THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER vs LAXMAN

Court
Karnataka High Court

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA


KALABURAGI BENCH

TH
DATED THIS THE 13 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE P SREE SUDHA

MISCL. FIRST APPEAL NO.207664 OF 2025

(LAC-Chimmalagi Lift Irrigation)


BETWEEN:

1. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
UKP, ALMATTI, TQ. B. BAGEWADI,
DISTRICT VIJAYAPURA.

2. THE COMMISSIONER,
REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT,
SECRETARY FOR LAND ACQUISITION DIVISION,
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
NAVANAGAR, BAGALKOTE.

3. THE GENERAL MANAGER,
REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT,
LAND ACQUISITION DIVISION,
NAVANAGAR, BAGALKOTE.

…APPELLANTS

(BY SRI. MALLIKARJUN C. BASAREDDY, PGA)

AND:

1. LAXMAN S/O NINGAPPA KUMBAR,
AGE: 41 YEARS, OCC: AGRICUTURE,
R/O MADINAL, TQ. MUDDEBIHAL,
DISTRICT VIJAYAPURA-586 101.









Digitally signed
by KHAJAAMEEN
MALAGHAN
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA

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2. THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, KBJNL,
ALBC DIVISION, CHIMMALAGI LIFT
IRRIGATION PROJECT, ALMATTI,
TQ. B. BAGEWADI-586 203.

…RESPONDENTS

THIS MISC. FIRST APPEAL IS FILED U/S 74(1) OF RIGHT
TO FAIR COMPENSATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN LAND
ACQUISITION, REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT ACT,
2013, PRAYING TO ALLOW THE ABOVE APPEAL AND TO SET
ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED 31.08.2023 IN LAC
NO.1708/2021 PASSED BY THE LEARNED I ADDL. DISTRICT
JUDGE AND LAND ACQUISITION, REHABILITATION AND
RESETTLEMENT AUTHORITY, VIJAYAPURA AND ETC.

THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

CORAM: HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE P SREE SUDHA

ORAL JUDGMENT
This appeal is filed by the Special Land Acquisition
Officer, UKP, Almatti, Taluk B. Bagewadi, District
Vijayapura on 20.09.2025 with a delay of 651 days.
I.A.No.1/2026 is filed on 04.08.2026 for condoning the
said delay in filing the appeal.
2 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of
Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 1969 has laid down the comprehensive

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principles on condonation of delay in filing the appeals. The

relevant paragraph reads as under:
“ v. Public Policy vis-à-vis Public Interest in
matters of delay on part of the State or any of
its instrumentalities.
228 . Limitation laws are themselves grounded in
public policy, as already discussed in the preceding
paragraphs of this judgment, it is based on the
maxim ‘interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium’ i.e., “it
is for the general welfare that a period be put to
litigation”. Therefore, public interest is better
served by timely governmental action than by
condoning repeated lapses. State cannot
simultaneously seek to represent the interest of the
public and yet consistently fail to protect that very
interest by allowing limitation periods to lapse.
229. Public interest is best served by ensuring
efficiency and diligence in governmental
functioning, rather than by condoning its lapses as
a matter of course. Thus, a liberal inclination
towards the State or any of its instrumentalities, in
matters of condonation of delay, cannot be
adopted, merely on the presumption that, if the
delay is not condoned, public interest runs the risk
of suffering, by a meritorious matter being thrown

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out. Public interest lies not in condoning
governmental indifference, but in compelling
efficiency, responsibility, and timely action.
230. To permit condonation of delay to become a
matter of course for the Government would have
the deleterious effect of institutionalising
inefficiency. It would, in substance, incentivise
indolence and foster a culture where accountability
for delay is eroded. If the State is assured that its
lapses will invariably be excused under the rubric of
“public interest,” there would remain little incentive
for its officers to act with vigilance or for its
instrumentalities to streamline procedures for
timely action. The consequence would not be the
advancement of public interest but rather its
betrayal.
231. Public interest, therefore, does not lie in
condoning governmental negligence, but in
compelling efficiency, responsibility, and timely
decision-making. This Court has time and again
emphasised that liberal condonation of delay on
behalf of the State, merely on the ground that
refusal might cause the dismissal of a potentially
meritorious matter, is a misplaced proposition.
Public interest is not synonymous with the cause of
the Government; it is, instead, synonymous with

