, submits that this Court has
recorded the fact that the contesting respondents are only
concerned with Sy.No.143, which is not the subject matter of
the application filed in Form No.7 filed at the hands of the
petitioners. It was clear to this Court that since the earlier
owner of the property which is claimed by the petitioners
had succeeded in a suit for specific performance and in
respect of property belonging to Smt. Venkatamma, the
petitioners cannot claim any part of the property belonging
to Sri T.Pujappa.
- 26 -
3. Having that in mind, while disposing of the writ
petition, this Court quashed and set aside the impugned
orders passed by the Land Tribunal. It was clarified that the
lands belonging to Sri T. Pujappa and his legal heirs,
including respondent No.7 to an extent of 6 acres 15 guntas
in Sy.No.143, should not be disturbed by the petitioners.
Further, directions were issued to the revenue authorities,
viz., the Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore Urban District and
the concerned Assistant Director of Land Records, to assign a
separate number to 2 acres of land in Sy.No.143, which is
the land which was purchased by Sri Akbar Basha, in terms
of a sale deed executed by the Court in respect of property
which was earlier belonged to Smt. Venkatamma. Directions
were issued to assign a separate number to the said lands
belonging to the petitioners.
4. In view of the directions issued by this Court, the
Tahsildar and the Survey Settlement Authorities i.e., the
Assistant Director of Land Records, surveyed the property in
question and found that Sy.No.143 had a total extent of 6
acres and 15 guntas only and not 12 acres, as was stated by
the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner. The
Tahsildar and the Assistant Director of Land Records
therefore found it difficult to implement the directions issued
by this Court, as 2 acres of land which belonged to the
petitioner in Sy.No.143 cannot be separately identified, since
the entire extent of 6 acres 15 guntas originally belonging to
Sri T. Pujappa now belongs to the private respondents
herein. Therefore, this application has been filed seeking
modification of the earlier order passed by this Court.
5. During the previous dates of hearing, this Court
called upon the Tahsildar and the ADLR to furnish certain
information, more particularly the total extent of land in old
Sy.No.100 and the further phodes/divisions and new survey
numbers assigned in the said old Sy.No.100. Information
was supplied by the revenue authorities. It was brought to
the notice of this Court that in Sy.No.143, the Survey
settlement records showed the name of the Sri T. Pujappa as
the kardadar to the entire extent of 6 acres 15 guntas. This
Court further directed the Tahsildar to place information
before this Court to say from whom Smt. Venkatamma
claimed properties and in which survey number. Today, the
learned Additional Government Advocate submits on
- 27 -
instructions that the claim of Smt. Venkatamma, was in old
Sy.No.129 and new Sy.Nos.129/2, 129/4, 137/1 and 137/2.
6. At this juncture, learned counsel for the petitioners
submits that in the sale deed executed by the Court in
favour of Sri Akbar Basha, as found at Annexure-P dated
19.09.1970, in the schedule, it is shown as 2 acres in
Sy.No.100, Re-survey No.143 and the western boundary is
that of Sri T. Pujappa.
7. Having regard to the material placed before this
Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the survey
settlement records clearly show that, from the beginning, the
name of Sri T. Pujappa has been entered in the karda in
respect of 6 acres and 15 guntas of land.
8. It is also clear that Smt. Venkatamma had
purchased lands and the survey settlement records indicate
that the previous owners were either Sri. R. Krishna Rao or
Sri. Venkataramanachari, both of whom had properties in
Sy.No.129. Therefore, any claim on behalf of Smt.
Venkatamma will arise only in Sy.No.129 and the four survey
numbers which have been noticed herein above, viz.,
Sy.Nos.129/2, 129/4, 137/1 and 137/2. At any rate, no
claim can arise from Smt. Venkatamma insofar as Sy.
No.143 is concerned. There appears to be some mistake in
the Sale Deed executed by the Court in favour of Sri Akbar
Basha in mentioning the Re-Survey number.
