Mohd. Zaheer (Ex-Promoter Of Al-Dua Food Processing Pvt. Ltd) vs Ashu Agencies & Anr & Ors.

Court
National Company Law Appellate Tribunal
Case type
Company Appeal(AT)(Ins)
Decided on
12-03-2026
<div> <b>NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL </b><br /> <b>PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI </b><br /> <b>Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1526 of 2025 </b><br /> <b> </b> [Arising out of Order dated 24.09.2025 passed by the Adjudicating <br /> Authority (National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi Bench, Court – IV), <br /> in I.A. No.5208/2024 &amp; Restored Company Petition (IBC)/15/ND/2024 (Old <br /> Case C.P. (IB)/2405/ND/2019)] <br /> <b>IN THE MATTER OF: </b> <b> </b><br /> <b>Mohd. Zaheer, </b><br /> <b>(Ex-Promoter of </b><br /> <b>AL-Dua Food Processing Pvt. Ltd) </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> …Appellant </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>Versus </b><br /> <b>Ashu Agencies &amp; Anr. </b> <b>…Respondents </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>Present: </b><br /> <b>For Appellant </b> <b>: Mr. Abhijeet Sinha, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Shivam </b><br /> <b>Shukla, Ms. Heena Kochar, Mr. Aridaman, Ms. </b><br /> <b>Anjali Upadhyay and Mr. Syed Saud, Advocates. </b><br /> <b> </b> <b> </b> <b> </b><br /> <b>For Respondents </b> <b>: Mr. Abhinav Prakash, Mr. Himanshu Singh and </b><br /> <b>Ms. Srishti Kher, Advocates for R-1. </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>Mr. Rishi Singhal, Advocate for R-2. </b><br /> <b>J U D G M E N T </b><br /> <b>ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.</b> <br /> This appeal by a suspended director of the corporate debtor has been <br /> filed challenging the order dated 24.09.2025 passed by the adjudicating <br /> authority (National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi Bench, Court – IV), by <br /> which order, an application under Section 9 filed by the respondent herein <br /> has been admitted. <br /> <b>2.</b> <b> </b> Brief facts of the case necessary to be noticed for deciding this appeal <br /> are: <br /><br /> i. The corporate debtor M/s. Al-Dua Food Processing Pvt. Ltd. issued <br /> purchase orders to the operational creditor M/s. Ashu Agencies, a <br /> proprietorship firm for purchasing the kraft paper reels. <br /> ii. Operational creditor after receiving oral purchase order from the <br /> corporate debtor forwarded the same to manufacturer company and as <br /> per directions of the corporate debtor got material directly supplied to <br /> the corporate debtor in the Financial Year 2017-18 &amp; 2018-19. <br /> iii. Various transactions took place. Part payments were made by the <br /> corporate debtor towards the goods received. A demand notice under <br /> Section 8 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, (for short the <br /> Code or the IBC) was issued on 25.07.2019 claiming a debt of <br /> Rs.2,48,46,299/-. <br /> iv. Corporate debtor after receiving the demand notice sent a reply dated <br /> 05.08.2019 stating that liability and debt has been transferred to M/s. <br /> MK Overseas Pvt. Ltd. New management has been taken over on <br /> 07.07.2018. The company is not liable to pay any amount to the <br /> operational creditor and operational creditor was advised to approach <br /> M/s. MK Overseas Pvt. Ltd. for payment of amount. The liability of <br /> company was disputed. The operational creditor filed a Section 9 <br /> application in August 2019 claiming an amount of Rs.2,48,46,299.76/-<br /> . <br /> v. Notices were issued by the adjudicating authority. Reply to Section 9 <br /> application was filed by the corporate debtor. Corporate debtor in the <br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>2 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> reply to Section 9 application denied the claim. It was pleaded that <br /> from July 2018, corporate debtor was owned and completely controlled <br /> by M.K. Overseas Pvt. Ltd. The present promoters of the corporate <br /> debtor bought the corporate debtor from M.K. Overseas Pvt. Ltd. and <br /> their promoters and as part of the acquisition and takeover, liabilities <br /> of the corporate debtor were to be paid by M.K. Overseas Pvt. Ltd. as <br /> they have retained the responsibilities of making payments. In books <br /> of the accounts of the corporate debtor from 01.04.2018 to 07.07.2018, <br /> the name of the operational creditor is also in the list of sundry creditors <br /> which has been transferred to M/s. M.K. Overseas Pvt. Ltd. Letter <br /> dated 30.06.2018 was claimed to have been sent by the operational <br /> creditor to the effect that it has no objection if the debt balance of <br /> Rs.2,47,69,431/- is transferred to M/s. M.K. Overseas Pvt. Ltd. <br /> Reference of the agreement and arrangement between the corporate <br /> debtor and M/s. M.K. Overseas Pvt. Ltd. dated 07.07.2018 was <br /> mentioned. It was pleaded that it is M.K. Overseas Pvt. Ltd. which is <br /> liable to pay the amount to the operational creditor. <br /> <br /> vi. Adjudicating authority heard the parties and by impugned order held <br /> that plea of corporate debtor for novation of the contract is unsupported <br /> by any Tripartite Agreement. No objection letter dated 30.06.2018 is <br /> disputed and cannot be itself extinguish liability of the corporate <br /> debtor. <br /> vii. The Share Purchase Agreement between the corporate debtor and M/s. <br /> M.K. Overseas Pvt. Ltd. is nothing but sham and collusive document <br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>3 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> devised with sole objective of defrauding creditors. So-called dispute <br /> raised by the corporate debtor has <i>mala fide</i> attempt to create a <br /> moonshine dispute. <br /> viii. Adjudicating authority after recording aforesaid findings had admitted <br /> Section 9 application and appointed the respondent No. 2 as Interim <br /> Resolution Professional (IRP). <br /> ix. This appeal was heard on 07.10.2025, on which date, notices were <br /> issued and interim order was passed that <i>“let the IRP receive and collate </i><br /> <i>the claims but shall not take any further steps.”</i> Reply has been filed in <br /> the appeal to which the rejoinder has also been filed. <br /> <b>3.