Digamber Kumar vs National Ins Co Ltd & Ors
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~4 to 7
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
th
% Date of decision: 08 July 2026
+ MAC.APP. 288/2018
DIGAMBER KUMAR .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Anshuman Bal, Advocate
versus
NATIONAL INS CO LTD & ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Manu Luv Shahalia, Adv. for
Insurance Company.
5
+ MAC.APP. 289/2018
SHASHI BEDI .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Anshuman Bal, Advocate
versus
NATIONAL INS CO LTD & ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Manu Luv Shahalia, Adv. for
Insurance Company.
6
+ MAC.APP. 290/2018
LAJWANTI & ORS .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Anshuman Bal, Advocate
versus
NATIONAL INS CO LTD & ORS .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Manu Luv Shahalia, Adv. for
Insurance Company.
Signature Not Verified
MAC.APP. 288/2018, 289/2018, 290/2018 & 197/2019 Page 1 of 22
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
Signing Date:24.07.2026
12:47:10
7
+ MAC.APP. 197/2019
LEKH RAJ .....Appellant
Through: Mr. S N Parashar & Mr. Ritik Singh,
Advocates
versus
BABLOO YADAV & ORS (NATIONAL INSURANCE CO LTD 0
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Manu Luv Shahalia, Adv. for
Insurance Company.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL
JUDGMENT
ANISH DAYAL, J (ORAL)
th
1. All these four appeals arise out of an accident which occurred on 11
October 2015 at about 04.30 a.m., when injured Digambar Kumar
(appellant in MAC.APP. 288/2018), injured Lekh Raj (appellant in
MAC.APP. 197/2019), Anil Bedi (deceased in MAC.APP. 289/2018) and
Ramesh Chand (deceased in MAC.APP. 290/2018) were sleeping on the
pavement under the Madipur Metro Station . A truck number HR-37B-4372
came from the side of Punjabi Bagh at high speed, driven by the driver,
respondent no. 2 and owned by respondent no.3, and hit all the said persons
who were sleeping there and thereafter hit the metro pillar.
2. The driver of the truck ran away from the spot, leaving behind the
truck. The PCR van took all the injured to SGM Hospital, Mangolpuri,
where two of the persons died due to fatal injuries received in the accident.
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Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
Signing Date:24.07.2026
12:47:10
3. Claim petitions were filed by the injured-claimants and the legal
representatives of the deceased, which were adjudicated by the MACT vide
th
a common award passed on 09 March 2017 in respect of injured
Digambar Kumar and the two fatal cases of Anil Bedi and Ramesh Chand,
th
whereas award dated 27 February 2018 was passed in case of injured Lekh
Raj .
4. Compensation of Rs. 30,005/- along with interest at 9% per annum
was awarded by MACT in case of injured, Digambar Kumar ; in case of
injured Lekh Raj a compensation of Rs. 9,05,285/- along with interest at 9%
per annum was awarded; as regards the deceased Anil Bedi , an amount of
Rs. 2,34,810/- along with interest at 9% per annum was awarded whereas in
case of Ramesh Chand , an amount of Rs. 5,79,452/- along with interest at
9% per annum was awarded.
5. The two injured persons were 41 years and 34 years of age,
respectively, on the date of the accident, and the deceased were 41 years
and 48 years of age, respectively. They were either working as labourers or
engaged in private employment.
6. Mr. Anshuman Bal, counsel, represents appellants in MAC.APP.
288/2018 , MAC.APP. 289/2018 , and MAC.APP. 290/2018, whereas Mr. S
N Parashar , counsel, represents appellant in MAC.APP. 197/2019 .
7. Mr. Parashar , at the outset, states that appellant-injured, Lekh Raj ,
nd
has since passed away on 22 April 2019, and his legal representatives will
pursue the appeal.
On the issue of contributory negligence
8. All these appeals have been filed challenging the finding of the
MACT with respect to assessment of contributory negligence at 50% .
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Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
Signing Date:24.07.2026
12:47:10
Issue of contributory negligence was addressed in the respective awards.
9. It is submitted that a plea was raised by the insurance company
before MACT, contending that there was contributory negligence on the
part of the injured/deceased as they were sleeping on the pavement under
the Metro station.
