Surendra Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

Court
Madhya Pradesh High Court

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
th
ON THE 16 OF NOVEMBER, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 8928 of 2012
CNR No.: MPHC010249852012
SURENDRA SINGH
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Hakim Khan - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Giresh Kakre - Government Advocate for the respondents/State.
ORDER
The present petition has been filed seeking the following reliefs :-
"(1) It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon’ble Court may
kindly be pleased to call for the relevant record
pertaining to case of the petitioner.
(2) The Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash
the impugned final order of punishment dated 06-07-
2011 (Annexure P/3) and order of rejection of appeal
dated 19-03-2012 (Annexure P/6), in the interest of
justice.
(3) The Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to take
back the petitioner in service imposing minor
punishment, in the interest of justice.
(4) Kindly be pleased to issue any other writ or
directions which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and
proper in the facts and circumstances of the case
including cost of the litigation may kindly be awarded
in favour of the petitioner."
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, at the relevant point
of time, the petitioner was posted as a Head Constable in District Umaria.
Due to unavoidable circumstances, the petitioner remained absent from duty
for the period from 05.05.2010 to 20.07.2010, i.e., for a total period of 77
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days. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that, in respect of the

aforesaid period of absence, the respondents issued an order dated
14.08.2010, whereby the period of absence was regularised in accordance
with Rule 24 of the Leave Rules and a warning was issued to the petitioner
as a measure of punishment. It is further submitted that, thereafter, on the
basis of the same allegations, a charge-sheet dated 05.03.2011 was issued to
the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet,
whereupon a departmental enquiry was conducted by the appointed Enquiry
Officer. Upon conclusion of the departmental enquiry, the disciplinary
authority, vide order dated 06.07.2011, imposed the penalty of compulsory
retirement upon the petitioner. The disciplinary authority also directed that
the aforesaid period of absence, i.e., from 05.05.2010 to 20.07.2010 (77
days), be treated as a period of 'No Work, No Pay'. Learned counsel for the
petitioner submits that, being aggrieved by the order of compulsory
retirement, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the appellate authority.
However, the appellate authority, vide order dated 19.03.2012, rejected the
appeal without properly considering the fact that the respondents had already
dealt with the very same period of absence by passing the earlier order dated
14.08.2010, whereby a warning had been issued to the petitioner and the
period of absence had been regularised in accordance with the applicable
Leave Rules. Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, contends that,
once the respondents had already imposed a penalty of warning in respect of
the same misconduct, the disciplinary authority was not justified in initiating
fresh disciplinary proceedings on the same charges and imposing the major
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penalty of compulsory retirement upon the petitioner. It is further contended

that the appellate authority also failed to consider this material aspect while
rejecting the appeal vide order dated 19.03.2012. In support of his
contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the
judgment dated 20.06.2013 passed by this Court in W.P. No. 4629/2005
(Ramesh Singh Jatt Vs. The State of M.P. and Others), wherein, in similar
circumstances, this Court quashed the order of punishment. Learned counsel
for the petitioner further submits that the petitioner has rendered
approximately 27 years of service and, therefore, upon setting aside the
impugned orders, he is entitled to all consequential benefits, including the
monetary benefits, in accordance with law.
3. Per contra, learned Government Advocate appearing for the
respondents/State submits that the charge-sheet dated 05.03.2011 contained
two charges against the petitioner, and the second charge was distinct and
separate from the first charge. It is further submitted that the earlier
punishment of warning, imposed vide order dated 14.08.2010, pertained only
to the first charge, whereby the period of absence was dealt with in
accordance with Rule 24 of the Leave Rules. Learned Government Advocate
further submits that the earlier order dated 14.08.2010 had subsequently been
cancelled and this fact has also been specifically mentioned in the appellate
order dated 19.03.2012, whereby the petitioner's appeal was rejected.
Therefore, it is contended that the petitioner cannot claim that the subsequent
disciplinary proceedings amounted to double punishment for the same
misconduct. It is further submitted that the scope of judicial review under
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Article 226 of the Constitution of India is limited and this Court, while