</b> <b> </b> We have heard learned Sr. counsel Mr. Abhijeet Sinha appearing for the <br /> appellant and learned counsel Mr. Abhinav Prakash appearing for the <br /> respondent No.1. Learned counsel Mr. Rishi Singhal has appeared for <br /> respondent No. 2. <br /> <b>4.</b> <b> </b> Learned counsel for the appellant challenging the order impugned <br /> submits that there was no operational debt payable to the operational creditor <br /> under Section 41 of the Contract Act, 1872 when promisee has accepted to <br /> receive its debt from M.K. Overseas Pvt. it cannot proceed against the <br /> corporate debtor. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on Section 41 <br /> of the Contract Act 1872 for discharge of the liability. It is further submitted <br /> that contract between the parties stood novated under which the corporate <br /> debtor is discharged from its liabilities to pay debt and liability to pay debt <br /> was on M.K. Overseas Pvt. Ltd. It is submitted that no objection letter dated <br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>4 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> 30.06.2018 was relied by the corporate debtor in its reply but no rejoinder <br /> was filed disputing the letter. Operational creditor having accepted to receive <br /> its balance amount from MK Overseas Pvt. Ltd, it could not have filed any <br /> application under Section 9 against the corporate debtor. It is submitted that <br /> operational creditor had received payment from MK Overseas Pvt. Ltd. of <br /> Rs.35 lakh by banking channel and Rs.85,000/- in cash, which clearly prove <br /> that operational creditor has accepted to receive its entire dues from MK <br /> Oversees Pvt. Ltd. Appellant, operational creditor in Section 9 application has <br /> not disclosed the payment received from MK Overseas Pvt. Ltd. of <br /> Rs.35,85,000/-. Rs. 35 lakh amount was received from banking channel <br /> which cannot be denied by the appellant. Corporate debtor having disputed <br /> the claim of the appellant, adjudicating authority could not have proceeded <br /> to exercise any jurisdiction in the summary jurisdiction under the IBC. <br /> Impugned order admitting Section 9 application is unsustainable. Learned <br /> counsel for the appellant in support of his submission placed reliance on <br /> various judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Courts and this <br /> Tribunal which we shall refer to while considering the submission in detail. <br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>5.</b> Learned counsel appearing for the respondent refuting the submissions <br /> of the appellant submits that the operational creditor having made supplies <br /> to the corporate debtor which was accepted, it was obligation of the corporate <br /> debtor to make the payment. Letter dated 30.06.2018 relied by the corporate <br /> debtor is not admitted and even if the letter is looked into, the same claims to <br /> be issued as no objection which was issued one by Jagveer Singh. There was <br /> outstanding debt of ₹ 2,48,46,299.76/–, it was obligation of the corporate <br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>5 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> debtor to clear the debt. No objection letter dated 30.06.2018 cannot by itself <br /> extinguish liability of the corporate debtor. Defence raised by the corporate <br /> debtor does not qualify as a pre-existing dispute. The plea of novation of the <br /> contract is bald defence unsupported by any Tripartite Agreement, releasing <br /> the corporate debtor from its liability. Mere internal arrangement between <br /> groups companies cannot absolve the corporate debtor of its obligation <br /> towards third-party creditors. Appellant in the appeal is introducing new <br /> facts. No such plea was placed before the adjudicating authority regarding <br /> any payment. The above payment in any manner is not relevant in the case. <br /> Learned counsel for the respondent relying on the judgement of this Tribunal <br /> in <b><i>‘Chetan Sharma’ Vs. ‘Jai Lakshmi Solvents Pvt. Ltd. &amp; Ors.’</i></b> in <b>[Comp. </b><br /> <b>App. (AT) (Ins.) No.66/2017]</b> submitted that corporate debtor by entering <br /> into any agreement cannot transfer its liability of debt to third-party. Share <br /> Purchase Agreement between the MK Overseas Private Limited and new <br /> promoters of the corporate debtor cannot transfer the liability of debt. The <br /> operational creditor was not part of the Share Purchase Agreement. <br /> Adjudicating authority has rightly come to the conclusion and finding that it <br /> was the corporate debtor in connivance with MK Overseas Pvt. Ltd. attempted <br /> to extinguish its liabilities, which was nothing but a collusive arrangement <br /> with the objective of defrauding creditors, including the operational creditor. <br /> <b>6.</b> <b> </b> We have considered the submissions of the counsel for the parties and <br /> perused the records. <br /> <b>7.</b> <b> </b> From the pleadings of both the parties, following facts are not disputed <br /> between the parties: <br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>6 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> I. In pursuance of the purchase order issued by the corporate debtor, <br /> appellant has supplied kraft paper reels to the corporate debtor in the <br /> Financial Year 2017–18 and 2018–19. The corporate debtor has made <br /> part payments against the supplies, which were received by the <br /> corporate debtor and utilised. <br /> II. A Share Purchase Agreement was entered between the MK Overseas <br /> Private Limited, Mohammed Kamil and Ms. Naseera Begum as a seller <br /> with AL Hamid Agro Food Private Ltd and AL-Dua Food Processing <br /> Private Ltd. AL Ahmed Agro Food Private Limited and three individuals <br /> as purchasers and AL-Dua Food Processing Private Limited Company. <br /> In the Share Purchase Agreement, apart from above, no other person <br /> was party including the operational creditor. <br /> III. According to the corporate debtor in the statement of account from <br /> 01.04.218 to 07.07.2018, amount of ₹ 2,47,69,431/- is shown to be due <br /> to the operational creditor. <br /> <b>8.