10. The MACT, considering it was an admitted situation that all of them
were sleeping on the pavements, observed that “ pavements on the roads are
not meant for sleeping and as such, to my mind, the insurance has been
able to prove that there was contributory negligence on the part of the
deceased person and the injured as well. ” On this account, 50%
contributory negligence was attributed to the claimants, and the
compensation was accordingly reduced.
11. Counsel for the appellants contends that the said observation and
conclusion had no bearing on the assessment of contributory negligence,
either on first principles or in law. The driver and the owner never
presented themselves for evidence or rebutted evidence presented, which
was led by the claimants. Therefore, there was no reason to hold that
contributory negligence had been proved in favour of the driver and owner
and, therefore, by derivation, the insurance company.
12. The Court is quite surprised to note the observation of the MACT in
this regard and the conclusion drawn of 50% contributory negligence. The
question which the MACT ought to have asked itself was whether the truck
driver had any authority or right to drive his truck over the pavement,
which is meant for pedestrians. The answer to that question would have
been obvious, and therefore, whatever activity is happening on the
pavement, whether people are sleeping, or hawkers are present, or people
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Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
Signing Date:24.07.2026
12:47:10
are walking, cannot come within the purview of contributory negligence.
13. The issue before us is whether the driver of the offending vehicle
could be party absolved of liability only because the deceased were
sleeping on the pavement. The follow-up question would be whether driver
of a car at all can access the pavement. Aside from simple common sense,
the following provisions are instructive, which categorically state that
pavements are not meant for access to cars.
14. Section 2(r) of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 , states that ‘street’ includes
any highway, bridge, way over a causeway, viaduct or arch or any road,
lane, footway, square, court, alley or passage accessible to the public,
whether or not it is a thoroughfare. Thus, a footway, a bridge etc. would be
covered under the expression 'street' under this statute. A pavement is used
as a passage by people on foot. Rule 39(3) of the Motor Vehicles (Driving)
Regulations, 2017 , provides that where a road is provided with a footpath
or cycle track, a driver shall not drive on such footpath or track except with
the permission of a police officer in uniform. Further, Rule 15 of the Rules
of The Road Regulations, 1989 , prohibits parking of motor vehicles on a
footpath, while Rule 8 mandates that drivers slow down on approaching
pedestrian crossings.
15. The Supreme Court in its judgement in Olga Tellis & Ors. v.
Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors . (1985) 3 SCC 545, has observed
that pavements or footpaths are public property and are meant for
pedestrians for passage, and they cannot be used for any private purpose.
The Court further noted that if the footpaths are used for any purpose other
than that it would constitute trespassing. Relevant paragraphs are extracted
as under:
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Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
Signing Date:24.07.2026
12:47:10
“ 43. In the first place, footpaths or pavements
are public properties which are intended to
serve the convenience of the general public.
They are not laid for private use and indeed,
their use for a private purpose frustrates the
very object for which they are carved out from
portions of public streets. The main reason for
laying out pavements is to ensure that the
pedestrians are able to go about their daily
affairs with a reasonable measure of safety and
security….. ”
(emphasis added)
16. Notably, the Supreme Court recently in the decision of Maniyar
Iliyaz @ Shaik Riyaz & Anr v. P. Ayyappan & Ors. 2026 INSC 647 has
expounded extensively on the rights of pedestrians and, in fact, elevated
the right to walk to a legal right. The Supreme Court observed that the right
to walk, including the right to safe and demarcated footpaths, is a
fundamental right flowing from Articles 19(1)(d) and 21 of the Constitution
of India. Relevant paragraphs are extracted from the discussion as under:
“13. Insofar as the right to walk on demarcated
footpaths is concerned, though it is integral to
Articles 21 and 19(1)(d), there is no legislation. It is
compelling to lay down a statutory framework not
only for declaring the right, but also to recognise the
duty bearers. The Act must protect, enhance, and
provide quick remedies for violations, and also
establish a full-time regulator to plan, enforce, and
implement this precious right. We direct the Registry
to send a copy of our judgment to the Ministries of
Housing and Urban Affairs, Rural Development,
Road Transport and Highways, to reflect on the
compelling necessity for initiating the necessary
legal framework. A copy may also be sent to the Law
Commission for examining the statutory framework
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By:MANISH KUMAR
Signing Date:24.07.2026
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for protecting the right, identifying the duty bearers
and provisioning remedies. Constitutional Courts
also have a duty to declare with clarity the existence
of this fundamental right and ensure that the existing
civil and the constitutional remedies are accessible
and effective.