9. At this juncture, learned Counsel for the petitioners
submits that the petitioners have filed a suit in
O.S.No.1775/2025 on the file of the III Addl. Senior Civil
Judge, Bengaluru Rural District, seeking declaration and
permanent injunction against respondent No.7 and the
predecessors-in-title of the petitioners and therefore, the
learned Counsel submits that any observations made by this
Court in this writ petition will prejudice the interest of the
petitioner in the suit.
10. On hearing the learned Counsel for the petitioners,
learned Senior Counsel Sri Vikram Huilgol for respondent
No.7, learned Additional Government Advocate and on
perusing the material placed on record pursuant to
I.A.No.1/2026, this Court is of the considered opinion that
the directions earlier given by this Court to the Tahsildar and
the concerned ADLR was based on the submission made by
- 28 -
the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that
Sy.No.143 had a total extent of 12 acres of land. This
information is found to be incorrect.
11. The revenue records, survey settlement records
clearly indicate that the total extent of land in Sy.No.143 is
only 6 acres 15 guntas. It is also not disputed that the
entire extent of 6 acres 15 guntas in Sy.No.143, was the
subject matter of litigation in PTCL proceedings which has
ended in favour of respondent No.7 in W.P.Nos.12843/2025
and 14207/2025.
12. In that view of the matter, this Court would recall
the earlier directions issued to the Deputy Commissioner,
Bengaluru Urban District, and the concerned Assistant
Director of Land Records to assign a separate number to 2
acres of land in Sy.No.143 which was purchased by Sri Akbar
Basha. Liberty is hereby reserved to the petitioners to work
out their remedy before the Civil Court in the suit already
filed by the petitioners seeking declaration of title.
13. A further clarification is required insofar as
Sy.Nos.137/1 and 137/2 is concerned. Learned Senior
Counsel Sri Vikram Huilgol appearing for respondent No.7
submits while pointing out to paragraphs No.2 and 3 of the
order passed by this Court that since respondent No.7 had
no claims insofar as Sy.No.137/1 and 137/2 is concerned,
this Court has already recorded the submission that the
rejection of the application in Form No.7 filed by the
petitioner insofar as Sy.Nos.137/1 and 137/2 is concerned
was not called for.
14. Respondent No.7 has no claim insofar as
Sy.Nos.137/1 and 137/2 is concerned. To that extent the
order passed by the Land Tribunal regarding Sy.No.137/1
and 137/2 is hereby set aside. The concerned Tahsildar and
the Assistant Director of Land Records shall now identify the
entire extent of 6 acres 15 guntas in Sy.No.143 for the
benefit of respondent No.7 herein.
All contentions are left open before the Trial Court.
Accordingly, I.A.No.1/2026 stands disposed of.”
- 29 -
10. Pursuant to the order passed by the co-ordinate bench,
the Assistant Director of Land Records makes a communication
seeking to conduct Hadbast of the boundaries of the property. It
reads as follows:
10.1. Pursuant to the afore-quoted communication,
intimation is sent by the Tahsildhar to all the concerned
stakeholder with regard to the conduct of Hadbast, or fixing of
boundaries on 02.05.2026. The communication is as follows:
- 30 -
10.2. This was objected to and therefore, police protection
was sought by the petitioners, but was not granted. The
petitioners approached this Court seeking police protection in
another writ petition in W.P.No.15609/2026. The co-ordinate
- 31 -
Bench, in terms of the order dated 12.05.2026, grants police
protection to the petitioners. The order reads as follows:
“ORAL ORDER
Heard learned Senior counsel for the petitioners and
learned AGA for the respondents and perused the material on
record.
2. In addition to reiterating the various contentions
urged in the petition and referring to the material on record,
learned counsel for the petitioners invited my attention to the
earlier orders passed by this Court as well as the
representation submitted not only by the petitioner, but also
by the Tahsildar in order to point out that the respondents-
Police Authoriteis are not providing police protection in favour
of the petitioners in respect of the petition schedule property.