</b> <b> </b> According to the case set up by the corporate debtor by virtue of Share <br /> Purchase Agreement entered on 30.07.2018 (transaction date 07.07.2018), <br /> the liability of corporate debtors stood transferred to MK Overseas Private <br /> Limited, which liabilities have also been reflected in the Financial Statement <br /> of MK Overseas Private Limited. The name of the operational creditor apart <br /> from other creditors is mentioned in the Financial Statement of MK Overseas <br /> Private Limited with respect to appellant the dues of ₹ 2,47,69,431/– are <br /> reflected. The submission which has been pressed by the counsel for the <br /> appellant is that in view of the transfer of the debts of creditors to MK <br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>7 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> Overseas Private Limited, corporate debtor is no longer liable for any <br /> outstanding of the operational creditor. <br /> <b>9.</b> <b> </b> The entire case of the appellant is based on a letter dated 30.06.2018, <br /> written on behalf of the Ashu Agencies to management of AL-Dua Food <br /> Processing Private Limited. The said letter has been brought on record as <br /> Annexure A-2, which is as follows: <br /> <i>“Dt. 30 June 2018 </i><br /> <i>To </i><br /> <i>The Management </i><br /> <i>Al Dua Food Processing Pvt. Ltd. </i><br /> <i>16-Fire Brigade Lane, Connaught Place New Delhi-</i><br /> <i>110001 </i><br /> <b><i>Sub:-Amount Transfer Confirmation </i></b><br /> <i>Dear Sir, </i><br /> <i>We have confirm that we do not have any objection to </i><br /> <i>transfer our debit balance of Rs. 2,47,69,431.00 (Two </i><br /> <i>Crore forty seven lac sixty nine thousand four hundred </i><br /> <i>thirty one only) of Al Dua Food Processing Pvt. Ltd. to </i><br /> <i>MK Overseas Pvt. Ltd. </i><br /> <i>Therefore after 30th of June 2018 we will receive our </i><br /> <i>balance amount from MK overseas Pvt. Ltd. And as on </i><br /> <i>30 June 2018 we don&#x27;t have any liability on Al Dua </i><br /> <i>Food Processing Pvt. Ltd. </i><br /> <i>For Ashu Agencies </i><br /> <i>(Authorised Signatory)” </i><br /> <b>10.</b> <b> </b> In the reply which was filed by the corporate debtor to Section 9 <br /> application, the said letter has also been mentioned. It is useful to notice <br /> paragraphs 4 and 5 of the reply, which is as follows: <br /> <i>“4. That the management of the corporate debtor was </i><br /> <i>taken over by its present management from its earlier </i><br /> <i>management w.e.f. 08.07.2018 and it was tagreed by </i><br /> <i>its earlier ntanagement that the liability of its certain </i><br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>8 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> <i>sundry creditors including the present operational </i><br /> <i>creditor be transferred to their holding company M/s </i><br /> <i>MK Overseas Pvt. Ltd. and the said transferred liability </i><br /> <i>shall be borne and paid by their holding company M/s </i><br /> <i>MK Overseas Pvt. Ltd. </i><br /> <i>M/s MK Overseas Pvt. Ltd. has shown the above said </i><br /> <i>credit balance of the operational creditor in its ledger </i><br /> <i>account being maintained by it in the name of the </i><br /> <i>corporate debtor and a copy of the Statement of </i><br /> <i>Account of Al Dua Food Processing Pvt. Ltd. (TRF) i.e. </i><br /> <i>the corporate debtor for the period upto 01.04.2018 to </i><br /> <i>07.07.2018 is annexed as Annexure 3. </i><br /> <i>5. That the operational creditor sent a letter dated </i><br /> <i>30.06.2018, to the earlier management of the corporate </i><br /> <i>debtor to the effect that it has no objection if the debit </i><br /> <i>balance of Rs.2,47,69,431/- is transferred to M/s M.K. </i><br /> <i>Overseas Pvt. Ltd. and original of the said letter given </i><br /> <i>to the present management by the earlier management </i><br /> <i>of the corporate debtor is Annexure 4. </i><br /> <i>In addition to this the earlier management of the </i><br /> <i>corporate debtor also gave the photocopy of the letter </i><br /> <i>dated 31.03.2018 sent by Maa Gauri Land Developers </i><br /> <i>and letter dated 30.06.2018 sent by Maa Gauri </i><br /> <i>Corrogator to the current management of the corporate </i><br /> <i>debtor wherein they gave their no objection if their </i><br /> <i>debit balance of Rs.15,62,583/- and Rs. 8,34,843/- is </i><br /> <i>transferred to M/s M.K. Overseas Pvt. Ltd. and the </i><br /> <i>photocopy of the said two letters are Annexure-5 </i><br /> <i>(Colly). </i><br /> <i>The corporate debtor, on enquiry has been informed by </i><br /> <i>the earlier management that the said letters are signed </i><br /> <i>by Shri Jagveer Singh, father of Shri Ashu Chaudhary, </i><br /> <i>the sole proprietor of the operational creditor in the </i><br /> <i>present case.” </i><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>11.</b> Adjudicating authority in the impugned order has noted that said letter <br /> 30.06.2018 is disputed. Adjudicating authority further held that the letter <br /> itself cannot extinguish liability of the corporate debtor. No rejoinder was filed <br /> by the operational creditor before the adjudicating authority. We thus for the <br /> purposes of this case, proceed on premise that no objection letter dated <br /> 30.06.2018, signed by one Jagveer Singh was sent to the management of the <br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>9 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> corporate debtor. Submission of the appellant as noticed above is that <br /> operational creditor having accepted and having given no objection for <br /> transfer of its debit balance to MK Overseas Private Limited, liability of the <br /> corporate debtor stood extinguished and the operational creditor’s claim if any <br /> was only against MK Overseas Private Limited. Learned counsel for the <br /> appellant in support of his submissions has relied on Section 41 of the <br /> Contract Act, 1872. Section 41 of the Contract Act, 1872 deals with the effect <br /> of accepting performance from third-party. Section 41 of the Contract Act, <br /> 1872 provides as follows: <br /> <b><i>“41. Effect of accepting performance from third </i></b><br /> <b><i>person.—</i></b> <i>When a promisee accepts performance of the </i><br /> <i>promise from a third person, he cannot afterwards </i><br /> <i>enforce it against the promisor.” </i><br /> <b>12.</b> <b> </b> Learned counsel for the appellant in support of his submissions under <br /> Section 41 of the Contract Act, 1872 has relied on the judgement of the <br /> Hon’ble Supreme Court in <b><i>‘Lala Kapurchand Godha &amp; Ors.’ Vs. ‘Mir </i></b><br /> <b><i>Nawab Himayatalikhan Azamjah’,</i></b> reported in <b>[1962 SCC OnLine SC </b><br /> <b>412],</b> <b><i>‘Citibank N.A.’ Vs. ‘Standard Chartered Bank’</i></b> reported in <b>[(2004) 6 </b><br /> <b>SCC 1],</b> and Madras High Court judgement in <b><i>‘Chegamull Suganmull </i></b><br /> <b><i>Sowcar’ Vs. ‘V. Govindaswami Chetty &amp; Ors.’</i></b> reported in <b>[1928 SCC </b><br /> <b>OnLine MAD 260].</b> Judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in <b><i>‘Lala </i></b><br /> <b><i>Kapurchand Godha &amp; Ors.’ (supra),</i></b> where suit was filed for recovery of <br /> ₹ 9,99,940/- towards amount due with regard to certain jewellery sold to the <br /> defendant. A payment of ₹ 20,00,000/- was made towards full satisfaction of <br /> the claim. Receipt was also issued mentioning the receipt of amount in full <br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>10 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> and final payment of the balance. In the above context, Hon’ble Supreme <br /> Court in paragraph 5 of the judgement laid down following: <br /> <b><i>“5.</i></b> <i> Then there was an appeal by the respondent which </i><br /> <i>was heard by the appellate court (Chagla, C.J. and </i><br /> <i>Mody, J.). By its judgment dated 15-4-1958 the </i><br /> <i>appellate court came to a contrary conclusion and held </i><br /> <i>that on the evidence, oral and documentary, given in </i><br /> <i>the case it was clearly established that the appellants </i><br /> <i>accepted the sum of Rs 20 lakhs in full satisfaction of </i><br /> <i>their claim and duly discharged the promissory notes </i><br /> <i>by endorsing full satisfaction thereon; therefore, </i><br /> <i>Section 63 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 applied and </i><br /> <i>the suit of the appellants was liable to be dismissed. It </i><br /> <i>accordingly allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit </i><br /> <i>with costs.” </i><br /> <b>13.</b> <b> </b> In the above case relying on Section 63, Hon’ble Supreme Court held <br /> that the suit was liable to be dismissed. Section 63 of the Contract Act, 1872 <br /> provides as follows: <br /> <b><i>“63. Promisee may dispense with or remit </i></b><br /> <b><i>performance of promisee.—</i></b> <i>Every promisee may </i><br /> <i>dispense with or remit, wholly or in part, the </i><br /> <i>performance of the promisee made to him, or may </i><br /> <i>extend the time for such performance, or may accept </i><br /> <i>instead of it any satisfaction which he thinks fit. </i><br /> <i>Illustrations </i><br /> <i>(a) A promises to paint a picture for B. B afterwards </i><br /> <i>forbids him to do so. A is no longer bound to perform </i><br /> <i>the promise. </i><br /> <i>(b) A owes B 5,000 rupees. A pays to B, and B accepts, </i><br /> <i>in satisfaction of the whole debt, 2,000 rupees paid at </i><br /> <i>the time and place at which the 5,000 rupees were </i><br /> <i>payable. The whole debt is discharged. </i><br /> <i>(c) A owes B 5,000 rupees. C pays to B 1,000 rupees, </i><br /> <i>and B accepts them, in satisfaction of his claim on A. </i><br /> <i>This payment is a discharge of the whole claim2. </i><br /> <i>(d) A owes B, under. a contract, a sum of money, the </i><br /> <i>amount of which has not been ascertained. A, without </i><br /> <i>ascertaining the amount, gives to B, and B, in </i><br /> <i>satisfaction thereof, accepts, the sum of 2,000 rupees. </i><br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>11 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> <i>This is a discharge of the whole debt, whatever may </i><br /> <i>be its amount. </i><br /> <i>(e) A owes B 2,000 rupees, and is also indebted to </i><br /> <i>other creditors. A makes an arrangement with his </i><br /> <i>creditors, including B, to pay them a [composition] of </i><br /> <i>eight annas in the rupee upon their respective </i><br /> <i>demands. Payment to B of 1,000 rupees is a discharge </i><br /> <i>of B’s demand.” </i><br /> <b>14.</b> <b> </b> The present is not a case where Section 63 can be held to be applicable. <br /> The operational creditor has neither remitted wholly or in part the <br /> performance of the promise made to him nor it has extended time for such <br /> performance or have accepted any satisfaction. The judgement of the Hon’ble <br /> Supreme Court, thus in the above case does not help the appellant. The next <br /> judgement relied by the appellant is judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, <br /> in <b><i>‘Citibank N.A.’ (supra), </i></b> relying on Section 41 of the Contract Act, 1872. <br /> Section 41 has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said <br /> judgement. It was held that when a promisee has accepted satisfaction from <br /> third-party it cannot insist on satisfaction of its claim of the promissor as well. <br /> It was held that Section 41 applies where a contract has in fact been <br /> performed by some person other than person bound, thereby. In paragraph <br /> 46 of the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, following was laid down: <br /> <b><i>“46.</i></b><br /> <i> The Special Court fell in error in applying Section </i><br /> <i>41 of the Indian Contract Act to the facts of the present </i><br /> <i>case. Attempt on the part of Scb to place reliance on </i><br /> <i>Section 41 of the Contract Act is completely misplaced </i><br /> <i>in the facts of the case as has been held by this Court </i><br /> <i>in Citi Bank [(2004) 1 SCC 12] . Section 41 of the </i><br /> <i>Contract Act only provides that the promisee cannot </i><br /> <i>have double satisfaction of its claim i.e. from the </i><br /> <i>promisor as well as a third party. It does not give a </i><br /> <i>cause of action to the promisee, but, to the promisor, to </i><br /> <i>contend that the promisee who has accepted </i><br /> <i>satisfaction from the third party cannot insist on the </i><br /> <i>satisfaction of its claim from the promisor as well. The </i><br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>12 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> <i>case of Citibank would squarely fall under Section 63 </i><br /> <i>of the Indian Contract Act, as was held in Citi </i><br /> <i>Bank [(2004) 1 SCC 12] . It was observed in paras 50 </i><br /> <i>to 52 as follows: (SCC pp. 35-36) </i><br /> <i>“50. Under Section 63, unlike Section 62, a promisee </i><br /> <i>can act unilaterally and may </i><br /> <i>(i) dispense with wholly or in part, or </i><br /> <i>(ii) remit wholly or in part, the performance of the </i><br /> <i>promise