14. We have clarified at the very outset that the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is not a legislation for
protecting the right to walk on the footpath. Its
predecessor, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, was
enacted with the primary concern of the State to
standardise commercial transport and to create a
revenue-generating system through registration,
licensing, and permits. Its successor the present
1988 Act, continues the same tradition of laying
down the entire infrastructure for licensing of
drivers of motor vehicles, licensing of conductors of
stage carriages, registration of motor vehicles,
control of transport vehicles, special provisions
relating to state transport undertakings,
construction, equipment and maintenance of motor
vehicles, control of traffic, insurance of motor
vehicles, claims tribunals and such other provisions.
The Motor Vehicles Act is built upon “vehicle” as
the subject of the legislation, while “human”
interests are incidental, which a motor vehicle must
avoid violating - that's all, and no further. In its
discourse, the right of a pedestrian is incidental; the
mainstay of this legislation is the Motor Vehicle. In
the year 2017, the Ministry of Road, Transport and
Highways notified i.e., on 23.06.2017, the Motor
Vehicles (Driving) Regulations, 2017, which defines
Road User to include a person driving or travelling
on the road in a vehicle or otherwise and a
pedestrian (Regulation 2(o)). Regulation 3
contemplates a duty of a vehicle towards road users
and general public. Regulation 5 imposes a duty on
drivers to take special care and precautions to
ensure safety of vulnerable road users such as
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Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
Signing Date:24.07.2026
12:47:10
pedestrians, cyclists, children etc. Regulation 9
speaks about precautions to be taken at intersections
where there is inter alia a pedestrian crossing. These
regulations are nothing more than guiding principles
for a motor vehicle driver, they neither recognise the
fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths
nor prioritise the right to footpath over a motorised
road. Unfortunately, as of today, even under the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Parliament has not put
in place a full time regulatory body for motor
transport. The Transport Authorities contemplated
under Chapter V are not regulatory bodies. This
Court has long been struggling to squeeze in
pedestrian rights in the nooks and crannies of the
Motor Vehicles Act and the attempt is still continuing
with monitoring the implementation of its directions
issued since 2012.
15. It is important to recognise that if the
fundamental right to walk on a demarcated footpath
is violated, a citizen is entitled to enforce
restitutionary remedy. This remedy is distinct from
that of the claim that a person may make under the
Motor Vehicles Act. The restitutionary remedy under
the Constitution or under Sections 38-40 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 for the enforcement of
public duties can be enforced against the Urban
Development Authorities, Municipal Corporations,
Municipalities, or the Panchayats.
*
20. Returning to the discussion and the articulation
of the right, the correlative duty and followed by the
constitutional statutory remedies, in conclusion, we
declare as under:
a. The right to walk is a fundamental right under
Part III of the Constitution. It is integral to the right
to movement guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d),
read with Article 19(1)(a), Article 19(1)(b), Article
19(1)(c) and Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
The fundamental right to walk will take within its
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Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
Signing Date:24.07.2026
12:47:10
sweep the right to demarcated footpaths. These
rights are primary and shall have priority over
movement by motorised vehicles.
b. The fundamental right to walk on demarcated
footpaths has a correlative duty. If the road exists,
there is a duty to ensure that there are demarcated
and well-maintained footpaths for walkers. The duty
bearers are the urban development authorities,
municipal corporations, municipalities and even
panchayats, who must endeavour to demarcate,
construct, maintain, and safeguard footpaths and
other necessary pedestrian infrastructure, as
walking is integral to life.
c. The violation of the right to walk on demarcated
footpaths will entitle the citizens to invoke
constitutional and legal remedies against duty
bearers for restitution and compensation. This
remedy is independent of the remedies that are
available under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.”
