SRI MANSOOR ALI vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 04 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION No. 12586 OF 2024
BETWEEN:
SRI MANSOOR ALI,
S/O ABDUL AZEEZ,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
RESIDING AT M.S.PALYA VILLAGE,
S.KODIGE HALLI POST,
GUBBI TALUK,
TUMAKURU DISTRICT – 572 213.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI D.R RAVISHANKAR, SENIOR ADVOCATE A/W
SRI SANDEEP NAIKAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1 . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE
KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA
POLICE STATION, MANGALURU
REPRESENTED BY
SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
SPECIAL COUNSEL KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 560 001.
2 . SRI GIRIDHAR SHETTY,
S/O JAYARAM SHETTY,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
Digitally signed by
PADMAVATHI B K
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka
2
RESIDING AT SAGAR COURT,
KOTTARA CHOWKI,
MANGALURU – 575 006.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.B.PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R-1;
SRI ANANDARAMA K., ADVOCATE FOR R-2)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 528 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR IN CR.NO.03/2024
REGISTERED BY LOKAYUKTHA POLICE STATION, MANGALURU FOR
THE ALLEGED OFFENCE P/U/S 7(a) OF P.C. ACT AGAINST THE
PETITIONER PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE III ADDL. DIST. AND
SESSIONS JUDGE, DAKSHINA KANNADA AT MANGALORE
REGISTERED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1 POLICE STATION
AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS
DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner is before the Court calling in question the
registration of a crime in Crime No.3 of 2024 for the offence
punishable under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short).
3
2. Heard Sri D.R.Ravishankar , learned senior counsel
appearing for the petitioner, Sri B.B.Patil , learned counsel
appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri Anandarama K , learned
counsel appearing for respondent No.2.
3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:
nd
3.1. On 22-03-2024, the 2 respondent - complainant, who is
said to be the owner of Sagar Reality Promotion and is into the
business of real estate, registers a complainant. The complainant is
said to have purchased a land in Sy.No.57/p totally measuring an
extent of 10.8 acres from one Raziya Shekh and others. The
complainant and the earlier owners had generated a
correspondence for the allocation of Transferrable Development
Rights ('TDR') to extend the area for dumping solid waste. In terms
of the said proposal of development of an area for solid waste
management, the land comes to be registered in favour of
Mangalore Mahanagara Palike. Thereafter, the Commissioner,
Mangalore Mahanagara Palike is said to have transferred the file to
the office of the Mangalore Urban Development Authority (‘MUDA’)
4
and it is the averment that the planners of MUDA have put up the
file to the Commissioner, MUDA.
3.2. The Commissioner is alleged to have kept the file
pending with him. The complainant alleges that the Commissioner
was wanting some illegal gratification and, therefore, he did not
process the file. Since the complainant was not interested in giving
any illegal gratification, the complainant again visits the office of
MUDA at 10.00 a.m. on 22-03-2024, at which point in time, as per
the case of the complainant, the petitioner had demanded
` 25,00,000/-. Despite this, it appears that the complainant
arranges funds. The complainant registers a complaint before the
Lokayukta which becomes a crime in Crime No.3 of 2024 for the
afore-mentioned offence. The Lokayukta Police then lay a trap
along with the staff and panch witnesses and the complainant; they
go to the parking area of Mangala stadium in Mangaluru and
thereafter the complainant calls one Saleem, accused No.2 who was
said to be waiting near the parking area at Mangala stadium and
the complainant there handed over ` 25,00,000/- to accused No.2.
Accused No.2 was apprehended on the spot.
5
3.3. The petitioner/accused No.1 who at that time was at Zilla
Panchayat Office in a meeting hall was also taken into custody. The
seizure panchanama was drawn on the same day and the
investigation commenced. The petitioner is drawn as accused No.1
and is before this Court calling in question the said registration of
crime.
4. The learned senior counsel Sri D.R.Ravishankar
appearing for the petitioner, would vehemently contend that the
petitioner/accused No.1 has nothing to do with the allegations. He
has neither demanded nor accepted any money. If accused No.2
has accepted and placed the blame upon accused No.1, it cannot
become an offence under Section 7(a) of the Act, which requires
both demand and acceptance to be proved. He would seek to place
reliance upon a plethora of judgments of the Apex Court to buttress
his submissions.
st
5. Per contra , the learned counsel appearing for the 1
respondent/Lokayukta Sri B.B.Patil , would contend that accused
No.2 has accepted the gratification in furtherance of the directions
6
of the petitioner/accused No.1, which is indicated by the voluntary
statement of accused No.2, as is found in the trap mahazar.
Learned counsel would further submit that Explanation-2 to Section
7 of the Act clearly indicates that it would be immaterial whether
such person being a public servant obtains or accepts or attempts
to obtain an undue advantage directly or through a third party;
therefore, it is for the petitioner to come clean in a full-blown trial.
The entire edifice of the objections of the Lokayukta is based on this
explanation to Section 7.
nd
6. Learned counsel for the 2 respondent/complainant Sri
Anandarama K , would toe the lines of the learned counsel for the
st
1 respondent/Lokayukta in submitting that though accused No.2
has accepted the gratification and not accused No.1, it is only in
furtherance of the directions of accused No.1.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.
7
8. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The entire
issue gets triggered from registration of the complaint. The
complaint reads as follows:
,
“ ಂದ
.
ೕ ಧ ೆ
: 55
ಾಯ ವಷ
:
ತಂ ೆ ಜಯ ಾ ೆ
: ,
ಾಸ ಾಗ ೋ! ೊ"ಾರ $ೌ&
.
ಮಂಗಳ)ರು +ಾಲೂಕು
: 9448480819
. ನಂ
,
0ೆ
,
12ೕ3 ಉ ಾ5ೕ6ಕರು
,
ಕ7ಾ ಟಕ 9ೋ ಾಯುಕ:
.
ಮಂಗಳ)ರು
,
;ಾನ< ೇ
: . . ,
=ಷಯ > ಆ @ೕಡಲು ಲಂಚದ ಹಣ ೆE Fೇ> ೆಯನುG ಸ2HIರುವ ಬ0ೆK
,
7ಾನು ಾಗ Lಾ2 ಪ .ೕಶO ಎಂಬ Qೆಸ ನ ಸಂ ೆRಯ ;ಾಲಕ7ಾ ದುS ಯT
.
ಎ ೇ! ಮತು: UಲV ವ<ವQಾರವನುG ನWೆಸುX: ೆSೕ7ೆ
57/ 10.8
7ಾನು ಮಂಗಳ)ರು +ಾಲೂಕು ಕುಡುಪY 0ಾ ಮದ ಸ ೇ ನಂ Z ರ2Hನ ಒಟು ಎ ೆ
.
ಜ\ೕನನುG ರ]ೕLಾ ೇ^ ಮX:ತರರು ಎಂಬವ ಂದ ಖ ೕ` ;ಾ>ರು+ೆ:ೕ7ೆ ಮಂಗಳ)ರು
ಮQಾನಗರ ಾ2 ೆಯ ಾ<Z:ಯ2H ಬರುವ ಪಚa7ಾ> ಮತು: ಕುಡುಪY 0ಾ ಮಗಳ ಸುತ:ಮುತ: ಪ ಸು:ತ
ಾಯ@ವbಸುX:ರುವ ಘನ+ಾ<ಜ< @ವ ಹdೆಯ ಘಟಕವನುG ಭ=ಷ<ದ2H =ಸ: ಸುವ ಬ0ೆK
. .
ಅವಶ< ಾ ರುವ ಜ\ೕನನುG > ಆ @ಯಮದ> ಖ ೕ` ;ಾಡುವ ಬ0ೆK ಮಂಗಳ)ರು ಮQಾನಗರ
.