In support of his contentions, he placed reliance upon the
following order and interim orders passed by this Court:
In W.P.No.100509/2025
“ 1. Learned AGA is directed to accept notice for
respondents No.1 to 4.
2. The petitioner is before this Court seeking for
the following reliefs:
a. Issue a writ, order or direction, more in the
nature of writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate
writ, direction, or order directing the Respondents to
consider the representations dated 22.12.2024,
10.01.2025, 16.01.2025, 23.01.2025 and 24.01.2025
(Annexure-A-A4) issued by the
petitioner to the Respondents No. 2 & 3 to take
appropriate actions at such other locations situated at
the Project Area until completion of the Project by the
Petitioner and;
b. To pass any other order or directions as this
Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the facts and
circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice and
equity.
3. The grievance of the petitioner is that despite
several complaints having been submitted to respondent
No.2, no action has been taken by respondent No.2 to
provide police protection and/or to stop various
- 32 -
miscreants from interfering with the implementation of
the project by the petitioner.
4. The categorical submission of the petitioner is
that no one else apart from the petitioner has any right
title or interest over the subject lands and the owner of
the land has also not objected to the petitioner in
making use of the property.
5. If that be so, when complaints have been filed
making serious allegations, the respondent No.2 was
required to take the said complaints on record,
investigate the matter and proceed therefrom. Not
having done so, the complaints from 22.12.2024 have
remained unanswered without any action.
6. In that view of the matter, I pass the
following;
ORDER
i. The writ petition is allowed.
ii. A mandamus is issued, respondents are
directed to act on the complaints filed by the petitioner
at Annexure-A- same on record, registering necessary
First Information Report and proceeding therefrom.
iii. If the claim of the petitioner is correct, then
the respondent-police is directed to provide police
protection to implement the project without any
disturbance being caused by any third parties.
In W.P.No.13260/2024
“Heard learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner
and perused the material on record.
In addition to reiterating the various contentions
urged in the memorandum of petition and referring to
material on record, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner invited my attention to the representations at
Annexure – A to A5 submitted by the petitioner in order
to contend that despite repeated requests made by the
petitioner to provide police protection for the purpose of
carrying on construction activity of a Solar Power Plant in
the subject land, respondent – police authorities are not
taking any steps in this regard and as such, petitioner is
before this Court by way of this petition.
Learned AGA for the respondents seeks time to
obtain necessary instructions.
- 33 -
Re-list on 18.06.2024.
Meanwhile, by way of an interim arrangement
and without prejudice to the rights and contentions of
the parties, respondents are directed to provide
necessary police protection to the petitioner in relation to
the subject land as indicated in the photographs
produced at Annexure – H series, till the next date of
hearing.
Liberty is reserved in favour of the respondents
to seek modification / vacation of this order.
Hand delivery of this order is permitted.”
In W.P.NO.102206/2023
“Heard the learned Senior counsel Sri. Sandesh J
Chouta for petitioner. Reiterating the grounds urged in
the petition, the learned counsel would bring to the
notice of this Court that some anti-social elements are
unnecessarily causing hurdles and obstructing the
implementation of project. Referring to the material on
record, he would bring to the notice of this Court that
on account of disturbance at the site, the petitioner is
incurring loss to the tune of Rs.45 lakh per day. The
petitioner reasonably apprehends that if it continues,
they may not be able to complete the project within
stipulated time and they are bound to lose bank
guarantee on account of breach. He would further point
out that the petitioner is entitled seek protection and
sufficient materials are placed on record to demonstrate
that this is a fit case where the petitioner is entitled to
seek police protection under Section 46 of the
Karnataka Police Act.
On examining the materials, this Court would
find that the petitioner is implementing the projects
which are directly connected with the agency of Ministry
of Renewable Energy, Government of India, company
which intends to promote wind power generation in
India. Therefore, pending consideration of captioned
writ petition, I am of the view that the petitioner is
entitled for police protection at site till next date of
hearing.