exercising its writ jurisdiction, cannot sit as an appellate authority over the
findings recorded by the disciplinary authority, particularly when the
departmental enquiry has been conducted in accordance with the applicable
rules and procedure.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. Before considering the submissions made by counsel for petitioner,
this Court would like to consider the scope of interference by this Court in
departmental matters. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka
and another Vs. N. Gangraj reported in (2020) 3 SCC 423 has held as under:
“8. We find that the interference in the order of punishment by the
Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court suffers from patent error.
The power of judicial review is confined to the decision-making
process. The power of judicial review conferred on the
constitutional court or on the Tribunal is not that of an appellate
authority.
9. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, a
three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not
a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to
determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent
in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that
behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated.
The Court held as under :
(AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7)
“7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under
Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision
of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public
servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held
by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the
procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of
natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence,
which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has
accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the
conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is
not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under
Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent
finding on the evidence.”
10. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 :
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1996 SCC (L&S) 80], again a three-Judge Bench of this Court has
held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision
but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power
of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives
fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the
authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court.
The court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as
an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at
its own independent findings on the evidence. It was held as under
:
(SCC pp. 759-60, paras 12-13)
“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review
of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial
review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair
treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority
reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an
inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant,
the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry
was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice
are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based
on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold
inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of
fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some
evidence. Neither the technical rules of the Evidence Act nor of
proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary
proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and
conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is
entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge.
The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as
appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its
own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal
may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the
delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of
natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the
mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the
disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or
finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached,
the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the
finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the
facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where
appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power
to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a
disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings
on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or
reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before
the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR
718 : AIR 1964 SC 364, this Court held at p. 728 that if the
conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the
disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on
the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of

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certiorari could be issued.”
11. In High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC
416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144, this Court held that interference with
the decision of departmental authorities is permitted if such
authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of
natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing
the mode of such enquiry while exercising jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution. It was held as under : (SCC p. 423,
para 16) “16. The Division Bench [Shashikant S. Patil v. High
Court of Bombay, 1998 SCC OnLine Bom 97 : (2000) 1 LLN
160] of the High Court seems to have approached the case as
though it was an appeal against the order of the
administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court.
Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be
permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of
the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory
regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision
of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the
evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the
authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious
that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion,
or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that
the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary
Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the
enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is
that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be
based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a
matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed
under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
12. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya,
(2011) 4 SCC 584:(2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 721, this Court held that
the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the
evidence led
in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another
view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been
fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence,
the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of
the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findings in
departmental enquiries. The Court held as under:(SCC pp. 587-88,
paras 7 & 10)
“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate
court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor
interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the
material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held
and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy
of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be
grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental
enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact
recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are
based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test

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to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably
could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material
on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in
disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory
regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be
arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous
considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6
SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80, Union of India v. G.
Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806 and
Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999
SCC (L&S) 1036, High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil,
(2000) 1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144].)

*
10. The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted the
respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not in any way
render a completed disciplinary proceeding invalid nor affect the
validity of the finding of guilt or consequential punishment. The
standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being different
from the standard of proof required in departmental enquiries, the
same charges and evidence may lead to different results in the two
proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental proceedings
and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal
proceedings. This is more so when the departmental proceedings
are more proximate to the incident, in point of time, when
compared to the criminal proceedings. The findings by the
criminal court will have no effect on previously concluded
domestic enquiry. An employee who allows the findings in the
enquiry and the punishment by the disciplinary authority to attain
finality by nonchallenge, cannot after several years, challenge the
decision on the ground that subsequently, the criminal court has
acquitted him.”
13. In another judgment reported as Union of India v.
P.Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 554, this
Court held that while reappreciating evidence the High Court
cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary
proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when the High
Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings : (SCC p.
617, para 13) “13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same
has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings
can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its
conscience.”
14. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent relies
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upon the judgment reported as Allahabad Bank v. Krishna
Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 335,
wherein this
Court held that if the disciplinary authority records a finding that is
not supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which is
unreasonably arrived at, the writ court could interfere with the
finding of the disciplinary proceedings. We do not find that even
on touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High Court could
interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority It
is not the case of no evidence or that the findings are perverse. The
finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct has been
interfered with only on the ground that there are discrepancies in
the evidence of the Department. The discrepancies in the evidence
will not make it a case of no evidence. The inquiry officer has
appreciated the evidence and returned a finding that the respondent
is guilty of misconduct.
15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the
enquiry officer and had passed an order of punishment. An appeal
before the State Government was also dismissed. Once the
evidence has been accepted by the departmental authority, in
exercise of power of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High
Court could not interfere with the findings of facts recorded by
reappreciating evidence as if the courts are the appellate authority.
We may notice that the said judgment has not noticed the larger
Bench judgments in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963
SC 1723 and B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC
749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 as mentioned above. Therefore, the
orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from
patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law.” The
Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India and others Vs.
Ramesh Dinkar Punde reported in (2006) 7 SCC 212 has held a
under:
“6. Before we proceed further, we may observe at this stage that it
is unfortunate that the High Court has acted as an Appellate
Authority despite the consistent view taken by this Court that the
High Court and the Tribunal while exercising the judicial review
do not act as an Appellate Authority:
“Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of
law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of
justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review
is not akin to adjudication on merit by reappreciating the evidence
as an Appellate Authority.” (See Govt. of A.P. v. Mohd. Nasrullah
Khan [(2006) 2 SCC 373 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 316], SCC p.
379, para 11.)
9. It is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the
evidence which had been considered by the inquiry officer, a
disciplinary authority and the Appellate Authority. The finding of
the High Court, on facts, runs to the teeth of the evidence on
record 12. From the facts collected and the report submitted by the
inquiry officer, which has been accepted by the disciplinary
authority and the Appellate Authority.