made to him, or </i><br /> <i>(iii) may extend the time for such performance, or </i><br /> <i>(iv) may accept instead of it any satisfaction which he </i><br /> <i>thinks fit. </i><br /> <i>51. It is Citibank&#x27;s case that Scb on its own asked for </i><br /> <i>and voluntarily accepted two SGLs from Citibank as </i><br /> <i>satisfaction which it deemed fit in exchange for </i><br /> <i>Citibank&#x27;s obligation to deliver GOI Bonds of the face </i><br /> <i>value of Rs 50 crores under the two BRs. Such a plea </i><br /> <i>would fall under Section 63. The Special Court </i><br /> <i>concluded that provisions of Section 41 of the Contract </i><br /> <i>Act would be applicable to the facts of the case because </i><br /> <i>CMF had failed to deliver the GOI Bonds to Scb and, </i><br /> <i>therefore, Scb could claim them from Citibank. In our </i><br /> <i>opinion, the Special Court fell in error in applying </i><br /> <i>Section 41 of the Indian Contract Act to the facts of the </i><br /> <i>case. Section 41 of the Indian Contract Act only </i><br /> <i>provides that the promisee cannot have double </i><br /> <i>satisfaction of its claim i.e. from the promisor as well </i><br /> <i>as a third party. It does not give a cause of action to </i><br /> <i>the promisee, but, to the promisor, to contend that the </i><br /> <i>promisee who has accepted satisfaction from the third </i><br /> <i>party cannot insist on the satisfaction of its claim from </i><br /> <i>the promisor as well. No case under Section 41 of the </i><br /> <i>Contract Act has been pleaded by Citibank. It nowhere </i><br /> <i>pleaded that CMF had delivered the bonds to Scb and, </i><br /> <i>therefore, Scb cannot enforce its demand for delivery </i><br /> <i>of bonds against Citibank. The Privy Council in Har </i><br /> <i>Chandi Lal v. Sheoraj Singh [AIR 1916 PC 68 : 44 IA </i><br /> <i>60] held that Section 41 of the Contract Act applies only </i><br /> <i>where a contract has in fact been performed by some </i><br /> <i>person other than the person bound thereby. What is </i><br /> <i>required by Section 41 is actual performance of the </i><br /> <i>original promise and not a substituted promise. </i><br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>13 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> <i>In Chegamull Suganmull Sowcar v. V. Govindaswami </i><br /> <i>Chetty [AIR 1928 Mad 972] it was held that actual </i><br /> <i>performance has to be there for importing the </i><br /> <i>applicability of Section 41. It was held: (AIR p. 974) </i><br /> <i>‘Much more than a bare promise is necessary under </i><br /> <i>the section. What it contemplates is actual performance </i><br /> <i>of the original promise. According to the section, </i><br /> <i>performance by a stranger, accepted by the promisee, </i><br /> <i>produces the result of discharging the promisor, </i><br /> <i>although the latter has neither authorised nor ratified </i><br /> <i>the act of the third party.’ </i><br /> <i>52. The learned Special Court fell in error in holding </i><br /> <i>that Section 41 of the Contract Act would be more </i><br /> <i>appropriately applicable. Section 41, for the reasons </i><br /> <i>set out above, would not be applicable to the facts of </i><br /> <i>the present case. It also fell in error in holding that </i><br /> <i>Citibank did not plead complete discharge from </i><br /> <i>performing its obligation in terms of Section 63. In our </i><br /> <i>opinion, Citibank has specifically pleaded that it stood </i><br /> <i>discharged from the performance of the original </i><br /> <i>obligation on the delivery of SGLs to Scb, which were </i><br /> <i>asked for and accepted by Scb for reasons best known </i><br /> <i>to it. Scb instead of the original satisfaction accepted </i><br /> <i>another satisfaction, deemed fit by it, in terms of </i><br /> <i>Section 63 of the Indian Contract Act.” </i><br /> <b>15.</b> <b> </b> Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the judgement of the <br /> Madras High Court in <b><i>‘Chegamull Suganmull Sowcar’ (supra),</i></b> in which <br /> case Madras High Court had occasion to consider Section 41 of the Contract <br /> Act, 1872. Madras High Court has held that what is contemplated under <br /> Section 41 is much more than a bare promise what is contemplated is actual <br /> performance of the original promise and according to the performance by a <br /> stranger accepted by promisee produced the result discharging the promisor. <br /> In paragraph 6 of the judgement, following has been laid down: <br /> <b><i>“6.</i></b> <i> This contention is obviously untenable. In the first </i><br /> <i>place, Lingayya cannot be regarded as “a third person” </i><br /> <i>within the meaning of this section. The plaintiff </i><br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>14 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> <i>accepted the signature of Lingayya, not on the footing </i><br /> <i>that he was a stranger, but that he represented the </i><br /> <i>estate of Chengayya. That was a mutual mistake, </i><br /> <i>which vitiated the transaction and which frustrated the </i><br /> <i>intention of the parties. There is another answer to this </i><br /> <i>contention. The section does not say that the original </i><br /> <i>obligation comes to an end, merely because the </i><br /> <i>promisee accepts from a stranger a fresh promise in </i><br /> <i>the place of the old one. Much more than a bare </i><br /> <i>promise is necessary under the section. What it </i><br /> <i>contemplates is actual performance of the original </i><br /> <i>promise. According to the section, performance by a </i><br /> <i>stranger, accepted by the promisee, produces the </i><br /> <i>result of discharging the promisor, although the latter </i><br /> <i>has neither authorized nor ratified the act of the rd </i><br /> <i>party. There is not much authority on the point, but the </i><br /> <i>view I have taken receives support from the opinions </i><br /> <i>expressed in the two standard works on the subject </i><br /> <i>(Shepherd and Cunningham&#x27;s Commentaries and </i><br /> <i>Pollock and Mulla&#x27;s Contract Act).” </i><br /> <b>16.</b> <b> </b> The above judgement of the Hon’ble Madras High Court has been <br /> quoted with approval by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in <b><i>‘Citibank N.A.’ </i></b><br /> <b><i>(supra), </i></b> thus, applicability of Section 41 is when actual performance of the <br /> original promise has been made by a stranger, which results discharge of the <br /> promissor. Present is not a case where the debt which was claimed by the <br /> operational creditor and is the admitted dues on the corporate debtor, which <br /> according to the corporate debtor has been discharged by MK Overseas <br /> Private Limited. Thus, Section 41 cannot come to any aid of the appellant in <br /> the facts of the present case. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted <br /> that operational creditor has received an amount of ₹ 35,00,000/- from MK <br /> Overseas Private Limited and an amount of ₹ 85,000/- in cash. The facts of <br /> payment of ₹ 35,00,000/- and ₹ 85,000/- by the MK Overseas Private Limited <br /> were not before the adjudicating authority nor had been pleaded. The <br /> operational creditor in its reply in the appeal has disputed the nature of <br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>15 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> transaction with MK Overseas Private Limited. Be that as it may, even if <br /> submission of the appellant is accepted that amount of the ₹ 35,00,000/- and <br /> ₹ 85,000/- has been paid by the MK Overseas Private Limited, that cannot be <br /> held to be discharge of promise which was made by the corporate debtor by <br /> third-party i.e., MK Overseas Private Limited, so as to discharge the corporate <br /> debtor. Thus, present is a case where corporate debtor cannot be held to be <br /> discharged by virtue of Section 41 of Contract Act, 1872. <br /> <b>17.</b> <b> </b> We also need to notice the submission of the appellant based on Section <br /> 62 of the contract that is a novation of the Contract Act, 1872. Section 62 of <br /> the Contract Act, 1872 provides as follows: <br /> <b><i>“62. Effect of novation, rescission, and alteration </i></b><br /> <b><i>of contract.—</i></b> <i>If the parties to a contract agree to </i><br /> <i>substitute a new contract for it, or to rescind or alter it, </i><br /> <i>the original contract, need not be performed. </i><br /> <i>Illustrations </i><br /> <i>(a) A owes money to B under a contract. It is agreed </i><br /> <i>between A, B and C that B shall thenceforth accept C </i><br /> <i>as his debtor, instead of A. The old debt of A to B is at </i><br /> <i>an end, and a new debt from C to B has been </i><br /> <i>contracted. </i><br /> <i>(b) A owes B 10,000 rupees. A enters into an </i><br /> <i>arrangement with B and gives B a mortgage of his (A’s) </i><br /> <i>estate for 5,000 rupees in place of the debt of 10,000 </i><br /> <i>rupees. This is a new contract and extinguishes the </i><br /> <i>old. </i><br /> <i>(c) A owes B 1,000 rupees under a contract. B owes C </i><br /> <i>1,000 rupees B orders A to credit C with 1,000 rupees </i><br /> <i>in his books, but C does not assent to the arrangement. </i><br /> <i>B still owes C 1,000 rupees, and no new contract has </i><br /> <i>been entered into.” </i><br /> <b>18.</b> <b> </b> Section 62 begins with the expression “if the parties to the contract <br /> agreed to substitute a new contract for it or to rescind or alter it, the original <br /> contract need not to be performed”. In the present case, no contract is <br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>16 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> claimed by operational creditor with the corporate debtor which can be treated <br /> to be a novated contract. What is relied by the appellant is letter dated <br /> 30.06.2018 as noticed above. The said letter appears to be unilaterally <br /> written on behalf of the operational creditor. No contract between the parties <br /> even is alleged or placed on record. There is one more aspect with respect to <br /> the letter dated 30.06.2018. Letter dated 30.06.2018 is an unenforceable <br /> letter and is void. We may refer to Section 25 of the Contract Act, 1872 which <br /> makes the agreement made without consideration as void. Thus, even if it is <br /> accepted that letter dated 30.06.2018, written on behalf of the operational <br /> creditor is treated as an agreement, agreement being without consideration is <br /> void. Letter does not refer to any consideration for which operational creditor <br /> has agreed to accept the debit balance of ₹ 2,47,69,431/- from MK Overseas <br /> Private Limited. It is settled law that novated contract which is relied for the <br /> purposes of applicability of Section 62 of the Contract Act, 1872 has to be <br /> enforceable contract. <br /> <b>19.</b> <b> </b> Privy Counsel in <b><i>‘Har Chandi Lal &amp; Ors.’ Vs. ‘Sheoraj Singh &amp; Ors.’</i></b> <br /> reported in <b>[AIR 2016 P.C. 68]</b> had held that substituted contract must be <br /> valid and enforceable contract to be effective as a novation. When letter dated <br /> 30.06.2018, even if it is accepted as contract novated as claimed by the <br /> appellant, it being clearly void within meaning of Section 25(3) of the Contract <br /> Act, 1872 is unenforceable. Thus, submission on behalf of the corporate <br /> debtor that corporate debtor was entitled for benefit of Section 62 of the <br /> Contract Act, 1872 does not commend us. <br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>17 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> <b>20.</b> <b> </b> The present is a case where goods were supplied which has been <br /> received and utilised. It was not even pleaded on behalf of the corporate <br /> debtor that amount is not due, rather corporate debtor itself in his pleading <br /> has claimed that amount of ₹ 2,47,69,431/- was due on the corporate debtor, <br /> which according to the appellant has been transferred to MK Overseas Private <br /> Limited. We may also notice the reply to the demand notice which was issued <br /> by the corporate debtor after receipt of the demand notice dated 25.07.2019. <br /> The reply to demand notice dated 05.08.2019 is as follows: <br /> <i>“Dated: 05.08.2019 </i><br /> <i>1.Shri Ashu Chaudhary </i><br /> <i>M/s Ashu Agencies </i><br /> <i>Reg. Office at: </i><br /> <i>Jain Mandir Wali Gali, </i><br /> <i>Bima Nagar Soor Mill. </i><br /> <i>G.T Road, Aligarh (U.P). 