Learned HCGP is directed to accept notice for
respondents.
Learned HCGP to seek instructions in this regard
by the next date of hearing.
- 34 -
List this matter for preliminary hearing on
13.04.2023.”
3. Learned AGA seeks time to obtain instructions.
4. List after Summer Vacation, 2026.
5. In the meanwhile, by way of an interim
arrangement and without prejudice to the rights and
contentions of the parties, respondents-Police Authorities are
directed to provide necessary police protection to the
petitioners in relation to the petition schedule property as
indicated in the photographs at Annexures-F series and also as
per the representations/complaints dated 02.05.2026 and
08.05.2026 (Annexures-G and H) and earlier orders passed by
this Court (supra), till the next date of hearing.
6. Liberty is reserved in favour of respondents to
seek vacation / modification of this order.
7. Hand delivery of this order is permitted.”
11. It is then, springs the complaint. The complaint reads as
follows:
“ರವ ೆ,
ೕ ಇ ೆಕ ,
ಾಡುೋ
ೕ ಾೆ
ೈ ೕ ! "#ಾಗ
%ೆಂಗಳ(ರು ನಗರ.
ಇಂದ,
,ೊಡ!-ಯ/ಾ0ಾ 1 2ೇ -ಯ/ಾ0ಾ.
ವಯಸು4 82 ವಷ8,
ಾಸ 9ಾ:ೊೆ;ನಹ=> ಾ?ಮ,
ಕನAಮಂಗಲ ಅಂ0ೆ,
%ೆಂಗಳ(ರು ಪEವ8 FಾಲೂGಕು,
- 35 -
%ೆಂಗಳ(ರು H%ೈ ನಂಬ 9739431465
QಾನRSೇ.
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9ಾ: ೊ^ೆ>ೕನಹ=> ಾ?ಮದ ಸ ೆ8 ನಂ.143 ರ
Gನ | ಎಕSೆ 36 ಗುಂkೆ ಜlೕನನುA
mVಾಂಕ:21-04-2006 ರಂದು ೆ.ಆ.ಪqರಂ ಉಪVೋಂದಾhಾ ಕsೇಯ
G
Vೋಂ,ಾtiರುವ ಶುದfಕ?ಯಪತ?ದ ಮೂಲಕ ಖೕmi ಜlೕUನ ಆ.w.i ಮತು\
ಮೂRkೇಷ ಗಳನುA ನನA bೆಸೆ ವಾ8tiೊಂಡು ಜlೕUನ ಸುತ\ಲೂ ದxಣ ಮತು\
ಪyzQಾ{ಮುಖ ಾ- ಕಲುG ಕಟಡದ ಾಂ/ೌಂ| ಮತು\ ಪEವ8 ಮತು\
ಉತ\Sಾ{ಮುಖ ಾ- 12 ಅ ಎತ\ರವqಳ> ಕಲುG ಚಪಗಳ ಾಂ/ೌಂ| ೋcೆಯನುA
Ul8iೊಂಡು ಾ~hೕVಾನುಭವದ
GರುFೆ\ೕVೆ.
ಈ ಜlೕUನ Qಾ
ೕಕತ~ದ "0ಾರ ಾ- 9ಾ: ೊೆ;ನಹ=> ಾ?ಮದ ಹೕ_ 1
ಮುUVಾSಾಯಣಪ ಮತು\ %ೊಮZನಬಂcೆ ಾ?ಮದ 1.ಎಂ.ರeೕ_ 1 2ೇ
ಮುU•ಾಮಪ ಎಂಬುವರ "ರುದf Vಾನು ಕVಾ8ಟಕ ಉಚz VಾR‚ಾಲಯದ
G ಅƒೕ
ನಂ.1657/2025ರ
G ,ಾ ೆ ಹೂದು…, ಸದ ,ಾ ೆಯ
G VಾR‚ಾಲಯವq ನlZಬ†ಗೂ
ಜlೕUನ #ೌXಕ i‡XಯನುA ಬದ2ಾtಸದಂFೆ, ನನA ಾ~hೕನೆ] ಅ!ಪಸದಂFೆ
ಯˆಾi‡XಯನುA ಾ/ಾಡುವಂFೆ mVಾಂಕ:03-10-2025 ರಂದು ಆ,ೇಶ Uೕದು… ಅದರಂFೆ
Vಾನು ಜlೕUನ ಾ~hೕVಾನುಭವದ
G ಮುಂದುವSೆmರುFೆ\ೕVೆ.