ಾ2 ೆgಂ`0ೆ ನನ0ೆ Qಾಗೂ ಜ\ೕ@ನ ಈ bಂ`ನ ;ಾಲಕ 0ೆ ಪತ ವ<ವQಾರ ಾ ರುತ:ೆ
2024
ಅದರಂ+ೆ ಸ` ಜ\ೕನು ರ ಜನವ ಯ2H ಮಂಗಳ)ರು ಮQಾನಗರ ಾ2 ೆಯ Qೆಸ 0ೆ
. . .
7ೊಂದiLಾ ರುತ:ೆ ಬjಕ ಮQಾನಗರ ಾ2 ೆಯ ಆಯುಕ:ರು > ಆ @ೕಡಲು ಮುWಾ
, . .
ಆಯುಕ: 0ೆ kೆಬು ವ Xಂಗಳ2H ಕಳlbIದುS ಮುWಾ ಕmೇ ಯ Z Qಾಗೂ Zಎಂ ರವರು ಸ`
.
kೈT ಅನುG ಆಯುಕ: 0ೆ ಪY!! ಅo ;ಾ>ರು+ಾ: ೆ ಆದ ೆ ಮುWಾ ಆಯುಕ:ರು ಸ` kೈT ಅನುG
8
.
ೆಂ>ಂp ಇ ರು+ಾ:ೆ ಈ ಬ0ೆK 7ಾನು ಮುWಾ ಆಯುಕ: ಾದ ಮನೂr ಆ2ರವರ ಬj Qೋ
.
;ಾತ7ಾ> ಾಗ ಅವರು Qಾ0ೆ ;ಾಡಲು ಆಗುವY`ಲH ಏ7ಾದರೂ ೊಡFೇಕು ಎಂದು Qೇjರು+ಾ: ೆ
ನನ0ೆ ಲಂಚದ ಹಣ @ೕ> ೆಲಸ ;ಾ>ಸಲು ಇಷ ಇಲH ೇ ಇದುSದS ಂದ 7ಾನು
:21.03.2024
`7ಾಂಕ ರಂದು ಮಂಗಳ)ರು 9ೋ ಾಯುಕ: ಕ$ೇ 0ೆ ಬಂದು ಅ2Hನ ಓವ
ಅ5 ಾಯವರ2H =$ಾರ XjI ಾಗ ಅವರು ಕ$ೇ ಯ ಾur ೆ ಾಡ ಅನುG @ೕ> ಸ` ಾur
.
ೆ ಾಡ ಅನುG ಉಪgೕ ಸುವ ೕXಯನುG ನನ0ೆ XjIದರು 7ಾನು ಾur ೆ ಾಡ ಅನುG
,
ಪWೆದು ೊಂಡು ಮುWಾ ಕ$ೇ 0ೆ Qೋ ಾಗ ಅವರು ಅ2H ಇರ ೇ ಇದುS 7ಾನು ನನG .FೈT @ಂದ ಕ ೆ
. 9.30
;ಾ> ಾಗ ಅವರು 7ಾನು > I ಆvೕ3ನ2H \ೕ ಂpನ2H ಇ ೆSೕ7ೆ 7ಾwೆ Fೆj0ೆK 0ೆ ಬ@G ಎಂದು
. 10.00
XjIರು+ಾ: ೆ ಅದರಂ+ೆ 7ಾನು ಈ `ನ ಗಂ"ೆ0ೆ ಾur ೆ ಾಡ ಆO ;ಾ> ೊಂಡು
, ,
ಕmೇ 0ೆ Qೋ ಮನೂr ಆ2 ಆಯುಕ:ರು ಮಂಗಳ)ರು ನಗ ಾxೕವೃ`z ಾ5 ಾರ ಇವರ ಕ$ೇ 0ೆ
. 45
Qೋ ;ಾತ7ಾ> ಾಗ ಅವರು 7ಾನು ಖ ೕ`Iರುವ ಕುಡುZನ ಜ\ೕ@0ೆ >ಆ @ೕಡಲು ರೂ
,
ಲ6 ಲಂಚದ ಹಣ ೆE Fೇ> ೆಯನುG ಒಂದು Uj ೇಪ ನ2H ಬ ೆದು ನನ0ೆ +ೋ IದುS 7ಾನು
25
ಚ{ Iಾಗ “ಇಷು ;ಾ> ಮ+ೆ:ೕನು ;ಾಡುದು Fೇಡ” ಎಂದು Qೇಳl+ಾ: ಲ6 ಎಂದು ಬ ೆದು ಅದ ೆE
. 20 ,
ೌಂ} ;ಾ> ನನ0ೆ +ೋ Iದರು ಆಗ 7ಾನು ೆE ;ಾ> ಸ ಎಂದು Qೇj ಾಗ ಅವರು ಇಲH
, , ,
FೇWಾ ಇ`9ಾHಂ ೆ ;ಾಡ ಾಗ9ಾH ಎಂದು XjIದುS ಆಗ 7ಾನು ನನG ಬj ಈಗ ಹತು: ;ಾತ ಇ ೆ
Fೇ ೆ ವ<ವ ೆR ;ಾಡFೇಕು ಎಂದು Qೇj ೆನು ಆಗ ಅವರು 7ೋ> ಅದು ಎಂದು Qೇjದರು ಆಗ 7ಾನು
, .
Lಾ 0ೆ ೊಡFೇಕು ಎಂದು ೇjಾಗ ಮ+ೆ: ~ೕO ;ಾ> Qೇಳl+ೆ:ೕ7ೆ ಎಂಬು ಾ XjIರು+ಾ: ೆ ಈ
.
ಸಂ•ಾಷdೆಗಳl ಾur ೆ ಾಡ◌್ರನ2H ೆ ಾ} ಆ ರುತ:ೆ
7ಾನು ಸ` ಜ\ೕ@0ೆ Qಾ&ರುವ ಬಂಡ ಾಳವನುG 7ಾನು ಪWೆಯFೇ ಾ ರುವYದಂದ ನನ0ೆ
ಲಂಚದ ಹಣ @ೕ> ೆಲಸ ;ಾ>ಸಲು ಇಷ ಇಲH ೇ ಇದುSದS ಂದ 7ಾನು ನನG Fಾಬು ಇದS ಹಣ Qಾಗೂ
25,00,000/- .
ನನG ೆGೕbತಂದ ಹಣವನುG ಪWೆದು ಈ ನಗದನುG ಲಂಚ ಾ @ೕಡಲು ತಂ`ರು+ೆ:ೕ7ೆ
57/ 10
7ಾನು ಖ ೕ`Iರುವ ಕುಡುಪY 0ಾ ಮದ ಸ ೇ ನಂ Z ರ2Hನ ಒಟು ಎ ೆ ಜ\ೕ@0ೆ
. .
> ಆ @ೕಡಲು ರೂ ಇಪ‚+ೆƒದು ಲ6 ರೂ ಾ„ ಲಂಚದ ಹಣ ೆE Fೇ> ೆ ಇ ರುವ ಮಂಗಳ)ರು
ನಗ ಾxವೃ`z ಾ5 ಾರದ ಆಯುಕ: ಾದ ಮನೂr ಆ2ರವರ =ರುದS ಸೂಕ: ಕ ಮ ಜರು ಸುವ ಬ0ೆK ಈ
:22.03.2024
`ನ `7ಾಂಕ ರಂದು ಾur ೆ ಾಡ 7ೊಂ`0ೆ ಈ ದೂರು ಅ] ಯನುG
.
ಸ2HಸುX: ೆSೕ7ೆ
: .