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the enforcement of rule of law, certainty in legal
rights, and an administrative machinery that
functions with diligence and accountability.
232. It must, therefore, be underscored that the
guiding principle is not the protection of
governmental indifference but the promotion of
responsible governance. The State is under a higher
duty to act in time, for in every matter it litigates, it
does so not in its private capacity, but as the
trustee of the people’s interest. Hence, repeated
indulgence in condoning delays on grounds of
bureaucratic inefficiency would amount to eroding
the very object of limitation statutes, which are
enacted in every civilised jurisdiction for the sake of
finality, certainty, and public order.
233. Any other view, would invariably defeat the
sound public policy embodied in the Limitation
Act and fail in enthusing efficiency in
administration, and bring a balance between
accountability and autonomy of action, It would
result in giving immunity or carte blanche power to
act as it pleases with the public at whim or vagary
and inevitably spell doom all over the collective
responsibility that the State and its
instrumentalities are entrusted with. Thus, we are
of the considered opinion, that delay cannot be

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condoned, merely because not doing so would
result in non-suiting the State and thereby run the
ostensible risk of public interest suffering. Such by
no stretch can be the sole consideration for the
purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as to do
so would be to ignore the provision of Section 3 and
the overarching public policy of giving quietus to lis,
that forms the bedrock of the Limitation Act.
234. Even otherwise, it is no more res-integra, that
law of limitation has to be applied all but the same
and with all its rigour, even if it may harshly affect
a particular party. In Basawaraj (supra) this Court
observed that a result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A court has no power to
ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation. Even if the
statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party the court has no
choice but to give full effect to the same. It is based
on the legal maxim dura lex sed lex i.e., “the law is
hard but it is the law”. The relevant observations
read as under:-
“12. It is a settled legal proposition that
law of limitation may harshly affect a
particular party but it has to be applied
with all its rigour when the statute so

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prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds. ‘A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A court has no
power to ignore that provision to relieve
what it considers a distress resulting from
its operation.’ The statutory provision may
cause hardship or inconvenience to a
particular party but the court has no choice
but to enforce it giving full effect to the
same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex
which means “the law is hard but it is the
law”, stands attracted in such a situation.
It has consistently been held that,
“inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to
be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on
public policy, its aim being to secure peace
in the community, to suppress fraud and
perjury, to quicken diligence and to
prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all
acts of the past which have not been
agitated unexplainably and have from
lapse of time become stale. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

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235. An application seeking condonation of delay is
to be decided only within the parameters laid down
by this Court. In case there was no sufficient cause
to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time
condoning the delay without any justification, on
lofty ideals amounts to passing an order in violation
of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to
showing utter disregard to the statute.”
xxx
249 . Once the State chooses to litigate, it must
shoulder the same responsibilities and abide by the
same limitations that bind every litigant. To permit
the State to evade the consequences of delay on
the ostensible plea that the fault lay with individual
officers would amount to diluting the rigour of
limitation statutes and undermining their very
object. Such an approach would not only privilege
the State unjustly over private parties but would
also perpetuate a culture of indifference and
irresponsibility within the administration.
xxx
254 . We say so because if such observations by the
High Court, to condone delay in the interest of a
State-machinery, were allowed to be sustained by
us, it would allow the State-machineries a leeway

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to systematically orchestrate delays in the guise of
laxity exhibited by their authorities. Given the
majesty and colossality a State-machinery would
hold against a private litigant, it would be grossly
unfair to a litigant, who would be perpetually
entangled in the clutches of litigation, if enormous
delays, like that of almost 11 years in the present
case, are permitted to be condoned. This Court has
never turned a blind eye to the gradients of
substantive justice.
xxx
258 . The length of the delay is a relevant matter
which the court must take into consideration while
considering whether the delay should be condoned
or not. From the tenor of the approach of the
respondents, it appears that they want to fix their
own period of limitation for instituting the
proceedings for which law has prescribed a period
of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his
right to have the matter considered on merits
because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be
presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to
plead that the substantial justice deserves to be
preferred as against the technical considerations.
While considering the plea for condonation of delay,
the court must not start with the merits of the main