‰ೕ-ರು ಾೆŠ mVಾಂಕ:07-05-2026 ರಂದು %ೆ=ೆŠ ಸುQಾರು 6-00 ಗಂkೆಯ
G
eೕಲ]ಂಡ ನನA ಜlೕUೆ ‚ಾSೋ 10-20 ಜನ 2 ‹ೆ.i.1 Fೆೆದುೊಂಡು ಬಂದು
ಜlೕUನ ಸುತ\ಲೂ bಾŒದ… ಾಂ/ೌಂ| ೋcೆಯನುA ೆಡ" bಾಕುX\,ಾ…Sೆಂದು ನನA
ಪಚಯಸ‡ರ ಮು9ಾಂತರ ನನೆ X=ದು ಬಂದ eೕSೆೆ Vಾನು %ೆ=ೆŠ ಸುQಾರು 11-00
ಗಂkೆೆ ನನA ಜlೕUನ ಹX\ರ bೋ- Vೋಡ2ಾ- %ೊಮZನಬಂcೆ ಾ?ಮದ
:.ಎಂ.ರeೕ_ ಮತು\ 9ಾ: ೊೆ;ನಹ=> ಾ?ಮದ ಮುUVಾSಾಯಣಪನವರ ಪXA
ೌರಮZ, ಮಕ]^ಾದ ಹೕ_, ನಟSಾಜು ಮತು\ ಮಂಜು^ಾರವರು ಸುQಾರು 15 ಜನ
- 36 -
ಅಪ •ತ ವRŒ\ಗ^ೆ(ಂmೆ eೕಲ]ಂಡ ಜlೕUೆಎರಡು ‹ೆi1ಗ^ೆ(ಂmೆ ಬಂದು
ಜlೕUನ ಮುಖR,ಾ~ರೆ] ಅಳವiದ ಕ1†ಣದ ೇಟನುA ಮುದು ಅXಕ?ಮ ಾ- ಒಳ
ಪ? ೇyi ಜlೕUನ ಪEವ8 ಮತು\ ಉತ\ರ ಅ{ಮುಖ ಾ- bಾŒದ… 12 ಅ ಎತ\ರವqಳ>
ಕಲುG ಚಪಗಳ ಾಂ/ೌಂ| ೋcೆಯನುA Vೆಲಸಮೊ=i ‹ೆ.i.1 tಂದ ಸಮತಟು
QಾಡುX\ದು…, ಈ ಬೆŠ ೇಳಲು bೋದ ನನAನುA %ೊಮZನಬಂcೆ ಾ?ಮದ 1ಎ• ರ ೇ_
ರವರು ಮತು\ 2ೇ ಮುUVಾSಾಯಣಪನವರ ಪXA ೌರಮZ, ಮಕ]^ಾದ ಹೕ_,
ನಟSಾಜು ಮತು\ ಮಂಜು^ಾರವರು ತcೆದು U
Giದ…ಲG,ೇ ಅ ಾಚR ಶಬ…ಗ=ಂದ %ೈದು
Uೕನು ಇ
Gಂದ ‹ಾಗ 9ಾ
Qಾಡ,ೇ ಇದ…
G UನAನುA ‹ೆ.i.1 ೆಳೆ bಾŒ ಹೂತು
bಾಕುವq,ಾ- /ಾ?ಣ%ೆದೆ bಾŒರುFಾ\Sೆ.