ಸRಳ ಮಂಗಳ)ರು
:22.03.2024
`7ಾಂಕ
ತಮ… = ಾ†I
ಸb/-”
9
Who is caught accepting the bribe is not the petitioner, it is accused
No.2 who is trapped in a parking area of a place. It is accused
No.2’s statement that he has accepted money on the instructions of
accused No.1. Whether this can amount to an offence under Section
7(a) of the Act against accused No.1/petitioner is required to be
noticed. Section 7 of the Act reads as follows:
“ 7. Offence relating to public servant being
bribed .—Any public servant who,—
( a ) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain from any
person, an undue advantage, with the intention to
perform or cause performance of public duty
improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or cause
forbearance to perform such duty either by himself
or by another public servant; or
( b ) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain, an undue
advantage from any person as a reward for the improper
or dishonest performance of a public duty or for
forbearing to perform such duty either by himself or
another public servant; or
( c ) performs or induces another public servant to perform
improperly or dishonestly a public duty or to forbear
performance of such duty in anticipation of or in
consequence of accepting an undue advantage from any
person,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not
be less than three years but which may extend to seven years
and shall also be liable to fine.
10
Explanation 1 .—For the purpose of this section, the
obtaining, accepting, or the attempting to obtain an undue
advantage shall itself constitute an offence even if the
performance of a public duty by public servant, is not or has not
been improper.
Illustration .—A public servant, ‘S’ asks a person, ‘P’ to
give him an amount of five thousand rupees to process his
routine ration card application on time. ‘S’ is guilty of an offence
under this section.
Explanation 2 .—For the purpose of this section,—
( i ) the expressions “obtains” or “accepts” or “attempts to
obtain” shall cover cases where a person being a public
servant, obtains or “accepts” or attempts to obtain, any
undue advantage for himself or for another person, by
abusing his position as a public servant or by using his
personal influence over another public servant; or by any
other corrupt or illegal means;
( ii ) it shall be immaterial whether such person being a public
servant obtains or accepts, or attempts to obtain the
undue advantage directly or through a third party.”
9. It is trite law that for an offence to become punishable
under Section 7(a) of the Act, the basic ingredients necessary
would be demand and acceptance. If there is demand and no
acceptance, it would not become a crime, except in exceptional
circumstances. If there is acceptance and no demand, it would
become a triable issue, as it would require as to why the accused
accepted the alleged bribe if he has not demanded. But if there is
no demand and no acceptance, in the considered view of this Court,
11
no crime can spring. Jurisprudence is replete with judgments of the
Apex Court on both the issues as to when it would meet the
demand and acceptance and as to when it would not. I deem it
appropriate to notice them.
INTERPRETATION UNDER THE UN-AMENDED ACT:
9.1. The Apex Court in the case of B.JAYARAJ v. STATE OF
1
ANDHRA PRADESH interprets Section 7 of the Act and holds as
follows:
“…. …. ….
7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is
concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of
illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said
offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot
constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved
beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily
accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above
position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of
this Court. By way of illustration reference may be made to the
decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. [(2010) 15 SCC 1 :
(2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 89] and C.M. Girish
Babu v. CBI [(2009) 3 SCC 779: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1].”
9.2. The Apex Court later, in the case of N.VIJAYAKUMAR v.
2
STATE OF TAMILNADU has held as follows:
1
(2014) 13 SCC 55
2
(2021) 3 SCC 687
12
“…. …. ….
26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by
itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against
the accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of
this Court in C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish
Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1]
and in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P. [B. Jayaraj v. State of
A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] In the
aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering the
case under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to
prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be
bribe. Absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification and
mere possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient
to constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is also held
that even the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be
drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal
gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial
presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets
doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court.
27. The relevant paras 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment
in B. Jayaraj [B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC
55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] read as under: (SCC pp. 58-
59)
“7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is
concerned, it is a settled position in law that
demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to
constitute the said offence and mere recovery of
currency notes cannot constitute the offence
under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all
reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily
accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The
above position has been succinctly laid down in
several judgments of this Court. By way of
illustration, reference may be made to the decision
in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. [C.M.
Sharma v. State of A.P., (2010) 15 SCC 1 : (2013)
2 SCC (Cri) 89] and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [C.M.
Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2
SCC (Cri) 1] .
13
8. In the present case, the complainant did not
support the prosecution case insofar as demand by the
accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined
any other witness, present at the time when the money
was allegedly handed over to the accused by the
complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to
any demand made by the accused. When the
complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in
the initial complaint (Ext. P-11) before LW 9, and there
is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made
any demand, the evidence of PW 1 and the contents of
Ext. P-11 cannot be relied upon to come to the
conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the
demand allegedly made by the accused. We are,
therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial court as
well as the High Court was not correct in holding the
demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved.
The only other material available is the recovery of the
tainted currency notes from the possession of the
accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the
accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of
the currency notes from the accused without proof
of demand will not bring home the offence under
Section 7. The above also will be conclusive insofar as
the offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is
concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for
illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or
abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any
valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to
be established.
9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be
drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such
presumption can only be in respect of the offence under
Section 7 and not the offences under Sections
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on
proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that
presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act
that such gratification was received for doing or
forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of
illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of
demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the
primary facts on the basis of which the legal
presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly
absent.”
14
The abovesaid view taken by this Court fully supports the case
of the appellant. In view of the contradictions noticed by us
above in the depositions of key witnesses examined on behalf of
the prosecution, we are of the view that the demand for and
acceptance of bribe amount and cellphone by the appellant, is
not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Having regard to such
evidence on record the acquittal recorded by the trial court is a
“possible view” as such the judgment [State of T.N. v. N.
Vijayakumar, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 7098] of the High Court is
fit to be set aside. Before recording conviction under the
provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the courts have
to take utmost care in scanning the evidence. Once conviction is
recorded under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, it casts a social stigma on the person in the society apart
from serious consequences on the service rendered. At the
same time it is also to be noted that whether the view taken by
the trial court is a possible view or not, there cannot be any
definite proposition and each case has to be judged on its own
merits, having regard to evidence on record.”
9.3. The Apex Court in the case of K.SHANTHAMMA v.
3
STATE OF TELANGANA has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
10. We have given careful consideration to the
submissions. We have perused the depositions of the
prosecution witnesses. The offence under Section 7 of the PC
Act relating to public servants taking bribe requires a demand of
illegal gratification and the acceptance thereof. The proof of
demand of bribe by a public servant and its acceptance by
him is sine qua non for establishing the offence under
Section 7 of the PC Act.
11. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P. [P.
Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152 :
(2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 11] , this Court has summarised the well-
3
(2022) 4 SCC 574
15
settled law on the subject in para 23 which reads thus : (SCC p.
159)
“23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification,
thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7
and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and in absence
thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail.
Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of
illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof
of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to
bring home the charge under these two sections of the
Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove
the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and
mere recovery of the amount from the person accused
of the offence under Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not
entail his conviction thereunder.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. The prosecution's case is that the appellant had kept
pending the return of commercial tax filed by the said Society
for the year 1996-97. The appellant had issued a notice dated
14-2-2000 to the said Society calling upon the said Society to
produce the record. Accordingly, the necessary books were
produced by the said Society. The case made out by PW 1 is
that when he repeatedly visited the office of the appellant in
February 2020, the demand of Rs.3000 by way of illegal
gratification was made by the appellant for passing the
assessment order. However, PW 1, in his cross-examination,
accepted that the notice dated 26-2-2000 issued by the
appellant was received by the said Society on 15-3-2000 in
which it was mentioned that after verification of the books of
accounts of the said Society, exemption from payment of
commercial tax as claimed by the said Society was allowed. PW
1 accepted that it was stated in the said notice that there was
no necessity for the said Society to pay any commercial tax for
Assessment Year 1996-97.