(emphasis added)
17. It is a reality in this country that many persons are homeless, work
through the night, or are part of labour deployed at various constructions
sites and do not have a place to sleep. For such persons, these pavements
also become a relatively safer place to rest, considering that they do not
expect vehicles to be driven onto the pavements and mow them down.
Even if they had taken a calculated risk sleeping on the pavement, it
certainly cannot be translated into contributory negligence.
18. In view of the statutory framework and the judgements of the
Supreme Court and High Court discussed above, it is evident that
pavements and footpaths are intended exclusively for the use of
pedestrians. The law does not permit their use for any other purpose,
whether by way of unauthorised encroachments, parking of vehicles, or
driving motor vehicles upon them. The very purpose of a pavement is to
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Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
Signing Date:24.07.2026
12:47:10
provide pedestrians with safe space to walk and be free from the dangers of
vehicular traffic.
19. Therefore, a pedestrian who is using a pavement, walking, standing,
or resting owing to compelling circumstances, cannot be expected to
anticipate that a motor vehicle would be driven onto the footpath. The very
purpose of the pavements or footpaths is for pedestrians or for any licensed
user, and not for motor vehicles to drive. Therefore, the entire
responsibility, in such circumstances, lies upon the driver who drove the
vehicle into a space reserved exclusively for pedestrians. Needless to say, a
driver ought to be more cautious while driving in an area meant for
pedestrians. Even if it is not being used for the purpose it is intended for,
still it certainly cannot be used for driving, which is completely prohibited
under the law.
20. C ontributory negligence, in tort law, contemplates a situation where
a person’s own negligence has materially contributed to the harm suffered,
thereby warranting apportionment of liability to the extent of such
negligence. The Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bombay v. Laxman Iyer , 2003 (8) SCC 731 , explained the term
‘negligence’, ‘composite negligence’ and ‘contributory negligence’. For
ease of reference, the relevant paragraph is extracted as under :
“ 6. The plea which was stressed strenuously related
to alleged contributory negligence. Though there is
no statutory definition, in common parlance
“negligence” is categorised as either composite or
contributory. It is first necessary to find out what is
a negligent act. Negligence is omission of duty
caused either by an omission to do something which
a reasonable man guided upon those considerations,
who ordinarily by reason of conduct of human
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Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
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affairs would do or be obligated to, or by doing
something which a prudent or reasonable man
would not do. Negligence does not always mean
absolute carelessness, but want of such a degree of
care as is required in particular circumstances.
Negligence is failure to observe, for the protection of
the interests of another person, the degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury. The idea of negligence and duty are strictly
correlative. Negligence means either subjectively a
careless state of mind, or objectively careless
conduct. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a
relative one; it is rather a comparative term. No
absolute standard can be fixed and no
mathematically exact formula can be laid down by
which negligence or lack of it can be infallibly
measured in a given case. What constitutes
negligence varies under different conditions and in
determining whether negligence exists in a
particular case, or whether a mere act or course of
conduct amounts to negligence, all the attending and
surrounding facts and circumstances have to be
taken into account. It is absence of care according
to circumstances. To determine whether an act
would be or would not be negligent, it is relevant to
determine if any reasonable man would foresee that
the act would cause damage or not. The omission to
do what the law obligates or even the failure to do
anything in a manner, mode or method envisaged by
law would equally and per se constitute negligence
on the part of such person. If the answer is in the
affirmative, it is a negligent act. Where an accident
is due to negligence of both parties, substantially
there would be contributory negligence and both
would be blamed. In a case of contributory
negligence, the crucial question on which liability
depends would be whether either party could, by
exercise of reasonable care, have avoided the
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Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
Signing Date:24.07.2026
12:47:10
consequence of the other's negligence. Whichever
party could have avoided the consequence of the
other's negligence would be liable for the accident.
If a person's negligent act or omission was the
proximate and immediate cause of death, the fact
that the person suffering injury was himself
negligent and also contributed to the accident or
other circumstances by which the injury was caused
would not afford a defence to the other.
Contributory negligence is applicable solely to the
conduct of a plaintiff. It means that there has been
an act or omission on the part of the plaintiff which
has materially contributed to the damage, the act or
omission being of such a nature that it may properly
be described as negligence, although negligence is
not given its usual meaning. (See Charlesworth on
Negligence, 3rd Edn., para 328.) It is now well
settled that in the case of contributory negligence,
courts have the power to apportion the loss between
the parties as seems just and equitable.