202001 </i><br /> <i>And also at: </i><br /> <i>Shaura No. 25, Nangla Murari Sarcol, </i><br /> <i>G.T. Road, Aligarh (UP) 202001 </i><br /> <i>2. Mr. Tarun Aggarwal. </i><br /> <i>Advocate, </i><br /> <i>Chamber No.533, 1 Floor, </i><br /> <i>Western Wing, Tis Hazari Court </i><br /> <i>Delhi-110054 </i><br /> <i>Subject: </i><br /> <i>Reply to your demand notice dated 25.07.2019 issued </i><br /> <i>in the name of Al Dua Food Processing Pvt. Ltd. having </i><br /> <i>its office at 114. Babar Road, Near World Trade Centre, </i><br /> <i>Connaught Place, New Delhi-110001 </i><br /> <i>Sirs. </i><br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>18 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> <i>From the contents of your legal notice it appears that </i><br /> <i>you have issued the same in our name with malafide </i><br /> <i>intention and ulterior motive to intimidate us to pay the </i><br /> <i>money which we are not liable to pay. </i><br /> <i>All the allegations made by you for you said legal </i><br /> <i>notice are denied by us unless specifically admitted by </i><br /> <i>us. </i><br /> <i>1.We are not admitting the liability being claimed by </i><br /> <i>you in your legal notice and the same is strongly and </i><br /> <i>vehemently opposed and denied by us. </i><br /> <i>2.As you are well aware that the management of the </i><br /> <i>company has been taken over by its present </i><br /> <i>management from its earlier management w.ef. </i><br /> <i>07.07.2018 and it was agreed by the earlier </i><br /> <i>management that the liability of the certain creditors </i><br /> <i>shall be borne and paid by them and the amount </i><br /> <i>payable to them be transferred to their company, M/s </i><br /> <i>MK Overseas Pvt. Ltd. having its office at B-64, Site IV, </i><br /> <i>Sahibabad Industrial Area, Ghaziabad, U.P. </i><br /> <i>3.As per the audited accounts as on 07.07.2018, the </i><br /> <i>company is not liable to pay any amount to your firm. </i><br /> <i>Hence the Company is not liable to pay amount which </i><br /> <i>is not reflected in the audited amounts submitted to the </i><br /> <i>new management by the previous management. </i><br /> <i>In view of the submissions made above, we are not </i><br /> <i>liable to pay the amount demanded by you in your </i><br /> <i>abovesaid notice and you are advised to approach Mis </i><br /> <i>M.K Overseas Pvt. Ltd, for the payment of your amount, </i><br /> <i>if any. </i><br /> <i>In view of the above facts and submissions and in </i><br /> <i>terms of the Code to dispute the existence of debt itself, </i><br /> <i>aur company is not liable to pay any amount se you </i><br /> <i>and hence you are once again advised to withdraw </i><br /> <i>your present legal notice under reply under intimation </i><br /> <i>in writing to us within three days from the date of </i><br /> <i>receipt of this reply to your notice to avoid the </i><br /> <i>unwanted and unwarranted multiplicity of the </i><br /> <i>litigation. </i><br /> <i>In case you would initiate any uncalled for and </i><br /> <i>unjustified litigation against us instead of M/s MK </i><br /> <i>Overseas Pvt. Load., who is liable so pay the said </i><br /> <i>amount, the same shall be contested by the company </i><br /> <i>entirely at your cost, risk and consequences </i><br /> <i>Copy kept. </i><br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>19 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> <i>Yours truly, </i><br /> <i>For Al Due Food Processing Pvt. Ltd. </i><br /> <i>Authorized Signatory” </i><br /> <b>21.</b> <b> </b> Thus, what was pleaded in reply to the demand notice is that the <br /> amount is payable by MK Overseas Private Limited, neither the amount was <br /> disputed nor supplied goods were disputed. We may in this context also refer <br /> to the judgement of this Tribunal relied by the counsel for the respondent in <br /> <b><i>‘Chetan Sharma’ (supra),</i></b> in which case appeal was filed by the corporate <br /> debtor against the order admitting Section 9 application. The claim of <br /> novation of contract was also pleaded on behalf of the corporate debtor. In <br /> the above case, also there was Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to which <br /> the operational creditor was not party. This Tribunal in the above case held <br /> that unilateral transfer of liability does not constitute a dispute. The creditor <br /> can always transfer its asset to an assignee but borrower cannot transfer its <br /> liability of debt to a third-party. In paragraph 15, 17 and 18, following was <br /> held: <br /> <i>“15. It is a settled law that unilateral ‘transfer’ of </i><br /> <i>liability does not constitute a ‘dispute’ within the </i><br /> <i>meaning of Section 5(6) of the ‘I&amp;B Code’. The ‘dispute’ </i><br /> <i>under Section 5(6) of the ‘I&amp;B Code’ has to be between </i><br /> <i>the ‘Corporate Debtor’ and the ‘Operational Creditors’ </i><br /> <i>and an inter-se dispute between two groups of </i><br /> <i>shareholders of the ‘Corporate Debtor’ does not </i><br /> <i>constitute a ‘dispute’ in reference to ‘Operational </i><br /> <i>Creditors’. </i><br /> <i>17. An outstanding in the account of a borrower </i><br /> <i>(customer), is a debt due and payable by the borrower </i><br /> <i>to the Creditor. The Creditor is the owner of such debt. </i><br /> <i>Such debt is an asset in the hands of a Creditor, </i><br /> <i>whether ‘Secured Creditor’ or ‘Unsecured Creditor’ or </i><br /> <i>‘Operational Creditor’ or ‘Financial Creditor’. The </i><br /> <i>creditor can always transfer its assets (debt) to an </i><br /> <i>assignee but the borrower cannot transfer its liability </i><br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>20 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> <i>of debt to a third party. Therefore, the Appellant cannot </i><br /> <i>take advantage of agreement of transfer of liability of </i><br /> <i>debt of ‘Corporate Debtor’ to Mr. Dinesh Arora. </i><br /> <i>18. The alleged Memorandum of Understanding was </i><br /> <i>never signed by the ‘Operational Creditors’. It is not the </i><br /> <i>case of the Appellant that the Memorandum of </i><br /> <i>Understanding was signed on behalf of the ‘Corporate </i><br /> <i>Debtor’; in fact, the Memorandum of Understanding </i><br /> <i>relied upon was signed as an inter-se agreement </i><br /> <i>between shareholders of the ‘Corporate Debtor’ with </i><br /> <i>Mr. Dinesh Arora, which has no binding effect on the </i><br /> <i>‘Operational Creditors’.” </i><br /> <b>22.