13. According to the case of PW 1, on 23-3-2000, he
visited the appellant's office to request her to issue final
assessment order. According to his case, at that time, initially,
the appellant reiterated her demand of Rs 3000. But she scaled
it down to Rs 2000. Admittedly, on 15-3-2000, the said Society
was served with a notice informing the said Society that an
exemption has been granted from payment of commercial tax to
16
the said Society. Therefore, the said Society was not liable to
pay any tax for the year 1996-97. The issue of the final
assessment order was only a procedural formality. Therefore,
the prosecution's case about the demand of bribe made on 23-
3-2000 by the appellant appears to be highly doubtful.
14. PW 1 described how the trap was laid. In the pre-trap
mediator report, it has been recorded that LW 8, Shri R. Hari
Kishan, was to accompany PW 1 — complainant at the time of
offering the bribe. PW 7 Shri P.V.S.S.P. Raju deposed that PW 8
Shri U.V.S. Raju, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB, had
instructed LW 8 to accompany PW 1 — complainant inside the
chamber of the appellant. PW 8 has accepted this fact by stating
in the examination-in-chief that LW 8 was asked to accompany
PW 1 and observe what transpires between the appellant and
PW 1. PW 8, in his evidence, accepted that only PW 1 entered
the chamber of the appellant and LW 8 waited outside the
chamber. Even PW 7 admitted in the cross-examination that
when PW 1 entered the appellant's chamber, LW 8 remained
outside in the corridor. Thus, LW 8 was supposed to be an
independent witness accompanying PW 1. In breach of the
directions issued to him by PW 8, he did not accompany PW 1
inside the chamber of the appellant, and he waited outside the
chamber in the corridor. The prosecution offered no explanation
why LW 8 did not accompany PW 1 inside the chamber of the
appellant at the time of the trap.
15. Therefore, PW 1 is the only witness to the alleged
demand and acceptance. According to PW 1, firstly, the demand
was made of Rs.3000 by the appellant on 24-2-2000.
Thereafter, continuously for three days, she reiterated the
demand when he visited the appellant's office. Lastly, the
appellant made the demand on 29-2-2000 and 23-3-2000. On
this aspect, he was cross-examined in detail by the learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant. His version about
the demand and acceptance is relevant which reads thus:
“In the vicinity of office of AO the jeep, in which
we went there was stopped and I was asked to go into
the office of AO and the trap party took vantage
positions. Accordingly, I went inside the office of AO. I
wished AO. At that time apart from AO some other
person was found in the office room of AO and he was
17
talking to the AO. AO offered me a chair. After
discussion with the AO the said other person left the
room of AO. I informed AO that I brought the bribe
amount as demanded by her and also asked her to issue
the final assessment orders. Then I took the said tainted
currency notes from my shirt pocket and I was about to
give the same to the AO and on which instead of taking
the same amount directly by her with her hands she
took out a diary from her table drawer, opened the diary
and asked me to keep the said amount in the diary.
Accordingly, I kept the amount in the said diary. She
closed the said diary and again kept the same in her
table drawer and locked the drawer and kept the keys in
her hand bag which was hanging to her seat. She
pressed the calling bell and a lady attender came into
the room of AO, then she instructed the lady attender to
call ACTO concerned to her along with the society
records concerned.
Accordingly, ACTO came to AO along with record. After going
through the ledger and cash book, etc. AO signed on the last
page of the said ledger and cash book mentioning 26-2-2000
below her signature in the said register though she signed on
27-3-2000 in my presence. AO directed her attender to affix
official rubber stamp below her signature in the ledger and cash
book and accordingly attender affixed the same. AO also signed
on the office note of final assessment orders at that time.
Thereafter, I collected the general ledger and cash book from
the attender after affixing the said rubber stamp thereon and
came out of the office of AO and relayed the pre-arranged signal
to the trap party.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. Thus, PW 1 did not state that the appellant reiterated
her demand at the time of trap. His version is that on his own,
he told her that he had brought the amount. What is material is
the cross-examination on this aspect. In the cross-examination,
PW 1 accepted that his version regarding the demand made by
the appellant on various dates was an improvement. The
relevant part of the cross-examination of the appellant reads
thus:
“I did not state to ACB Inspector in Section 161
CrPC statement that on the evening of 24-2-2000 I met
18
the AO and that she demanded the bribe. I did not
mention in Ext. P-3 complaint that continuously for 3
days after 24-2-2000 I met the AO and the AO
reiterated her demand. I did not mention in Ext. P-3
complaint that on 29-2-2000 I approached the AO and
the AO demanded bribe of Rs 3000 and that unless I pay
the said bribe amount she will not issue final assessment
orders. I did not state in my Section 164 statement
before the Magistrate that 13-3-2000 to 16-3-2000 I
was on leave and from 1-3-2000 to 12-3-2000, I was
engaged in recovering the dues of the society. It is not
true to suggest that I did not meet the AO continuously
3 days i.e. on 25-2-2000, 26-2-2000 and 27-2-2000 and
that 27-2-2000 is Sunday. It is not true to suggest that
I did not meet the AO in the evening of 24-2-2000 and
that AO did not demand any money from me. I did not
state in my Section 161 CrPC statement to Inspector of
ACB that before I left the office of DSP on the date of
trap I made a phone call enquiring about the availability
of AO and the AO was in the office and informed me that
she should be available in the office from 6.00 to 7.00
p.m. on that day so also in my Section 164 CrPC. I
made such a phone call from the office of the DSP, ACB.
I do not remember as to from which phone number I
made phone call on that day. I cannot describe office
telephone number of the AO. It is not true to suggest
that I did not make any such phone call to AO and that
she did not give any such reply to me. I did not state to
ACB Inspector in my Section 161 CrPC statement or to
the Magistrate in my Section 164 CrPC statement that I
went inside the office of AO and I wished AO and at that
time apart from AO some other person was found in the
office room of AO and that he was talking to the AO and
that the AO offered me a chair and that after discussion
with the AO the said person left the room of AO and
then I informed the AO that I brought the bribe amount.
I did not state that said aspects to DSP during the post
trap proceedings also.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. Thus, the version of PW 1 in his examination-in-chief
about the demand made by the appellant from time to time is
an improvement. As stated earlier, LW 8 did not enter the
appellant's chamber at the time of trap. There is no other
evidence of the alleged demand. Thus, the evidence of PW 1
about the demand for bribe by the appellant is not at all
19
reliable. Hence, we conclude that the demand made by the
appellant has not been conclusively proved.
18. PW.2, Shri B.D.V. Ramakrishna had no personal
knowledge about the demand. However, he accepted that on
15-3-2000, the said Society received a communication
informing that the said Society need not pay any tax for the
year 1996-97. PW 3 Shri L. Madhusudhan was working as
Godown Incharge with the said Society. He stated that on 15-3-
2000, when he visited the appellant's office, ACTO served the
original notice dated 26-2-2000 in which it was mentioned that
the Society was not liable to pay any tax. It is his version that
when he met the appellant on the same day, she enquired
whether he had brought the demanded amount of Rs 3000.
However, PW 3 did not state that the appellant demanded the
said amount for granting any favour to the said society.
19. PW.4 Ahmed Moinuddin was ACTO at the relevant
time. He deposed that on 27-3-2000, the appellant instructed
him to prepare the final assessment order, which was kept
ready in the morning. He stated that he was called at 6 p.m. to
the chamber of the appellant along with books of the said
Society. At that time, PW 1 was sitting there. He stated that the
appellant subscribed her signature on a Register of the said
Society and put the date as 26-2-2000 below it. He was not a
witness to the alleged demand. However, in the cross-
examination, he admitted that the appellant had served a memo
dated 21-3-2000 to him alleging that he was careless in
performing his duties.”
The afore-quoted judgments were rendered interpreting Section 7
of the Act as it stood prior to amendment. The Apex Court holds
that demand and acceptance are sine qua non for an offence under
Section 7 of the Act.