Apportionment in that context means that damage is
reduced to such an extent as the court thinks just
and equitable having regard to the claim shared in
the responsibility for the damage. But in a case
where there has been no contributory negligence on
the part of the victim, the question of apportionment
does not arise. Where a person is injured without
any negligence on his part but as a result of the
combined effect of the negligence of two other
persons, it is not a case of contributory negligence
in that sense. It is a case of what has been styled by
Pollock as injury by composite negligence.
(See Pollock on Torts, 15th Edn., p. 361.) ”
(emphasis added)
21. Moreover, negligence cannot ordinarily be presumed just because an
accident occurred. The circumstances of the accident themselves should
clearly indicate negligence, and if the person in control of the vehicle fails
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By:MANISH KUMAR
Signing Date:24.07.2026
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to give a reasonable explanation for how the accident occurred, the court
may apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and infer negligence.
22. In Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka , (1980) 1 SCC 30, the Supreme
Court has observed that where a vehicle mounts a pavement and injures a
person, the very nature of the accident ordinarily speaks of negligence,
attracting the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur , unless the driver proves
otherwise. Relevant paragraph of Syad Akbar ( supra ) is extracted as under:
“ 19. As a rule, mere proof that an event has
happened or an accident has occurred, the cause of
which is unknown, is not evidence of negligence. But
the peculiar circumstances constituting the event or
accident, in a particular case, may themselves
proclaim in concordant, clear and unambiguous
voices the negligence of somebody as the cause of
the event or accident. It is to such cases that the
maxim res ipsa loquitur may apply, if the cause of
the accident is unknown and no reasonable
explanation as to the cause is coming forth from the
defendant. To emphasise the point, it may be
reiterated that in such cases, the event or accident
must be of a kind which does not happen in the
ordinary course of things if those who have the
management and control use due care. But,
according to some decisions, satisfaction of this
condition alone is not sufficient for res ipsa to come
into play and it has to be further satisfied that the
event which caused the accident was within the
defendant's control. The reason for this second
requirement is that where the defendant has control
of the thing which caused the injury, he is in a better
position than the plaintiff to explain how the
accident occurred. Instances of such special kind of
accidents which “tell their own story” of being
offsprings of negligence, are furnished by cases,
such as where a motor vehicle mounts or projects
over a pavement and hurts somebody there or
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Signing Date:24.07.2026
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travelling in the vehicle; one car ramming another
from behind, or even a head-on collision on the
wrong side of the road. (See per Lord Normand in
Barkway v. South Wales Transport Co. [(1950) 1 All
ER 392, 399] ; Cream v. Smith [(1961) 8 AER 349] ;
Richley v. Faull [(1965) 1 WLR 1454 : (1965) 3 All
ER 109] ) ”
(emphasis added)
23. Contributory negligence arises only where the victim's own negligent
act contributes to the accident and the resulting harm. The proximate cause
of the accident should be the act of the deceased/injured. In the present
case, there is no material to show that the injured/deceased’s act had
contributed towards the accident.
24. In this regard, the Court holds that the finding attributing 50%
contributory negligence to the claimants is unsustainable and is accordingly
set aside. Accordingly, the compensation for each of these appeals would
be revised as under.
MAC.APP. 288/2018
25. Mr. Anshuman Bal, counsel for appellant, raises the issue of
inadequate compensation for pain and suffering to the injured, Digambar
Kumar . It is recorded that the injured had sustained fractures in both legs,
for which rods were inserted in both legs, besides other multiple injuries.
He further stated that his movement in both legs was restricted, and he had
remained unemployed since he was not able to do physical labour. In the
cross-examination, he denied that he had suffered any loss of income on
account of the injury or had incurred any expenditure on treatment,
conveyance and special diet.
26. The Court has perused the material on record and is of the opinion
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that the compensation awarded under the head of 'pain and suffering ' ought
to be enhanced to Rs.50,000/-.
27. Accordingly, the revised computation is as under:
Sr.
No.