</b> <b> </b> The above judgement, thus support the claim of the respondent. <br /> Adjudicating Authority in the impugned order has considered all aspects of <br /> the matter and has rejected the plea of novation raised by the corporate <br /> debtor. In paragraph 13 and 14, following was held: <br /> <i>“13. It was submitted that the said ‘Operational </i><br /> <i>Creditors’ received the balance confirmation letter </i><br /> <i>dated 30th November, 2015 from the ‘Corporate </i><br /> <i>Debtor’ signed by the authorised Director of the </i><br /> <i>‘Corporate Debtor’, wherein they confirmed that as per </i><br /> <i>their books of accounts, there is a credit balance of Rs. </i><br /> <i>5,08,43,252/- in the ledger account of the said </i><br /> <i>‘Operational Creditors’ as on 30th November, 2015. </i><br /> <i>14. It was also submitted by the learned Senior </i><br /> <i>Counsel for the ‘Operational Creditors’ that there was </i><br /> <i>no pre-existing dispute between the parties.” </i><br /> <b>23.</b> <b> </b> Adjudicating authority, thus clearly held that the defence raised by the <br /> corporate debtor is not acceptable that there was any dispute. Learned <br /> counsel for the appellant submitted that observations have been made in the <br /> impugned order that corporate debtor and MK Overseas Private Limited are <br /> liable to be proceeded under appropriate criminal provisions. When we look <br /> into the operative portion of the order, there are no directions to forward the <br /> copy of the order to the IBBI for considering/initiating any proceedings for <br /> proceeding in criminal proceeding against the corporate debtor and the MK <br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>21 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> Overseas Private Limited. We thus are of the view that apprehension of the <br /> appellant is misconceived, the impugned order cannot be read as issuing any <br /> direction for initiating any criminal proceeding or any proceeding under <br /> appropriate criminal provisions. The observation in the paragraph 16 of the <br /> order that both the corporate debtor and MK Overseas Private Limited are <br /> therefore liable to be proceeded under criminal provisions need to be deleted. <br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>24.</b> Learned counsel for the appellant during his submissions submitted <br /> that corporate debtor is a company with a turnover of 1700 crore earning <br /> foreign exchange of 1500 crore and employees over 1200 persons. In the <br /> synopsis in paragraph J following has been pleaded: <br /> <i>“J. The Corporate Debtor is a company with a turnover </i><br /> <i>exceeding Rs 1700 crores, earning foreign exchange of </i><br /> <i>about Rs 1500 crores, and employing over 1200 </i><br /> <i>persons. </i> <i>Admission </i> <i>into </i> <i>CIRP </i> <i>on </i> <i>a </i> <i>disputed </i><br /> <i>operational debt of around 2 crores already assumed </i><br /> <i>and partly discharged by a third party results in grave </i><br /> <i>prejudice and jurisdictional error.” </i><br /> <b>25.</b> <b> </b> In view of the above discussion and our conclusion, we are of the view <br /> that the plea of the corporate debtor that liability to pay debt of the operational <br /> creditor was of MK Overseas Private Limited has rightly not been accepted by <br /> the adjudicating authority. The corporate debtor is neither entitled to benefit <br /> of the Section 41 of the Contract Act, 1872 nor the contract under which the <br /> corporate debtor has liability to pay for outstanding dues of the operational <br /> creditor can be said to have been novated within meaning of Section 62 of the <br /> Contract Act, 1872. We, thus are of the view that there being debt and default <br /> committed by the corporate debtor, adjudicating authority has rightly <br /> admitted Section 9 application. However, looking to the pleadings of the <br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>22 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> appellant that appellant is a company with turn over exceeding ₹ 1700 crore, <br /> we are of the view that an opportunity need to be given to the appellant to <br /> make the payment of amount claimed in Part IV by the operational creditor, <br /> i.e., amount of ₹ 2,48,46,299.76/- within a period of 30 days from passing of <br /> the order. On such payments being made, operational creditor has to file an <br /> application under Section 12A for withdrawal of the CIRP, which can be <br /> proceeded and decided by the adjudicating authority in accordance with law <br /> as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in <b><i>‘GLAS Trust Company LLC’ </i></b><br /> <b><i>Vs. ‘BYJU Raveendran &amp; Ors.’ </i></b> reported in <b><i>[(2025) 3 SCC 625].</i></b> <br /> <b>26.</b> <b> </b> In result of the forgoing discussions, we dispose of the appeal in <br /> following manner: <br /> i. The impugned order of the adjudicating authority dated 24.09.2025, <br /> admitting Section 9 application is upheld. <br /> ii. The observations in paragraph 16 of the order to the effect “the directors <br /> of both the corporate debtor and MK Overseas Private Limited are <br /> therefore liable to be proceeded against under appropriate criminal <br /> provisions” are deleted. <br /> <br /> iii. Appellant is given opportunity to make the payment to the operational <br /> creditor of the amount of ₹ 2,48,46,299.76/- within 30 days from today, <br /> either by bank transfer or a bank draft to the operational creditor. <br /> iv. On receipt of payment of the aforesaid amount, operational creditor to <br /> file an application under Section 12A through IRP for withdrawal of the <br /> CIRP under Section 12A read with Regulation 30A of the CIRP <br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>23 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> Regulations, 2016. Adjudicating authority to decide 12A application in <br /> accordance with law expeditiously. <br /> v. The Section 12A application is to be filed as indicated above within 30 <br /> days from the payment of the amount to operational creditor, the <br /> interim protection granted in this appeal shall continue till the disposal <br /> of the application. <br /> Parties shall bear their own costs. <br /> <br /> <b>[Justice Ashok Bhushan] </b><br /> <b>Chairperson </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>[Barun Mitra] </b><br /> <b>Member (Technical) </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>NEW DELHI </b><br /> <b><i>th</i></b><br /> <b><i>12</i></b> <b><i> March, 2026 </i></b><br /> <i>himanshu</i> <br /> <i>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 1526 of 2025 </i><br /> <i>24 of 24</i><br /> <b><i> </i></b><br /> <i> </i></div>