20
INTERPRETATION POST AMENDMENT:
9.4. The Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court has further
interpreted Section 7(a) of the Act post its amendment, in the case
4
of NEERAJ DUTTA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) , and
has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
8. Before we analyze the evidence, we must note that we
are dealing with Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act as they stood
prior to the amendment made by the Act 16 of 2018 with effect
th
from 26 July 2018. We are referring to Sections 7 and 13 as
they stood on the date of commission of the offence. Section 7,
as existed at the relevant time, reads thus:
“ 7. Public servant taking gratification other
than legal remuneration in respect of an official
act.—
Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public
servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or
attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for
any other person, any gratification whatever, other than
legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or
forbearing to do any official act or for showing or
forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official
functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for
rendering or attempting to render any service or
disservice to any person, with the Central Government
or any State Government or Parliament or the
Legislature of any State or with any local authority,
corporation or Government company referred to in
clause (c) of section 2, or with any public servant,
whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with
imprisonment which shall be not less than three years
but which may extend to seven years and shall also be
liable to fine.
4
2023 SCC OnLine SC 280
21
Explanations.-
(a) “Expecting to be a public servant”- If a person
not expecting to be in office obtains a
gratification by deceiving others into a belief that
he is about to be in office, and that he will then
serve them, he may be guilty of cheating, but he
is not guilty of the offence defined in this section.
(b) “Gratification”. The word “gratification” is not
restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to
gratifications estimable in money.
(c) “Legal remuneration”- The words “legal
remuneration” are not restricted to remuneration
which a public servant can lawfully demand, but
include all remuneration which he is permitted by
the Government or the organisation, which he
serves, to accept.
(d) “A motive or reward for doing”. A person who
receives a gratification as a motive or reward for
doing what he does not intend or is not in a
position to do, or has not done, comes within this
expression.
(e) Where a public servant induces a person
erroneously to believe that his influence with the
Government has obtained a title for that person
and thus induces that person to give the public
servant, money or any other gratification as a
reward for this service, the public servant has
committed an offence under this section.”
9. Section 13(1)(d), as existed at the relevant time,
reads thus:
“ 13. Criminal misconduct by a public
servant.—
(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of
criminal misconduct,-
(a) ………………………………
(b) ………………………………
(c) ………………………………
(d) if he,-
22
(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or
for any other person any valuable thing or
pecuniary advantage; or
(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant,
obtains for himself or for any other person any
valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or
(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains
for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage without any public interest; or
(e) ………………………………….”
10. The demand for gratification and the acceptance
thereof are sine qua non for the offence punishable under
Section 7 of the PC Act.
4
11. The Constitution Bench was called upon to decide
the question which we have quoted earlier. In paragraph 74, the
conclusions of the Constitution have been summarised, which
read thus:
“ 74. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion
is summarised as under:
(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification by a public servant as a fact in
issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in
order to establish the guilt of the accused
public servant under Sections 7 and
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(b) In order to bring home the guilt of the
accused, the prosecution has to first prove
the demand of illegal gratification and the
subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact.
This fact in issue can be proved either by
direct evidence which can be in the nature
of oral evidence or documentary evidence.
(c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof
of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification can also be proved by
23
circumstantial evidence in the absence of
direct oral and documentary evidence.
(d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by
the public servant, the following aspects have to
be borne in mind:
(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe
giver without there being any demand from the
public servant and the latter simply accepts the
offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is
a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the
Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior
demand by the public servant.
(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes
a demand and the bribe giver accepts the
demand and tenders the demanded gratification
which in turn is received by the public servant, it
is a case of obtainment . In the case of
obtainment, the prior demand for illegal
gratification emanates from the public servant.
This is an offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i) and
(ii) of the Act.
(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer
by the bribe giver and the demand by the
public servant respectively have to be
proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue.
In other words, mere acceptance or receipt
of an illegal gratification without anything
more would not make it an offence under
Section 7 or Section 13(1)(d), (i) and (ii)
respectively of the Act. Therefore, under
Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the
offence, there must be an offer which emanates
from the bribe giver which is accepted by the
public servant which would make it an
offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the
public servant when accepted by the bribe
giver and in turn there is a payment made
which is received by the public servant,
would be an offence of obtainment under
Section 13(1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act.
24
(e) The presumption of fact with regard to the
demand and acceptance or obtainment of an
illegal gratification may be made by a court
of law by way of an inference only when the
foundational facts have been proved by
relevant oral and documentary evidence and
not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the
material on record, the Court has the discretion
to raise a presumption of fact while considering
whether the fact of demand has been proved by
the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption
of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and
in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands.
(f) In the event the complainant turns ‘hostile’, or
has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence
during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be
proved by letting in the evidence of any other
witness who can again let in evidence, either
orally or by documentary evidence or the
prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial
evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it
result in an order of acquittal of the accused
public servant.
(g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is
concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue,
Section 20 mandates the court to raise a
presumption that the illegal gratification
was for the purpose of a motive or reward
as mentioned in the said Section. The said
presumption has to be raised by the court as a
legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of
course, the said presumption is also subject to
rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(h) We clarify that the presumption in law under
Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption
of fact referred to above in point
(e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while
the latter is discretionary in nature.”
(emphasis added)
25
12. The referred question was answered in paragraph 76
of the aforesaid judgment, which reads thus:
“76. Accordingly, the question referred for
consideration of this Constitution Bench is answered as
under:
In the absence of evidence of the complainant
(direct/primary, oral/ document-tary evidence), it is
permissible to draw an inferential deduction of
culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7
and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the
Act based on other evidence adduced by the
prosecution .”
(emphasis added)
13. Even the issue of presumption under Section 20 of
the PC Act has been answered by the Constitution Bench by
holding that only on proof of the facts in issue, Section 20
mandates the Court to raise a presumption that illegal
gratification was for the purpose of motive or reward as
mentioned in Section 7 (as it existed prior to the amendment of
2018). In fact, the Constitution Bench has approved two
decisions by the benches of three Hon'ble Judges in the cases
1 2
of B. Jayaraj and P. Satyanarayana Murthy . There is another
decision of a three Judges' bench in the case of N.
5
Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu , which follows the view
1 2
taken in the cases of B. Jayaraj and P. Satyanarayana Murthy .
1
In paragraph 9 of the decision in the case of B. Jayaraj , this
Court has dealt with the presumption under Section 20 of the PC
Act. In paragraph 9, this Court held thus:
“9. Insofar as the presumption permissible
to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is
concerned, such presumption can only be in
respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the
offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the
Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance
of illegal gratification that presumption can be
drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such
gratification was received for doing or forbearing
to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal
gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand.
As the same is lacking in the present case the primary
26
facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under
Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent.”
(emphasis added)
14. The presumption under Section 20 can be
invoked only when the two basic facts required to be
proved under Section 7, are proved. The said two basic
facts are ‘demand’ and ‘acceptance’ of gratification. The
presumption under Section 20 is that unless the contrary
is proved, the acceptance of gratification shall be
presumed to be for a motive or reward, as contemplated
by Section 7. It means that once the basic facts of the
demand of illegal gratification and acceptance thereof are
proved, unless the contrary are proved, the Court will
have to presume that the gratification was demanded and
accepted as a motive or reward as contemplated by
Section 7. However, this presumption is rebuttable. Even
on the basis of the preponderance of probability, the
accused can rebut the presumption.
5
15. In the case of N. Vijayakumar , another bench of
three Hon'ble Judges dealt with the issue of presumption under
Section 20 and the degree of proof required to establish the
offences punishable under Section 7 and clauses (i) and (ii)
Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of PC Act. In
paragraph 26, the bench held thus:
“ 26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery
by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution
against the accused. Reference can be made to the
judgments of this Court in C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [C.M.
Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC
(Cri) 1] and in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P. [B.
Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5
SCC (Cri) 543] In the aforesaid judgments of this
Court while considering the case under
Sections 7, 13(1) (d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to
prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily
accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of
proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere
possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient
to constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is
27
also held that even the presumption under Section 20 of
the Act can be drawn only after demand for and
acceptance of illegal gratification is proved. It is also
fairly well settled that initial presumption of innocence in
the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal
recorded by the trial court.”
(emphasis added)
16. the Thus, the demand for gratification and its
acceptance must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
th
17. Section 7, as existed prior to 26 July 2018,
was different from the present Section 7. The unamended
Section 7 which is applicable in the present case,
specifically refers to “any gratification”. The substituted
Section 7 does not use the word “gratification”, but it
uses a wider term “undue advantage”. When the
allegation is of demand of gratification and acceptance
thereof by the accused, it must be as a motive or reward
for doing or forbearing to do any official act. The fact that
the demand and acceptance of gratification were for
motive or reward as provided in Section 7 can be proved
by invoking the presumption under Section 20 provided
basic allegations of the demand and acceptance are
proved. In this case, we are also concerned with the
offence punishable under clauses (i) and (ii) Section
13(1)(d) which is punishable under Section 13(2) of the
PC Act. Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 13, which
existed on the statute book prior to the amendment of
th
26 July 2018, has been quoted earlier. On a plain
reading of clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d), it is
apparent that proof of acceptance of illegal gratification
will be necessary to prove the offences under clauses (i)
and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d). In view of what is laid down
by the Constitution Bench, in a given case, the demand
and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant
can be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence
of direct oral or documentary evidence. While answering
the referred question, the Constitution Bench has
observed that it is permissible to draw an inferential
deduction of culpability and/or guilt of the public servant
for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and
13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. The
28
conclusion is that in absence of direct evidence, the
demand and/or acceptance can always be proved by
other evidence such as circumstantial evidence.
18. The allegation of demand of gratification and
acceptance made by a public servant has to be
established beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision of
the Constitution Bench does not dilute this elementary
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Constitution Bench was dealing with the issue of the
modes by which the demand can be proved. The
Constitution Bench has laid down that the proof need not
be only by direct oral or documentary evidence, but it can
be by way of other evidence including circumstantial
evidence. When reliance is placed on circumstantial
evidence to prove the demand for gratification, the
prosecution must establish each and every circumstance
from which the prosecution wants the Court to draw a
conclusion of guilt. The facts so established must be
consistent with only one hypothesis that there was a
demand made for gratification by the accused. Therefore,
in this case, we will have to examine whether there is any
direct evidence of demand. If we come to a conclusion
that there is no direct evidence of demand, this Court will
have to consider whether there is any circumstantial
evidence to prove the demand .”
9.5. Subsequent to the judgment of the Constitutional Bench
of the Apex Court in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA supra , the Apex
5
Court in the case of SOUNDARAJAN v. STATE has held as
follows:
“…. …. ….
FINDING ON PROOF OF DEMAND:
5
2023 SCC OnLine SC 424
29
9. We have considered the submissions. It is well settled
that for establishing the commission of an offence punishable
under Section 7 of the PC Act, proof of demand of gratification
and acceptance of the gratification is a sine qua non. Moreover,
3
the Constitution Bench in the case of Neeraj Dutta has
reiterated that the presumption under Section 20 of the PC
Act can be invoked only on proof of facts in issue, namely, the
demand of gratification by the accused and the acceptance
thereof.
10. As stated earlier, complainant PW-2 has not
supported the prosecution. He has not said anything in his
examination-in-chief about the demand made by the appellant.
The public prosecutor cross-examined PW-2. The witness stated
that there was no demand of a bribe made by the appellant.
According to him, he filed a complaint as the return of the sale
deed was delayed. Though PW-2 accepted that he had filed the
complaint, in the cross-examination, he was not confronted with
the material portions of the complaint in which he had narrated
how the alleged demand was made. The public prosecutor ought
to have confronted the witness with his alleged prior statements
in the complaint and proved that part of the complaint through
the concerned police officer who had reduced the complaint into
writing. However, that was not done.
11. Now, we turn to the evidence of the shadow witness
(PW-3). In the examination-in-chief, he stated that the
appellant asked the PW-2 whether he had brought the amount.
PW-3 did not say that the appellant made a specific demand of
gratification in his presence to PW-2. To attract Section 7 of
the PC Act, the demand for gratification has to be proved by the
prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. The word used in
th
Section 7, as it existed before 26 July 2018, is ‘gratification’.
There has to be a demand for gratification. It is not a simple
demand for money, but it has to be a demand for gratification.
If the factum of demand of gratification and acceptance thereof
is proved, then the presumption under Section 20 can be
invoked, and the Court can presume that the demand must be
as a motive or reward for doing any official act. This
presumption can be rebutted by the accused.
12. There is no circumstantial evidence of demand
for gratification in this case. In the circumstances, the
30
offences punishable under Section 7 and Section 13(2)
read with Section 13(1)(d) have not been established.
Unless both demand and acceptance are established,
offence of obtaining pecuniary advantage by corrupt
means covered by clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d)
cannot be proved.”
The Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in the case of NEERAJ
DUTTA supra holds that the proof of demand and acceptance of
gratification is sine qua non for any allegation under Section 7 of
the Act, be it pre-amendment or post-amendment. This is
reiterated in SOUNDARAJAN supra .
10. On a coalesce of the judgments rendered by the Apex
Court, as quoted supra , the soul of Section 7(a) of the Act is
demand and acceptance. The unmistakable inference on the
interpretation, in the considered view of the Court, would be if there
is demand but no acceptance, it would not make an offence under
Section 7(a) of the Act. If there is acceptance but no demand, it
would then also make no offence under Section 7(a) of the Act. An
act alleged under Section 7(a) of the Act should have the
ingredients of demand and acceptance and it is for the performance
of a public duty or forbearance from performance. Therefore,
31
demand and acceptance should be for the purpose of performance
of some public duty. For such performance, there should be work
pending at the hands of the public servant against whom Section
7(a) of the Act is alleged.
11. The latest judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
BHARAT RAJ MEENA v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF
6
INVESTIGATION would steer clear the issue. The Apex Court
observes that acceptance of bribe amount by an intermediary would
not be of enough circumstance to drive home the offence
punishable under Section 7(a) of the Act. What is necessary is,
clear demand and acceptance. The Apex Court holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
44. Over the years, this Court has consistently held that
proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification
constitutes the gravamen of the offence and forms the
indispensable foundation upon which a conviction under the Act
must rest. The law in this regard is no longer res integra.
45. The jurisprudence governing offences under the
Prevention of Corruption Act has evolved on the fundamental
premise that criminality does not arise merely because money
changes hands. What the prosecution is required to
establish is that the public servant demanded, accepted
or obtained gratification other than legal remuneration as
a motive or reward for performing, forbearing or
6
2026 SCC OnLine SC 1904
32
facilitating an official act. Consequently, proof of demand
and acceptance occupies a position of central importance
in prosecutions under the Act.
8
46. In C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI , this Court held that
mere recovery of tainted currency notes is insufficient to
sustain a conviction unless the prosecution proves
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily
accepted the money knowing it to be illegal gratification.
The Court observed that recovery, divorced from proof of
demand and acceptance, cannot by itself establish the
commission of an offence under the Act.
47. The principle was reiterated and emphatically
9
restated in B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh . This Court
held that proof of demand is an indispensable essentiality
for establishing the offence and that in the absence of
proof of demand, possession and recovery of currency
notes from an accused would not establish the offence.