Heads Awarded by the
Awarded by
Tribunal
this Court
PECUNIARY LOSS
1. Expenditure on Medical Bills
and medical treatment (A)
Rs.2,475/-
Rs.2,475/-
2. Expenditure on conveyance,
special diet and attendant
charges (B)
Rs. 20,000/-
Rs. 20,000/-
3. Income of injured per
month(C)
Rs.9,178/- Rs.9,178/-
4. Loss of income (Rs.9178/- X
3) (D)
Rs.27,534/-
Rs.27,534/-
NON-PECUNIARY LOSS
5. Pain and suffering (E) Rs.10,000/- Rs. 1,00,000/-
6. Total compensation (A + B +
C + D + E) = L
Rs.60,009/- Rs. 1,00,009/-
7. Deduction towards
contributory negligence
50% of Rs.60,009/- =
Nil
Rs. 30,005/-
7. Interest awarded 9% 9%
28. Accordingly, the original compensation is enhanced by Rs.90,000/-.
A deduction of 50% was made to the original compensation towards
contributory negligence by the MACT. Since the same has been set aside,
the total enhanced compensation is Rs.1,20,005/ -. ( Rs.90,000/- +
Rs.30,005/- ).
29. Accordingly, it is directed that the enhanced amount along with
accrued interest be deposited with the MACT by the Insurance company
within a period of 6 weeks.
30. Further, it is directed that the amount so deposited be released in a
lump sum along with the accrued interest thereon.
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Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
Signing Date:24.07.2026
12:47:10
MAC.APP. 289/2018
31. Mr. Anshuman Bal submits that adoption of multiplier of ‘5’ instead
of ‘ 14’, on the basis of the age of the mother of the deceased, is untenable.
32. The Supreme Court in the case of Reshma Kumari v. Madan
Mohan (2013) 9 SCC 65, held that the multiplier is to be used with
reference to the age of the deceased. The Constitution Bench in National
Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi & Ors. (2017) 16 SCC 680
affirmed the view taken in Smt. Sarla Verma & Ors v. Delhi Transport
Corporation & Anr. (2009) 5 SCC 121 and Reshma Kumari ( supra ), and
recorded in the conclusions as under:
“ 59.7. The age of the deceased should be the basis
for applying the multiplier. ”
33. Accordingly, this determination cannot be sustained. At the time of
accident, the deceased was 41 years of age. According to principles
enunciated in Sarla Verma ( supra ) and Pranay Sethi ( supra ), where the
deceased was 41 years of age on the date of the accident, the appropriate
multiplier is '14' . Therefore, multiplier of ‘ 14’ shall be considered instead
of ‘ 5 ’.
34. It is further noted that future prospects were not awarded, as
observed in paragraph 31(b) of the impugned award . Accordingly,
applying the principles in Pranay Sethi ( supra ), future prospects at 25%
are also liable to be awarded.
35. Mr. Bal further points out that compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/- was
awarded towards loss of love and affection and for loss of consortium .
36. Loss of love and affection awarded at Rs. 1,00,000/- ought not to be
granted on the basis of the principles enunciated in United India Insurance
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Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
Signing Date:24.07.2026
12:47:10
Co. Ltd. v. Satinder Kaur @ Satwinder Kaur and Ors . (2021) 11 SCC 780.
37. Considering there was only one original claimant, the deceased's
mother, Shashi Bedi , an amount of Rs.40,000/- is awarded towards loss of
consortium .
38. It is also informed that the deceased's mother, Shashi Bedi , has
passed away and is now represented through her legal heir, Poonam Bhatia ,
sister of the deceased.
39. Some other aspects also need to be aligned as per the principles
stated in Pranay Sethi ( supra ):
(i) Funeral expenses ought to be Rs. 15,000/-, instead of Rs. 25,000/- .
(ii) Loss of estate will be Rs. 15,000/-, instead of Rs. 10,000/- .
40. Accordingly, the revised computation is as under:
Heads Awarded by the
Tribunal
Awarded by the
Court
Sr.
No.
1. Monthly income of the deceased
(A)
Rs. 11,154/- Rs. 11,154/-
2.
25% of Rs. 11,154/-
= 2,788.50/-
3.
Add-Future Prospects (B) -
1/2 of Rs.