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matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain
the bona fides of the explanation offered by the
party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient
cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of
the other side is equally balanced that the court
may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the
purpose of condoning the delay.
259 . We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical consideration.
The rules of limitation are based on the principles of
sound public policy and principles of equity. We
should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging
over the head of the respondent for indefinite
period of time to be determined at the whims and
fancies of the appellants.
xxx
V. CONCLUSION
261 . Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned
order of the High Court deserves to be set aside.
Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem
it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that
administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand
as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and
we want to convey an emphatic message to all the
High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on
frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper
case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the

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State-machinery is able to establish that it acted
with bona fides and remained vigilant all
throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as
is famously said. But courts, and more particularly
the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the
procedure for a litigating State agency, who also
equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing
litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.
262 . The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing
effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or
its instrumentalities, and should remain extra
cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay
is a State-authority. They should not become
surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The
constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the
apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants
cannot be placed in situations of perpetual
litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or
favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We
are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and
put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen
matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause
exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to
the injury, more particularly in appeals under
Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is
already limited to questions of law.

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263 . Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a
sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More
than the importance of judicial time, what worries
us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who
is to contest against an enormous State, and its
elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia.
Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the
very threshold, because, say if a party litigating
against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to
contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike
the present case, it reopens the lis for another
round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless
yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our
obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent
from pillar to post to seek justice.
264 . No litigant should be permitted to be so
lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by
the courts to misuse the process of law.”
3. Further, in the case of State of Odisha v.
Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School
reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held as under:
“16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) were
consistently followed by this Court until adoption of a

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different and seemingly strict approach while dealing
with applications for condonation of delay during the last
decade and a half became discernible starting with the
decision in Postmaster General v. Living Media India
Limited11, where a delay of 427 days in filing the
relevant special leave petition was not
condoned. University of Delhi v. Union of India12 is
another decision (of a three-Judge Bench of this Court)
where delay of 916 days was not condoned. While
upholding the decision of the relevant high court under
challenge refusing to condone the delay of 5659 days in
presentation of an appeal under Section 54 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 by the heirs of a deceased
landowner, a coordinate Bench in Pathapati Subba
Reddy v. Collector(LA)13 very recently reiterated that
the law of limitation is founded on public policy, the
object is that a legal remedy is put to an end so that no
litigation remains pending for an indefinite period. It was
also held, departing from the earlier view, that the
merits of the case cannot be considered at the stage of
considering the application for condonation of delay.
17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj
Singh v. Union of India14 authoring the judgment for a
coordinate Bench adopted the view taken
in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a host of
other decisions following the same while not interfering
with an order of condonation of delay passed by the
relevant high court. However, it was observed that a
distinction ought to be drawn between an ‘explanation’

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and an ‘excuse’ that is proffered as cause for
condonation of delay. It was also emphasized that a
different approach has to be adopted while this Court is
considering an application for condonation of delay in
presentation of an appeal/application and when it sits in
appeal over a discretionary order of the high court
granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case
of the former, whether to condone or not would be the
only question whereas in the latter, whether there has
been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of
the prayer for condonation has to be examined.
Xxxxxxx
19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur Riders
(supra), one after the other, leaves none in doubt that it
did not take much time for this Court to lose hope. It is
absolutely clear that the law was laid down
in Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with
much optimism that matters would improve. Their
Lordships, however, found no visible support for such
optimism and the Court's patience having been tested to
the extreme limit, held that there is a point beyond
which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the
litigant labouring under the shackles of bureaucratic
indifference is the Government.
20. We have found the State of Odisha to be utterly
lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before the High
Court but also before this Court. Notwithstanding that its
appeal was dismissed as time-barred by the High Court,

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this Court has been approached by the State of Odisha
four months after expiry of the period of limitation.
21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter
of right. It is entirely the discretion of the Court whether
or not to condone delay. Despite all the latitude that is
shown to a “State”, we are of the clear opinion that the
cause sought to be shown here by the State of Odisha is
not an explanation but a lame excuse. No case for
exercise of discretion has been set up.”
4. The appellants have not approached this Court
within a stipulated period and also failed to show sufficient
cause for delay. This Court is not satisfied by the reasons
stated in the affidavit accompanying the application.
5. Therefore, in view of the judgment rendered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases,
I.A.No.1/2026 is dismissed . Consequently, the appeal
also stands dismissed .
Sd/-
(P SREE SUDHA)
JUDGE

LG

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