This Court further held that the statutory presumption
under Section 20 of the Act does not arise unless the
foundational facts giving rise to such presumption are
first established by the prosecution , as under:—
“ 8. In the present case, the complainant did not
support the prosecution case insofar as demand by the
accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined
any other witness, present at the time when the money
was allegedly handed over to the accused by the
complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to
any demand made by the accused. When the
complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in
the initial complaint (Ext. P-11) before LW 9, and there
is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made
any demand, the evidence of PW 1 and the contents of
Ext. P-11 cannot be relied upon to come to the
conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the
demand allegedly made by the accused. We are,
therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial court as
well as the High Court was not correct in holding the
demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved.
The only other material available is the recovery of the
tainted currency notes from the possession of the
accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the
accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of
33
the currency notes from the accused without proof
of demand will not bring home the offence under
Section 7. The above also will be conclusive insofar as
the offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is
concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for
illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or
abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any
valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to
be established.
9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to
be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned,
such presumption can only be in respect of the
offence under Section 7 and not the offences
under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In
any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of
illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn
under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was
received for doing or forbearing to do any official act.
Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only
if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the
present case the primary facts on the basis of which the
legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are
wholly absent. ”
We are aware that in the aforesaid case, the complainant
did not support the Prosecution, as in the present case, but the
legal principle remains that the foundational facts have to be
proved for attracting Section 20 of the Act.
48. A similar view was adopted in P. Satyanarayana
10
Murthy v. District Inspector of Police , wherein this
Court observed that proof of demand of illegal
gratification is sine qua non for constituting offences
under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act and that mere
acceptance or recovery of money without proof of
demand would not bring home the guilt of the accused.
49. The law was comprehensively examined by a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Neeraj Dutta v. State
11
(Government of NCT of Delhi) . After an exhaustive
survey of precedents, the Constitution Bench reaffirmed
that proof of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification remains the gravamen of offences under the
Prevention of Corruption Act. At the same time, the Court
34
clarified that proof of demand need not invariably be by
direct evidence and may, in an appropriate case, be
established through circumstantial evidence. The
Constitution Bench also clarified that the absence of the
complainant's testimony would not necessarily be fatal if
demand and acceptance can otherwise be proved through
reliable evidence and surrounding circumstances. The
Constitution Bench further explained that the presumption under
Section 20 of the Act is not intended to relieve the prosecution
of its primary burden. The presumption operates only after the
prosecution establishes the foundational facts necessary to show
that the accused accepted or obtained gratification other than
legal remuneration. Once such foundational facts are
established, the burden shifts to the accused to offer a
satisfactory explanation. However, where the prosecution itself
fails to establish the foundational facts, the presumption does
not arise.
50. Equally well settled are the principles governing
prosecutions where the alleged gratification is received
for another public servant. The law does not require that
the public servant must personally receive the money for
himself in every case. Acceptance for another person or
through another person by way of an intermediary acting
on behalf of the public servant may, in a given case,
satisfy the statutory requirement. In this regard, it is
apposite to note the legal proposition as set out in the
observations of this Court in State by Lokayuktha Police v. K.
12
Rangayya ,:
“ 22. Thus, such an offending act can be done
by “another public servant” also under the
personal influence of the concerned public
servant. What we, therefore, understand from the
reading of Section 7 (a) of the PC Act read with
Explanation 2, is that, it is not necessary that the
public servant who has been charged of the
offence under Section 7 of the PC Act has to obtain
the undue benefit for himself, but it also covers
cases where he does the offensive act for
obtaining undue advantages for “another person”,
and this act may be done by himself by abusing his
position, or may be executed through another
35
public servant by using his personal influence over
the other public servant.
Therefore, in the light of the above
provision, a public servant may not be directly a
recipient or the executor of the offensive act and
thus, may not be in the limelight and remain in the
background. Nevertheless, he can be instrumental
in ensuring obtaining, accepting or attempting to
obtain from another person the undue advantage
for “another person” by taking the help of
“another public servant”. Such public servant who
has been charged of offence under Section 7(a)
may be the main instrumentality, through whom
undue advantage is obtained and/or arranged
through other public servant….
23. …….
24. The High Court fell into a grave error in
characterizing the aforesaid conduct of the Respondent
No. 1 as insufficiently proximate to constitute a
‘demand’ within the meaning of Section 7 of the PC Act.
The High Court appears to have imported a
requirement of a direct, personal, and express
demand by the public servant himself by not
taking into consideration Explanation 2, a
standard not warranted by the broad statutory
language. The PC Act does not countenance any
such straitjacketed formulation limiting to acts of
demand and acceptance of bribe by the official
himself as explained by expansive provision of
Explanation 2. It can be for obtaining the undue
advantage “for another person” also. Further, an
attempt to obtain a bribe through subordinates
who are also public servants, is precisely the kind
of indirect corruption that the legislature, by
enacting Explanation 2 to Section 7, has sought to
bring within the fold of the statute.
25. The interpretation adopted by the High
Court, if permitted to stand, would limit the broad
scope of Section 7 read with Explanation 2, and
would create a pernicious loophole in the anti-
corruption law by permitting senior public officials
to orchestrate and direct the collection of illegal
gratification through their public servant
36
subordinates and park the benefits in the account
of the “another person” for whose benefit the
public servant intends, while maintaining personal
deniability. Such a construction would subvert the
manifest purpose and policy of the PC Act and
render the Explanation 2 redundant, and thus,
cannot be countenanced.”
(emphasis supplied)
51. However, before criminal liability can be
fastened upon the public servant, the prosecution must
establish by reliable evidence that the intermediary was
acting under the authority, direction or for the benefit of
the accused and that the demand itself was attributable
to the accused. Mere receipt of money by a third person
cannot automatically result in criminal liability being
imputed to a public servant.
…. …. ….
61. Incidentally in his deposition, he does not make any
reference of the appellant asking him to collect the money from
Nandakumar. From the above evidence of Nandakumar and
Anantha Narayanan the following aspects emerge that though
Nandakumar had requested Anantha Narayanan to be present
with him when he meets the appellant, though Anantha
Narayanan went with Nandakumar, he came out and
Nandakumar alone met the appellant for about 5-10 minutes.
What transpired between Nandakumar and the appellant for
about 10-15 minutes is not known though the only purpose of
meeting the appellant was to give money. Further ,
Nandakumar had gone along with money to the office of
the appellant but the appellant apparently did not accept
the money from Nandakumar even though it was offered
to him in the office where no one else was present. It is
quite surprising that even though the appellant had
himself allegedly demanded bribe from Nandakumar, but
when it was offered to him directly where no one else
was present, the appellant did not take it and instead
asked Nandakumar to give it to Anantha Narayanan. At
the same time, when the appellant allegedly demanded
money from Nandakumar, he was not told at that time
that the money was to be given through Anantha
37
Narayanan. It is also to be noted that when Nandakumar
talked to Anantha Narayanan, Anantha Narayan asked
Nandakumar to give the money directly to the appellant.
Thus, the statements of Nandakumar and Anantha
Narayanan do not fall neatly together, but with variations
where these matter the most.
…. …. ….
63. If the prosecution wanted to show that it was the
strategy of the appellant that he would not directly accept
money himself in the office to leave any trail, but only through
the intermediary, Anantha Narayanan, it is inconsistent with the
statement of Anantha Narayanan who told Nandakumar that he
handover the money directly to the appellant. It is also notable
that the appellant never told Nandakumar earlier to give the
money to Anantha Narayanan.
There is nothing to suggest that the appellant was
apprehensive of a trap or had any reason to insulate
himself from the transaction, on the contrary, as per the
prosecution, the appellant made the demand himself
directly to Nandakumar. In these circumstances, it is not
comprehensible why a direct demand, made in person by
the appellant and offer made to him directly, should have
been redirected through an intermediary rather than
simply accept it.