ಆದ…ಂದ. QಾನR ಕVಾ8ಟಕ ಉಚz VಾR‚ಾಲಯmಂದ ಅƒೕ ನಂ.1657/2025
ರ
G ಯˆಾi‡XಯನುA ಾ/ಾಡುವಂFೆ ಆ,ೇಶ"ದ…ರೂ ಸಹ VಾR‚ಾಲಯದ ಆ,ೇಶವನುA
ಉಲGಂ•i ನನA ಜlೕUೆ bಾŒದ… ಕ1†ಣದ ೇಟನುA ಮುದು ಅXಕ?ಮ ಾ-
ಒಳಪ? ೇyi ಜlೕUನ ಸುತ\ಲೂ bಾŒದ… ಕಲುG ಚಪಗಳ ಾಂ/ೌಂ| ೋcೆಯನುA
Vಾಶೊ=i ನಷವನುAಂಟು Qಾರುವ bಾಗೂ ನನAನುA ತcೆದು ಅ ಾಚR ಶಬ…ಗ=ಂದ
%ೈದು /ಾ?ಣ%ೆದೆ bಾŒರುವ %ೊಮZನಬಂcೆ ಾ?ಮದ 1.ಎಂ.ರeೕ_ ಮತು\ 2ೇ
ಮುUVಾSಾಯಣಪನವರ ಪXA ೌರಮZ. ಮಕ]^ಾದ ಹೕ_, ನಟSಾಜು ಮತು\
ಮಂಜು^ಾರವರ "ರುದf ಸೂಕ\ ಾನೂನು ಕ?ಮ ೈೊಳ>%ೇಾ- ೋರುFೆ\ೕVೆ.
mVಾಂಕ: 11-05-2026
%ೆಂಗಳ(ರು ನಗರ. ತಮZ "•ಾ~i”
The allegations against the petitioners are for the offences
under Sections 329(3), 351(2), 351(3), 352 and 190 of the BNS,
which were Sections 447, 504, 506, 547 and 149 of the IPC, the
earlier regime. The said provisions read as follows:
“ 447. Punishment for criminal trespass .—
Whoever commits criminal trespass shall be punished with
- 37 -
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to
five hundred rupees, or with both.
504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke
breach of the peace .—Whoever intentionally insults,
and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or
knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause
him to break the public peace, or to commit any other
offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years, or
with fine, or with both.
.... .... ....
506. Punishment for criminal intimidation .—
Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or
with both;
if threat be to cause death or grievous hurt,
etc .—and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt,
or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to
cause an offence punishable with death or
496
[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to seven years, or to impute
unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.
12.
As observed hereinabove, the dispute between the
petitioners and respondent No.2 is not of today. It has been
pending for ages. Orders have been passed in the writ petitions,
and the writ appeal is yet pending. There are orders and counter-
orders passed by the authorities and by this Court, and therefore
the person who is in possession is yet to be ascertained. The
possession itself is not clear. In those circumstances, and during
- 38 -
the pendency of those proceedings, the impugned crime comes to
be registered for criminal trespass. If the possession itself is
clouded, or the petitioners are in possession of the property in
terms of the survey that is said to have been conducted pursuant
to the order passed by the learned single Judge in
W.P.No.18848/2025, it can hardly be said that the petitioners
have trespassed into the property, which is said to belong to
them. Therefore, the offence under Section 329(3) of the BNS is
loosely laid against the petitioners.
13. Insofar as other offences are concerned - Sections
351(2), 351(2) and 352 of the BNS are concerned, it is apposite
to refer to the judgments of the Apex Court in several cases. The
Apex Court in the case of MOHD. WAJID v. STATE OF UTTAR
1
PRADESH , has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
28. An offence under Section 503 has the
following essentials:
(1) Threatening a person with any injury;
( i ) to his person, reputation or property; or
( ii ) to the person, or reputation of any one in
whom that person is interested.