13,942.50/- = Rs.
6,971.25
4. Annual loss of dependency
[(A+B) - C ] x 12= D] Rs. 66,924/-
Less-personal expenses of the
deceased (C) 1/2
Rs. 83,655
5. Multiplier (E) 5 14
6. Total loss of dependency (D x E)
= (F) Rs. 3,34,620/-
Rs. 11,71,170/-
7. Compensation for loss of love
and affection (G)
Nil
8. Compensation for loss of
consortium (H)
Rs. 40,000/-
09. Compensation for loss of estate
(I)
Rs. 1,00,000/-
Rs. 10,000/-
Rs. 15,000/-
10. Compensation towards funeral
Signature Not Verified
MAC.APP. 288/2018, 289/2018, 290/2018 & 197/2019 Page 17 of 22
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
Signing Date:24.07.2026
12:47:10
expenses (J) Rs. 25,000 Rs. 15,000/-
11. Total Compensation
(F+G+H+I+J = L)
Rs. 4,69,620/-
Rs. 12,41,170/-
12.
50% of Rs.
4,69,620/- = Rs.
2,34,810/-
NIL
Deduction towards contributory
negligence
13. Interest Awarded 9% 9%
13. Enhanced Compensation Rs. 7,71,550/-
41. Accordingly, the original compensation is enhanced by Rs.
7,71,550/-. A deduction of 50% was made to the original compensation
towards contributory negligence by the MACT. Since the same has been set
aside, the total enhanced compensation is Rs. 10,06,360/- (Rs. 7,71,550/- +
2,34,810/-).
42. Accordingly, it is directed that the enhanced amount along with
accrued interest be deposited by the Insurance company with the MACT
within a period of 6 weeks.
43. Further, it is directed that a lump sum amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- shall
be released to the claimant from the amount so deposited within a period of
two weeks thereafter. Remaining amount, along with accrued interest, shall
be kept in Fixed Deposit Receipts (FDRs) of Rs. 20,000/- each for periods
of 1 month, 2 months, 3 months and so on, in succession, as maybe
calculated. Interest accruing on said FDRs shall be credited to the
designated Savings Bank Account of claimant. The amount of FDRs on
maturity would be released to the Savings Bank Account of claimant upon
due verification.
MAC.APP. 290/2018
44. It is contended by Mr. Bal that since the deceased was aged 48 years
Signature Not Verified
MAC.APP. 288/2018, 289/2018, 290/2018 & 197/2019 Page 18 of 22
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
Signing Date:24.07.2026
12:47:10
at the relevant time, future prospects ought to have been considered at 25% .
45. In light of principles enunciated in Sarla Verma ( supra ) and Pranay
Sethi ( supra ), and considering that the deceased was 48 years of age on the
date of accident, future prospects at 25% are also liable to be awarded.
46. Secondly , it has been contended that loss of consortium ought to be
awarded to the five family members of the deceased, namely, his wife,
mother and three sons, who are all appellants in this appeal. Accordingly,
an amount of Rs.40,000/- each shall be awarded on account of loss of
consortium to all these five appellants, i.e. Rs. 2,00,000/ -.
47. Some other aspects also need to be aligned as per the principles
stated in Pranay Sethi ( supra ):
(i) Funeral expenses ought to be Rs. 15,000/-, instead of Rs. 25,000/- .
(ii) Loss of estate will be Rs. 15,000/-, instead of Rs. 10,000/- .
48. Accordingly, the revised computation is as under:
Heads Awarded by the
Awarded by the
Sr.
No.
Tribunal
Court
1. Monthly income of the deceased
(A)
Rs. 9,178/- Rs. 9,178/-
2.
25% of Rs. 9,178/- =
Rs. 2,294.50/-
3.
Add-Future Prospects (B) -
1/4 of Rs.
11,472.50/- = Rs.