As we shall see later, this behaviour of the appellant is not
consistent with his act in the other complaint case, where the
appellant asked the bribe giver Gopi Kumar to meet him at his
residence.
64. Another interesting aspect is that when the money
was given by Anantha Narayanan to the appellant, the appellant
explained to Anantha Narayanan that the money was given for
reducing the punishment of two ASI Kanakraj and Muthuswamy
in DAR Enquiry. Why should a superior officer give an
explanation with regards to the reasons for accepting bribe to a
constable working under him? Also, why did not the appellant
keep the money with himself when he took it from Anantha
38
Narayanan. This behaviour of the appellant is certainly quite
weird, if not unbelievable. This unusual behaviour attributed to
the appellant casts a serious doubt on the credibility of the
prosecution case.
65. Another feature of PW-2's account of this envelope
episode involving Rs. 10,000/- invites comment. The aforesaid
transaction was a matter which was the subject of separate
prosecution in C.C. No. 3 of 2014 and in which the appellant
was, in fact, acquitted on trial. That PW-2 was, at the very
moment of the trap, simultaneously holding monies attributed
to a wholly separate transaction, one that did not survive
scrutiny at trial, is a circumstance that bears on the reliability of
treating him as a mere conduit acting strictly on the appellant's
specific instructions in every instance, and lends some support
to the alternative hypothesis already noticed above, that PW-2
dealt with such amount with independence of his own, where
the appellant was not a party.
Interestingly enough, further, when PW-2 was caught
with other extra-money of Rs. 8,000/- and Rs. 5,000/- which he
claimed to be his personal money, the same were not seized by
the CBI. At the time of such seizure, PW-2 was an accused and
not yet an approver. This Court, thus finds it extremely queer
that the CBI would accept his plea of the said amount to be his
personal money at face value and returned the same to PW-2.
How did the CBI distinguish at that moment that it was not
tainted bribe money, but personal money of PW-2? The act of
the CBI thus becomes questionable.
…. …. ….
71. To hold the appellant guilty of obtainment or
acceptance for the purposes of Section 7 of the Act, this
Court would have to draw the further inference that the
appellant would, in fact, have received the money at his
residence had the trap not intervened, and that this was
his established modus operandi for consummating such
transactions. That inference is not compelled by the
record, it is, at best, one possible suggestion of what
might have happened next, competing on equal footing
with the equally available hypothesis that PW-2 claiming
39
to be close to the appellant having himself pocketed the
sums in these transactions and retained the money for
himself, or intended to deal with it in some other manner
not sanctioned or even unknown to the appellant.
Nothing in the record excludes that hypothesis. As held in
Neeraj Dutta (supra), an inference of guilt from
circumstances is permissible only where the
circumstances are “ incompatible with the innocence of
the accused or any other reasonable hypotheses ”, a
standard this record does not meet on the specific
question of acceptance/obtainment by the appellant.
72. The permission to draw an inferential deduction
where certain foundational facts are proved is not an
invitation to bridge, relying on circumstantial evidence,
whatever residual gap separates the “money collected by
an intermediary at the accused's apparent direction” from
“the accused himself obtained or accepted that money.”
As observed in Neeraj Dutta (supra), “obtain” requires
initiative and effort on the part of the recipient, and here,
on the specific question of final receipt, the appellant
took no further step of any kind apart from the alleged
demand made. On the contrary, he left the scene, and the
transaction was intercepted at the door of an alleged
intermediary before its final leg could occur, if it was ever
to occur as described.
73. Moreover, in R.P.S. Yadav (supra) the accused
was alleged to have directed the complainant to hand the
bribe money to a co-accused, acting as intermediary. This
Court found the evidence consistent only up to the
handing-over of money to the intermediary. Beyond that,
the key witness gave contradictory versions as to
whether the recovery was from the intermediary's own
pocket or the accused's, and no hand-wash test was
conducted on the accused himself to show the money had
actually reached him. Holding that neither witness
furnished acceptable evidence that ‘the demand,
acceptance and recovery was chronologically proved as
against the appellant’, this Court set aside the conviction.
The case thus shows that a demand and an initial
40
handover to an intermediary are not enough; the chain
must be carried through, by cogent evidence, to the point
where the money is shown to have actually reached or
been intended for the accused failing which the
conviction cannot stand. "
12. On the touchstone of the principles of law as elucidated
by the Apex Court, if the facts obtaining in the case at hand had a
rehash, the unmistakable inference is that the petitioner cannot be
permitted to be investigated, for reason that the petitioner had not
accepted any bribe. The evidence that is placed before the Court is
bleak to contend that the petitioner has demanded any amount and
it is an admitted fact that the petitioner has not accepted any
amount. There is no trap laid against the petitioner and no pre-trap
mahazar is drawn against the petitioner nor did the hands of the
petitioner turn pink in the phenolphthalein test. In fact all these
have happened qua accused No.2.
13. If accused No.2 is instrumental in receiving the amount
and is caught redhanded, it is understandable as to how the axe
would fall upon the petitioner. The submission of the learned
st
counsel for the 1 respondent is that these are triable issues;
therefore, the Court must not interfere at this stage. No doubt,
41
certain issues are undoubtedly triable, but for issues to become
triable, basic ingredients, as a foundation, must necessarily be
present. Any amount of deciphering the complaint and the
st
recording that is projected by the counsel for the 1 respondent
does not indicate that the petitioner has demanded and accepted
the amount. Admittedly, he has not demanded nor accepted any
amount. Therefore, permitting further investigation even in case at
hand would become an abuse of the process of law.
14. The Apex Court in BHARAT RAJ MEENA supra clearly
holds that if a third person accepts bribe on behalf of another
Government servant, it would not suffice for the prosecution to
draw the other accused as an accused in the crime. The Apex Court
holds that at least there must be some semblance of demand and
acceptance in any given case. The trap panchanama that is drawn
and the conversation that is produced along with the pre-trap
panchanama of 13 minutes and 1 second is that of accused No.2.
The trap is laid against accused No.2. Even in the trap panchanama
there is nothing against accused No.1/petitioner. If the petitioner
has to be pinned down on voluntary statement of accused No.2 that
42
he had accepted the amount of ` 25,00,000/- on behalf of accused
No.1/petitioner it would run completely counter to the law laid down
by the Apex Court.
15. Insofar as the judgment of the Apex Court relied on by
the learned counsel Sri B.B. Patil in the case of A.KARUNANITHI
v. STATE REPRESENTED BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE reported in
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1677 , it was a case where accused No.1 had
directly accepted ` 500/- on a demand. Both demand and
acceptance were completely proved in the said case. The said
judgment would not become applicable to the case at hand. Merely
because there is a fancy figure of ` 25,00,000/- involved in the case
at hand, the same would not mean that the petitioner can be held
guilty even prima facie , for alleged demand and acceptance. If it
were to be a case where the petitioner himself had demanded and
accepted it would have been a different circumstance, as it is not
the case at hand that there was neither demand nor acceptance by
the petitioner. The conversation of demand and acceptance are all
that of accused No.2. In that light, permitting further investigation
43
against the petitioner would run foul of the law laid down by the
Apex Court in the judgments quoted hereinabove.
16. In this regard, it becomes apposite to refer to the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF HARYANA v.
7
BHAJAN LAL , wherein it is held as follows:
“.... .... ....
102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the
principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions
relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article
226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power
could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may
not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid
formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases
wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at
their face value and accepted in their entirety do
not prima facie constitute any offence or make out
a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
7
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
44
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the
basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a
just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is
a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
45
17. In the light of the foregoing discussions, the following:
O R D E R
(i) Criminal Petition is allowed .
(ii) FIR in Crime No.3 of 2024 registered by the Lokayukta
Police and pending before the III Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Dakshina Kannada, Mangalore stands
quashed qua the petitioner.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
BKP
CT:BR