(2) The threat must be with intent;
1
2023 SCC OnLine SC 951
- 39 -
( i ) to cause alarm to that person; or
( ii ) to cause that person to do any act which he
is not legally bound to do as the means of
avoiding the execution of such threat; or
( iii ) to cause that person to omit to do any act
which that person is legally entitled to do as
the means of avoiding the execution of such
threat.
29. Section 504 IPC contemplates intentionally
insulting a person and thereby provoking such person
insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a
person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted
may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public
peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may
not come within the purview of the section. But, the
words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an
intentional insult provoking the person insulted to
commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any
other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally
and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course
of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or
to commit an offence under the law, the case is not
taken away from the purview of the section merely
because the insulted person did not actually break the
peace or commit any offence having exercised self-
control or having been subjected to abject terror by the
offender.
30. In judging whether particular abusive
language is attracted by Section 504 IPC, the court has
to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would
be the effect of the abusive language used and not what
the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar
idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline.
It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive
language that is the test for considering whether the
abusive language is an intentional insult likely to
provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the
peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of
the complainant.
31. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or
insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult
within the meaning of Section 504 IPC if it does not
- 40 -
have the necessary element of being likely to incite the
person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an
offence and the other element of the accused intending
to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of
the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely
to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive
language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and
circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general
proposition that no one commits an offence under Section
504 IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the
complainant. In King Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai [ King
Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai , (1902) 4 Bom LR 78] , a
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court pointed out that:
“ To constitute an offence under Section
504 IPC it is sufficient if the insult is of a kind
calculated to cause the other party to lose his
temper and say or do something violent. Public
peace can be broken by angry words as well as
deeds .”
(emphasis supplied)
32. A bare perusal of Section 506 IPC makes it
clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation.
Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it
must be established that the accused had an intention
to cause alarm to the complainant.
33. In the facts and circumstances of the case and
more particularly, considering the nature of the allegations
levelled in the FIR, a prima facie case to constitute the offence
punishable under Section 506 IPC may probably could be said
to have been disclosed but not under Section 504 IPC. The
allegations with respect to the offence punishable under
Section 504 IPC can also be looked at from a different
perspective. In the FIR, all that the first informant has stated
is that abusive language was used by the accused persons.
What exactly was uttered in the form of abuses is not stated in
the FIR.
34. One of the essential elements, as discussed
above, constituting an offence under Section 504 IPC is
that there should have been an act or conduct
amounting to intentional insult. Where that act is the
use of the abusive words, it is necessary to know what
- 41 -
those words were in order to decide whether the use of
those words amounted to intentional insult. In the
absence of these words, it is not possible to decide
whether the ingredient of intentional insult is present. ”
13.1. Again, the Apex Court in the case of MAHMOOD ALI
2
v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH , has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
11. At this stage, we would like to observe
something important. Whenever an accused comes
before the Court invoking either the inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal
proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that
such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious
or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance, then in such circumstances the court owes a
duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more
closely.
12. We say so because once the complainant
decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior
motive for wreaking personal vengeance etc. then he
would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well
drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The
complainant would ensure that the averments made in
the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the
necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence.
Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to
look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint
alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence
are disclosed or not.
13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the
Court owes a duty to look into many other attending
circumstances emerging from the record of the case
2
2023 SCC OnLine SC 950
- 42 -
over and above the averments and, if need be, with due
care and circumspection try to read in between the
lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under
Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need
not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is
empowered to take into account the overall
circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of
the case as well as the materials collected in the course
of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand.
Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of
time. It is in the background of such circumstances the
registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance,
thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out
of private or personal grudge as alleged.