2868.12/-
4. Annual loss of dependency
[(A+B) - C ] x 12= D] Rs. 82,608/-
Less-personal expenses of the
deceased (C) 1/4
Rs. 1,03,252.56/-
5. Multiplier (E) 13 13
6. Total loss of dependency (D x E)
= (F) Rs.10,73,904/-
Rs. 13,42,283.28/-
7. Compensation for loss of love
and affection (G) Nil
Nil
8. Compensation for loss of
consortium (H)
Rs. 50,000/-
Rs. 2,00,000/-
Signature Not Verified
MAC.APP. 288/2018, 289/2018, 290/2018 & 197/2019 Page 19 of 22
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
Signing Date:24.07.2026
12:47:10
09. Compensation for loss of estate
(I)
Rs. 10,000/-
Rs. 15,000/-
10. Compensation towards funeral
expenses (J)
Rs. 25,000/-
Rs. 15,000/-
11.
Rs. 11,58,904/- Rs. 15,72,283.28/-
(rounded off to Rs.
Rs. 15,72,300/-)
12.
Total Compensation
(F+G+H+I+J = L)
50% of Rs.
11,58,904/-= Rs.
5,79,452/-
Nil
Deduction towards contributory
negligence
13. Interest Awarded 9% 9%
14. Enhanced Compensation Rs. 4,13,396/-
49. Accordingly, the original compensation is enhanced by Rs4,36,930/-.
A deduction of 50% was made to the original compensation towards
contributory negligence by the MACT. Since the same has been set aside,
the total enhanced compensation is Rs.9,92,848 (Rs. 4,13,396/- +
5,79,452/-).
50. Accordingly, it is directed that the enhanced amount along with
accrued interest be deposited with the MACT by the Insurance company
within a period of 6 weeks.
51. Further, it is directed that a lump sum amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- shall
be released to the claimant from the amount so deposited within a period of
two weeks thereafter. Remaining amount, along with accrued interest, shall
be kept in Fixed Deposit Receipts (FDRs) of Rs. 20,000/- each for periods
of 1 month, 2 months, 3 months and so on, in succession as maybe
calculated. Interest accruing on said FDRs shall be credited to the
designated Savings Bank Account of claimant. The amount of FDRs on
maturity would be released to the Savings Bank Account of claimant upon
due verification.
Signature Not Verified
MAC.APP. 288/2018, 289/2018, 290/2018 & 197/2019 Page 20 of 22
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
Signing Date:24.07.2026
12:47:10
MAC.APP. 197/2019
52. There is no component for enhancement pressed for by the
appellants’ counsel. Liberty is given to Mr. Parashar, counsel for claimant ,
to apply for the release of compensation in respect of the legal
representatives of the legal heirs of Lekh Raj , who has since passed away,
as noted hereinabove.
53. An amount of Rs. 18,10,569/- was awarded by MACT in favour of
the claimant , Lekh Raj. However, 50% of the same was deducted towards
contributory negligence. Rs. 9,05,285/-.
54. Since, the finding of the MACT on contributory negligence has been
set aside by this Court, the amount deducted towards contributory
negligence, i.e. Rs. 9,05,285/- along with accrued interest, by the MACT,
be deposited by the Insurance company within a period of 6 weeks.
55. Further, it is directed that a lump sum amount of Rs. 2,50,000/- shall
be released to the claimant from the amount so deposited within a period of
two weeks thereafter. Remaining amount, along with accrued interest, shall
be kept in Fixed Deposit Receipts (FDRs) of Rs. 25,000/- each for periods
of 1 month, 2 months, 3 months and so on, in succession as maybe
calculated. Interest accruing on said FDRs shall be credited to the
designated Savings Bank Account of claimant. The amount of FDRs on
maturity would be released to the Savings Bank Account of claimant upon
due verification.
Conclusion
56. All these four appeals, i.e. MAC.APP. 288/2018, MAC.APP.
197/2019, MAC.APP. 289/2018, and MAC.APP. 290/2018 stand disposed
of in the above terms.
Signature Not Verified
MAC.APP. 288/2018, 289/2018, 290/2018 & 197/2019 Page 21 of 22
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
Signing Date:24.07.2026
12:47:10
57. Pending applications, if any, are rendered infructuous.
58. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court.
(ANISH DAYAL)
JUDGE
JULY 08, 2026/sm/ bp
Signature Not Verified
MAC.APP. 288/2018, 289/2018, 290/2018 & 197/2019 Page 22 of 22
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
Signing Date:24.07.2026
12:47:10