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15. In Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur [(1972) 4 SCC 618 :
(1972) 2 SCR 218] it is held as under: (SCC p. 623, para 15) A
disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. The standard proof
required is that of preponderance of probability and not proof
beyond reasonable doubt. If the inference that lender was a person
likely to have official dealings with the respondent was one which
a reasonable person would draw from the proved facts of the case,
the High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision
based on it. The Letters Patent Bench had the same power of
dealing with all questions, either of fact or of law arising in the
appeal, as the Single Judge of the High Court. If the enquiry has
been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of the
evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court. A finding
cannot be characterised as perverse or unsupported by any
relevant materials, if it was a reasonable inference from proved
facts. (SCR p. 219) 16. In Union of India v. Parma Nanda [(1989)
2 SCC 177 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 303 : (1989) 10 ATC 30] it is held
at SCC p. 189, para 27 as under:
“27. We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment
cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal
cannot interfere with the findings of the inquiry officer or
competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly
perverse. It is appropriate to remember that the power to impose
penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent
authority either by an Act of legislature or rules made under the
proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an
enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with principles
of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice
is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent
authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed
on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute
its own discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of
penalty unless it is mala fide is certainly not a matter for the
Tribunal to concern itself with. The Tribunal also cannot interfere
with the penalty if the conclusion of the inquiry officer or the
competent authority is based on evidence even if some of it is
found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter.”
17. In Union Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan [(1998) 4 SCC 310 :
1998 SCC (L&S) 1129] this Court held at SCC p. 315, para 12 as
under:
“12. After hearing the rival contentions, we are of the firm view
that all the four charge-sheets which were enquired into relate to
serious misconduct. The respondent was unable to demonstrate
before us how prejudice was caused to him due to non-supply of
the enquiry authority's report/findings in the present case. It needs
to be emphasised that in the banking business absolute devotion,
diligence, integrity and honesty needs to be preserved by every
bank employee and in particular the bank officer. If this is not
observed, the confidence of the public/depositors would be
impaired. It is for this reason, we are of the opinion that the High

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Court had committed an error while setting aside the order of
dismissal of the respondent on the ground of prejudice on account
of non-furnishing of the enquiry report/findings to him.”
18. In Chairman and MD, United Commercial Bank v. P.C.
Kakkar [(2003) 4 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 468] this Court
held at SCC pp. 376-77, para 14 as under:
“14. A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of
honesty and integrity. He deals with the money of the depositors
and the customers. Every officer/employee of the bank is required
to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to
discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and
diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank
officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the
functioning of every officer/employee of the bank. As was
observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional
Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik [(1996) 9 SCC 69 : 1996 SCC
(L&S) 1194] it is no defence available to say that there was no
loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted
without authority. The very discipline of an organisation more
particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and
officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting
beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a
misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in
nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been
kept in view by the High Court.”
19. In Regional Manager, U.P. SRTC v. Hoti Lal [(2003) 3 SCC
605 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 363] it was pointed out as under: (SCC
p.614, para 10)
“If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty
and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not
be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such
cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with
public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a
fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and
trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable.”
20. In Cholan Roadways Ltd. v. G. Thirugnanasambandam
[(2005) 3 SCC 241 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 395] this Court at SCC p.
247, para 15 held:
“15. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the principles of
the Evidence Act have no application in a domestic enquiry.”

6. Looking to the aforesaid and the fact that the earlier order dated
14.08.2010 has already been cancelled by the respondents themselves. Even
otherwise, the warning issued vide the aforesaid order does not constitute a
penalty under the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1966, as well as the Police Regulations. Therefore, the petitioner
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cannot claim that he has been subjected to double punishment on the basis of

the said order. As reflected in the charge-sheet and the petitioner's service
record, three major penalties and 33 minor penalties have previously been
imposed upon the petitioner. Despite having been subjected to such
disciplinary action on earlier occasions, the petitioner has repeatedly
indulged in misconduct. It is further contended that the petitioner has
challenged only the punishment order dated 06.07.2011 and the appellate
order dated 19.03.2012. The petitioner has neither sought any specific relief
regarding the consequential service benefits arising out of the completion of
27 years of service nor has he established any independent entitlement to
such benefits in the present proceedings.
7. In view of the above, no case is made out for interference by this
Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India and, therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed.
8. Accordingly, this petition sans merit and is hereby dismissed.
(ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT)
JUDGE
SSL

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