14. State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [ State
of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy , (2004) 6 SCC 522 :
2004 SCC (Cri) 1805] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court
elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can
assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine
distinction between consideration of materials that
were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such
evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to
prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for
quashing an FIR. The Court held : ( Golconda Linga Swamy
case [ State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy , (2004) 6 SCC
522 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805] , SCC p. 527, paras 5-7)
“ 5 . … Authority of the court exists for
advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to
abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the
court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an
abuse of the process of the court to allow any action
which would result in injustice and prevent promotion
of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be
justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the
process of court or quashing of these proceedings
would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no
offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may
examine the question of fact. When a complaint is
sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look
into the materials to assess what the
complainant has alleged and whether any
offence is made out even if the allegations are
accepted in toto .
- 43 -
6 . In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [ R.P.
Kapur v. State of Punjab , 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21
: AIR 1960 SC 866] , this Court summarised
some categories of cases where inherent power
can and should be exercised to quash the
proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC para 6)
( i ) where it manifestly appears that there
is a legal bar against the institution or
continuance e.g. want of sanction;
( ii ) where the allegations in the first
information report or complaint taken at its face
value and accepted in their entirety do not
constitute the offence alleged;
( iii ) where the allegations constitute an
offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced
or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly
fails to prove the charge .
7 . In dealing with the last category, it is
important to bear in mind the distinction
between a case where there is no legal evidence
or where there is evidence which is clearly
inconsistent with the accusations made, and a
case where there is legal evidence which, on
appreciation, may or may not support the
accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would
not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether
the evidence in question is reliable or not or
whether on a reasonable appreciation of it
accusation would not be sustained. That is the
function of the trial Judge . Judicial process, no doubt
should not be an instrument of oppression, or,
needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and
judicious in exercising discretion and should take all
relevant facts and circumstances into consideration
before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument
in the hands of a private complainant to unleash
vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same
time the section is not an instrument handed over to
an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring
about its sudden death.”
(emphasis supplied)
15. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby
allowed. The impugned order [ Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P. ,
- 44 -
2022 SCC OnLine All 2568] passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad is hereby set aside. The criminal
proceedings arising from FIR No. 127 of 2022 dated 4-6-2022
registered at Police Station Mirzapur, Saharanpur, State of
U.P. are hereby quashed.”
The Apex Court holds that for offences under Sections
351(2) and 352 of the BNS, which were Sections 504 and 506 of
the IPC, the earlier regime, the ingredients as obtaining under
Section 351(1) of the BNS, which was Section 503 of the IPC must
be present. It is ostensibly absent in the case at hand when it is
looked into the complaint or the backdrop of the registration of
the complaint. The Apex Court also holds that this Court should
look into the backdrop of the registration of the complaint, the
antecedents or the circumstances to register the complaint. It
also holds that while examination of the complaint, the
genuineness of the allegations or it is registered for wreck
vengeance or whether the matter is purely civil in nature has to
be determined.
14. If what is observed hereinabove is considered on the
bedrock of the law elucidated by the Apex Court, qua the facts
obtaining in the case at hand, it becomes unmistakably clear that
the impugned crime is registered against the petitioners to get
- 45 -
over the afore-quoted proceedings pending between the parties .
Therefore, permitting further proceedings would run foul of the
judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of STATE OF
3
HARYANA v. BHAJAN LAL , wherein it is held as follows:
“…. …. ….
102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV
and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a
series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we have given the
following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein
such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of
the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if
3
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
- 46 -
any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose
a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations
made in the FIR or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of
any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the
Code or the concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fide
- 47 -
and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him
due to private and personal grudge.”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
In the light of the afore-quoted judgments and the facts
obtaining in the case at hand, it is clear that the offences are not
made out against the petitioners and the unmistakably inference
would be that permitting of investigation will become an abuse of
the process of the law. The petition deserves to succeed.
15. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
a. The criminal petition is allowed.
b. The impugned crime in Crime No.209/2026 pending
before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru
Rural District stands quashed.
c. It is made clear that the observations made in the course
of the order is only for the purpose of considering the
petition under Section 528 of the BNSS and shall not
- 48 -
influence or bind any proceedings pending before any
other fora .
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
NVJ